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Over time, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and its later amendments were remarkably successful in excluding ‘coloured’ immigrants from Australia.² It is clear, however, that although most Australians wanted to preserve the ‘white’ and British character of their nation, the argument that ‘non-white’ and non-British immigrants were more suited to the settlement of northern Australia was frequently debated in the early decades of the twentieth century. While this idea continued to challenge the validity of a ‘white Australia’ in the north, public figures were divided on the issue.³ This article examines in some detail the contemporary debates over the peopling of the Northern Territory in the inter-war years.

World War I brought the difficulties of defending a large coastline into sharper focus. Failure to populate and develop the north caused anxiety about Australia’s ability to defend itself against possible Asian aggression.⁴ With the rise of Japan as a power in the Pacific region in the interwar years, Australians became increasingly concerned about security. An unoccupied north was seen as a constant menace to the declared policy of a ‘white Australia’. As before the War, politicians and others argued that the only chance of developing the north was to use southern European immigrants such as Italians or Maltese.⁵ This view was shared by the Royal Commissioners in their Report of 1917 on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty’s Dominions, known as the Dominions Royal Commission. One of the Commissioners, Bishop White, Anglican Bishop of Carpentaria, declared that it was better to have ‘coloured’ labour in the north than to lose that portion of the country altogether [presumably to invaders from the north].⁶ On the other hand, Josiah Thomas, Minister of External Affairs, and J S T McGowen, New South Wales Labor Premier, were strongly opposed to this idea.⁷

A leading participant in the debate in the 1920s was the South Australian Premier, Sir Henry Barwell. He stated that the north could not be settled without the use of indentured Asian labour, a view periodically put forward by planters and wealthy conservatives. Barwell stated that, if introduced, these workers would be segregated and prohibited from settling in the south. His statements provoked much heated public discussion. Although Barwell had openly expressed such views before World War I, to question the settled policy on restricted immigration in Australia in the 1920s was little short of blasphemy.⁸

As in the late nineteenth century, there were repeated pleas in the twenties for more research into the suitability of northern Australia for extensive European occupation. Although by 1920 there were twice as many Europeans as non-Europeans in the Territory, excluding Aborigines, with nearly 4 000 in all, this was still well below expectations.⁹ At the Australian Medical Congress in Brisbane in August 1920, a sub-committee appointed to investigate the whole question of the occupation of tropical Australia by ‘white’ people presented its report. The importance with which the Congress viewed this question is indicated by the fact that the previous Congress in Sydney in 1911 had recommended that it be the principal subject for discussion at the next meeting. The sub-committee was established in 1914, although its collective investigation was interrupted by the war. The report revealed that there was no evidence of ‘the existence of inherent or insuperable obstacles in the way of permanent occupation of tropical Australia by a healthy indigenous white race’. (Indigenous here referred to the acclimatisation of Europeans over time so that they developed an immunity to serious tropical diseases.¹⁰)

This report, together with the research of the Institute of Tropical Medicine and the work of Raphael Cilento, Medical Officer of Tropical Hygiene for the Commonwealth, did much to overcome the long-held belief in medical circles that ‘white’ men were economically ineffective and women and children not
sufficiently robust for the tropics. Cilento had spent two years in various countries studying tropical hygiene and he too presented a comprehensive report at the above conference. His book, *The White Man in the Tropics*, published five years later in 1925, focussed on the treatment and eradication of tropical diseases rather than climate adaptation. All this contributed to a questioning of the conviction of the past that the tropics could never be successfully colonised by 'whites'.

With this new wisdom, it seemed clear that, henceforth, ‘white’ men could work without harm in the heat. Constructive suggestions from the ‘experts’ were the regulation or prohibition on the sale of alcohol, more rational working hours, better diet, education on hygiene, and occasional spells in cooler regions for recuperative purposes. As Henry Barwell argued, this favoured the wealthier classes while ordinary workers could rarely afford to take regular holidays in the south. For ‘white’ women, the verdict was less favourable, especially in the more northern parts of the Territory and the coastal regions. Improved housing, better dietary habits, more appropriate clothing, and railway facilities for cheap speedy access to temperate climates were all advocated. It should be noted that at this time, almost all domestic servants in the Territory were non-European - many Chinese, Aboriginal or Aboriginal people of mixed descent, known at the time as ‘half-castes’. For children, a change of climate was recommended after they reached eight or nine years of age.

Over the ensuing months, academics and scientists around the country and overseas, contributed to the public discussion; for example, T W Edgeworth David, Professor of Geology at the University of Sydney, and A W Gregory, Professor of Geology and Mineralogy at the University of Melbourne. The debate was inflamed by the controversial writings and speeches of the prominent geographer from Sydney University, Griffith Taylor, who tried to counter the more extravagant schemes for the expansion of Australia’s rural development into marginal areas. Griffith Taylor reinforced the point made by the sub-committee, and largely ignored in the subsequent publicity, that the successful development and settlement of tropical Australia by ‘white’ races, while possible, was a matter of applied public health in the modern sense. The appointment of a Federal Ministry of Health was recommended by the Congress, along with expanded activities of the Institute of Tropical Diseases, the dissemination of scientific and practical information, and legislation on the requirements for a healthy life in the tropics.

The early 1920s were a period of economic stagnation for the Territory. Business and trade were depressed, industrial relations troubled and fisheries at a virtual standstill. Agriculture was negligible, the pastoral industry was in a slump owing to the closure of the Vestey's meatworks, and mining was at a low ebb. Population decreased marginally each year from 1919 to 1922, remaining virtually stationary at around 3 200 non-indigenous people in 1923 and 1924. Owing to lack of work, unemployment and poverty were widespread.

Relatively high unemployment was also experienced throughout the rest of Australia at this time. As the twenties progressed and economic conditions recovered, however, immigration was actively promoted. In a historic agreement of March 1920, known as the Joint Commonwealth and States Immigration Scheme, the Commonwealth took over from the states the responsibility for recruiting immigrants and transporting those selected or nominated to Australia. In 1922, the *Empire Settlement Act* was passed by the British Parliament. This inaugurated a new and important strategy for state-aided Empire settlement. These new developments, together with the £34 million agreement between the British and Commonwealth Governments in 1925 and the *Development and Migration Act* of 1926, led to important changes in immigration policy. Not only did the Commonwealth Government take a more active role in
Australian immigration but the British Government joined with it in financing the fares of assisted immigrants to Australia and development works. One aspect of immigration policy under the Act was the authorisation of financial co-operation with approved independent and private organisations either in the United Kingdom or in the dominions, in sponsoring overseas settlement.

Despite the rhetoric of the redistribution of the population of the empire for the purposes of defence and national development, the Northern Territory figured little in these official schemes. As economic conditions improved in the southern states, progress was almost negligible in the Territory. Peanut growing made some headway, especially by Russian growers, but experiments with cotton in 1923, which could have stimulated closer settlement, proved disappointing. There were also serious stock losses. These problems were reflected in the declining or stationary population over the decade of the 1920s. There were simply insufficient attractions in terms of productive industries and therefore employment, to induce Europeans to the Territory, either from other Australian states or from overseas. In 1925, Sir George Buchanan was commissioned by the Government to inquire specifically into port facilities in the Territory and, more generally, to give his opinion on questions affecting northern development. In his report, he concluded that isolation, inefficient administration, poor communications and labour problems were endemic in the Territory. He stressed the futility of agriculture and the need to concentrate on pastoralism and railway development. Little notice, however, was taken of his specific recommendations.

The Northern Australia Act of 1926 divided the Northern Territory into the separate administrative areas of North Australia, above the 20th parallel, and Central Australia, between the 20th and 26th parallels south. Alice Springs became the seat of administration and capital of the latter. The new Government Resident, J C Cawood, identified the primary needs of Central Australia as railways and water. He acknowledged that to make a success of settlement in the area, the government had to offer greater inducements to families than cheap rentals, as this had proved insufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of lack of permanent water, isolation, heavy transport charges and climate. He recommended a vigorous policy of water conservation and the enforcement of regulations applying to lessees to stock land leased for pastoral activities.

Given the availability of land, better transport, access to markets and utilities in other parts of Australia, there was little reason for people to invest in northern Australia. According to Prime Minister Stanley Bruce, the Territory, 'in its present empty and undeveloped state is the Achilles' heel of Australia'. This was a 'white elephant' analogy in other form and rather an upside-down way of referring to the Top End. Consequently, in 1926, the Commonwealth Government appointed a three-member North Australia Commission to establish the foundations for the subsequent development of north Australia. The recommendations submitted in 1927 were similar to those of past committees: stimulation of primary industry through improved communication facilities, cattle and sheep dips, and water boring and conservation. Apart from the extension of the North Australian Railway from Emungalan (Katherine River) 117 miles to Birdum in 1929, very little actual development work was done. When the Bruce-Page Coalition Government lost office in 1929, all other plans were abandoned.

In keeping with ideas about the need for immigration in general during the 1920s, there was no shortage of proposals specifically to develop the north, especially from politicians outside the area such as GJ Miles, MLC, of Western Australia and Senator George Pearce, Commonwealth Minister for Home and Territories and former Minister of Defence. Ideally, they would have
solved all Australia’s defence problems; in reality, governments rarely acted upon any of the
suggestions to achieve this purpose because most schemes involved non-British settlers.

Several examples, not solely concerned with the Territory but with the north in general, can be
cited here. The Queensland Government wanted to develop the upper Burnett River lands but,
because of the necessity of a loan of £2 million for railway construction, Prime Minister Hughes
did not consider the scheme financially viable. Queensland Labor Premier, E G Theodore, was
bitterly disappointed, maintaining that 3 000 immigrants could have been settled.27

Throughout 1921 and 1922, Sir James Connolly, Agent-General for Western Australia, urged
the British Government to act upon a scheme he had devised involving a mutually guaranteed
Imperial loan of £2 million annually to settle a small number of British ex-officers in Western
Australia. This was not approved.28 In 1922, Connolly submitted a much more ambitious scheme
for the settlement of the Kimberleys involving a British Government loan of £20 million over
thirty years. He argued that it was crucial for defence, therefore a question for the empire. The
Colonial Office advised that it was too extensive a scheme to sanction.29

A Victorian barrister, Sir Edward Mitchell, submitted a scheme at the All-Australia Labour
Convention of 1921 for the settlement on the Atherton Tableland near Cairns of Royal Navy
men who would become unemployed as a result of the disarmament proposals after the war.30
He wanted Cairns developed as a naval base for northern Australia thereby contributing to
Australia’s defence.

The North Australia Railway and Development League together with Australian Farmers’
Limited devised a pastoral development scheme for coastal Western Australia in 1921.31 It is
likely that an ulterior motive on the part of the proponents was to build support for a nation-
wide country party. Similarly, the President of the Sydney-based Millions Club, Sir Joseph
Carruthers, former New South Wales Premier, planned to settle a million farmers on a million
farms which, in private correspondence, he hinted might become the programme for a
‘progressive Australian Party’.32 Clearly, the political agenda was to increase support within
the rural sector for the Nationalist Party and bring about a coalition between Nationalists and
Progressives. He enlisted the assistance of David Lindsay, explorer of the Northern Territory,
to formulate a scheme for the occupation of all coastal and river areas. Carruthers suggested
the plan be managed jointly by the British and Australian Governments with a combined fund
of £30 million.33

Publicity for the Million Farms campaign was typical of immigration schemes of the 1920s,
highlighting imperial ties and the immense size of the Australian landmass compared with its
small population. Exploiting the general fear of ‘the yellow peril’, it drew attention to Australia’s
vulnerability and the importance of defence. Above all, it emphasised the role of the farmer in
Australia’s future development.34 Carruthers continued to promote the scheme through
conferences, state legislation, private advertising and the press. By mid-1925, however, his
proposals had become completely submerged beneath other more pressing political issues and
were finally abandoned.35

The idea of settling immigrants on cotton lands in Queensland was suggested by Crawford
Vaughan, former Premier of South Australia and Joint Managing Director of the Australian
Cotton Growing Association.36 In addition, Sir James Barrett, prominent Melbourne
ophthalmologist and publicist, continued his pre-World War I efforts to facilitate the immigration
of Anglo-Indians to Australia.
Governments were sympathetic to these schemes to settle northern Australia but recognised their limitations. Most were too idealistic or too costly to put into practice. Frequently they were submitted by businessmen or politicians, each trying to outdo the next in the magnanimity of their proposals. Plans for the development and settlement of the northern part of the continent were continually on the political agenda and widely publicised. The depression of the 1930s put an end to most of them.

The Northern Australia Act was repealed in 1931, combining once again the Territories of North Australia and Central Australia into a single administrative unit. At the time the population, excluding Aborigines, was 4 193 (3 600 north and 593 south of the 20th parallel). This showed a slight increase that continued in the following years although another population ‘problem’ was by then manifesting itself. This overall growth was partly due to a rise in the ‘half-caste’ population, considered by the Administrator of the time, Lieutenant-Colonel R H Weddell, as ‘serious’. Weddell pointed out that it was only a matter of time before the ‘half-castes’ would outnumber the ‘whites’. To counteract this, he suggested the removal of the ‘mixed-race’ population from Darwin, where they were on government relief work, to country districts, where they would be able to maintain themselves. Despite the fact that many of the Territory’s European unemployed had had their fares paid back to their home ports, their numbers too increased in the early 1930s.

At this time a situation developed which was similar to the depressed 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century with negative net immigration and renewed concerns over a declining birth rate. Demographers and others contributed to a protracted debate in the community, the contemporary press and in academic journals such as The Australian Quarterly and The Economic Record. Two important monographs on the peopling of Australia were published. During the early 1930s many in the Territory, as elsewhere, were destitute and Darwin witnessed several demonstrations by unemployed workers.

It was in this grim context that Alfred Cotton in 1933 put forward his scheme for a new province in northern and north-western Australia, to be developed and administered by a chartered company or a separate Crown colony. Cotton was a visionary born in the Channel Islands who immigrated to Australia in his early twenties. In later years, he became a large station owner in northern Australia. His scheme was an attempt to address the continuing problems of development in Australia north of the 20th parallel and was hailed as the solution to ‘the Northern Territory problem’. Again, the emptiness of this region was perceived as dangerous and economic development and ‘protection’ from invaders were seen as synonymous. The colony would incorporate the raising of both cattle and sheep, the growing of cotton, spices, coffee and other tropical products, the construction of roads, railways and port facilities, the expansion of the pearl-shelling and mining industries and not least, the settlement of thousands of people. Enthusiasm, however, was short lived. Opposition from the Western Australian Government and private vested interests, lack of government support for immigration during the worst of the depression years, general unease over separate administration of the area, and the high capital costs necessitating huge loans, all militated against the project. Early support from the Commonwealth Government was withdrawn in favour of its own cooperative proposal for the development of the Barkly Tableland.

Cotton’s was only one of a large number of schemes proposed in the 1930s for the development of the north. From the middle of the decade, there was a gradual improvement in economic conditions, and consequently in population growth. As the decade progressed, the growing number of refugees in Europe sparked settlement plans with a different focus. Individuals, as
well as Zionist groups such as the ‘Freeland’ League for Jewish Territorial Colonisation, formed in London in 1935, and the Jewish Board of Deputies, urged the Australian Government to set up a Jewish state within the empire. Northern Australia, notably the Kimberley and Melville Island, were put forward as possibilities for a Jewish colony.40 Such a settlement, the League argued, would contribute to the solution of the refugee problem as well as populating and developing the empty spaces of northern Australia. The official response was that ‘the mass migration of any particular class of aliens would not be permitted’ although a maintenance guarantee furnished by an approved organisation such as the Australian Jewish Welfare Society in Sydney, was accepted in lieu of guarantees by individuals. This would ensure that on arrival, the refugees would have some support and would not become economic burdens on the state. A Jewish colony in the north, however, was contrary to the Government’s policy of assimilating new immigrants and avoiding group settlements or congregations of nationalities in particular areas. In addition, the government by this time had accepted that northern Australia offered very limited prospects for closer settlement. The scheme of the Freeland League was finally rejected by Labor Prime Minister John Curtin in 1944.41 Other applications, such as one in 1938 from a group of ninety families of Jewish ex-soldiers in Austria to settle on a cooperative basis in South Australia, elicited a similar response.42

In 1937, the Commonwealth Government appointed yet another Committee of Investigation ‘to inquire into and report upon the resources of the Northern Territory, particularly in regard to the future of grazing and raising of stock’. This Committee consisted of W L Payne, Chairman of the Land Administration Court in Queensland, and J W Fletcher, a Queensland pastoralist, with W M McLean, Queensland Lands Department, acting as Secretary.43 All, curiously, were from outside the Territory. The new Administrator of the Northern Territory, C L A Abbott, realistically accepted that there was no great source of untapped wealth lying undeveloped, awaiting only the capital and settlement to be realised. ‘The Northern Territory’, he wrote, ‘is a vast area of good, bad and indifferent land, the good very much in the minority’. Settlement and development did not compare with other regions of the country. He believed that it was only through the pastoral and grazing industries that the Northern Territory would become self-supporting. He acknowledged that investors in the past had had very disappointing experiences from pastoral, mining and industrial ventures. In his view, the Territory was overcapitalised, mainly due to the expense of railways. Yet he maintained that, in view of the strategic position of Darwin, its future defence development was crucial.44


_The Northern Territory as it exists today [1937] is a national problem, a national obligation, a challenge to other nations, and a detriment to ourselves. Since the Commonwealth Government has been in control from 1911 to date, the expenditure exceeds £15 million, whereas the increase in population (inclusive of Asians and half-castes) numbers only 2,144 persons. The population today, exclusive of aboriginals, is 5,454 persons of whom 3,890 are whites. Adult females number less than 30 per cent of adult males._

_The deficit last year was £611,439 whereas the total value of production was only £499,110. Moreover, this production did not pay those responsible for it. Nearly all enterprises in the Territory – both government and private – railways, pastoral and mining, are not making profits but are merely breaking even or more frequently accumulating losses. Altogether, the Territory is a heavy liability to Australia._
Thus, at the end of the 1930s, the Territory was still seen as a white elephant in a white Australia because of the costs of development and the public debt it had incurred over many decades. Its value was measured in terms of the European component of its population and its economic potential. So it would be for some time to come. The estimated Aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ population was given in the Report as 17315 for 1 July 1937 (several times the non-Aboriginal total given above) under the general heading of ‘The Aboriginal Problem’. It is evident that the placement of ‘half-castes’ in these calculations was confounding the statisticians. One suggestion for the population ‘problem’ was that more Aboriginal women be trained as domestic servants in order to free European women for their primary task of maintaining the ‘white Australia’ policy, that is producing more ‘white Australians’. Another was that Aboriginal men from the Darwin Compound could be usefully employed improving the environment for the comfort of Europeans, beautifying the town, cleaning and planting, and so making it more attractive to migrants.

The continuing gender imbalance amongst Europeans was also alluded to in the Report. While medical testimony over the previous two decades had confirmed that ‘white’ men could lead active and productive lives in the tropics, the health laboratory in Darwin had revealed a high incidence of anaemia amongst women. The Report urged the government to address the medical, dietary and housing issues that might alleviate this problem for those female citizens who were doing their best to uphold the ideal of ‘white Australia’. The document reveals much about race and gender relations of the day.

In its overall recommendations, the Report was both like and unlike the many previous investigations into the development of the Northern Territory. It predicted a definite future for both sheep and cattle, while at the same time acknowledging the very limited nature of other production possibilities. In terms of agriculture, only the heavily-protected peanut industry had proved successful. With sheep, the Report argued, would come closer settlement, more employment, greater wealth, smaller holdings and stability. It suggested the possibility of a European population of at least 40,000 and an annual production of wealth of over £4 million within twenty-five years. The major problems identified were, again, distance from markets, communications and freight, and lack of water. A policy of land development was put forward, although the final conclusions were cautious. There was no mention at all of the possibilities for a tourist industry. The committee placed the responsibility for change firmly on the government, urging the establishment of conditions of parity for pioneering industries in the Territory, already disadvantaged by less favourable conditions than the rest of Australia. It recommended that government charges (tariffs, petrol taxes, income taxes) be eliminated for a period of twenty years, that the government try to understand the problems of industry, cooperate closely with the people, resolve disputes more promptly - and provide essential new east-west transport facilities. Only through the complete subordination of revenue to development would the Territory be converted into an asset of some value to the nation instead of a liability.45

Abbott was confident that when government plans based on the Report were implemented, the practice over many years of referring to the Northern Territory as a white elephant would cease. With the population of the Territory in 1938 at 6,704, an increase of 891 over the previous year and the highest since the Commonwealth Government took over in 1911, the future looked more positive.46 The Government, however, went only part of the way in carrying out the recommendations of Payne and Fletcher: income tax was waived for ten years for primary producers only; freight was subsidised, transport and stock routes upgraded; and advances given to settlers. With the outbreak of war, the Report lost the priority it might have had.47
The outbreak of World War II heralded a new era for the Northern Territory. There was a heightened consciousness of the vulnerability of the north, a movement of troops to the region both from within Australia and from the United States, and the subsequent devastation and evacuation as a result of the Japanese bombings of Darwin, Broome and other northern towns in February and March 1942. While the ‘white Australia’ policy remained legally intact for a further twenty years after the War, the presence of African-American GIs and the involvement of Aboriginal Australians in the war effort led to the questioning of the policy’s underlying assumptions. At the same time, the War reinforced anti-Japanese sentiments. Darwin, rebuilt after the War, remained one of Australia’s most multicultural cities with a significant Asian population and an ambivalent relationship with its northern neighbours. Like the rest of Australia, the Territory experienced a new wave of immigrants under Arthur Calwell’s post-war migration scheme but, despite its special place in the nation’s psyche, its population remained tiny in comparison with the other states.

Notes
1. The support of the Northern Territory Government and the Northern Territory History Awards Committee for this research is gratefully acknowledged.
4. See letter by W Rogers, 29 April 1917 on ‘Unpopulated Australia’, Prime Minister’s Department, Correspondence File, Annual Single Number Series, ‘Populating Northern Australia 1917’, NAA, CRS A2, item 1917/2068.
7. See letters from Arthur to Thomas, Minister for External Affairs, 4 June 1912, 27 July 1912 and to Thomas’ successor, P M Glynn, 4 July 1913, 12 August 1913, Home and Territories Department, Correspondence File, ‘Immigration of Maltese to the Northern Territory, 1912-22’, National Archives of Australia (NAA), CRS A3, item NT 22/2897. See also Michael Roe, 1984, *Nine Australian Progressives: Vitalism in Bourgeois Social Thought, 1890-1960*, p 163; *Argus*, 22 July 1912, p 10; 17, 26 August 1912, pp 21 and 11 respectively; *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), 19 November 1913, *The Sun*, 31 January 1914.
8. *Argus* (Melbourne), 5 January 1922, p 6; 6 March 1922, p 7; 31 May 1922, p 11. Non-Europeans, particularly Japanese, were already admitted to work in the pearlimg industry.
The figures were 2770 Europeans and 1161 others, making a total of 3931. *Report of the Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory for the Year 1920*, pp 17-18, 34.

Report of the Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory for the Year 1920, p 18.


*SMH*, 8 September 1920, NLA, T Griffith Taylor Papers, MS1003, items 225-283.

*Argus*, 2 August 1922, NLA, Hughes papers, 1538/16/560.


It was renewed in 1937 for 15 years and in 1952 for a further 5. Some Labor MPs expressed scepticism about its benefits, *Argus*, 28 April 1922.

There was a small increase in the total in 1925 thereafter it again declined. The estimated figures for 1925 were Europeans, 2356, ‘Coloureds’ 1050, Total, 3406; and for 1926, 2345 European, 1040 ‘Coloureds’, Total 3385. Annual Reports of the Administrator of the Northern Territory for the Years ended 30 June 1925, pp 3, 23-4, 1926, pp 5, 19.

*Daily Telegraph*, 11 August 1925; *The Northern Territory Investigation Committee Report*, 10 October 1937, Historical Society NT, NTAS, MRS 1853/P1, Box 11, Pastoral Industry – Folder 108, Historical Notes on the Northern Territory, p 89.

There was a slight increase in overall population in 1927, owing to employment available on railway construction work. Report of the Government Resident, Territory of Central Australia, 1 March to 30 June 1927, pp 3-4. The population of Central Australia in 1927 was 411. Of North and Central Australia combined, it was estimated as 2713 Europeans, 1057 ‘Coloureds’, total 3770, showing a small increase over the previous year.


*Argus*, 8 July 1922, p 21.

Cable dated 23 November 1923, Prime Minister’s Department Secret and Confidential Series, ‘Executive Commission - Development North Australia, 1923’, NAA, CRS A3934, item SC 42 [25].

*Argus*, 28 January, 19 April, 9, 11, 14 May 1921.

Connolly to Colonial Office, Colonial Office Records (COR), Australian Joint Copying Project (AJCP), CO/418, 31 January 1921, Reel no 4307, Piece no 212, p 152; 6 April 1921, Reel no 4308, Piece no 212, pp 232-40; Amery to Connolly, 13 December 1921, Reel no 4308, Piece no 212, p 521; *Argus*, 19, 20 December 1921.

High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 9 January 1922, COR, AJCP, CO/418, Reel no 4319, Piece No 224, pp 77-80.

Affairs Report from Governor Allardyce, 1 October 1921, COR, AJCP, CO/418, Reel no 4307, Piece No 211, p 502.
31 West Australian, 30 December 1921; ‘Immigration Encouragement. Western Australian Pastoral Development Scheme’, NAA, CRS A457, item H400/8/27.
33 Argus, 20 July, 23 September, 26 November 1921; Age, 26 November 1921.
34 See Prime Minister’s Department, Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, First system, 1921-23, ‘Immigration Encouragement, Million Farms Campaign. Sir Joseph Curruthers’ Scheme, 1921-22’, NAA, CRS A457, 1400/5, Part 11. Similar advertising about Australia can be seen in Australia Today, for example, 15 December 1905, p 5.
35 Lewis, ‘Million Farms’ Campaign, pp 70-71.
38 Department of Community Development, 1985, Northern Development, An Historical Perspective: The Late A J Cotton’s Scheme for the Development of Australia North of the 20th parallel, NTAS, Darwin.
39 Labour Call, 10 May 1934, cited in Department of Community Development, 1985, Northern Development, An Historical Perspective, the Late A J Cotton’s Scheme for the Development of Australia North of the 20th parallel, NTAS, Darwin.
43 The Northern Territory Investigation Committee Report, 10 October 1937, Historical Society NT, NTAS, MRS 18531P1, Box 11, Pastoral Industry - Folder 108.
46 Report on the Administration of the Northern Territory for the Year 1937-38, pp 7,10,20. In 1938-39, the total population increased by 553, the European population increased by 701, while the Asians decreased by 129 and ‘half-castes by 11.

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