This is the published version (version of record) of:


Available from Deakin Research Online:

http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30006039

Reproduced with kind permission of the copyright owner.

Copyright: ©2006, Australasian Political Science Association
Herbert Spencer in the suburbs? Class, politics, ideology and the Australian petty-bourgeoisie in the Howard years

Dr Geoff Robinson
Lecturer Australian Studies & Politics
Faculty of Arts
Deakin University
PO Box 423
Warrnambool
VIC 3280
Ph: 03 5563 3512, International + 61 3 5563 3512
Fax: 03 5563 3534, International + 61 3 5563 3534
Mobile: 0407 731 963
Email: geoffrey.robinson@deakin.edu.au

Abstract
A dominant trope of media commentary after the 2004 federal election was the rise of blue-collar self-employment and small business and its negative impact on Labor electoral support. In this paper I examine the evidence on the growth of self-employment and small business in Australia since the 1980s and the political consequences of this growth. I consider why the growth of self-employment and small business has been overstated by many observers, and the emergence of a right-wing anti-capitalism in the critique of the dependence of wage-labour. Although the growth of self-employment and small business has been overstated it is a real phenomenon. I extract the rational kernel from the largely ill-informed commentary on this issue and place contemporary debates about self-employment in a historical and global context. I consider why the self-employed and small business were once seen as natural allies of the working-class in a populist coalition but why they are now identified by commentators as hostile to class politics.
1. Introduction
At the time of the 2004 federal election a higher portion of the Australian electorate than ever before participated in paid labour, as the steady rise in female participation in recent decades has outweighed the tendency for mature age male workers to withdraw from the workforce (AMP/NATSEM 2005b). Despite this issues about employment relations played almost no role in the campaign and traditional indices of class voting declined from 2001 (Bean & McAllister 2005, 325).

In the aftermath of Labor’s 2004 defeat a mass of commentary attributed Labor’s setback to ill-defined fundamental social changes. This narrative combined arguments about rising incomes, a fundamental shift to ‘aspirational’ values and more substantially an argument that a dramatic rise in self-employment had transformed many former Labor loyalists into wealthy small businesspeople enjoying massive incomes (Northington & Bachelard 2004. Rintoul 2006). This argument was not new. Academic commentary after the defeat of the Keating government in 1996 had highlighted Labor’s poor performance among the growing constituency of the self-employed (McAllister & Bean 1997, 183). The comfortable re-election of the Kennett Liberal government in 1996 and Victorian Labor’s poor electoral performance in many outer-suburban seats led to suggestions within the Victorian ALP that self-employment had transformed the political allegiances of many former Labor voters (Timmerman & Mikakos 1997).

In this paper I consider the trends in level of self-employment and participation in small business in Australia, the political and intellectual debates about these trends and the implications for public policy, in particular the arguments of members of the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) and associated bodies, and the political implications of these trends. The 2004 Senate election result demonstrated that Labor’s political malaise is shared by the broader left. My analysis thus focuses not on the ALP alone but on the combined left vote which I define as the total of the Labor, Greens and Democrats House of Representatives vote. The electoral analyses are simple bivariate comparisons, designed to suggest hypotheses for future exploration by a multivariate analysis, rather than any definite conclusions. I draw on the Australian Elections Studies (AES) 1996-2004, the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, analyses by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Productivity Commission and the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS). I discuss below definitions of ‘small business’ and ‘self-employed’. For the purposes of this paper I will refer to the two groups together as the petty-bourgeoisie. Unfortunately much of the data combines these two categories. The framework I employ for describing the Australian social structure draws loosely on Erik Wright’s analytical Marxist typology.

2. Past analyses of the Australian petty-bourgeoisie
The recent proponents of the self-employment hypothesis were unaware that their contentions echoed the arguments of much earlier Australian political analysts. Scholars such as V. G. Childe and W. K. Hancock had argued in the 1920s and 1930s that the unionised working class and dependents were too small a portion of the electorate to enable Labor to win elections and that the Party needed to appeal to small employers and the self-employed, particularly farmers, to form an electoral majority. Whether this evaluation of the social structure of the Australian electorate was correct by the interwar years an accurate description has been questioned
However a commitment to wooing small producers certainly inspired the political strategy of Labor moderates.

From the 1950s however the emerging discipline of Australian political science gave little attention to the self-employed. Scholars generally accepted the view that the economic significance and relative numbers of the self-employed and small business were in inevitable decline. Analysts of the Labor party followed the path of British and American political sociology and turned their attention to the question of whether the manual working-class was becoming 'middle-class' and what were Labor's prospects among the growing number of white-collar employees (Scalmer 1997, Sasson 1996, 241-61). Sociologists adopted a stratification-based typology that tended to merge the self-employed into the appropriate occupational category (Encel 1970, 106-08). Significant here was the influence of American political sociology which tended to characterise the self-employed as a marginal and declining stratum vulnerable to extremist political appeals. The self-employed were seen as an anomaly whose persistence reflected distinctive cultural values inculcated through family history, ethnic or religious history. In recent years however there has been an upsurge of academic interest in the self-employed and small business, this interest has reflected not only empirical economic trends but a more general turn by the social sciences towards an emphasis on individual agency and choice. We can also see the influence of theories of post-Fordism and postmodernity that identified a shift towards small-scale production and niche marketing in late capitalist economies (Lipset 1981, 131-48. Muller & Arum 2004, 2-9).

Labour historians had always retained an interest in the self-employed. Those inspired by the new left tended to see Labor's ties to the petty-bourgeoisie as its original sin, Humphrey McQueen, and to a lesser extent John Merritt and Ray Markey stressed the dependence of early Labor on the rural petty-bourgeoisie and the consequent hegemony of racism and republican nationalism within the party. As late as the 1980s the long hegemony of the Queensland National party led to the argument that the distinctive features of Queensland politics reflected the allegedly more petty-bourgeoisie nature of the states' population, despite the very limited evidence for this (McQueen 1970, 236. Merritt 1986. Markey 1988. Robinson 1988).

3. The Australian workforce
To understand the impact of the changing employment structure on Australian politics we have first to define the structure of employment in Australia. My analysis divides the Australian population into the following categories:

1. Non-employed persons: this includes the traditional categories of dependents, those not actively seeking employment and also unpaid workers in family businesses. HILDA does include the later as a form of employment, but there are no detailed statistics on this category.
2. Employed persons
   2.1 Owner-managers of employing businesses. Nearly all of these are small business (however defined), but the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated businesses causes problems in enumeration.
   2.2 The self-employed, also known as 'own account workers' and 'self-employed contractors'. This category can then as I explain below be divided into the subcategories of:
2.2.1 Independent contractors
2.2.2 Dependent contractors
2.3 Employees:
2.3.1 Government employees
2.3.2 Employees of large business
2.3.3 Employees of small businesses

My focus is on the second category.

A distinguishing feature of Wright’s typology is that he further divides the category of employees according to their assets (Wright 1997, 19-26). These assets include educational credentials but also organisational assets, in the form of positions of power within formal organisations. These categories overlap but not perfectly, some individuals are employed above or below the level of their formal qualifications (Webster & Kelly 2003). A more traditional sociological approach would also highlight the mental/manual labour division and would place shop assistants and labourers in different categories. In my analysis I have divided wage and salary earners by the level of qualifications usually required of their job and for jobs not requiring post-school qualifications into separate categories I have persisted with a rough mental/manual division between unskilled manual workers and routine clerical/service jobs, although I suspect that this distinction would disappear under a multivariate analysis.

Within a consistent Marxist typology we would wish to distinguish between those enterprises where the owner-managers worked alongside employees and invested his or her funds and those in which the enterprise was ‘depersonalised’, where managers did not have a direct material interest in the enterprise. Existing legal divisions do not adequately capture this division. Large public companies are capitalist enterprises, but there are many large private companies. Data has generally been collected on the basis of business size; the ABS defines a non-farm small business as one with 0-19 employees. The line between the self-employed and very small businesses may be difficult to draw in practice. The international Comparative Class Analysis project initiated by Erik Olin Wright defined small employers as those with 2-9 employees and defined the petty-bourgeoisie as those with 0 or 1 employees (Wright 1997, 46-48). Even on Wright’s definition the number of large capitalists is tiny and so my analysis will focus on small business. In this paper I employ the ABS definition of small business.

Levels of small business activity could plausibly impact on electoral outcomes in two ways: 1) an individual who becomes a small employer may change their political views and perhaps become more likely to identify with the conservative parties; 2) employees in small business may due to their personal ties to the employer be less likely to define their class interests as opposed to the employer and thus be less likely to vote for left parties, or to join unions (Fieldes 2005, 1-2). We would expect that the larger a small business is the more likely it would be for the small business owner to identify as a capitalist, it thus significant that the portion of larger small business (those with 5-19 employees) has been declining (AMP/NATSEM 2005a, 4). In 1995 the AWIRS found that 83% of small business workplaces had no union members compared to 26% of all workplaces, and that in 89% of small businesses the owner was present compared to 35% of non-small business workplaces. Employment
relations were more informal in small than in large business: 83% of small businesses dealt with complaints or grievances individually rather than by a set procedure (Morehead et. al. 1997, 301-04). The AES does not distinguish small business employees but it does distinguish employees of farm and family business. A simple bivariate comparison using the AES suggests that employees of family and farm business have lower levels of left party voting, but the numbers are very small.

4. Trends in small business growth
Contrary to what might be expected the role of small business in the Australian economy has shown little change over the last twenty years. There is very little evidence for the decline of big business identified by John Roskam (Roskam 2005, 4). An ABS analysis in 2001 found that from 1984 to 2001 the number of small businesses rose from 96.2% of all businesses to 96.4%. A pattern of relative growth by small business did emerge from the mid 1980s and in the severe economic recession of the early 1990s small business employment fell less than in larger business, and some big business downsized to small businesses, but since 1997-98 the growth rate of small business has ebbed compared to larger business (Kryger 2000. ABS 2001, 14. SEWRERC 2003, 3.4-3.9). From August 1998 to November 2004 ABS Forms of Employment Survey (FOES) found that the percentage of the workforce that were owner-managers of incorporated and unincorporated enterprises with employees was stable at 7.5% (ABS 2004, table 1). The only longer-term figures are from the slightly divergent Labour Force Survey (LFS) which found that the share of employers in the labour force rose from 6.7% in 1978 to 8.6% in 1998 (Waite & Will 2001, 23).

This insignificant changes in levels of small business activity obscured changes in the distribution of employment. The portion of private sector (including gas and water) non-agricultural employees in small business rose from 45.1% in 1983-94 to 47.2% in 2001. This figure includes those self-employed who were employed by their own company and hence slightly overstates the levels of genuine employment. But this insignificant shift obscured noteworthy sectional shifts. There was a slight decline in levels of small business activity in the traditional heartland of services: from 1984 to 2001 the portion of accommodation, café and restaurant businesses that were small business fell from 90.2% to 88.3% and the portion of workers in this sector employed in small businesses fell from 49.8% to 43.7%. In manufacturing, construction, transport and storage however the portion of employees in small businesses rose from 36.2% in 1984 to 50.4% in 2001(ABS 2001, table 3.3). Drawing on the 1990 and 1995 AWIRS data David Peetz found that in a multivariate analysis it was changes in the size of enterprises, rather than their sectoral distribution, that led to falls in union membership (Peetz 1998, 118-19). It seems plausible that this pattern will have continued since 1995.

More significant perhaps than the trends in the number of size of employing enterprises are changes in how enterprises operate. Within many larger businesses there has been a tendency towards greater workplace autonomy, particularly in the public sector. Schools within University faculties define themselves as separate business units (Morehead et. al. 1997, 96-97). Greater competitive pressure due to economic liberalisation, globalisation and the development of supply chains encourages initiatives such as Human Resource Management, benchmarking, individual contracting and de-unionisation that aim to integrate workers into the

5. Trends in self-employment
An evaluation of the level of self-employment is hampered by four factors: 1) for a long period the ABS classified those self-employed who were employed by their own company as employees rather than own account workers; 2) a contested number of self-employed contractors are (some observers argue) actually so dependent on one contracting partner to be effectively employees; 3) whether to take subjective definition as self-employed as decisive for analytical purposes or to apply a more objective test; 4) some surveys combine the self-employed and small business (which I call the petty-bourgeoisie) into a single category. The first factor means that the growth of self-employment has been understated, particularly in recent years when there have been incentives for incorporation, due to tax reform (Evans & Sikora 2004, 204-05) the second factor has meant that the level of 'genuine' self-employment may be overstated. For some self-employment is a second job, in 2004 for 8% of the petty-bourgeoisie their business was not their main job, it seems likely very few of these would have been employing businesses (AMP/NATSEM 2005a, 5).

The level of self-employment will thus always be contested. One recent analysis identified nine competing definitions (Jordan 2001, 5.2). However competing estimates tend to be fairly close and if our objective is to draw conclusions about electoral behaviour these differences are not large enough to be significant. The ABS Forms of Employment Survey found that from 1998 to 2004 the percentage of owner-managers of incorporated or unincorporated enterprises without employees rose from 11.5% to 12% of the employed population (ABS 2005, table 1). However analysis by the Productivity Commission suggests that this total probably overstates the actual level of self-employed contractors. They suggest that self-employed contractors declined as a percentage of employed persons from 10.1% in 1998 to 8.2% in 2004 (PC 2006, 135). Some of the discrepancy between the two figures is due to the small number of self-employed who do not contract for delivery of services such as shopkeepers (PC 2006, 136). The Productivity Commission estimates are only available for recent years, but they are reasonably close to those of the ABS Labour Force Survey which found that 'own-account' workers rose from 9.7% of total employment in 1978 to 11.8% in 1998 (Waite & Will 2001, 21).

Government members such as Workplace relations minister Kevin Andrews and commentators such as the IPA have often cited a figure of 1.9m independent contractors (Andrews 2006a. Moran 2002) but this is misleading number as it includes employers. It seems that a substantial number of individuals do not understand the conditions under which they employed. One noteworthy discrepancy is that evidence from employers collected for the AWIRS 1990 and 1995 surveys suggested a level of contract employment about half of that reported by the ABS survey of employed workforce, although the AWIRS survey was biased towards large employers (Waite & Will 2001, 24).

The published FOES and LFS data does not enable self-employment patterns to be identified at the industry level. A 2001 ABS estimate, which excluded owner-managers employed by their own company, found that across all private sector non-
agricultural employees the level of self-employment rose only from 12% in 1984 to 12.1% in 2001. However there was a similar sectoral pattern to what we have seen in small business employment. Self-employment in manufacturing, construction, transport and storage rose from 13.6% in 1984 to 20.2% in 2001 (ABS 2001, table 3.3).

The total of self-employed contractors is then further divided by some analysts into ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ contractors, with the later seen as so dependent on and subject to the control of a customer for their services that their position is closer to that of employees, but without industrial protection, than an independent businessperson. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers such as cleaners, security personnel and truck drivers are particularly susceptible to this (Buchanan 1999, 14-16. LH MU 2005). The Coalition majority on a recent parliamentary inquiry into self-employment and labour hire conceded that this could occur (HRSCEWRWP, 25). The test of dependence is contested. The ABS has proposed a broad definition that a dependent contractor is one who cannot subcontract their work, is excluded from working for multiple clients or lacks control over their own work procedure. The Productivity Commission however contended that a dependent contractor must lack control over their own work procedure. The ABS approach finds that about 41% of nominally self-employed contractors were dependent in 1998 but the Productivity Commission finds about 26%. From 1998 to 2001 the overall number of self-employed contractors fell but that the portion that were dependents on the Commissions’ definition rose to 31% which may be due to taxation incentives (PC 2006, 11-14, 20-21, 34-35).

The position of the federal government has been to reject the validity of the concept of dependent contractors, although its position has been tempered by pragmatic political and revenue considerations. Employer associations along with the IPA and the closely associated Independent Contractors Association have (ICA) rejected the concept altogether. They together with the federal government have admitted the possibility that employment relations might be disguised as contract relations, but insist that the courts have developed tests to identify such ‘sham’ arrangements and their arguments imply that only a small portion of those classified as dependent contractors would fail such a test (ICA 2005. PC 2006, 19) and the federal government has largely agreed, although it has retained a narrower definition of self-employment for taxation purposes. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Independent Contractors) Bill introduced in June 2006 will overrule state legislation that ‘deems’ some self-employed contractors to be employees and leaves the existing common law definition of ‘sham’ contracts unchanged. The government has however been concerned to conciliate owner-drivers and existing state level protections for them have been retained pending further review (Jordan 2001, 5.2.-5.3. DEWR 2005, 11. Andrews 2006b).

In the preparation of the legislation divisions emerged on the Coalition backbench. Some backbenchers felt the legislation did not go far enough and allowed the Transport Workers’ Union to retain a role in the representation of owner-drivers, others feared it potentially left some workers vulnerable to exploitation by sham arrangements (Humphries 2006. ABC Online 2006). Those backbenchers who felt the legislation did not go far enough were supported by an organisation called the Owner Drivers’ Association (ODA) which is linked to the ICA and the IPA, and according to
a media report that has not been denied by the Association, backed by courier

The debate about labour market regulation in Australia has predominately focused on
casualisation and the position of self-employed contractors has received little
attention. Casual employment has features of a secondary labour market with a high
representation of unskilled young and female workers. Self-employed contractors
seem different from casual workers in that they many more are professionals (PC
2006, 37-40, 58). In some aspects however dependent contractors (on the restrictive
Productivity Commission definition) are an exception and look rather like disguised
casuals. Compared to independent contractors they are more likely to be women,
younger and lower skilled, they have a higher portion of males than among employees
(PC 2006, 38-54). A 2000 survey that did not distinguish between independent and
dependent contractors found that over two thirds of self-employed unskilled women
worked in retail trade or as domestic workers, child-care, helpers and cleaners,
although the sample size was small (Evans & Sikora 2004, 221). In the United States
it has been argued that self-employment has quite different meanings for skilled
professionals and for unskilled workers (Arum 2004).

The shifting patterns of self-employment also reflect transformations in the gender
order. Female representation among the petty-bourgeoisie fell from 1995 to 2004 and
this demonstrates the extent to which new jobs were disproportionately taken by
women, from 1995 to 2004 about one in every 14 new female entrants to the labour
force became a member of the petty-bourgeoisie compared to one in three men
(AMP/NATSEM 2005a, 7). Here lies an explanation of the gender composition of
primary education students. An institutionalist interpretation might suggest that
dependent contracting operates to force men into a secondary labour market in which
women have always been over represented. We could see this as an example of how
an increasing convergence of employment standards for men and women has often
meant a decline in male labour standards to that of women (Whitehouse 2001).

The debate about the distinction between independent and dependent contractors
echoes earlier socialist debates in the early twentieth century about the relation
between small commodity producers, particularly farmers, and capitalism. Revisionist
Marxists argued that agriculture was an exception to the Marxist principle of the
increasing concentration of industry. Rather like the ALP at the same time they
argued that socialists should espouse the cause of small producers (David 1984: von
Vollmar 1984). In the interwar period the revisionist case won out and socialist parties
sought to appeal to small producers, especially farmers, but with little success outside
of Scandinavia (Eley 2002, 246-47). Their approach is echoed in some aspects by
recent post-structuralist critics of orthodox Marxist class analysis (Gibson-Graham
advanced by Kautsky argued that the apparent resistance of farmers to capitalist
concentration was misleading, and that an increasing number were ‘dwarf holders’
whose small holdings, dependent on extremely long hours and exploitation of family
members, merely supplanted their income from wage-labour. Kautsky admitted that
dwarf holders clung to the dream of self-sufficiency but insisted their objective status
was proletarian and the left should appeal to them as workers rather than raise futile
hopes that their micro-farms could be viable. Kautsky contended that the left could
never outbid the right’s appeal to farmers. Lenin’s analysis was similar but he placed
more emphasis on internal differentiation within among farmers and the emergence of a capitalist stratum of farmers, he also, more than Kautsky emphasised the extent to which small producers, like contemporary understandings of dependent contractors, were enmeshed in capitalist production through its of trade and finance (Lenin 1956, 96-97, 370, 438-43, 456. Kautsky 1988, vol. 1, 166-72, vol. 2 298-300, 315, 322-25). Nicos Poulantzas took up Lenin’s work to stress the importance of drawing a clear distinction between the petty bourgeoisie, small employers and the working class (Poulantzas 1975, 151).

The Australian evidence seems to match broader international trends of a modest increase in levels of self-employment and small business, particularly in the transformative sector at least up until the mid 1990s(Wright 1997, 118, 127, 138). The survey data on self-employment does not distinguish between voters and non-voters. In the AES the portion of respondents who claimed to be self-employed or employers actually fell from 19.1% in 1996 to 17.3% in 2004. In a longer-term perspective the claim by Bean and McAllister that the portion of the ‘electorate [that] were self-employed or had a head of household that who was self-employed’ increased from 9% in 1979 to 20% in 1996 seems an overstatement, even if we include employers in this total (Bean & McAllister 1997, 183). The AES did not distinguish small business employees but the portion of respondents who worked for a farm or family small business oscillated around 4%. The impact of further labour market deregulation on trends in self-employment and small business is difficult to predict; on the demand side it may reduce the incentive for employers to use contractors, but on the supply side increased managerial control, uncertainty and insecurity among unskilled workers may make self-employment more attractive (Muller & Arum 2004, 21).

Even if trends to self-employment and small business are limited they may have a political ‘multiplier’ effect. The portion of employees who move into self-employment in any one year is small, HILDA found that from 2001 to 2002 1.8% of respondents became either employers, self-employed or unpaid family workers (HILDA 2006, 77), but across the course of a life span many more will attempt self-employment, and international evidence finds that the likelihood of such attempts has increased (Muller & Arum 2004, 5). The likelihood of a transition to self-employment is the result both of inclination and feasibility. Survey evidence finds that substantial numbers of workers express interest in self-employment. The International Social Science Survey found that in a survey of 19 developed and transition economies in 1997 some 53% (unweighted average) of workers said that they would choose self-employment if available (Benz & Frey 2004, 126). Earlier surveys collated by Wright found similar levels of enthusiasm although men were notably more likely to aspire to self-employment than women (Wright 1997, 116).

There are also social and familial linkages between the working-class and self-employment. Wright found that intergenerational class mobility was most likely from the working-class to self-employment or small business. Ties of marriage and friendship also were strong (Wright 1997, 185). Technological change has encouraged the emergence of home-based small business and in one estimate about 10% of homes host a home-based small business (SEWRERC, 2.32-34). This would encourage social linkages between workers and the self-employed. However the direction of the flow of political influence between workers and the self-employed remains to be determined. In the United States the self-employed seem to be pulled towards workers
and their views on economic policy and class relations are closer to those of workers than large employers; however a 1986 survey in Australia found the opposite. Unionised members of the Australian self-employed were however closer to workers in their social attitudes (Emmison 1991, 254-64). This supports the Marxist argument that ideological factors may be particularly important in determining the class consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie due to their separation from the core classes of large employers and wage-labourers (Poulantzas 1975, 254-64). Twenty years of union decline can only have tightened the hold of conservatism on the self-employed.

Privatisation has completed a historical transformation in the Australian public sector that impacts on the possibilities of social mobility and consequent class colations. Under the ‘colonial socialism’ of the nineteenth century the Australian public sector was disproportionately male and manual, now as elsewhere it is disproportionately female and credentialed and with a high portion of managers (Wright 1997, 72). Today credentialed public sector workers who display higher levels of left party support, especially for the more radical Greens, than the remaining uncredentialed public sector workers. This is the reverse of the private sector

6. Ideology and self-employment
Despite the limited extent of changes in the employment status of Australian electors a lofty, if jerry-built, ideological edifice has been erected on them by the IPA which has strangely revived some themes of late nineteenth century liberalism. The extent to which the employment relation was one of subservience was a problem for classical liberals. In the later nineteenth century this was particularly acute because of the widespread belief that mass factory-based employment was the wave of the future. John Stuart Mill anticipated, or hoped, for a supercession of capitalist employment by worker co-operatives. Herbert Spencer shared Mill’s concerns, but his critique of capitalism was tempered by the threat of socialism which he saw as threatening a new Toryism of state paternalism. More than Mill Spencer tended to justify dependence in employment as an inevitable evolutionary stage, a sign that the character of workers, had not sufficiently developed to enable them to stand on their own (Mill 1970, 126-29. Spencer 1896, 485, 516, 563, 564).

The new or social liberalism recognised the fact of working-class dependence under capitalism but looked to institutions such as trade unions and the democratic state to balance this. The right-wing of social liberalism as represented in Australia by Menzies retained this acceptance of collective action (unlike Spencer) but added an element of moral evaluation. When Menzies described ‘the mass of unskilled people, almost invariably well-organised, and with their wages and conditions safeguarded by popular law’ as those who deserved ‘a proper measure of security’ (Menzies 1942, 6) there is a clear pejorative tone. Menzies’ approach is echoed in what Samuel Bowles calls the neo-Hobbesian justification of capitalist authority which contends that capitalist authority is required to enforce discipline upon the work group and to prevent ‘free-riding’ and ‘shirking’. In this perspective workers’ acceptance of the fruits of capitalism constitutes an implicit consent to capitalist authority (Bowles 1985). John Howard’s concept of the ‘enterprise worker’ operates within this paradigm, it includes not only the self-employed but also a large portion of wage earners united by ‘an attitude of mind’ expressed in a commitment to the commercial success and long-term viability of their workplace. (Howard 2005).
At first glance the approach of the IPA (and the linked Independent Contractors Association) seems divergent from that of Howard. John Roskam, IPA executive Director and before that director of the Liberal Party’s Menzies Research Centre has together with his colleagues written several articles that claim to identify an upsurge in self-employment. Roskam and his colleagues cite increasing absolute numbers of self-employed, sometimes including all employers in the category of self-employed as well, and do not convert these absolute numbers to percentages (ICA Submission. Roskam 2005a. Roskam 2005b)

The IPA authors make occasional references to technological change and rising education levels but predominantly represent self-employment as a matter of individual moral choice: ‘workers opting to exercise choice over their working conditions’(Roskam 2005b, 4). They espouse two different arguments as to why self-employment might be sought: 1) self-employment is a response by workers to the their subordinate position in the production process, Roskam seems to present self-employment as an alternative to union membership (Roskam 2005a, 4); 2) self-employment frees workers from industrial regulations that prevent them working harder and longer (Berg 2005). Their themes even echo aspects of the socialist critique of wage-labour, so that the ICA even claims that individuals who enter employment ‘enter a contract in which the right to control themselves has legally been transferred to another person’. But this critique is combined with a vehement defense of the employer’s ‘right to manage’. Individual workplace contracts, the IPA’s preferred model of labor market regulation, are associated with an increase in management discretion (ICA 2005, 15. Philips 2003. Phillips 2005. Peetz 2006, 75-80.). These two themes of the IPA authors might seem contradictory but to them self-employment is a free moral decision so that those who choose not to remain self-employed have no right to complain. In this new landscape workers who bargain collectively rather than individually by definition subordinate themselves to ‘third parties’ apparently in the form of their fellow workers (DEWR 2005, 10). Indeed according to the ICA holiday pay, sick leave etc. actually represent a form of coercion, a forced loan from employees to employers, so that it is a marker of freedom to be deprived of these conditions (ICA 200, 16).Conservative populism has always raided the conceptual toolbox of the left from anti-Semitic equations of capitalism and Jews to fascism and more recently political Islam (Neumann 1942, 158-60). We could look back even further to American pro-slavery arguments that dependent labour necessarily disqualified the labourer from independent citizenship and should hence be undertaken by a servile race (Ashworth 1996).

The IPA’s evocation of wage-labour as a form of dependence is probably only a transitional phase. In Australian history the rhetoric of ‘freedom of contract’ predates debates about industrial regulation. In the industrial battles of the 1880s and 1890s employers claimed that they wished to uphold ‘freedom of contract’ in their dealings with their employees. The ICA has argued that there if there are dependent contractors there must be ‘independent employees’ who have the ‘desires and attitudes of independence’ (ICA 2005, 8). The government’s discussion paper on independent contractors outlined the next, logical and final step in workplace reform thus:

The Government recognises that there may be people who are attracted to some aspects of independent contracting (particularly the freedom to contract about one’s own terms and conditions without being restricted by workplace
relations legislation) but who would prefer to be employees. This has led some to suggest there should be a third choice of working arrangements: being an employee, but being free to contract without the current restrictions imposed by legislation and industrial instruments. While the Government considers that this concept is worthy of further consideration, this proposed instrument is beyond the scope of this paper (DEWR 2005, 5).

The neo-liberal rediscovery of self-employment also reforms earlier understandings of self-employment. These understandings were Lockean, evoking images of a society based on manual labour in which individuals applied blood, sweat and tears to an unforgiving environment and carved out a modest sufficiency. Labourism with its focus on physical labour and its perception that capitalism rewarded the unproductive and deprived producers of their fair share took up these themes (Foote 1997, 6-16). Such themes are still echoed in the rhetoric of small business spokespeople that they the hard working backbone of the nation (Cohen 2004). This is a rhetoric often evoked by policymakers, and business commentators, apparent in the tendency to describe small business as the essential driver of job growth (AMP/NATSEUM 2005a, 2. Parker 2000, 240) and the manner in which the discourse of ‘workplace reform’ has tended to define productivity as a worker problem so that greater output can only come from people working harder (McDonald, Campbell & Burgess 2001, 12-14. Raeburn 2006). Contemporary proponents of ‘welfare reform’ argue that Australians want to see income reflect moral desert and reward those who work hard (Saunders 2004, 72-77).

Yet classical liberals are aware that the image of self-reliant society in which rewards reflect desert and work is not that of a dynamic liberal capitalist society. Such a self-reliant distributivist utopia would actually require massive state intervention, as the agricultural polices of Australian governments once sought to guarantee rewards to farmers and insulate them from an unpredictable market (Norton, Kukathas & Melleuish 1996, 34-35). One of the IPA’s complaints against the Howard government is its occasional tendency to protect small business against competition (Watson 1999). Economic reward as Frederich Hayek argues reflects not the contribution of the individual but their ability to predict or even guess the future, and Hayek harboured doubts about the viability of a capitalist economy because of the contradiction between this reality and popular equation of income with moral desert (Hayek 1976, 67-74, 92).

Recent liberal formulations have sought, apparently with success, to evade this Hayekian dilemma. We can trace these formulations back to the separation of ‘business’ from ‘labour’ (Wood 2003). Contemporary academic and political discourse slips easily from self-reliance to entrepreneurship, the self-employed are identified as entrepreneurs by scholars and politicians alike (Benz & Frey 2004, 127. Andrews 2006). However only a small minority of small business aspire to become big business (Parker 2000, 246-47. Priestley 2002). Indeed if there is anything to Roskam’s view of self-employment as an escape from the dependence of wage-labour it is not surprising that most small business wish to remain small and escape dependence on banks, regulators and markets. The rhetoric of ‘wealth maximisation’ and its American equivalents seeks to resolve the Hayekian dilemma by an exercise in redefinition, income becomes proof of moral desert and labour, rather than a reward, in much the same way as Protestants whilst rejecting the doctrine of salvation through

Available evidence on the motivations of the self-employed suggests their principal motive is a desire to escape the subservience of wage-labour rather than to work longer hours for a higher income, although the fact that they find work more pleasant might encourage longer hours (Benz & Frey 2004, 103, 118, 126. PC 2006, 42). Unfortunately the most recent Australian data on petty-bourgeoisie income levels does not distinguish the self-employed and small business but it finds comparable overall income levels, slightly lower for men but higher for women (AMP/NATSEM 2005a, 14). International survey data collated by Benz and Frey (2004) found higher levels of job satisfaction among the self-employed and this conforms to Australian evidence (Evans & Sikora 2004, 219). HILDA did not analyse self-employment separately but found that those in 'non-standard' jobs including casual, contract, labour hire and self-employment, had similar levels of satisfaction to those in traditional full-time employment (HILDA 2006, 74). In 2001 HILDA found that only 8.5% of those in standard jobs wanted longer hours compared to 42.5% for part time and that 42.6 of part-time wanted longer hours. Those who take on second jobs tend to be a part-timers trying to bring their working hours up to a full time level, and they do not do not persist with multiple jobs for long periods (HILDA 2006, 67, 75). Average hours of work for self-employed contractors tend to be similar to traditional employees but they tend to work either noticeably more or less, perhaps because independents work longer enjoying their work whilst dependent contractors are quasi-casuals (PC 2006, 63). The fact that overall the petty-bourgeoisie work longer hours suggests that small business employers (distinct from the self-employed) must work exceptionally long hours (AMP/NATSEM 2005a, 9).

Those who consider self-employment is an act of autonomous moral choice downplay the extent to which the experience of wage-labour may encourage the pursuit of self-employment. The linkage between the choice of self-employment and a family background is often cited as evidencing that self-employment is based on a personal disposition. However this only seems to apply only to for men in skilled self-employment and women in professional employment (Evans & Sikora 2001, 227). It seems plausible that declining job quality and satisfaction could encourage workers to seek self-employment. HILDA found that of those with low job satisfaction in 2001, 4.8% had become employers, self-employer or unpaid family workers, compared to 1.8% and 1.5% for those who had high satisfaction, but they were also more likely to be unemployed or to withdraw from the labour force. Those who had moved to self-employment from high or medium satisfaction jobs were not more or less happy, but the sample was too small for a reliable estimate of whether or not those who had left low satisfaction jobs were happier (HILDA 2006, 66-67). Here is some evidence that self-employment is a response to poor-quality jobs, and this has always been the case for non-English speaking background migrants (Collins et. al. 1995, 58-98). NESB small business operators are much more likely to come from a labouring background
than non-immigrant small businessmen and to be Labor voters (Collins 2000). Rather than seeing union membership and left party voting as opposed to the pursuit of self-employment it makes more sense to see them as complementary strategies.

In passing we could note that the approach of the contemporary Australian Marxist left to the question of class and politics is almost a mirror image of the IPA. The ‘working class’ is enlarged to an overwhelming majority of the workforce by ignoring the importance of educational assets, divisions by sector of employment and by overstating the number of dependent contractors (Fieldes 2005).

7. The electoral evidence
Historical evidence on the political behaviour of the self-employed and small business in Australia is limited. Poll evidence showed levels of ‘small business’ support for Labor in the mid 1940s higher than other non-manual working-class groups. In the mid 1960s James Jupp argued that small businesspeople were notably more likely to support Australian than British Labour (Jupp 1968, 28). However even by then a decline in their levels of Labor support was notable and this accelerated during the Whitlam government (Kemp 1978, 72-77). In 1986 the self-employed however defined were second only to major employers in their level of opposition to the ALP (Western, Baxter & Emmison 1991, 328).

In this section I conduct a simple bivariate analysis of the AES that compares the left vote, identified as the total of the Labor, Greens and Democrats vote in the House of Representatives from 1996 to 2004 by employment status and occupation. I also analyse the One Nation vote due to its high level among unskilled workers in 1998. I include only those respondents who identified a paid occupation and an occupation.

The definition of employment status is simply based on the four categories in the AES question. The AES classified respondents’ occupation into several categories. I have compressed these into four groups: 1) professional-managerial; 2) trade; 3) clerical which includes lower-level service workers such as waitresses and shop assistants and 4) unskilled (see appendix).
Table 1: Left vote by employment group 1996-2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Family/Farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>25 (n=287)</td>
<td>49 (n=761)</td>
<td>57 (n=351)</td>
<td>22 (n=72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>34 (n=309)</td>
<td>49 (n=759)</td>
<td>55 (n=403)</td>
<td>34 (n=47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>36 (n=296)</td>
<td>48 (n=856)</td>
<td>58 (n=394)</td>
<td>33 (n=73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>29 (n=261)</td>
<td>46 (n=742)</td>
<td>60 (n=440)</td>
<td>30 (n=50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the number of respondents from family/farm businesses is very small the relative levels of support are what would be expected. The particularly low levels of left party support among the self-employed were a distinctive feature of the 1996 election compared to 1993 (McAllister & Bean 1997, 183). The recovery in 1998 and 2001 is compatible with the suggestion that the GST was unpopular among small business. In 1996 self-employment retained its negative impact on the Labor vote in a multivariate analysis (Charnock 1997, 287-88) but perhaps the 1998 recovery suggests that the exceptionally low levels of left party support among the self-employed in 1996 were not the manifestation of a deeply held cultural disposition. The fall in left party support among the self-employed in 2004 is noteworthy. The rise in the left vote among government employees is as we shall see probably largely driven by the distinctive nature of professional employment in the government sector. One Nation was not distinctively attractive to the self-employed.

Table 2: One Nation vote by employment group 1998-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Family/Farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6 (n=309)</td>
<td>6 (n=759)</td>
<td>7 (n=403)</td>
<td>2 (n=47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5 (n=296)</td>
<td>4 (n=856)</td>
<td>4 (n=394)</td>
<td>5 (n=73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2 (n=261)</td>
<td>0 (n=742)</td>
<td>1 (n=440)</td>
<td>2 (n=50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern in occupational support largely fits the story of a poor Labor performance among manual working-class voters in 1996, a recovery in 1998 dampened by the appeal of One Nation to unskilled workers and stability in 2001 with a decline in One Nation support among the unskilled and then in 2004 a distinctive erosion of Labor's working-class support similar in some aspects to 1996. The pattern among professionals sheds light on the counterintuitive conclusion of Clive Bean and Ian McAllister that taxation policy advantaged the Coalition in 1998, perhaps in 1998 we see a rightward shift by Keating enthusiasts (and readers of Paul Kelly books), to a more economically rational Coalition (Bean & McAllister 2000, 191-92). In 2004 the left's problem was most marked among unskilled workers, indeed in some respects Labor's performance was worse than 1996 (Bean & McAllister 2005, 325-26). One minor sign of this is the decline in working-class self-identification from 44.6% in 2001 to 40.2% in 2004.
Table 3: Left vote by occupation 1996-2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>44 (n=640)</td>
<td>44 (n=207)</td>
<td>42 (n=382)</td>
<td>55 (n=206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40 (n=618)</td>
<td>55 (n=177)</td>
<td>51 (n=436)</td>
<td>53 (n=234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>45 (n=702)</td>
<td>48 (n=158)</td>
<td>46 (n=448)</td>
<td>58 (n=249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>45 (n=738)</td>
<td>49 (n=118)</td>
<td>48 (n=409)</td>
<td>50 (n=191)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: One Nation vote by occupation 1998-2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5 (n=618)</td>
<td>5 (n=177)</td>
<td>8 (n=436)</td>
<td>10 (n=234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3 (n=702)</td>
<td>4 (n=158)</td>
<td>8 (n=448)</td>
<td>6 (n=249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1 (n=738)</td>
<td>0 (n=118)</td>
<td>1 (n=409)</td>
<td>2 (n=191)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further subdivision of the AES data encounters the problem that in many cases the cells are too small to be reliable, even if the private and family/farm categories are combined. But overall they support the argument that the self-employment have not been the disaster area for Labor that some claim. If the left had a particular problem in 2004 with the self-employed it seems to be with the IT professional rather than the tradesman. The leftward shift among professionals in 2004 was restricted to the public sector, musings about 'doctor’s wives' notwithstanding the Green heartland lies in the public sector caring professions.
Table 5: Left vote by employment status and occupation 1996-2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>44 (n=286)</td>
<td>20 (n=137)</td>
<td>59 (n=218)</td>
<td>55 (n=111)</td>
<td>22 (n=73)</td>
<td>61 (n=23)</td>
<td>42 (n=276)</td>
<td>22 (n=32)</td>
<td>47 (n=74)</td>
<td>53 (n=136)</td>
<td>49 (n=35)</td>
<td>65 (n=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>44 (n=247)</td>
<td>28 (n=187)</td>
<td>50 (n=214)</td>
<td>53 (n=98)</td>
<td>50 (n=48)</td>
<td>67 (n=31)</td>
<td>56 (n=270)</td>
<td>40 (n=43)</td>
<td>58 (n=123)</td>
<td>54 (n=166)</td>
<td>39 (n=36)</td>
<td>56 (n=29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>45 (n=314)</td>
<td>34 (n=174)</td>
<td>54 (n=214)</td>
<td>48 (n=97)</td>
<td>38 (n=40)</td>
<td>62 (n=21)</td>
<td>45 (n=308)</td>
<td>19 (n=37)</td>
<td>50 (n=103)</td>
<td>49 (n=183)</td>
<td>55 (n=28)</td>
<td>55 (n=37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36 (n=294)</td>
<td>25 (n=166)</td>
<td>63 (n=278)</td>
<td>50 (n=86)</td>
<td>44 (n=34)</td>
<td>56 (n=16)</td>
<td>48 (n=276)</td>
<td>33 (n=30)</td>
<td>52 (n=101)</td>
<td>45 (n=135)</td>
<td>30 (n=23)</td>
<td>30 (n=33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Conclusions
These preliminary conclusions suggest that the increase in self-employment and small business and its possible political impact has been overstated. The sources of the decline in the left vote among workers have to be sought elsewhere. In this respect my findings on left party support echo those of David Peetz on union membership where he shows that structural change can account for only a small part of the decline in union membership (Peetz 1998, 81-84). An adequate understanding of political shifts in Australia will have to move beyond the economic determinist approach of both the self-employment hypothesis and the Marxist left’s ‘working-class majority’ and also the ideological determinist approach of an emphasis on ‘wedge politics’ and political rhetoric. What is required is a closer analysis of the Australian class structure and in particular divisions among employees and of how processes of economic production are articulated with processes of cultural production that produce political outcomes. Australian political parties, both as institutions and electors, are the parties of a class society but they do not directly represent social classes (Poulantzas 1973, 91).
Appendix: occupational categories

Respondents’ description of their ‘kind of work’ was classified by the AES under a large number of headings that from 1998 were matched to the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations. I have allocated these to the four categories of Professional-managerial, Trade, Clerical & Services and Unskilled as follows:

Professional-managerial:

Trade:

Clerical & Services:

Unskilled:
Bibliography

Surveys


Other


Emerson, C. (2005) ‘It is time for Labor to be the rooster’ (6 January 2005), The Age, 6 January.


House of Representatives. Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation (HRSCEWRWP) (2005) Inquiry into independent contractors and labour hire arrangements


Independent Contractors Association (ICA) (2004) *It's official: we are happier* 


Liquor Hospitality & Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) (2005) Submission to the Inquiry into Independent Contracting and Labour Hire Arrangements


Mikakos, J. & Timmerman, F. (1997) Supplementary Report from Members of the State Election Campaign Review Committee, Pledge (Labor Left) faction, Victorian ALP.


Senate Employment, Workplace Relations & Education References Committee (SEWRERC) (2003) *Small business employment*.


### Monday 25 September APSA Conference

**REGISTRATION CITY HALL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Streams</th>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>Concert Hall 1</th>
<th>Waratah</th>
<th>Mullinba</th>
<th>Cummings</th>
<th>Hunter</th>
<th>Concert Hall 2</th>
<th>Newcastle Room</th>
<th>Playhouse (Civic Theatre)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0900</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Aust &amp; NZ Politics 1</td>
<td>Aust &amp; NZ Politics 2</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Int. Pol. Economy</td>
<td>Political Theory</td>
<td>Federalism Panel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1030</td>
<td>Ben Goldsmith (Chair)</td>
<td>Tod Moore (Chair)</td>
<td>Jim Jose (Chair)</td>
<td>Robert Mackie (Chair)</td>
<td>Michael Howard (Chair)</td>
<td>James Juniper (Chair)</td>
<td>John Tate (Chair)</td>
<td>AJ Brown (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T. Davis &amp; M. Moran</td>
<td>G. Craig</td>
<td>C. Johnson</td>
<td>P. Brent (Pollsters)</td>
<td>P. Carroll (Policy Transfer Trends)</td>
<td>M. Barks</td>
<td>G. Cowper</td>
<td>A. Heness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Manicom</td>
<td>P. Senior</td>
<td>J. Staples</td>
<td>N. Kelly</td>
<td>R. Eccleston</td>
<td>S. Young</td>
<td>I. Molloy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030-1100</td>
<td>MORNING TEA (Banquet Hall)</td>
<td>Tod Moore (Chair)</td>
<td>Alison Convery (Chair)</td>
<td>John Gow (Chair)</td>
<td>Ben Sheehy (Chair)</td>
<td>John Tate (Chair)</td>
<td>J. Bellamy (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Searle (Chair)</td>
<td>G. Croucher</td>
<td>C. Beer</td>
<td>N. Economou</td>
<td>N. Bassil</td>
<td>M. Beacroft</td>
<td>B. Penson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Goldsmith &amp; Y. Horiiuchi</td>
<td>S. Younane</td>
<td>M. Sawyer</td>
<td>L. Hill &amp; S. Young</td>
<td>P. Carroll (Copyins by Agreement)</td>
<td>J. Juniper (Money, Semiotics &amp; Social Analysis)</td>
<td>D. Bruckhorst &amp; I. Reeve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1230</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
<td>Fem Pol</td>
<td>Victor Quirk (Chair)</td>
<td>Carol Johnson (Chair)</td>
<td>Greg McCarthy (Chair)</td>
<td>Steven Threadgold (Chair)</td>
<td>Ina Allegretti (Chair)</td>
<td>Ian Gray (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jackson Maogofo (Chair)</td>
<td>Alison Convery (Chair)</td>
<td>A. Mughan</td>
<td>M. Goot</td>
<td>M. Howard &amp; J. Vince</td>
<td>R. Abdel-Tawaab</td>
<td>J. Juniper (Homo Sacer and Biopolitics)</td>
<td>W. Sanders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Kimungu</td>
<td>P. van Onselen</td>
<td>P. van Onselen</td>
<td>M. Scott</td>
<td>N. Hall &amp; R. Taplin</td>
<td>B. Isakhan</td>
<td>A. Little</td>
<td>I. Gray</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T. Takamine</td>
<td>H. Pearse</td>
<td>H. Pearse</td>
<td>J. Jenkins</td>
<td>J. Jenkins</td>
<td>T. O'Brien</td>
<td>D. Giorgas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1400</td>
<td>Women’s Caucus (Waratah Room)</td>
<td>Carol Johnson (Chair)</td>
<td>Victor Quirk (Chair)</td>
<td>John Jenkins (Chair)</td>
<td>Gloh-Gow Panel</td>
<td>Robert Mackie (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carol Johnson</td>
<td>M. Beard &amp; P. van Onselen</td>
<td>A. Boin</td>
<td>A. Broome (Chair)</td>
<td>N. Barry</td>
<td>AJ Brown (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G. Evans, C. McIntyre &amp; G. McCarthy</td>
<td>M. Rhodes</td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Fraser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Z. Chazarian</td>
<td>D. Biro</td>
<td></td>
<td>K. Fraser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1530</td>
<td>Postgraduate Caucus (Newcastle Room)</td>
<td>Elections &amp; Internet Panel</td>
<td>R. Davis (Chair)</td>
<td>John Jenkins (Chair)</td>
<td>Robert Mackie</td>
<td>AJ Brown (Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carol Johnson (Chair)</td>
<td>R. Davis</td>
<td>A. Convery</td>
<td>A. Boon, A. Boon</td>
<td>ARC “Towards Sustainable Regional Development Institutions” Project Team Meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Lowe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M. Tyler</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1600</td>
<td>AFTERNOON TEA (Banquet Hall)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1735</td>
<td>Book Launch: “Berry Berry I” and “Berry II”, Four Jays Press, in Banquet Hall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms &amp; Times</td>
<td>Concert Hall 1</td>
<td>Waratah</td>
<td>Mulbinba</td>
<td>Cummings</td>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>Concert Hall 2</td>
<td>Newcastle Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous Pol</td>
<td>Aust &amp; NZ Politics 1</td>
<td>Aust &amp; NZ Politics 2</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Int. Pol. Economy</td>
<td>Political Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1030</td>
<td>Peter Searle  (Chair) C. Doran (Military &amp; Neo-Lib) B. Stevens</td>
<td>John Tate (Chair) R. De Costa A. Gunstone S. Maddison</td>
<td>Youth &amp; Pol Panel A. Vromen (Chair) K. Edwards L. Hill &amp; J. Louth, A. Elliot &amp; S. Goodwin S. Threadgold</td>
<td>Harry Williams (Chair) A. Broome M. Van Egmond, M. Flaherty &amp; B. Tranter J. Wanna</td>
<td>Michael Howard (Chair) S. Reeves S. O'Sullivan I. Ward</td>
<td>Kath Gleeson (Chair) F. Gale J. McGee P. Ross</td>
<td>J.S. Mill Panel P. Corcoran (Chair) A. Goldstone P. Griffiths H. Pringle K. Smits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030-1100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lunch 1230-1300: “Keywords” CUP Book Launch Banquet Hall Rod Rhodes Editorial Meeting (Waratah Room)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1400</td>
<td>1230-1300: “Keywords” CUP Book Launch Banquet Hall</td>
<td>Rod Rhodes Editorial Meeting (Waratah Room)</td>
<td>AJPS Board Meeting (Newcastle Room)</td>
<td>Load buses – Travel to Hunter Valley Wineries Winery Tour &amp; Wine Tasting Travel to Harrigan’s Irish Pub Drinks &amp; Presidential Address at Harrigan’s Irish Pub Travel to Tamburlaine Winery Conference Dinner</td>
<td>Depart for Newcastle City Hall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545-1700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700-1715</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715-1830</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845-2230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Lord Mayor’s Reception Area</td>
<td>Waratah Political History</td>
<td>Mulbinba Aust &amp; NZ Politics 1</td>
<td>Cummings Aust &amp; NZ Politics 2</td>
<td>Hunter Public Policy</td>
<td>Newcastle Room Political Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1030</td>
<td>Teaching Politics Panel</td>
<td>John Gow (Chair)</td>
<td>Jim Jose (Chair)</td>
<td>James Juniper (Chair)</td>
<td>Michael Howard (Chair)</td>
<td>(Chair)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Fenna</td>
<td>T. Moore</td>
<td>D. Coldicott</td>
<td>C. Doran (Australian Constitution, Corporate Personhood &amp; Democracy)</td>
<td>P. Quiddington</td>
<td>M. Bode</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Vromen</td>
<td>H Williams</td>
<td>D. Erdos</td>
<td></td>
<td>E. Davies</td>
<td>J. Tate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030-1100</td>
<td>MORNING TEA (Banquet Hall)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1230</td>
<td>Fem Pol</td>
<td>Alison Convery (Chair)</td>
<td>Harry Williams (Chair)</td>
<td>Peter Carroll (Chair)</td>
<td>Heads of Discipline meeting (inc lunch)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M Andrew</td>
<td>K. Alport &amp; L. Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Morriss</td>
<td>P. Brent (AEio)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G. Gillon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P. Larkin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1400</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1530</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1600</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To be held in the Cummings Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFTERNOON TEA (Banquet Hall)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONFERENCE CLOSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>