6 Cosmopolitanism and republican citizenship

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In recent years there has been a revival of republican conceptions of political theory and citizenship. This revival has been notably championed by the neo-roman republican conception of republicanism as articulated by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit. While arguments mounted by scholars such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and David Miller have strongly defended the importance of national political community, it was the neo-roman conception of citizenship that placed republican ideas closer to liberalism by articulating a conception of liberty constituted by a republican state. However, within the context of accelerating spatial integration in the form of contemporary globalisation, scholars connected to the cosmopolitan critique of state-bound political theory have increasingly questioned the feasibility of democracy and citizenship at the level of the state. The question for political theorists in general, and republicans in particular, is whether cosmopolitanism forecloses other, less global, structures of governance and citizenship.

In what follows, I am going to argue that a broad understanding of cosmopolitanism opens up spaces for global forms of politics that fall short of a universal global democracy that is championed by cosmopolitans such as Anthony McGrew and David Held. As such, I will first examine the breadth of cosmopolitan political theory and then focus on the cosmopolitan argument for a global democracy. Then, I will turn to the neo-roman conception of citizenship and governance and examine the degree to which it exhibits universal or cosmopolitan elements.

Cosmopolitan democracy

Cosmopolitanism, or the idea of a world citizenship, was first expressed by Diogenes and the Stoics with the claim that 'each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities – the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration' (Nussbaum 1996: 7). This cosmopolitan claim is essentially that the human community is the one that should be supreme and thus forwards an unwavering commitment to the universal community of humanity and a sense of detachment from solely local or
national affiliations. It should be noted from the outset that cosmopolitanism is not a ‘monolithic’ or exclusively liberal approach to politics (Rengger 2000: 463). While the universal value of individual humans is an important part of the cosmopolitan liberalism of Immanuel Kant, there are many tangents within cosmopolitanism. Some cosmopolitans such as Thomas Pogge emphasise the intrinsic universal value of humans being the ‘ultimate unit’ of concern (Pogge 1992: 49). While others emphasise the development of global moral responsibility as tangible interdependence expands globally (Beitz 1979). There are also some who claim that the historic mutability of human community opens the possibility to an inclusive global community (Linklater 1998).

However, cosmopolitans differ at an even more fundamental level. The crucial distinction within cosmopolitan theory is between the position of ‘political’ cosmopolitanism on one hand, which advocates the creation of universal political institutions at a global level, and ‘moral’ cosmopolitanism on the other, which advances universal principles that do not justify global institutions but ‘the basis on which institutions should be justified or criticised’ (Beitz 1999: 287). Both moral and political cosmopolitanism revolve around a moral obligation and identification with the human species, but political cosmopolitans extend beyond this to include an account of global citizenship and democracy. This distinction is important because political cosmopolitanism seeks to provide the political infrastructure of a universal political community and democratic system that radically delimits the state. This entails developing a world where all people have an input into a single global democracy. While this distinction is important, and the idea of a worldwide structure of government has a long history in Western thought, the placement of some authors within these positions is often the source of considerable debate. Immanuel Kant is a chief example of an author who is variously claimed to be a political or moral cosmopolitan (Heater 1996). In contemporary times, political cosmopolitans are more forthright in their support for global institutions. While there are many examples of contemporary political cosmopolitan thought, the strongest and clearest accounts of political cosmopolitanism are those of Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, Anthony McGrew, and especially David Held’s defence of cosmopolitan democracy.

The chief reason that there has been a strong revival of political cosmopolitanism is that the context of world politics in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century is seen by many to be travelling in a cosmopolitan ‘direction’. This context that is claimed by many cosmopolitans to be congenial for political cosmopolitanism includes accelerating globalisation; the increasing role of international organisations and non-governmental organisations; an increase in the number of states that practise democracy around the world (Archibugi and Held 1995: 3); and the development of an extensive system of universal human rights law under the aegis of the UN. However much these developments point in a
cosmopolitan direction, they do not achieve the globally unified institutions envisioned by those who support political cosmopolitanism, nor do they eliminate the sovereign authority of the state. This provides the context from which scholars such as David Held launch their justification for cosmopolitan democracy.

The starting point for Held is that the various processes of globalisation are radically delimiting the capacity of the democratic nation-state to have any real sense of control over its fate. He claims that substantive self-government cannot be ‘located within the boundaries of a single nation-state alone’ (Held 1998). Held argues that globalisation creates a series of ‘disjunctures’, such as international law, the internationalisation of political decision-making, international security structures, and the globalisation of culture and the world economy, that all cut across and constrain the democratic state’s capacity to regulate its own fate (Held 1998). He maintains that because these disjunctures frustrate the congruence between a public and the state, that the state is not a viable location to enable people to govern themselves democratically. People will be both affected by ‘outside’ decisions and influences, and people within the state will affect others without recourse. In the context of globalisation, the only way to overcome these disjunctures is to include everyone in decisions that affect them and thereby make the apposite site for democracy a global one.

Indeed, the desire to globally extend democracy across states is the objective at the heart of political cosmopolitanism. It is required so that individuals and not states are enabled to be the primary moral agents in world politics. Held’s justification for this rests not just on contemporary globalisation but on a support of Kant’s principle of hospitality, which affirms that a foreigner should be tolerated and not ‘treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another’s country’ because ‘a transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere’ (Kant 1983: 118–19). However, Held dramatically extends such principles beyond just conduct towards foreigners to include a fundamental respect for the rights of everybody foreseeably affected by a given political decision. In practice:

universal hospitality must involve, at the minimum, both the enjoyment of autonomy and respect for the necessary constraints on autonomy. That is to say, it must comprise mutual acknowledgments of, and respect for, the equal rights of others to pursue their own projects and life-plans. Moreover, in a highly interconnected world, ‘others’ include not just those found in the immediate community, but all those whose fates are interlocked in networks of economic, political and environmental interaction.

(Held 1998: 228)

For universal hospitality to exist, a cosmopolitan legal system is required. Furthermore, this prescription of governance suggests that democracy
ought to be extended to a global level, so that both local and global problems can be addressed in an effective and globally inclusive manner.

The animating force of Held's articulation of political cosmopolitanism is his conception of 'cosmopolitan democratic public law' – a common legal structure that is entrenched across and within a range of 'diverse political communities' and 'multiple citi­zenships' (Held 1998: 233). While Held argues for a global executive, constitution and the related paraphernalia of government, at the heart of his account is a willingness to develop global democratic structures that enable all people affected by a given process to have a say in the public policies aimed at addressing these global or regional problems (Held 1998: 278). Cosmopolitan democratic public law is a 'binding framework' that includes only those people likely to be affected by a given decision – local decisions like garbage collection will be made locally, while global decisions such as regulating greenhouse gas emissions would be made by everybody (Held 1998: 233). Richard Falk refers to this as a movement towards a global constitution which represents the 'intensified continuation' of the emergent normative and institutional framework already under way during the twentieth century under the aegis of the UN – not just a milder form of moral cosmopolitanism or liberal internationalism (Falk 1991: 7). Therefore global constitutionalism entails a strengthening of the rule of international law by entrenching the judicial resolution of interstate disputes and embedding transnational social actors into global governance. While these cosmopolitan aspirations are sometimes embodied in law as it presently stands, Held seeks to embed cosmopolitan practices into an overarching body of cosmopolitan democratic law.

It is important to state that Held does not argue for a simplistic model of world government, but rather a flexible and complex model of democracy at a global level where citizenship is held by all people. As Anthony McGrew maintains, cosmopolitanism is defined by the principle of 'heterarchy', which entails a 'divided authority system subject to cosmopolitan democratic law' rather than hierarchy (McGrew 1997: 250). Thus cosmopolitan law is embedded at all levels of global political life: states are not the only form of governance operating within cosmopolitan democracy. City-states, communities, and even functional organisations such as TNCs will be subject to cosmopolitan democratic law. This also raises the distinct need for clear rules to determine what sorts of issues are dealt with at which level of governance. Held's response to this question is to establish a boundary court that determines public issues on the basis of the number of people affected, the intensity of effect of the issue on people and the 'comparative efficiency' of why lower levels of governance cannot deal with the issue (Held 1998: 236). This legal requirement, and the long-term plans for cosmopolitan democracy by Held, means that the legal-political fabric of this model is elaborate, and fuels fears of cosmopolitanism's critics that the cosmopolitan model is indeed a model for a world government.
By contrast, moral cosmopolitanism does not involve developing such elaborate structures. Moral cosmopolitans would be satisfied with the elaboration and substantiation of human rights and democracy in states across the world as well as foreign policy being guided by principles of restraint in regards to conflict and compassion to foreigners. As such, moral cosmopolitanism – a basic universal concern for human welfare and dignity – can be found in much of liberal thought, some strands of social democratic thought and, I would argue, republican thought.

Republican democracy

The contemporary revival of republicanism has centred on republicanism being different from both liberalism and communitarianism (Pettit 1999: 7–8). The revival of neo-roman republicanism political theory is attributable to writers such as Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and Maurizio Viroli. These writers have emphasised republicanism’s critique of both liberalism, for its asocial view of freedom, and communitarianism, for the idea that involvement in a pre-political community can define or sustain freedom (Brugger 1999: 12–14). The neo-roman strand of republicanism emphasises a series of interlocking civic ethics and institutions that are intent on establishing liberty as a civic achievement that requires an institutionalised context where citizens are free from subordination or domination. Consequently, republicanism’s conception of liberty is one of ‘non-domination’ (Pettit 1999), a context that entails a sensitivity to the capacity of arbitrary intervention in people’s lives or the dependence of people on the goodwill of others. This conception of liberty reflects a concern with the ways ambition, self-interest and powerful private or factional interests can corrupt the body politic and usher in domination and a dependency on the goodwill of these interests. The objective of non-domination is for individuals to be free from both imperium, that is domination by the state, and from dominium, meaning domination by sectional interests within society (Pettit 1999: 13). Republicanism stresses that transparent, publicly governed state power is the way to construct liberty. Pettit contends that liberty defined as non-domination ‘comes about only by design’ (Pettit 1999: 122).

A requisite in the design that achieves this liberty is the publicly directed and constrained exercise of power by a republican state. Pettit has referred to this activity as a form of ‘antipower’ where ‘the power of some over others – the power of some over others in the sense associated with domination – is actively reduced and eliminated’ (Pettit 1999: 588–89). Thus it is not just well intentioned laws that help enact the republican conception of liberty. It is that laws backed by the publicly directed use of power can actually counteract multifarious forms of vulnerability and domination. The design of enacting non-domination requires that the exercise of public power is structured and delimited within a republic. A republic is a state where sovereignty is ‘located in the people’ even if the
actual exercise of authority is delegated across a range of institutions and governments (Deudney 1996: 197). Such authority is both defined and constrained by the principle of self-government that is focused on the common or public good of its resident citizens (Skinner 1992: 217). The republican conception of the public good is not a pre-political conception of the good life, nor an aggregation of individual interests. Rather it is a common interest in goods that are not able to be obtained individually – particularly a dependable and extensive sense of liberty and mutual respect (Pettit 1999: 284). Non-domination is a shared and constitutive condition that is typified by a secure and peaceful environment for individuals to live their chosen lives. However, maintaining the public good requires constituent citizens' political participation and responsibility. Thus a republic is both an institutional assemblage and a political association encompassing members of a public united around a concern for their mutual liberty.

These interlocking ethics and practices converge on the observation that liberty can only be realised when citizens act together to control power in order to avoid both domination by particular interests and preventable vulnerability. Consequently, republican citizenship is not merely a status, or the right to be politically involved, but an active ongoing duty and an ongoing stake in the political operation of the state in which citizens reside. Pettit regards this practical conception of republicanism as ‘gas-and-water-works republicanism’ that departs from romantic accounts of republicanism or democracy – it does not require a step back to positive liberty or the ‘liberty of the ancients’ (Pettit 1999: 239). Republicanism unites the demand for virtue and civic activity on the part of citizens with public institutions in order to contest power and construct institutions that secure the protection of citizens from domination.

The question remains whether republican citizenship is inherently nationalistic or communitarian. The answer is no, although republicanism is not purely cosmopolitan either. I contend that the republican practice of citizenship and the notion of ‘the public’ are unavoidably particularist in the sense that they develop from actual ongoing forms of common political association (Viroli 1995: 13). While some communitarians and republicans claim that nationality may well be a ‘partial replacement’ for patriotism in the modern world (Miller 2000: 67), national forms of solidarity are not sufficient for the active political motivation and participation embedded in the practice of patriotism (Viroli 1995: 11–13). Patriotism and citizenship are active practices that are ‘sustained by shared memories of [a] commitment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance against oppression and corruption’ (Viroli 1995: 13). Mauritizo Viroli makes the distinction between republicanism and nationalism by arguing that republicanism invokes an ongoing ‘love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people’ rather than a love of a nation’s ‘cultural, linguistic and ethnic oneness’ (Viroli 1995: 1). Nor does republicanism stipulate a blinding righteousness. In fact, patriotic citizenship is demanding
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exactly because it requires a moral commitment to open-mindedness beyond citizens' own private interests, a political involvement in the development of the public good and personal vigilance in the face of threats to the republic. Such commitment, solidarity, and passion are only enabled by people feeling that they are 'part of something’ (Viroli 1995: 13). Ultimately then, republicanism does not necessarily embed any ethnic or nationalistic norms or conception of the good life other than norms that entail public responsibility and oversight over a particular set of political institutions. These norms reflect the social nature of the morality that constitutes non-domination (Pettit 1999: 8).

So while republicanism is not nationalistic it is still dependent upon a civic culture that constitutes and develops a context of non-domination. This is where the contrast with liberalism is made clear. Republicanism does not embrace the social atomism embedded within liberal citizenship and does not embrace the idea of a minimal state with few regulatory powers. Republicanism is dependent upon a particular public ethos which entails that citizens cherish the institutions that act as a bulwark against arbitrary forms of power, but also requires that these citizens are actively 'political' in the sense that individuals 'respect other citizens' liberty, and to discharge their civic duties', in addition to being wary and vigilant in respect to potential threats to the public good (Viroli 1995: 45). At an ethical level the values of civility and patriotism become guiding norms of political life, while at an institutional level, forums and avenues of democratic oversight over the working of authority are indispensable to facilitating non-domination. It is impossible to see republican citizenship in isolation, as the practice is deeply connected with an appropriately empowered state that is actively directed to moderate public and private forms of domination.

So the question is, how do republican ideas operate in relation to international politics? While cosmopolitan ideas seem well suited to a context of accelerating globalisation, at first glance the statist inclination of republicanism does not seem to fit this context as well. While republicanism connotes the unavoidable necessity of the state, I am going to argue that the republican legacy in international affairs unsettles the notion that republicanism is a form of statism or realism because the design of the republic does not stop at the borders of republican-constituted states. Ultimately, the republican state is only possible within a wider association of republican states and international institutions set up by republican states. Interstate cooperation and institutionalisation are crucial to republican aims – even though these forms of governance cannot in and of themselves construct the civic liberty of republicanism. According to Pettit, judicial sovereignty is not ‘sacred’, indeed:

it is going to be in the interest of the republican state to encourage different layers of multinational cooperation and institutionalization ...
while the republican state represents an indispensable means of furthering people's non-domination ... there are some domestic issues on which it may be better from the point of view of promoting freedom as non-domination to give over control to those bodies and thereby to restrict the local state.

(Pettit 1999: 152)

This construction would require checks and balances within these institutions as well as institutional transparency and oversight by the publics from constituent states. Despite the dangers of possible domination by distant bodies, well crafted institutional arrangements that bind states and the delegation of popular sovereignty are not just consistent with republicanism but constitutive of republicanism's efforts to actively suppress domination.

These forms of cooperation would be aimed at enabling states to address transnational problems so republics can have meaningful public deliberations and realise a condition of non-domination. Republicanism would support the regulation of the various forms of transnational activity that transmit the capacity to dominate people, such as environmental degradation or transnational crime. Also these measures would stabilise and regulate economic connections between states, so that republican states are not competing against each other for regulatory standards or dominated by mobile capitalist interests. I also think one of the most distinctive elements of republicanism in the international sphere would be a promotion of state-building and development. In pursuing this goal of individual empowerment to prevent domination, the promotion of development assistance for developing countries would be an important goal even if the promotion of republican values and institutions were not immediately possible. It must be stressed that the ultimate objective of global civic republicanism is always the empowerment of people. The ethos of republicanism seeks to promote the 'basic capabilities that are required for functioning in the local culture' and as such the promotion of human development is central to this ethos (Pettit 1999: 158–59).

Consequently, republicanism can be seen to advocate both the building of complex forms of inter-state cooperation and a civically minded public in states around the world (Hudson 2003). While the republican legacy in international affairs could be read as either endorsing the broadening of the extended nature of popular sovereignty across states or of extending the act of mutual binding between popularly sovereign states, for my part I think that the choice between a global public and states that are responsible to their resident citizens collapse on each other in the sense that effective public control of states now requires citizens to think globally. While republicanism requires a significant change in the way people live the idea of political responsibility within their state in the form of patriotism and citizenship, it also requires citizens to be globally conscious and
responsible. So while republican citizenship is in contradiction with being a ‘citizen of the world’ and political cosmopolitanism, the contrast with moral cosmopolitanism is far less problematic. I now turn to an exploration of some of these intersections with both moral and political cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism and republicanism

While there are certain sympathies between cosmopolitanism and republicanism, the differences are sufficient to be wary of attempts to simply conflate the two political projects. However, there are three good reasons why there is some convergence between republicanism and moral cosmopolitanism. First, patriotism is not in contradiction with a concern for humanity. Republicans contend that the patriotic citizenship that animates the republican state is not ‘exclusive’ or a hindrance to forms of transnational solidarity and hospitality (Viroli 1995: 12). Second, a republican-inspired citizenry and state would see ‘the domination of others as cause for real moral and political concern’ (Rattan 2001: 127). Thus, republicanism can be seen to be morally cosmopolitan in the sense that it values the liberty of all human beings, even if it does not suggest that a unified political order is a possible way to achieve this. While non-domination is a universal value, the way this value is realised is inherently particularist in that republicanism sees the only way to promote liberty is by enabling people to have an empowered state that is carefully guided by its citizens. While non-domination is a universal goal, it cannot be achieved by universal means. Last, for purely prudential reasons republican concern for domination must necessarily extend globally. The goal of non-domination does open up the need to construct forms of governance that act upon global forms of domination that cut across state borders. Republicanism clearly requires a concern for the practice of non-domination to be facilitated on a global or regional basis, in a way that balances state-bound public sentiment with global forms of peace and cooperation.

Despite these overlaps with moral cosmopolitanism, republicanism is much less accommodating towards political cosmopolitanism. From a republican point of view there are many reasons to be wary of a cosmopolitan political order. While republicans would be concerned with giving up the potentially constructive political allegiances and solidarities that do exist or could be reinvigorated at a local or national level, they would also be alarmed by the significant concentration of power in world politics that is quite distant from oversight or control, which is embedded in cosmopolitan democracy. Ultimately for republicans, the cosmopolitan development of a global public sentiment and participation that is able to provide for liberty is much more difficult to develop than political cosmopolitans acknowledge. The main republican argument against the viability of political cosmopolitanism is that it does not possess the power needed to address contemporary global problems. The protection provided to individuals by
political cosmopolitanism stems from the legal rights and redress provided by cosmopolitan law. Republicans assert that something more than abstract laws is required. Publicly directed power, that is, government structured around protecting the liberty particular to a given society, is essential to protect societies and address global problems. Thus, states can provide a context domestically and globally that is sensitive to global problems and is empowered to address these global problems without resorting to the convolution of cosmopolitan democratic law. From the republican point of view, the public sentiment that stems from political cosmopolitanism is problematic for a series of interlocking reasons.

The first problem facing the public sentiment stemming from political cosmopolitanism is that it is inherently abstract. The elaborate transformation in public sentiments and institutions that is sought by political cosmopolitanism may seem attractive given the scale and increasing significance of problems that can only be addressed at a global level. After all, political cosmopolitanism seeks to narrow the authority of the state and broaden the political loyalties of its citizens. However, the shift away from states to a universal and global authority does not build upon existing institutions and sentiments, nor does it automatically address the social solidarity and legitimacy needed to empower institutions able to protect individuals from prevailing forms of power (Miller 2000: 70). The republican counterpoint is not just that this transformation is unnecessary because states can (and do) cooperate on matters without a cosmopolitan framework (Saward 2000; Neff 1999). Rather, the republican perspective is that ‘free institutions are not a bright idea that can be dreamed up and voted in: they must expand upon or restore some traditional institution’ (Crick 1998: 42). In contrast to the dramatic shift in authority and sentiment required by the approach of political cosmopolitanism, republicanism seeks to enhance and build upon the existing sentiments and structures of the state. As such, there is a strong element of pragmatism in the republican approach. It seeks to build upon the existing foundation by reworking the already existing nature of the state and the collaboration of states rather than enact a new global system of governance.

Interestingly, there are signs that the state is coming back to vogue in political thought and policy-making circles. Some neo-liberals are realising that some neo-liberal programmes of liberalisation and privatisation have gone too far or have been undertaken by countries that do not yet have the legal infrastructure to underpin vibrant capitalism. This has been indicated in recent shifts in World Bank and IMF policy towards what has become referred to as a ‘Post Washington Consensus’, a movement away from pure free markets to include a concern for the institutional conditions of the state and for development (among other policies) (Jayasuriya 2001). This point has also, surprisingly, been made by Francis Fukuyama in a recent article of his termed ‘Bring Back the State’ when he says that the ‘excessive zeal in pursuing this “neo-liberal” agenda undermined the strength of states
to carry out those necessary residual government functions' (Fukuyama 2004). While he defends the view that the state should be stronger he still thinks the state should have a rather narrow set of functions. I do not agree. I think that people in various parts of the world should choose what set of functions their state should deal with, not states as Fukuyama suggests. I think the state should reflect the wishes of its public so far as is possible, so long as it does not dominate its people or people in other states.

The second problem that republicanism has with political cosmopolitanism is the functional vision of the 'public' arising from the emphasis on the role of regional and global layers of governance (as suggested by David Held) or NGOs (such as emphasised by Richard Falk). This functional approach to political association is most evident within Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy, where people engage in political practice on various levels of governance according to whether the issue at hand affects them (Saward 2000: 33-35; Miller 2000: 36-37). By contrast, republican practice entails the social process of people collectively creating a form of public power that is aimed at upholding their common interests on an ongoing basis. While falling short of an inward looking community or a defence of nationalism, republicanism is defined by a historically shaped sense of common responsibility for the state by its citizens. This ongoing activity creates what Michael Saward refers to as a 'baseline unit' that is foundational and not merely functional (Saward 2000: 36-37). I use the term foundational because it suggests that other forms of governance may be built on top of this 'level' of governance as well as suggesting that the republican state is a foundation in terms of being the legitimate public authority. While republicanism supports the practice of NGOs (as well as regional and global layers of governance) and the important contestatory role they perform in contemporary global politics, it does not see these organisations as being the foundation of non-domination. To produce a context in which power is restrained, government must be publicly developed and directed within a culture of democracy that stems from a patriotic citizenry. The ongoing responsibility of citizenship is a crucial foundation for republican global governance. This attitude of the public construction of governance is central to republicanism in the sense that practices of contestation and delegation require citizens to see themselves as shapers of their state and now, ultimately, global forms of governance.

The third problem that republicanism has with political cosmopolitanism is that the power and authority arising from cosmopolitan democracy is intangible and removed from citizen oversight. Political cosmopolitanism takes an Archimedean and dispassionate starting point for authority in the shape of cosmopolitan law. While political cosmopolitanism is defined by 'heterarchy' rather than hierarchy, there is still a de jure reallocation of authority towards the new centre of global legal authority (McGrew 1997: 250). From a republican perspective there are concerns that if political
cosmopolitanism were to be too strong, it could become a tyrannical centralised power. If it were too weak or abstract, it would not stimulate citizens to act in ways to address the power of transnational capital or other highly organised and diffused networks of interest and or power, thereby allowing private forms of power to reign. By contrast, republicanism seeks to build authority from the bottom up in the sense that the reconstruction of civic ethics and structures that seek to constrain power within the state will ascend into higher layers of governance. For political cosmopolitanism, multi-level global governance constitutes different levels whereby people affected by an issue can influence the issue. For global civic republicanism, the global infrastructure of multi-level global governance would be an ongoing construction that augments rather than replaces the republican state. Republicanism suggests that civic states can build upon the forms of multilateral governance that have been aptly if not unevenly demonstrated within the last sixty years. In addition, the European Union has developed into a potential hope as to the ways citizens can discipline and transform multiple levels of governance and their state (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). Thus while there are multiple levels of governance that the state is enmeshed in, the purpose of this governance ought to be clearly aimed at enhancing opportunities for the state to protect its citizens.

It is my contention that while there is the exercise of global politics, there is no global public. There is no sense of global patriotism that motivates a 'thick' sense of global solidarity and reciprocity (Walzer 1994: 8; Barber 1996; Miller 2000: 72–77), or that encourages people to think beyond their own personal interests (Miller 2000: 77). There is no love of the UN, let alone the WTO. Ultimately, a context that is kept free from insecurity and vulnerability requires more than activists or policy-makers. It needs broad participation and a passionate sense of political involvement and consideration by citizens participating to enact their own liberty. Clearly, virtuous citizenship and political involvement is not being exercised in democracies around the world. Republicanism seeks to overturn a culture of democracy typified by civic disengagement rather than stretching the scale of democracy. The chances are greater of mobilising people in the states in which they live to develop virtuous public involvement than developing such virtue in a larger and much more abstract context devoid of the history and 'familiar life-ways' that can mobilise commitment and citizenship (Walzer 1994: 8). As Falk asserts:

citizens are now being challenged to reconfigure the outmoded dichotomy between undifferentiated patriotism and cosmopolitanism. If this challenge is met, the vitality of traditional patriotism can be restored, but only on the basis of extending ideas and practices of participation and accountability to transnational sites of struggle.

(Falk 1996: 60)
This is certainly right but it understates the important struggles to develop the ethics of political responsibility within the state that motivates people to entrust considerable power to the state. Clearly, we need to avoid this ‘outmoded dichotomy’ and be wary of patriotism and indeed nationalism, but we should not overlook the desire of people to create their own political responses to contemporary globalisation and other forms of global power via public control of the state. While I concur with Falk in regards to the ‘common commitment’ between patriotism and cosmopolitanism to create a ‘humane state’ (Falk 1996: 60), and ultimately a humane world, I think the only feasible route is through enhancing patriotism and the civic concern for arbitrary power rather than enhancing cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, a cosmopolitan awareness is clearly important to enabling globally astute citizens to be able to conduct civic activity that enacts a global concern for arbitrary power.

Consequently, republicanism directly addresses the shortcomings of political cosmopolitanism while moving beyond moral cosmopolitanism. It fills in the missing step within cosmopolitan thought by asserting the importance of citizens collectively wielding the public power of their state in order to ward off vulnerability and insecurity, without resorting to inward looking nationalism or chauvinism. Republicanism, in contrast to political cosmopolitanism, sees the state as essential to the construction of liberty. That this public accomplishment develops within a broader structure of governance does not validate the potential of a cosmopolis able to provide non-domination or authorise a ‘global republic’ in the immediate future.

**Conclusion: the value of the republican legacy**

Republicanism offers a distinct alternative to that of political cosmopolitanism, and it offers a more defined and forceful political approach to that of moral cosmopolitanism. The value of republicanism lies in being a potential alternative to cosmopolitan modes of politics and ethics. Although republicanism and cosmopolitanism have different lineages, there are important lessons to be learnt from the two approaches. The message that cosmopolitanism has for republicanism is that a concern for global forces and a concern for people outside the republican state is increasingly necessary for constructing durable non-domination at home. Globalisation is blurring the distinctions between foreign and domestic politics, as well as speeding up connections across national borders in ways that necessitate showing consideration for people outside the state. Moral cosmopolitanism also wards off elements of chauvinism and xenophobia in political thought and practice. I do not think that there is anything in the republican legacy or the creation of patriotic cultures within states that is necessarily antagonistic with the need to be globally aware and tolerant. Indeed, for republican attitudes to endure in a globalising context, they will require cosmopolitan moments of reflection.
The republican advice for cosmopolitanism is simply that we need to strengthen forms of citizenship that do exist and buttress the development of public ethics that support and justify the responsible exercise of state power. Ultimately, the ideal of a global cosmopolis is a long way off, and the political cosmopolitan ideals of discarding the potential of the state, state citizenship and patriotism seem to miss a step in the development of global politics that is going to improve the human condition. The emphasis, according to republicans, should be on the culture of democracy rather than the scale of democracy, and while the reworking of this culture should include a moral cosmopolitan outlook, it should also avoid the dispassion and economism of prevailing forms of liberalism. The republican idea is that controlling power is essential to the creation of liberty, and that the state is the site which at present we could control through virtuous citizenship. Thus the republican prescription is the promotion of patriotism and civic engagement within states around the world and the creation of elaborate international institutions, not only the creation of global values and institutions as cosmopolitans contend.

Note
1 This argument is developed further in Slaughter (2005).

Bibliography
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