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On 21 June 1950 Australia's top defence planning body, the Council of Defence, assembled in Canberra for conference with Britain's Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Slim. The Council of Defence was an amalgam of leading cabinet members and Australia's top defence personnel, and it met with Slim to consider the gravity of the Cold War crisis and its implications for Australians. It was mid-century (almost exactly), some fifty years since Australian federation and eight years since the Japanese began their assault on Papua New Guinea, an attack that was seen as the greatest external threat yet to Australia.

Slim wanted agreement from the Australians that Europe and the Middle East were the most crucial theatres to hold in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. More specifically, he wanted the Australians to agree to send an expeditionary force to help defend British airbases in the Middle East. Interestingly, he prompted something of a collective excursion into the history of Australia at war. Robert Menzies, prime minister said, 'The Middle East has been an Australian theatre now in two wars. We raised and sent the 2nd AIF to it and it was our primary preoccupation until Japan entered the war'. His Chief of General Staff, Sidney Rowell, added, 'We did right to help out in Middle East in the last war, and the situation now resembles this'; while another cabinet member suggested that the situation was in fact 'more comparable to the first world war than to the second'.

From the detailed notes taken of this meeting, Slim seemed both pleased and surprised at the historical turn the conversation took. He encouraged the Australians to assume that war with the Soviet Union would be global, and he pointedly reminded them of how the British empire might unravel should the Middle East not be held. If this happened, he said, 'it may open the route to Africa, finish cooperation by Pakistan and India, cut the sea route through the Mediterranean and deny to us oil resources which may be essential to the prosecution of this war.' Menzies agreed, adding that the Russians were also

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students of history: 'If they take note of the lessons of past history their aim must be to knock us out in the early period of the war'.

This episode illustrates well the paradigmatic problems historians of Australia in the world have faced. In the global crisis of the late 1940s to the early 1950s, a crisis which resembled the beginning of a third world war according to Menzies, leading policy-makers were quick to think globally and to envisage their involvement in terms of global strategic dictates. When war comes, Australians get in ships and sail to the Middle East. They had done it in two previous world wars and in the early 1950s; they would agree to do so again. The events of the 1940s, including declarations of the new importance of the United States for security in the Pacific, and ratification of the Statute of Westminster (enacted in Britain in 1931) conferring legal independence for Australia, had not disturbed the pattern of what Australians did when global war broke out.

The June 1950 talks therefore present a problem for those who would chart ascendant nationalism or independence in Australia's international relations. For such commentators, it has to be an interregnum, an aberration or an imperial hangover in a story of progressive change for the better. But, as I argue further in this paper, it does not seem like an aberration. The big problem with the independence/nationalism line of inquiry is that it tends to appropriate the consequences of the two world wars through a selective blend of national sacrifice and highlighted moments of self-consciousness. The soul-searching and shock resulting from more than 58,000 deaths in Europe and the Middle East in the first world war, when the population stood at a mere 5 million, and the prospect of a worst nightmare coming true in the second world war with the apparent likelihood of Japanese invasion, contains a tempting teleology. Australians must have grown more conscious of their distinctive national interests in the South Pacific, and more sensitive to changes in their region.

The three main propositions in this paper suggest another way of viewing the history of Australia in international affairs. The first is that Australian policy-makers were, from the moment of federation and even earlier, deeply interested in change in their region. Secondly, they were equally conscious that their security in their region depended on the fate of European empires in the global order, especially of course the British empire of which Australia was a proud member and which maintained the Royal Navy, Australians' main source of regional protection in the first half of the century. The third proposition is that the world wars, as interpreted by key Australian policy-makers, did not undermine this situation so much as throw it into even sharper relief.

Australians and Their Region in the Global Order

One the pioneers in the history of early Australian perceptions of and contacts with Asia, Neville Meaney, writes that the question of how to relate Europe to Asia

\(^2\) Ibid.
was, from the start, the central issue in Australian foreign policy. Coping with Asia was a major theme from the outset even if the idea of engaging with Asia had a decidedly patchy history for much of the twentieth century. Australians, for example, insisted quickly on varying the dominant British nomenclature of the 'Far East' to account for their own perspective on the Asia-Pacific region. As historian David Walker has shown, constructive relations with Asia loomed as a nation-building challenge for some Australian elites, and jostled with deep-seated fears that Asia's 'teeming millions' threatened white Australians' seemingly tenuous hold on their island-continent. Between 1909 and the outbreak of the second world war, prominent Australians ventured descriptions ranging from the 'Near East' and 'Far North' to the more apposite conflation, 'Near North', a description Prime Minister Menzies used in 1939 when the threat from Japan seemed imminent.

At the same time, Australian ministers were always acutely sensitive to the global implications of their being part of the project that was the British empire. They were very conscious of the tension between far-flung imperial responsibilities and their own concrete needs for security in the Pacific. In 1910 Minister of Defence George Pearce reminded his fellow parliamentarians that while the British empire had long been Australians' source of protection, their connection with it entailed the possibility that they could, at any time, find themselves at war with an enemy who had no designs on Australia. Australian military contributions in the cause of empire was also an expectation that London promoted, stressing that it was only with the strongest empire effort that the Royal Navy would be able to carry out its many tasks. Imperial defence plans implied mutual help. The more unified the empire, the better able it was to protect distant frontiers. The consequences of a stretched empire for Australian defence was therefore one of the most worrying unknowns informing Australian foreign and defence policy for more than half of the century.

Not surprisingly then, most of the Australian initiatives towards stronger regional defence before the first world war incorporated the empire. Instead of merely contributing financially to the maintenance of the Royal Navy, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin suggested the creation of an independent Australian navy and, more radically, the extension of the Monroe doctrine to the western Pacific. Australia's separate navy was born soon afterwards, but closer association with the Americans through an extended Monroe doctrine was an idea that sank quickly, if not completely. Importantly, both outcomes were very much the product of Anglo-Australian negotiations.

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3 See MEANEY's excellent introductory chapter in his Towards a New Vision: Australia & Japan through 100 Years, Sydney, 1999, pp. 9-36
6 PEARCE, 18 August 1910, in ibid, p. 192.
The great problem for Australians during the first two decades of the century was that Britain was allied by treaty with Japan, the source of most Australian anxiety. This treaty was, according to Whitehall, intended in part to benefit Australia. It was meant to take the strain off the Royal Navy in its mammoth roving brief, thereby enabling it to be more effective when it counted. Instead, it probably prompted more Australian probing of imperial strategy than had it not been struck.⁸

At the end of the first world war, some Australians were still calling for a more generous Monroe doctrine, and therefore more direct American involvement in Australian security.⁹ And later, in the mid to late 1930s, Australians made a comprehensive case for a Pacific pact, linked to the League of Nations Charter and ideally involving the British, Americans, Japanese, Russians and other European powers such as France and the Netherlands, with strong interests in the region. The proposal was considered seriously in foreign capitals around the world but did not enjoy enough support to get off the ground. London’s cool response was consistent with earlier British reactions to Australians venturing thoughts on improving their security in the Pacific: sympathetic, but knowing better, given the complexities of international politics at the time.

There were some half-chances for Australians to promote regional thinking and become more involved in strengthening links with Asia and across the Pacific. The 1930s was a period in which restrictive trading patterns and a depressed world economy stimulated forms of regionalism in East Asia. Japanese activity on the Asian mainland had a strong economic as well as a military dimension, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere being fleshed out, and plans developed for its full realization. Not surprisingly, Australians had not such grand vision of regional trade, especially not a regionalism dominated by Japan, but they did enjoy healthy bilateral trade with Japan. Even this was sacrificed, though, when number one trading partner, Britain, seemed threatened. Between mid 1936 and early 1938 the Australians imposed severe restrictions on Japanese imports (mainly textiles), and the other major trading nation bordering the Pacific, the United States (mainly motor chassis). In the case of Japan, the trade diversion was particularly shortsighted, given that Australia enjoyed a very favourable balance of trade with Japan, which had in fact become the Australians’ second best customer for major produce. British textiles exporters were the main beneficiaries. As one observer has put it, the policy amounted to sacrificing the interests of the second best customer in order to protect those of the best customer, Britain, and hope for even more custom from Britain.¹⁰

It was only really in the late 1940s that an Australian government, the Labor government of Ben Chifley, gave serious thought to Australian involvement in regional cooperative diplomacy. This was made possible partly because the Chifley

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⁸ Ibid.
⁹ For example, Prime Minister Billy Hughes in parliament, 10 September 1919: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. LXXXIX, p. 12172.
government had watched closely and had become involved in Indonesia's bloody struggle for independence from the Dutch; and the government was ready to contemplate the ending of European empires in the region. There was also a personality factor. Chifley had struck up some rapport with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during the complex negotiations leading to India's retaining membership of the Commonwealth in 1949 while introducing a republican constitution. In the same year Australia sent representatives to an essentially regional meeting in New Delhi to discuss Indonesia and possibilities for further regional meetings. And just before Chifley lost office and the decade ticked over, his government was pondering ways of making helping make South East Asia a buffer between Australia and the rest of Asia through measures such as education and technical aid and other development-related assistance.11

Two things curbed this line of thinking severely, the first being the arrival of a new Menzies government not as prepared as Labor to contemplate the region drained of civilising European influence; and the second was the re-emergence of world war as a dominant way of viewing change in world affairs.

World Wars

It is little wonder that the three world wars locked regional thinking into the most imperial and most global of gazes. Compared to previous wars, the first world war was of course extraordinary for its parameters — all of the major powers involved, and many of the smaller ones — its duration, its extravagant use of vast transport and weapons industries, its destruction of property, and the appalling loss of life, mostly European men, numbering nearly 10 million. Its magnitude left a deep imprint on the generation who lived through it. The war ended with the creation of the first codified international body designed to mediate disputes and uphold the rule of international law. Whatever its limitations as a source of collective security, the League was a fillip to an emerging internationalism which grew during the century through increasing activity across national boundaries in legal, humanitarian, economic and cultural spheres.12

The second world war involved even more nations. Air power now enabled more constant and easy transgression of national boundaries, and aerial bombardment and the concept of total war made mockery of the distinction between soldiers and citizens. Of the more than 50 million killed, at least half were civilians. Almost as many were uprooted as refugees in Europe, and not all were able to return to their pre-war homelands. Nazi ideology targeted Jews and Slavs, and in the case of Jews almost brought about their destruction as a group, with six million killed. The war ended with the creation of a world organization, the United Nations, intended to reform the international system that had allowed war to occur. It also ended with

the dropping of two atomic bombs, signalling a new high point in space-time compression, an absurd level of disproportion between the use of weapons and human suffering, and the prospect of human self-destruction.

The long Cold War bears few of the characteristics of the earlier world wars, save that, by mid 1950 at the latest, it was global in character. The early Cold War, however, from 1948 to 1952-53, was remarkable for how it was widely seen as the prelude to another world war. From 1948, Australians were treated to a stream of foreboding British analyses of the Soviet threat. The Chifley government tried to maintain a distinction between the Cold War polarity in Europe and more multifaceted problems in South East Asia, but the global logic of cold war was formidable, and was positively embraced by the Menzies government sworn at the end of 1949. By the middle months of 1950, both before and after the outbreak of the Korean war, leading British and American policy-makers began employing even more climactic metaphors, arguing that the time was fast approaching when had to take a stand and fight communism squarely. Menzies, as noted earlier, agreed.13

And Australian prime minister Menzies did more than merely speak in terms of history lessons. He doubled the defence budget as a percentage of domestic product, he introduced a big, expensive national service program for 18-year-old men, he led cabinet into agreeing to send troops and aircraft again to the Middle East when war broke out, and he commenced stockpiling and gearing the economy for war.14 His Chief of General Staff made ambitious promises about how many troops would be available to travel to the Middle East on the basis that national service trainees had joined up in droves when the first world war had broken out. The trainees of the early 1950s would surely do the same.15

Australians fought in all three of these world wars, if we include, as a third, involvement in the Korean war and preparations to safeguard defence of the Middle East in the early 1950s. Leading Australian politicians saw the world wars as having huge implications not only for Western civilization but also for their own pocket of Western civilization trying to keep the uncivilised peoples out. Returning from a visit to Britain in 1916 Australian prime minister Billy Hughes reminded his countrymen and women that the mighty issues involved in the war would determine the future of the world, including Australia. He urged Australians to remember that they had sheltered from the horrors of the war beneath the 'widestretched wings' of the British Navy, and told them to look again at their maps:

So far from being far removed from the busy hive of men we live almost within hail of its greatest populations. We have nailed 'White Australia' to the top of the mast. Yet we are but a tiny drop in a coloured ocean. We are 5,000,000 of white people claiming to hold inviolate

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13 See LOWE, Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle', pp. 29-30, pp. 43-44.
14 Ibid., pp. 80-99, pp. 128-151.
15 Rowell memo for McBride, 'Citizen Military Forces - Survey', 28 February 1952, CRS A5954 item 2291/4, NAA.
a great continent which would maintain 100,000,000 and we live almost within coo-ee of a thousand millions of coloured people, who jostle one another for want of room.¹-six

Apart from his ugly racism, characteristic of many in the English-speaking world at the time, Hughes's warning highlighted existing key features of Australia in the world. Australians were constantly measuring British declarations about the Royal Navy's capabilities against what they, the Australians, thought they might be capable of when tested in several oceans at the same time. They were very practised, even before the first world war, at considering how wars might cross boundaries or have consequences for several spheres of influences. Global war accentuated this global-regional interdependence rather than transforming Australians' concepts of international power and competition.

This was also the case in Australian anticipations of world war. Australians were amongst the keenest appeasers of Germany and Japan during the second half of the 1930s. Senior politicians and advisers had studied Hitler's rise to power carefully and had been divided over whether revision of the Treaty of Versailles would satisfy the new Germany. By late 1937 most felt that dealing with Hitler would have to involve either substantial territorial concessions, at the expense of central Europe, or rearmament and declarations of intent to take up arms. It was the appeasers, led by Prime Minister Joe Lyons and then Attorney-General Menzies, who won out in Australian debates. In the months leading up to the Munich agreement of September 1938 the Australian cabinet moved quickly to separate the Sudetenland issue from the bigger issue of Czechoslovakia and other international problems, and to petition London that the Czechs did not warrant going to war. After war with Germany had been declared, the Menzies government was similarly most reluctant to provoke Japan into aggression, pressuring London to keep closed the Burma Road that supplied Chinese nationalists, and declining to make significant reductions in exports to Japan well into 1941.¹-seven For a time, Australian appeasement was amongst the most fear-driven, informed by a panicked guess at how quickly global war with several main fronts could bring unstuck plans for the Royal Navy to protect Australia's north.

There is no equivalent of appeasement in the Menzies' government of the early 1950s. On the contrary, like many others in Western capitals, the Australian policy-making elite was hypersensitive to any allegations of appeasement of the new threat, the Soviet Union and its communist satellites. Memories of Manchuria and Munich were close to the surface of Australian discussions with Slim in 1950. Menzies, however, was also most sensitive to the possibility of a war even more global than the two before it stretching the democracies' resources across even more theatres. Having visited Britain, the United States, Korea and Japan shortly


after the outbreak of the Korean war, he noted in his diary another historically informed interpretation of communist activity in Korea and other parts of Asia:

All these Asian adventures are diversions by the Russians
(a) to contain substantial democratic forces
(b) to create a psychology which will make countries like Australia unwilling to make commitment outside S.E. Asia
(c) to try out weapons and techniques first as in the Spanish civil war.18

In the wake of these thoughts, Menzies urged the British and Americans to resist Stalin’s invitations to spread their defence resources thinly in response to the several communist-led crises. He wanted them to choose between those areas that were vital and worth defending, and those that were not.19 The idea of preserving the empire’s military forces, and now also American forces, in order to best safeguard Australia’s own regional security was as strong as ever.

Occasionally, both sides of Australian politics suggested some capacity for Australians to look after themselves, some measure of self-sufficiency in Australian defence. Labor leaders in opposition promoted big spending on air power in the late 1930s as a move designed to conquer geography and provide a defensive screen for the great island continent. Conservatives indulged in the same wishful thinking. A few weeks after the declaration of war in September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies told the public that they must keep two great questions in mind: 'What must we do in Australia to protect ourselves against a danger of attack in our own waters or on our own shores? Having made all proper provisions for that, in what way can we best contribute to the victory of Great Britain?'20. No amount of grammatical construction could hide the fact though, that it was only through British victories or American intervention that the Australians would be adequately defended under their current defence provisions.

Occasionally also, Australians led the way in Australian-British involvement in the South East Asian region. During the latter half of the second world war John Curtin’s Labor government spoke ambitiously and even took some action to give Australia a more prominent role in the local region at the end of the war. In addition to rather grandiose musings about assuming the mantle of European empires destined to withdraw from South East Asia, the Australians struck an agreement with New Zealand at the beginning of 1944 to promote their interests in the region. The so-called ‘ANZAC Agreement’ was bold, bordering on belligerent in its declarations that Australia and New Zealand had to be parties to any peace in the Pacific, and that they refused to recognise any change in sovereignty in the region as a result of allied use of bases during the war, a clause aimed especially at the United States. The agreement arose through a mixture of local imperialism and imagined power vacuums in the post-war Pacific, frustration at having been ignored in the making of key allied decisions in the latter half of the war, and a

18 Diary entry, 10 July 1950, Menzies Papers, MS4936, box 397, Canberra.
20 MENZIES’ comment of 27 September 1939, in MEANEY (ed), Australia in the World, p. 462.
sense of new opportunity as representatives of the British Commonwealth in the South Pacific. Curtin said that it served a ‘global idea’, stressing that Australia and New Zealand had had imposed on them ‘for all time to come, the great associated role of trusteeship in the South Pacific’. It was a global idea which suffered from another dose of wishful thinking about Australia’s capacities as a military power, and which still had a line thrown to Britain for support. The Americans were unimpressed, as were those European powers, such as Portugal and the Netherlands, whose colonies seemed to be in the Australians’ sights. As a result, the ANZAC Agreement did not enjoy support overseas.

And in the third world war, in 1951, Australians’ long-sought Pacific pact was finally achieved in the form of the ANZUS Treaty, a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Having often been described as the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy since its inception, and also the great symbol of Australia’s ‘turn’ away from Britain towards the United States, ANZUS has attracted a lot of historical attention. Very rarely, however, has its correct context, that of the war-like planning of the early 1950s, been adequately appreciated. What is clear is that, despite some clumsy diplomacy and some British bristling at being excluded from this pact, both London and Washington saw its main value in the context of how it related to the global crisis. As the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations told Menzies in 1951:

We completely accept your thesis that it is essential for your back door to be bolted. A guarantee [of your security] by the United States would make a significant contribution to the strengthening of our joint plans for global strategy and for the defence of the Middle East, which I know from our recent talks in London is so much on your mind.

Importantly, the Americans viewed ANZUS in the same way: providing the Australians with the security guarantee that would enable them to send forces overseas to help in areas of global significance, such as the Middle East. Whatever its status would become in future years, ANZUS was, at the time of its drafting, another example of a regional security measure tied inextricably to global imperatives and the role of Australia in imperial defence planning.

It was not until the mid-1950s that the idea of a long cold war replaced expectations of a likely ‘hot’ one. This slow transition paved the way for harder

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21 Curtin, 21 January 1944, in ibid., pp. 492-3.
23 An example which does not adequately cover the global context of ANZUS is C. Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1988, and a more detailed study which incorporates the global strategic setting is W.D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, New York, 1995.
25 O. Bradley (Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Marshall (Secretary of Defense), 9 July 1951, RG 59, 790.57-2051, United States National Archives, Washington DC; Joint Chiefs memorandum for Secretary of Defense (Lovett), 'The Military Role of Australia and New Zealand', 28 December 1951, RG 330 box 265, CD 337, USNA.
thinking in Australia about the consequences of past and likely future decolonization in South East Asia and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{26} It did not mean the end of interdependence between security in a regional context and involvement in British and American global strategy. Such interdependence has never disappeared. The transition was also far from smooth, as was well illustrated by the Menzies government’s strident support for Britain during the Suez crisis of 1956. A crisis in the Middle East in which British and French interests were at stake triggered a default setting in government for Australian rallying to preserve the imperial lifeline, the sea-lines between Britain and Australia. But without an overpowering anticipation of another world war there was more space to think constructively, from the second half of the 1950s, about Australian involvement in its region.

\textit{Conclusion}

The term ‘independence’ did not loom large in Australians’ notions of their foreign policies in the first half of the twentieth century. This has not stopped historians from spreading considerable ink on the matter of Australian dependence and independence — admittedly more in titles and structural architecture than as incisive analytical approaches. Most of these studies have obscured the fact that constant tension between and interdependence of globalism and regional security concerns was present from the outset, and Australia’s involvement in the world wars of the first half of the century confirmed rather changed this.

One of the implications of my interpretation here is that there is, in the Australian case study, plenty of support for Eric Hobsbawm’s comment that there is no understanding of the world since 1914 without understanding the impact of world war. The twentieth century, he argues, ‘lived and thought in terms of world war, even when the guns were silent and the bombs were not exploding.’\textsuperscript{27} Hobsbawm discusses the two world wars in one chapter on total war, and other historians have linked them through the idea of a thirty years war.\textsuperscript{28} If the Australian experience can contribute to the bigger project of structuring the history of international relations, there may even be a case of extending the continuous war idea to forty years — or perhaps employ the metaphor of a triptych, to deal adequately with the special circumstances of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The New Zealand experience might illustrate the same point. Space does not permit a detailed comparison here, but it is worth noting that the greater geographical remove from Asia enabled New Zealanders to respond even more decisively than Australians to the global/imperial dictates of three world wars. In the first world war, they went a step further than the Australians and introduced conscription for military service; in the second world war they were quicker to send

\textsuperscript{26} This is one of the main arguments in LOWE, \textit{Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’}.

\textsuperscript{27} E. HOBBSBAWM, \textit{Age of Extremes}, London, 1995, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{28} As discussed, for example, P.M.H. BELL, \textit{The Origins of the Second World War in Europe}, Harlow, 1986, pp. 14-52.
troops to the Middle East, and inclined to leave them there after Japan’s entry into the war; and in 1950–51 they were faster and unconditional in confirming their role in sending another expeditionary force to help the Commonwealth defend the Middle East if and when needed.29

Less ambitiously, we can conclude that the history lesson played out in Canberra in June 1950 was testament to the globalism of the two world wars. Here, some clarification of terminology might be made. ‘Globalization’, in its relatively un-theorised form of space-time compression and increasing interconnectedness, was also something that the two world wars promoted. For reasons outlined in this paper, Australians tended to be very sensitive to forces which made the world seem more interconnected, and which might affect the Royal Navy’s capacity to save them from invasion. They were sensitive to revolutions in technology and communications and challenges to the imperial world order. The work and life span of the Australian Council of Defence provide some illustration of this. Its June 1950 meeting with Slim was the last but one before the council was disbanded, and its first meeting had been in May 1905, coincident with the stunning Japanese demolition of the Russian Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits.

In relation to the key themes of our focus on globalization and regionalization, the Australian experience in the first half of the twentieth century suggests that globalism was a more central idea than globalization. The ongoing process implied in the term ‘globalization’ is not as important in explaining the early 1950s Cold War episode as the globalist mindset: the interpretation of economic and foreign policy in relation to events and developments throughout the world. Australian federation occurred at the beginning of the century, at a time when the British empire was near its peak of expansion. Federated Australia was therefore born thinking global, even if it was global via empire.

We can safely say that globalization during the twentieth century also assisted in Australians’ capacity to think in regional terms. South East Asia and the Pacific underwent changes that owed much to shifts in world power and the changing nature of the world economy. But there were also two more specific processes that facilitated Australians’ closer engagement with their region in the second half of the century. One was the slow, complicated end of the far-flung British empire and Australians’ identification with it, and the other was the erosion of strong expectations in another world war. With respect to the latter, the Australian case study suggests that changing strategic circumstances and also the ageing of a generation of policy-makers led by experience to expect global struggle were both necessary. As the 1960s wore on, there grew fewer cabinet colleagues and public servants with whom one could sit down and reminisce about what we had done in the last war and how this would guide Australia in the next one.

29 On these themes, see McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact.