Abhāva:
Negation in logic, real non-existent, and a distinctive pramāṇa in the Mīmāṃsā

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The focus of this essay is on the Mīmāṃsās' radical epistemological theory of negation, otherwise known as abhāva or “absence”, and which may be read as nāsti or non-existent. Before we go any further, a word on “Mīmāṃsā” is appropriate, particularly for those who may not be familiar with this particular school of classical Indian thought —perhaps in some ways even pre-classical with its roots in the Brāhmaṇas of the Vedas—and to which also arguably belongs the genesis of the Nyāya school of thought.

The term “mīmāṃsā” literally signifies “commeasurement” — from the root “mān”, “to think” and (with the additional gāṇ-prefix mī) — “to interpret and align”, and this implies, in Zilberman’s words, “achievement of consistency in reasoning [nāya, later nyāya], as a necessary precondition of making the meanings of words or sentences (for Sanskrit it is all the same) comprehensible [19].”

According to the definition given by Śabara in his bhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra I.1.2,

“... interconnected words or sentences which instruct in methods of cooperation or congruency in actions are known as pūrvā-mīmāṃsā, or karma-mīmāṃsā [19].”

It is in this semantic field where internal consistency is aligned with the normative pragmatic of “what is to be done” (actual or potential actions) — and, counterfactually, what is not to be done (i.e., prohibition)— that the doctrine of negation first makes its appearance in Indian philosophical thought. With Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, c. 7th century CE, the doctrine achieves a decisive logical formulation in the dialectical tussles with the Nyāya school of thought.

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Buddhist philosophers. In the background are the rule-based formulations where varieties of negations and self-defeating paradigms within language-uses are schematically dealt with by the—even more vintage—Grammarians, Pāṇini and Patañjali. (By “logical”, then, one means not so much formal reasoning as in mathematical logic, but rather ratiocination encompassing linguistics, epistemology and ontology — the Vedanta added “metaphysics” to this developmental ratio.)

I have three aims. First I should like to present an outline of the logical theory of negation in the Mīmāṃsā. Second, I shall make a connection of this with the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic of moral judgments (which for them are inscribed in śruti, the Vedas, in the form of Vedic injunctions, “the ought to do” type of positive propositions or vidhis. And finally, we make a further link of these two moves to its epistemological radicalism in standing up for an independent and distinctive pramāṇa, valid instrument of knowing, in respect of “absence” — and that too, on pain of being true to a realist ontology. The most important part of the discussion here is the Mīmāṃsā treatment of negative propositions.

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As mentioned above, the logical thesis begins with deliberations on rules followed in expressions pertaining to certain actions. The concern is not at all with indicative or purely descriptive expressions (for these are regarded as arthavāda, of auxiliary aid to the deliberations). To elaborate on this, I shall use Zilberman’s succinct descriptors for action-statements. Actions are divided subjunctively into two classes: prescriptive and prohibitive. Normative injunctions (vidhis), derived from the Vedic sentences, which stimulate or are an accomplice to actions can take one of these forms (1) regular, imperative or non-exemptive (nitya), i.e., categorically non-conditional; (2) imposed by circumstances (naimittika), hence conditional to some greater good; (3) optative, prudentially conditional, i.e., conducive to some desirable award or potential effect (kāmya), and is non-prescriptive. These together constitute dharma, the normative performatives: this is the Bhāṭṭa a (followers of Kumārila) view; the Prabhakara extend the kāryatā, practicum, of dharma only to the first two.1 The inducement or conducive-ness toward the requisite effort is communicatively generated, after attention has been roused, in the form of a verbal energy in the so-compelled, excited or inspired initiate by the vidhi-proposition, generally of the form: “Let him be induced to do this and that”, and it abides in the subjective

1anyākāryatā, anyā ceṣṭasādhivatā ... phalaṃ prati upayataṃ phalasādhiva-

vatavam, kṛtakṛtam pradhānatvaṃ tadbhāvita kāryatā; ... loke kṛṣṇakāryatājñānāti pravṛttavāpi kāryatājñānaṃ pravṛttimistāh. [11, p. 57]. Cf. also

[9, p. 63] where this passage is also cited.
intention (bhāvana) much like the subjunctive force of modality. It is rendered by the imperative or optative form of the verb (liṅ) and it conceals the deontic modality of the statement which proposes something as hitherto not existent (non-existent), but as due or awaiting to be done (kāryatā): the potential or portending action [19, p. 289].

Now, and this is a crux of the argument, the prior non-existent (or the facticity of non-existence) is the logical negation of what has not yet been actualised. The relation between the non-existent (or non-existence of the action/thing), abhāva, and its counterpositive (pratigōgi) is that of incomensurability. In its simplest form this could be expressed as \( \neg(p \land \neg p) \). All subsequent schools of Indian thought that recognised the ideality of non-existence accepted this formulation of negation. But there are other possible kinds of negations as well; and even more so, the Mīmāṃsā was pressed to argue, in the case of subjunctive propositions, i.e., of the prescriptive, vidhi, type. The problem then that faces the philosopher is to interpret all parts of the vidhis and the larger passages in which they are embedded, and to sort through the kinds and degrees of permitted (i.e., included), proscribed or prohibited, delimited and bounded qualifications (i.e., inclusive-exclusive), as well as the wholly excluded conditionals governing a particular action (such as, for example, the special sacrifice on the night of equinox). The way this is done is by focusing primarily on the verbal displayment that abides in the impersonal Vedic words (being authorless, there is no question of inquiring into the intentions of the supposed author[4]); and that focus narrows down to the verbal intentionality (śabdibhāvana) that presents a specific transcendental function as the specific property of the intension of the verbal meaning.\(^2\) It follows that among the injunctions there may well be resemblances, dissimilarities, or oppositions and defeats; and so generating an order among these becomes of paramount importance.

In the analysis that ensues, two categories become important: affirmative and negative meanings attached to the verbal expressions. Balancing the effects, the consequent, of these would mean first examining their antecedent casual potency (śakti) — how much good or damage they can do; this calls for dialectical mediation, and it may mean a recourse to non-formal logic (deontic, subjunctive, subjective, aesthetic, causal, etc.).

It may be noted that, in fact, the Mīmāṃsā were the first to introduce negative kinds of propositions in Indian philosophy. Jaimini-sūtras at VI.5.15, VIII.7.10, specifically discusses pratishedha and nisedha, and it may be noted that this is well before the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣīka and the Jaina and

\(^2\)Here Zilberman cites Maṇḍana Miśra as his authority for this rendering of “śabda bhāvana”, as he calls it, which otherwise would be śabdibhāvana, as “verbal energy” [19, p. 289]. Arindam Chakraborty disputes this is a correct rendering of śabdibhāvana, for the bhāvana presumably is not in the verbal formation but rather is a disposition within the hearer which propels him forthwith into action.
Buddhists took up these concepts and developed them in rather different and indeed logically rigorous ways. Although it is the case also, as mentioned earlier, that the Grammarian Pāṇini had already laid out some of the terms and rules for interpreting opposition and tensions between contrary expressions or linguistics predicates. The contradiction is recognised to be of the form \((\varphi \land \lnot \varphi)\). But the grammarian’s rules did not embed the same degree of logical articulation, particularly in respect of non-indicative or non-doxastic sentences, which the Mīmāṃsā would herald in. Again, the Mīmāṃsā needed this in order to sort out the different kinds of negative injunctions, which—as already noted—Jaimini set out to do, so that all kinds of pratibādhyā-pratibhandakas or handicaps, contradictions and incommensurabilities (classed as vipraṭisedha, “mutual prohibitions”—in and between the injunctions of equal force, mantras, and their supplementations, i.e., arthavādās, and the most distinctions between these as well) could be put in place. So here is an application of early Indian thinking on negative propositions and how one is to “read” these in respect of their ramifications for the intended purport of the Vedic codanās or vidhikīs. For those with an interest in finding other ways to talk about contradictions or self-defeating relations—a divergence from Aristotelian logic—this earliest of Indian classical treatment may well be instructive.

In what follows I shall adopt the notation that Staal used when first discussing the matter [16]. The use of the term “negation” has largely been ignored by modern logicians in favour of sentential negation. The intended reading of \(\lnot F(x)\), as opposed to \(\lnot[F(x)]\), is “\(x\) is non-\(F\)”. and is familiar from the discussion of Aristotelian syllogistic logic. The negation of singular terms, as as \(F(\lnot x)\), however, will strike modern logicians as something unheard of. Its intended reading is “not that \(x\) is \(F\)”. The point of introducing these grades of involvement is not just to stay closer to the grammatical form of the original statements (something modern logic cares precisely little about), but to keep track of the different inferential roles the Mīmāṃsāsakas attribute to them. All of \(\lnot[F(x)]\), \(\lnot F(x)\), and \(F(\lnot x)\) mean that \(x\) is not \(F\), but \(\lnot F(x)\) additionally carries the information that \(x\) is something other than \(x\) is \(F\). Granted, these concepts can be formalized using sentential negations (given identity and second order quantification are expressible in logic). However, the exact meaning of the different negations is what is discussed by the Indian philosophers. For example, Staal gives a passage that states that \(F(\lnot x)\) is to be interpreted as “only \(x\) doesn’t \(F\)” [16, p. 64]”, prompting a quite different translation into modern logic.

There are four-fold division of negation, as follows (which in much modified form also came to be accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, although they differed on the means of apprehending the stated negations):³

³SV, Abhāva 2–4, p. 336: kṣīrē dadhiyād yannāsti prayābhāvahsa ucyate//2// nāstītā
1. **prāgabhāva**: antecedent non-existent or prior negation; the “not-yet so” or absence of an effect (e.g., the negation of curd in milk, by its theory of asatākārya: an effect is not prior to its cause; the pot’s non-existence (ghatābhāva) before the clay is thrown and its counterpositive,  ghata, is manifested); this absence is causelessly beginningless but ceases once the effect is produced in temporal space.

2. **dhvamsabhāva**: posterior non-existent or deconstructive negation, the “no-more” type of absence due to destruction of some being in time: (e.g., the negation of milk in the curd; the destruction of the pot once it falls to the ground and is shattered into pieces; or there is no book now on the table; when the Faculty of Arts will all but be destroyed, the absence of the Faculty of Arts will be in or haunt the University; when my savings dwindle to zero; and Saddam Hussein is hanged).

3. **anonyābhāva**: mutual and relational negation; the “not-related” type of absence (\(x\) is not in \(y\), e.g., the negation of the horse in the cow, due to the absence of dew-lap; and vice versa; Rāma is not Laxmīna (being more honest of the two); Sītā is not Rāvaṇa’s wife, as this rāpiyā belongs to Rāma; Philosophy is not Cinema Studies; my dogs are not related to the cat in the same house etc.)

4. **atyantabhāva**: absolute negation; the “never-never” or impossible type
of negation in all possible worlds (e.g., absence of hardness in the lower portions of the hare’s head, or its likelihood of ever growing horns; Lucy in the sky with diamonds). If absolute nothingness militates against all possible-world emergences, and there is no temporal space for being or things to materialise, ever, then it would be a case of nityābhava, Absence of Presence, eternality of Nothingness, Void. This seems to be one sense in which the Mīmāṃsā, especially Kumārila, understood the Buddhist doctrine of śāṅgātā, “non-dependent non-origination”, the truth of which he would be persuaded by except that he couldn’t condescend to the absence of the timeless śruti propositions; even if # 2 above comes to pass, or there is global pralaya (Armageddon), mathematical logic has to live on somewhere.

From # 3, following the Grammarian commentator Patañjali, one is able to derive pratisedha, “mutual prohibition”, and vipratisedha where “two rules with different meaning apply to one (word)”; which could be read as “opposition (between two propositions) of equal force”. The question is how to resolve the tension. The Mīmāṃsā for their part begin by grouping the negations into three categories, which I shall call limiting negations. These are now described: vipratisedha, pratisedha or nisedha, paryudāsa: permissible, prohibited, and excluded, respectively.

The first kind is a contingent opposition, applying to individual instances but is not considered to be universal (for there is no jāti, genus, that pervades across the two expressions). When a jar is destroyed, not all jars are destroyed. You may be seen with the umbrella or long-brim hat this morning even though it is not raining, for it may rain in the afternoon (as it always does in Melbourne). Nevertheless, it has more of a force in prescriptive sentences than in indicative or nominal constructions. Strict prohibitions belong to the pratisedha in its nisedha form.

Negation proper admits of two types, prasājya (mutual prohibition) and paryudāsa (exclusion). Let us take prasājya first: “snow is not black” or “there is not-any snow that is black”, and it will take the form: \( \neg F(x) \). On the other hand, Paryudāsa, in its simple form, is exclusion: “the jar is not (here)”, “it has not snowed here”, \( F(\neg x) \); A little more complex form may involve negative implication, “\( p \) implies \( \neg q \)”, example of this would be: “if Rāma is a ksatriya, he is not a brahmin”; “if it is grey, it is not white”, “if \( y \) is an asura, he is not a god”. This is as far as the Grammarians went and they did not bother with what Staal calls the injunctive operator (the obligation conditional), \( N \); where negation is attached either to \( F \) (what is) or to \( N \) (what is to be done). The latter is compounded and is often a cause for ambiguity when the negation is attached to or pervades the obligatory

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4Cf. [17, pp. 51–71].
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predicate; thus: not-ought, ought-not, ought not to, you-not ought, you not-ought, etc., etc. So now we shall see how these formulations are transformed and tightened up when the injunctive operator, \( N \), is introduced by the Mīmāṁsā.

Let us take Prasājya-pratiṣedha (which is also called nisedha) first and take the injunction “na bhaksayet”, “he shall not eat”. It is a negation of the positive injunction “bhaksayet”, “he shall eat” that is denoted by \( N[F(x)] \), where \( F(x) \) denotes “he eats” (and modally, “it is necessary that he eats”). Its injunctive force is not in prescribing an action other than eating; rather it simply prohibits eating and so should be rendered as “he shall-not eat” (colloquially, eating is a “no-no”). If “he shall eat” is symbolised by \( N[F(x)] \), its logical negation is symbolised by \( \neg N[F(x)] \).

In this context, as J. L. Shaw notes, the negative injunction has not been symbolised by \( \neg N[F(x)] \) for “in standard deontic logic ‘\( \neg N[F(x)] \)’ would be equivalent to ‘\( P\neg[F(x)] \)’, where ‘\( P \)’ stands for the permissibility operator. So \( \neg N[F(x)] \) would not express a negative injunction [14].” In other words, the expression \( \neg N[F(x)] \), even though it appears as a negation of the positive injunction (takes on, as it were, the whole sentence), it eo ipso does not have the force of an injunction, and could mean “it is permissible that he does not eat”. In that regard, it is more consistent with the second, the paryuḍāsa, or “exclusionary” rather than the strictly prohibitive type of negation, which must strike at a very specific part of the injunction (represented by the verbal ending only, ākhyāta/lakara-pratīṣṭha). And this takes us to the second type of negation.

The second type is paryuḍāsa, or “exclusion” negation. Here the negation is connected with either the verbal root or with the noun (the nominal indexical or the predicate object); thus in the injunction, nekṣetā, “he shall not look”, the “not” is attached to the verbal root, so it should be rendered as “he shall not-look”; more positively it prescribes something other than looking (looking away, for instance). Curiously, there is positive injunction here, because there is a preceding phrase “his vows are...” Hence, technically speaking, nothing is prohibited; there is no ikṣana-virodhi (opposition to looking) for he never thought of looking (in the direction of Dharmakīrti’s distractingly dancing mistress)! He has not been given a desirous option: the expression is bereft of an optative ending in the negative, which is different from saying you can be enjoined to do \( W \) (kāryatā), even where \( W \) cashes out into \( \neg F(x) = \text{not-look} \). You are still doing your work. But the negative could as well strike at the nominal indexical or the predicate object: “he-shall not look”; “he shall not look-at-the-mistress”; thus someone is excluded or something is occluded from the gaze.\(^6\) Symbolised

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\(^5\)Staal takes this from the Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prākāśa in [6].

\(^6\)Whereas Staal takes it to be the opposite and swaps the two. Staal gives the sym-
respectively (per bold qualifiers) by $N[\neg F(x)]$, and $N[F(\neg x)], N[F(x, \neg y)]$.

We could go on and find sentences where one of the nouns is negated (subject, qualia, or object), drawing on #3, the anyonyābhāva negation. Thus it could take any one of these forms: $N\neg[F(x)], N[\neg F(x)], N[F(\neg x)]$.

If the positive injunction of the expression $F(x, y)$ is $N[F(x, y)]$, $y$ is contra $x$, so other than $x$, its negation or paryudāsa is $N[F(\neg x, y)]$, but it still remains positive in its injunctive force (kāryatā).

The difference between the two is that in paryudāsa, there is a residue of the essentially positive still lingering on, while the negative is secondary or of second order, a semantic negation that strikes at the last member, not necessarily the verb itself. Whereas in the former, prasajya, the essential assertion is of a negation and there need not be any positive residue; it does not apply to the last member of the negative compound but strikes at the verbal ending (kriyaya saha yatra nañ) (nañ signifies the negation). So the “paryudāsa” type of negation may be called “exclusion type of negation”; whereas prasajya-pratisedha is a “prohibition type” of negation. And this latter is also called “nisṛtha”, which can spell out more radical forms of negation the harder the negative strikes at verbal intension via the $N$ operator.

In other words, one form of negation may suggest that doing $x$ is not all right at this moment, but it may be permissible at another moment, or by someone else. “He shall not-eat”, inscribes into its propositional structure the permissibility of eating at other times. The Mīmāṃsās were interested in delineating the kinds of negation that are prohibitory without a residue of permissibility in any part of the semantic field, for one can easily say, “Do not indulge in sex”, but if $F$ got married tomorrow it may become permissible. Likewise, “a Śudra should not even as much as be permitted to hear the Vedas recited”, but it does not necessarily exclude the remaining castes from being present at a sacrifice, and so on. These belong to the exclusionary type. While the Mīmāṃsās are in search of the equivalence of the strictly obligatory of the negative kind.

Clearly the kind of negation in the foregoing examples, if it be admitted as a valid kind of negation (which I presume it would not be in Aristotelian logic, unless one brings in some other operators, like Church’s bolic form of nisṛtha as “$\neg[N][F(x)]$), but which does not in deontic modal logic express a negative injunction, so while it admits of permissibility it may or may not reign in prohibition, which prasajya-pratisedha or nisṛtha must do. Staal’s candidate “$\neg[N][F(x)]$” would denote there is no injunction or mandate for him to eat — and Staal says as much when he renders “$\neg[N][F(x)]$” as “there is no mandate for eating”; whereas there is a clear injunction prohibiting any eating: “shall-not”; the negation must strike at the verbal ending not just the $N$ operator. It is not a simple withholding of the taxes but forfeiting the taxes to the taxman.

7E.g., crossing communities, it would apply to the Muslim observance of Ramzaan, where eating in the day hours is prohibited, but permitted after sunset.
Abhāva

$sutra$ (event): $F(x)$ the door is locked (i)

$paryudāsa$ : $F(\neg x)$ you may unlock not this, the other door (ii) (not well formed negation; not governed by principle of noncontradiction, as in Quine also)

$prasajya-pratisedha$: $\neg F(x)$ you may not unlock this door (iii) (negation of the predicate, as in Aristotelean logic; governed by principle of noncontradiction)

Figure 1. Grammarian

$\lambda$, I suppose), the Mīmāṃsā would classify under $paryudāsa$, “exclusion”. $Yatra$-$uttara$-$padena$ $nāṁ$, “where the negative is connected with the next word” — denoting here, “other than the verbal ending”, $kriyaya$ $saha$ $yatra$ $nāṁ$. And the “next word”, $uttarapada$, as suggested earlier, denotes the second member of a negative compound ($tatpuruṣa$ or $bahuvrihi$, different kinds of nominal compounds in Sanskrit, but not ruling out verbs) can be either a verbal root or a noun, but such a negation does not strike at the core of the injunction (because it excludes the verbal ending), hence it is not properly a negative injunction. In other words, it has a qualitative limiting function rather than an absolute prohibitory function, and therefore it is not consistent with the fourth category of negation either, i.e., $atyantabhāva$.

Bringing this part of the discussion to a close, it should be said that the innovative element in the Mīmāṃsā approach to prohibition and exclusion vis-à-vis the grammarians in respect of the three types of negation, is that negation can be applied to either $N$ or $F$ or all parts of a sentence, which is impossible in grammar. This may not seem very novel from our modern, post-classical point of view in logic, but at a time when logic was totally in the control of a tool used principally by grammarians to structure the determinants of proper speech, this indeed is quite a remarkable break-through. For it attempts to mirror the world outside, while playing with modal possibilities and instantiations — of real $kriyas$ and $kāryas$, actions and things, being and events, in speech-forms; and this onto-logic further tries to understand, without compromise, the meaning of certain a priori negations in the Vedic corpus, which the Mīmāṃsā took to be unquestionably valid (because of its $apauruṣeyatva$, freedom from personal errors, including that of a possible deity).
(event) \( F(x) \) the door is locked (iv)

\( \text{vidbi} \) (positive injunction):

\( N[F(x)] \) the door ought to be locked (v)

\( paryudāsa \ I \) (exclusion):

\( N[\neg F(x)] \) the door need not-to-be-locked (vi)

\( paryudāsa \ II \) (inclusive-exclusion):

\( N[F(\neg x)] \) not this, another door needs to-be-locked (vii)

\( niśedha \) (strict prohibition):

\( N[\neg F(x)] \) the door shall-not be locked (viii)

The anomaly or “wild card” here is:

\( \neg N[F(x)] \) you told me not to lock the door (ix) (ambiguous)

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<th>Figure 2. Mīmāṃsā</th>
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So we finally give the difference in formal expression in Figures 1 and 2. J. L. Shaw points out that a sharper distinction needs to be drawn between vi/vii and viii, making the former permissible: if we substitute \( F \) for eating, then vi/vii renders it permissible that \( x \) does not eat (he might not be observing a dietary vow); however, the latter, viii, is an injunction against eating: ought-not to eat. But I believe, from what has been demonstrated above, that the Mīmāṃsā actually achieve this quite successfully.

The Naiyāyikas, from what I understand to be their thinking, reduce negation to two—at most three—main kinds of negation. From the list given earlier by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, they accept the “not-yet” (prāgabhāva), “no-more” (dhvamsa), and—if J. L. Shaw is right—“never” (atyantabhāva). But each of these is based on the fundamental recognition of the self-defeating relation of a thing and its simultaneous absence (pratibādhya-pratibandhaka bhāva), which is represented by \( (p \land \neg p) \); but the pot could

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8I am grateful to Staal—when I was very confused by the Mīmāṃsā formulations, I went to Staal back in 1981, and we discussed some Mīmāṃsā texts together in Berkeley many moons ago. But I have also modified his formulations with the corrective provided by J. L. Shaw (cf. Footnote 6).

9In his [15, pp. 144–145], he classes them under “relational absences”, with certain caveats built into the “temporal relation as the limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive”. Although in his other papers on negation, Shaw limits Nyāya negation to two main kinds: relational absence and mutual absence, represented respectively by (1): \( x \) is not in \( y \), or \( x \) does not occur in \( y \), or the absence of \( x \) occurring in \( y \); and (2): \( x \) is not \( y \), or \( x \) is different from \( y \); where “\( x \)” and “\( y \)” are non-empty terms, and their counterpositive are: (1') \( x \) is in \( y \), or \( x \) occurs in \( y \), and (2') \( x \) is \( y \). I am indeed grateful to J. L. Shaw for sharing his papers on negation with me, and I have drawn liberally with his permission and kind guidance for the present essay. In particular, his [14] (cf. Footnote 4), [13], and [15, p. 144].
also lack blueness, or there is blueness but no potness, or neither; thus \((p \land \neg b), (\neg p \land b), (\neg p \land \neg b)\), which is really to say, \(\neg (p \land b) \iff \neg p \lor \neg b\).\(^{10}\) It was also recognised that \(\neg p\) rejects \(p\) in a way different from that in which \(p\) rejects \(\neg p\). Or take the simple identity \(A\) is \(A\); so \(A\) is \(\neg A\), and \(\neg A\) is \(A\) are self-defeating but in quite, even radically, different senses, precisely because the priority of absence is marked in a different way in each of the copulas, and one excludes much more than the other.\(^{11}\) (God is His own Absence, or Nothingness; Eternal Absence or Nothingness is analytically God. The first absence — exclusion — is part of the meaning of God, as the base or \(\text{adhi}ra\); while Absence in the second conjunct cannot be the base, metaphysically, of God — although a Buddhist might think so!). I leave it to the scholars of Nyāya to elaborate on the Nyāya theory of negation and its difference from the Mīmāṃsaka’s theory that I have sketched above, and also to show what the Nyāya owes to the Mīmāṃsaka in developing its particular view in all its symbolic and logical sophistication, particularly when it comes to double negation and contradictions.

Having as it were worked around with the law of non-contradiction without giving it up (but limiting its pragmatic scope), Indian logicians appear to have no hesitation in rejecting the law of excluded middle or “bivalence”; so it turns out on this view to be quite reasonable to say that it is neither true nor false that man will land on Mars by 2020. But to the question of whether man is capable of landing on Mars, the bivalent answer may take this form:

Either it is not in man’s power to land on Mars or (given the current state of space-technology) it is not in his power not to land on Mars. It is neither true that man will by 2020 land on Mars (because they never have, and the future owes nothing to the present, as Bradley reminded us), nor is it false that men will land on Mars (given other conditionals). If we replaced “nor” with “and”, it will be self-defeating and therefore has to be rejected: \(\neg (M \land \neg M)\).

But what about \(\neg (M \land \neg M) \lor \neg (M \lor \neg M)\), given that \textit{paryudāsa} may permit negation of the whole statement, bivalence included? This is where the Buddhists come into the picture. And we may only touch on this intervention before moving onto Section 2 of the paper.

Firstly, the Buddhists also recognise the distinction between \textit{paryudāsa} and \textit{prasajya-pratiśedha}, but they characterise the distinction in terms of the

\(^{10}\) Cf. [8].

\(^{11}\) A point made by K. C. Bhattacharyya in his celebrated essay [3, p. 576]; cf. also, [3, pp. 599–601]. Bhattacharyya asks, what is the denial of “\(A\) is either \(B\) or \(C\)”? Is it “\(A\) is either not \(B\) or not \(C\)”? Bhattacharyya’s response is “no”; he says it that “\(A\) is either \(B\) or not-\(B\)” is the logical negative of “\(A\) is either \(B\) or \(C\)” but this is the proverbial excluded middle again; however, Bhattacharyya feels strongly that the “indeterminacy” reeking through such negations that evade absolute truth is the “limiting mystery of all philosophy”! Cf. [3, p.601].
different modes of negation involved. In the former, a certain affirmation of a positive entity or event is said to be involved and the negation is more usually than not by implication (arthāpatti) rather than by direct reference: so when one means kṣatriya he uses the single expression “non-brahmin”, and it is implied that he is a kṣatriya. Hence the commitment is quite marked, so that even where one is seen to deny “the flower is red”, at least he believes the flower to have some colour or that its former red-colour has now withered to a mellow-yellow. While in the case of the latter, prasajya, it negates directly whatever the opponent asserts, and there is no implication, nor does it affirm the counterfactual (for other castes are “non-brahmins” too, such as śūdra, vāśya); it simply means he is “not a Brahmin”. There is no commitment to anything here, so that when one says “Man is not the creator of the universe”, there is no a priori commitment to any creator or for that matter creation.

Using semantics and pragmatics Shaw is able to describe the moves at stake in the view more clearly, and I quote:

Pragmatics is involved when it is claimed that in paryudāsa negation affirmation is primarily intended, but in prasajya-pratisedha negation affirmation is not primarily intended if there is any affirmation [at all]. Semantics is involved when it is said that both the negative sentence and its implicate describe the same fact in paryudāsa negation. The negative sentence “he is not a Brahmin” and its intended implicate “he is a kṣatriya” describe the same fact, and the expression “not a Brahmin” and “kṣatriya” refer to the same thing. But in the case of prasajya-pratisedha negation “he is not a Brahmin” and “he is a kṣatriya” do not have the same meaning, and the former does not imply the latter. [13, pp. 62–63].

Furthermore, it may be observed that when a prasajya-pratisedha negation is leveled against the weaker paryudāsa negation to which the opponent is bent on committing his adversary (because of its affirmative implicate), despite admitting to the prasajya-pratisedha alternative (but recall it left the two sentences unconnected), and thereby extract a position, both the alternatives are negated and all presuppositions therein also: $G \neg([F(\neg x) \land \neg F(x)])$ — where $F(\neg x)$ is paryudāsa, and $\neg F(x)$ is prasajya-pratisedha type of negation, and G is the intended residue qualified by the parenthesis. This makes possible a prasajya-paryudāsa type of negation.

Space does not permit us to develop this line of thought to its logical culmi-

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12By the way, the Buddhist view represented in the text here is attributed to one Avalokitavarta, which Shaw finds discussed by Kajiyama; but also cf. [12].
nation in Nāgārjuna’s famous catuṣkoti, four-cornered dialectic, especially the last premise: *there is neither $x$ nor non-$x$*; symbolized by “$\neg(p \lor \neg p)$”.\(^{13}\)

2

Now to the last part of the paper. As we have seen, the Mīmāṃsā were inexorably committed to the absoluteness of negation and its manifestation at least in the injunctive mode, initially in Vedic propositions. The *paribhāṣā* (“meta-language”) rules became instructive with the development of grammar for its application to more secular speech. The Mīmāṃsās, however, under Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, followed a trajectory laid out in Śābarasvāmin’s *bhāṣya*,\(^ {14}\) or even before that in one Upavarsā\(^ {15}\); their intuitions on negation is taken a step further and extendedly applied to the perceptual encounter with the objective world as well. In other words, they set out to make a connection between negation and things seen or un-seen, and even to the soteriological end of all perception and knowing: namely, *apavarga* or emancipation. There is a negative underbelly to that as well. Let me explore these insights further, beginning with the foray into the epistemological frontier.

Let us revert back to the fourfold division of negation we began with: antecedent, posterior, mutual, and absolute. Kumārila’s argument turns on causality: if one did not admit these four kinds of negation it would not be possible to differentiate between cause and effect (i.e., we would be committing the fallacy of running cause into effect, and vice versa). But what precisely is the ontological status of “negation”? Is it simply a characteristic, *viśeṣa*, of an object whose negation is being effected here, or is it about a phenomenon in its own right? The word used here is “*vastūta*” (not a mere semantic substantive but a “thing-signifying” substantive), substantive entity or object, which I have advisedly called a phenomenon as it could be an event, or an episode, or a substantive absence: an existentially non-existent object, rather an “entitative item” in that sense nevertheless.\(^ {16}\)

In his *adhikaṇḍa* on “Abhāva”, Kumārila observes: there are “those who hold that negation being a non-entity (avastu) is not an objective

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\(^{13}\)In its expanded form, without collapsing double negation into its positive assertion: $(p \lor \neg p) \land (\neg p \lor \neg \neg p)$. The stifling modern debate of whether this commits the Buddhist to rejecting the excluded middle or, more damagingly, law of noncontradiction is completely beside the point when viewed from the foregoing *logicus negative* genealogy.

\(^{14}\)abhāvo ‘pi pramāṇo ‘bhavo nāstītyagṛthayayasyānamukṣyasi, I.i.5; 5.47

\(^{15}\)Cf. [12, p. 74] with the analysis [12, pp. 26–29] (I have drawn liberally from this discussion). For a useful philological treatment and philosophical discussion of Kumārila’s understanding and various possible translations of the key definition (by no means the only telling verse) in Śloka-varttika (*abhāvapariccheda* 11), cf. [7].

\(^{16}\)I think we are entering a Meinongian-Sylvian jungle here.
reality (tuccha) and is without a self-existent character (niḥsvabhāva)."¹⁷ Adverting to the fore-going classification of negation, he avers that such a classification would not be possible in respect of a non-entity (avastu); therefore, he concludes “negation must be an entity”. For what is the negation of an effect, other than the absence of the cause.¹⁸ In other words, all effects are non-existent putatively prior to their production; otherwise, under # 1 and # 2, the thing would be always present in time. If there were no prior absence of curd in milk, then, we would have to say, curd is present in the milk at all times, and we would not be able to cognise the milk, that is, the cause of the effect (curd). And # 1 is negated in # 2, the counter-entity (pratīyogin).

Likewise, with #3: a cow is decisively absent in a horse, and vice versa, even as both are species of the same genus of vertebrates. Thus, “all things are positive from their own standpoint, but negative from that of the other”. As for # 4, if the absolute absence of colour were not in the air, or fire in the water, or horns in the hare, smell in the waters, etc, we would be forced to say otherwise.

These may be crude examples, but Kumārila wants to underscore a metaphysical point; he needs a theory of natural kind negation in order to ground the fledgling Mīmāṃśā epistemology of “Abhāva”. What do I mean by the latter? Among the accepted pramāṇas or valid means of knowledge are perception, inference, analogy, and testimony: but these are all in respect of things that exist naturally, or perhaps supernaturally. What if perception itself fails to deliver any object? Or any of the pramāṇa for that matter? However, where there is perception of absence of any or all of the entities, padārthas (to use a Nyāya term), should we bring in absence simply as the failure of cognition of the same or should we say that there is a veridical perception of the absence in the locus (adhāra) where the object or entity or event would otherwise have been present? Of course, even this can be interpreted in at least two ways, as we shall see shortly with the Nyāya insisting that there is a perception of something “not there” in a substantive base where it would have otherwise been; but the percept of “absence” is as it were conjunctive rather than disjunctive (though the theory suggests that it is disjunctive but not in the radical sense in which Kumārila would have it, consistent with the trope of antyantabhāva or absolute negation). The other way to interpret this absence is to suggest that there is an inference (via arthāparthi¹⁹ or implication) made in respect of

¹⁷This is an intersperse by Pārthasārathī Miśra preceding Sv, Abhāva 7, p. 336; cf. Footnotes 15 and 19.
¹⁸Pārthasārathī Miśra in Nyāyaratnākara on Sv 7–8 (p. 336). We find this also in Śāstrodāpyākā.
¹⁹Although for Udayana it is more a case of anumāna, straight inference than it is of implication.
something “x” in lieu of the substantive base which is perceived as lacking what would otherwise have been there. The “absented x” is epistemically derivative, rather than sui generis (svabhāvic). Kumārila argues that the failure of perception in this instance, that is “non-perception” itself, constitutes a kārṇa, instrument (reazon = liṅga), that warrants the postulation of a separate pramāṇa. Kumārila’s reasoning for his radical interpretation is partly captured in this passage (it is not the best argument one can make, nevertheless, one can appreciate his motivation and boldness in urging for this warrantability):

Negation is cognised (prameyatva cca ganyate) as an entity such as a cow, etc. For it is the object of inclusive and exclusive conceptions and is an object of cognition. It is not merely fortuitous, that it is an (incorrect) imposition or an erroneous notion. Therefore, the fact that (negation defined in terms of) the universal and the concrete particular is not false. (SV, Abhāva 8–10, p. 337).

Kumārila’s worry is that in order for us to be able to differentiate a particular from all other things and affirm it in its generality, we must first cognise it with its class character and then proceed with the differentiation. The cow is first cognised as the bearer of cow-ness (genus, ākṛti = jāti), but for the precise cognition of the cow that belongs to Devadatta we must differentiate (vyāṛtta) it from all other cows and from all other objects that are not cows. He believes that such a cognition of affirmation and denial is possible only because every entity (vastu) has two-fold reality, namely, that of its class and that of the individual. Moreover, when we cognise the antecedent non-existence of a thing, after having affirmed (anuṛṛtta) it as belonging to the class of “abhāva”, we differentiate (vyāṛtta) it from the other three kinds of negation. We also cognise posterior-negation as distinct from antecedent, mutual and the absolute negations. In the same way the last two are cognised as distinct from each other and from the rest. So, Kumārila contends that like any other (positive) form of reality negation forms the object of cognition, and that it (negation) can be expressed by affirmative and negative propositions (a move we already encountered in respect of positive and negative injunctions), with M-predicates, for example: “He does nothing”, “He eats nothing” — the predicated absence is to be treated as the object of a distinct cognition (vastu). This affirmative propositional use of negation indicates a class character (anuṛṛttva-dharma) Thus, all negative cognitions are members of the class of abhāva or absence. And this abhāva is a padārtha requiring its own pramāṇa rather than being simply seen as a prameya that can be subsumed under the regular pramāṇas — as the Nyāya would have it.

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Supplemented with Dhirendra Sharma’s translation (with slight modification), [12, pp. 29 sqq].
Of course, the Buddhist recognise the need to differentiate and affirm; but to them this simply amounts to discrimination and elimination (apoha) by virtue of there being positive entities, and it does not warrant bringing this under a separate entitative category, much less a distinctive pramāṇa as Kumārila seems to need to ground this perception of the negative entity.

Precisely, Kumārila retorts that he should not be misunderstood as arguing for the existence of abhāva in the absence of some positive reality (that would be a sort of Nietzschean nihilism). The abhāva inexorably bears relation to its counterpositive (pratīyogī), except that it is not known simply via cognition of the counterpositive as his Nyāya counterparts argue for. His point is that when he says “x is its own absence” he means just that, x has both a presence (in regard to its own form, i.e., svārāpa) plus an absence (in regard to the form of another object, i.e., parārūpa) in all possible worlds (nityaṇusad-asadātmakavastu). The two are logically related; but they are also independent, inasmuch as they form the objects respectively of two different cognitions: people sometimes cognise one, sometimes the other (jñayate kaiścid rāpaṃ kaiścit kadācana). (SV 12, p. 337).

The realist contention is that “absence of the cloth in the jar” simply means that the cloth in its non-existent form inheres in another object, the jar, and as such, produces the cognition of its “non-existent form” in the jar. Furthermore, Kumārila argues:

A judgment (niṛṇaya), concerning a (positive) existent (bhāva) — such as “this is (the jar) and nothing else” — is not possible without reference to the cognition of absence of everything else. Nor is the knowledge (saṃvedīti) that “it (the jar) does not exist” possible, without reference to the negated thing itself; for there can be no cognition without an objective substratum. (SV Abhāva, 15–16, pp. 338–339).

What Kumārila seems to be suggesting in this passage, which is brought out more clearly in a later passage, is that the function of perception is over once our sense-organ fails to make contact with an objective substratum out there (arthasyendriyasanniktasyābādha) and there thus is non-generation of perception, inference, etc.; instead, there is a stark absence of that object (nāstityasyārthasya); now this “absence” is presented phenomenologically or noetically in the mental grasping, as he comments:

After the object (the place where the jar is not present) has been perceived, and the counter-entity (the jar) has been remembered, then follows the notion that it (the jar) is not, which is purely mental (and as such) independent of the sense-organs. (SV Abhāva, 27, p. 341).

So, the judgment “p” implies denial of “not-p”; hence, all meaningful positive judgments embed negative cognitive essence — they are not mutually contradictory as Śaṅkara later wanted to argue; when the judgment
Abhāva

Abhāva tilts to the latter, in full view, literally, of the absence of “p”, we say it in respect of the negative cognitive entity, “not-p”. There cannot be a cognition without reference to some object or other. Kumārila is being consistently realist, perhaps a naïve negative realist!

In short, from Kumārila’s standpoint, negation is not plain “ignorance” (ajñāna) but rather “the knowledge of absence” (abhāvajñāna), which occurs through the absence of knowledge of the counterpositive; in other words, pratiyogināḥ anupalabdhyā abhāvasya upalabdhiḥ. Another way of putting this is to say that “negation is a cognition of real absence in the same way in which affirmation is (a) cognition of real presence”. In Stcherbatsky’s words: “The Mīmāṃsakas viewed non-existence as a reality sui generis (vasṭuvantaram)”.\(^{21}\) The Buddhist objection to this standpoint is that the process of grasping the absence connected with the perception of the bare locus (kaivalya) could be explained inferentially as tending towards the exclusive or pariyudāsa kind of negation. Of course, the neo-Nyāya, railing against the Buddhist reductionism, also came to accept abhāva as designating a real which is absent in the locus (entity — hence a padārtha); however, the Naiyāyikas denied that its perceptual grasping (albeit, the non-cognition of the otherwise present in the locus of absence) needs to be attributed to an independent pramāṇa. The judgment for them is in respect of the cognition of the locus devoid of the suggested relation with the object negated there, on the epistemic consideration that the negative cognition must refer to positive entities only. The perception of kaivalya, bareness, is in respect of the locus (ādhāra, adhikaraṇa, āśraya) and not in respect of the absented object as such to which of course it is related by resemblance (i.e., relationally to its counterpartive). This alternative standpoint that inscribes a relational exclusion was first championed by Prabhākara, and by Śālikanātha Miśra\(^{22}\) — who set out to refute abhāvaprāmaṇa, which brings the Prabhākārans closer to the Buddhists (who re-tool it as drṣṭyānupalabdhi). The Naiyāyikas seem to have expropriated the qualified reading in Prabhākara in order to qualify the more radical standpoint of Kumārila: on the basis of the non-perception of a perceptible object (drṣṭyādarśana or yogyānupalambha), whence the bare locus, the substratum (bhūtala) is cognised, the absence of the object is apprehended through a special inferential trope (yogyānulapabdhi). The free-standing reference to anupalabdhi is left-out as being otiose, in the Nyāya at least, while for later Mīmāṃsakas, particularly with Pārthasārathī Miśra, anupalabdhi comes to replace abhāva in naming the distinctive pramāṇa that is implicated, rendered it simply as “non-perception of the otherwise

\(^{21}\)Cited in [12, pp. 35–36]. This means that for these philosophers the “non-existent” is a reality sui generis (vasṭuvantaram) and this “knowledge of absence” (not just absence of knowledge) is admitted via yogyā-pratyiṣṭya-anupalabdha, though not as an inference (anumāna), but a special means of knowing, pramāṇa, which they called abhāva.

\(^{22}\)Cf. Footnote 23.
perceptible object because of its absence in the locus”. Śālikanātha, whom I just mentioned, invidiously misrepresents the theory of abhāva and gives it the Naiyāyika’s twist; he writes

the evidence to prove abhāva is the cognition that there is no jar on the ground (bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti) [10, p. 265].

As we have seen, Kumārila makes no mention of bhūtala (or ādhāra, adhikarana, āśraya); it is prolix for him to introduce the cognition of the substratum and what it is lacking — for the non-existence of the jar becomes a mere attribute of the ground — and the ground would be there even the jar is perceived but we do not necessarily relate the perception of the jar with the perception of the ground, which again is “bare to the bone” but for the presence of the jar! It would be more parsimonious to accept a direct cognition of the non-existence of the jar, regardless, rather than make recourse to its relational counterpositive — which is really a post-abhāva intellectual exercise!

The Prābhākārans reject this view because perception would require that there is contact of the senses with the non-existent, which is not possible; the only contact there is is with the ground or locus. So absence has to be viewed as the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of the locus which at another moment flagged that presence. It is not the pratiyogin of absence that comes to the cogniser’s mind, rather it is the unified cognition of the locus-minus-the-object as kaivalya or bareness; the absence, if you will, of the relation between the ground and the jar. It is a disjunction built upon a prior conjunction. The disjunction is the non-perception of a positive thing, or it is a perception that underscores a dis-affirmation (literally, an-upalabdhi) of a thing, by exclusion (nivṛtti), not an affirmation of no thing (tuccha). It is the mere presence as bare-boned locus (tanmātra), which means that it is devoid of the relation with the other object: anupalabdhir hi bhāvanam abhāvaḥ. It is a denial of the perception of the object (adṛṣṭa-upalabdhi; which is like “inference to the absence of the best argument”).

However, I contend that in its Bhātṭa formulation this doctrine ought not to be reduced to the pramāṇa (means of knowing) of anupalabdhi (non-cognition) as it only achieves this latter re-naming and articulation with Pārthasārathi Miśra and the Prābhākāran, Śālikanath Miśra. Both these commentators are influenced by and condescended to the criticisms of Buddhist logicians, especially Dharmakīrti (a contemporary of Kumārila, c. 7th century CE) and Prabhākara (the other doyen of the Mīmāṃsā) and indeed

23Neither is it a prameya nor is separate pramāṇa what we call “non-cognition” is really a perception of the positive entity (the counterpositive), namely that the locus is bereft of a certain entity that otherwise was there — the latter is recalled by memory and thus provides the counterpositive as the positive entity in the apprehension along with the locus that is indeed given in perception.
Abhāva 61
to the Naiyāyikas. The latter themselves did not begin with the kind of radical doctrine of negation that they end up with, particularly, in Vallabha and Raghunāth Śironāṇi.

The Buddhists again enter at this juncture and insist that without the bare locus nothing is perceived: or that all cognitions are in relation of one thing to another, and so it is only with reference to the empty ground that the negative judgment, “the jar is not there” is made possible. Dharmottara in Nyāya-bindutikā, puts it thus: “the perception of the bare locus with reference to the perceptible jar and the apprehension of this fact are the basis of the negative cognition”. “Non-perception is due to the paryudāsa type of negation” (which is really Dharmakīrti’s position in Nyāya-bindu).

It is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who heed most to this objection, recognising that since there is no direct sense-contact with the non-existent object it cannot properly be said to be a case of perception; however, if we shift the focus to the locus—or if the locus is made the focal point of perception—then the onus too shifts from the non-existent to the absence-marking-the-locus, as though the invisible ink-traces of the once-present-but-now-absent object is simmering to the clear-light of the mind that picks up the efflorescence. A negative entity of the kind the Bhāṭṭas of the realist world are hell-bent on positing is not a substance and it therefore cannot come into contact with the senses (indriyasaṁnakar śayogya). Thus, on the anti-Bhāṭṭa view circling around, it is far better to hypothetically a unique relation (viśe saṁnatā) between the so-called negative entity (nivrūṭti, by default) and the locus or substratum which is at least pravrūṭti, substantive. Thus, they maintain that the reality of non-existence (abhāva) is perceived not as ordinary perception goes but as qualifying the locus which is a perceivable substance (Śrīdhara, though it is also in Vallabha). This is tantamount to the return of the bhūtalamātra in another guise. Even Raghunāth Śironāṇi, who bolstered the logical character of negation by redefining abhāvatva as upadhī, and introducing double negation without regress, could not bring himself to accept the traditional Bhāṭṭa view of “abhāva” as an ontological padārtha that calls for its own distinctive pramāṇa; he accepts abhāva as a prameya, yes, but only derivatively so. And much has been made of this compromised Navya-Nyāya doctrine in recent literature on Indian philosophy, even as it took the sails out of the more radical Bhāṭṭa view. Why then this resistance to condescending to “abhāva” as an object (padārtha) not in respect of the absent-marked locus as the perceptible object (prameya), but of absence qua the non-existent itself that is neither perceived nor inferred but is the result of a certain “non-cognition”?

Two implications of the Bhāṭṭa view are worth noting: where there is absolute absence of valid knowledge of something, one can be assured

24 Notice that paryudāsa negation still involves or implies an affirmation, so this is “catch-22” situation from which even the Buddhist could not escape!
that it is absolutely non-existent. The omniscience of the Buddha, and the existence of God, are two such instances. But what if as the Prābhākaraṇas insist, the absence of perception (or non-perception) is a given for non-perceptibles (adrśyavastu), as for some perceptibles too (as in the standard examples of anupalabdhi)? The Bhāṭṭa’s retort that their theory of abhāva does not preclude non-perceptibles — not due to some yogic feat, but by virtue of the possibility of cognition of non-existents in the empirical plane (which does not rule out their existence and positive perception thereof in other possible and real worlds: Martians, for example, seeing green cheese). Adrśya should not be conflated with anupalabdhi; something non-existent does not mean it is imperceptible (to the mind, even if not to the senses). Sensory contact was not deemed essential to the perception of absence (and by the time of Gaṅgeśa nor for presence either), why then for other non-existents?

Second, and in concluding this disquisition, the theory of negation has ramifications for a theory of emancipation as well. If the life of saṃsāra is full of pain or duḥkha as the Buddha also recognised (he wasn’t the first to do so, the Śramaṇa and Jainas preceded him), then the eradication of pain or the “absolute non-existence of pain” (duḥkhātyanta-vomikṣo apavargah), accordingly to asatkārya theory of causality, namely, “non-pre-existent effect” entails that its causes, including its “antecedent non-existence” (prāgbhāva), be destroyed (dhwamsa-ed) by the production of the effect: so this implies a double negation of contraries. Thus, it is clear that apart from the problem of negative judgment, postulation of the negative reality was necessary (also) for their doctrines of Causality and Emancipation. Although, the Mīmāṃsakas’ apavarga was not as negative, ironically for the bhūtalamātrikas, as that of the Naiyāyikas where the end-state of enlightenment was some zombie-like, tirelessly pain-free fiddling in a state of near-boredom;25 rather for the Mīmāṃsaka, there was at least the rich harvest of the apūrva, the transcendental credits or “never-before merits” from the rituals performed and the negative injunctions too carried out equally diligently or with the same inner propulsion of the śādbhāvāna, from which a blissful state of svarga, or heaven in all worlds could be gleefully drawn upon. Here the empirical world becomes the object of the negative perception of absence, a real negation at that; and realism is not ever compromised: one does not need to run off to or with the temptresses of metaphysical or internal realism of any variety, Indian or Western.

Vive la negation and negative realism of the Mīmāṃsā!

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SV. = Ślokavārttika, with Nyāyaratnakara of Pārthasārathī Miśra, in: [1].

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25Cf. [5].
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