Treaties
as
Tools of Foreign Policy

A Psychopolitical Inquiry
via Keating's Vision for Australia

by

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Deakin University

December 2001
“...uncertainty is at the heart of human creativity.”

Ilya Prigogine, 1996
Nobel laureate,
Member of The Club of Rome
For my children,
Nicha, Lauran, Alba and Kajeera

Many thanks to Gary Smith for letting me chase rainbows; my love to Merryn for helping me find them; deepest love and respect to Sally for bearing the brunt of the write-up; and much love to Susan for her long time support.

Lastly, thanks to Paul Keating for the inspiration.

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Preamble

Paul Keating will be remembered by some Australians as a visionary. As Prime Minister he outlined the structure of external and domestic reform that he believed would guarantee global security for all Australians.

Driving these reforms, more often than not, were interstate agreements, often in the form of multilateral treaties, sometimes in the guise of bilateral compromise, rarely as unilateral declarations.

In areas as diverse as collaborative scientific research or the protection of children in the workplace, the Keating Executive set out, through codification, to transform Australia’s political landscape.

The fields of trade, military, environmental and human rights were all included in the attempts by Keating to forge a new image of and for Australia in the Asia Pacific region.

Treaties were vital agents of change in this milieu in the bid to reformulate regional perceptions of Australia.

The path of inquiry in this thesis stemmed from a quest to examine the origin, role, purpose and efficacy of treaties in the Keating Government’s foreign policy aimed at regional military security.

In order to make this examination it develops a polyphonic\(^1\) analytical model whose purpose is to explore the psychopolitical underpinnings of these agreements.

Thus the thesis has a two fold task. To develop an analytical model of how treaties work as tools of foreign policy and to outline and assess the Keating treaty strategy. Its principal contribution is on the theoretical side.

In an attempt to extend the comprehension of the effect of treaties in international politics, the thesis is a wide ranging survey and synthesis of possible theoretical tools from a range of disciplines and traditions.

\(^1\) Polyphonic: consisting of many voices
Chapter One

Treaties as Vital Mainstays of Australia's Evolution

Treaties have long been major determinants of Australia’s foreign policy, while their domestic impact has also been considerable. When Great Britain passed legislation to be implemented by its Australian colonies, usually at their behest, British foreign policy was being determined by externally generated impetuses, and imperatives. Resultantly a pattern of attempts by Australia at gaining autonomy within the Empire could be identified. Throughout Australia’s constitutional history such forms of agreement have been a mainstay of the evolution from independent colonies occupying a continental territory, and demonstrating allegiance to the British Crown, to an independent federation of states.

Early instruments of international law, which created political entities in the colonies and the nation, included The Australian Colonies Government Act of 1850, which granted Australian colonies a form of responsible government, and The Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901, passed by the UK Parliament, which federated the Australian Colonies. While both pieces of legislation are commonly understood as British Laws, their very enactment brought into effect agreements between recognisably separate sovereign bodies, the basic premise of a treaty. In fact, before Federation consultations with regard to commercial treaties occurred between Australian colonies and the United Kingdom Government [Trick or Treaty: 95:46], another indication of the UK’s acceptance of a legally prescribed autonomy in the Australian colonies, or at least of the need to consult.

The Statute of Westminster, passed by the UK Parliament in 1931, and based on the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which formally transferred full control of external affairs from the British Home Office to the Dominions, gave Australia the potential to be an independent contributor to global political activity. But, curiously, the ratification of the Statute of Westminster wasn’t forthcoming until 1942. Australia’s reticence suggested a lack of confidence, or at least a less than enthusiastic acceptance that Britain was setting Australia free to find its own way in the world. Admittedly the ratification removed any residual legal constraint on Prime Minister John Curtin and the War Ministry of the Commonwealth of Australia to conduct
its own foreign policy and to negotiate alliance guidelines with regional states, European colonial powers and, particularly, the United States of America. But while this began a new era in Australia’s foreign relations, in essence Australia simply replaced the guiding principles of the Empire with the alliance guidelines of its fighting partner in the Pacific, the United States. Independence was beckoning, but the young federation was still uncertain about its ability to stand alone. This uncertainty has rarely abated.

Significant bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements have contributed to the evolution towards independence. With the ANZAC Agreement of 1944 Australia and New Zealand declared that at the conclusion of World War 2 they would be responsible for regional security in the South-West and South Pacific areas, along with the UK, USA, France, Portugal and the Netherlands. In 1945 Australia participated in the San Francisco Conference, which agreed upon the UN Charter, and the following year Australia sat on the UN Security Council. Its External Affairs Minister became President of the UN General Assembly in 1948. This was the same year that ANZAM was initiated by Australia, New Zealand and the UK, to quell a communist insurrection in Malaya.

The most dramatic evolution was the coming into force of security networks, which included the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. This was a compact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, which was widely seen as a trade-off for Australian acceptance of a "soft" Peace Treaty with Japan. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was created by the Manila Treaty of 1954. This pact was drawn up by Australia, France, the USA, New Zealand, the UK, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. It was designed to ensure that any threat from China, or from communism in Indochina, to the security of the region, and thus of Australia, was contained on the Asian mainland. The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), an anti-communist association between Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam, was formed in 1966. Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War as an ally of the US, intimately bound up with being a signatory to SEATO and ASPAC, was a statement of filial association, and also a strong indicator of how external agreements could generate considerable and serious domestic impact, especially with the loss of Australia soldiers lives in battle in Vietnam. Eventually the Australian constituency would react against this impact, electorally,
although it would continue to overlook the premise of the agreement with the US, dependence on a powerful ally.

But this challenge could well have been the result of Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1971, which stipulated that US allies should begin a process aimed at achieving self reliance in military affairs, and reducing their dependency on the US. That year the Five Power Defence Arrangement or FPDA, was drawn up between Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This could be construed as the Conservative Coalition Government in Australia looking to the old friend, the UK, after the new friend, the US, had denoted a reduced commitment. The Whitlam Labor Government, that won office the next year, began a process of withdrawing Australian troops from Vietnam, and brokered a rapprochement with the PRC. There seemed to be a willingness for Australia to branch out from its long dependence on "great and powerful" friends, although the US was also shifting its China policy. While the US may well have been the catalyst of moves towards independence and self-reliance, the negative reaction of the Australian people to the on-going Vietnam War and conscription can also be construed as leading to a commitment to change. For a substantial moment Australia seemed intent on standing alone.

In fact Australia's commercial networks were developing in wider spheres compatible with the US alliance; the Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement of 1957; [Rix:97:198] the creation of ASEAN, in 1967, with whose members Australia was to also engage in expanded trade [Ingleson:97:27] ; and the initiatives of the Whitlam Government to venture into the Asian region, which were supported and pursued by the Fraser Government, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, through the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) [Cotton & Ravenhill:97:8] Such initiatives gained prominence under Labor Prime Minister Hawke, with the realisation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in the late 1980s. Thus for a significant part of the late twentieth century Australia projected an image of an independent self reliant state confident of its role in global affairs.

APEC became an absolute priority for the Keating Government, as it incorporated Asian, American and Australasian nations in free trade oriented commercial exchange. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), developed under the guidance of Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans,
launched in 1994, and aimed at enhancing military security, was another highly significant regional cooperation initiative of that era. In addition, the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed in 1995, was a final act of amelioration, which occurred when Keating relieved the pressure that had existed between Indonesia and Australia, since the former achieved independence and had taken a confrontationist approach to the post colonial order through to 1965. The AMS, based on Australian-Indonesian cooperation and partnership, promised to be as significant at the beginning of the twenty first century as the Japan Trade Treaty had been in the previous 40 years.

It is two of these major agreements, the ARF and the AMS, that led to the line of enquiry of this thesis. The model developed in this thesis views both the external and domestic psychopolitical impact of treaties. The focus of the analysis of the ARF is essentially external. The data available to analyse domestic reaction was minimal, as multilateral regional cooperation on security appeared to be of limited significance to the Australia domestic constituency. As a result the domestically oriented component of the model with regard to the ARF had a limited perview.

The AMS, on the other hand, while a component of regional enmeshment, and viewed as a vital element in the construction of regional security, was analysed from a primarily domestic viewpoint. This occurred because the AMS, from its inception, was a point of contention within the Australian constituency, who were influenced by the troubled relationship between Australia and Indonesia. While the import of the AMS, as the beginnings of the construction of a network of bilateral security arrangements within the region, was shared by regional political elites, this comprehension eluded the Australian public. This meant that the externally oriented elements of the model had less pertinence.

Space did not permit a detailed analysis of APEC. However, the fact that the economic arrangement has an impact both externally and domestically, and that the model would be tested in both respects with the ARF and AMS agreements, rendered an in-depth examination redundant. Further, unlike the security agreements discussed APEC enjoys widespread regional application, bipartisan support in the Australian polity and the acceptance of the domestic constituency. In that sense, it does not offer the lackadaisical
treatment meted out to the ARF, nor is it an issue like the AMS, which was always a point of contention.

The Keating Governments of 1992 to 1996 were censured in the Australian Parliament for allegedly engaging in less than democratic practices in their treaty making processes. In response to the Keating Government signing the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995 the Liberal-National Coalition launched a strategy aimed at ‘democratising’ the treaty making process. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer informed the House of Representatives, on May 2nd 1996, that the treaty making system would be reformed and updated so that a treaty would not be ratified without parliamentary analysis of its impact. [Hansard, HoR: 2-5-96:233]

This activity by the Coalition followed previous attempts by the Australian Democrats, in 1994 and 1995, to introduce legislation into the Senate, to achieve a similar end. On the 29th June 1994, Senator Vicky Bourne first introduced a bill for an act to provide for the parliamentary approval of treaties which the government proposed should apply to Australia. Bourne and the Democrats were concerned that the Australian Government should be made more accountable to its domestic constituency. Their belief that treaties should be approved by Parliament went back to the mid 1980s, when the nuclear debate had revealed that Australian governments had signed agreements which "made Australia a nuclear target", and later in 1988, when the Hawke Government “signed new ten-year agreements covering the US - Australian facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.” [Hansard, Senate: 29-6-94:2206]

The essential issue was that Parliament did not vote to approve treaties, and that even in instances where the provisions of a treaty required domestic legislation and thus some parliamentary debate, this was “an incidental and marginal form of accountability...” [Hansard,Senate:29-6-94:2206] Although then Opposition Leader Alexander Downer, on the 8th of June 1994, told the National Press Club that “...the Australian Parliament should have a ‘proper say’ in our international treaty making processes...”, Bourne’s legislation did not gain the requisite support for passage. Bourne renewed her efforts the following year and when launching the “Parliamentary Approval of Treaties Bill 1995” spoke of the “annual treaties farce”. [Hansard, Senate: 31 -5-95:661] She recognised that historically treaty making was “an executive
prerogative” but contended that change was in order due to the “growth in the number and scope of international agreements...” [Hansard, Senate: 31-5-95:661]

The calls for reform of the treaty making system had occurred as treaties were having greater domestic implications. Australia now had the ultimate responsibility for its own international affairs, and there was “growing popular pressure for greater executive accountability...” [Hansard, Senate: 31-5-95:661] Bourne proposed that “the Government be prevented from entering into a treaty...unless both Houses of Parliament gave their approval”. [Hansard, Senate: 31-5-95:661] Her major concern was with parliamentary sovereignty, and while accepting that the Commonwealth’s ratification of a treaty may rely on existing legislation to comply with the treaty, she contended that “legislation should be entrenched by parliamentary rather than executive act”. [Hansard, Senate: 31-5-95:663]

But the parliamentary process was only one aspect of treaty making activity with which the Australian polity was concerned. Creative interpretation of international treaties by the High Court of Australia had vested greater power in government to influence and affect domestic political activity by applying external law and norms. An instance of this was the High Court's adjudication of the Teoh case, through Mason CJ and Deane J, which was a discussion about how the deportation of a non citizen, for drug offences, which would result in his children remaining in Australia, was a breach of the international covenant against cruelty to children. [Galligan: 97:35] While accepting that treaty provisions are not a direct source of rights and obligations, unless they have been "incorporated by statute into municipal law", the Justices rejected the notion that a "...ratified but unincorporated convention 'could never give rise to a legitimate expectation' that an administrative decision-maker would act in conformity with the treaty." [Alston: 95:19]

According to Bourne's speech to the Senate on May 31st 1995, both justices also found that where “a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia’s obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party... It is accepted that a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language permits, so that it is in conformity and not in conflict with the established rules of international law...” [Hansard, Senate: 31-5-95:662] It was further argued that international conventions, or treaties, may play a part in
the development by the courts of common law. One argument from the
High Court put it that “ratification of a convention is a positive statement by
the executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian
people that the executive government and its agencies will act in accordance
with the Convention.” The counter argument within the High Court was that
“the ratification of a treaty ...(was)... not a statement to the national
community, but only to the international community.” [Hansard,Senate:31-
5-95:663] Thus, according to McHugh J. “ if the result of ratifying an
international convention was to give rise to a legitimate expectation that that
convention would be applied in Australia, the Executive Government of the
Commonwealth would have effectively amended the law of this country”.
[Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663]

Sir Ninian Stephen used the expression “democratic deficit” in regard to his
concern with “treaties which transfer power from national to supranational
bodies.” [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] Then Chief Justice Anthony Mason
raised the issue of the federal executive government committing Australia
“to an international convention which obliges the Australian Government to
regulate conduct as between citizens within national boundaries...”
[Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] Bourne concluded that Australia’s role in
international law making could not be confined “to the secrecy of the
Cabinet room”. [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:665]

The implication of the attacks on Labor, especially from the Coalition’s
perspective, was that Executive Government was working beyond the reach
of the Parliamentary process and thus treaty making was seen as an
excessive abuse of power. The Coalition Government may have been
responding to Keating’s hasty and secretive signing of the AMS in December
1995. But the underlying disagreement between the Labor administration,
which had favoured multilateralism, and by implication a 'rationalist'
perspective, and the Coalition, with its penchant for bilateral forms of
exchange between nations, a 'realist' approach, seemed more to do with
party traditions than with the actual practice of international relations. But
Labor had used bilateral strategies, too, as evidenced by the AMS. Keating
and Evans justification for employing so called ‘secret diplomacy’ was also
based on common practice, whereby bilateral treaties were usually
negotiated in secret to avoid "premature disclosure", as "the international
convention amongst countries is to treat the text of such treaties as
confidential until signature." [Trick or Treaty:94:99] But this stance was seen
as anachronistic by the Liberal Opposition, a position held even more strongly by the Australian Democrats.

Curiously, both the Liberal Prime Minister, Howard, and Foreign Minister, Downer, on attaining power, went on to enunciate Realism as the overriding tenet of their policy making teams. The basis for negotiation of treaties for Realists is secret diplomacy. In fact in the Review of Treaty Making, the final reform envisaged wider parliamentary and community consultation, except when such consultation would impede the realisation of the national interest. In the end the real objections of the Coalition may have been to the successes, at least internationally, of a proactive foreign relations team under the guidance of Labor, and this indicated that leadership is a crucial element of foreign policy. However, it seems it was only with the Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement of 1995 that partisan sentiment became sharply defined, but this may have been mere window dressing by oppositionist groups to attract the attention of the domestic constituency.

The nation’s foreign policy, that appeared to be based on national interest, and the interest of the Australian population, may well have been guided, outlined and defined by ‘external’ determinants. Treaties, which encompassed the trade and security relationship between Australia and Indonesia, the relationships between Australia and its regional neighbours, and Australia’s entrenched loyalty to the USA and western values, were instruments of foreign policy for the Keating Government. Equally they may have impacted as external agents of influence and of change in the domestic economic, military, and social arenas.

Thus it must be asked to what extent was Keating challenging the dominant social paradigms? Underpinning the Australian discourse on values and attitudes was the legacy of the White Australia Policy, fear of Asia, protecting Australia's membership of the West, and maintaining Australia's allegiance to great and powerful friends. Keating's vision, as presented here, seemed to be seen by some as heralding a new age of hope, and by others as a betrayal of all things sacred.
Keating's Vision for Australia

"By the turn of the century, by the centenary of our nationhood, I hope this will be a country in which more and more Australians speak the languages of our neighbours; our business people are a familiar and valued part of the commercial landscape of the Asia-Pacific; we are making full use of the great resource of the growing number of Australians of Asian background; our defence and strategic links with countries around us are deeper than ever; our national identity is clearer to us and our neighbours through the appointment of an Australian as our head of state; and our national culture is shaped by, and helps to shape, the cultures around us."

Asia-Australia Institute, Brisbane, October 1994

Was it simply the effect of the entrenched conservatism of the Australian constituency, complemented by historically based negative attitudes towards "Asia", which made Keating's reform program much less digestible than logic would suggest? Or was there another element, an apprehension about 'sinister' motives due the Keating's secrecy? Because he excluded parliament and thus the Australian people from the treaty making process was he attempting to impose a regime of change on the Australian community without their knowledge? Was the rejection of Keating's vision thus more a rejection of Keating's secretive method, and less to do with that vision? Or was the essence of the rejections premised on something much deeper in the national psyche, an innate fear of the unknown?

An analysis of how Keating used his foreign policy tool-kit will allow an understanding of both the conventional use of varying forms of agreements, and a more qualitative exploration of the ways in which treaties contribute to and can contrive to change the constituents world-view. In short, how did Keating challenge Australian attitudes? 'Arrogance' was often used to describe Keating's attitude. Just two days prior to the signing of the Australia-Indonesia AMS, Opposition leader Howard, speaking on National Identity, described national leadership under Keating as "arrogant, prescriptive, divisive and manipulative" [Howard:95:7].

Keating's attitude to change purportedly demonstrated his disregard for the opinions and attitudes of the Australian constituency, and this seemed evident when he suggested that the Government had not referred to the Australian people about the Agreement on Maintaining Security with Indonesia, because if they had there would have been no agreement. [Smith.H:97:17-18] His contention seemed to be that it was in the national interest to reach that agreement with Australia's northern most neighbour,
but that the animosity felt by Australians against Indonesia, because of East
Timor, meant the domestic constituency would have rejected such an
agreement. This, in turn, was seen by Keating as a position untenable in light
of the developing economic power of Asia. He argument appeared to be that
pragmatism should prevail regardless of historical legacies.

In light of these psychosocial insights there is a need to consider Treaties
Beyond the Text - imbued with the author's technical predilections,
influenced by the initiators thoughts, constructed to achieve widespread
acceptance if possible, and essentially an ideational compilation. Thus the
context in which it is presented is vital, and the concepts on which it is
based, as well as what is ultimately written on the page. The agreement
could be even more elusive and not be readily found on the document
which underpins it, but be premised on perceptual comprehensions
inherently historic, persuasively futuristic or pragmatically centred in the
present.

Exploring the psychological dimension of treaties is the major focus of this
analysis. An attempt will be made to assess the impact of Keating's
experiments from a psychopolitical perspective. The existing outcomes and
probable future attainments stemming from Keating's stratagem will be
analysed. How should he have dealt with the domestic constituency to
achieve success? The essence of the discussion presented here is to delve into
the psychosocial and psychopolitical elements of attitudinal conservatism in
a bid to identify how Keating breached those protocols, and how he may,
perhaps, have avoided the pitfalls of rejection that stemmed from
challenging the constituency's comfort zone.

The value of the tools chosen by Keating will be assessed.

Thus the underriding discussion throughout this thesis explores the
following hypothesis:

To achieve success as tools of foreign policy treaties must be
constructed and construed so as to satisfy the psychopolitical
necessities of all key actors, external and domestic.
Synthesis and Analysis

This thesis follows two lines of inquiry. One explores theoretical comprehensions of how treaties may be utilised as tools of foreign policy, while the other looks at particular examples in practice. At the theoretical level, the thesis is an examination of the possible ways in which treaties can effect change in not only global policy but in domestic policy, as a general rule. This entails an excursion through social theory which is driven by the pragmatic needs of the investigation. There is no well developed body of theory which focuses on how treaties effect change. Thus a wide variety of literatures have been examined for what they have to offer, by extrapolation, to this question. The larger part of this thesis is an exercise in theoretical argument, speculation and synthesis of literature on International Relations (IR), Organisation Studies, Political Communication and Social Psychology, to develop a multifaceted theoretical insight into treaties, their aims and effects, and to identify the psychopolitical elements within those agreements.

Theoretical Understanding of Treaties

While thoughts about treaties lead naturally to considering their legal implications or the strategic ramifications, a less obvious but arguably essential consideration must be paid to the psychological impact that compacts can have. Such an approach will go some way towards explaining Keating's attempt to shift Australia's primary allegiances away from a singular dependence on the USA, militarily, and Great Britain and Europe, culturally. Such activity drew attention to the elements of perception formation or perception enhancement that treaties bring to interstate relations. For Australia this dimension was particularly pertinent at the closing of the Cold War period, when foreign policy makers in the Keating Government, in collaboration with Foreign Minister Evans, were constructing regional 'architecture' with both military and economic dimensions. The architecture was intended, in part, to impress on regional neighbours Australia’s full hearted intent to participate interdependently with regional states.

The Keating Government expanded on the work of its predecessors, the Hawke Ministries, and with Evans program as the cornerstone of Keating’s
foreign policy, Keating proactively pursued multilateral assent for both military and economic strategies in the region. But foreign policy making is not only targeted towards the external. The domestic constituency must be convinced that such policy is in the "national interest". This was the task of several members of the Keating Ministry, with Keating and Evans taking the lead, but McMullan must also be recognised as a major contributor to raising Australia’s profile in the region, through his work as Australia’s Trade Minister. Both Keating and McMullan had the task of convincing the domestic constituency of the pertinence, salience and efficacy of Australia’s push in to the region, in the hope that electors would assist in the quest rather than act as inhibitors. In gauging the success or not of this strategy this thesis searches for an understanding of how social psychology works to form or enhance perceptions, or not.

**Psychopolitics Explored**

Perception and misperception featured in Pettman’s work on Human Behaviour and World Politics, wherein he describes how “social psychological research is largely ...(focussed)... upon individual behaviour... and upon human behaviour in groups.” [Pettman:75:201] Although he cautions that the relevance of social psychology to world politics will be a "partial and conditional one”. Pettman’s work is a sound basis for developing an appreciation of the psychopolitical aspects of Keating’s foreign policy.

Essential to understanding Pettman’s argument is his view that individual performance will be modified by ‘objective constraints’, but that a good deal may be learned about a state’s foreign policy “in terms of the personality, the motives, the attitudes, the beliefs, the stereotypes, the emotions and perceptions of its key decision-makers and their advisers, or in terms of the psychological attributes of its people, or at least those sections of it which the decision-makers take into account...” [Pettman:75:202] Thus his caution, which rests on the premise that the informative nature of the psychological picture depends upon the “influence of role constraints and the immediacy of systemic imperatives”. He further qualifies this judgement when he contends that “the individual and the constraints that enclose him are in constant interaction and will to some extent reorganise each other... as... human beings act upon their understanding of reality”. [Pettman:75:203]
Having established a base from which to mount an argument concerning the pertinence of socio-psychological analysis of decision makers Pettman then explores the structural cornerstones of the psychopolitical analytical approach. To best illustrate this he comes to a position where he states that “(m)isperception - wilful or unconscious - will distort the most objective seeming realities, running before the policy-making process and conditioning it at every point.” [Pettman:75:207] But what are these systemic imperatives which act to modify or control policy? He writes of how images are mapped "...for their selective effects upon the perceptions of elites and of the led; personality traits are scrutinised for possible political implications; psychological drives are assessed for their part in producing aggressive behaviour and war or in maintaining the peace; and public opinion, or rather the opinions of diverse publics, are plumbed as contributing causes of one external stance or another” [Pettman:75:203].

The argument, according to J.D.Singer, is that the key to national character is the statistical aggregation of the modal personality of a state’s citizens; that the mass ideology is representative of the sum of personal attitudes; and that “the sum of individual opinions on a matter is a climate of opinion”. [Pettman:75:204] Attitudes are seen by Singer as major incentives and constraints on foreign policy while ideology is viewed as an aggregate of those attitudinal configurations.

Thus Pettman invites his readers to “probe the central concept of ‘attitude’ for its psychopolitical effects upon world affairs.” [Pettman:75:204] He contends that ‘attitude’ is construed as an implicit disposition which exerts a general but consistent influence over evaluation responses. It is learned, not innate, and as a phenomenon it is cognitive, in that it underpins believing and knowing; it is affective, in that it is constructed in terms of what is seen as good or bad; and it is behavioural, in that it is reflected in what is done. Thus he identifies a direct relationship between thinking and feeling, and behaviour.

Behaviour can be determined by thinking and feeling, but equally the pattern and form of behaviour can have a guiding influence over thinking and feeling. As a result of the influence of pattern and form, images become entrenched. These images act either to enhance creative ways of thinking or as retardants to proactivity, resulting in pathological retreats. Images are investigated extensively by Pettman as being spatial, temporal, relational,
personal, value oriented, affectional, public or private. He then adds to this the Freudian dimensions of conscious, subconscious and unconscious minds [Pettman:75:205-6]. Thus he concludes that these images and attitudes act as prejudgments, as simple models of the world, as working hypotheses which make sense of what is perceived but at the cost of complexity. These prejudgments are resistant to change and act to set entrenched patterns of behaviour within the greater polity and within the policy making elite, in responses where images either precede action or partly predetermine it, and this can lead to selective attention, selective remembering and forgetting, and distorted perceptions, and misperceptions.

In a further explanation of this phenomenon Pettman discusses the role of cognitive consonance and cognitive dissonance in the making of perceptions, of the intolerance of ambiguity, the theory of pattern preservation and of how simplistic thinking leads to simplistic perceptions in a bid to avoid any confrontation with ambiguity, as there is a reluctance to deal in anything less than certainty. A clearer understanding of cognitive dissonance makes Pettman's argument more pertinent.

Cognitive dissonance is identified as a major element in psychopolitical activity. Festinger's theory about this process, developed in 1957, is based on the reasoning that "...when a person holds two cognitions (ideas about the world) that are consistent with each other, he or she experiences a satisfying state of consonance. However, two (or more) cognitions that are inconsistent (one cognition implies the opposite of another) result in dissonance, and an unpleasant state of arousal." Thus, "...people are motivated to reduce the unsettling state of cognitive dissonance." [Gergen:81:178] It then follows that the more important the cognitions in opposition, the greater the dissonance and the greater the motivation for dissonance reduction.

Two common ways of reducing dissonance are by altering behaviour, whereby the action related to a cognition in contention is abandoned in favour of the status quo, or where the interpretation of that cognition is altered to make it less oppositionary. Hence members of the political constituency in Australia, when faced with Keating's proposition that Australia was part of Asia, came up against a societally entrenched fear of Asia. One group reacted by rejecting Keating's message and staying with the entrenched attitude, while the other group adopted his vision by placing the
entrenched opinion in an historic context, which allowed for a contemporary shift in attitude.

However, Jervis suggests that in reducing dissonance, "people alter their beliefs and evaluations, thereby changing the premises of later deliberations..." thus cognitive dissonance has "...implications for the person's future decisions, actions and perceptions." [Jervis:83:387] This suggests that regardless of the form dissonance reduction takes, attitudes are affected, dissonance can be a means for realising change, and while a leader opposed to change may elicit cognitive consonance as a pacifying force in the short term, this actually leads to opportunities for change agents to create dissonance and achieve attitudinal shifts.

Pettman's discussion continues to elucidate in this manner offering an insight in perception formation [Pettman:75:215], the role of conformity and loyalty in policy making and patterns of group communication. Pettman draws on both Burton's and Hoffman's work on perceptions to further explain psychodynamics in the international system. Burton states that reality is a "contest of active perceptions competing for the privilege of defining reality... "[Burton, cited by Pettman:75:230], while Hoffman suggests that "International politics ...was often an arena of coercion without persuasion; ...(while now)...it is tending to become an arena of persuasion, more or less coercive." [Hoffman, cited in Pettman:75:230] Pettman concludes that “(t)he arts of persuasion are first and foremost psychological ones, and their political implications are profound.” [Pettman:75:230]

It can be seen from Pettman etal. that the psychopolitical has pertinence as an analytical tool. But what can be discovered from this perspective? Was the destination to which Keating and his lieutenants were attempting to propel the Australian public a desirable one, from the public’s viewpoint? The March 1996 election result, when Keating lost government, suggests it was not.

An opening question, raised by reading Pettman, is related to how 'psychological manipulation' was used in a bid to convince Australians of the salience of the shift into Asia. Thus it is possible to view the objective of that psychopolitical analysis as one of illuminating manipulation. And yet were the foreign policy makers aware of this manipulative dimension? Thus, at first glance this appears to be a psychological assessment, but if it is
necessary to ascertain the raison d'etre’ of the elite it becomes a political assessment of how psychological tools were utilised. But if that elite was intent on psychological manipulation, to achieve political outcomes, was this then a conscious application of psychopolitical tools to achieve political ends? Put simply, is the task at hand one of discerning the extent of the conscious application of psychopolitical tools?

Practical Understandings of Treaties.

The thesis is also an investigation, an analysis, into how the Keating Government may have attempted to use treaties, in their various forms, to persuade Australians to accept a new outlook with regard to the Asia Pacific region, in a project articulated by Keating’s vision, and to gauge his success. To achieve this objective the two agreements creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) are examined. Their aims and effects will be outlined in the case studies presented in the last part of the thesis. Each Agreement will be subjected to a series of questions constructed to identify likely helpful theoretical comprehensions which will provide qualitative and quantitative insights into the role, purpose and effect of treaties in general, and then of those cited above.

Of prime importance at the early stage in the project was the need to address the diverse understanding of what a treaty actually is. Thus a brief exploration of the various comprehensions of what constitutes a treaty, drawing on both international law and the Australian Government’s declared interpretation serves as a preamble to the development of analytical tools with which to assess the efficacy of treaties.

Introducing Treaties

The definition of what constitutes a treaty is varied and contested. The view expressed by Professor at Law, D.P. O’Connell, in the Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee of November 1995, entitled Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to make and Implement Treaties, was that

"There is no general touchstone for determining what is a treaty. Everything depends upon analysis of the instrument in question, whether its contemplated goal is juridically significant, whether the language used is indicative of
juridical intent, and whether the signatories acted in a manner consistent with
the view that they intended to enter into a binding arrangement as distinct from
merely assenting to an ad hoc political aim."

Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia

O'Connell seems to imply that a treaty must have application at law to be
salient and efficacious. He appears to denigrate the symbolic treaty, which
has the purpose of binding without legal constraint.

Another view stems from Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties states that a treaty is "...an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law...(which is)... binding on any nation state which enters into it... The term
'treaty' covers a range of international agreements including charters,
conventions, covenants, protocols, pacts and exchanges of notes." [Trick or
Treaty: CofA: 95:31]

A variant on this focusses more closely on the intent of the treaty, which is
defined as a contract or other written instrument binding two or more states
under international law. The term treaty is confined to the more important
international agreements, whereas those agreements of lesser or subordinate
importance have been called conventions, agreements, arrangements,
protocols and pacts. A treaty is normally negotiated between
plenipotentiaries provided by their respective governments with "full power
'to conclude the treaty within the scope of their instructions. Signature,
however, is presumed to be subject to ratification by the government unless
explicitly waived. Apart from such express provision, the instrument does
not become formally binding until ratifications have been exchanged.
[Encyclopedia Brittanica: 87:11-907]

International jurists have classified treaties in a practical way according to
their object, as follows: (1) political treaties, (2) commercial treaties, (3)
constitutional and administrative treaties, (4) treaties relating to criminal
justice, (5) treaties relating to civil justice, and (6) treaties codifying
international law. In practice it is often difficult to assign a particular treaty
to any one of these classes, or simply as general (multilateral) or bilateral
treaties, [EB:87:11-907]
International organisations play an important role in international law matters. They are usually established by multilateral agreements and have independent legal personalities, meaning that they can enter into treaties in their own right. Two major international organisations are the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation. The fundamental goal of the United Nations is to ensure international peace and security. The purpose of the International Labour Organisation is to establish labour standards.

Bilateral treaties usually come into force upon signature. In contrast a multilateral treaty must be ratified before coming into force for a state. When state representatives sign a treaty it usually denotes that they agree to the content of the agreement. When a state ratifies a treaty it expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty. Bilateral treaties are by far the easiest to realise if both polities share a vision, or when one side can influence, encourage or coerce the other side to cooperate, or when two dictators meet in agreement; but when two democracies meet and attempt to come to an agreement, both are subject to domestic judgement and thus agreement becomes less than relevant if it does not enjoy widespread constituent support.

When the aim is to reach an agreement on terms negotiated between treaty makers, free of domestic intervention, short term success is possible. However, a change in attitude within the domestic constituency can limit the life of such an agreement, even though it enjoyed multipartisan support at the moment of signing or ratification. Thus the successful treaty must promise whatever the constituency affected by that treaty is hoping for, so that that constituency is not challenged and forced to retreat to a comfort zone or attitudinal plateau as a result of cognitive dissonance.

One successful path is to construct an agreement that is so loosely defined, and so encumbered with essentially contested concepts that it can always be accepted, regardless of the political outlook of the constituent members. Such an agreement may serve little purpose as a useful tool, or become a powerful tool of persuasion in the right hands. It can be used to shore up certainty; to create boundaries for action to occur within; to delineate; to define; include; maintain; retain; exclude; instigate; prevent; initiate; launch; halt; cease; ensure; guarantee; or stymie.
However, a more radical view, as expressed by McDougal and Lehmann [1995] suggests that a treaty, or international agreement, is "not that of a mere collocation of words or signs on a parchment, but rather that of a continuing process of communication and collaboration between the parties in the shaping and sharing of demanded values." [McDougal etal:95:xxiii] Here we encounter the possibility of psychosocial elements influencing interaction between states in how they interpret their relationship and the agreements which underpin such exchange.

The hopes and aspirations of the treaty makers must serve as an indicator of their intent in, and of, the agreements which they entered into. This outline allows for the development of questions with which to construct a further research agenda, the objective of which is to identify likely helpful theoretical approaches which will provide insights into the origin, role, purpose and efficacy of treaties in general, and as illustrated in particular case studies.

The thesis concentrates on treaty making from a theoretical perspective, and develops a multivoiced or polyphonomous analytical model to test the efficacy of a treaty. This model is a synthesis of various comprehensions drawn from a range of disciplines, in a bid to address the claims of the hypothesis. This multiperspectival approach hinges on the focus on norms, perceptions and discourses as the primary targets and tools of change agents, and thus the test is essentially aimed at treaties likely to effect change domestically.

Two case studies are included where the polyphonic analytical model is applied to the agreements underpinning the ASEAN Regional Forum, revealing an external concern not matched domestically, and the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, which discloses significant interest in the Australian political arena. A detailed summary of how the thesis evolves indicates the development of that model.
How the Thesis Evolves.

The thesis is divided into five sections, the first three of which are surveys of theoretical comprehensions which throw light on the psychological underpinnings of political activity. Each Chapter of the three theoretical sections is based on seminal works from which clear conceptual outlines are drawn. The purpose of the enquiry into each perspective is to identify the basic concepts, and no enquiry into the contestability of concepts is pursued. The purpose of these examinations is to extrapolate conceptual applications to treaties, and to identify likely psychopolitical elements. Section Four presents the polyphonic analytical model that is a synthesis of the pertinent insights gleaned from the survey of theoretical data and Section Five is comprised of the two aforementioned case studies.

Section One, External Comprehensions, begins with insights into treaties borne by examinations of international law comprehensions, conventional international relations theories and the more contemporary outlook of social constructivism. The prime objective of this section, which targets the external application of treaties, is to identify psychopolitical elements which have a domestic impact, and take the form of norms, perceptions or discourses.

In Chapter Two, initial reference is made to Gerhard von Glahn's text, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law, published in 1970. His discussion about the traditional role of treaties as sources of international law, led onto an extended insight into interpretation, the basis of which was the divide between the content of a treaty and the intent of the treaty maker. This raised the notion of how cultural norms can interpose on intentionalities and guide interpretation. In more contemporary works, by McDougal, Lasswell and Miller in 1994, and McDougal and Lehman in 1995, the process of interpretation and the context in which it is performed are explicated, with the conclusion being reached that when deciphering a treaty the peremptory norms of general international law must be paid due regard. In this manner the interpreter can be guided by the community's wants or needs. Thus norms are identified as a major element of international law and as a consideration for treaty makers as change agents.
Chapter Three deals with a grouping of conventional international relations theories, which were selected due to their focus on the state as primary actor, within a system. NeoRealism, refers to the work of Waltz, and critical comments by Cox and Ashley, as summarised in Burchill and Linklater's 1996 text, *Theories of International Relations*. The expose' is used to identify how systemic constraints can lead to socialisation of states whereby, in a bid to influence, leaders may be forced to adapt to dominant discourses, or in pursuit of perception enhancement, adopt new behaviours, often engendered by norms amended by treaty action.

Hegemonic Stability Theory, draws on work by Cox, who offers an outline of how leadership can be exercised by a benign power, in pursuit of universal or general interests, or as a facilitator of collective action. The crucial point here is that the hegemon is assuming the role of agent by acting beyond the constraints of structure. Thus the hegemon enters the field of psychosocial influence once it exercises agency. Kono's overview of regional regimes, published in 1998, although critical of the hegemon's role in regime formation, supports this argument, while Min and Waldron, in their 1998 paper titled *Emergence of Synergistic Hegemony in International Relations*, offer a further complexion to the comprehension of a hegemon as an agent based construct, whose emergence can be an expression of efforts for collective action.

In a like manner arguments put forward by Krasner and Keohane feature in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger's conclusion about international regimes, presented in their journal article, *Integrating Theories Of International Regimes*, published in 2000. In their own right, Hasenclever etal present views on the role of agency with insights into cognitivism, a counterpart of constructivism. Regime Theory informs of how the treaty can be utilised to impose a set of principles or norms on states to construct order. Kono also features in this discussion with his articulation of possible gains realised through regime activity and the role of transactionalism.

The comprehensions of NeoLiberal Institutionalism presented here stem from Martin's work at Harvard, and her 1997 paper titled *An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies*. Martin further articulates the impact of regimes, looking at how interdependence is engendered and enhanced through the imposition of norms in the guise of rules and regulations, and applied by international institutions. Thus, again
norms figure prominently as elements with which change agents must contend, or utilise, to achieve their objective.

The more contemporary theory of social constructivism, presented in Chapter Four, draws on the work of both Ruggie, who delves into comprehensions of structure and agency emanating from Giddens, and notions on ideas originating with Goldstein and Keohane. This data is presented to better explain the role of ideational motives within international relations, as it focusses on structure and agency. But also because it introduces the notion of how beliefs can underpin political comprehensions, contending that for change to occur intersubjective beliefs, that are social facts based on collective intentionality, must be addressed. Thus shared narratives are established, which are based on evolving societal norms, influenced by discourses, and with an awareness of maintaining perceptions. An afterword from Sliker, from her 1992 publication ‘This Small Planet’ Multiple Mind : Healing the Split in Psyche and World, extends the base of ideational influence, by linking the actions of the individual to global patterns of political activity, when she outlines how a growing interdependency between states is partly an outcome of the sharing of beliefs and the convergence of ideas between peoples across cultures which is redefining state relations.

Section Two, External / Internal Perspectives, examines norms, perceptions and discourses, by illustrating how they serve to bridge the gap between external and domestic political activity, particularly with regard to change elicited by treaty making activity.

Chapter Five begins by demonstrating how pertinent domestically generated impetuses and imperatives are in the development of treaties. It draws on Saunders text, Officials and Citizens in International Relations, as presented in Volkan's publication of 1991, The Psychodynamics of International Relations, where he contends that interstate exchange is a dynamic political process which involves not only states, but includes human dimensions, such as ideational elements like norms.

While this chapter looks at norms, it then proceeds to develop the links between norms, perceptions and discourses. As an expose of these three elements it examines norm dynamics, perception mechanics and discourses. Finnemore and Sikkink's article, International norm dynamics and political
change, as presented in *International Organisation* in 1998, is the main source of data. In this work a variety of norm types are identified to aid in understanding what treaty makers must work with before the role of the norm entrepreneur is outlined, as a way of explaining the requisite actions of the treaty maker as change agent. The process of internalisation of norms is described as this is a vital outcome if change is to occur. With this work the authors are used to offer an explanation of how socialisation works, and to illustrate possible challenges for change agents.

The work on perception formation, modification and enhancement is essentially an explication of how perceptions are constructed, and what they are premised on. Jervis's 1983 text, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, is the primary source for this insight, and is used to offer explanations of intentionality and the impact of 'evoked sets' on perception and interpretation. Ekecki's work, on the formation of perceptions, extends the notion of evoked sets, by looking at stocks of knowledge as ideational benchmarks. To conclude this part of the chapter Jervis is drawn on again to enunciate the relationship between perceptions, attitude and change. This comprehension is a necessary guide if the treaty maker is to achieve success.

Discourses as the basis of perceptions, or the outcome of norms, are a vital and intrinsic element in this troika of psychopolitical apprehensions, spanning the external and domestic polity. Fairclough's expose, *Language and Power*, published in 1989, is used to look at the relevance of discourses to language, the order of discourses, and at how a particular discourse can achieve dominance. The connection between discourses and common sense and ideology, both of which can be either conducive or oppositionary to the treaty makers actions, is examined as a means to explaining the origins of discourse, and to give a clue at to how a discourse may come about or be constructed. Fairclough is drawn on further to examine the naturalisation of discourses, which correlates with the work on the internalisation of norms. This chapter concludes by examining the relationship between norms, perceptions, discourses and treaties, and overall is a necessary introduction to the next section, which identifies the salience of these three ideational elements as tools of political communication.

**Section Three**, Internal Comprehensions, moves into the realm of the domestic constituency, by enquiring into the psychosocial and thus
psychopolitical bases of implementing change, and the likely impediments to or strategies for achieving attitudinal shifts domestically, to ensure the success of a treaty regime.

Chapter Six approaches cultural change from an organisational viewpoint. Its selection was premised on the simplistic notion that the domestic political constituency is essentially an organisation, in that it has leaders and followers. The discussion, which draws on the resources presented in Bate's text of 1994, *Strategies for Cultural Change*, revolves around the forms of cultural change that can be actualised, and the effectiveness of each of those realisations. Bate's work is used to explain the strategies for cultural development, a method which maintains the status quo while allowing for change; and cultural transformation, whereby a fundamental change within the culture occurs. These explanations are complemented by an outline of the possible means of implementation of strategies, and the variant styles of leadership, which can be appended to those forms of cultural change. This material is aimed at elucidating possible cultural changes and there execution, and thus can be utilised to examine the actions of leaders and to assess their successes as change agents.

In Chapter Seven reference is made to data drawing on social psychology, as a way of identifying possible challenges to be met by treaty makers intent on change. The discussion revolves around intangibles like beliefs, desires and opinions, as outlined by Money-Kyrle in his articulation of general principles cognitive development, in his text 1977 publication, *Psychoanalysis and Politics*, and complemented by conceptual explanations drawn from Eysenck's insights into the relationship between opinions, attitudes and ideologies, as presented in his 1968 publication, *The Psychology of Politics*. This expose offers a deeper understanding to the change agent of what processes must be utilised. Sarbin's work, drawn from the 1986 text, *Narrative Psychology*, is used to further extend this comprehension with the identification of narrative structures, akin to discourses, which influence thinking and attitudinal stance. Gergen and Gergen, in the same publication, offer another dimension by linking narrative and interpretation. The chapter concludes with the presentation of concepts articulated by Volkan, in the 1990 text, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, where other psychodynamic elements, like identification, rituals of identification, proper interpretation, message receptivity and cognitive dissonance, all receive necessary explication as a
guide to better understanding possible tactical measures that could be employed by treaty makers as change agents, or which could act as impediments to the implementation of change engendered by a treaty.

The final theoretical explanations are contained in Chapter Eight, which has two major focuses, one on the methods of political communication, with insights into persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination. The outline of persuasion is premised on insights drawn from Pratkanis and Aronson's 1991 text, *Age of Propaganda*, where they look at the relationship between persuasion and behaviour, before an examination of mass persuasion techniques, which undergo explication. Using this material the link is made between persuasion and propaganda. At this point the 1989 publication, *Propaganda*, edited by Smith III, is used to identify variant forms of propaganda, and there mechanisms, with the work of MacDonald [1989] looking at propaganda and order, Burnett's insights [1989] into ideology and propaganda; and O'Donnell and Jowett's views [1989] on propaganda as a form of communication. The arguments taken from the authors are synthesised to an end point where indoctrination is viewed as a possible outcome of persuasion, or as an underpinning of propaganda.

The text, *Concepts of Indoctrination*, published in 1977 and edited by Snook, is an articulation of educative techniques, and presents a discussion on philosophical and psychological mechanics of persuasion, in its variant forms, and is used to set the context in which to consider the ways that attitudinal shifts are possible using political communication. These discussions are intended to elucidate the various approaches that a treaty maker may adopt to implement change, but also to alert the change agent to the barriers to achieving attitudinal shifts and redefinitions of cognitive frameworks.

The second focus is on the machinery of political communication, which concerns strategies employed in advertising and media communications, and elements of those processes, including the variant forms that the communications can take. McNair's *An Introduction to Political Communication*, published in 1995, provides the starting point for this discussion, with his explanation of what characterises political communication. Huckfeldt and Sprague's publication of the same year, *Citizens, Politics and Social Communication*, is used to make the link between social communication and persuasion techniques, to tie in this
section on the machinery to the previous section on means of political communication. The discussion on persuasion is extended by referencing Petty and Cacioppo's articulation of central and peripheral routes to persuasion, contained in the 1983 publication, *Advertising and Consumer Psychology*, edited by Percy and Woodside. While this work if focussed on advertising, it combines concepts from psychology and communications, and applies cognitive frameworks from social psychology to suggests possible avenues to achieve successful attitudinal shifts. This second part of the chapter concludes with Zanna's examination of message receptivity and the processes which can be used to enhance or inhibit attitudinal change in a constituency, as contained in *Advertising Exposure, Memory, and Choice*, published in 1993 and edited by Mitchell, and drawn from the consumer psychology discipline. This latter section has been excluded from the case studies as the analysis mostly depends on data obtained at the point of implementation, and is difficult to access or collect beyond that time.

**Section Four** presents the polyphonic analytical model, developed as a synthesis of these multiperspectival insights. The model has four essential concerns of assessment, and they are,

How do the theoretical perspectives of international relations explain the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?,
What influences must treaty makers contend with?,
What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty?, and
Was the attempt at effecting change a success?

These questions are then applied to ascertain the viability of treaties as change agents, discovering the extent to which treaties were used by the Keating government to achieve aims that would have been stymied domestically, and estimating how much Australia was guided in its adherence to treaties by external forces, be they other nation states or institutional processes like globalisation.

**Section Five** is based on analysis, and contains the two case studies considered appropriate to demonstrate the saliency of the model, and a conclusion which contains a diagnosis of treaties as tools of foreign policy, the theoretical component of the thesis, and a prognosis of Keating's legacy, where comment is made regarding the likely long term outcomes of the
strategy employed by Keating to persuade the Australian community of the relevance of Asia to Australia's destiny.

A primary objective of the theoretical synthesis, herein, was to create a model with which to test the efficacy of any treaty or international agreement. The Keating treaties provided test cases, as they were topical at the moment the project was conceived. It is intended that the theory developed here is useful in understanding the Keating period, and this utility suggests a wider applicability of the model in approaching a little understood area of treaties in world politics.
Section One

External Comprehensions
Section One

External Comprehensions

The initial focus of this section is on the role and purpose of treaties in the external context, while it also aims to identify the forces behind the genesis of a treaty. Thus treaties may be systemic outcomes, concoctions of a ruling elite intent on creating or maintaining hegemonic positions, ideological imperatives, or devices constructed to assist in policy implementation. The exercise, then, is aimed at gauging the extent to which a treaty regime may be understood as an outcome of neorealist systemic constraints, an extension of the aspirations of expansionary states, or the neoliberal penchant for creating institutions.

However, while the study of international relations traditionally revolves around the system of states, characterised as anarchic, or the society of states, where order is maintained through cooperation, the nuanced arguments about whether a society is a system, or whether anarchy creates order, contributed to the recent adaptation into the International Relations discipline of a systemically located, and state centric sociological perspective, social constructivism, an ideational insight.

The constructivist perspective introduces the notion of attitudinal change, and the role of norms, perceptions and discourses as the locales where change occurs, or as the agents used to effect change. The prime objective of this section, which allows an appreciation of the validity of psychopolitical elements as intrinsic components of change imbed by treaty makers, is to identify those elements which have a domestic impact, and take the form of norms, perceptions or discourses.
Chapter Two

Treaties:
Instruments of International Law or Social Constructs?

This Chapter takes a more than legalistic approach to an evaluation of a treaty's role and purpose by focussing on the interpretive nature of legal activity and contending that the prognostications about legal elements like justiciability, whether the court can pass judgement on an issue, are always prone to subjective comprehension or auto-interpretation. Thus the real value of the legal construct, known as a treaty, may lie less with its addition to the codification of behaviour, both externally and domestically, and more with its symbolic resolution of construed difference between states, the social contracts which develop between those states and the attitudinal shifts within domestic constituencies which are a legacy of treaty making.

When attempting to identify why a treaty was created, what its possible role could be, and how it might function, commentators can be drawn to legalistic perspectives, whereby treaties are seen to be a source of international law. This is due in part to the fact that while treaty makers may be politicians or diplomats, invariably the architects, the authors, of a treaty are trained in law. Thus the treaty can be considered primarily a legal construct and its efficacy assessed according to how it succeeds as an instrument of law.

While it can be argued that this is a narrow view, as this chapter suggests, it may be necessary to take that path as a way of building the structural profile of a treaty, in short, its content. However, sparse reference is paid to this conventional insight, as the objective of this thesis is to identify the deeper underpinnings of an agreement. These hinge on the intent of the treaty maker, the treaty and its interpreters, and allude to the import of agency as a further and meaningful element of treaty making. Thus, while this chapter begins with the conventional comprehension of treaties as the source of international law, it moves on to inquire into the possible effect of a treaty as an agent of social change, and the role of interpretation in this process.

In his text Law Among Nations, an introduction to public international law, von Glahn comments on common types of treaties and their role as a source
of international law. His work is used here to create the context for an examination of traditional legal comprehensions, but it also extends into the area of interpretation. Von Glahn considered treaties to be "generally accepted as a major...source of international law", but cautioned that the bulk of treaties did not create "one single general rule of international law". [von Glahn:70:11] This was the function of the law making treaty.

Thus the first questions to apply to a treaty under investigation are

"Is it 'an instrument through which a substantial number of states declare their understanding of what a particular rule of law is, by which new general rules for the future conduct of the ratifying or adhering states are laid down, by which some existing customary or convention rule of law is abolished or modified, or by which some new international agency is created.'"? [von Glahn:70:11]

To identify the categories of law making treaties von Glahn based his differentiation on whether the intent of a treaty was in transforming existing law and legal rules by altering the content; reinterpreting existing customary or conventional rules, without changing the content; or creating new principles of law. He stated that this divide was contingent on "the basis of content and intent" [von Glahn:70:12]. This is a fine point which introduces the notion of the dynamic relationship between structure, seen as content, and agency, seen as intent, an underpinning already alluded to in the introductory remarks to this chapter, and to the thesis in general. It can be understood that changing the content of a treaty can transform its impact, and it must then be asked what was the intent of the changes that were made, and was that intent also the intent of the change makers?

In fact, von Glahn did recognise how intentions can sometimes be subsumed by custom, a second source of international law. He contends, and quite legitimately from a psychopolitical viewpoint, that while a new law making treaty may be intended to override an earlier conflicting rule of customary law, "if a custom has been so generally accepted that its provisions could be said to be ingrained in national behaviour, a subsequent and contrary rule of conventional law may be found to be unenforceable." [von Glahn:70:17] This is a significant comprehension in that it countenances the possibility of cultural norms interposing a barrier to reformism. Thus intent becomes a vital concern when assessing a treaty's efficacy.
The intent of the treaty maker, as with the treaty itself, is open to interpretation, and this is a major component of justicial activity. Interpretation is a vital concern for treaty makers, policy makers and the judiciary and it receives due attention in an earlier work on auto-interpretation from Fried [1968]. He cites Gross as remarking that "each state has a right to interpret the law, the right of auto-interpretation..." [Fried:1968:115], but that this right can lead to conflicting interpretations and thus that strict barriers must be raised against excesses of interpretation by states in an environment where no overarching authority exists. Fried, however, then suggests that interpretation is dynamic and prone to determination by 'autonomously acting persons' [Fried:1968:115], suggesting a subjective and biased application.

Von Glahn is more subdued in his judgement about the interpretation of international agreements, contending that that is the task of international courts. He cites the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 as the guide to interpretation, detailing the two commonly accepted principles which govern commentary on treaties. These are that "the object of interpretation is to determine the real meaning of the parties accepting the instrument and... that... a treaty must be assumed not to be intended to be without effect or even to be absurd."[von Glahn:70:436] Here he may be paying regard to the excesses of auto-interpretation raised by Fried, by suggesting the application of entrenched interpretive guidelines.

He also contended that interpretation is about ensuring that the parties to a treaty have a mutual comprehension of its intent. Further he suggests that words used in an agreement should be interpreted in their usual, ordinary manner unless "...such would produce absurd, contradictory, or impossible consequences." If that occurred it then may be necessary to diverge from a literal meaning to avoid conclusions "obviously contrary to the intent of the treaty". [von Glahn:70:436]

Other possibilities relate to an historical interpretation of a treaty, which allows for cultural norms to influence comprehension and application, or to take into account the intended function of the treaty and to ensure that the treaty is interpreted, usually by a court, in such a manner as to ensure the realisation of the purpose it was intended to fulfil. It then follows that a vital concern for treaty makers must be to ensure that the wording of an agreement allows for broad, general and obvious interpretation in order to
avoid conflicting understandings. On the other hand, a shrewd application of treaty making could result in a seemingly innocuous agreement which, in fact, hides breaches of the Law of Treaties, or simply proves to be totally ineffective as an instrument of law, while still serving a completely adequate and effective role as an agreement. In such an instance the symbolic effect of the treaty may far outweigh its salience as an instrument of law.

In a more recent work, McDougal, Lasswell and Miller [1994] also probe interpretation, with regard to international agreements. In their introductory discussion they examine the process of communication, which depends on the dynamic between communicators and audiences, usually involved in the supplementary roles of initiator and recipient of messages, respectively. But negotiation is another form of communication where two interlocutors are engaged in a process of both initiating and receiving messages. Both forms are employed in the treaty making process and in interpretation by actors charged with the implementation of an agreement.

While the authors identify the component elements of communication, they do this to further reveal the workings of the process of interpretation and how context is vital, as "each detail in the whole of an act of communication is affected by, and in turn, affects all other details..." [McDougal:94:xvi] Thereby to achieve success in communication, and thus in ensuring that the content of the message will gain widespread support, the communicator, who in this instance is the treaty maker, must "discover the shared expectations" [McDougal:94:xvi] that the parties to the treaty create in each other. Thus attention must be paid to ensure that individuality, inventiveness and diversity are allowed to influence the process of interpretation. In short, the authors appear to be arguing against a reading of an international agreement which is based solely on the text of the document and fails to take into account the dynamic developments that have occurred around the treaty. Thus the contextuality of the process of communication must be heeded, as it "implies that any interpreter ... must be ready and able to explore the possible influence...of the identity of communicators and audiences,...of significant objectives, of base values and strategies." [McDougal:94:xv] The authors advance Fried's argument, while radicalising von Glahn's.

In a following work Lehman joins with McDougal [1995] to continue this insight into contextuality of interpretation. They mount an argument
concerning the application of international agreements, and the procedures which may assist in a successful completion of that task. In performing this task they encounter the comments of the drafters of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 with regard to interpretation, who state that "the intentions of the parties" and the "objects and purposes of the treaty"...are..."extrinsic evidence", warranting only a "certain place" in the process. [McDougal & Lehmann:95:xl] Thus it follows, according to the International Law Commission, that "the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation...into the intentions of the parties."[McDougal:95:xli] In fact, the authors are critical of the drafters for giving no indication as to how text can be given meaning without reference to its full context.

The resultant justification of Lehmann and McDougal's position hinges on the principle, espoused by DeCastro, that the purpose of interpretation is to "ascertain the true will of the parties" [McDougal:95:xliii] and that the terms of a declaration indicate the intent of the authors. But as words change in meaning over time it is then necessary to understand the intent of the authors at the time of writing and to apply that intent to contemporary situations. Thus words have no intrinsic value in themselves and their semantic values "depends on the time and the circumstances in which they were uttered."[McDougal:95: xliv] Thus "interpretation is not a procedural but a substantive process..." [McDougal:95:li].

However, as Falk pointed out, "the orientation of the interpreter is shaped by the conception [of interpretation] that he adopts, and this may influence the kind of evidence that is relied upon to reach and to explain the interpretation of a disputed text." [McDougal:95:lx] Thus the role of agency as an element of interpretation is elevated to the level where psychosocial considerations must be included in any analysis of the relationship between treaties and international law.

McDougal and Lehmann extend this argument along more critical lines with the introduction of peremptory norms, which can act as a major obstacle to agreement between states on a common acceptance of law, because they are taken to refer to the norms "...most intensely demanded by the peoples of the world for protecting their most deeply held common interests." [McDougal:95:lxvi] A prime example of a peremptory norm being one designed to protect the basic values of human existence, as provided in the
International Bill of Rights, incorporating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its Covenants and Protocols.

Further, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 relates to *jus cogens*, a contemporary doctrine premised on the notion that "some of the constitutional policies of the larger general community are so basic to the common interests of all that particular states, even a number of states, are not to be honoured with a competence to make agreements in contravention of these policies." [McDougal:95.lxx] In fact, Article 53 states that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law..." which it defines as "...a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only be a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties :69] The sometime reliance on norms by arbiters of change or those opposed to change may be comprehended as a psychopolitical manifestation.

So, too, may the elements of interpretation implied by Falk, who extends this discussion and notes that "the interpreter of a broad international agreement is operating in a largely indeterminate setting...(where)...(t)he making, performance, and termination of international agreements, and their authoritative application, is afflicted by the same indeterminacy ...(being)...that of many constantly changing variables in a very large context."[McDougal:95:lxxii] This is because "legal rules are inescapably expressions of a community's policy." [McDougal:95:lxxiii] In short, the interpreter is guided by a comprehension of the community's wants or needs when applying the strictures of an agreement, and this might, at times, be completely counter to the intent of the agreement or of the authors of that agreement, as even the intent is open to interpretation.

Thus this excursion into the explanation of the relationship between law and treaties is also an explication of the subjectivity of the practice of law, both internationally and domestically. It raises the possibility of how state sovereignty can be delimited by external expectations realised as peremptory norms. This realisation contributes to the development of the argument that the treaty has an existence beyond the text, and is generative of norms, perceptions and discourses, that can be viewed as psychopolitical elements of foreign policy.
As this thesis is formed on the question of the psychopolitical validity of a treaty, a model is sought which allows the evolution of such an insight. In this chapter the overall quest was to gauge the impact of a treaty on International Law, but this was extended beyond the legal to the ideational, through reference to peremptory norms. An investigation based on the conventional legalistic comprehension of a treaty illuminates the import of an agreement with regard to international law. However, in light of the foregoing discussion, wherein that comprehension was essentially relegated to a minor concern by the focus on norms, the underlying intent was to gauge a treaty's psychosocial impact on domestic lawmakers, judiciary and political constituency.

In developing an analytical model, reference must be made to the legal basis of a treaty as a way of identifying whether the treaty has a primary role as an instrument of law. Hence questions must be asked about a treaty's justiciability, which is defined as being proper and thus able to be examined in a court of justice; its enforcability, seen as being able to be used to compel obedience to, and breachability, which can lead to termination or suspension of a treaty. The answers can reveal a treaty's legitimacy in a legalistic frame.

But these answers may also reveal that the treaty has no legal impact on international law, and thus content is unaffected. However, the treaty may be a symbolic manifestation of diplomatic exchanges between states, and appear to be a simple representation of arrived at common interest, with little or no influence beyond its facade. Curiously that very facade may act to have influence in the area of intent, by working to modify the nature of legal interpretation, as a result of the pursuit of common interest developed between states.

The modification to legal interpretation can then overlap into domestic legal activity. An insight into the domestic impact of a treaty can reveal how state actions can be determined by external influence. Such an examination can reveal a psychosocial underpinning, in that particular constituent activity can be aroused in response to a treaty. This may occur where a treaty engenders change which advances the salience of international law, concurs with the pertinent peremptory norms, and enjoys the support of the domestic constituency.
A further possibility is that a treaty may be construed to have aspirational elements aimed at change but which is considered to be an assault on the peremptory norms that underpin international law, or as a clash with common domestic law. Moreover, there is a need to consider whether a treaty is in line with a peremptory norm, but as a result countermands domestic legislation, and is thus likely to attract external support, but be liable to domestic rejection. Regardless of likely impact each type of treaty is worthy of investigation to subject the triggers of cognitive action to illumination.

Bearing this in mind, the treaty maker must not only be aware of how a treaty contributes to the development of international law, but also the manner in which that treaty may act to redefine a state’s external or domestic interests, or work to catalyse attitudinal shifts and to then flow on into domestic law, as a prescriber or proscriber of change.
Chapter Three

Treaties and Systemic Constructs

Treaties generate change within the international system. Such change can manifest as the removal of uncertainty. Thus the treaty has a dual role as a tool with which to create order, and as a reformist prescription aimed at modification. In either instance implementation leads to structural change. The preceding chapter delved into the relationship between treaties and international law. It found that treaties serve either as instruments of law, symbolic manifestations of diplomatic exchange between states, or as catalysts of or mechanisms for attitudinal change. The following discussion examines the genesis of treaties, either as outcomes of systemic structures, or as the origin of those structural elements. In this sense it outlines conventional international relations comprehensions of systems, hegemons, regimes and institutions. But it also probes the psychosocial impact of treaties. It does so by suggesting that treaties may arise from instigations that are less concrete, and realisable, than they are aspirational, as treaty makers are influenced by an evolution in thinking and behaviour which is premised on the ideational advances and cultural progressions related to the pursuit of power, the quest for stability and security, or the crusades of universalism.

The bid to identify how the varying systemic structures encountered in the global arena influence the development of treaties elicits questions about the extent to which a treaty regime is an outcome of

(i) neorealist systemic constraints and the search for order leading to the creation of regionalised security agencies;

(ii) the neoliberal institutionalist penchant for creating economic institutions aimed at maintaining free market ideology;

or simply

(iii) the proto-globalists attempt to create organs of world justice.

But a second, and equally important consideration is the extent to which a treaty impacts internationally by initiating an hegemon, a regime or an institution or, for that matter, a system.

This quest leads the enquirer to engage with recent but mainstream theories of international relations, through the neorealist systemic constraints model,
hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and neoliberal institutionalist exchange and interdependency, all of which have systemic bases. These perspectives were identified as a means whereby the motivating forces behind treaty makers could be identified, or at least postulated. Thus by looking at each theoretical view it may be possible to posit the impetus for the genesis of treaties. Different perspectives may suggest that treaties are systemically generated, concoctions of a ruling elite intent on creating or maintaining hegemony, implemental constructs in the guise of regimes, or institutions based on ideology.

Thus the structural imperatives of a system may be realised in the form of a regime, a hegemon or an institution, all of which possess physical attributes, such as buildings and personnel and are capable of generating agreements, or as imagined complexes with a like capability. Thus an equally important search is on for an indication of psychopolitical elements intrinsic to the instigation of a treaty or as a basis for its intent. In effect, instigatory elements can be realised, in the abstract, as constructs of the mind, as ideational rather than physical entities. And in a space where reality is based on implication and realised as an adoption of particular behaviours as suggested by actors' interpretations of those ideational constructs. The result may be deference to an imagined hegemon, a regime of truth, or an entrenched and institutionalised leaning, with all sometimes manifesting as ideology, attitude or belief, or an amalgam of these elements of influence. Bearing this qualification in mind Hasenclever etal. raise the perspective of cognitivism and its focus on the influence of social knowledge, which will be aired as an insight into regime formation, and expanded to intuit possible psychopolitical insights.

**Systemic Constraints**

The premise that states cooperate to enhance or guarantee security can act as a basis for exchange that can result in treaty arrangements, which ensure continued cooperation. Such activity lends itself to the realisation of a system within which states practice co-independence. The standard explanation of the system in IR theory stems from Waltz's articulation of structural realism. According to Waltz, systemic forces homogenise foreign policy behaviour by interposing themselves between states and their diplomatic conduct. [Burchill etal:96:85] In effect Waltz is saying that structural conditions, which belong to a system, impose themselves on all
units within that system and determine the outcomes of the interactions between those units. Thus there is an ordering principle at work which impacts on the way units behave, as appropriate behaviour is a requisite of belonging to the system. But Waltz asserts that the system is anarchic. It must then follow that appropriateness is contested and circumstantial, unless the units are socialised into behavioural patterns which attract the consent of other units within the system. To create such certainty units must cooperate, but unilaterally. Thus anarchy leads to order.

Drawing on Burchill's summary, Waltz's unit-structure relationship is seen "to leave little or no room for systemic change induced by the units themselves", and "to discount the character of the units in the system". This is because the units are "all required to pursue security before they can perform any other functions" and thus that "...states cannot widen their conception of self-interest beyond the egoism of strategic action, despite the gains that can be made through cooperation, submission to the rules of a diplomatic culture, and membership of international organisations". However, Waltz concedes that "...under certain conditions 'virtuosos' can resist the constraints of a system." [Burchill:96:86-88]

But, to do what? To abrogate their security? To further enhance it, while operating outside the perceived strictures of that system, or to better define what those strictures are in a bid to create a more cooperative environment, due to the very systemic constraints Waltz contends prevent cooperation. Such a virtuoso quest can lead to unexpected bilateral exchanges between constituent members of a state system. The result may be a compromised position within the system, for a state subjected to pressure from one or more other states, or in reaction to a state acting belligerently. This could bring to fruition Cox's criticism of a structural realism, which "reduces international relations to great power management by legitimating political order which favours the powerful..." [Burchill:96:89]

Cox sees structural realism as also hostile to change, and Ashley and Cox both suggest that neo-realism naturalises the international system "...by treating structures which have a specific and transitory history, as if they were 'permanent', 'normal' or 'given' political fixtures" [Burchill:96:88] and this then legitimises the status quo. However, it is possible to envisage change as driven by powerful forces within the system, intent on modifying
behaviour while maintaining the overall status quo, if that is taken to mean ensuring that extant power structures remain intact.

That change would be manifested as action by states, motivated by systemic imperatives, such as the quest for security, or more dynamic and psychopolitical impetuses, such as a state's quest for increased influence, through perception enhancement, or more physical applications aimed at enhancing power, or the exercise of power. This last notion taps into the darker underpinnings of hegemonic stability theory and regime theory and invites the question whether it is the state pursuing influence, or state leaders acting as change agents, intent on realising personal power, particularly in bilateral relationships.

In a like manner creating a form of interdependence between constituent members of a system can take the form of multilateral exchange, through consensually realised prognostications, aimed at identifying an umbrella of agreement to which reference can be made in times of dispute. Such an exchange can also function as a way of ascertaining appropriate action by a state or group of states within a system, or as a means to controlling the systemic environment to maintain security, to widen the ambit of interdependence to ensure wide spread security or to enhance particular national interests through covert power exercising.

Again the 'darker underpinnings' may be evident, although the role of state leaders appears to be diluted in the multi-state arena. Nevertheless, manipulation is still possible in this seemingly more open environment. In the end the form of the ordering principle of the system must be identified, and it could well be manifested as a treaty, or agreement which contains behavioural guidelines, or through the formation of a treaty intended to elicit preferred behaviours.

NeoRealism opens an investigation into the relationship between treaties and systemic forces. Questions focus on whether or not the treaty was devised to satisfy systemic pressure, or if the intent of the treaty was to create systemic pressure. If the latter was the intent, the form that that pressure took can be identified as having an hegemonic or institutional origin, and an ideological or pragmatic philosophical underpinning. This process will indicate the physical and psychopolitical impact upon systemic constructs.
Hegemonic Influence

While a hegemon can be perceived as a self interested agent intent on further extending influence and increasing power by assuming a dominant role within a system, an equally salient role is as a facilitator of state interaction and cooperation, through such devices as treaties. Thus the hegemon can exercise leadership, according to Cox, that is expressed "in terms of universal or general interests, rather than just serving their own interests."[Devetak:96:160] Cox defines hegemony as "a fit between material power, ideology and institutions...which...frames thought and thereby circumscribes actions."[Devetak:96:160] Devetak describes it as a "form of dominance woven from many interlacing threads of social and cultural power which assumes the form of a legitimate intersubjective consensus."[Devetak:96:160] In both readings the implications are that hegemony can be exercised by the hegemon, in the pursuit of self-interest, or on behalf of fellow systemic actors, as a quest to realise common interests.

Kono's reading of hegemonic stability theory is that it implies that "...a regional hegemon is a necessary condition for regime formation..." as a single state must have sufficient interest in a public good to be willing to bear "the full cost of its provision."[Kono:98:2] But Kono is critical of this stance presenting Snidal's argument that it only makes sense if the regime is a public good and that collective action among states is impossible. He then outlines how most regimes are characterised by excludability and are thus not true public goods, and that collective action is possible among a number of states without a hegemon being present. But he concedes that rational hegemons could achieve their ends through either bilateral or multilateral arrangements, [Kono:98:2] and commonly realised as treaties. This is an admission that while hegemons are not essential for regime formation there are benefits from such participation.

In contrast to Kono's dismissive assessment of hegemons, Min and Waldron present a more balanced insight by considering three variants: coercive hegemony, which is based on exploitation of the weak; benevolent hegemony, where the strong provide a collective good, and the form that received harsh criticism from Kono, and a third form; synergistic or cooperative hegemony. [Min etal:98:1] In essence, the authors contend that rather than individual states attempting to maximise their own interests
through benevolent or coercive hegemony they, in fact, organise themselves for collective action, to overcome the 'tragedy of the commons'.

Thus the emergence of a hegemon is a natural outcome of collective action, brought about by the realisation that "as members within a system cooperate they become more and more familiar with its benefits" [Min:98:1] and thus make a greater commitment and are more supportive. It is in the members interest to support the hegemon, or to be involved in creating one. In effect a peak body, brought about through a treaty arrangement, can act with greater impact within the system, to enhance the regard afforded a particular change, either through persuasion or coercion.

Hence the notion of leadership arises in the context of hegemony as a facilitator of collective action. Min and Waldron suggest that the emergence of cooperation is dependent on the strong leadership of a hegemon committed to a better optima for each member of the hegemonic system. But the facilitation role of the hegemon is to ensure compliance of members and to punish defectors. This ability depends on whether the hegemon possesses enhanced capabilities, which encourages participation, or if they are limited, which manifests as members cooperating only if everyone else does. The notion of capabilities runs through neorealism and indicates the premise that underpins leadership, which is either the ability to mount persuasive and encouraging arguments in favour of cooperation, or to apply pressure to conform on recalcitrant actors.

In fact, Min and Waldron venture that a hegemon is an agent-based system, where "fundamental social structures and group behaviours emerge forming the interaction of individual agents...[Min:98:9] Thus "...each agent tries to adapt to other's behaviour and the whole system shows ever-changing patterns..."[Min:98:9] While this explanation does not seem to allow for the possible recognition that human individuals may be relevant in global politics, as individual agents here appears to refer to states, or groups of states, as is the nature of systemic theories, the discussion certainly advances beyond the rigidity of neorealism and Kono's articulation of hegemony. Again, the idea of hegemon can have both a physical manifestation and provide an ideational influence.

With this excursion into the field of interdependence the hegemon appears to contribute greatly to the possible comprehension of the forces driving
treaty makers, in that cooperation is endemic in a bid to deal with the "...search for greater local optima in a rugged landscape." [Min:98:11] But most importantly it has moved the discussion further on from solely a concern with structure to identifying the role of agency, which will be expanded on in the following section dealing with regimes and institutions.

In composing the analytical model, an insight into the relationship between the hegemon and the treaty maker will contribute to a deeper comprehension of the psychological impact of any influence exerted by the hegemon. It will also expose the intent of the hegemon or its agent and consider if the treaty was developed to bolster the hegemon's self interest or to enhance universal interests.

**Regimes, Intent and Outcomes**

Treaties can be the basis of regimes, which are created in a bid to implement the regulatory guidelines outlined within the text, or as a manifestation of states' interpretations of the intent of an agreement. Krasner's definition of international regimes as "sets of principles, norms, rules and decision making processes around which actor's expectations converge", [Hasenclever:2000:3] leads Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger to conclude that international regimes, as deliberately constructed orders that create shared expectations about appropriate behaviour and through enhanced transparency, help states "...to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security." [Hasenclever:2000:1] Keohane extends Krasner's insight by suggesting that regimes are a major type of international institution [Hasenclever:2000:1], and are manifested in the forms of security regimes, and issue areas encompassing economics, human rights and the environment.

Hasenclever etal. attempt to articulate a distinct view of the origins of international regimes using the systemic theories of realism and neoliberalism, and the more agency oriented insight of cognitivism. Kono delved into regional trade regimes, by investigating the systemic conditions that facilitate regime formation from the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist perspectives, and with a further insight from constructivism, which in common with cognitivism, delves into the role of agency. He concluded that neorealists were pessimistic about the possibilities for cooperation, because competition among states is intrinsic to their relations,
and in order to survive states must strive to maximise their power. Thus states would shun cooperation that produces asymmetric relative gains - and hence security risks- even if such cooperation produces absolute gains for all. [Kono:98:1]

Hasenclever et al. concur with Kono that structuralist realists have paid little attention to international institutions, however, they suggest that 'post-classical' and 'modified structural' realists acknowledge that "regime-based interstate cooperation is a reality..." [Hasenclever:2000:9] but that states need to take into account "...both absolute and relative gains when contemplating regime based cooperation with others." [Hasenclever:2000:9] They contend that a regime is most likely to be stable "...when the expected gains are balanced such that relative losses do not accrue." [Hasenclever:2000:10] They contend that the post-classical and modified structural realists, such as Gilpin, Krasner and Grieco, who argue that "...power is no less central in cooperation than in discord among nations," see that "the distribution of capabilities among actors critically affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an issue-area and the nature of the regimes that result, especially insofar as the allocation of benefits from cooperation is concerned."[Hasenclever:2000:9]

Portraying a neoliberal view Hasenclever et al. suggest that states use international regimes to realise common interests, but "as rational egoists who care only for their own (absolute) gains." [Hasenclever:2000:7] And while cooperation could lead to overall improvement for all participants, it is hard to achieve due to an uncertainty about relying on partners' commitment. Thus neoliberalism favours the regime as a way of reducing uncertainty, and this leads to more stable "...'collaboration regimes' based on formal contracts and 'coordination regimes' based on conventions." [Hasenclever:2000:8]

Transactional costs figure as an important incentive for states to maintain regimes once they are in existence. By coordinating their behaviour states can avoid suboptimal outcomes, and although states may lack a sense of obligation to a regime they rarely violate the rules as this may impinge on their being accepted as partners in a potentially beneficial regime. Thus once a regime has been created it appears it is usually in the interests of the members to hesitate before putting that regime at risk. This is partly due to
possible future benefits, but also to avoid the loss of political investment made in the original construction of the regime. [Hasenclever:2000:8]

Kono's articulation of the neoliberal institutionalist comprehension of regimes follows a similar path whereby gains are of concern. The neoliberal institutionalist literature on regimes is functionalist, in that it explained that the function of regimes was to enable states to "...capture cooperative gains by providing rules around which actors' expectations converge and increasing the provision of information, monitoring and enforcement...", [Kono:98:3] thus implying that regimes were welfare improving. But the neoliberal institutionalist approach was also contractualist, whereby it portrays regimes as "cooperative, voluntary arrangements, aimed at Pareto-improving..." [Kono:98:4] which implies joint gains.

This component of the debate concerning gains, both relative and absolute, offers insights into possible motivations for states joining international institutions. This insight serves to help better appreciate the reasons for treaty commitments and what type of approaches are needed to convince domestic populations that such actions are in the national interest.

Keohane premises his discussion about gains on the idea that states' interests may be interdependent and that mutual interests underpin cooperation. He suggests that the realist view that state's pursue relative gains, which Grieco explains as "...preventing others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities" [Keohane:93:275], is not sustainable. Grieco is critical of the neoliberal claim that "...states seek to maximise their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others." [Grieco:93:117] Keohane argues that concerns with relative gains are conditional, as states evaluate the intentions of institutional members before cooperating. If the acquisition of relative gains is seen as not to inhibit the actions of other states those other states may well still participate in the cooperative arrangements. In some instances states may join in what Snidal calls "cooperative clusters", [Keohane:93:277] a form of defensive cooperation, to achieve relative gains collectively. Such a situation may come about in the face of powerful actors attempting to gain higher levels of utility "...by blocking the enactment of international rules..." [Keohane:93:278]

Kono emphasises similar impetuses related to domestic preference formation, a further possible force behind regime formation, which he
describes as a situation where "national government leaders are gatekeepers between a domestic game of negotiation between interest groups, public and government, that is nested in an international negotiation game." [Kono:98:4] He outlines two possibilities, the first, commitment mechanisms, focusses on how governments create or join regimes in order to demonstrate their credibility to domestic actors, or their commitment to policy reforms which promote investment, while neoliberal institutional theorists suggest that governments join regimes "...to increase the credibility of their commitment to other governments."[Kono:98:7] His second insight raises the notion of transactionalism. The transactionalist argument posits that increases in cross border transactions, that can be social, economic or political, create pressure for further integration, or even a place for "...governance at the supranational level." [Kono:98:7] This is the result of the process of complex interdependence where members of an international regime realise the benefits of the regime, and make further commitments to its extension and development. This argument concurs with that presented by Hasenclever etal. below.

Both these insights stem from constructivist underpinnings. While constructivism will be addressed in a later chapter, a brief foray into its premises here will suggest how psychopolitical elements are constitutive of the process of regime formation. Kono contends that constructivists see that ideas affect choice, but those "...ideas have structural characteristics." And ideas, understood in general as "...collective knowledge institutionalised in practices..." define what is "...cognitively possible for individuals." [Kono:98:5] Thus interests are "...socially constructed by collective interpretations..." which are the outcome of interacting individuals who act purposively on the basis of their personal beliefs. [Kono:98:5] These interests are constituted through communication, interaction and persuasion, rather than as being structurally given. Thus the basic premise of constructivism, for Kono, is the dynamic relationship between agents and structure, where institutions are defined by participant activity. [Kono:98:4]

Hasenclever etal. also venture beyond the systemic purview by introducing a cognitivist perspective of international regimes, which emphasises "...actor's causal and social knowledge." [Hasenclever:2000:4] A brief overview will be presented here to add to the store of psychopolitical indicators in this section. In essence cognitivism has two strands. Weak cognitivism focusses on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation, where
"(u)ncertainty about causal relationships creates a demand on the part of
decision-makers for reliable issue specific knowledge, which...can become a
source of political influence for those who can supply it." [Hasenclever:2000:10] Thus the role of epistemic communities in
international policy coordination is seen as vital.

Strong cognitivism emphasises the social character of international relations
where social knowledge, in the form of norms and understandings of self
and other are accentuated. States are seen to be "...as much shaped by
international institutions as they shape them..." and hence
"...institutionalised cooperation is likely to initiate a process in which actors' egoism is dampened and actors increasingly respect, rather than merely take into account, the legitimate interest of others." [Hasenclever:2000:11] Thus, cooperative norms are internalised, even when, initially, they were viewed by the actors as mere instruments to further their individual goals. Again the insights raised about the longevity of regimes as raised by Kono and Hasenclever before are iterated. But norms become a prominent interest with the strong cognitivist and open up further thoughts along those lines, as they appreciate that "international norms operate as an essential yardstick in states' selecting of foreign policy goals and options." [Hasenclever:2000:12]

The impact of regimes on treaties is tested in the polyphonic analytical model, with an enquiry into that relationship. The question is asked about whether regime formation is influenced by a treaty, if the treaty is an outcome of regime activity, or both. Influence is further unpacked with an enquiry into the treaty's impact on the Pareto frontier, which implies an economic focus, but could be creatively extended to include social capital. In this sense the treaty can aid transactionalism, by enhancing cooperation, and thus interdependence.

An important component of the discussion on regimes is the repeated use of regime and institution interchangeably. Presenting an institutionalist insight Martin seems to concur with Keohane's earlier statement, when she defines them as not substantially different from institutions, particularly when regimes are formalised. [Martin:97:2] Bearing this in mind Martin's work on institutions, in the next section, is conjunctive to and complementary of the regime outline.
Institutions and Norms

Institutions can be outcomes of regime activity, or serve as the foundational elements of a regime, after having been brought into focus and applied as the policy of a peak group. Their elemental role within regimes gives institutions pertinence and their viability can be determined by the contribution they make to enhancing the regard paid to a regime. Treaties can also serve as major contributors to the development of regimes, through the institutional manifestations of underlying commitments contained within the text, or due to the enhancement of perceptions of cooperation, either implied or conveyed by the symbolism inherent in states' assent to a treaty, particularly if the agreement is of a multilateral or plurlateral nature.

Martin's work on international institutions contributes valuable insights into understanding both what constitutes an institution and the genesis of treaties. While conceding that Keohane's definition of international institutions as "related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time" is influential, Martin prefers Mearscheimer's more specific explanation, as a "set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with one another...(by prescribing)...acceptable forms of state behaviour, and ...(proscribing)...unacceptable kinds of behaviour." [Martin:97:2] Further, international institutions can be seen as "rules of the game and as endogenous descriptions of strategy...", the latter recognising that "at some level these institutions are the result of state strategies about how they wish to organise their relations with one another." [Martin:97:2] Nye's insight into interdependence which underpins regime and institutional comprehensions hinges on his notion that a regime is essentially a "...framework of rules, norms and institutions" [Nye:97:171]

Martin's elaboration on the functions of institutions closely resembles the articulations presented in the materials pertaining to regimes. This acts to confirm her claim that regimes and institutions are akin. But Martin extends the discussion with insights into the relationship between states and institutions charging that they are either endogenous, because they are subjects of state's choice, and consequential or exogenous, because they change state beliefs and strategies. [Martin:97:6] This claim thus elicits the question about what impact or effects international institutions may have,
and the response will contribute to the understanding of how treaties are a component of the process.

While the form of institutional change engendered by a treaty may have a similar appearance to that produced by a regime, the nuanced differentiation between the institution and the regime will not be considered here. Suffice to say the institution is perceived as benign, while the regime is commonly portrayed as connoting forceful control. Of concern with this component of the analytical model is the likely effect of a treaty and whether a new institution may be fomented by the envisaged change. In fact several institutions can be realised during the development of a treaty program with a wide scope. The whole neoliberal institutionalist quest can be seen as not only furthering the global reach of capital, but of implementing a universal human rights agenda and the democratisation of the system of states. Thus the types of gains that may be realised by treaty instigators are of value as indicators of a treaty’s ability to effect change, as are the distributional effects that a treaty regime may realise.

Outlining institutional effects Martin sees international institutions as substitutes for the domestic mechanisms, where convergence of outcomes among members may occur as "...state practices are brought more closely in line with one another."[Martin:97;7] A second possibility is that international institutions might complement the effect of domestic-level processes and structures, and "...lead to increasing divergence of state practice"[Martin:97:7] as those states "...that already come close to institutional norms will move further in that direction, while those who deviate from such norms will remain unchanged."[Martin:97:7] The introduction of norms into an investigation of the effects of international institutions allows for a deeper insight into how they are developed by states to deal with uncertainty. Martin suggest that what must be considered is how the effects of an international institution are distributed either among the members states, or between members and non-members. In short she raises Keohane's argument that "...international cooperation may enhance the well-being of cooperating states at the expense of those left outside international regimes..."[Martin:97:10] Gruber extends this notion and suggests that if a few powerful states create an institution, other states may realise that they maybe better off becoming members, but at times that
those outsiders may discover they were better off before the institution was created. [Martin:97:10]

Hegemonic pressure or indeed systemic pressure could be seen as the motivating force behind outsider states seeking membership. In an attempt to avoid being excluded those states may undermine their own welfare, through fear of it being undermined by the possible impact of the new institution. Also current members have "...substantial control over admitting new members." [Martin:97:11] and this in turn puts pressure on outsider states, seeking membership, to modify their actions in a bid to appeal to those members, or to adopt new behaviours that will perceived to be in line with institutional requirements. Botcheva and Martin here ponder on "which states prevail in an attempt to establish their preferred standard as the international norm." [Botcheva:98:4]

What this implies is that norm modification occurs at the state level, as norms are a guideline to behaviour, and thus state's will act to modify behaviour to satisfy a norm. This understanding serves as a timely reminder of the similar position arrived at in International law, where norms were considered of major significance in the ongoing development of global cooperation. Again here is a further test of the viability of treaties. Can they be seen individually as contributing to the evolution and development of emergent norms in their areas of pertinence? Equally, behavioural modifications must be seen to impact on norms, and this can work to subtly change the implementation of a norm, which in turn alters the interpretation of that norm. Thus a treaty can initiate behavioural change, which in turn generates a redefinition of a treaty's meaning or intent.

The review of how norms, perceptions or discourses have evolved or been modified as a result of treaty making is a further and essential component of the analytical model arrived at in this chapter. Rather than applying this gauge to each theoretical variant in this chapter, an overall assessment avoids repetitive responses to the enquiry about the Psychopolitical Impact of a treaty, which asks "Is there a noticeable modification of norms, perceptions or discourses?"

Overall, this chapter has raised the possibility that treaties can be viewed as outcomes of systemic imperatives. However, it suggests more persuasively, that those imperatives are less structural than they are aspirational, where
state leaders are guided to agreement by the realisation that cooperative behaviour is beneficial, either domestically, externally or both. But the NeoLiberal Institutionalists focus on norms raises the need to consider social constructivism, which is premised on the notion that identities, norms, aspirations, ideologies or ideas about cause-effect relations, are important factors in international life.
Chapter Four

Treaties And Ideational Motives:
A Social Constructivist Insight

Treaties can be the product of aspirations aimed at ensuring security, redefining identity, enhancing perceptions, modifying extant norms or introducing new ones. They can be the outcome of ideological initiative or of reactive or proactive measures based on the ideational influences of leaders. But there has been a traditional neglect and widespread discounting of the role of such ideational elements in the IR discipline. This has led to the development of social constructivism, an insight, according to Ruggie writing in the journal, International Organisation, [98:2], that is based on "human consciousness and its role in international life". He contends that "...not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity and will." [Ruggie:98:2]

Constructivist and Cognitivist comprehensions surfaced in the evolution of international relations theory during the 1990s, [Ruggie:98:2] and the insights into treaty initiation and facilitation engendered by that development are crucial to understanding the psychopoliticality of ideational influences. While cognitivism is significant here, it will suffice to simply see it as a component of constructivism, in that it has causal beliefs and social knowledge [Hasenclever:2000:4] as the foundation of its outlook, which is essentially that epistemic communities and social norms underpin the development of international relations.

The intellectual base of constructivism lies in the sociological work of Durkheim. In essence he argued that "a variety of social outcomes were influenced by the different interpersonal bonds of social order "...embodied within..." reference groups to which individuals belong". Thus, "social facts are constituted by the combination of individual facts through social interaction. These social facts may be 'linguistic practices, religious beliefs, moral norms and similar ideational factors...[which]...in turn influence subsequent social behaviour." [Ruggie:98:4] These insights explain the pertinence of how social constructivism can contribute to an understanding
of the treaty making process, and the cognitive activities of treaty makers and their constituencies.

Ruggie pays tribute to Giddens contribution of structuration theory, which he saw as profoundly affecting the "...emerging constructivist project". [Ruggie:98:8] Structuration theory purports to "...transcend the dualism of structure and agency" [Hay:95:197] outlined by structuralism and intentionalism. Structuralists "privilege structure within the structure-agency relationship, seeking to account for observable social and political events, processes and outcomes in terms of the operation of unobservable social and political structures of which actors are merely bearers." [Hay:95:193] "...(S)tructure is largely seen to constrain and even determine agency. [Hay:95:194] "...(E)xplanations are not sought in terms of the motivations, intentions, strategies and actions of agents..." as notions of causality "...arise out of consideration of the complex interplay or 'over determination' of structures and systems which have their own relative autonomy." [Hay:95:194]

Intentionalism focuses on "...social practices, human agency and the rich texture of social and political interaction" where structures are conceived as "...the product of intentional action." [Hay:95:195] Constraints and context are absent from this comprehension and explanations are constructed "out of the direct intentions, motivations and self-understandings of the actors involved..." [Hay:95:195] Thus the focus is "...largely upon the micro-practices of social interaction as opposed to the macro-embeddedness of action within broader social and political structures."[Hay:95:196] Hence outcomes are the result of "specific intentional acts ...whose existence is largely the product of chance and intention..." [Hay:95:196] But intentionalism is criticised for "failing to consider the structural constraints on the realisation of actors' intentionality." [Hay:95:196]

Thus Giddens theory is a hybrid "capable of reconciling ...a focus on structures which are the very condition of social and political interaction, with, ... a sensitivity to the intentionality, reflexivity, autonomy and agency of actors." [Hay:95:197] He "introduces the idea of mutual dependency, and internal relatedness, of social structures and human agency, where through the duality of structure, "social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution." [Hay:95:197] Thus, according to Giddens, social processes and practices are
"brought about by the active constituent skills of ...[society's] members... as historically located actors, and not under conditions of their own choosing. [Hay: 95:197]

Comprehending and accepting Giddens 'duality' is beneficial to this project as it gives a possible insight into how structural or systemic constraints can propel actors into progressing along a path prescribed by a treaty, or alternatively how actors can take the initiative and create an agreement with which to change a structure and influence the impact of systemic constraints. Thus this latter notion allows for the direct inclusion of psychopolitical motivation and opens the path to further investigation of the relevance of individual action.

Interests and identity can stem from or be a motivating force for individual action. The illumination of these two elements can act to persuade an acceptance of social constructivism's pertinence in explaining interstate interactivity. Ruggie suggests that it is necessary to ascertain how "...the constituent actors- in international relations, territorial states -came to acquire their current identity and the interests that are assumed to go along with it." [Ruggie:98:9] To do this requires considering how "...specific identities of specific states shape their interests and, thereby, patterns of international outcomes." [Ruggie:98:9] Further to this he contends that "the identity of ...(a)...state can change and pull its interests along." [Ruggie:98:9] He implies that a transformation of identity may occur as domestic norms and institutions are modified by global activity. But this can be extrapolated to work in the opposite direction, where normative factors, some "...international in origin, others domestic..." can shape state's identities or behaviour directly. [Ruggie:98:10] This comes about with the "...diffusion of identical cultural norms "which lead to the expression of "...identical preferences for policies and institutional arrangements." [Ruggie:98:10] Diffusion is a "...process through which an innovation is communicated within a social system," which notes "...the importance of individuals in the process, reflecting the role of social influence." [Borgatta:92:487]

Ruggie's comments on ideational causation suggest that the socialisation, whereby states "...learn to conform to the dictates of the system", as described by Waltz. [Ruggie:98:11], hinges on ideational elements. Krasner, in extending Waltz's argument, explores the role of ideology in negotiation and refers to states' ideational interests, while Katzenstein speaks of how
further work on Waltz's model introduces ideational factors "...such as the role of culture as an instrument of social mobilisation..." [Ruggie:98:12] What is common throughout these comprehensions is the notion that ideas are the basis of ideological, systemic or cultural expression.

Extending this work Ruggie illustrates how Goldstein and Keohane identified three types of ideas which influence policy outcomes. These were "world views", which are "entwined with people's conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties" and occur as "civilisational constructs, cultural factors, and state identities"; "principled beliefs" which "specify right from wrong and just from unjust" and "causal beliefs" that are beliefs about cause effect relations. [Ruggie:98:13] Hence, these views can be extended to the treaty making process, whereby the negotiating parties are drawn together in the first instance through a commonality that may be based on a shared world view, or a shared aspiration. This commonality may stem from shared beliefs and is often expressed as a preamble to a treaty either as a single or series of principled beliefs, on which the agreement is premised.

Ruggie examines each type of idea describing how constructivists are interested in world views, and in how civilisational constructs, cultural factors, and state identities shape states' interests and patterns of international outcomes. He comments on how constructivists document the impact of principled beliefs on, interalia, the role of multilateral norms in stabilising the consequences of rapid international change, and on how "...in certain circumstances...(principles beliefs)... lead states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self" [Ruggie:98:14], as illustrated by the acceptance of the 'greenhouse' issue as a global concern. Or at how causal beliefs have had an impact by assessing the "roles played by transnational networks of knowledge based experts, or 'epistemic communities." [Ruggie:98:15] But Ruggies' most telling comment is on how social constructivists view causation, where aspirations are seen not as causes of actions but as reasons for actions. This is crucial to understanding intent, as causal factors may have their genesis in aspirations, but equally may bring about an aspirational realisation. But whose reasons and whose beliefs are also of major importance here.

Goldstein and Keohane define ideas exclusively as "beliefs held by individuals", but social constructivists prefer the notion of 'intersubjective
beliefs' that are social facts based on collective intentionality, where individuals function autonomously but with the collective in mind, [Ruggie:98:16] and can act to create "...new rights and responsibilities," through 'collective legitimation'. [Ruggie:98:17] Thus through establishing a shared narrative, collective intentionality can establish standards of behaviour and rules of conduct, within regimes, as well as intersubjective frameworks of understanding. This results in cohesion and coherence amongst individuals acting within the regime and following the shared narrative. [Ruggie:98:17] This shared narrative can take the form of constitutive rules. These rules define "...the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organised social activity" [Ruggie:98:18] meaning "they specify what counts as that activity." [Ruggie:98:18] This discussion has raised the relevance of the development of societal norms practices and Hopf extends the brief insight into Giddens structuration theory by arguing that actors and structures are mutually constituted. He contends that actors develop "...their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices," [Hopf:98:2] and thus norms become constitutive.

Bull has also argued that norms can be constitutive. Thus if constitutive rules are the institutional foundation of all social life, and those rules are the outcome of collective intentionality, then with an erosion of that intentionality the rules can change. But what drives the erosion of intentionality and has a transformative effect? If the exercise of agency is the basis of change whereby actors engage in an "...active process of interpretation and construction of reality..." [Ruggie:98:24], either in response to circumstance, or by creating a circumstance within which to make the change, then the process must be seen to "...implicate such ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders seeking to persuade their publics and one another through reasoned discourse..." [Ruggie:98:25] These insights are particularly pertinent to contextualising treaty making and the actions of treaty makers, who are prone to varying influences, ranging from lobby groups pursuing self interest, to government working in the national interest through to representatives, acting as leaders, but constrained by prescribed guidelines on interpretation.

Leadership is delved into by Sliker in her discussion on personalities and sub-personalities, where she takes Plato's statement that "(t)he State is the individual writ large", and draws attention to "the profound relationship of
macrocosm to microcosm." She argues that there is a parallel between global patterns of political activity between states and the relationship of individual humans within cultures, contending that within the individual "subpersonalities develop in response to environmental and historical circumstances...", and that in a like manner national cultural groups of people develop "individual national 'personalities'". However, sub-personalities develop within nations as cultural groups vie for dominance. Fixed ideological positions can become "sacred and inviolable..." over time, leading to rivalry for expression of subpersonalities resulting in alignments which create opposing camps. Hence change is inevitable. Sliker suggests that with change in a subpersonality comes immediate and automatic change in the whole personality. The sets of a reaction among other states and the "...network of interdependency becomes denser. " Thus there is a developing interdependency emerging not only between states entities, but cultural identities are developing across borders, with a sharing of beliefs and convergence of ideas between peoples redefining state relations.

Social constructivism extends cooperation and interdependence arguments into the realm of ideas. It also picks up on the pertinence of norms and discourses as means by which change is engendered, and alludes to the role of leadership. It is invaluable as a tool to investigate the relevance of treaties to their constituents, by looking at community participation in the process. It is helpful as a way to enquire into the likely success of treaty makers in convincing the electorate of the efficacy of policy platforms being pursued. But it also raises new perspectives on the importance of individual human activity in global politics.

To assess a treaty from a social constructivist viewpoint, as a component of an analytical model, insights into the conditions which led to a desire for change, the inspiration driving the treaty makers and the likelihood of a successful implementation, set the scene for the further investigation into the intent of the treaty maker. Also under review is the aim of the treaty and whether its purpose was essentially concrete and capable of physical manifestation, or if it had a more symbolic, although equally practical, application, based on changing world views. A deeper search will enquire into what influences the treaty makers contended with and whether the envisaged change was part of a systematised pursuit, the result of aspirational influences, ideological imperatives, or an attitudinal shift. The
treaty makers activity could be realised as an outcome of changing beliefs, evolving societal norms, or changing circumstances, and culminating in societal change as a result of collective intentionality.

With the acceptance of social dynamism in international relations comes the necessity to enquire further into concepts which impact both externally and domestically. The varying manifestations of political beliefs and ideas span both horizons and include norms, perceptions and discourses. These elements all share ideas as their base, and thus stem from either the collective cognition of a society, which has gained credence externally, through being adopted by external institutions as norms; by domestic constituencies as perceptions, or which enjoy majoritarian respect either across domestic constituencies; or within a hegemonic system where the core influences its satellites. Equally they can be outgrowths of the constructions based on individual prognostications that have gained influence, either within the domestic constituency, and have been exported; have been recognised in the external arena and have been imported into one or many states; or have simply been the one voice allowed legitimacy, within an autocratic state or a hegemonic system.

The next section looks at the relationship between the three most prominent means of transmitting ideational influence, norms, perceptions and discourses, and their individual relationship to the treaty, as a way of better appreciating the arguments presented by social constructivists about how ideas are a dominant basis of interstate exchange, which thus evolves around psychopolitical activity.
Section Two

External/Internal Perspectives
Section Two

External/Internal Perspectives

Treaties can be construed as tools of foreign policy, which can be read as a policy with external application. Equally they can be seen as intended to affect domestic policy. This is an important qualification, as the efficacy and effectiveness of a treaty can be determined by which orientation it is construed to possess by the constituents of the signing states. Also the internal political dynamics of each state will impact on a treaty’s acceptance or rejection. The relationship between leaders and followers must be considered. The strength of the political constituency and its ability to influence the political agenda is pertinent. The attitude to change within a constituency and the ability of the leadership to effect changes of attitude will act as defining pressures on a treaty.

The following chapter examines those variant forms of ideational influence, with an examination of the relationship between officials and citizens in international relations, which reveals the value of dialogue for leaders. Of importance here is a probe of national identity, which will illustrate the overlap between domestic and external considerations and how that overlap influences attitudes, or demands attitudinal change. Finally the processes which must occur if attitudinal change is to be possible will be gleaned from the study of norm dynamics, perception formation enhancement and modification, the hierarchies of discourse and regimes of truth.
Chapter Five

Bridging the External-Domestic Ideational Divide: 
The Relationship Between Treaties, Norms, Perceptions and Discourses.

Treaties can be generated to effect perceptions in a particular manner, to impact on existing norms and to direct discourses. Applying a social constructivist comprehension of interstate exchange, treaties can be seen as a means to establishing identity. The social dynamism brought to bear with the realisation of national identity stems from both external and internal determinants. Thus political beliefs and ideas can span both horizons and include norms, perceptions and discourses. A probe into the genesis of national identity will disclose how pertinent norms are, which in turn unveils the purpose of perception and the impact that discourses have on such a development. This will illustrate the connections to treaty development and implementation.

National identity is a contentious concept, that can lie at the heart of political division within a domestic constituency. As such it is a concept to which the leaders of any state must pay constant and due regard. It is akin to national interest and invariably the appropriate articulation of the national identity is of major concern to state leaders intent on making an impression in the interstate arena. This dynamic can be the driving force behind treaty makers intent on constructing facades with which to impress potential customers, business partners, investors, military allies or foes. But equally this same dynamic can be incontrovertibly domestically oriented, with the intent of treaty makers to impress the domestic constituency in a bid to ensure domestic harmony, or plausible election outcomes.

Saunders work on psychodynamics offers useful insights into the role of individuals in political activity. With his discussion of officials and citizens in international relations he points out how interstate exchange is not merely "a series of transactions between states", but "a political process of continuous interaction involving policymaking and policy influencing communities on both sides of a relationship"...(and that the)...focus on the politics of a relationship requires attention to human as well as state
dimensions of policymaking, interests, power, interaction and conflict." [Saunders:91:42]

It is this humanness which he develops, suggesting that leaders are "not immune to the normal human frailties of speaking imprecisely from self-centred positions and not showing interest or really hearing another's concerns." [Saunders:91:43] These limits of tolerance are brought to bear in dialogue and Saunders arguments provide a lucid insight into the predilections which guide treaty makers. In essence he contends that mature relationships increase that "ability to define problems together across cultural divides, in operational ways that enlarge opportunities for leaders to tackle them despite political differences."[Saunders:91:45]

Thus if "nations and leaders are working in the context of a relationship to deal with a commonly defined problem, they will be more likely to develop courses of action that take into account each others political needs and constituencies." [Saunders:91:45] In short Saunders contends that state negotiators bring paradigmatically limited ideas to the negotiating table and rarely are able to escape the confines of the norms promulgated within their home state, and intrinsic to their national identity. What this implies is that leaders must eventually reach positions of compromise that are determined by both external interaction and domestic predilection. The basis of agreement will rest with negotiated comprehensions of norms emanating from each state's constituency, and resulting in the formation of shared norms between the entreating states, where the norm is "...a negotiation of one character or another." [Saunders:91:49]

Thus in order for a treaty to be accepted it must do one of two things. It must be constructed in such a way that all parties to the agreement are able to leave the negotiating table content that there is a likelihood that domestic constituencies will be amenable to the changes that the treaty will bring, and this usually means a dilution of the agreement until a consensus is reached. Alternatively one of the parties to the agreement have sufficient sway to persuade the other parties to agree even though those parties must then face the difficult task of convincing domestic polities of the treaty's salience. In both cases norms will be under review and face challenges and thus norm dynamics are a crucial consideration.
Norm Dynamics

In an examination of norm dynamics Finnemore and Sikkink are particularly interested in "the role norms play in political change - both in the ways in which norms, themselves, change and the ways in which they change other features of the political landscape." [Finnemore:98:2] They contend that "norms evolve in a patterned life cycle and that different behavioural logics dominate different segments of the life cycle." This evolution is driven by the dynamics of "strategic social construction", in which "actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context."

What is of concern here, however, is defining norms, understanding the relationship between domestic and international norms and gauging whether norms are agents of stability or change. Finnemore and Sikkink recognise types such as "...regulative norms, which order and constrain and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or categories of action."[Finnemore:98:2] There are also evaluative or prescriptive norms, which have a quality of "oughtness", and thus involve standards of appropriate or proper behaviour, which are gauged by "reference to the judgements of a community or society." Thus norms are "shared assessments" with varying strengths depending on the amount of support they enjoy within the community. [Finnemore:98:5] What is being explained here is how norms develop. The process of "norm creation" occurs in three stages, - Norm emergence; norm cascades, involving "broad norm acceptance"; and internalisation.

The task of the 'norm entrepreneur' involves utilising these mechanisms of the norm 'life cycle', wherein norm emergence occurs when a norm entrepreneur convinces a critical mass of states, or norm leaders, to embrace a new norm and this "...can create a tipping point after which agreement becomes widespread." [Finnemore:98:6] Vital to the installation of an emergent norm is behaviour aimed at replacing an extant norm, by generating disapproval or stigma, known as "norm breaking". Equally "norm conforming" behaviour must be encouraged as this either produces praise for the emergent norm, or provokes no reaction whatsoever.

Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence as they construct "cognitive frames", which if successful, "resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about or
understanding issues." [Finnemore:98:9] Equally, in constructing new frames, the norm entrepreneur may encounter "firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest." [Finnemore:98:9] Thus to challenge existing "logics of appropriateness" activists may need to be inappropriate. To do so risks inciting cognitive dissonance within the community, but oftentimes the norm entrepreneur is motivated by an ideational commitment to the ideals and values embodied in the norm. The risk of failure is countered by the possibility of success, and the imposition of an idea on the community has an effect which can continue long after the new idea has been dispelled by its opponents, intent on maintaining the status quo.

The second stage of the norm 'life cycle' involves imitation, where norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers, and the result can be that a norm cascades through the followers. Until the "tipping point" is reached little change occurs, but after that point new norms are adopted more rapidly by states, often with little domestic pressure. A form of "contagion" occurs as transnational norm influences override domestic political concerns. Socialisation is seen as a dominant mechanism of the norm cascade. It occurs through emulation, as a form of followership; as praise for conformist behaviour, or as ridicule, if a state attempts to deviate from the prescribed norm. It is employed by networks of norm entrepreneurs to pressure "targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties..." [Finnemore:98:13] And thus conformity, too, is an underlining precondition of norm emergence and norm creation.

In the same manner as with regimes and institutions, the motivations for state acceptance of external norms can be conformity, where a state demonstrates that it belongs to the group, and esteem, which is bestowed upon those states conforming and enhances perceptions of those states. It has been suggested that "state leaders conform to norms in order to avoid the disapproval aroused by norm violation and thus to enhance national esteem." [Finnemore:98:15] But if a state continues to object to accept an externally generated norm it is contended that norm entrepreneurs may "...provoke cognitive dissonance among norm violators", which leads those actors to reduce the dissonance "...by changing either their attitudes or their behaviour," in a bid to conform. [Finnemore:98:14]
The third stage of norm creation involves the internalisation of the norm, as it acquires "...a taken-for-granted quality" and is no longer "...a matter of broad public debate." [Finnemore:98:8] and makes "conformance with the norm almost automatic."[Finnemore:98:15] Another mechanism contributing to internalisation of norms is "iterated behaviour and habit," which arises when frequent interactions among state representatives creates "predictability, stability and habits of trust." And in turn internalised trust can lead to evolutionary normative change as "...procedural changes that create new political processes can lead to gradual and inadvertent normative, ideational and political convergence." [Finnemore:98:16]

But internalisation can be undone if and when there is domestic uprising against an entrenched norm, as the result of an emergent norm offering a more contemporary and timely outcome. Equally an emergent norm can be firmly rejected by the domestic constituency because it provokes cognitive dissonance within the polity which then shifts to a conservative and recalcitrant opposition to change. Disapproval of an external norm can stem from the domestic constituency, when that norm is perceived to undermine domestic sovereignty.

Thus how global or regional norms impact domestically by setting standards of behaviour for states is another consideration that warrants recognition. But so too is the realisation that domestic norms can become externalised, particularly through the efforts of "norm entrepreneurs". Equally these actors may adapt external norms for application domestically, and this is most often the case where multilateral agreements have been reached and must be passed on to domestic constituencies. Thus the dynamism of leaders is a significant factor in political change.

This material on norms can be read in two ways. As an insight into what treaty makers must do to achieve institutional change, either externally or domestically, and thus gain acceptance of the agreement they are promoting, or as a recipe for constructing a treaty with which to effect institutional change and minimise any resistance. In either case norm entrepreneurs "face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest." [Finnemore:98:9]

Perception Formation, Modification or Enhancement
This struggle with perceptions is a major preoccupation for all political leaders and treaty makers who must maintain a profile of proficiency in the global economic arena, to ensure healthy commerce; who must demonstrate an ability to provide military security in a harsh global military environment; who must increasingly persuade other states of their adherence to global ecological and human rights concerns; and who must impart these perceptions to a domestic constituency in a bid to retain the facades of legitimacy endowed through democratic elections. While these forms of perception management pertain particularly to liberal democracies, authoritarian states must also practice perception maintenance, and will pursue some of the tactics already outlined. However, the focus may be on the state sustaining the perception, both externally and domestically, of its ability to exercise control domestically. In many instances stability is often a basic requirement. Treaties can be employed to codify such stability. Thus perceptions are a vital component of the investigation into the effect of treaties.

A major underpinning of perception formation is intentions. An actor's intentions can be defined as the actions taken under given circumstances (or, if the circumstances are hypothetical, the actions that could be taken if the circumstances were to materialise). Usually intention is seen to refer to "what the actor plans to do or what goals he hopes to reach." But here the term designates "the collection of actions the state will or would take because that is what others are trying to predict." [Jervis:83:48] Thus a state's "utopian intentions", as predicted by other states, influence the perceptions those others have of that state, and this determines their policy toward that state. In this way pre-existing beliefs can influence perceptions, as solutions are determined by cognitive processes prevalent at the time. [Jervis:83:215] Thus preconceived ideas and attitudes colour the understanding of new messages.

Jervis's early work on perceptions and misperceptions [1983] raises the impact of immediate concerns ["evoked sets"] on perception and interpretation. [Jervis:83:203] Evoked sets are crucial communication devices and when leaders enter into cooperative dialogue it is often assumed that all participants share the same concerns and information. But the sender may transmit a message which the receiver posits within his own framework and
receive a message at odds with that sent. Thus complex and subtle messages can create confusion, ambiguity, misperceptions and eventually, conflict.

In related work, Schutz and Luckmann [Ekecki:99:2] look at the impact of "stocks of knowledge" on cognitive frameworks, and the interpretation of perceptions. Stocks of knowledge are described as the sedimentation of past experiences, and are important in interpreting new and irregular events. [Ekecki:99:3] This element is used in interpretation by reference to "...a stock of symbols, such as words... and other cultural knowledge to make sense of the world..." [Collins:88:275 in Ekecki:99:3] This knowledge is socially based as it develops through accumulation, and primarily through language. Further this knowledge "...determines the social reality one detects and how one interprets events based on that detection." [Ekecki:99:3] The stock of knowledge contains "...not only an individual's past experience but the experiences of others as well." [Ekecki:99:3] But it also is a knowledge which, as a provision of language, can refer to "...provinces of meaning which are in principle inaccessible as immediate experience."[Schutz and Luckmann; 73:248,250 in Ekecki:99:4] Stocks of knowledge "help determine which occurrences become classified or not classified as taken-for-granted experiences", [Schutz and Luckmann in Ekecki:99:3] and are key components of social perception, as they are of norms. Thus interpretation rests on past experiences or on categorisation,

Categorisation explains collective human activity particularly with regard to attitude, and is an important explanation of why social change can be so difficult. Allport, a social psychologist delving into cognitive processes, suggested that categorisation occurs when people form "large classes or clusters" in a bid to simplify daily events and assimilate them into clusters. This means that the surfeit of information received daily can be more easily processed, but it also means that categorisation "saturates all that it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavour" [Ekecki:99:2], and thus perceptions are pre-determined by the categorical style. This style can exempt some members of society and thus create a series of we/they demarcations.

This divide provides opportunities for change. Categories can be more or less rational, depending on the strength and cognitive prowess of the dominant group. As Ekecki suggests "(e)ven when presented with contradictory evidence, a person may find it costs them more to reject or
modify the previous category than to maintain them..."[Ekecki:99:2] Thus the stock of knowledge, which constitutes categories, is akin to the evoked set. Both stem from shared language and influence the interpretation of perceptions.

In both instances, these elements of perception can create uncertainty or lack of clarity that can lead to misinterpretation and a revised perception of the other. It follows that if the evoked set, for instance, is firmly entrenched within the psyche of state leaders, who have engaged in considerable debate about an issue, then they are locked into a comprehension and interpretation which defies outside influence. The actor is constrained by the framework that has developed over time and interprets new information within that construct. The actor then is predisposed to noticing certain things and neglecting others, so that information which deserved serious attention was ignored, as it fell outside the parameters of the recipients immediate concern [Jervis:83:204].

A perceptual predisposition works in a way that an actor, even though faced with discrepant information, will maintain an entrenched view. [Jervis:83:146] But perceptual predispositions do not defy influence. While they are "...most influenced by those domestic practises that are so deeply ingrained throughout the society that people do not realise the possibility of alternatives", [Jervis:83:283] attitudinal shifts can be realised by the pragmatic and adept negotiator. The process of persuasion is vital here and a competent diplomat can entreat an attitudinal shift within the ranks of the oppositionary negotiants, and within the domestic constituency. An investigation into persuasion techniques in a later chapter will expand on this significant psychopolitical element.

Attitude change most often arises after discrepant information has been received. While the tendency is to maintain images and beliefs, the information may not be ignorable and thus must be reconciled with the dominant perception. [Jervis:83:289] Initially the recipient will attempt to seek a balance and reduce dissonance, while minimising the change to their attitude structure. If change is necessary as the discrepant information elicits such movement, the recipient will at first "...alter those beliefs that are least important, that are supported by the least information, and that are tied to the fewest other beliefs," thus preserving all of the original attitudes. But if these mechanisms prove inadequate, in light of the discrepant information,
processes involving minor or peripheral changes will be invoked. If, then, contradictions still prevail, mechanisms that "...necessitate more far-reaching changes will be called into play". [Jervis:83:291]

While this is a method of coping with discrepant information, an outline of the other mechanisms of attitude preservation or change suggests an insight into the strategy a treaty-maker must employ to guarantee the successful adoption and implementation of an agreement. Initially a recipient may fail to see that the new information might contradict existing beliefs. This can occur through a reaction whereby the message is immediately and automatically dismissed, through the activation of defence mechanisms, or through a psychological process of selective cognition, whereby the message simply is not understood, due to a recollection or dependence on entrenched frames of reference. [Jervis:83:291]

Another possible element of attitude preservation to be overcome by the change agent is the recipient's rejection of the validity of the information, as the source is discredited, but this can be judged solely by the recipient as the message advocates a position too discrepant to be given due regard. Equally the skill and objectivity of the communicator can be called into question and the message be discredited. Or the message can be discredited by the recipient who, in defence of old beliefs, can admit puzzlement and thus charge that the information is incomprehensible. [Jervis:83:293]

Another tactic against change is 'bolstering', whereby new information is sought to support the existent view that is being challenged by discrepant information, and thus a rearrangement of attitudes can be brought into effect, as a counter measure to change. This bolstering may in turn entrench the extant attitude even more deeply. Thus the change agent must act to limit the impact of bolstering, or to avoid it entirely. But not all discrepant information can be readily dismissed using these processes.

At times the change agent has presented information worthy of review and regard. Change can be minimised through differentiation, whereby the parts causing attitudinal conflict can be separated from the rest, so that those parts become exceptional and circumstantial. A final tactic used against change agents is transcendence, which works to absorb the new discrepant information into the older existing attitude, [Jervis:83:296] thus reconciling "undeniable fact and immovable premises." [Jervis:83:303] However, the
immovability of central beliefs raised here can affect less important beliefs. But then conjecture arises about which beliefs are central and which peripheral. Further, a peripheral belief can become centralised by change and set off a series of further changes, which may be influenced by the new idea if it is accepted. In fact once a recipient realises this new idea contradicts many older ideas "...the same dynamics that protected the old concept will spread the implications of the new one by altering subsidiary beliefs." [Jervis:83:305]

To complete this excursion into perception theory and how change agents, in this instance, treaty makers, can achieve success, an insight into how to transmit discrepant information will be informative, and demonstrate how misperception can arise. Jervis contends that "(g)reater change will result when discrepant information arrives in a large batch than when it is considered bit by bit", [Jervis:83:308] as the contradictions between the new information and the prevailing view will be clear. But if the discrepant information arrives gradually, the conflict between new and old can go unnoticed, be dismissed as unimportant or result in slight modifications. Thus an explanation may not be completely satisfactory and a questionable interpretation can be used to support an image that in turn can be used to justify other dubious explanations, with inherent dangers in judging other states' intentions, since interpretation of past events often quickly become enshrined.

In the end, the viability of the interpretation of perceptions is determined by the recipients "stock of knowledge", akin to Jervis's "evoked set", and the circumstances under which the perception is being presented to its constituency. Thus the appreciation of the intent of a treaty depends on the worldview or the mind set of the critic. This view stems from social constructs, which include cultural underpinnings and, importantly, language. This latter element brings to the fore the role of discourses in social construction.

**Discourses**

Discourses are a vital element of political activity. They can be entrenched comprehensions which span several generations of a constituency, or they can be outcomes of newly installed norms and thus tools of the change agent, the norm entrepreneur, and the treaty maker. Their essential effect in
the political arena, be it external or domestic, is on language. This can be the language of diplomacy, used in the realm of high politics, or of social exchange, where constituents share ideas and information.

Fairclough's investigation into language as a "social practice determined by social structures" introduces the idea of "socially constituted orders of discourse", which he sees as "sets of conventions associated with social institutions." [Fairclough:89:17] His explanation serves as a reminder that treaty makers need to consider dominant discourses in their attempts at attitudinal change. He suggests that an order of discourse contains several discourses, which are related to practice, where the individuals actions are constrained by social convention. Fairclough describes these constraints on discourse and practice as interdependent networks, or orders of discourse and social orders, respectively. He suggests that the social structure is comprised of different spheres of action, each with variant practices, which have their own discourses, and thus "an order of discourse is really a social order looked at from a specifically discoursal perspective..." [Fairclough:89:29]

To illustrate these points let us consider how the notion of free trade has been a multilateral pursuit globally, and the discourse appears to enjoy the support of the global media. Domestically, state agencies offer a similar support, and particularly within international media, but are constrained with regard to their domestic constituencies, where there is a clash between the discourses of the globalist free trader, and the local protectionists pursuing the national interest.

Drawing on Foucault, Fairclough explains orders of discourse as pertaining to social institutions and contained within the confines of those constructions, but also operating outside the institution and determining the activity and interaction which occurs between institutions, and in society as a whole. Thus he states that "how discourses are structured in a given order of discourse, and how structuring changes over time, are determined by changing relationships of power at the level of the social institution or of the society. Power at these levels includes the capacity to control orders of discourse..." [Fairclough:89:30]

These orders of discourse are "ideologically shaped by power relations in social institutions and in society as a whole."[Fairclough:89:17] Ideological discourse control is aimed at "... ensuring that orders of discourse are
ideologically harmonised..." [Fairclough:89:30] Ideological power is understood to be the ability to "...project one's practices as universal and 'common sense'..." and it is exercised through coercion, with the "...ultimate sanctions of physical violence or death," [Fairclough:89:33] as might be practised by the treaty maker engaged by an authoritarian regime to effect change; or as a "...key mechanism of rule by consent" [Fairclough:89:34] be it tacit or direct. Where this leads to, according to Fairclough, is a "...high degree of ideological integration between institutional orders of discourse within the societal order of discourse." In effect key discourse types which legitimise existing social relations have colonised institutional orders of discourse. [Fairclough:89:36] Thus the task of the treaty maker intent on change is to persuasively open those apparatuses of social control to modification, and then to introduce a change which is amenable to widespread interpretation within each constituency to which it pertains.

In an extension of this argument Fairclough draws the links between discourse, and common sense, when he asks how "common sense relates to the coherence of discourse and to the processes of discourse interpretation". [Fairclough:89:77] To reach a coherent interpretation of a text, which could be a treaty, Fairclough suggests that a connection must be made between the text and the world it describes. The connections are made by the interpreter, and not by the text, and thus "the common sense assumptions and expectations of the interpreter..." and "what's in the text" must be conjoined to achieve coherence. [Fairclough:89:78] This activity describes the interaction between the text and the world view and is the premise for viewing the treaty beyond the text. It is a way of comprehending the actuality inherent in symbolism, of seeing the possible physical manifestations of ideas that are conveyed by the images and evoked by what the treaty represents, rather than by what it says.

But Fairclough takes common sense further and elaborates on its connection to ideology. He suggests that it is the "...conception of ideology as an 'implicit philosophy' in the practical activities of social life, backgrounded and taken for granted, that connects it to common sense..." [Fairclough:89:84] Thus ideology is most effective when it is invisible, and this occurs when ideologies are brought to a discourse as "...background assumptions..." which influence interpretation of texts, assumptions that are commonsensical. [Fairclough:89:84-5] In this manner ideologies reproduce themselves through discourses. Thus the treaty maker, when faced with an
entrenched but invisible ideology underpinning constituent political comprehensions, is faced with a momentous task of persuasion and discourse redefinition.

This can be a momentous task because discourse types can be "ideologically diverse...ideologically particular and ideologically variable." Fairclough contends that "(w)hat is a stake is the establishment or maintenance of one type as the dominant one in a given social domain, and therefore the establishment or maintenance of certain ideological assumptions as commonsensical." [Fairclough:89:90] In essence there is a contest for control over the way that political situations are described, and about what solutions are most likely to succeed. Dominant and dominated discourse types occupy the realm of political exchange. A dominated type may exist in opposition to a dominant discourse or be contained by it. The quest for the change agent is to win the battle to control the contours of the political world and the treaty maker beginning with a dominated type of discourse must be very persuasive.

Again the discourse established around free trade can illustrate the point. The constituency is advised that due to circumstances changing externally, and thus beyond the control of the state, domestic reconstruction is necessary to again return to a position of viability. This will entail a period of uncertainty during the rebuilding process if the necessary modifications are to occur in an appropriate time span, implying that time is of the essence. A recalcitrant constituency, not able to recognise the urgency of the situation will react negatively, and fall back to a position of complacency and demand a maintenance of the status quo. To override this dissension the change agent must take action, which may not only meet with opposition but be determined undemocratic. The promoters may argue that change is necessary for the national interest, while opponents may use the same argument, but base it on historical precedent, or dominant and entrenched national values.

One avenue with which to effect a change of focus for a treaty maker is for a discourse to become dominant through naturalisation, which Fairclough describes as a process whereby the discourse will come to be seen as natural and commonsensical. However what comes to be common sense is "...determined by who exercise power and domination in a society..." [Fairclough:89:92] Thus any attempts to change the dominant discourse, and
effect changes to social structures, and thus political structures, will be limited by the dynamics of political power and the concomitant powers of persuasion.

The treaty maker must not only be aware of discourse dynamics but be a competent operator of that psychosocial machinery to create effective devices that will elicit desired changes. While this is vital in the external arena where negotiation between state leaders is the first step to realising an agreement, the implementation stage of the provisions of a treaty, which invariably has a domestic impact, has a crucial dependence on being accepted by the domestic constituency. If, however, the treaty is aimed primarily as a symbolic device that acceptance is less crucial, but still important as its intent will undoubtedly be to alter the dominant discourse. If this is the case domestic acceptance, through attitudinal change, must be achieved, to guarantee the life of the treaty beyond its initial signature and ratification.

The Relationship between Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties.

As has been clearly identified, norms are a major institutional mechanism, providing guidance for treaty makers by outlining what policies attract acceptability or by offering indications of the need for change. Perception management is a primary objective for state leaders where instigation or enhancement can be realised through treaty making activity. Discourses flow from norms, but can also underpin them, but the convolutions become more intricate with the comprehension that perceptions may actually create discourses, which in turn generate norms. Which element gains precedence is often determined by the change being attempted, by the complexion of the culture targeted for change, or by leadership skills utilised by the change agent.

Hence each of these elements can have influence over the strategy employed by a treaty maker intent on change. The analysis of the relationship between a treaty and norms, perceptions or discourses must first identify which of the three ideational elements influenced the treaty maker. This will give an insight into the type of task faced by the change agent. A further concern regards the impact that the treaty may have had on these elements. Beyond that deductions about whether the treaty challenges societal norms, or has an ideological base, or fits within attitudinal expectations, will indicate the
extent of cultural change that may be necessary for the treaty to gain widespread constituent support, and if such support is necessary to achieve success?

This chapter has unpacked the ideational elements of norms, perceptions and discourses, to show how seemingly externally generated suggestion for change will inevitably be influenced by particular domestic predilections, and hence the most substantial investigation of the genesis, role and purpose of treaties occurs at the domestic level. Thus the next section aims to construct a lens with a psychological and psychopolitical bias by examining theoretical accounts of cultural change, leadership, political communication, including persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination, and the psychopolitical barriers to change that may be encountered by treaty makers.
Section Three

Internal Comprehensions
Section Three

Internal Comprehensions

This section examines the psychopolitical underpinnings of domestic political activity and in particular the ways in which social change comes about or is brought about. It deals with the mindset of the domestic constituency, and the tasks faced by treaty makers, acting as change agents. The treaty maker, when dealing with the domestic constituency, must contend with psychological variables, where a state's foreign policy is affected by "the personality, the motives, the attitudes, the beliefs, the stereotypes, the emotions and perceptions of its key decision makers and their advisers, or in the terms of the psychological attributes of its people, or at least those sections of it which the decision makers take into account". [Pettman:75:202]

In dealing with these variables the treaty maker may need to construct treaties as tools of manipulation, persuasion, perception formation, modification or enhancement, or be aware that to ensure the acceptance and success of a treaty regime that such processes are employed to ensure change. The role of propaganda, examined here as part of the discussion on persuasion, is considered an important element in this process. This may be a process that involves the attempted diffusion of reformist concepts, is dependent on the acceptance and legitimising actions of the domestic constituency, and can be a form of "social engineering".

But treaty makers must also be aware of the processes that can influence the success of programs premised on change, where cognitive dissonance, once invoked, can work against change; or where the persuasive leader can successfully implement a process of cultural transformation.

In a wide ranging discussion this section begins with Chapter 6 and concerns Cultural Change and Leadership, which is based on Bate's 1994 explication of cultural change, taken from an organisational perspective. This seems pertinent to an investigation of societal change, as a society and an organisation can be seen to be similarly structured.
The explanation of psychopolitical challenges to change contained in Chapter 7 is premised on both Money-Kyrle's and Eysenck's works, from the 1950s, on the relationship between psychology and politics. The chapter is filled out by more contemporary psychologists from the 1980s, such as Sarbin who looks at narrative as a useful means of analysis, and Gergen and Gergen, who delve into interpretation. It is completed with Volkan's work from the early 90's on psychodynamics and the impact of identification on social groups.

Finally Chapter 8 examines Political Communication, and looks at both the ways and the means employed by treaty makers as change agents. It outlines various comprehensions of persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination, drawing mostly on the work of Pratkanis and Aronson from 1991, before accessing Snook's 1977 contentions regarding propaganda as an educative technique. Having dispensed with the method of political communication, a brief but insightful foray into the techniques of political communication employed by change agents follows, and is based on related work by McNair from 1995, and on Advertising and Consumer Psychology from the early 80s, drawing on Petty and Cacioppo. Zanna's view on cognitive manipulation and persuasive communication, from a 1993 text, finishes the Chapter and the Section.
Chapter Six

Cultural Change, Leadership and Treaties

Treaties can change cultures and inevitably this is the result of active leadership and successful implementation. The task for the treaty maker, as change agent, is to effect a realignment of cognitive frameworks. Such frameworks can be variously described as norms, perceptions, or discourses and it is these social constructs which are the targets of change. But the underlying dynamic in all instances is attitude. Attitude stems from evoked sets and stocks of knowledge, and as such is both an individual and collective dimension. But more than that it can be the sum of present individual experience, conjoined with the contemporary experiences of the collective, and complemented by the historical underpinnings of the pertinent culture, be it dominant or otherwise. This chapter questions how attitudinal shifts come about, and who engenders those shifts. This discussion will outline the approaches to change, and identify the role of change agents by examining forms of leadership.

In a bid to better appreciate the process of achieving attitudinal shifts in the community Bate's work on cultural change within organisations adapts well to the political community, which has structural similarities, and provides a succinct insight into organisation studies. Bate suggests two possible comprehensions of culture. The scientific rationalist view is that culture is a component of organisation and thus "cultural change is essentially cultural engineering". [Bate:94:10] The anthropological viewpoint is that culture is "a perspective", "a framework of attention in the eye of the beholder", a social construction, but more than that,"(s)ocieties are cultures." [Bate:94:12] Thus a culture has "...no external reality but merely social creations and constructions emerging from actors making sense out of ongoing streams of actions and interactions." [Allaire etal in Bate:94:14] Thus, Bate contends that any change among and between individuals, among the pattern of connections and interpretations, is cultural change. And cultural change is "the 'deconstruction' of something that already exists, and the 'reconstruction' of something new or different to take its place"[Bate:94:15]

To effect cultural change, and often the introduction of a new treaty is likely to have that effect, several strategies can be employed. Strategies are seen as
"...the ways and means an organisation or society has developed in order to cope with the basic 'life problems' relating to its survival and growth" [Bate:94:33], and to provide directional orientations. The conforming strategy is the simplest model, whereby social constructions are adapted, improved on or perpetuated, while deforming strategies have the attendant opposite effect, by perverting or subverting existing frameworks. The reforming strategy is aimed at abandoning or removing existing social constructions, while the transforming strategy is aimed at "...moving across from one form of social construction to another..." [Bate:94:16] through form or frame-breaking. The many social forms or constructions which can be affected by such strategies include knowledge structures, systems of ideas, belief systems, collective assumptions and symbolic systems.[Bate:94:16] Hence norms, perceptions and discourses must be included under this rubric.

What also must be appreciated is that change will rarely occur as the outcome of only one strategy, but is more likely to be the result of a combination of strategies. In the process of transforming a culture there are likely to be both conforming and deforming elements at work on the culture being modified, and some reform may also be necessary. This makes the task even more complex as the change agent must attempt to predict which strategies are likely to have the greater impact, and if necessary then alleviate that impact if it proves to work against the dominant strategy. For the treaty maker, working within the confines of a liberal democracy, where scrutiny of the process is possible, or even likely, the constraints can be limiting. Thus executive action, which excludes parliamentary scrutiny, may be forthcoming as a means of finalising agreement between state parties.

In a bid to introduce change the treaty maker has the option of pursuing the conservative but assured path to cultural development which leads to a change in culture, or a less certain but more radical attempt at a change of culture through a process of cultural transformation. The former option, while likely to achieve some success, may be so minimal as to be little more than a gesture, while the latter approach may contain requisite adaptations, but be defeated before the process begins. How should the change agent proceed? The following discussion examines both approaches to cultural change, before outlining types of leadership, in a bid to identify possible
combinations of leader and strategy that would be effective. With such knowledge it will be possible to gauge the likely success of a treaty regime.

**Cultural Development or Cultural Transformation**

Cultural development is interpreted as "evolution towards greater order and continuity..." through "...variations on a cultural theme." [Bate:94:35] Its basis is a conforming strategy pursued by culture conservationists who "...wish to preserve and protect the cultural environment (The Order) that their predecessors or present-day 'elders' have created." [Bate:94:34] These strategists are seen as "...imitators rather than innovators, copiers rather than creators, improvisers rather than inventors, refiners rather than reformers...", and actors who see change as an "adapting, correcting, conforming process...dedicated to making the culture last." [Bate:94:34] Thus this is a strategy of 'cultural continuity'. A treaty maker pursuing this pathway is likely to be acting to maintain or reinforce the status quo, and to be entering into agreement for security purposes. However, while transiting this pathway may meet with success, its impact may be ceremonial, rather than functional.

The culture conservationist can also be an evolutionist, intent on "...a course of development that will produce not so much a change as a 'growth of order'" [Bate:94:38] Their strategy is custodial, change is acceptable if it produces a mutation of the existing form where the surface shape can be altered, but "...the underlying form or matrix from which it is constituted must remain the same." [Bate:94:38] Re-creation, reproduction, repetition are the strategic processes at play, and change is a disturbance to be corrected. Such correction may be realised with the imposition of cultural order where control is "...exerted by operating on the ideological premises of action." [Perrow in Bate:94:39] This is explained through hegemony, defined as a "form of ideational control" or mind control, aimed at changing the way the constituency thinks rather than how it behaves. Equally the intent can be the maintenance of a dominant discourse in light of discrepant information that challenges dominant paradigms, or threatens the salience of cultural norms, or is construed to impact negatively on perceptions propagated by ruling elites. The process of control is realised through

"(f)irstly ...the dissemination of the values and norms favoured by the elite group; secondly... the denial, refutation and ultimately censorship of beliefs, values and norms which threaten the position of the elite group; and thirdly..."
the attempt to define and limit the parameters of permissible and normal discussion of beliefs, values and norms." [Kirkbridge:83:238 in Bate:94:40]

Hence a strategy of cultural order depends on ideational control. If this breaks down or is in imminent danger of doing so the ruling group can fall back "...upon the coercive power of the political society or state machinery in order to reassert its domination." [Kirkbridge:83:239 in Bate:94:40]

However, this intransigent attitude to change could result from "schematic myopia", where cultural change does not occur, because leadership suffers "... a cognitive or perceptual affliction that narrows the range of vision..." resulting in missed opportunities and unrealised ambitions. This collective and functional blindness is a paradox of a culture which has a directional orientation [Bate:94:87], whereby it only looks one way at a time. A similar problem relates to misreading situations and picking wrong strategic alternatives. This is an outcome of blindspots, or cultural dysfunctionalities, which "...place cognitive barriers on perception, self reflection, learning action and interaction." [Hennestad:91:55 in Bate:94:88]

These blindspots are the result of culture being inherently time bound and "a past solution to a past problem." Due to time constraints a culture tends to develop in a circular fashion in the sense of being "...an immanent, enclosed and self-contained cognitive whole within which patterns of thinking and logic endlessly repeat themselves" [Watzlawick etal:74 in Bate:94:90] Participants "...become prisoners of their own culture, hermetically sealed into a bubble" where "thinking processes become increasingly culture-bound." [Bate:94:91] Simmel suggests that the culture has its own demise built into it that locks it into "irreversible courses of action." [Simmel:22:17 in Bate:94:86] Thus a culture may value consistency in behaviour which can result in entrenched conservatism, that undermines growth and leads to implosive characteristics.

A visionary treaty maker is likely to be disappointed with the constituency's response to a proposal for change engendered by a proposed agreement, when the political environment has such a conservative complexion. However, change may be vital for the sake of that constituency. In such an instance blindspots must be overlooked and the bubble burst by breaking down cognitive barriers, and transforming the culture.
Cultural Transformation is a process intended to change the cultural structure, with an accompanying "fundamental change of cultural identity." [Bate:94:81] The prime objective of a strategy of transformation is to reframe culture, break the 'vicious' circle of "...narrowing options and endless repetitions of constantly failing solutions...", to take up "...the requirements of the modern world" [Bate:94:83] and overcome "cultural obsolescence." This can be achieved through a process of 'cultural discontinuity', by disengaging from the "futile and counterproductive activity of repackaging and recycling useless recipes and formulas" and initiating "...a genuine process of renewal and replenishment, regeneration and innovation." [Bate:94:83] But while the transformative objective may have lucid and logical premises and a functional salience, it may be deemed unsaleable to a constituency perceived as hostile to such an agreement, due to its symbolic incongruity, particularly if the treaty partner is considered unacceptable. In short, cultural transformation is premised on proactive thinking and application, and as such must work to overcome the endemic conservatism underpinned by the elements outlined below. Such obstacles may seem insurmountable and in the end change depends on the breaking down of cultural impediments to change and an effective leadership/ followership symbiosis.

Leadership

Treaty making can be led by policy change, be the basis of policy change or be designed as a symbolic placebo. But treaty making goes beyond the abstract process of textualising interests, desires and needs. The treaty maker needs be aware of the barriers to implementation that must be faced domestically by a treaty which, if it engenders change, is to meet with success. The implication is that a treaty which does not call for change will likely be absorbed into the discourse, without any notice being taken of it. But for a transformational treaty implementation is imperative, and as objective prescription becomes subjective interpretation that leads to cultural change, effective leadership is just as vital.

Based on the notion that cultural change occurs through either cultural development or cultural transformation, reference to Bate's insights into leadership will reveal the style seemingly most suitable to the strategy to be pursued to implement change. Bate suggests that leaders act in either an aggressive, conciliative, corrosive, or indoctrinative manner, or in any
combination of these. [Bate:94:168] A brief insight into each category will assist in evaluating the leadership style of a successful treaty maker.

The aggressive style is characterised by cultural 'vandalism', where the objective of the change agent, the leader, is to deliver a large shock to the system in a very short time. Aggressives unmake one world in order to make another. A process of "invalidation and delegitimisation of previous patterns and practices" occurs, where the "past is debunked" and "history is rewritten". [Bate:94:170] "Deauthenticating the authenticity of a previous way of life", dissolving cultural coherency, fragmenting reality, and removing habit and common sense as reliable ways of coping are vital preludes to change, where a "...careful self-censored discourse..." is encouraged among the population. [Bate:94:171] The new cultural directions must be policed to ensure effective implementation. Thus a strong integrated culture must be established with "...a single source of authority and a single focus of loyalty..." whereby a form of cultural hegemony exists "...through which ideational control can be exercised by the ruling group."

[Bate:94:174] While the unmaking can be an elementary task, the second stage of creating an integrated culture works against this style of leadership, unless the major stake-holders in the polity gain through the change.

The aggressive leader's behaviour is heroic. It is intent on survival and based on the notion that "radical times demand radical remedies." There is a commitment to redemption, wherein the leader behaves messianically, intent on a "...legitimate struggle fought in the name of truth and goodness"; initiative, which must be seized "in order to ensure a high probability of success" through radical and revolutionary activity; and innovation, where the rebel "works against the existing social structure..." [Bate:94:17-8] Bate contends that the aggressive leader is less a revolutionary, a political sobriquet, and more a rebel and a romantic "motivated by a self-centred desire to ... transform the world." Concern for cultural substance over political process may bring about the romantic's downfall, as "immersed in his vision he often fails to notice the gathering clouds of opposition until it is too late." [Bate:94:178-9] An opposition that may form when the extant cultural framework is swept away, the culture becomes less unitary and more pluralistic, with a "...multitude of discordant voices, divided loyalties and rampant segmentalism." [Bate:94:175]
These voices enter into dialogue with regard to implementation. Involved in the process are the dominant faction, which supports the ruling ideas; the enhancing faction, whose members are "more fervently attached to the values of the dominant culture than the dominant group itself; the orthogonal faction, who support the dominant group but "have their own separate values; and the counterculture, who "...repudiate the ruling values completely." [Bate:94:175] Hence it can be postulated that if the change agent, the treaty maker, is seeking the installation of a program coincidental with ruling ideas then support can be garnered, however, if that leader steps outside those parameters and is perceived as acting in the interests of the counterculture then failure may be the only outcome. But on the positive side, such leaders are committed to cultural innovation and play the "anti-role to the establishment truths" [Bate:94:179] by challenging dominant paradigms. For them success may not be as important as the symbolic action of the challenge. The legacy of the aggressive leader may be to alter the content of cultural discourse, through norm modification [Bate:94:198-9], as pursued by the norm entrepreneur.

The conciliative leader is more an incrementalist and a new culture is slowly grafted on to the old. The approach is characterised by a form of discourse that is flexible, accommodating and egalitarian. It appeals to common sense, and is achieved through persistence and hard work. There is no need for a "dialectical confrontation" in negotiation as the processes of convergence, conformity and order are preferable in order to achieve change than those of divergence, deviance and rebellion. "Mutuality is the key principle" [Bate:94:182] The conciliative approach is aimed at avoiding friction and this is possible through logical incrementalism, with low profile partial solutions unfolding as part of a strategic vision. The use of language that deemphasises the extent of the envisaged change and presents the package in conventional terms will raise less resistance. The opposition must be targeted and be invited to participate and be involved in the development of options and to engage in the dialogue about change. But in its basic form the gradualist paradigm proposes that "systems can accept any change given time and patience."[Bate:94:183]

The success of the conciliative approach rests on the leader's perceived lack of power; an ability to avoid conflict through collusion; through maintaining cooperative relations and a sense of order to achieve a level of cultural continuity; by using elements of the old order to construct the new; by
utilising existing competences; and by ensuring that the new construct makes its forerunner appear obsolete. [Bate:94:183-5] This is a process which depends on evolution and is contained by convention. Bate contends that it may succeed in bringing about developmental change rather than transformational change. [Bate:94:185] This leader may be the conservative intent on change, to demonstrate insightfulness, and to illustrate pragmatism, but is shrewd enough to know that minimalism will meet with the most success. This seemingly benign approach to change can alter how the culture performs, its process. But it is malign too in the sense that the change program goes on unnoticed by those involved. It is its incrementalism which poses the greatest threat as mediocrity may become the norm.

The corrosive approach to leadership is essentially a political process, the purpose of which is to "effect a major change in the locus and distribution of power and authority." Corrosives "...tend to be covert and devious, skilfully manipulating relationships in order to achieve their ends." [Bate:94:186] The rationales for the corrosive approach suggest that "...the pursuit of informal, non-legitimate and corrosive processes is indispensable to the process of cultural change and development." [Bate:94:187] They work by erosion, "progressively undermining the power base of rival groups" until those groups become either submissive or irrelevant. This is the approach where deals are struck behind closed doors, where favours are bought and sold, where networking is the "basic unit of cultural production and modification." [Bate:94:189]

Corrosives see that to bring about cultural change the balance between directions and performance must be disturbed, where directions include "...indications, signposts, codes of meaning, guidelines, instructions, orientations and definitions" while performance means "...both actions and institutions, the conventionally appropriate responses to cultural directions." [Bate:94:188] For the treaty maker, the political guidance to which they are subjected can stem from such a leader, committed to effecting change through realising external agreement, but with the simple aim of bolstering domestic power and control.

Networks are essential to this process as channels of meaning into which ideas are introduced and subsequently defined, developed, validated or corrected. Thus cultural change is a "...function of network complexity", 

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where networks empower individuals who then change cultures; are permissive and allow an "...almost infinite capacity for deviant thought and, behaviour; are non-hierarchical, self-reliant and self-helping; arenas for learning, information processing, and meaning negotiation; flexible and highly tolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty and internal dissension." Networks have no respect for the boundaries and contents of existing cultural paradigms..." [Bate:94:190] A major criticism of networks, however, is that they can be order-directed rather than change-directed, and thus an innate conservatism can undermine their possibly transformational function.

The corrosive leader may use the networks that grow out of global and interstate institutions to garner greater domestic support. Facadism is an element of this form of leadership, which by its nature alters how the exercise of power is practised, but does not lend itself to collective well-being as its primary focus is on political power. Its practice leads to cultural development, as its prescribed nature does not allow it the flexibility to transform. Thus as a form of leadership it takes a treaty, interprets it in a manner beneficial to its power-base, and attempts to implement the agreement with a similar end in mind, and that is essentially the maintenance of power.

**The indoctrinative leader** sees cultural change as a learning process, that is planned and programmed. This process can be seen as a means of controlling people, a socialisation program aimed at teaching core values, a form of indoctrination, or cultural conditioning. This cognitive imperialism favours the dominance of one world view. [Bate:94:192-6] The rationale for this approach is that it devotes itself to changing the "underlying frame of meanings and values", the philosophical form of culture. [Bate:94:198] In short the change affects the guiding principles, or meta-directions, which give "...identity, wholeness and organisation to directions and performance" and provide "doctrinal and logical material from which particular normative directions are shaped." [Bate:94:198] Such a regime may be implemented by a leadership intent on introducing widespread reform into a society, particularly with regard to global agreements, which require the participation of state polities to achieve success.

Bate suggests that the benefit of such a leadership approach is that changing meta-directions, or the philosophical basis of the organisation, acts to alter the directions and performance of that institution. The underlying frame of
meaning and values is changed and thus the "...whole definition of reality changes..." [Bate:94:198] The cultural system will tend to follow on naturally and develop behind the change in meta-direction. However a major criticism of this approach is that it has "...no theory of learning associated with it, only a theory of teaching..." [Bate:94:199] and thus while it may offer a "discursive' kind of consciousness, a theoretical knowledge of culture, it does not give... a 'practical' consciousness of culture, a form of knowledge that can be used in everyday life." [Bate:94:200]

Thus, in a practical sense, a treaty maker intent on engendering change by using this process would need to launch educative programs well in advance of reaching an agreement externally, for it to be readily accepted domestically. But Louis suggests that the "cultural learning must be active; it has to be sought by the individual..." [Louis in Bate:94:201] To create that desire the individual must be interested in the proposed change, and this suggests a treaty program which allows a longer period of time for implementation than the likely term of office experienced by most parties in liberal democracies. This suggests that as a leadership model the indoctrinative approach had authoritarian application. It could eventually guarantee cultural change in a democracy, if it enjoyed multipartisan support, but to be so acceptable implies a conciliative form of change.

A final comment from Bate pertains to the conception of leadership. To be successful, change agents as leaders must assist in "...guiding, influencing or directing the passage of the idea or spirit through the life-course of the cultural production process." [Bate:94:237] They must be the "activators of human energy and momentum, the animators of the spirit, the stirrers and protesters who lead the call to arms." [Bate:94:246] They are in "...constant rebellion against what they see as a stagnant and dehumanising world." They are the "transforming leaders, the inspirers, those who through their own power as personalities and through the exciting energising force of their vision, inspire others to passion, commitment, energy and excitement about a shared purpose." [Bate:94:246]

To do so, however, requires a multidimensional application of leadership to ensure that all facets of the culture undergo a similar change. The inter-relationships between the multiple dimensions will dictate the direction and outcome of the change process, and thus leadership will be a collective and not an individual activity. This is because culture is a social not an
individual phenomenon: socially created, socially maintained and socially transformed. Thus "...leaders and followers mutually co-produce overall system leadership." [Bate:94:242] In this way cultural change is assured if the required transformation fits within dominant cognitive frameworks.

When assessing a treaty from the perspectives presented in this chapter the purpose of the treaty and the intent of the treaty maker must be ascertained, before delving into what changes are required if the introduction and implementation of the treaty are to meet with success. If attitudinal shifts are necessary, are they possible, what type of leadership is required to effect such a shift and what approach must that leader take to guarantee the legitimacy of the treaty and the change it engenders?

Whether the approach to cultural change depends on the style of leadership or the form of the change depends on the prevailing circumstance, in that variant approaches may be required which will realise variant outcomes. A treaty which requires changes that will have a minimal cultural impact domestically is likely to attract little or no attention, or even if illuminated by the political process, be accepted and phased into the dominant political discourse. However, a treaty which may be vital for the state's long term interest, which will attract widespread dissension within the domestic constituency because of construed attacks on the status quo, may need to be imposed on the polity, through bipartisan or multipartisan means and the interaction of several leaders, committed to a global or multilateral objective, as contained in the agreement, who can use diverse leadership skills to ensure societal acceptance of requisite change. Such programs can be met with hostility and impenetrable psychopolitical obstructionism. The basis of this resistance stems from entrenched attitudes, beliefs, opinions and ideologies. These elements undergo scrutiny in the following discussion, which examines the psychopolitical challenges to change.
Chapter Seven

Psychopolitical Challenges to Change.

A treaty may appear to satisfy all the obvious requirements of a domestic constituency and seem ready for implementation, but still meet with psychopolitical challenges to change. The basis of such challenges may relate to entrenched cognitive frameworks. Thus a change agent with a radical program of reform, inherited from a newly ratified treaty regime, may be concerned only with the means of implementation, and this could be manipulated to alleviate concern of critics. However, a reform which requires significant attitudinal change to achieve implementation could be met with hostility and intransigence. Major impediments to change can be entrenched beliefs, opinions, attitudes and ideologies. This chapter examines each of these elements to gauge their resistance to modification, and the likely intransigence they imbue in the constituency, in a bid to identify the most proficient strategies to be employed by treaty makers to ensure success. The relationship between the elements will be established by delving further into the mechanisms of each, separately.

The articulation of the various forms that challenges to change take allows for a further insight into the reactions of a political community to a leader's initiatives. Those various challenges are based on beliefs, opinions, attitudes and ideology, but are also premised on the grander themes contained in cultural narratives, that encompass myth and legend, and the ritualised notions of difference which develop between disparate groups in a constituency, and that stem from the preferred norms, perceptions and discourses on which each group bases it political and cultural predilections.

This chapter draws on several authors from the psychology discipline to develop an understanding of the relationship between psychology and politics. The early works of Money-Kyrle [1951] and Eysenck [1954-1968] introduce the possibility of interaction between the two comprehensions. This is continued with insights gained from Sarbin [1986], a narrative psychologist, who develops a link between discourse and narrative; Gergen and Gergen [1986], who examine interpretation and narrative; and Volkan's work on the psychodynamics of international relationships [1991], which examines how people acquire 'national' identity.
In his 1951 publication, *Psychoanalysis and Politics*, Money-Kyrle applies psychology to politics in a bid to "discover the nature and extent of whatever unconscious processes may influence...political desires, feelings and beliefs..."[Money-Kyrle:51:23] Thus his text is an essential and introductory document in this investigation into psychopolitics, as he lays the groundwork for later thinking on social psychology. Money-Kyrle examines the cause of political dispute with regard to beliefs, desires and opinions. He states that the primary aim of the psychological analysis of politics is "to discover the nature and extent of whatever unconscious processes may influence political desires, feelings and beliefs" [Money-Kyrle:77:23]

Beliefs are explained as "imageless expectations", which are based on "...dispositions to be surprised at any combination of sensory experience which is incompatible with the expected combination." [Money-Kyrle:77:32] The expectations are based on perception, and are an outcome of experience. They are arrived at through a process of cognitive development where learning "...consists in substituting true beliefs both for ignorance and for false ones." [Money-Kyrle:77:39] This action depends on realising a belief as a conscious awareness, as opposed to an unconscious understanding and acceptance of reality that impacts as an emotional response.

The development of conscious awareness is the outcome of the interaction between the totality of the logically possible experience, the imaginative universe; the totality of the physically possible experience, the real universe; the totality of the objects of any one person's beliefs or expectations, the belief system; and the totality of an individual's actual experience, the biography. [Money-Kyrle:77:39] This interactive process increases the validity and widens the area of the belief system, by imposing tests on experience. Reality tests analyse the corresponding relationship between a belief and reality, while regimes of consistency are based on the comparison of beliefs, which if in conflict, result in the eventual elimination of "one or other of the opposing expectations." [Money-Kyrle:77:40] When these tests are combined it follows that a belief system based on a more accurate and complete world view should pertain. However, disputes about accuracy come about as a result of an impediment to learning, which Freud called the Pleasure Principle, whereby the actor will resist images which impact on beliefs in such a way as to require the actor to "retain pleasurable and to
exclude or repress painful images." [Money-Kyrle:77:42] In short, to stay in the comfort zone.

This psychological delving into political activity is central to this thesis, because it seeks to address the deeper challenges that change agents must face. One significant and vital concern is with the individual within society who must be persuaded to accept change. As the foregoing discussion on beliefs suggests this requires a movement away from the unconscious, to the realisation of an integrated person, "...whose mind has nothing hidden from itself, and who is rational in the sense that the belief-systems governing his behaviour are true within the range of his experience because they have been consciously tested..." [Money-Kyrle:77:44] Thus the treaty maker must ensure that if the perception of the envisaged change forces the constituent to respond, then that response must be positive, in that there will be no retreat to the comfort zone, but rather an appreciation of the validity and worth of the proposed change, and ultimately its acceptance.

In essence the constituency must believe that the change is either non-threatening, necessary or in their interest. But that belief must be expressed freely amongst members of the constituency for it to gain legitimacy. Political expression is often contained within opinion, not only about the change but about the intent of the change, how that change can be realised and how its impact will manifest.

The following insight into political disputes is concerned with differences of opinion about means and ends. It is contended that disputes about means are soluble, while those concerned with which end to pursue appear to be insoluble. The reasoning behind these declarations, according to Money-Kyrle, is that an opinion about what means are likely to secure a given end "...expresses a belief... (which)... must be either true of false", although Money-Kyrle prefers "...probable and improbable". [Money-Kyrle:77:26] However, he contends that an opinion about the choice of ends "expresses a desire, ...an aspiration..." which can be neither proved nor disproved. Thus "...all ultimate political opinions expressing desires must be equally indefensible and unassailable." [Money-Kyrle:77:25]

But desires and beliefs are symbiotic, in that while the means, which express a belief, may create an end, those means are also a creation of the end aspired to. Equally an end is only arrived at through the rational application of a process deemed legitimate, and pursued by its aspirants. Legitimacy is
based on a system of beliefs which underpin the aspiration. Thus a criterion of rationality can be applied to desires and aspirations. In this way the "...rational can be defended", while "...the irrational can be assailed..." [Money-Kyrle:77:26] But the interpretation of what is rational or irrational often stems from prejudice. Thus opposition to change can be premised on prejudice, whereby a rationally valid aspiration would be deemed irrational. This opinion is "...influenced by unconscious motives and beliefs" and would be different if those motives "...were to become conscious." [Money-Kyrle:77:27] Hence the task for the treaty maker as change agent is to elicit a conscious recognition and rejection of prejudicial barriers and thus allow the consideration of alternatives view, the development of new ideas and fresh opinions, and shifts in attitude. The task is to ensure that the changes likely to come about through the implementation of a treaty regime will meet with little prejudice.

Such prejudice, though, can have many faces, and be focussed solely on the envisaged change, or be related to a rejection of the form in which the treaty is delivered, and thus there is limited receptivity of the message, or simply a rejection based on the constituency's more personalised non-acceptance of the change agent charged with attempting to introduce change. A major impediment to the removal of that prejudice, however, stems from entrenched opinion, rigid attitude and ideological fervour. The following discussion attempts to identify the relationship between these significant elements of communal solidarity, sometimes entrenched as collective conservatism.

Eysenck, a renowned British psychologist of the 1970s, in his text of 1968, The Psychology of Politics, offers an explication of the organisation of social attitudes which, according to empirical psychologists, are "arranged in some kind of hierarchical system" [Eysenck:68:110] He traces the evolution of specific opinions to habitual opinions, which combine to form attitudes, and can then congregate as ideology [Eysenck:68:111-3], but it would be equally valid to see how an ideology fosters attitudes, which manifest as habitual opinions, and underpin specific opinions. An investigation into this hierarchy will explain this evolution/ devolution hypothesis.

Specific opinions appear to have been discounted as of any pertinence. They are "...not related in any way to other opinions,...are not characteristic of a person who makes them,... are not reproducible in the sense that if the same
or a similar question were asked again under similar circumstances, the answer might be different." [Eysenck:68:111] Habitual opinions, however, are reproducible and form a relatively constant part of an individual's make-up. They are expressed "...in the same or a similar manner on different occasions,...are not subject to sudden arbitrary changes...(and)... are reliable in the sense of being stable. [Eysenck:68:112] Thus opinion polls about a treaty's likely acceptance in a community can be misleading if the question posed elicits a specific opinion of the respondent, as that response may be reactionary and less considered than necessary to gain a valid insight. However, habitual opinions seem even more impervious to change. Would the treaty maker be best served by eliciting a specific opinion, with the hope that that specificity is widespread and thus likely to become a habitual response?

Attitudes occur when individuals hold "...a particular opinion with regard to a particular issue with a certain degree of stability." But they also hold concurrently "... a number of other opinions on the same issue which in combination define...an...attitude towards that issue." [Eysenck:68:112] Opinions do not occur in isolation and they are closely related to other opinions on the same issue. But these attitudes are not independent. Attitudes themselves are correlated and "...give rise to ...super-attitudes and ideologies." [Eysenck:68:113] The premise of this articulation is correlation, understood as having mutual or reciprocal relations, where intercorrelated opinion begets attitude and, thus, intercorrelated attitude begets ideology. Thus, for a discourse to gain ascendancy it must traverse the path from single opinions, through the attitudinal phase, to the stratum of ideology.

In a bid to explain the relationship between attitudes, the verbal expression of mental states, and opinions, the actual behaviour as shown in physical actions, Eysenk looks at the functions of words and actions. [Eysenck:68:237] He concludes that "...neither words nor actions are invariably accurate reflections of underlying attitudes." [Eysenck:68:238] Words may be distorted reflections of attitude because the speaker is constrained by the expectations of the listener. Equally actions may be misleading as behaviour connotes a particular attitude, where in fact the real attitudinal bias of the actor is suppressed during the duration of the activity. Equally attitudinal indices, such as a show of words, may be equally misleading, where attitude is assumed for political effect. Thus overt verbal disapproval ...(can be)... found
together with covert approval and actual participation", and a knowledge of attitude is not sufficient when "...dealing with behaviour..." [Eysenck:68:239]

These convolutions raise the possibility of duplicitous political action, where attitudes are assumed by change agents for political gain, but are bereft of underlying adherence by the constituency. Constituent members are encouraged to adopt a specific opinion, through the persuasive means of the change agent, or as a way of maintaining pertinence within a particular social grouping within the political collective. But the opinion, although less than entrenched, may achieve commonality, simply because the members are reticent about challenging its legitimacy. In this way responses can be elicited by change agents, but the saliency of the change realised would be suspect, and thus its impact either negligible or destructive, as the duplicitous nature of its acceptance and implementation works against the constituency.

The treaty maker must be alert to the possibility of the distortion or hijacking of a policy of change, which could undermine or prevent further attempts at essential modification of constituent's interest. Again interpretation of intent is vital here, and the gatekeepers of society will act to propose or oppose depending on their constituent support bases. But treaty makers must equally be aware of how to imbibe attitudinal flexibility if they are to achieve change.

One approach to attitude which can reveal underpinnings of behaviour is through the study of stereotypy. Stereotypes can embody a valid "generalisation", but often are "infallibly wrong..." [Eysenck:68:241] Perceptions can be "...determined by previously acquired attitudes of a stereo-type's character," [Eysenck:68:240] Ethnocentric attitudes can be based on "...generalised and stereotyped views of out-groups, not on factual knowledge about members of these groups." [Eysenck:68:241] Stereotyped thinking can be more influential than factual thinking. And attitudes can be akin to stereotypes. For like stereotypes, "...attitudes prejudge the issue by determining our set, our way of reacting to new facts and new experiences; like stereotypes, attitudes give us an organised frame of reference which determines what we perceive and how we perceive it; like stereotypes, attitudes are mental habits which, if aroused, determine our actions." [Eysenck:68:242]
Thus "...the concept of attitude corresponds...to the concept of habit..." [Eysenck:68:246] where attitudes and habits are both learned; are both dispositions to act; are hypothetical constructs. But, as opinions are expressed as actions, so too are habits, described as well worn modes of action, whereas attitudes continue to appear as "the hypothetical underlying state of the organism which gives rise to this action." [Eysenck:68:246] Thus Eysenck asserts that attitudes determine actions and words. [Eysenck:68:247] They also "...determine the way in which we perceive things; the way in which we learn and remember things; and the manner of our reasoning." [Eysenck:68:247] And, as a qualifier, he points out how "...what we learn and what we remember depends in part at least on our pre-existing attitudes towards the material with which we are presented". [Eysenck:68:247]

In a summary of the effect of attitudes the point is made by Eysenck that social and political actions are mediated through attitudes, which like habits are learned modifications of the central nervous system. Attitudes show a considerable degree of organisation or structure, and can be acquired through a learning process, or by conditioning. [Eysenck:68:265] It is the constructivist nature of attitudes with their ideational underpinnings, as implied by Eysenck, which suggests that the clash of ideologies can be a major impediment to a treaty maker realising success.

Whether ideology is the basis of attitudes and opinions, or achieves widespread acceptance because of those elements, may be circumstantial, in that in any instance an ideological explication may redefine constituent cognitive frameworks, or may be adopted by that constituency as a succinct explication of its proponent's comprehensions. In either case the proponents and opponents will vie for the prominence of their preferred ideological approach. For, in essence, the ideology is a composite of desires, feelings, beliefs, opinions and attitudes. It contains and constrains the context within which comprehension may occur. It articulates process and delineates outcomes. It objectifies agency and gives the interpretation of structure subjectivity. In short, ideology can give a political narrative both structure and aspiration. Again there is a relationship between the ideology and the narrative generated by that ideological underpinning. And thus the treaty maker must also attempt to create an extension to the extant narrative, the dominant discourse, that is pertinent to the site of the envisaged change.
Sarbin, a narrative psychologist of the 1980s, was intent on "...demonstrating the utility of looking upon human action as narrative". [Sheehy:97:501] He saw narrative as determining the conventions of discourse, and considered the reporting on and analysis of life histories more useful than the analytical methods of conventional psychology which reviewed experiments "...done on nameless, faceless subjects, the results of which were expressed as probabilities." [Sarbin:86:x] The connection between narrative and discourse suggests that this approach brings the psychological and political closer together and is thus a useful tool for this thesis.

According to Sarbin examining a narrative extends analysis beyond the text, with its focus on structure, to a contextual analysis, where meaning can be derived from the context in which the story was related. Hence a narrative, which enjoys widespread usage, functions in a like manner to the discourse by determining cognitive frameworks, and the analysis of a particular narrative can reveal the obstacles to cultural change, or how that narrative can be used to achieve change. The narrative, if entrenched, creates a context in which the interpretation of the changes envisaged is defined by and under the influence of "collateral episodes, and by the efforts of multiple agents who engage in actions to satisfy their needs and meet their obligations". [Sarbin:86:6]

Thus humans "think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative structures" [Sarbin:86:8], and when presented with information which is not immediately recognisable, the individual organises that data "into an imaginative formulation that meets one or more tests of coherence". [Sarbin:86:12] Thus the "self as author can imagine the future and reconstruct the past" [Sarbin:86:18] In effect, to achieve success the treaty maker needs to build a story around the change envisaged by an intended agreement so that it becomes an element of an extant discourse. This construct can hinge on imagined futures, if they are limited to the level of vision that the change agent perceives the constituency to be able to attain.

This is a recipe for explaining the processes of acceptance and rejection of paradigmatic challenges. Equally, this recipe also contains a guide to instituting paradigmatic change successfully. Gergen and Gergen [1986] expand the insight into the function of narrative suggesting that the reader determines what the text is saying rather than the text determining "..the reader's reaction..." and hence the construction of a comprehension will be
"...governed largely by the convention of proper interpretation". [Gergen:86:24] They argue that interpretation is guided by entrenched preconceptions, and that the reader's "...expectations, skills and affective dispositions are major determinants of the text's meaning." [Gergen:86:24] This suggests that any attempts at change that take the form of an agreement will come under particular and individual scrutiny within the constituency. It also raises the possibility that that individual scrutiny is influenced by societal constraints that must be modified by the treaty maker intent on change, while if the intent is a reinforcement of the status quo a simple presentation of text in the commonly accepted form will see an easily realised success.

While Gergen and Gergen focussed on interpretation they were also concerned about narrative construction. Their insight offers a further understanding of how a constituency can be persuaded to adopt a new form of narrative, as it details how a narrative needs an end point and it is the end point of the narrative which defines its content. [Gergen:86:38] But what is considered the necessary endpoint for any narrative is subjected to exercises of power. The authors suggest that while public opinion can suggest "...what people believe to be goals; it cannot furnish insights as to whether these goals are worthy or not." [Gergen:86:37] This harkens back to Money-Kyrle's discussion of the divergence of opinion around means and ends, and how the ends are always the point of unresolved contention. It must be concluded that for the treaty maker intent on change a clear enunciation of end goals is vital to persuade acceptance of change within the polity. Narrative formation is a crucial concern for change agents as it is the means whereby the constituency perpetuates political comprehensions, and can be the basis of any legitimacy bestowed on policy arrangements. This insight is also valuable as it implies a relationships between opinion, attitude and ideology, as base elements of the narrative, and indicates how important an awareness of narrative is to the change agent.

Further and more complex impediments to change can be found in Volkan's insights into psychodynamics. His work outlines the impact of identification, whereby "...the sense of self is intertwined with the identity of the group." [Volkan:91:36] Individuals assimilate within themselves the functional image of the collective, and the members of the group come to resemble one another. And while the individual's "psychological, defensive, and adaptive mechanisms..." may enlarge, and be used as different ways of
protecting and regulating the sense of self, this rarely overrides "...the deep-rooted notions of belongingness..." [Volkan:91:36] imbued during childhood. Thus institutions and social organisations grow around these entrenched notions. Through identification individuals can make sense of and control the world around them, and share in "differentiating those unlike the group and inimical to it." [Volkan:91:36] If this differentiation occurs within a domestic constituency the treaty maker must attempt to form an agreement which satisfies not only the members of the dominant societal group, but in a bid to give an agreement longevity, members of opposing groups, or minority groupings which can be persuaded to offer support. The convolution of negotiation in such an event lends to the notion that a simple imposition of change from above, which requires minimal discussion and elicits little or no dissent, would be considered pragmatic and lucid.

However, Volkan suggests that the principle of maintaining sameness, as pursued by socially cohesive groups, is often based on a common cause about which enmity exists. A group when faced with an extreme alternative will react with strength, but "when differences are minor, the principles of sameness and distancing are at risk and must be maintained at all costs." [Volkan:91:38] Rituals of differentiation may be manifest as adversarial symbiosis, where groups are locked into a vicious cycle which distances them "while at the same time connecting ...(them)...in unending and obsessive competition." [Volkan:91:38] Thus the simple imposition may be rejected because it undermines differentiation. Hence the change agent needs to present change in a manner which is perceived to maintain the distance between social groups, eliminate the ritualistic competition about the issue, and satisfy the requirements of the entire constituency.

This calls for leadership which unites disparate social groups on an issue while allowing those groups to continue to believe that they are maintaining competition, difference and distancing. But leadership of those disparate social groups can be a major impediment to realising change. There is a need to bring the groups together so the leaders are involved in the formation of policy that leads to change, and in its implementation. Volkan recommends an assimilator, " who is psychologically indispensable in helping his followers assimilate changes that are brought about by a transforming leader." [Volkan:91:42] Thus each group needs to be encouraged by the treaty maker, acting as a transformative leader, to appoint assimilative leaders, to encourage the acceptance of change. Such a scenario must be seen
as virtually impossible aspiration unless the changes envisaged within an
agreement are so broad that they include all players.

From the discussion we can discern psychopolitical challenges to change
with which a treaty maker must contend to achieve a successful acceptance
and implementation of new policy. Not only must entrenched attitudes and
ideological underpinnings being accounted for, but the more refined
components of narrative structure must be factored into how the change is
communicated to the constituency. The treaty must be written in a manner
which leads to proper interpretation, thus avoiding politically manipulative
exploitation of an agreement to advance an opponents interests at the
expense of a change possibly advantageous to the constituency. The message
must be presented in a manner conducive to communal receptivity, rather
than a retreat to cognitive dissonance, which can be premised on
differentiation, or the constituency's lack of identification with the proposed
change likely if a treaty undergoes implementation.

To overcome such widespread disparateness the treaty maker must contrive
a text which shares universal acceptance within the greater constituency,
albeit with some processes of persuasion being applied by the norm
entrepreneur at both the leadership level and within the constituency.
Equally the task of persuasion must have an impact on the context within
which change must occur, and this may include a reconstruction of the
political arena, though rewritings of history, or the redefinition of the
constituency's role in developing the future. The discussion in the following
chapter will deal with persuasion techniques, the psychology of influence
and the practices which lead to attitudinal change, before making a brief but
potentially elucidating visit to data on possible communication techniques.
Chapter Eight

Political Communication : Ways and Means

The effect of a treaty must be communicated to the political constituency in a manner that overcomes all psychopolitical challenges to its ability to engender change. Thus a treaty's likelihood of effecting change depends on how its impact is communicated, politically. Political communication is comprised of both ways and means. While the form of leadership is a determinant of possible outcomes, it is also an indicator of the likely philosophical method that will be used to change the political attitude. The means with which to achieve attitudinal change must also be considered, by identifying the physical manifestations of the tools of social and political communication. Thus this chapter is presented in two parts, the methods and the machinery. The several works referred to in both contain outlines of the conceptual underpinnings of political communication. Due to the density of data and the limited space in which to present it the reader is encouraged to make the links between the theory and the possible practices that treaty makers must employ to be successful.

The Methods

Prominent in the writing on techniques of political communication are persuasion, as a form of positive encouragement, and the more negative methods of propaganda and indoctrination. Each of these methodological forms will be examined to indicate possible approaches that may be adopted by treaty makers. In an attempt to further gauge the possible success of a treaty regime and to comprehend the likely obstacles that would be encountered by the change agent this work is elucidating. The main authors used here were Pratkanis and Aronson, in their 1991 text, Age of Propaganda, which examines the psychology of persuasion; MacDonald, O'Donnell and Jowett, and Burnett, in Smith III's media studies text Propaganda, published in 1989, and Snook's 1972 educational treatise, Concepts of Indoctrination, which is a series of philosophical essays. Each publication was selected from a survey of materials pertinent to the discussion.
Persuasion, Propaganda and Indoctrination

The notion of indoctrination is raised in education theory as a form of persuasion, sometimes defined as propaganda. In a far reaching discussion which again arrives at cognitive dissonance as the turning point in attempts at cultural change, Pratkanis and Aronson mount a philosophical and psychological explanation of how persuasion works. They are curious about the nature of persuasion and how it influences behaviour. [1991:2] Their work makes reference to earlier notions of persuasion, which took the form of "...an argument, a debate, a discussion or ... a well argued speech presenting the case for or against a given proposition..." [Pratkanis:91:9] and was practiced by Sophists. In opposition to this comprehension, Plato contended that the arguing of "...both sides of any argument merely clouded the understanding of what he saw as truth." [Pratkanis:91:11] The authors outlined the reconciliation of these views, as propounded by Aristotle, in the Rhetoric.

Aristotle argued against the Sophist notion that persuasion was needed to discover important facts, whereby a student would eventually be convinced of a fact through the argumentative process, that was essentially subjective and the outcome was negotiable. Plato's concern however was that elite's could manipulate masses through argumentative trickery. Aristotle suggested that knowledge could only be gained by logic and reason, but he was concerned with ensuring viable outcomes. He cautioned that "...not everyone was capable of reasoning clearly about every issue." Thus..."(f)or these denser souls, the art of persuasion was needed to communicate the truth to them in such a manner as they might come to a right conclusion." [Pratkanis:91:11] The modern leader who makes the mistake of excluding members of a constituency perceived as dense runs the likely risk of losing the position of leadership. Thus persuasion must have a universal focus in that the whole constituency must be encouraged to assent to envisaged change.

Persuasive communication has been defined by O'Donnell as a process "that attempts to get the receiver to accept or adopt a new response in a voluntary fashion." [O'Donnell in SmithIII:89:59] Successful persuasion can result in response shaping, where new behaviour is rewarded; response reinforcing, where persuadees are stimulated to greater involvement; and response changing, which involves behavioural change or the adoption of new
behaviour. [O'Donnell:89:61] It has also been defined as an appeal that persuades "not through the give-and-take of argument and debate but through the manipulation of symbols and of ...basic human emotions." [Pratkanis:91:5-6] Treaty makers intent on altering the content of an agreement may be wary of the symbolic approach and its dependence on emotional appeal, due to its unpredictability. Equally, the treaty maker pursuing perception modification may consider such an approach the most likely to succeed.

Persuasion, an element of marketing, has been labelled as propaganda, when it works as a mass persuasion technique. [Pratkanis:91:9] Propaganda was originally defined as "the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception," but the meaning has evolved to mean "mass suggestion or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. [Pratkanis:91:9] This is a process where a point of view is communicated with the intent of having the recipient of the appeal "...'voluntarily' accept this position as if it were his or her own." [Pratkanis:91:9]

The language of the contemporary social psychologist intent on understanding persuasion includes terms like persuasion techniques, and the labelling of election campaigns as persuasion rituals, or negatively, influence attacks. [Pratkanis:91:6] The connotations are that modern persuasion techniques are manipulative and goal oriented. A better understanding of these processes is enhanced by insights into psychoanalysis, learning theory and cognitive approaches.

The psychoanalytic theory of persuasion is based on finding the hidden meaning of things, and designing a campaign of persuasion, based on symbolism, that appeals to the deepest motivations of its recipients. This is a form of subliminal influence. [Pratkanis:91:21] While a hard to prove theory, as the location of its impact is in the unconscious, its element of subliminality may be an effective tool of persuasion, particularly with regard to the attitudinal or cultural change intended by the treaty maker.

The learning theory approach contends that "...a persuasive message is persuasive when it is learned and accepted by the recipient; propaganda must be seen, understood, learned, remembered and acted upon. [Pratkanis:91:22] This will occur if the message rewards recipients by
attracting their attention; presenting a clear, appropriate and persuasive argument that can be learned; and provide an incentive to act on the learned knowledge and beliefs. According to Pratkanis research suggests that "...a communication can be persuasive even if it misses a few of the learning theory stages" [Pratkanis:91:23], but it must follow that a change maker intent on success should take each aspect into account.

With cognitive approaches Pratkanis and Aronson contend that "...the target of persuasion is not a passive receptor of influence, dutifully obeying the principles of learning theory, but an active participant in the persuasion process." [Pratkansi:91:23] This is because persuasion depends on how a message is interpreted and responded to by the recipient. Reception is affected by the recipients predominant cognitive framework at that time. Thus a successful persuasive tactic "...is one that directs and channels thoughts so that the target thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator's point of view." [Pratkanis:91:24]

What determines which cognitive framework is predominant at the time of reception is the mystery the change agent must probe to be successful. The authors suggest that the successful persuasion tactic "...disrupts any negative thoughts and promotes positive thoughts about the proposed course of action." [Pratkanis:91:24] Two overarching principles which influence the way messages are received are how "humans seek to conserve... cognitive energy by taking mental shortcuts" and "...attempt to rationalise...thoughts and behaviour so that they appear reasonable..."[Pratkanis:91:24] Hence a successful change agent will satisfy both these demands of their recipients.

However, the process that is utilised by the change agent is more extensive than that suggested by the previous comments. The tactics that can be employed require explication. As a foretaste pre-persuasion can be used to establish how an issue is defined, after which a communicator "can influence cognitive responses and obtain consent..." without appearing to be attempting persuasion. [Pratkanis:91:24] Persuasion can occur when recipients are in a mindless state or when they are thoughtful and, according to Petty and Cacioppo, two possible routes to persuasion, the peripheral and the central, are possible. Taking the peripheral route the recipient devotes little attention and effort to processing a communication, while taking the central route involves "...a careful and thoughtful consideration of the true merits of the information presented." [Pratkanis:91:28]
The route the recipient takes is determined by the personal relevance of the issue to which the communication pertains. But thoughtful persuasion is difficult and time consuming, whereas propaganda uses the peripheral route to persuasion and is "designed to take advantage of the limited processing capabilities of the cognitive miser." [Pratkanis:91:31] This design would include a simplistic persuasion device that makes it likely that recipients will adopt the peripheral route having been presented within a simplified version of a complex problem. Thus the change agent has two options. To present a succinct and simplistic version which is so innocuous it goes unnoticed and is simply incorporated into the collective stock of knowledge with little or no recognition, or to attempt to communicate a message which requires thoughtful consideration and considerable cognitive commitment. The former, the almost invisible message, which may be accepted tacitly or wholeheartedly, seems to suggest little change, unless the communicators are especially competent, whereas the more complex task appears to promise a depth of improvement if accepted, but that likelihood is low as cognitive dissonance always looms. These insights can be used to construe the possible structure of the program of persuasion a government need utilise.

Cognitive dissonance occurs whenever two inconsistent cognitions (ideas, beliefs, opinions) are held simultaneously. This state of inconsistency will be resolved rapidly by changing one or both cognitions so that "they will fit together better" [Pratkanis:91:34] To protect self-esteem individuals will go to "great lengths of distortion, denial and self-persuasion in order to justify ...past behaviour". [Pratkanis:91:34] The greater the commitment to a course of action the more resistance there will be "to information that threatens that course." [Pratkanis:91:35] "People will ignore danger in order to avoid dissonance. But the reduction of dissonance is used to advantage by propagandists in the "rationalisation trap". How this works is the "propagandist intentionally arouses feelings of dissonance..." and then offers one solution, one way of reducing this dissonance - by complying with whatever request the propagandist has in mind." [Pratkanis:91:35] Propaganda, however, according to MacDonald, writing on propaganda and order in modern society, has a greater role in society than merely persuading communities to a particular way of thinking. It can be used by "...social-political-economic-cultural-intellectual elites..." to 'inform' efficiently and authoritatively, to seek a "predetermined reaction in..."
mass audience". and to play "...a critical role in the preservation of order." [MacDonald in Smith III:89:24] It does this as it

"reiterates mutually respected values, skews events and phenomena to harmonise with the national viewpoint, and reaffirms the correctness of national policies and goals. Even when contentious major political parties seek the support of the electorate, it amounts to competition among varying sociopolitical interpretations, each communicated assuringly through party propaganda. The citizen here is left to decide which partisan 'truth' to accept". [MacDonald:89:25]

A form of social engineering can be identified here where "propagandistic rituals that shape the individual and forge a common citizenship" can also form the framework of the mind-set of the modern state. [MacDonald:89:25] Thus national perspectives can be the outgrowth of propagandistic leaders, who must convince the masses of the salience of modern social constructs. The social, political and economic organisation of modern society depends on propaganda to persuade compliance. It acts as a social adhesive, it stirs emotions to direct public opinion, [MacDonald:89:28] it educates and it controls. For, while "degrees of dissent may be permitted...true radicals are always in a minority. Their critiques are either suppressed by authorities or they are nationally disdained as threatening curiosities or unpatriotic subversions." [MacDonald:89:30] Thus propaganda has made sustained order possible in mass society as it has offered "the method by which to reorganise, consolidate and govern. And via its ability to condition, it has forged in each political arrangement a stabilising consensus." [MacDonald:89:34] The fate may be sealed for a treaty maker seeking to introduce change that threatens that consensus, whereas the pragmatist will need arguments that extend the consensus, while effecting change.

Often, however, propaganda has achieved this consensus due to its ability to serve as a discourse, where it may be spoken or written, in the service of ideology, defined by Burnett as "the study of ways in which meaning serves to sustain or alter relations of domination." [Burnett in Smith III:89:127] Ideology is further defined by Ellul as "any set of ideas accepted ... without attention to their origins or values. [Burnett:89:130] O'Donnell suggests that institutional propaganda has as its purpose promoting "an ideology to an audience which the propagandist sees as having similar objectives." [O'Donnell in Smith III:89:53] The appearance of a similarity of objectives gives the message viability, but it may also be the result of resonance, a technique "whereby the receivers of the message do not perceive the themes
of the messages to be imposed upon them from an outside authority ... (but)... perceive the arguments of the message as having come from within themselves", thus "...voicing the beliefs and feelings that already exist in the audience." [O'Donnell:89:52]

Ellul identified several categories of propaganda including the political, whereby a government, a party, an administration or a pressure group used techniques of influence with a view "to changing the behaviour of the public", and these were the propaganda of agitation, which describes the "...efforts of those working against the government or the established order"; the sociological, seen as a "progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, a certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously moulds individuals and makes them conform to society"; and the propaganda of integration, which "aims at making the individual participate in his society in every way. It is a long term propaganda, a self-producing propaganda that seeks to obtain stable behaviour, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, to reshape his thoughts and behaviour in terms of the permanent social setting."[Burnett:89:130-1]

Each style of propaganda must be seen to operate in different political circumstances. The first style must be seen as revolutionary, and likely to succeed in a newly emerging political environment. The second is an incremental approach most favoured in liberal democracies, while the integrative approach could be most effective in an autocracy, or as a symbolic approach within a liberal democracy, where change occurs as an outcome of inevitability, as circumstance demands resolutions beyond the control of the political hierarchy.

Burnett extends the argument towards the motivational impact of ideology on the propagandist by examining the way in which "ideology operates in the social sphere". [Burnett:89:131] He identifies legitimation, dissimulation and reification as the three central processes at work here. These are important signifiers with which to examine the response of a constituency to treaty makers' attempted advances, which may have ideological underpinnings. In essence "...relations of domination may be sustained by being represented as legitimate...". To achieve this ideology is used to justify extant approaches and to delegitimise any threat to the existing order. Dissimulation occurs when sectional or individual interests are represented as more universal interests. This is a cloaking of the true aims or goals of a
policy so that the interests of the authors are concealed. Reification occurs, according to Giddens, when "...the interests of dominant groups are bound up with the preservation of the status quo. Forms of signification which 'naturalise' the existing state of affairs, inhibiting recognition of the mutable, historical character of human society thus act to sustain such interests." [Burnett:89:135]

The process that leads to signification can be seen as propaganda, defined as "the systematic propagation of a given doctrine...", or as education, understood as "the act of imparting knowledge or skill." [Pratkanis:91:216] This is a crucial link as it introduces the possible likelihood of formal education being used by the state as a mechanism of social control. Thus change agents opposed to official doctrine may find an intransient foe in the education system, if the system is mobilised against change. This can occur because formal education can be seen to "systematically endorse the system, legitimise it, and by implication, suggest it is the natural and normal way." [Pratkanis:91:216] Equally the link implies a possible utilisation of the education system to inculcate propagandistic messages, particularly those with an ideological base. Hence what is labelled as propaganda and what is labelled as education depend on one's own propaganda purposes." [Pratkanis:91:217]

Propaganda can also be likened to 'conditioning' and 'indoctrination', both of which have been considered as educative techniques. The philosophical underpinnings of indoctrination reveal a relationship between these forms of persuasion and education. However, while education is seen to impart "skills, attitudes or ways of behaving" Snook contends that indoctrination, like propaganda, has a motive based on "the handing on of beliefs". [Snook:77:2] Views on the content of indoctrination vary, from the notion that "...any beliefs can be indoctrinated...", or that "...indoctrination can be used only of doubtful or false beliefs...", to the notion that "doctrinal beliefs are subject to indoctrination." [Snook:77:2] But the intent of the educators is also a factor in the determination of whether a message is a form of indoctrination. One argument supports the idea that the communicator's intended outcome can be used as a determinant, or that the mere presentation of contentious beliefs constitutes indoctrination, regardless of the intent. Thus a government setting up training programs which support an envisaged change as contained within a treaty regime may stand accused
as propagandists or equally be seen as educators. Such labelling will be
determined by and contested in the political circumstances.

Wilson points out that there is a distinct difference between conditioning,
which is related to teaching behaviour, and indoctrination, which is aimed at
teaching beliefs. [Snook:77:3] Green qualifies this by suggesting that "the
only beliefs...which must be rejected are those which prevent us from being
open to reasons and evidence on all subsequent matters." [Snook:77:4]

Kilpatrick sees reconditioning as a form of indoctrination where doctrines,
construed as "an inter-connected set of beliefs..." [White in Snook:77:7] are
implanted and are to be held uncritically. [Snook:77:4] It is here that the
teachers intentions are crucial. Snook contends that intention encompasses
both "...what is actively desired...", suggesting agenda-realisation, and
"...what is foreseen..." [Snook:77:7], which must imply an inculcation
premised on either the maintenance of the status quo, or a more radical
furtherance of social comprehensions. The connection between intention and
responsibility is raised by Snook, and it follows that the onus to ensure that
the message is not a form of indoctrination lies with the educator. But
realistically educational programs are controlled by powerful elites whose
intent is invariably political, and thus responsibility becomes a negotiable
commodity, with little relevance to or regard for the recipients of the
message. Equally the form the communication takes is open to the same
disregard, and thus indoctrination, in the form of propaganda, can be
readily realised and effectively create attitudinal change.

However, communication itself has varying definitions, from the simple
face-to-face form, between communicator and receiver, through mediated
communication, where the message is encoded by a third agent before it
reaches the recipient, to transactional processes "in which participants create
and share information with one another in order to reach mutual
understanding." [O'Donnell:89:49-50] Mediated communication seems the
most common form utilised by dominant political elites, through mediums
like television, where face-to-face communication occurs, while
oppositionary forces proffering alternative ideas to mainstream discourse
tend to be employing on-line facilities frequently and effectively.
Assessing the Ways of Political Communication.

In a bid to better appreciate the psychopolitical means employed by the treaty maker to achieve change conceptual insights from this chapter contribute to the development of the analytical model to be applied to treaties by seeking to identify possible modes of influence. The probe begins with the more benign persuasion, propaganda is considered a possible strategy, as is indoctrination. Questions are raised about if these possible forms of psychosocial manipulation are aimed at attitudinal modification, or if a less intensive program is being employed by change agents intent on perception modification. Finally are the treaty makers acting in leadership roles and pursuing either cultural development or cultural transformation?

It can be seen that political communication is linked intrinsically to notions of cultural change and leadership, and that various psychopolitical mechanisms can be utilised to create shifts in attitude, beliefs, world views and cognitive frameworks. Thus an insight into the ways communication mechanisms can be utilised by change agents is necessary to give pertinence to the preceding philosophical underpinnings of political communication.

The Machinery

In order to implement treaties the political leadership must gain the support of its constituency. This, thus, requires acquiescence on the polity's behalf to accept the intentions of a treaty. A treaty's success can be closely tied to this acquiescence in a democratic environment. The value of any change which may be implied by the introduction of new legislation as a result of signing and ratifying a treaty must be imparted to the political constituency. The success of the treaty is thus dependent as much on the 'gatekeepers' abilities to convince and persuade that constituency, as it is on the pertinence of the treaty and the changes implied therein. The means of political communication must thus be assessed, as it is another of the tools with which to gauge the role of a treaty, to deduce the purpose of that treaty and to assess its likely effect. This section has been labelled machinery because it outlines and assesses the mechanisms that can be employed by political
communicators. However, while it is important to outline these elements they will not be a feature of the overall analysis.  

This section of the chapter draws on McNair's 1995 text *An Introduction to Political Communication*; Petty and Cacioppo's work on routes to persuasion, in the Percy and Woodside text on *Advertising and Consumer Psychology*, published in 1983; and Zanna's discussion regarding message receptivity, presented in Mitchell's 1993 text, *Advertising Exposure, Memory and Choice*. These texts were utilised as a way of accessing materials which related psychological processes and advertising effects. Thus they are drawn from the variant forms of advertising and consumer psychology, but can also be linked to communications studies.

The basis of McNair's insights into political communication is Denton and Woodward's contention that political communication is characterised by "the intentions of its senders to influence the political environment", and that what makes communication political is not the source of the message but "...its content and purpose". However, they see political communication as "...public discussion about the allocation of public resources... official authority... and official sanctions". McNair suggests that while this definition includes "verbal and written political rhetoric", it excludes "symbolic communication acts", which offer insight into the political process as a whole. [McNair:95:3]

If McNair's claim is applied to treaties he seems to suggest that they can be proffered to a community as utilities with a practical application or as agents of symbolic change. The possible effects of the former need simply be quantified, whereas symbolism is a qualitative variable. If the changes being offered by implementing treaties are comprehensible, an empirical measure, the likelihood of their acceptance by their constituency is high. However symbolic changes must be comprehensible, a position not only hard to gauge, by recipient and analyst alike, but also difficult to achieve.

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1 The machinery of political communication concerns advertising and the communications devices found in broadcasting and publication. The theory contained in this explanation of the means of political communication gives further context to the task of the treaty maker in achieving change. However, the theoretical comprehensions will not be tested in this thesis, due to limits of space and time, but also because media analysis is a lengthy and precise task, requiring a visit to media archives. The box developed for enquiry would be a useful starting point for students of public relations or media studies.
If the premise that governments will engage in political communication in order to persuade the constituency of proposed changes is accepted, then this argument is valid. But it is also an important consideration of treaty makers to ensure that the value of treaties they enunciate can be communicated to the public. Huckfeldt and Sprague [1995], in a discussion on social communication, question how people obtain political information, and this is pertinent here as it relates to persuasion techniques. In essence the authors suggest that the constituency can either obtain information directly from the external political environment and then "...process that information as independent decision makers guided by their own decision rules... (or)... they make decisions on the basis of shared deliberations, shared information and shared social experience." [Huckfeldt:95:45] The authors are concerned about whether the competent and rational individual is at the centre of attitudinal change, or if the common social environment determines preferences and opinions. [Huckfeldt:95:46]

In further work on persuasion, a vital component of political communication and a vital tool of the treaty maker in the process of cultural change, the psychology of advertising offers profound insights into strategies for success. Petty and Cacioppo [Percy and Woodside:83] discuss the differing routes to persuasion as a means to achieving attitudinal change. The central route views attitude change as "...resulting from a diligent consideration of information that is central to what people feel are the true merits of the advocacy." [Petty etal in Percy:83:3] Whereas the peripheral route leads to attitudinal change "because the attitude object has been associated with either positive or negative cues or the person uses a simple decision rule to evaluate communication." This approach does not require "...any extensive issue-relevant thinking." Thus there is an automaticity involved, which means "that attitudes do not always change in a thoughtful manner." [Petty:83:4]

Petty and Cacioppo attempt to explain the two routes to persuasion with the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Attitude Change. [Petty:83:5] In essence, they are gauging the likelihood of a message recipient to elaborate through issue relevant thinking. They argue that as a recipient receives an overload of information daily some messages will be elaborated upon, unwanted ones will be filtered out, while others will simply be accepted. If a treaty maker is to achieve success then the constituency must be persuaded to adopt the message which outlines changes. The message needs to be both worthy of
elaboration and liable to simple acceptance. The advocate need to realise that the cognitive responses to a message can be favourable or unfavourable thoughts. Again the message must be constructed so as to "point to desirable consequences..." [Petty:83:7] for the recipient.

However the authors do conclude that the central route is preferable if the generated attitude change is to be "more salient in memory..." as people hold these attitudes with more confidence. [Petty:83:16] This suggests that the task of the treaty maker is more complex if the objective is to introduce significant and substantial change, but if the task requires acceptance of change, but little commitment to that change from the constituency, then the peripheral route has utility. The authors link the impact of message repetition with this approach to attitudinal change, suggesting that "...persuasion first increases then wears out as the number of repetitions increases." [Petty etal in Alwitt etal:85:96] Thus subjects were most favourable to message that were "...supported by strong arguments and presented a moderate number of times." [Petty:85:97-8] This work on routes to persuasion gives further insight into the task before treaty makers if a treaty is to gain acceptance within a political constituency. It also serves as a tool for retrospective analysis of the promotion of treaties.

With his examination of attitudinal change Zanna [Zanna in Mitchell:93] completes the work in this section on political communication. His concern was with the process of message receptivity, and the 'problem' of open and closed mindedness in persuasive communication. He pondered the conditions under which a message recipient would be "...open-minded and motivated by concerns for validity...", and when the recipient would be "...closed-minded, and motivated to defend his or her attitude." [Zanna:93:143] He concluded that message recipients respond according to whether the communication is perceived to advocate "a position within their latitude of rejection... (or) ...within their latitude of acceptance." [Zanna:93:148] Zanna's work is an intricate insight into cognitive manipulation and offers insights into how the public can be encouraged to be receptive to change, and by implication, how that same community can be persuaded to reject change. As a means to adjudge the salience of a treaty prior to introducing it to the community, this is a valid prescriptive tool. It also offers clues to the statesmen forced to introduce treaties into a domestic environment as a result of external pressure, and how that presentation must be modified to gain acceptance. Again this is a crucial concern for the
democratically elected politician, or the benevolent dictator. The arguments presented here outline the processes of persuasion and the methods by which political effects can be ascertained. They are a vital measure to be applied to treaties to gauge their efficacy.

Assessing the Means of Political Communication

To contribute insights, from this section on the forms of political communication, to the development of an analytical model the following questions must be put, with regard to a treaty regime, when testing the likelihood of attitudinal change. The answers can indicate the strategy of the change agents, and offer clues as to why a treaty may have been accepted or rejected by the constituency. Firstly the form of the communication must be ascertained. Was the treaty maker attempting to achieve change by transmitting messages about the content and purpose of a proposed agreement, with the hope of attracting the support of recipients through the central route of persuasion, or by symbolic means, and thus by attracting the attention of the cognitive misers, through the peripheral route of persuasion? But does the constituency receive the information individually, and directly from the change agents, or are its adjudications based on common deliberations? Again the central and peripheral routes to persuasion come into play. Equally, does the message conveyed by the change agent elicit favourable or unfavourable thoughts, and thus contribute to its acceptance or rejection by the constituency? Finally, was the message conveyed on a basis that attracted attention or was it rejected for excess repetition which challenged the tolerances of the members of the constituency.

However, examining the dynamics of political preference is a difficult observational task. Huckfeldt et al suggest an inability "to observe directly the process of social interaction with political content." In fact there is a requirement to take independent samples at "multiple points in time, or by repeated observations of the same sample." This suggests that this particular insight requires preparation prior to an event occurring, as the data generated around an issue can be quickly lost, or can become contaminated "due to reinterviewing and sample attrition." [Huckfeldt:95:46] As a result this test will be excluded from the polyphonic model which will be compiled in the following section.
Overall, this chapter has examined the manner in which political communication can be utilised, by suggesting the variant forms of persuasion, before delving into the means with which to pursue the communication objective. A treaty maker fully cognisant of the means of message delivery and the diffusion of innovation, would simply need to choose a form of encouragement suitable to the policy context to achieve likely success. The difficulty with the analysis of political communication is its interpretive nature. There is a fine line between indoctrination and education; so how does one discern the intent of the propounder of information? Equally, to fully appreciate which machinery was employed by the change agent not only requires extensive quantitative analysis of media activity with regard to a treaty, but also a qualitative analysis of how the information was transmitted and received. The following section brings together the quantitative and qualitative test developed in this thesis in a bid to create a model with which to gauge the likely efficacy of a treaty regime.
Section Four

Developing the Polyphonic Analytical Model
Section Four

Developing the Polyphonic Analytical Model

In this section the polyphonic analytical model is developed which examines the origin, role, and purpose of treaties, from a polyphonous and multiperspectival theoretical view, before testing the efficacy of the Treaties identified in this project. The model has two complexions, one of which presents general assessments, while the other presents particularist insights, gleaned with the application of the model. Waltz's justification for creating an analytical tool that is "...a necessarily slender explanatory construct" [Waltz:90:32] which looks at particularisms rather than generalisms, justifies this process. But, equally, the quest for "Big Picture" analysis can be satisfied.

This theoretical explication reveals how treaties may not only be pertinent in the external political arena, but that their impact may equally affect the domestic regime. Further the growing significance of the individual in global political activity means the treatises expounded within the discipline of psychology, and in particular, psychopolitical and sociopolitical insights, are also needed to extend the comprehension of the utility of treaties.
Chapter Nine

The Polyphonic Analytical Model

The primary objective of this exercise is to create a model with which to
gauge a treaty's efficacy and to test the hypothesis that psychopolitical
underpinnings must be taken into account if change is to occur. Throughout
the preceding chapters of this thesis, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 8, groups of
questions aimed at testing the efficacy of a treaty as a tool of foreign policy,
where its intent is change, have been drawn out from selected readings of
theoretical precepts, from International Law, International Relations,
Organisation and Communication Studies and, Psychology.

This wide source of investigative elements has been developed in four
stages. Firstly, to comprehend the general origin, role and purpose of
treaties, as a way of contextualising a treaty regime. A second dimension is
introduced into the equation by suggesting that a treaty maker is influenced
by external factors that must be given due consideration during the creation
of a treaty and throughout its implementation. But equally the domestic
impact of a treaty must also be addressed to ensure constituent acceptance.
However, this is a complex task as the treaty maker must extend the reach of
the treaty beyond the text and take into account psycho-social and psycho-
cultural challenges to change which they must overcome before a treaty
gains acceptance. Possible avenues are identified to be followed by treaty
makers as change agents in pursuit of that success. This is the third and most
significant concern for the change agent and leads to the investigation into
psychopolitics. These three stages are synthesised in this chapter as the
polyphonic analytical model. A fourth element is the more particular
component of this project which examines the efficacy of selected treaties as
tools of foreign policy.

Each of these four stages is dealt with in case studies, to indicate the possible
application of the model, with a view towards legitimising the synthesis
developed in this thesis and to suggest its value as a means to further
research. The investigation deals with four major dimensions, that are
discussed in correlative sections.

The first three are related to theoretical insights, and are thus generalised,
while the question of efficacy is included as a diagnostic adjudication in the
concluding chapter. It needs to be appreciated that the efficacy of a treaty, its power to produce an effect, depends on the context in which the treaty is located, and on the intent of the treaty makers. However that context can be influenced by determinants beyond the control of the treaty maker. Equally the challenges to change posed by the domestic constituency are often outside the realm of influence enjoyed by change agents and extra effort must be expended to gain efficacy. This suggests that efficacy is being tested in each instance of this analytical process, with the probes into possible psychopolitical impacts on treaty programs, that are realised as each chapter ponders the role of norms, perceptions or discourses as elements of change.

**Essential Dimensions of the Assessment**

Questions regarding the essential dimensions of this assessment

A  How do the theoretical perspectives of international relations explain the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?
B  What influences must treaty makers contend with?
C  What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty?
D  Was the attempt at effecting change a success?

Bearing these concerns in mind an explanation of the mechanics of the development of the groups of questions pertinent to each strand of the investigation is necessary for a better understanding of how to apply those questions. The model is constructed as a series of probes categorised as A, B, C, or D, based on the questions presented as the **Essential Dimensions** of the Assessment.

Those primary questions are broken down into secondary enquiries of a broad nature, and presented as General Lists, which indicate possible avenues to investigation. For example, the inquiry into the origin of a treaty suggests a probe into international law, or an examination of how systemic pressures can instigate treaty making activity. Thus, the secondary group of general questions identifies constituent elements, defined by theoretical comprehensions, that may be regarded as relevant to each general concern.

Those constituent elements, in turn, lead to a tertiary group of questions in Boxes, drawn up using descriptive headings, as designated by the theoretical materials chosen for the development of the model. Each
theoretical category is delved into to ascertain particular insights called for, and to then generalise those particularisms.

Thus, this is a two way process, where particular insights gleaned within each perspectival Chapter and based on the probes called Essential Dimensions, were presented as General Lists of questions, which then came under more in-depth scrutiny as series of questions about particular aspects of each theoretical contribution. The responses to these questions when applied to a treaty or package of treaties, can then be articulated in a more general manner in the case studies, and summarised as essential comprehensions in conclusion.

**Essential Dimension A**

**How do the theoretical perspectives of international relations explain the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?**

The first group of questions, presented in the following list, seeks to ascertain the context in which the treaty maker is attempting reform, if that is the case, or is simply tinkering with political symbolism in a bid to engender perceptions of activity, while maintaining the status quo, a political ploy aimed at enhancing regard. The list is self explanatory but the responses may be contestable, and suggestive, rather than concrete.

**Origin, Role and Purpose of a Treaty**

- **Origin** Where and why was the treaty developed?
- **Role** [function] What role can the treaty serve?
- **Purpose** [aim] What is the purpose of the treaty?

The theoretical insights gained from International Law, NeoRealism, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regime Theory, NeoLiberal Institutionalism, and Social Constructivism are used in this opening section, to place the treaty within an external context. Each of these theoretical perspectives was chosen because they have psychopolitical or psychosocial elements in common, in the form of norms, perspectives or discourses. The questions posed within each perspective are intended to disclose the role of a treaty in international and national politics, by identifying and outlining possible functions of an interstate agreement. The questions are
manifestations of insights developed through the explication of theoretical perspectives drawn from the selected International Relations theories which identify psychopolitical elements as vital components of theoretical comprehension. This occurs because the hypothesis being pursued contends that those psychopolitical elements influence constituent acceptance of a treaty and thus must be satisfied before a treaty can realise widespread support.

From the following List, extracted from Section 1 of the thesis, it is possible to ascertain expectations of possible functions of a treaty within the international arena.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General List A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possible Construction And Interpretation Of Treaties Using Selected International Relations Theoretical Perspectives.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The impact of a treaty on International Law or with reference to peremptory norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NeoRealism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The influence of systemic constraints on a treaty or of a treaty on systemic constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hegemonic Stability Theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of hegemons in engendering change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime formation and the impact of treaties on transactionalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NeoLiberal Institutionalism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The form of institutional change engendered by a treaty, types of gains and distributional effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Constructivism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The context of the treaty environment and intent of the treaty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each component discussion suggests elements of influence which determine how a treaty may impact on those components, and an insight into the dynamics of treaty making.

**International Law and Treaties**

As the purpose of the thesis is to develop the hypothesis with regard to the psychopolitical validity of a treaty a model must be sought which allows the evolution of such an insight. From an international law perspective the
overall quest appears to be to gauge the impact of a treaty on International Law or with reference to peremptory norms. A consideration of a treaty's justiciability, enforcability, and breachability, explores the basis of legalistic legitimacy. An insight into the domestic impact of a treaty can show how state actions can be determined by external influence. But the focus on norms is seen to be of greater relevance in this project which is examining the influence and demands of psychopolitical elements and how they affect domestic lawmakers, the judiciary and the political constituency. Thus, domestic impact is analysed as having a psychosocial underpinning, in that constituent activity can be aroused in response to a treaty. This may occur as the treaty is construed to have aspirational elements aimed at change and is thus considered to be an assault on peremptory norms, which underpin international law or as a clash with common domestic law. Moreover, there is a need to consider whether a treaty is in line with a peremptory norm, but as a result countermands domestic legislation, and is thus likely to attract external support, but be liable to domestic rejection.

Box A1
The Legal and Psychosocial Impact of a Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact as Agent of New International Law?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal basis of treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justiciability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breachability?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence on or of Peremptory Norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Impact?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirational elements?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neorealism, the System and Treaties.

The essence of neorealist comprehension is related to the system of states and how influence is brought to bear upon states by the system, or alternatively how states can utilise the system to create pressure on states. This table is applied to gauge the influence of such systemic constraints and to explain the nature of the system and thereby identify the possible origin, role or purpose of a treaty. Equally it illuminates possible effects of treaty making activity and can indicate any change that may have come about.
NeoRealism, the System and Treaties

Was the treaty devised to satisfy systemic pressure?
Was the treaty intended to create systemic pressure?
What form did that pressure take?
How did the process impact upon systemic constructs?

Hegemonic Stability Theory, Influence and Treaties

Hegemonic power is a constant in the international system and reference needs be made to the possibility of a hegemon exerting influence over states by demanding, overtly or covertly, that treaty makers engage in consensus building to find agreement. Such pressure can also be an outcome of a state pursuing influence with a hegemon, by acting of its own volition, in seeking an agreement either with that hegemonic state, or with other states to garner the hegemon's attention and respect. Thus the origin of a treaty can be revealed by this inquiry into influence?

The Hegemon and Influence
Did a hegemon have influence over the formation of the treaty?
Was the treaty developed to enhance universal interests?

Regime Theory and Treaties - Implementation

This table looks at the impact of a treaty and its implementation on how states interact and the possible impetus for regime formation as a result of that interaction. It is also possible that a regime based on an extant treaty may generate further agreement which could be formalised as a treaty. Further to this can a treaty be seen to bring joint gains to states negotiating agreement? Equally are there other benefits to be gained beyond the material, in the form of actions strengthening symbolic ties or enhancing perceptions of cooperation and interdependence? In the following table the impact of regimes on treaties is tested, with an inquiry into the relationship between regimes and treaties.
**Box A4**

**Regimes, Transactionalism and Treaties.**

Is regime formation influenced by the treaty?
Does the treaty have a positive impact on the Pareto frontier?
Does the treaty aid transactionalism?
Is Interdependence enhanced or hampered by the treaty?

**NeoLiberal Institutionalism and Treaties.**

In a similar manner the precepts of NeoLiberal Institutionalism are subjected to analysis, but equally Regime theory can be included in this table, as it relates to interdependence and interstate interaction, but also because it has an element of transactionalism, where the strictures of the state have less influence and the personality of leaders begins to impact on global structures and to encourage regime formation. Bearing this in mind it becomes necessary to ascertain what impact a treaty has on the structure of the system and what possible effects the change which accompanies the treaty may have. In short, the task is to identify the form of institutional change engendered by a treaty, and the types of gains and distributional effects.

**Box A5**

**Institutions and Treaties**

Is a new institution fomented by the envisaged change?
What types of gains may be realised by treaty instigators?
What distributional effects can be estimated and realised?

What institutional change implies is that norm modification occurs. As norms are a guideline to behaviour, behavioural modifications must be seen to impact on norms. This understanding serves as a timely reminder of the similar position arrived at in International law, where norms were considered of major significance in the ongoing development of global cooperation. Again here is a further test of the viability of treaties. Can they be seen individually as contributing to the evolution and development of emergent norms in their areas of pertinence?
Thus an essential component of the analytical models arrived at in these chapters must review how norms, perceptions or discourses have evolved or been modified as a result of treaty making. Rather than apply this gauge to each theoretical perspective an overall assessment avoids repetitive responses to the following enquiry.

Box A6
Psychopolitical Impact of Treaties

Is there a noticeable modification of
norms?
perceptions?
discourses?

Social Constructivism, Context, Intent and Treaties.
The concluding insight contained in each of Boxes A1 to A6 is a lead-in to the societally grounded views of social constructivism, which are centred on the import of ideas as agents of change. Box A7, articulating social constructivist probes is vital for the extension of the argument about psychopolitical influence either on treaty makers, or as a result of their confabulations. It contains complex enquiries into the intellectual and psychosocial support structures that treaty makers must employ to realise their agendas.

Box A7
Social Constructivism, Context, Intent and Treaties,

Was the treaty making environment conducive to success?
Was the intent of the treaty symbolic?
Did the treaty have pragmatic or aspirational underpinnings?
Would interests be affected by proposed change?

Social constructivism also offers insights into influences on treaty makers and is discussed further in the next section, Essential Dimension B.
Essential Dimension B

What influences must treaty makers contend with?

Comparable components constitute Box B1 below, which expands on the influence of norms, perceptions and discourses as raised in companion Box A7. The reason for splitting the application of social constructivism is the notion that ideational motives can be at work in both the external and domestic environments. This occurs through the manipulation of norms, perceptions and discourses, which are the bridging arrangements between the outer and inner political realms. Thus a fuller comprehension of the influence of ideas is gained by testing the treaty in both environments.

This is realised through insights gained into the forms of external and domestic influence with which the treaty maker must contend. These elements of influence include norms, perceptions and discourses, which preside in both the international and domestic arenas and have been identified at work in the external environment in the preceding boxes. Thus the following section looks at the bridge between these two realms.

General List B, constructed from notions contained in Section 2 of the thesis, attempts to ascertain the extent to which treaty makers were influenced by norms, perceptions or discourses, or if in fact the treaty maker was attempting to influence those societal constructs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General List B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External And Domestic Influences On The Treaty Maker.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Constructivism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What external / domestic influences must the treaty maker contend with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms, Perceptions, Discourses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of these influences were pertinent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of these elements of psychopolitical comprehension did the treaty makers engage?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social Constructivism, Influence and Treaties.

With the various ways in which ideas can manifest within the collective, Box B1 enquires into the likely form that ideational influence takes with regard to the introduction and implementation of a treaty. Such identification gives the treaty maker a comprehension which assists with the instigation of change. It is possible that most or all of the influences may contribute to the eventual strategy employed by the change agent.

Box B1
Social Constructivism, Influence and Treaties.

Were the treaty makers influenced by precedent?
- collective intentionality?
- societal norms?
- perceptions?
- discourses?
- beliefs?

Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties

When considering norms, perceptions and discourses as forms of influence which element gains precedence is often determined by the change being attempted, by the complexion of the culture targeted for change, or by leadership skills utilised by the change agent. These three elements have been selected as prominent political forms of ideational control. The following questions in Box B2 concern which of these influences were pertinent, and which of these elements of psychopolitical comprehension were engaged by the treaty maker. The underlying purpose of the application of the enquiries in Box B2 is to identify the validity for the argument that psychopolitical elements underpin any attempts at constructing treaties, and that change is a difficult process to implement if the requirements demanded by psychosocial forces are not manifest.
Box B2
Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties.

Which of these 3 elements influence the treaty maker?
Does the treaty have an impact on these elements?
Does the treaty challenge societal norms?
Does the treaty fit within attitudinal expectations?
Does the treaty have an ideological base?
What extent of cultural change is necessary for the treaty to gain widespread constituent support?
Is widespread constituent support for the treaty necessary for success?
Does the treaty enhance extant perceptions?
Does the treaty modify the dominant discourse?
Essential Dimension C

What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty?

Psychopolitical Components and Treaties.

The prime question in this grouping is what processes must treaty makers utilise to achieve acceptance and what barriers must be overcome for the successful realisation of change? This investigation is instigated by the possibility that a treaty may appear to have an intended role, which does not coincide with the outcomes realised by the implementation of that treaty. This may be intentional, but equally happenstance may intervene in the process and modify the applicability of the treaty at any instant.

Thus a third group of tests is arrived at, with the extraction of viable and pertinent psychosocial insights gleaned from Section 3 of the thesis, which treaty makers can, may or should, subject political constituencies to, if a treaty is to be successfully integrated or incorporated into the consciousness of the polity and thus enjoy widespread constituent support or at least a crucial subscription of an influential political elite. The following List outlines the general inquiry within each perspective from which those insights are drawn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General List C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenges to Change Facing the Treaty Maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What types of change are possible?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What form of leadership is necessary?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopolitical challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the likelihood of attitudinal barriers being lowered, or of cognitive dissonance being engendered?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion, Propaganda, Indoctrination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which mode of encouragement must be employed to achieve success?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which forms of communication will facilitate the requisite changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cultural Change, Leadership and Treaties.

In the context of cultural change the purpose of a treaty and the intent of the treaty maker must be ascertained, before delving into what changes are required if the introduction and implementation of the treaty are to meet with success. It is also important to gauge the extent of cultural change necessary for the treaty to gain widespread constituent support, if that support is necessary for success. Such constituent support may require attitudinal shifts and this can depend on the style of leadership adopted by the change agent, and the approach taken. This is vital to guarantee the legitimacy of both the treaty and the change it engenders.

Box C 1
Forms of Cultural Change and Leadership When Introducing a Treaty

- Can the treaty initiate cultural exchange domestically?
- Was that the treaty makers intent?
- Does the treaty require cultural change for acceptance?
- What psychological alterations are required within society to effect cultural change?
- What type of leader will achieve success?
- What approach must that leader take?

To continue this overview the insights stemming from the psychopolitical challenges that treaty-makers might encounter, when faced with a recalcitrant constituency, must be understood.

Psychopolitical Challenges to Change

From the discussion we can discern major challenges to change with which a treaty maker might engage to achieve a successful acceptance and implementation of new policy. Not only should entrenched attitudes and ideological underpinnings be accounted for, but the more refined components of narrative structure must be factored into how the change is communicated to the constituency. The treaty needs to be written in a manner which leads to proper interpretation, thus avoiding politically manipulative exploitation of an agreement to advance an opponents
interests at the expense of a change possibly advantageous to the constituency. The message is best presented in a manner conducive to community receptivity, to avoid a retreat to cognitive dissonance, which can be premised on differentiation, or the constituency's lack of identification with the proposed change likely if a treaty undergoes implementation. Thus the following queries, in Box C2, when applied to a treaty, can identify those challenges to change to be contended with by the treaty maker.

**Box C 2**

**Psychopolitical Challenges to Change**

Were these challenges encountered and met?
- attitudinal constructs
- ideological obstructions
- narrative structures
- proper interpretation
- identification
- rituals of differentiation
- message receptivity
- cognitive dissonance

By examining the possible challenges to change, with Box C2, the likely psychological barriers faced by treaty makers can be identified. To overcome these barriers appropriate styles and forms of communication must be employed by a change agent intent on success. These various approaches to political communication adopted by a treaty maker must be assessed as they offer an important view of likely failure or success.

**Political Communication**

Having ascertained the purpose of the treaty and the intent of the treaty maker Box C3 allows for an extensive probe into the style taken by the psychosocial and psychopolitical processes of influence. In a bid to better appreciate the means employed by the treaty maker to achieve change the following table posits those possible modes of influence. It begins with the more benign persuasion, while propaganda is considered a possible strategy, as is indoctrination. Are these processes possible forms of psychosocial manipulation aimed at attitudinal modification, or is a less
intensive program being employed by change agents intent on perception modification, where attitudes remain static while opinions become more flexible? Or are the treaty makers acting in leadership roles and pursuing either cultural development or cultural transformation?

**Box C 3**

**Identifying the mode of influence**

Was the form taken by the psychopolitical processes aimed at change and the acceptance of the treaty
- persuasion, propaganda or indoctrination?
- psycho-manipulation?
- attitudinal modification?
- perception mechanics?
- leadership?
- cultural development / transformation?

But the style of political communication is strategic, and thus the tactics to be employed need to be identified to fully comprehend which process the treaty maker used to influence the constituency. The enquiries presented in Box C4 are to be used to identify whether the treaty under consideration conveyed a message premised on content and purpose, and thus a practical program with possible concrete manifestations, or if its intent was symbolic, aimed at engendering changes in attitude and belief.

**Box C 4**

**Forms of Political Communication**

What form did the political communication take?
- content and purpose
- symbolism

How was the message conveyed to the domestic constituency?
- direct information
- shared deliberations
- favourable thoughts
- message repetition
However, examining the dynamics of political preference is a difficult observational task, as suggested in Chapter 8. Thus this task falls outside the parameters of this project and will be excluded from the polyphonic model.

In the final section the success of a treaty regime is gauged and analysis of the process pursued by the treaty makers is finalised.
Essential Dimension D

Was the attempt at effecting change a success?

This fourth grouping, the test to gauge the efficacy of a treaty, is essentially realised by subjecting the treaty to the three groups of tests outlined above. The final section, as suggested, will gauge the efficacy of the treaty, but will be a composite prose articulation drawing upon the information gleaned by the application of the series of questions presented in Boxes, and identified and outlined in this Chapter. In its own right, however, this section has a grouping of questions which need be applied at the completion of the application of the other three groupings of questions.

Box D
Efficacy of the Treaty

Assessing the results of applying the polyphonic analytical model is the treaty likely to

- only have an external impact?
- be rejected externally?
- be accepted by the domestic constituency?
- be implemented domestically?
- meet with constant resistance domestically?
- be firmly rejected domestically?
- have a symbolic effect?

Following the application of the series of questions articulated in this a polyphonic analytical model a conclusion about the efficacy of a treaty under examination will be possible. The next two chapters utilise the model to explore elements of Keating's Treaty Package. This, in turn, will allow a reflection on the utility of the polyphonic analytical model in the concluding chapter.
Section Five

Assessing Keating's Treaty Package
Section Five

Assessing Keating's Treaty Package

While previous sections offered insights into the varying perspectives with which to look at treaties as tools of foreign policy, the function of this section is to present an assessment of treaties chosen for analysis, by applying those multiperspectival insights. The model enunciated in the previous section will be applied to treaties selected from the Keating Package, which will be evaluated to ascertain their usefulness as components of that government's attempts to engender change in Australian political culture. But, at the same time, the results of the analysis of the treaties will be used to identify the effectiveness of the polyphonic model developed to assess the treaties. In short, the model will test the treaties which in turn will test the model.

The analysis begins by setting in place the complexion of the investigation and the form that the evolutionary examination of each of the treaties will take. This depends on the shape of the model being applied, which is itself evolutionary, in that the initial task was to outline the origin of the treaty. It was necessary to ascertain the motivating forces behind the genesis of a treaty. A second task was to identify the role each treaty was expected to perform, and to clearly enunciate the possible proper or customary role of each treaty. But there was a claim being made within the Australian Parliament that treaties were impacting negatively on domestic conventions. It was implied that treaties were being used in ways which exceeded their proper function. Thus the purpose of the treaties and of the treaty makers was placed under scrutiny. In this instance purpose, defined as intent, is taken to convey a different comprehension to treaties, than role. The questions that arose with purpose in mind included what other purposes treaties could be used for?, and what the intentions of the treaty makers were? The fourth and final comprehension was to gauge the efficacy of the treaties under consideration, in a bid to ascertain their likelihood of successful acceptance and implementation. Thus the case studies will delve into the origin, role, purpose and efficacy, where the latter, understood here as having the power to elicit change, is an extension of either role or purpose. In this sense efficacy can be read as an outcome, either quantifiable or qualifiable, or as a less concrete and less tangible implication or impression, with futurist and predictive overtones.
Essentially the investigation will be applied to individual areas of treaty activity pertinent to the Keating "Big Picture" Project. However while the primary focus of Keating’s foray into Asia was premised on economic considerations, and in particular on APEC, an investigation into that area of development, by applying the polyphonic analytical tool, would proffer up little evidence with which to test the model. The APEC policy platform is simply an extension of decades old development of economic arrangements in the region, that stem from the Australia-Japan Trade Treaty of 1957, PECC and PBEC.

It is the military security agreements on which the focus of the case studies will fall as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is essentially targeted at the external environment, while the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, (AMS), was targeted at domestic audiences. Although the APEC analysis would provide an opportunity to apply the model to its full extent, as the economic reach of APEC is both external and domestic, the divergent applications to the ARF and AMS will reveal the salience of both aspects of the model.

These three agreements must be placed in a context which illustrates their pertinence to each other, and also to Keating’s Vision. Initially Keating was intent on economic reform. When Treasurer he pursued the economy, as stand-in Prime Minister after ousting Hawke he perceived economics still as the main game; post election, on assuming the Prime Ministership in his own right, he appeared to assume office pursuing the activities outlined in the duty roster of the PM&C Office. But this did not explain his foreign policy pursuit. It was necessary to take a look further back in Keating’s development to discover the basis for his interest in this area of policy; and tradition may well have constituted his raison d'etre; for Curtin and Whitlam had both focussed on external engagement.

Equally circumstance could have been the main reason. The mere fact that Keating had served as treasurer for several terms of Parliament before becoming Prime Minister gave him a natural inclination towards economic rationales. His involvement with the fledgling APEC, under Hawke’s stewardship, would have aroused his interest in external affairs, as would his constant struggle with the effects of economic globalisation on Australia. Through that involvement in APEC Keating was privy to regional and
global discourses on economic futures and was also meeting regional leaders on a regular basis. Australia was intent on realising a stronger economic relationship with regional states and ASEAN was an obvious place to seek influence. Suharto was the strong man in ASEAN and Keating would have had no option but to seek him out, which he did and successfully. It was through Suharto's efforts of persuasion that the Bogor meeting of APEC came about in 1994, setting in train the Heads of Government meetings which were to become an annual feature of regional economic diplomacy.

It was not a big step from Bogor to the acceptance by ASEAN of the Evans' proposal for a regional military cooperation grouping based on the European model, which would be realised in 1994, with the formation of the ARF. While this institution was welcomed by regional leaders it was not of great concern to domestic constituencies and failed to attract any noticeable praise. As a result of the work that Evans and Keating did in the region, and particularly with the influential Indonesian leadership of Suharto and Alatas, the foreign minister, it was not unfathomable that Keating and Suharto came to agreement on a mutual security pact between Australia and Indonesia. It was a surprise, however, and the reactions in Australia were mostly premised on the secrecy component of the negotiations and paid little regard to the actual effects that the Agreement might have on regional security.

The bland acceptance of the APEC reforms and the imperceptible passage of the ARF into existence, were in stark contrast to the volatile attacks on Keating's and Evans's secret diplomacy, and an underlying distrust of the AMS that seemed based on entrenched fear of Indonesia, rather than any logical arguments that would support rejection of the document. The purpose of the following case studies is to test two treaties for efficacy as tools of foreign policy, and to ascertain if there was a need for either to be presented in a persuasive manner to gain the approval of the domestic constituency.

These will be very brief and speculative applications of the polyphonic analytical model, to demonstrate that there is a viability in pursuing this avenue of investigation into the psychopolitical underpinnings of treaties, and the need for those underpinnings to be considered when constructing an agreement.
Chapter Ten

ASEAN Regional Forum and Australia

The ASEAN Regional Forum was created in a bid to enhance regional military cooperation following the post Cold War redefinition of strategic concerns. This chapter will discuss the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Australia's involvement in that. The aim is to examine the source of the agreements reached to create the ARF, their role, purpose and efficacy, by utilising the polyphonic analytical model to examine how treaties are tools of foreign policy. What this analysis demonstrates is that the ARF was based on consensual agreement, rather than through formal treaty arrangements. But that those agreements were premised on extant treaties. Thus the initial task of identifying the origin, role and purpose of the agreements constituting the ARF is also focussed on those primary constitutive documents. In developing this case study reference will be made to a series of questions based on the previous theoretical discussions and the polyphonic analytical model, but the presentation will take the form of an analytical narrative. A final judgement will be made concerning each facet of the investigation into the function of the agreements, before a synthesising and concluding statement is made concerning the efficacy of the ARF, as revealed by the analysis of those constituent elements.

Origin, Role and Purpose of the ARF

The 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit proclaimed the members states "...intent to intensify ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia Pacific region." [see Addendum B] During the 1993 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore foreign ministers from ASEAN and dialogue partners in that process "...agreed to separate, regular gatherings which would focus on regional security issues under the auspices of a newly constituted ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)." [Dupont:98:1]

The inaugural ARF ministerial meeting, which was held on July 25, 1994, in Bangkok, Thailand, brought together foreign ministers from the European Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific countries. At the time ASEAN consisted of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. ASEAN's Dialogue Partners were: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States. ASEAN's Consultative Partners were China and Russia. ASEAN's Observers were Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. The meeting established the ARF as the first region-wide multilateral forum for consultations at the government level on Asia-Pacific security issues. The 1994 Chairman's Statement, issued by consensus following the meeting, described the ARF as a useful instrument for contributing to regional security by easing tensions, reducing suspicions, and cultivating consultation habits.

Then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, referred to Australia's "...initiative at the 1990 ASEAN-PMC in Jakarta..." as an important impetus for the ARF. A priority for DFAT was to enhance the regional security environment by gaining acceptance of cooperative security approaches. [Ball&Kerr:96:73-4] ASEAN was considered a key regional player in organising security dialogue forums. Australia had presented a proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in 1990 [Soeya:94:87] In 1991, Japan's Foreign Minister at the time, Nakayama, proposed making use of the ASEAN-PMC as a forum for political dialogue "aimed at enhancing a sense of mutual reassurance." [Soeya:94:89] While visiting Japan, in January 1992, US President Bush was party to a US-Japan declaration, which included a reference to the ASEAN-PMC as a forum for political dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. Two factors behind this development were, firstly, pressure from ASEAN-ISIS, a non-official organisation, to establish a security dialogue; and, secondly, that the ASEAN-PMC was the only sub-regional forum which had the potential to host a security dialogue. [Ball&Kerr:96:74]

In fact the ASEAN-PMC process was seen as addressing the security concerns of the ASEAN region by acting as a medium through which dialogue amongst Association members could occur, with regard to cooperation in security matters, but also as a forum at which to address issues "relevant to the Asia Pacific region and community as a whole." [Jawhar:93:7] The resultant formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, while initiated by ASEAN states, saw a commitment by Australia and then Foreign Minister, Evans, to organise seminars and help "...frame ARF procedures, protocols and agendas." [Cheeseman:96:261]
Contained in the Chairman’s Statement of the First ASEAN Regional Forum was the agreement to “endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.” [See Addendum B] The following year, at the 2nd ARF, the Meeting recognised that “the concept of comprehensive security includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues.” Through these mechanisms, put in place by the ARF, cooperation has been engendered and enhanced by the socialisation of member states. By accepting membership the contractual commitment of states appears obvious, and although the contract is unenforceable members have an interest in cooperating through the gains guaranteed by interaction. Significantly the ARF is the only regional security framework "in which all the great powers are represented..." [Simon in Carpenter:96:42]

The basis of the measures and guidelines adopted by member states of the ARF is a series of agreements realised over several years, as adjunctive evolutionary commitments. However, for the purpose of this exercise the preliminary document for analysis will be the Chairman’s Statement from The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, 25 July 1994, Bangkok.

This Document outlines how ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security matters, as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. It was also agreed to mount an extensive study regime looking at ideas related to

a) confidence and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues, and preventive diplomacy.

b) the comprehensive concept of security, including its economic and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-Pacific region;

c) other relevant internationally recognized norms and principles pertaining to international and regional political and security cooperation for their possible contribution to regional political and security cooperation; and to

d) promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the UN Conventional Arms Register.
But more importantly the meeting agreed to

"... endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's **Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia**, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation." [See Addendum B]

This is a crucial insight into the workings of the ARF, as endorsement of the principles of the Treaty with which ASEAN was founded implies a commitment by all parties to agree to abide by the guidelines of that document. Thus the **Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia**, signed by ASEAN members in 1976, is the primary underpinning of the ARF and a significant focus for investigation. In essence this treaty commits its signatories to an "...abiding respect for justice and the rule or law ...", to "... peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971", and to the settlement of differences or disputes through "...rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation." [Addendum C]

**International Law and the ARF**

Thus, while it can be claimed that the ARF has no treaty basis or powers of compliance, as it appears to be founded on Statements issued from meetings of ASEAN-PMCs, such statements constitute commitments which allow for reference to previous agreements, as is evidenced by the endorsement of the **Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia** (Amity Treaty). Hence the legal basis of the agreements must be related to the documents from which they stem, including the Amity Treaty. Such treaties and agreements have a degree of justiciable reality through long term existence and prior reference, and thus precedence must be a factor. Compliance is not dependent on enforcement, as States voluntarily make commitments to the process, and compliance can be forthcoming, as an evolutionary flourish
stemming from a realisation of the benefits that flow from compliance, and as an outcome of covert systemic pressure. Thus breaches would be dealt with within the ARF, although a deeper investigation into the conflict resolution mechanisms of the ARF reveals a dependence on the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(l) of the Charter of the United Nations. This offers a proviso that members which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve that dispute by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Insofar as the ARF is committed to maintaining peace and security between States, it is not seen as likely to be able to intervene domestically. In fact concern amongst ASEAN members was expressed at the possible Japanese involvement in the process. The concern was based on entrenched historical fears, particularly with regard to security and "a possible Japanese military role..." [Soeya:94:90] But concerns about China's growing military power and naval adventurism also contributed to the perceived need to develop an institutional framework for security dialogue which would "incorporate China as a valued participant in regional security affairs." [Goldsworthy:97:26] Although China was not eligible to join ASEAN, its inclusion in the ARF, as a Consultative partner, may begin a socialisation process which contributes further to the PRC's pacification. Moreover, the ARF, through endorsement of the Amity Treaty, appears to be adopting a regional commitment to the signatories pledge of pursuing "the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony..." [See Addendum C]

This aspirational element of the Forum's objectives can have an overall influence on comprehensions of cooperation in the region, although such understandings are of a voluntary nature. But could well result in a lessening of fears of members of the ARF of either Japan's or China's military agendas. No doubt judicial interpretations and influence on peremptory norms, both internationally and domestically, within member and participant states, can be influenced by the developing notions of cooperation, as the cross fertilisation of ideas continues.

**Psychopolitical Impact**

The psychopolitical impact on judicial judgements can be brought about as a result of the exchange process, but also because legal training for higher
office often involves processes related to intergovernmental programs. Domestic legal norms come under scrutiny as a result, discourses are modified and the resultant changes alter perceptions of a state's activities, but equally state's will modify their legal attitudes in a bid to gain greater acceptance and influence at regional forums.

**Conventional Theoretical Comprehensions**

**Systems, Hegemons, Regimes and Institutions**

The initiative for the ARF appears to have stemmed from discussion relating to Evans' call, in 1990, for the creation of a collective security body along the lines of the European CSCE, to be dubbed the CSCA, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia. His commitment to a common security approach in the region was first presented in the Australian Senate in 1985. At the time Evans was serving as both Minister for Resources and Energy and Minister Assisting the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He called for the creation of "a stable and secure network of bilateral and multilateral alliance and treaty arrangements." [Scott:99:279] The United States, which enjoyed "clear military dominance and saw no need to engage in multilateral security arrangements" in the region, was opposed to the CSCA. [Scott:99:278] Evans amended his proposal, but was intent on finding support for a regional security dialogue. It was Nakayama's expressed interest, in 1991, and then the later declaration by Bush and Miyazawa in Tokyo, in 1992, which arguably led to the creation of the ARF.

From the perspective of how systemic constraints led to this outcome it can be seen that Evans was both privy to foreign policy discussions in the early 1980s, which were predominantly UN focussed, emanating from Hayden's office, and resource and energy discussions which undoubtedly pointed to the region to the north. It was in Australia's interest to pursue economic advantage in the region and one possible avenue was through the virtuous path of regional cooperation, particularly as any dissension in the region seemed to be related to resource politics.

Evans applied pressure to the system and the system responded through both the regional hegemon, Japan, which eventually expressed interest and the global hegemon, the United States, which gave assent, after having encountered persuasive arguments from both its major allies in the Asia Pacific, Japan and Australia. In 1993, the Clinton Administration had made
clear "its willingness to participate," [Murdoch:23.7.93:5] with Clinton declaring during a trip to Japan and Korea that a "...continued US military presence in the region and new security dialogues were the guiding principle for his vision for the Asia-Pacific region." [Murdoch:23.7.93:14]

The US was concerned to maintain its regional prominence and constraining the ambitions of the regional powers was now "its primary purpose," while Evans was pressing for an eventual "self-sustaining, and self regulating alternative security system..." [Scott:99:283] It seemed that assuaging the hegemon was crucial if the development of the AFR was to proceed. But equally the US needed to heed its major regional allies, as it realised that its traditional bilateralist security approach in the region had been surpassed by regional developments. [Scott:99:285] In fact, the six original ASEAN states saw the Forum as shaping a new order in the region by "fostering cooperative security", while Singapore's Prime Minister Goh could see how the Forum could sort out problems, both present and future, before they triggered armed conflict. [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] Regional countries were also becoming increasingly worried "about the risk of a nuclear arms race in Asia." [Murdoch:22.7.94:11]

However, the US always had the upper hand, as its continued presence in the region was recognised as "...a vitally important stabilising factor." [Soeya:94:93] But there are difficulties associated with this dependence on the US for stability. There may be important economic incentives for reducing that dependence on the US. Or the value oriented issues pushed on the Asian states, and related to universal interests such as democratisation and human rights "...could create a major obstacle to Asian efforts to develop a comprehensive framework" for regional cooperation. Alternatively, the imposition of hegemonic driven reform could hasten "...the process of dissolution of those rigid political and social systems" apparent in some authoritarian states in Asia. [Soeya:94:94]

The realisation of the ARF as an offshoot of ASEAN-PMCs demonstrates how institutions develop within regimes. In this instance the early work on the Amity Treaty, and the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the overarching guidance of the Charter of the United Nations, all set the stage for further extensions of that work. The agreements realised at the ARF enhance interdependence as cooperation is engendered
through consultation and consensus decision making. Transactionalism is fostered, as domestic issues feature unofficially, and states work to resolve disputes that threaten to overflow borders and undermine regional peace and security. Institutions, both physical, in the form of SOMs, (Senior Officer's Meetings) and through 'first track' (official) work programs, and "second track" (non-official) seminars and workshops on regional security issues, and conceptual, with the burgeoning appreciation of the benefits that flow from interstate interaction, and the practice of consensual regional politics, develop as components of an ongoing process of reform.

**Psychopolitical Impact**

While there seems little likelihood that the machinations of the ARF can have a significant impact on domestic constituencies, due to the external orientation of the objectives, which are related to regional concerns, the involvement of leadership cadres from each member state suggests that inflexible and dogmatic stances on policy issues will eventually succumb to modification, and pragmatic comprehensions will be realised as intransigence is abandoned in preference for imperative action. What is at work here is the psychomanipulation of leaders as an outcome of the socialisation process which they encounter when engaged in interstate regional exchange.

**Social Constructivism - Intentions and Influences**

The involvement of states pursuing diverse liberal democratic, socialist or authoritarian domestic political application means that the environment in which the change makers are operating is less than conducive to success, and that any advances to be realised by the ARF will be bargained for extensively. This can mean that outcomes are diminutive and no more than lowest common denominator articulations, which can attract guarded support, rather than overt embrace. However, the nature of the socialisation process suggests that a middle ground between radical reform and conservative entrenchment will be reached, where the pragmatic leaderships of both liberal and conservative states can reach an agreement.

The ARF attempts to create a mood within member constituents of cooperative dialogue with regard to maintaining security, an end to which all participants subscribe. The logic of membership suggests this as it seems
unlikely that a state intent on belligerence would bother to present a facade of cooperation. However, a belligerent could usefully apply to the consensuality of the forum in a bid to air arguments that would not be heard if the forum did not exist. In this sense influence can be brought to bear if the state intent on dissent can gain access to the agenda making process. Again negotiation becomes important here. The persuasive change agent can make it difficult for the Forum to function effectively, or can impress upon members the pertinence of due process, and achieve outcomes through constitutional processes.

While the ARF has been called a "...talking shop" [Dupont:98:abstract], it is symbolic of aspirations that have long been held by ASEAN, as evidenced by the Amity Treaty. The endorsement by all participants of the Amity Treaty, as a component of the ARF, is further evidence that that attachment is still viable. Yet, while the ARF is symbolic of a hope for regional peace it is also a pragmatic application aimed at dispute resolution, and a more transparent practice of regional political, economic and militarily strategic activity.

The pursuit of, what Evans called, Good International Citizenship as a national aspiration can be realised through the ARF and thus participation in the Forum can be in the national interest. National identity may undergo some modification as the result of such a stance but this is not likely to undermine sovereign status, nor lessen perceived power. It may connote acceptance of western ideological commitment, particularly with regard to justice, but as the ARF is ostensibly not concerned with domestic political arenas this can be discounted. In such instances, though, authoritarian states may experience challenges to domestic control if they appear conciliatory.

While treaty makers as change agents must often contend with the domestic constituency, the process which resulted in the formation of the ARF seems singularly focussed at the inter-governmental level, where concerns with electoral or other domestic outcomes are less influential than are attempts at implementing reforms aimed at enhancing interstate activity, and particularly if those reforms are aimed at alleviating tensions between states, or at ensuring that tensions are unlikely. External influences may have a greater impact on how policy is arrived at within the ARF, as pressures can be brought to bear on less cooperative states to shift their programs into reform mode.
In building the ARF, the change agents borrowed from previous ASEAN agreements, and thus utilised precedent, while collective intentionality was manifested once the forum engaged in dialogue. To some extent an acceptance of the societal norms of the regional players, gathered around ASEAN, meant that the collective commitment was extant prior to the exchange. To what extent belief was significant here is arguable, as pragmatic political cooperation may have been the one comprehension shared by all participants, and thus a belief in its efficacy may have been the underpinning which made the negotiations possible.

**Psychopolitical Impact**

Any domestic attitudinal impact of the ARF would be related to the political elite, as the foreign minister was the representative of the state. The political associates, academic advisers, senior bureaucrats and journalists accompanying the foreign minister to ARF meetings would be privy to the necessary toing-and-froing demanded by the practice of diplomacy, and inevitably attitudinal shifts would be required to achieve outcomes, as the ARF is a consensus based decision making forum. But pragmatism rarely undermines the dogmatic nor ideological underpinnings of the participants, and thus attitudinal facades would be presented for the sake of the outcome and to preserve the institution. This suggests that norms were safe, perceptions maintained and the discourse fluid but consistent, although constrained by the founding documents of the ARF and by the dominant powers present at the discussion table.

**Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and the Treaty**

A challenge to the notion of maintaining the status quo exists though, with an understanding that there are substantial issues to be discussed between all participants at the ARF, and that these issues will be raised. There is a perception of the ARF serving as a talkfest, but it is exactly that function, where multiperspectival discourses underpin the various debates encountered by the members, which gives the Forum its salience. Norms will be challenged, particularly with regard to the means of conflict resolution, where the ARF can be used to avoid conflictual situations, or at least to "...move quickly to try to settle disputes." [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] Extant norms will play a role here as the defining characteristics of the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia do provide guidelines for behaviour. It is also suggested that officials will see the forum "...as having close links with the United Nations" [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] and this comprehension will further enhance the burgeoning cooperative nature of regional exchange. Undoubtedly state representatives will attempt to change the underlying interpretations of guidelines and the norm entrepreneurs will be active, enhancing existing measures aimed at cooperation, or defending extant measures aimed at protecting sovereignty.

In a similar manner perception mechanics are a crucial component of the exchanges engaged in within international institutions. States perceived as belligerent will be persuaded by the society of states, constituted by the membership grouping of the ARF, of the benefits of adherence to societal norms. But negotiation is also about gaining advantage and states will strive to present themselves in a positive light, while pursuing their less than altruistic national interest. Again the limiting factors to self-interested activities for the ARF participants are the Amity Treaty and the UN guidelines on conflict resolution.

The recognition of those founding documents must influence the participants in the ARF and have an impact on attitude. That is an outcome of the socialisation process, which all participants encounter by being involved in institutional, and thus constitutional, exchange. While attitudinal shifts within the rarefied atmosphere of regional exchange at the institutional level is likely, it is questionable that the business of the ARF will have any domestic impact, within any constituent state. Security issues are the affair of the externally oriented departments of foreign affairs and defence, and traditionally beyond the concern of any but the most diligent domestic constituents.

The ARF met with a similar fate if the reportage in Australian newspapers around the time of the inauguration of the forum is indicative of domestic interest. In fact while the ARF was primarily focussed externally it was introduced at a time when a series of governments pursuing regional enmeshment had been in office for just over a decade. Attitudes had been moulded during that time, and this message was likely to be received positively by a constituency well used to the discourse. Interestingly claims to having an instigatory role in the formation of the ARF, as well evidenced by reportage on Evans involvement in that process, have a psychopolitical
base, as there is a greater likelihood of domestic acceptance of an externally focussed and generated agreement if the domestic constituency is assured that its representatives had influence in its realisation, and that their activity was in the national interest. The onus lies with the leadership to ensure that such assurance is forthcoming.

Cultural Change and Leadership

Members of ministerial entourages appear to be the only participants in ARF activity, hence those actors are the only ones likely to need to contend with cultural change. Those actors are consistently subjected to nuanced exchanges based on cultural predilections, which not only challenges their own cognitive frameworks, but through a socialising process modify their frames of reference. This can trickle down into society but is unlikely too, due to the entourage being assembled around the foreign minister, who is often invisible to the domestic constituency.

Also the nature of the ARF activity is aimed at the external arena. Widespread constituent support in not necessary for the institution to achieve successes. This is essentially because the ARF is aimed at cooperative security, which is in the interest of liberal democracies, where the domestic constituency is ideologically committed to peace and security. Authoritarian states, on the other hand, participating at ARF meetings have no need to refer to their domestic constituencies, because of the nature of their domestic political structures. This latter situation could be challenged, however, if adequate reportage of the outcomes of ARF deliberations were to filter through to that population. This is not only a possibility, but a consideration which those states must have countenanced before deciding to participate in the Forum, and thus it must be accepted that the risk of domestic change is possible and even probable. However, in both instances, with liberal democratic constituencies amenable to the discourse, and populations of authoritarian states either not privy to them or accepting of any positive advancement as an outcome of such talks, there is little or no need for persuasion to be utilised.

Again this can be challenged, if and when the judgement and prognostications of the ARF work against the interests of a state and its population. At those times, however, it would be most likely that the disgruntled states would seriously consider abandoning the talks, but again
once the state is locked into negotiation the maintenance of positive perceptions may be deemed vital, and there may be a reluctance to move to a position of "rogue" state. At that point the domestic constituency may need to be convinced that the collective judgement of the ARF was in the interests of that domestic population. Again if the primary motivating force of all ARF participants is peace and security then this likelihood may only be encountered by belligerent states, which have little need to consult the domestic constituency, let alone convince the need for change.

Thus with regard to the ARF there seems little need to delve into the means of achieving attitudinal change within the domestic constituency. But by accepting the notion that regional enmeshment was a well established discourse within the Australian polity, the acceptance that attitudinal change had occurred in the past must be recognised. In fact, as a result of the Guam Doctrine of 1969, whereby the United States, through President Nixon, effectively shifted the onus for regional security in the Asia Pacific onto regional states, Australian governments had been pursuing a form of self-reliance in security, on a bipartisan basis. Having said that, the onus was still on the leadership of the Keating Government, and particularly Evans as Foreign Minister, and to a lesser extent, Keating as Prime Minister, to assure the public their interests were being taken care of with Australia's involvement in the ARF.

The leadership task was not a momentous one, but it required a conciliatory approach and a tactful explication to an Australia constituency long suspicious of Asia. Keating's forays into the region in pursuit of APEC, which had been preceded by representatives of the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke ministries, had softened domestic attitudes to pragmatic arrangements with regional states. Things economic or strategic were considered legitimate, although cultural exchange was still a troubled area, and this may have stemmed from domestic comprehensions of historic Australia-Asia migratory patterns.

It was said that Evans achieved "...a remarkable standing in the region" for his work on the ARF. Thailand's then foreign minister, Prasong Soonsirir, following the inauguration of the forum, stated that "(i)f credit for a single individual's contribution to the ARF could be given, the honour would have to go to my good friend, Senator Gareth Evans..." [Sheridan:30.7.94.] In domestic reportage little comment was made on the ARF, or on Evans
involvement in its realisation. This either suggests that the publishers considered the Forum of little relevance domestically, or that the reports were diverted to more specialist publications.

Further Psychopolitical Components and Treaties

Bearing these thoughts in mind a brief assessment of the relevance of the further groupings of questions developed as the polyphonic analytical model will support the conclusion that the ARF is of limited interest to the domestic constituency, while it continues to be of limited significance.

In this sense the change agents are unlikely to have to deal with a recalcitrant constituency, and will not need to contend with possible psychopolitical challenges. Attitudinal barriers will not be encountered, ideological obstructions are not encountered as the change engendered by the implementation of ARF processes is unlikely to impact domestically, although if, as a result of an ARF adjudication, Australia became involved in a regional imbroglio this situation could change rapidly, as dominant narrative structures were challenged by a call to arms in defence of a regional entity not considered worthy of support by the domestic constituency, particularly if rituals of differentiation were triggered by such a request. Failure on the part of the constituency to identify with the issue or the actors involved in that issue could lead to further rejection, and cognitive dissonance could become a reality, with the resultant possibility that the ARF could be abandoned by an electorate which had not considered it relevant before it challenged the dominant attitudinal constructs. To avoid such a situation the adept leader would ensure a proper interpretation of the demands expected to be met by the constituency as a result of the ARF adjudication.

To guarantee that that interpretation was received by the constituency at large a form of political communication best suited to the urgency of the situation would need to be employed. It would be vital for the leadership to assure the constituency that any activities occurring externally in which Australia was involved were in the national interest and unlikely to have any domestic impact. The point about tactics being used to ensure a strategy of political communication is successful is brought into full force in an instance such as this, where the form of persuasion must generate timely

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1 An hypothetical possibility with low probability if the record of the ARF is any indication.
outcomes. If the demand is for symbolic interaction the pressure is on cerebral elements of the constituency, that may be realised as favourable thoughts. Whereas if there are demands for a physical application, the appeal must satisfy deeper requirements. The leader may need to take a more frank approach conveying a message directly, through message repetition, or by engaging the constituency in shared deliberations. The effects of how the leaders perform when communicating politically will determine the outcome of their appeal, but also give saliency to the institution, in this instance the ARF, and the task it is expected to perform.

Thus the role of the leader is crucial in convincing the constituency of the saliency of any change that can be brought about by externally generated pressure. While regional security persists the ARF offers little challenge to the domestic constituency, but once it offers a threat to stability it may come under intense review.

**The Efficacy of the ARF Founding Documents**

When evaluating the effectiveness of the documents which created the ARF we need to look to the ARF itself. To look at the impact of the treaty beyond the text. The ARF must be seen as a symbolic construction of significant importance to the region, and to all the actors involved. The fact that it is attended by all major global powers, including the US, Japan, Russia, Germany and the UK as European participants and China, gives it great credibility as a potential broker of security cooperation. However to continue to be of relevance it must be flexible enough to respond to the changing demands of a global community in transformation.

The risk is that the ARF will become a creature of habit, and simply a facade of interdependence where the annual attendance at meetings by foreign ministers, where obeisance and deference to overdiscussed possibilities will become the way of business. This is possible if the cognitive framework, built through the experiences of participants at meetings, where a comfortable position is realised and there is a reluctance to depart from that comfort zone, leads to ennui and a conservative maintenance of the status quo. On the other hand, the ARF could become a practical broker of regional cooperation, well able to resolve differences through negotiation. Its weakness may well be its dependence on the UN Charter as a last point of conflict resolution, thus creating a tendency to allow negotiations to go
through the gamut of ARF processes unsuccessfully, knowing that as a last resort the UN can intervene. This may mean the ARF never realises it potential as a regional tool of foreign policy.

In the end, the ASEAN Regional Forum is defined by the treaties on which it is built. It is thus a constitutionalist construction, privy to interpretation, and psychopolitical manipulation, and to be effective, it must be defined in a manner which satisfies the needs of the actors with which it is enmeshed, while ensuring that the interpretation of its outcomes guarantees its success.
Chapter Eleven

The Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security
In 1995, then Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, prior to signing the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, said it was "a major strategic development for Australia and for the region... providing for Australia's future and creating greater certainty about that future." [Stewart:15.12.95:1] President Suharto of Indonesia was quoted as saying that "both countries want to contribute to peace and security in the region, helping achieve economic development and prosperity." [Walters:15.12.95:4]

This chapter will examine the origin, role, purpose and efficacy, of the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), which is essentially a formal treaty, and hence a summary of the signatories objectives is well articulated and readily accessible. As with the preceding investigation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the polyphonic analytical model will be utilised to examine the AMS as a tool of foreign policy, and hence reference will be made to a series of questions based on the previous theoretical discussions but the presentation will take the form of a narrative. A final judgement will be made concerning each facet of the investigation before a definitive and conclusive statement is made concerning the hypothesis that to achieve success as tools of foreign policy treaties must be constructed and construed so as to satisfy the psychopolitical necessities of all key actors, external and domestic.

Origin, Role and Purpose of the AMS.

In 1988, during his first year as Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans met with Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister, and agreed to work at improving the relationship between the neighbouring powers. They reinstituted annual talks between senior officials, established an Australia-Indonesia Institute and in 1989 signed the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty, which was "...an agreement to jointly exploit oil and gas under the Timor Sea." [Scott:99:252] By 1990 Canberra and Jakarta were working on a Joint Declaration of Principles, but this was dropped in 1991 after the Dili Massacre in East Timor. However, the 1993 Strategic Review elevated defence cooperation with Indonesia to primacy in Australia's strategic outlook and Keating raised the idea of a full security treaty with Suharto at
the Australia Today promotions in Jakarta, in 1994. [Sheridan:15.12.95:1]
Keating and Suharto has worked closely on the APEC presentation at Bogor
in 1994, and Evans recalled that Keating's relationship with Suharto was
"...both imaginative and deferential simultaneously." [Scott:99:254]

Keating's arguments, in support of the Agreement, which he put to Suharto
in Jakarta, in 1994, were that Australia and Indonesia had no territorial
designs on each other; that neither of the communities of each country
clearly understood this; that with the end of the Cold War common interests
in defence and security were becoming clearer; and that multilateral
initiatives like APEC and the ARF needed to be supported bilaterally.
with Suharto and it was confirmed that a proposed security treaty between
Australia and Indonesia "...would be ready to sign before Christmas." 
[Gordon:96:317]

On the 18th December 1995 Evans and Alatas signed the AMS, in the
presence of Keating and Suharto. Devised as a means of bilateral
cooperation to maintain mutual security, at the time of its signing the AMS
was variously described, in Australia, as "...a treaty designed at the level of
grand strategy...the stuff of history..."[Sheridan:16.12.95:21]; and '...a
declaration of trust that would signal even closer defence ties and more
economic cooperation...' [Keating in Gordon:19.12.95:1]; while then
Opposition leader Howard called the signing "...a sensible move. Indonesia
is Australia's closest northern neighbour and the Coalition supports the
continued development of the relationship in a way which reflects its
importance to both countries." [Stewart:15.12.95:1] East Timorese resistance
leader Ramos-Horta was more critical, stating that "(w)hen you have a
dictatorship and a democratic country with very different legal systems -one
almost non-existent in Indonesia because the army is a law unto themselves
-to sign such a treaty is like a treaty between God and the devil." 
[Stewart:15.12.95:1]

According to Bhakti, an Indonesian commentator, by signing the AMS,
Indonesia became indirectly connected with a pattern of treaties that
Australia has established with its neighbours and other external powers.
These agreements included the 1971 FPDA, a pact between Australia, New
Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK; the 1987 Joint Declaration of
Principles between Australia and Papua New Guinea; and the 1951 ANZUS
Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This meant "...that Indonesia...(had)... not only indirectly become part of Western alliances, but also...(had)... a part in Australia's new forward defence strategy." [Anwar:98:510]

Sheridan commented on how the AMS was the first reciprocal security treaty Australia had ever signed with an Asian nation, the first mutual security treaty Indonesia had signed with anyone, and the first security treaty Australia had signed with a state whose troops had been in direct physical contact with Australian troops, during the 1960s. [Sheridan:16.12.95:21] He called the treaty a "powerful symbolic moment in Australian history ...(with)... the Keating Government telling the Australian people, and others, the truth about where our long term national interests lie." [Sheridan:15.12.95:5] Shadow Foreign Minister Downer thought the AMS an excellent initiative, in principle, and one "symbolically important because it underlines the value of the bilateral relationship...(and provided)...a framework to develop the security dialogue." [Hartcher:96:26] While there was bipartisan support in the Australian Parliament, the concern with the secrecy under which the Agreement was negotiated and the East Timor problem would offer impediments to the AMS gaining the support of the Australian constituency. How those impediments impacted on the domestic constituency are revealed in the following insights gleaned from an application of the polyphonic analytical model.

**International Law and the AMS**

The Agreement had three main clauses relating firstly, to regular consultations between Ministers about common security; secondly, to the provision for specific consultations in the case of adverse challenges to either party or their security interests; and finally to the promotion of "...cooperative activities in the security field." But the Agreement was "intentionally vague on what action might follow consultation on security challenges..." and was significant "...as much in its implications as in its operative clauses." For Viviani, it implied the completion of the web of Australian security treaties in the region, and it entrenched the relationship between the two states. [Viviani:97:155] However, it did not appear to have relevance in the field of International Law.
The AMS noted that "nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the existing international commitments of either party", suggesting that this treaty would not have precedence over previous commitments. But it also reaffirmed that international disputes would be settled by peaceful means "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law." [Addendum A] As with the ARF, the AMS was premised on UN resolution procedures. Thus the Legal basis of the treaty was not in doubt. It was a justiciable document, and its provision for consultation on security breaches and to consider measures which might be taken to resolve a conflict, allowed for an enforcibility of such measures through the UN. As for breachability, although there was no clause built into the agreement with which to identify a breach, with a reading of the preamble it was not difficult to construe the possibility that a perception of a loss of respect for sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity could offer possible avenues for either party to retract their assent to the agreement.

The likelihood of the AMS having any impact on domestic law seemed negligible, except in the instance of either state calling on the other to provide troops, as this would require special legislation to either finance such an operation or if either government was reluctant to make such a commitment, could provide a legislative escape route. The aspirational elements of the Agreement, such as promoting a dialogue on cooperative security, seemed less to do with affecting international law, and more with a focus on symbolic impacts. Keating wanted a simple and straightforward agreement, as it was "the commitment that mattered." [Keating:00:140] The fact that the agreement was couched in "intentionally vague" terms, suggests that it was written with reaching assent in mind, and thus its provisions needed to be very general. Howard was concerned with the term "adverse challenges" and saw that the term external challenges would have been more pertinent, and a safer option. He reportedly expressed concern that this wording "left open the risk of Australia being placed under pressure to become involved in Indonesia's internal matters." [Stewart:15.12.95:1] Shadow Foreign Minister Downer saw the wording as leading to a situation where "...one party interprets the treaty to mean internal rather than merely external challenges." [Greenlees:15.12.95:4] His argument may have been premised on the possibility that Australian could be asked to intervene, on behalf of Indonesia, in domestic conflicts within Indonesia. Equally, it also implied that Australia could be asked to ignore untoward activities in East Timor, and other troublespots in Indonesia.
Psychopolitical Impact

From an international law viewpoint both Australia and Indonesia had been summoned by the International Court of Justice due to a rift with Portugal over sovereign rights in the Timor Gap. [ICJ:95:] Hence for Portugal, the AMS was probably less than a surprise. The real surprise may have been felt most significantly within Australia, but the agreement did not appear to envisage any radical changes to international law.

Conventional Theoretical Comprehensions
Systems, Hegemons, Regimes and Institutions

In essence the AMS was a key component of a security web that Australia had been building in the region. The Labor Government, under Hawke, had made a commitment to regional cooperation, with Evans committed to working 'with' the region rather than 'against' it. This may have also been the result of the move towards greater self reliance in defence that Australia was obliged to engage in as a result of the Guam Doctrine of 1969, with which US President Nixon had effectively passed the responsibility for regional military security to regional states. Admittedly it had taken some time for Australia to begin to cope with the demands of that responsibility, and one avenue was through regional military cooperation.

While there appeared to be little pressure on Australia and Indonesia reaching such an agreement it was actually seen as a way of reducing Australia's "previous strategic dependence on the United States, although it...(did)...not invalidate nor compromise Australia's extant security obligations." [DuPont:96:53] Thus the AMS was a way of reducing pressure by sharing it on a wider front. This could be tied into the Guam Doctrine once again, and interpreted as hegemonic influence, if not overt pressure. Another possible motive was an anticipation of changes in the political climate resulting from the effects of economic globalisation. In fact, China had claimed sovereignty over an area of the South China Sea, which included a gas field off Indonesia's Natuna Island that Jakarta was developing with "US and Japanese energy companies". [Richardson:19,12,95:2]

Analysts had reportedly said that the AMS "...reflected a growing determination by countries in South-East Asia and the South West Pacific to
maintain stability in the region and lays the basis for a strategic counterweight to any attempt by China or any other outside power to interfere in regional affairs." [Richardson:19.12.95:2] However, it may be related also to the Labor penchant for regionalism, as opposed to Conservative governments apparent historical maintenance and entrenchment of the US alliance. The standoff between Indonesia and Australia over East Timor had been long standing and the AMS gave hope that quiet diplomacy could be brought to bear to influence a change in Indonesia's attitude to that troubled province. In this sense the treaty was an outcome of systemic pressure, that had emanated from the US, and its reduced commitment as a security guarantor in the region, but which had been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War.

In the context of wider strategic commitments in the region, and with the development of the ARF, the AMS enhanced the universal interest in peace and security in the region. For many Australians "Indonesia has long been regarded ...as the source of the most likely threat to Australian security." [DuPont:96:53] Thus the AMS had the potential to alleviate the tensions between Australia and Indonesia, by eliminating uncertainty. The existence of several institutional settings relating to Australian Indonesian security concerns, both military and economic, meant that the AMS was a further component of that institutionalised cooperation, which included both APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. In context, the AMS was one of a group of bilateral arrangements, realised in the region to Australia's north, which included the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Program, (1992), the Joint Australia-Singapore Coordinating Group (1992), the Australian-Indonesia Defence Policy Committee (1994) and the Australian Indonesian Defence Coordinating Committee (1994) [Horner:97:86], The Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership of May 1995, which "...committed the two countries to advancing their security dialogue..." [Rix:97:148] and The Australia-Singapore Joint Declaration 1996.

In this regard the above mentioned bilateral arrangements have contributed to the development of institutions and institutional exchange, with the promise of greater transparency in defence relations, and the possibility of reduced or negligible tensions. However, the longstanding concern of Australians about Indonesia's involvement in East Timor continued to be a "...thorn in the side of...successive Australian governments." [Kent:97:172] In this sense, Keating saw that "the treaty enhanced Australia's capacity to
make a positive contribution on issues like East Timor", while Alatas said that "Indonesian-Australian relations are not only based on the question of East Timor and neither should we allow it to be." [Gordon:19.12.95:2] Alatas' comment could well be read as a refutation of Keating's affirmation, or allow for the wider comprehension that stemmed from stability for economic pursuits.

**Social Constructivism - Intentions and Influences**

Realised in an environment of elite cordiality based on the relationship between Keating and Suharto, which undoubtedly stemmed from their cooperation on bringing together Heads of Government at APEC meetings, and possibly as a result of Whitlam's earlier friendship with Suharto, the AMS appears to have been reached with mutual interest. The Agreement's symbolic importance was that it sent a direct and unambiguous signal to the region that Australia accepted that its well being as a nation would "ultimately depend on its own ability to build constructive relations with its neighbours." [DuPont:96:52] It was a pragmatic agreement based on an understanding that regional cooperation would strengthen both parties' place in the world, but it also made it less likely that Indonesia would present a security threat to Australia. [DuPont:96:53] Nothing in the agreement threatened national identity from an Australian perspective, but the tacit affirmation that East Timor was *de jure* part of Indonesia, accepted by Australian governments, but not Australian public opinion, would fuel the notion that Keating had chosen to continue to disregard the totalitarian nature of the Suharto regime, and this could be seen as 'kowtowing' to a dictator to ensure Australian security, but at the expense of the East Timorese.

Domestically, in Australia, the Agreement was met with surprise, which came from the secrecy with which it had been negotiated, but also because it breached the rules of western liberalism, in that it could be perceived that Australia had "...sacrificed its commitment to liberal values, democracy and human rights on the altar of realpolitik." [DuPont:96:55] In fact, proponents of western liberal values, the 'anti-Indonesia lobby', were influential in raising suspicions about both Keating's and Suharto's motives, which could have seen the AMS foundering "...on the shoals of public opinion." [DuPont:96:60] This may have been avoided if future Australian governments worked to encourage the domestic constituency to view Indonesia in a more positive light. In the final analysis it would have to be
realised that Keating and Suharto were acting out of the belief that their actions may be of some mutual interest to Australia and Indonesia. The precedent of the Timor Gap Treaty was an indicator of how the relationship could proceed amicably, but there were significant hurdles to overcome within Australia. Not the least of which was the perception, amongst the Australian constituency that Indonesia was a country, in many respects, "...alien to the Australian consciousness." [Brown:99:103]

**Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and the AMS**

If norms play a part in this process, particularly domestically, it may be in the sense that Australian values have gradually been eroding with regard to human rights. Pragmatism, especially of an economic nature, had seen a previously entrenched stance on fair play undermined, in pursuit of other objectives. The commercialised vision of the national interest overrode the care and concern for fellow human beings, and human rights became the poor cousin of economic progress. Ironically, disregard for human rights can work against economic well-being, when dealings with sophisticated states are undermined by negative perceptions. Portugal's soured relations with Australia over East Timor could well have influenced other European states.

Domestically, the Australian peoples' concern with living standards and self interested regard, could result in tacit consent for the government's programs of economic and security reforms. Such was the discourse of the mid nineties in Australia, where securing a place in the region was considered of paramount importance for the future well being of the Australian people. A hard game where self interest was weighed up against altruistic commitment and the former appeared victorious. Suharto's comment on the AMS about economic development and prosperity reinforces a possible mutual comprehension of the role of the AMS. Thus the attitudes of the Australian people and the Indonesian ruling elite were not at odds on economics, but the Australian constituency could afford to consider moral obligations, a luxury the Indonesian leadership believed it could not afford if stability was to be maintained. [Woolcott:16.12.95:4] This was the point of dissension between the two political camps in Australia, the pro Jakarta lobby and the pro East Timor lobby.
For the Australian public to fully accept the outcomes of the AMS it would need to "quickly come to terms with seeing Indonesia as a permanent ally." [Viviani:97:156] This would mean overlooking the past indiscretions of the Indonesian military. This was particularly the case in East Timor, where mass murders like the Dili massacre of 1991, and the accumulated killings by the Indonesian military of an estimated 100,000 of the East Timorese population over a 25 year period, were well evidenced. This was further exacerbated by the 'never to be forgiven' slaying of five Australian journalists at Balibo, by Indonesian forces during the 1975 invasion. [Kent :97:172] The resultant attitudes of Australians towards Indonesia seemed insurmountable odds to overcome.

Widespread constituent support was vital for Keating's agreement to be wholeheartedly accepted by the Australian constituency. Significant attitudinal shifts were required to the extent that Australians needed to realise that Indonesia has broad defensive interests similar to Australia. Significant changes were necessary within Australian culture if such a magnanimous acceptance was to be forthcoming. Coupled with this was the fact that officially the Indonesian population was almost completely Muslim. The East Timorese population, on the other hand, were to a great extent Catholic. The division between cultures, both within Indonesia and with Australia, presented a major obstacle, based on perceptions, inflexible attitudes, and deeply held beliefs in the deviousness of the other. This could well have been Keating's objective, to break down the walls built on unsubstantiated assumptions. He needed to approach the Australian constituency in a persuasive and inclusive manner and to encourage their support in building bridges between two vital cultures, especially given the moderate nature of Islam, as practised in Indonesia. Instead he conducted the negotiation of the Agreement in secret. The Australian Democrat's foreign affairs spokeswoman, Senator Bourne, criticised the moves to formalise and promote security cooperation with Indonesia, claiming the government had presented the treaty as a fait accompli without any debate in Parliament or consultation with other parties. And that the Opposition was told "...after the Americans and just before the public announcement." [Greenlees:15.12.95:4]
Australian reportage of Keating's involvement in the realisation of the treaty was described as "...a foreign policy coup that enhances his leadership credentials...(and)...a demonstration of Keating's willingness to spend domestic capital in order to gain it..." [Gordon:16.12.95:21]; and "a major strategic and diplomatic coup...which could see either nation defending the other against attack." [Stewart:15.12.95:1] Both these comments exemplify Keating's ability to function as a statesman in the regional arena, but say little about his ability to convince a domestic constituency that it was in their interest to alter their attitude to a neighbouring state and to welcome the new arrangement which makes them allies, and possibly friends.

The criticism that was forthcoming was harsh, with Sister O'Connor, whose Order of St Joseph had offered sanctuary to East Timorese, saying Australia didn't have "...any backbone when it comes to dealing with Indonesia. It is a matter of kowtowing to them."[Ellicott:15.12.95:4] Former deputy secretary of defence Alan Wrigley asked, "why do we have to invest - and risk so much - in strengthening bonds with a military system overwhelmingly dedicated to checking the emergence of the free expression and diversity of opinion which we ourselves value above all else?" [Wrigley:15.12.95:5] These were major criticisms of leadership where Keating acted as the aggressive leader intent on shocking Australians into action, rather than the conciliative leader who could inspire acceptance of change. Thus he met with significant psychopolitical challenges from a recalcitrant constituency, which may have contributed to his eventual loss at the polls, at the hands of a conservative leader who reassured the electorate that their attitudes on change were correct.

**Psychopolitical Challenges for Change**

Although the Howard Opposition had called the treaty a 'sensible move' on the Friday before the signing, Howard had also suggested that it was time for Suharto to visit Australia, stating that it was "...a great pity he hasn't felt able to visit this country in 20 years. I think any relationship must be of a strong sense of mutual self and it would in my view bring further balance to the relationship if he were able to visit this country." Howard then went on to criticise the ambiguity of the phrase "adverse challenges", in the treaty, which Evans read as "external'. When asked if Australia would commit troops to defend Indonesia if they were requested Howard said "...the
government of the day would have to assess any request for troops on its merits." [Ceresa:16.12.95:4]

Counter arguments to the Agreement presented in Australia stemmed from three sources. Firstly, from those who believed that bilateralism would undermine regional cooperation and could antagonise China. [Lowry:96:14] In fact, while it was feared that the AMS could raise suspicions in Beijing that Australia was building an anti-Chinese coalition "aimed at denying China its rightful influence in the region", China seemed to accept that the Agreement did not target a particular state. However, in 1994, Keating had commented on "...a natural symmetry of interests between Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia in resisting any attempt by China to establish hegemony in Southeast Asia, or to become part of the Chinese orbit." [DuPont:96:55] Secondly, from those who objected to Australia signing such an agreement with an authoritarian regime governing Indonesia, and finally, from those who objected to the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of the treaty making process. [Lowry:96:14]

Not only did Keating meet with attitudinal obstructions, but he came up against several other impediments to success. Ideological obstructions, in the form of opposition to undermining the allegiance that Australia showed to its western allies, were made obvious in comments made by Duncan Campbell, a former diplomat and deputy secretary of DFAT, questioning whether Australia had ""...sought any clarification of the status of US commitment under ANZUS..." [Campbell:16.12.95:4] in light of the new arrangements with Indonesia.

Narrative structures, on which the "bad news" about Indonesia was premised, were indicated by Campbell, who said that pressure tactics from lobbies on human rights and independence had "...not protected or promoted a single human rights cause or dented Indonesian consumer resistance to morals made in Australia", implying that the AMS would meet with dissent as long as that pressure was maintained in Australia, and that the government must provide leadership to ensure recognition of "values in the region other than...(their)...own." [Campbell:15.12.95:5]

The lack of identification with the neighbours of a different cultural heritage was implied in a report in Kompas, an Indonesian daily newspaper, which suggested that prior to the Agreement "...relations between the two
countries was coloured by suspicion and other points of disagreement..." [Walters:18.12.95:2], while National Party leader, Tim Fischer, commenting on the "rushed signing" of the Agreement, suggested it should have been tabled in Parliament and allowed to lie for a month, because "some people could become suspicious of what they saw as secret deliberations between the Australian Government and governments in Asia." [Taylor::18.12.95:1] This was a cautious but overt criticism of the Keating Government's regional enmeshment program, and an indication of the conservative attitude of members of the Australian constituency.

The lack of message receptivity, where Keating seemed to fail as a communicator, is best summed up by political journalist Michael Gordon, who said that, in the end, Australians "...stopped listening to Keating...", but Keating blamed the media for making the communications task so difficult, contending that the "...media was sick to death of the Labor Government..." [Gordon:96:348] Keating called the criticism that he concentrated on the big picture at the expense of the people's interests nonsense, arguing that while there was a perception that his government was out of touch, "...perceptions in the modern world depend largely on the channels of communication, and if they are closed off it is extremely hard to change perceptions." [Gordon:96:349]

Finally, cognitive dissonance, was engendered by the parliamentarians and other critics, who identified faults with the treaty almost at its launch. Once the constituency was encouraged to go on the defensive, as it was revealed that their dominant attitudes were being subverted, Keating's program was under threat.

**Persuasion, Propaganda, Indoctrination**

While, on a state to state level, the AMS may have appeared to "be a major step in the diplomacy of reassurance", the lack of debate within Australia and thus the lack of support from the Australian domestic constituency, "...undermines its capacity to build the trust that the government has declared on Australia's behalf." [Smith:96:161] Keating had suggested that the AMS was about a declaration of trust between himself and Suharto "...which then goes beyond the official family into our communities", but Lowry warned that the Australian society's views of the Indonesian government "are unlikely to be changed by government-to-government
agreements, which have the taint of political expediency and do not address the underlying causes of Australian perceptions." However, the counter argument posits that government-to-government relations are vital before those tensions can be addressed, and that "higher level concerns relating to long-term national security demand that societal concerns be subordinated to more important 'national interests'." [Lowry:96:30] This was well illustrated by Keating's remarks with regard to finalising the AMS without prior public discussion, when he reportedly suggested that "if there had been a more public process, there probably wouldn't have been a treaty." [Smith.H:97:17-18] In fact it emerged that the negotiations for the treaty had been directed from the Prime Minister's office, to the exclusion of other departments, including Foreign Affairs. [Trood:97:48]

It was obvious that Keating did not employ any persuasion techniques, he was not committed to an indoctrination process, nor did he utilise propaganda. It would have to be said that he was totally unprepared to deal with any objections to the AMS, although the fact that he bypassed public debate ostensibly to ensure that the Agreement was signed, and that he did so within a short time of going to election, suggests that he doubted that the treaty would ever have been realised if he did not go through with it. In fact, Keating was concerned that a new Government, under Howard, would never be able to realise such an agreement, stating that "the Coalition would never have got it, and I wanted Australia to have it." [Gordon:96:317]

In essence the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security was a mutual security agreement, a bilateral arrangement reached between two neighbouring states with a history of suspicion, misperception and misunderstanding. With totally disparate and divergent religious and cultural evolutions neither nation was at ease, although the perceived differences had been appropriated as symbols of nationalism, and thus apportioned greater political than cultural significance.

The opposition, in Australia, to Keating’s realisation of a security agreement with Indonesia, at the end of 1995, was ostensibly based on what was considered to be an inappropriate process of negotiation, whereby the Australian community was not privy to or asked to legitimise any outcomes. According to convention, once Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas had signed the Australia Indonesia Security Agreement 1995, a bilateral treaty, the agreement came into force. The signing followed prolonged but secret
negotiations. Keating and Evans were well aware of parliamentary criticisms of the way the Labor Government had been making treaties and yet Keating pursued this line of communication. He explained that his approach followed the proper processes of the Westminster system, whereby the negotiation of a treaty was conducted by the executive, after which the treaty becomes subject to public debate in the process of consideration and ratification by Parliament. [Keating:00:148]

What must be gleaned from this fact is that Keating was committed more to realising an agreement between Australia and Indonesia than he was concerned with domestic political processes. Why was this so? Alternatively the question can be put, why were the critics of Keating’s approach to treaty making more concerned with the process than with the outcome?

In the long run Keating appeared to be pursuing a grand and visionary plan that moved Australia on from its secure and certain attachments to its age old alignment with Europe and the USA, to a less certain but adventurous excursion into Asia. A journey that could realise a bigger and brighter future for a small trading nation located in the centre of vast region that includes nations of the west South American and west North American coastlines, the East African continent, the Southern states of the Middle East and the Far East or South East Asia, and the Asian nations on the Pacific rim. There is a vast potential for Australia to be ally and partner of any or all these nations in the 21st and inevitably 22nd century. But to advance that cause Australia needed to extend its reach and to break new ground. Keating began that process. His cause was to suffer admonition and condemnation. Was this due to conservative objections raised within alliance structures, fear of uncertainty and the fears generated by change brought on by a reformist agenda, or the small mindedness that Keating saw as a possible impedance to realising the Indonesian agreement if the Australian public, and for that matter, the Australian Parliament had been privy to the negotiations?

Thus the questions that must be put, and which could be answered in the affirmative, if the psychopolitical considerations demanded by this thesis were utilised, are several fold. Was this a hard headed but factual analysis by an astute prime minister?, the thinking of an arrogant man who couldn’t see beyond his own imagination?, or the wisdom of a visionary leader, who had realised that attitudinal change was invariably a long time coming, and thus, while ensuring a peace between Australia and Indonesia may have
been a dream, the signing of the AMS was the beginning of that project, no matter how long the Agreement was to last, for the precedent had been set and change was ineluctable?
Chapter Twelve

Conclusion

Diagnosis of Treaties as Tools of Foreign Policy and of the Polyphonic Analytical Model

Prognosis of Keating's Legacy

Section Five offers a series of insights into how treaties are used as tools of foreign policy, but also of how treaties are used as tools of domestic policy. The fine line between domestic and external policy features throughout. In this final and concluding chapter the two strands of investigation are brought to a close. The general discussion about treaties as tools of foreign policy, which has followed an essentially theoretical track, reaches closure with an analysis of the validity of the polyphonic analytical model as a set of guidelines with which to assess treaties in general. The particularist discussion of elements of Keating's Vision for Australia, as presented in the case studies, is assessed for its likely legacy.
Chapter Twelve A

Diagnosis of Treaties As Tools Of Foreign Policy and of the Polyphonic Analytical Model.

Throughout this thesis the discussion regarding treaties as tools of foreign policy has evolved, both explicitly, through nuanced argument, and implicitly, by inferring or predicting possible comprehensions of insights or application of processes. Each theoretical insight encountered during the synthesis, which led to the development of the polyphonic analytical model, has illuminated tactics and strategies which can be employed by change agents, as well as obstacles with which they might contend. The conclusion that there is an interdependency between foreign policy and domestic policy is well substantiated here, but so too is the notion that in some instances foreign policy has little impact in the domestic political arena. But the discussion also reveals how treaties can be employed as tools of foreign policy, with either external or domestic objectives, or with an impact which will span both realms of policy activity.

The application of the polyphonic analytical model to elements of the Keating Treaty Package in the case studies supports this statement. In essence, the model can best be described as a very general application which is useful for a full interrogation of a treaty or agreement which has both external and domestic implications, as would pertain with APEC. Equally it can be used partially to uncover external pertinence of a treaty, whereby psychopolitical underpinnings come to bear when systemic constraint leads to interstate activity, and when leaders are moved to enter into arrangement which seemed outside the purview of national interest, as occurred with the realisation of the ARF. Again, the model can be applied to a treaty which may have been realised externally, but which has a predominantly domestic impact, although its implementation would occur in an external domestic situation, as implied by the AMS, which would see the need for Australia to place its trust in Indonesia.

A further use of this model would involve the compartmentalising of individual analytical components, whereby a treaty would be assessed for its validity as a tool of foreign policy from a particular viewpoint, such as a source of international law; or as a change agent being employed by a leader.
pursuing cultural transformation; or as an externally sanctioned tool to instigate attitudinal shifts within a constituency bogged down by entrenched notions which are impinging on societal development.

The polyphonic analytical model can be used as a general rule of thumb when gauging a treaty's efficacy. This will be a useful guide for treaty makers, and give them insights into strategies likely to achieve success. For constituencies, the task of identifying possible means of proposing or opposing change, through treaty making activity, can be furnished by the model. In retrospect it is realised that the application of the model to expose the psychopolitical underpinnings of a treaty was a vast undertaking, which required much more detail than was possible within the scope of this project.

However, the model opens up possibilities for further research into treaty making and the relationship between treaties and the political communities on which they impact. The mooted overlap between foreign and domestic policy continually expands, and the insights offered in this thesis support that conclusion but also extend the understanding of the reasons for that extension. The model also raises new ideas about how to comprehend influence on foreign policy. It gathers perspectives from a wide variety of literatures and adopts and adapts them as innovative ways of explaining, modifying and utilising the treaty making process to effect change.

Overall the model brings together seemingly disparate comprehensions through the identification of ideational elements, like norms, perceptions and discourses, around which attitudinal and cognitive processes flourish. It probes the psychopolitical underpinnings of each selected perspectives, and concludes that in each instance psychosocial processes are at work. It is this realisation which confirms that treaties are tools, in that leaders can utilise agreements to achieve ends which often go beyond the text of the treaty, and where symbolism becomes the instigatory force behind change. Impetuses and imperatives are generated by formal agreement, and impact on the ideological patterns of societies party to agreement. In this sense, and most importantly, a full appreciation of the model must conclude that in any instance whereby change is the objective of the treaty maker, that to achieve success as tools of foreign policy treaties must be constructed and construed so as to satisfy the psychopolitical necessities of all key actors, external and domestic.
Chapter Twelve B

Prognosis of Keating's Legacy.

Paul Keating’s treaty regime promised to be a major component of the ongoing construction of Australia’s place in the world, and to have a significant impact on perceptions of Australia as a regional actor, both in the region and within the Australian polity. An object of this thesis was to react to the challenges to the process of treaty making, which appeared to be a obstacle to the implementation of those treaties realised by the Keating Government. This reaction sparked an investigation into the psychopolitical processes which are engendered by change, and particularly those elements which inhibited societal advances.

Bourne’s opposition to the “annual treaties farce” and its companion, the democratic deficit, may have been apt from the point of view of the domestic constituency, but if Keating's project was to oversee a competent assemblage of both international and global networking that would advance Australia as a significant and sophisticated participant in an evolving global commerce, which action was in the national interest?

The debate about the salience of changes envisaged with the realisation and future implementation of treaty regimes should have been highly relevant to the domestic constituency, but the Parliamentary parties in opposition to Keating's Labor Government, including the Democrats, were more concerned about the treaty making process.

At the polls in March 1996 Keating’s Big Picture was abandoned by the Australian people and the Age of Vision ended. It was important to attempt to understand why the electorate acted the way it did, and it was vital to ascertain Keating’s objective. Not to explain his intransigent failure to heed the warning of pre election polling, but to comprehend fully what his vision offered Australia in the future. And this has pertinence because the perplexity of governance regarding globalisation, as faced by both Hawke and Keating, continues to this day. This is not to suggest that Keating’s prescription should be adopted or adapted, but the possible realisations of its application must be considered, as a guide to the future. Its probable
implementation must also be taken into account, to ensure that such manifestations are included within government policy or excluded if they work against new found objectives.

At the beginning of the 21st century another world order is beginning to focus. Keating became a memory when he lost the 1996 March election to John Howard. Keating’s vision of an Australia engaged in the region contributed partially to his downfall. He was construed by the domestic constituency as a leader distracted by grand alliances who had forgotten that his responsibility lay in the domestic arena. He was a leader besotted with global and regional adventures and out of touch with the Australian people. His final act of arrogance was the signing of the security agreement which he negotiated privately with Suharto, for many the perceived enemy of the Australian people, because of East Timor, and the five dead Australian journalist killed in Balibo in East Timor in 1975.

Howard paid allegiance to the economic possibilities promised by APEC and its free trade initiatives, although his government has used the multilateral body to engage in bilateral exchange. Further to this there was the likelihood that with the US presidency changing hands, and Clinton, a supporter of APEC, being replaced by Bush, a more conservative and isolationist realist president, APEC could well vanish into the dust of 20th century history.

The ASEAN Regional Forum has continued to be solely the concern of Foreign Minister Downer. With Australia's commitment to free elections for East Timor in 1998 the ARF's possible role as a facilitator was usurped by the United Nations. Arguably this occurred because Indonesia was a most influential member of ASEAN and thus the ARF was caught in a possible clash of interests scenario. The sobriquet "talking shop" is still used to describe the ARF although its potential for "...building trust and confidence as a multilateral vehicle... [DuPont:98:2] is ascribed to, although it is suggested that "its planners and policy makers need to recognise that the region's security environment has undergone considerable transformation..." [DuPont:98:7] since it was established in 1993.

As for the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security it seems to have gone down the same path as its procreator, Keating, and ended in oblivion. The much vaunted problem of East Timor, which was arguably
defused by the AMS, grew to national dominance in Australia, with the resultant commitment of Australian troops to the INTERFET force. Sanctioned by the UN to enter East Timor to bring an end to the killing and wanton destruction of infrastructure carried out by pro-integrationist forces, following the successful vote for independence by the East Timorese people, a perceived breach of the AMS by Australia saw the treaty meets its inevitable demise.

Was that the end of Keating's vision or would it achieve a Whitlamesque status and haunt policy makers for years to come, as Australia continues the struggle of finding a place in the world?
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Addendum

A  The Australia Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security 1995

B  The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum
    25 July 1994, Bangkok

C  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
    24 February 1976, Indonesia
The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement 1995

THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (hereafter referred to as ‘the Parties’),

DESIRING to strengthen the existing friendship between them;

RECOGNISING their common interest in the peace and stability of the region;

DESIRING to contribute to regional security and stability in order to ensure circumstances in which their aspirations can best be realised for the economic development and prosperity of their own countries and the region;

REAFFIRMING their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all countries;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

RECOGNISING that each Party has primary responsibility for its own security;

MINDFUL of the contribution that would be made to their own security and that of the region by cooperating in the development of effective national capabilities in the defence field and hence their national resilience and self-reliance;

NOTING that nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the existing international commitments of either Party;

THEREFORE AGREE as follows:

1. The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and the region.

2. The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each Party.

3. The Parties agree to promote - in accordance with the policies and priorities of each - mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by the two Parties.

4. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later notification by either Government of the fulfilment of its requirements for entry into force of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

[Signed by Senator Evans for Australia and Mr Ali Alatas for Indonesia on 18 December 1995].

The First Meeting Of The ASEAN Regional Forum 25 July 1994, Bangkok

1. The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 in accordance with the 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, whereby the ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region.

2. Attending the Meeting were the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, ASEAN's Dialogue Partners, ASEAN's Consultative Partners, and ASEAN's Observers or their representatives(*). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, served as Chairman of the Meeting.

3. Being the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the Meeting was considered a historic event for the region. More importantly, the Meeting signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast Asia.

4. The participants of the Meeting held a productive exchange of views on the current political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing that developments in one part of the region could have an impact on the security of the region as whole. It was agreed that, as a high-level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. In this respect, the ARF would be in a position to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

5. Bearing in mind the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Meeting welcomed the continuation of US-DPRK negotiation and endorsed the early resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

6. The Meeting agreed to:
   a) convene the ARF on an annual basis and hold the second meeting in Brunei, Darussalam in 1995; and
   b) endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic
instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.

7. The Meeting also agreed to entrust the next Chairman of the ARF, Brunei Darussalam, working in consultation with ARF participants as appropriate, to:

a) collate and study all papers and ideas raised during the ARF Senior Officials Meeting and the ARF in Bangkok for submission to the second ARF through the second ARF-SOM, both of which to be held in Brunei Darussalam. Ideas which might be the subjects of such further study include confidence and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation including regional peacekeeping training centre, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues, and preventive diplomacy;  

b) study the comprehensive concept of security, including its economic and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-Pacific region;  
c) study other relevant internationally recognized norms and principles pertaining to international and regional political and security cooperation for their possible contribution to regional political and security cooperation;  
d) promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the UN Conventional Arms Register; and  
e) convene, if necessary, informal meetings of officials to study all relevant papers and suggestions to move the ARF process forward.

8. Recognizing the need to develop a more predictable and instructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region, the Meeting expressed its firm conviction to continue to work towards the strengthening and the enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region, as a means of ensuring a lasting peace, stability, and prosperity for the region and its peoples.

(*) ASEAN consists of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  
ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners are: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States.  
ASEAN’s Consultative Partners are China and Russia.  
ASEAN’s Observers are Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam.
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
Indonesia 24 February 1976

The High Contracting Parties:

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule or law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;

DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation;

BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation