SHANGHAI'S WESTERN TOWNSCAPE AND
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CHINA

Fengqi Qian

BA, MA

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Faculty of Arts
Deakin University

September 2003
I am the author of the thesis entitled *Shanghai's Western Townscape andChanging Perceptions of Cultural Heritage in China*

submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis may be made available for consultation and loan. Copying of any part of this thesis is prohibited for two years from the date this statement was signed; after that time limited copying is permitted in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

**FENGQI QIAN**

Full Name.................................................................
(Please Print)

Signed ........................................................................

Date.................................................................
Consultation of Thesis

Please sign this form to indicate that you have used this thesis in accordance with the *Access to Thesis* form signed by the author of this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (please print)</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoping Au</td>
<td>Signature Redacted by Library</td>
<td>12/July 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Susan</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 00 04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deakin University Library
SHANGHAI'S WESTERN TOWNSCAPE AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CHINA

Fengqi Qian

BA, MA

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Faculty of Arts
Deakin University

September 2003
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
CANDIDATE DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis entitled SHANGHAI'S WESTERN TOWNSCAPE AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CHINA

submitted for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

is the result of my own work and that where reference is made to the work of others, due acknowledgment is given.

I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by any other university or institution is identified in the text.

Full Name: PENG QIAN

Signed: [Signature Redacted by Library]

Date: 14/10/2021
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have contributed to this study and to the production of this thesis. I am deeply indebted to my principal supervisor, Professor William Logan, for his professional support, encouragement and constructive criticism. Throughout this research I have been motivated by his patience and confidence in me, and benefited greatly from his commitment to rigorous scholarship and research excellence. I am also grateful to my associate supervisor Associate Professor Renate Howe, for her inspiring comments and feedback at various stages of the research.

I was fortunate to be involved as a research assistant in the ARC funded project *The Disappearing ‘Asian’ City: Protecting Asia’s Heritage in a Globalising World*, led by Professor William Logan. It was through this project that I became fascinated by the topic of thesis. I am grateful to the Faculty of Arts and the Cultural Heritage Centre for Asia and Pacific (formerly Heritage in Asia Research Unit), Deakin University, for giving me the opportunity and support to research the topic that I have been so interested while working closely with heritage professionals.

As part of the research team for *The Disappearing ‘Asian’ City*, I visited Shanghai for fieldwork in 1998, together with Adjunct Professor Susan Balderstone from the Department of Infrastructure, Victoria, Australia and Dr Zhang Bing from China Academy of Urban Planning and Design. By working with them I benefited from their knowledge in the profession and conservation issues.

I thank Dr Zhang Bing for assisting me with my fieldwork in Shanghai in 2000. I am grateful to many heritage professionals and residents in Shanghai, particularly Professors Luo Xiaowei, Ruan Yisan and Dr Zhang Song from Tongji University, Mr Zhao Tianzuo from Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Mr Huang Fuxiang and Zhao Wanliang from Shanghai City Planning and Designe Research Institute, Mr Yang Songping from Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage, Mr Li Chao from Pudong New Area Administration, Mr Liu Shouxiang from Xuhui District Government, and some residents from Lane 58/1382, LujiaBang
Road and Luchuan Residential Village, for participating willingly in interviews for this study.

At the final stage of the research, Ms Christine De Boos proofread the whole draft of the thesis and rectified grammatical errors. I am grateful for her time, support and advice.

My gratitude goes to Alan Fengning Lu, my brother, for spending many afterwork hours scanning maps and photos for me, and also for the assistance he offered me with the computer manipulation, as well as reference books during my research.

Above all, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my husband, Chen Qinglin, for putting up with the lengthy period of my part-time study. Having had the experience of working towards PhD himself, he shared my stress and happiness during my research. This research would not have been possible without his understanding and unreserved support. I am grateful to my daughter, JuJu, whose critical transition from high school to university coincided with the writing-up stage of my thesis, for supporting and motivating me with the excellence in her own study.
# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. I

CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. III

FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................................... VI

ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................. VIII

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1

Rationale for the Research ......................................................................................... 1

Methodology .................................................................................................................. 4

Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 6

Overview of the Thesis ................................................................................................ 32

CHAPTER TWO: SHANGHAI A SEMI-COLONIAL CITY ............................................. 36

Shanghai Before 1843 ................................................................................................. 37

1843: Shanghai Was Opened as a Treaty Port ........................................................... 41

The Treaty of Nanking and Shanghai Land Regulations .............................................. 41

Foreign Settlement Opened to Chinese Residents ...................................................... 45

The Shanghai Municipal Council and Extraterritoriality ........................................... 46

Interaction and Confrontation between Cultures ....................................................... 48

Meeting with the West ............................................................................................... 48

Westernization of Shanghai ....................................................................................... 51

Shanghai in Chinese Eyes ............................................................................................ 62

Rise of Nationalism ...................................................................................................... 63

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY, MEMORY AND HERITAGE IN MODERN

CHINA ......................................................................................................................... 69

Destroy the Old and Establish the New: From the May Fourth Movement to the

Cultural Revolution .................................................................................................... 70

Nationalism, Heritage and Globalization .................................................................... 80

Reinterpretation of Shanghai’s Colonial Legacy during the Mao Era ............................ 86

Shanghai Story Re-told .................................................................................................. 92

CHAPTER FOUR: SHANGHAI IN THE 1990S: HEADING FOR

MODERNIZATION ...................................................................................................... 97

Political and Economic Imperatives for Shanghai Development ............................... 97

Shanghai’s Urban Transformation: Pudong ................................................................. 101
Shanghai’s Transformation: Puxi ................................................................. 111

CHAPTER FIVE: CHANGES IN SHANGHAI’S URBAN FABRIC: IMPACT

ON THE BUILT HERITAGE ........................................................................... 127
Designation of Heritage Places .................................................................. 128
Impact of Redevelopment on Heritage Places and Historic Quarters .......... 130
  The Bund .................................................................................................. 130
  Nanjing Road ......................................................................................... 140
  Huaihai Road ......................................................................................... 143
Dominance of Economic Interests: How It Affects the Treatment of Historic Sites and Quarters ........................................................................................................ 147

CHAPTER SIX: HERITAGE CONSERVATION SYSTEM IN SHANGHAI. 161
Progress in the Heritage Protection Process in Shanghai .......................... 162
Shanghai Municipal Heritage Legislation: A Brief Review ....................... 165
Conservation Mechanism: the Administrative System .............................. 176
Conservation Process: the Lobby System ................................................ 183
Reform of Housing Supply and Its Impact on Conservation ....................... 188

CHAPTER SEVEN: TOURISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE – THE
SHANGHAI EXPERIENCE ............................................................................. 191
Tourism in Shanghai: A New Industry in the New Millennium .................. 193
Old Buildings, New Resources: Heritage Tourism in Shanghai .................. 201
Heritage Conservation and Tourism: A Critique ........................................ 210

CHAPTER EIGHT: HERITAGE CONSERVATION IN SHANGHAI – A
PICTURE IN GLOBAL SETTING ................................................................. 222
Colonial Sentiment and Nationalism in Urban Renewal and Conservation .... 223
Urban Transformation in Shanghai: Impacts of Economic Globalization .... 225
Urban Conservation: Another Step towards Modernization ..................... 228
Interactions between Economic Growth and Conservation ....................... 233
Conservation Advocacy and Management: A Top-down System ................. 235
Perceptions of Heritage and Views of History, Antiquity and Aesthetics ....... 239
The China Principles: A ‘Well-baked Charter’ .......................................... 241
Other Considerations ............................................................................. 249

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 253
APPENDICES ............................................................................................. 275
### FIGURES AND TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Shanghai inner ring in year 2000</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>The Mid-lake Pavilion in the early 1900s</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>The growth of foreign concessions 1843 – 1915</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Xujiahui Cathedral in the 1930s</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td><em>Shikumen</em> Residence</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>The Bund in 1930</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Centre Zoning Plan, 1929</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Government House</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Pudong New Area</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>The skyline of Lujiazui waterfront</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Shanghai Museum</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>Shanghai Opera House</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>The Bund in 1998</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>A portion of ‘The Bund Heads for the New Century’</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15-1</td>
<td>Building of the Shanghai Club in 1994.</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15-2</td>
<td>Building of the Shanghai Club in 2002.</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16</td>
<td>The Peace Hotel</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 17</td>
<td>Nanjing Road Pedestrian Street</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 18</td>
<td>Avenue Joffré in the 1920s</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 19</td>
<td>Huaihai Road in 2000</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 20</td>
<td>Moller’s Residence</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 21</td>
<td>The Orthodox Church at Xinle Road in 2000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 22</td>
<td>The site of the CCP’s first congress</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 23</td>
<td>Jiangwan Stadium</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 24</td>
<td>Map of the Hengshan Road precinct</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 25</td>
<td>The street-scape of Hengshan Road, 2000</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 26</td>
<td><em>A Lilong Block</em> in Shanghai</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 27</td>
<td>A close view of a <em>Lilong block</em> in 2000</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 28</td>
<td>Hierarchical relations between the SMG and relevant departments and their roles in conservation</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 29  Location of historic zones .............................................. 168
Figure 30  Chen Guichun’s residence ............................................. 184
Figure 31  Fangbang Road in the early twentieth century ................. 214
Figure 32  Fangbang Road in 2000 .................................................. 214
Figure 33  Newly renovated Duolun Road ....................................... 216
Figure 34  Xin Tian Di Recreation Complex .................................... 216
Figure 35  A poster board at Xin Tian Di ......................................... 217
Figure 36  A promotional photo for Europa Paradise ....................... 218
Figure 37  A promotional photo for entertaining programs at Europa Paradise ......................................................... 219
Figure 38  Dong Jia Du Church ....................................................... 219

Table 1  The extension of foreign concessions in Shanghai
1845-1915 .................................................................................... 44

Table 2  The growth of the tertiary industry in Shanghai’s GDP ........ 195
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHC</td>
<td>The Australian Heritage Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>The Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>Getty Conservation Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HETDZ</td>
<td>Hongqiao Economic and Technology Development Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICOMOS</td>
<td>The International Council on Monuments and Sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACH</td>
<td>Chinese State Administration for Cultural Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPDRI</td>
<td>Shanghai City Planning and Design Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMACH</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMARE</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Administration for Real Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCP</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Comprehensive Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td>Shanghai Urban Construction Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPAB</td>
<td>Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHC</td>
<td>World Heritage Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Shanghai Inner Ring in year 2000

★ District  Elevated ring road  Metro line
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Rationale for the Research

Shanghai, being the largest city of China and one of the first Chinese cities to open up to the outside world, is seen as a meeting place of cultures. The Treaty of Nanking between the British and the Chinese governments resulted in Western settlement on Chinese soil, led by the British in 1843 in Shanghai. The Western legacy in Shanghai has made it a Western city to the Chinese, while it still remains a Chinese city to Westerners. The foreign settlement over the century between 1843 and 1949 left striking impacts, tangible and intangible, on all aspects of this city, from its built landscape to the lifestyle of its citizens. The modern history of China began with the breakout of the Opium War in 1840 and, to an extent, the Western settlement in Shanghai marked the beginning of the semi-colonial period in Chinese history. Since 1843 Shanghai has been the arena of endless dramas. It has experienced wars, turmoil, revolution and, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the greatest transformation in more than half a century, with an unprecedented scale and speed.

This thesis comes out of a concern for the dramatic changes in the urban landscape of Shanghai during the last decade of the twentieth century, caused by the city renewal projects. The past ten years have seen economic reforms launched in Shanghai by the Central Government, hoping to restore Shanghai to its pre-1949 position as a world economic and finance centre and thereby attracting more international investments. The decision by the Central Government in 1990 to develop Shanghai was warmly welcomed and effectively implemented by the Shanghai Municipal Government. Since then, a full-scale development program has forged ahead. A completely new, international style business centre has been erected in Pudong, in a new area across the Huangpu River, opposite the old metropolitan area. The latter is also hurriedly acquiring a new look with old buildings being demolished in blocks to make way for city renewal projects. In order to build a modern metropolis, urban re-development is being undertaken in such a way that many parts of the city have changed beyond recognition.
Changes in the landscape of Shanghai are taking place as a result of multiple forces operating on different scales: China’s economic reform, a demand for the upgrading of living standards and the process of globalization. In other words, these changes have been made possible by joint forces – local, national, and global – and have to be seen as the result of the impact of these forces. The built environment of a city is a reflection of not only its economic status, but also its cultural identity and, to some extent, the ideological agenda of the ruling regime. As far as Shanghai is concerned, the current transformation of its landscape reflects China’s economic growth, the Central Government’s ambition to globalize China’s economy, as well as the zeal of the whole society for modernization.

This thesis aims to identify the impact of globalization on the urban heritage of Shanghai. The urban environment in Shanghai is considered distinctive because of the cultural mixing that Shanghai experienced between the 1840s and the 1940s. The Opium War that led to the foreign settlement in Shanghai is the beginning of China’s modern history, and Shanghai has an international reputation as the meeting ground, as well as the collision point of Chinese and Western cultures. The extraordinary experience of Shanghai, together with its the distinctive townscape, made it one of the 101 designated historic cultural cities in China. It is noteworthy that Shanghai’s economic takeoff in the 1990s, accompanied by the trend in globalization, triggered a new cycle of cultural hybridization. However, debate regarding the urban transformation of Shanghai has, until now, been addressed mainly from economic and technological perspectives by academics and professionals, while cultural issues have often been missed out, although cultural issues, according to Anthony King (1990), are more closely related to the professions than ever.

Globalization is a world phenomenon, but it is by no means a one-way process. Responses to economic and cultural globalization vary, and it is worth investigating how a developing country such as China, whose economy has been growing so rapidly in the recent two decades, has adapted itself to this world trend. As the country’s major economic centre, Shanghai is a good window from which to view the globalization process and its impacts on China. Since the early 1990s, Shanghai has been striving to become a finance and trade centre of international importance, and to become an internationalized metropolis. Meanwhile, in the name of modernization,
unsympathetic demolition has been implemented in old areas and, consequently, Shanghai's built heritage has been facing great threats due to this development. As a result, the historic landscape of Shanghai is rapidly disappearing, making way for global style highrise towers.

In attempting to identify the impact of economic and cultural globalization on the urban heritage of Shanghai, this research is conducted in the context of economic reform in China. Since the late twentieth century, there have been extensive debates on globalization and the way in which it is affecting human life and the environment. However, most debates have been held against Western settings and address problems that face the West. As globalization is a world phenomenon of which no economy or culture is immune, research with insight into the contemporary Chinese society, would provide a fresh perspective to the debate.

This thesis pursues the argument that, in the context of economic and cultural globalization, heritage conservation involves various theories and practices that have developed in different cultures. The progress of international conservation, strongly endorsed by international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), can be regarded as part of the cultural globalization process (Logan 2002b). In 1972, an international agreement, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO. Since then it has been signed by 175 State Parties and implemented as a set of universal principles monitoring conservation practices. The World Heritage Committee has to date inscribed on the World Heritage List 730 properties of outstanding universal values. ICOMOS, an international, non-governmental organization dedicated to the conservation of the world's historic monuments and sites, is UNESCO's principal advisor in matters concerning the conservation and protection of monuments and sites, and now it has national committees in 107 countries. The increased participation in international heritage conventions by countries of different cultures has brought diversity in heritage in terms of perceptions and practices. In this sense, heritage has become a global industry.
The involvement of countries and regions in the global heritage industry is often closely related to their governments' economic and political agendas. To an extent, signing up and complying with the World Heritage Convention is a gesture of commitment to the international community. Nevertheless, while Member States are expected to comply with the World Heritage Convention, conservation theories as well as practices vary in different cultures, and debates and conflicts remain.

This thesis explores interlocking issues arising out of China's economic development and the heritage industry in the late twentieth century. Since the early 1980s, China has adopted UNESCO-prescribed criteria and principles in heritage conservation, and international expertise has been invited to China to help with heritage conservation. Policy makers considered the heritage industry to be an important aspect of the modernization process, and heritage concepts and practices have been brought closer to international standards and trends. In a way, the heritage industry in China is impacted upon by cultural globalization. The process of globalization should be seen as a process in which cultures and economies in the world are becoming increasingly interdependent, rather than conforming. When exploring the impact of cultural globalization on China's heritage industry, one needs to look into the characteristics of Chinese perceptions of heritage, as well as tradition. The knowledge of Chinese characteristics in this area is vital to integrating heritage conservation in China with international conventions.

**Methodology**

The thesis is based on information collected from both Chinese and English sources, through various channels including printed literature, site visits, interviews, media, and the Internet. Existing literature has been reviewed in a range of areas, including sociology, history, economics, planning and tourism. Materials include academic and professional publications, media reports, legislation, and publicised government policies. I have also followed news reports since 1998 of two major Chinese newspapers: The People's Daily and Wenhuibao. The former is the official national newspaper, and the latter is the major newspaper of Shanghai.
The thesis attempts to deal with the collected data in an objective, unbiased manner. This is particularly the case when dealing with media sources. The Chinese official media mainly serves the government agenda, and reports regarding development projects tend to be overwhelmingly complimentary. In contrast, reports and comments on the Chinese development from the Western sources sometimes demonstrate a lack of cultural understanding and are not always free from the legacy of Orientalism. It is important, therefore, to put the data in the context of particular economic and political settings, and to read between the lines to obtain the true meaning and to make an accurate interpretation.

Apart from the literature survey, the thesis has involved fieldwork in Shanghai, conducted in 1998 and 2000 respectively, including site visits, interviews with Shanghai residents, heritage professionals, city planners and academics. The purpose of both site visits and interviews was to collect raw data about historic places, policies for and attitudes towards heritage conservation in Shanghai. The interview questions were designed in such a way that understanding could be achieved about attitudes of people from various backgrounds towards development and conservation. I have analysed the interview records by taking into account the interviewee’s profession, education, and social and financial status. As the thesis was not planned as quantitative research, I did not intend to use many examples just to deny or confirm a hypothesis. The interviews, therefore, do not involve a large number of people.

Fifteen people participated in the research. They were from Shanghai Urban planning Administration Bureau (SUPAB), Shanghai City Planning and Design Research Institute (SCPDRI), Pudong New Area Administration, Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage (SMACH), and Shanghai Tongji University. Interviewees also included a focus group of Shanghai residents who used to live in a neighbourhood near the Old City and were relocated to Pudong in 1996. Interviews with academic staff and residents were conducted through my personal contacts in China, while interviews with planning and heritage officials were coordinated by the office of their departments.

For the same reason, site visits in Shanghai have not covered all registered places. I have chosen places that are typical of the relevant categories: colonial, local;
traditional, modern and contemporary; official and civil. When looking at the buildings and sites, I will aim at the cultural messages being carried by them, rather than technical factors. Places covered in the thesis include the Old City, which was the Chinese quarter in the past; the KMT (Nationalist Party) Shanghai Municipal Centre; five neighbourhoods in the former concession areas which have been renovated in recent years, and Lujiazui, the new financial centre of Shanghai which was built in the 1990s. I have chosen these areas in order to illustrate the hybrid culture of Shanghai, and the process of globalization. Equally, I have chosen them as case studies because they have experienced the most drastic transformation in urban development during the recent decade.

As mentioned above, the current urban transformation of Shanghai should be seen as the result of economic and cultural globalization as well as the open-door policy of the Chinese Government. The observation and interpretation of this transformation therefore, must be made in the global context. The thesis is an attempt to identify the impact of economic and cultural globalization on the Chinese society and conversely the Chinese response to the trend of globalization. Given the scope of this general topic, however, the inquiries have been narrowed down to perceptions of modernization, heritage and tradition, focusing mainly on the case study of Shanghai.

In undertaking the thesis, my Chinese background and Western education allows me to take a cross-cultural approach. I will use this advantage to focus on cultural issues such as East versus West, margin versus centre, and development versus conservation. Through a case study of Shanghai, I will make comparisons between the views of Chinese and Westerners on the above issues.

**Literature Review**

As the most recent and dramatic urban transformation in Shanghai has been made possible by China's 'open-door' policy and the consequent influx of world capital, discourses of heritage conservation in Shanghai have to be placed in the context of cultural and economic globalization. The transformation may be seen as the product of the interaction of internal and external factors: the strong desire for modernization from both government and citizens, and the introduction of international investment
as well as concepts and practices from major economic centres in the world. The transformation is also very much related to the way in which Western modernization is presented and interpreted in the Chinese context. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look at the transformation of Shanghai from a cross-cultural perspective.

Shanghai has attracted great research interest from both inside and outside China. This thesis has focused mainly on the last two decades of the twentieth century with reference to Shanghai’s semi-colonial past. Recent research on Shanghai covers a wide range of topics, but little has been done on the impact of development on Shanghai’s historic townscape. From a world perspective, current research on the conservation of urban heritage has been broadened, encompassing cities in Europe and North America as well as cities of the former colonial and semi-colonial societies. Since the late decades of the twentieth century, urban heritage in the Asia Pacific Region, particularly in former colonial societies in Southeast Asia, has attracted enthusiastic research by many scholars. They have seen the significance of heritage issues in these societies in the process of economic and cultural globalization (Askew and Logan 1994b; Gills 1994; Lim 1998; Logan 2000a, 2000b; Philp 1998; Steinberg 1996). In comparison, few publications have concentrated on the impact of economic globalization on the urban environment in China. As far as Shanghai is concerned, while it has experienced the most drastic urban transformation during the trans-century years, its urban conservation issues have yet to attract adequate research by scholars in and outside China.

**Literature on Shanghai**

It is impossible to study Shanghai without looking back at its semi-colonial past. The Chinese published literature used to take quite a negative view about Shanghai’s experience between the 1840s and the 1940s, seeing it as a most humiliating period in Chinese history, marked by imperialist invasion, extraterritoriality and Western monopolizing capital. The anti-imperialist narrative as such was modified little until after the 1980s. A landmark publication on Shanghai in the reform era is Jin Dai Shanghai Chengshi Yan Jiu (Urban Shanghai in Modern Times: An Elaborated Study) (Zhang 1990). This publication was the result of one of the key research projects in the 1980s sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. It set a
new paradigm for the study of modern history not only of Shanghai, but also of other former semi-colonial cities in China. The research also provided the framework for the officially endorsed Exhibition of Modern History of Shanghai at the Shanghai Museum. While echoing the official rhetoric in condemning the imperialist invasions and the racial inequities such as extritoriality, the research took a more objective view about Western settlement by acknowledging the positive side of Shanghai's experience as a treaty port. It attributed the pre-1949 status of Shanghai as a world city to the introduction of Western civilization and the modern management system, as well as to the interaction of the Chinese and Western cultures. However the time span of this research merely covered the pre-1949 era, with no reference to the years after 1949.

Along with Shanghai's development in the 1990s was the flourishing of publications on Shanghai. Zheng Zu'an's Bai Nian Shanghai Cheng (A Hundred Years in Shanghai) (Zheng 1999c) was a celebrated research project on the urban history of semi-colonial Shanghai. Instead of following the chronic line of events, Zheng took a geographic approach in exploring Shanghai's growth between the 1840s and the 1940s. It targeted three key areas of the city and their ups and downs during a hundred years: The Old City, the Concessions, and the Nationalist Shanghai Municipality. Like Zhang's book, however, Zheng's study focused merely on semi-colonial Shanghai. Its main concern was, therefore, about Shanghai's evolution into a great metropolis in its semi-colonial years, and the post-1949 era was not within the scope of the book.

As part of the history, Shanghai's built heritage attracted research interest in the last two decades of the twentieth century. It is noteworthy that research on Shanghai's built heritage has largely focused on the 'modern architecture'; namely, those places built during the semi-colonial years. Important publications by Chinese scholars include Shanghai Jing Dai Jian Zhu Shi Gao (A Brief History of Shanghai Modern Architecture) (Chen and Zhang 1988), Shanghai Long Tang (Shanghai Alleys) (Luo and Wu 1997), Shanghai Lao Fang Zi De Gu Shi (Shanghai: The Stories of Classic Houses) (Yang 1999), The History of Shanghai Architecture (Wu 1997) and Shanghai Jin Dai Jian Zhu Feng Ge (The Evolution of Shanghai Architecture in Modern Times) (Zheng 1999a). Most of these publications were based on architectural
research into the influence of modern architecture on Shanghai’s townscape and some addressed the cultural significance of monuments and sites. However, although published in the 1990s, when the full-scale urban development was underway, these publications made little reference to the urban development at the time and did not address the imminent threat that the development posed to Shanghai’s heritage sites.

In contrast, people tended to be more concerned with Shanghai’s lack of change during the early years of economic reform. In his publication *Chengshi Jifeng* (City Monsoons) (1994), Yang Dongping, a renowned writer in China, studied Shanghai from the perspective of ‘urban culture’. In the book Yang lamented Shanghai’s loss of its place as China’s economic and cultural leader, and attributed this loss to planned economy. Shanghai, argued Yang, was virtually suffocated by that economic system and appeared more conservative than other Chinese cities during the post-1949 years. Yang’s book was published in 1994, when the development of Pudong had just been launched and Shanghai was yet to catch up with other leading cities in terms of urban modernization. The book reflected the anxiety, disappointment and resentment at the time about the slackness of Shanghai in the 1980s. To illustrate the outdated infrastructure and old fashioned townscape, Yang sarcastically remarked that Shanghai in the 1980s and early 1990s might be the best shooting place for historic movies, ‘just a few advertisement boards could make it look exactly like its old self in the 1930s’ (Yang 1994).

Shanghai has attracted research interest not only from Chinese scholars, but also from international writers. One of the publications about the semi-colonial Shanghai is *Shanghai: Key to Modern China* by Rhoads Murphey (1953), giving a detailed picture of Shanghai after the Western settlement. With a careful study of Shanghai’s history and geographic conditions, the book explored the question as to why Shanghai was more attractive to Western settlers than Canton, a coastal city in South China, and was able to override Canton to become the key international finance and trade centre in China. Although written in the 1950s and focusing on early Western settlement and trade, the book is still a useful reference in understanding Shanghai’s particular role in China’s economy.

Leo Ou-fan Lee, a Chinese born American scholar, internationally known for his research in modern Chinese literature and culture, commented that he used to have
few fond memories of Shanghai, as his early experience of life in the city was that of a young refugee fleeing the advancing communist troops (Lee 1999:xii). However through his research venture the old Shanghai emerged to him a city of great splendour – the very embodiment of Chinese modernity. His research led to the publication of *Shanghai Modern* (1999), a study of the cosmopolitanism that the 1930s’ Shanghai achieved from a literary perspective. By the term ‘Shanghai modern’, Lee meant a tendency towards a new type of urban culture and lifestyle that was fed from Western civilization. Looking into Shanghai’s press and some popular writers during the heyday of Shanghai’s semi-colonial period, Lee examined how print culture, particularly the popular press in the 1930s’ Shanghai, formed an ‘imagined community’ of modernity – a community existing and living in the film, newspapers, vogue magazines, novels and other printed forms, where people’s lifestyle was strongly Westernized but they were never free from the essence of Chinese tradition. What Lee reiterated, through this study on Shanghai’s literary circle in the 1930s, was an urban cultural sensibility that was rooted in Shanghai’s cosmopolitanism. In their works, the literary elites demonstrated a cultural openness of the 1930s’ Shanghai – ‘if cosmopolitanism means an abiding curiosity in looking out, then Shanghai in the 1930s was the cosmopolitan city par excellence’ (ibid:315). Such a cultural openness, however, was fed from a strong confidence in one’s cultural identity. It was such a confidence, Lee observed, that the quest for modernity by literary elites in the 1930s’ Shanghai was conducted. In contrast, Lee noted that a number of contemporary works – mainly films produced in Hong Kong and mainland China - failed in their attempts to represent life in the 1930s’ Shanghai simply due to the absence in these works of the very cultural sensitivity that underlay the earlier works.

This study by Lee focused on a cultural spirit of 1930s Shanghai. However the issues it inquired into is not irrelevant today. The redevelopment of Shanghai in the 1990s aimed to restore Shanghai’s lost status as an international metropolis - or a world city in a more fashionable rhetoric – as well as the cosmopolitanism once was wiped out in Shanghai. Questions are, to what extent has culture been taken into account in the reincarnation of Shanghai? Can Shanghai restore the cultural hybridity that characterized it in the 1930s? Also to what extent has that particular urban cultural sensitivity been demonstrated? In his book Lee noticed Chinese government’s efforts
in rebuilding Shanghai into a cultural and commercial centre, but the use of the old Shanghai legacy in the government’s contemporary agenda was beyond the scope of this study.

*Shanghai Sojourners* (Wakeman and Yeh 1992) is a collection of studies focusing on the composition of Shanghai’s multiple identities. During its semi-colonial days Shanghai was a city of immigrants, a large proportion of its population being ‘new comers’ from countryside across China. This brought in another dimension of Shanghai’s cultural hybridity – the mixture of different cultures originating from internal sources - different regions in China rather than foreign countries. Often people from a particular province would dominate a trade – for example silk weavers were mainly from Zhejiang and barbers from northern Jiangsu – and a large number of native societies existed. Native-place sentiment and class consciousness were involved in some major events in Shanghai history. Being a cosmopolitan city, Shanghai was also a miniature of a nation of mixed culture that was full of ethnic conflicts, discriminations and prejudice. Emily Honig’s *Creating Chinese Ethnicity* (1992) examined how local origins, not race, religion, or nationality, came to define identities that were ethnic in the context of China as surely as African-American and Chicano, Polish and Italian identities were considered ethnic in the United States (Honig 1992:1). Through the examination of immigrants from Subei (northern Jiangsu Province) in Shanghai, Honig provided an insight into Shanghai’s social hierarchy and the dynamics contributing Shanghai’s social and class conflicts. As the distribution of immigrants of different origins contributed to the composition of Shanghai’s trade population as well as demographic layout, the research on the ethnicity of this type throws light on the elements that determined Shanghai’s social and cultural landscape.

*Shanghai: Collision Point of Cultures: 1918-1939* (Sergeant 1990) took a more historic perspective, looking back at Old Shanghai (which here means Shanghai between 1840s and 1940s) from the distance of time. It is an extensive record of Old Shanghai during its prime time, a reflection of a diverse society with various groups of residents of most complex backgrounds. The purpose of the book, according to the author, was to ‘identify the trait which places Shanghai among the great cities and which makes any history of it relevant today’. This highly literary book focused
mainly on two groups of people and their lives: the British sojourners and the Chinese residents. As a Westerner, Sergeant tried to understand Shanghai not only through Western eyes, but also through Chinese eyes. She quoted the example of an Old Mr Wu, a typical member of the Chinese rural gentry with traditional visions and values who appears in a 1930s’ novel, *Midnight*, by a famous Chinese writer, Mao Dun. Shanghai, to many Chinese like Mr Wu, was a hell full of vices, whereas to many others it was a paradise. Sergeant obviously was obsessed with a nostalgic sentiment over the old days of Shanghai, and dismayed at what she saw and felt when she went back after the end of the Cultural Revolution. The book was published in 1990, and was written at the time when Shanghai was yet to pick up the pace of development.

Like Yang Dongping, Sergeant was struck to see that the city seemed ‘mummified’ under the planned economy of the Soviet model, and the political harshness of decades. Yet Yang and Sergeant were not likely to share the same vision of Shanghai. Yang was disappointed with Shanghai, as in his view Shanghai should always be the most modernized city in China, and its landscape should also match this status, featuring, for example, the country’s highest towers. In this sense Yang should be glad to see that Shanghai did grow much taller in the 1990s and boasted the most fascinating highrises. To Sergeant, Shanghai in the 1980s was dismal, not just because its appearance was almost the same as its old self, but its spirit was also missing. The Shanghai that Sergeant adored ended in 1939 when the Japanese invasion terminated the extraterritoriality of the Westerners. Back in Shanghai in the 1980s, Sergeant found herself looking at a dead city that had collapsed like a festival dragon falling into pieces at the end of its glamorous show. Shanghai was full of life again, but having shaken off much of its old self. How will Sergeant feel about Shanghai’s facelift in the 1990s, which took place at the great cost of Shanghai’s built heritage?

Shanghai changed rapidly in the 1990s and grew much ‘taller’ (in words of the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping). The change was so great that Shanghai was referred to by some as a reincarnated city (Balderstone, Qian, and Zhang 2002). The driving force for Shanghai’s change was complex. In her book, Sergeant asserted that Shanghai was good at creating illusions, but was a place in which people made money and left, a place lacking civic pride. This was possibly so in the semi-colonial Shanghai when people went to Shanghai seeking their fortune, and left satisfied or
defeated. Nevertheless, the transformation of Shanghai in the 1990s demonstrated a
strong civic pride not only through the enthusiasm of Shanghai officials as well as the
public in Shanghai’s economic and cultural renaissance, but also in media and mass
publications. Whether and to what extent the civic pride found grounds in Shanghai’s
past glory, however, need investigation in later chapters.

While Sergeant’s book on Shanghai was a search for Shanghai’s past glory, *Shanghai,
revolution and development in an Asian metropolis* (Howe 1981) was a collection of
studies on Shanghai’s economic and politic status in China during a few decades
under the Communist government after the 1949 liberation. As the book was
published in the early 1980s, when China was yet to take up economic reform and
open up to the outside world, the articles in the book sketched pictures of Shanghai
under the post-1949 political and economic system based on the Soviet model. It was
predicted in the book that, in pursuing the goal of the ‘four modernizations’ in the last
stage of the twentieth century, Shanghai as a city would be quick to adopt
innovations, and would again assert itself as the country’s most advanced and
dynamic city (Howe 1981). Yet at that time its researchers were not able to anticipate
the actual impact of economic and cultural globalization to be exerted on Shanghai at
the turn of the new century.

A publication by Tian Gang, an American based scholar, *Shanghai’s Role in the
studied the reform of the economic system and the investment environment of
Shanghai in the 1990s. The author’s knowledge of the operation of the Chinese
economy enabled the book to provide a very informed analysis about the economic
environment under the government’s open-door policy. However, the focal point of
the book was economic, and the objective of the book was to serve the needs of
international investment in China, and therefore other aspects of Shanghai than its
economic and financial performance were not included in the picture.

*New Shanghai: The Rocky Rebirth of China’s Legendary City* (2001) was the result of
a close study, and actual experience of Shanghai by Pamela Yatsko. The book tackled
a wide range of topics about Shanghai under the open-door policy – economy,
politics, history and culture. Being a journalist based in Shanghai for three years in the
late 1990s, Yatsko witnessed the rapid development of the city and was able to study
the development in the context of China’s economic reform. The book focused on the contradictions between the newly introduced free market economy and the authoritarian political system in China, and the incompatible ‘hardware and software’, namely the internationalized infrastructure and the Chinese bureaucratic system. It depicted the political imperatives behind the ‘rebirth’ of Shanghai, and argued that, while the city was physically reincarnated, it still lacked the soul of an international financial hub. While the book integrated studies of Shanghai’s semi-colonial history with its inquiry into the current development, it did not address the impact such a development would make on its built heritage, as conservation issues were obviously beyond the scope of the book’s topics.

Yasko’s study of Shanghai presents a broadly-sweeping narration of Shanghai’s transformation and ambitions during the economic reform, and is mainly based on the exploration of large scale investments and projects, and the stories of, and by government decision-makers, successful business people, as well as cultural elites such as writers and artists. In contrast, *Shanghai Transition* by Jos Gamble (2003) is a study of the experience of Shanghai residents (Shanghaiese) and their perceptions of the transformation of their hometown. An anthropologist, Gamble is interested in the lives of local residents and the changes that they have been through. The book seeks to gain an insight into the contemporary society of Shanghai and to address many issues that Shanghai residents have to deal with in the new era – the development of a free market, privatization, foreigners and foreign companies, rural migrants, job mobility, as well as the changing identities of the ‘Shanghaiese’. The book also addressed the changing city environment of Shanghai but did not go into depth to explore local people’s attitudes towards such a change or, their perceptions about Shanghai’s history and urban heritage.

In recent years, popular publications on Old Shanghai have been flourishing along with Shanghai’s economic revival and the rapid urban development. This kind of publications, for example *Xian Hua Shanghai (Tales of Shanghai)* (Xue 1996), *The Bund Then and Now* (Gao 1996), and *Bund: History and Vicissitudes* (Lou and Wu 1998), *A Last Look: Western Architecture in Old Shanghai* (Johnston and Erh 1993), can be labelled as ‘light literature’ or ‘cultural reading’ in Chinese terms. Focusing on the Old Shanghai, these publications provided more legends and myths rather than
history. In doing so, they expressed some widespread feelings about Shanghai – affectionate, proud, ambitious and, sometimes, a bit sentimentally nostalgic. Most of these publications are by Chinese authors who share a romantic view of Old Shanghai, with little reference to the humiliations of the semi-colonial days. Also, while presenting stories of historic structures, publications of this kind often gave little comment on urban changes that were at the time threatening the very sites being written about. The exception might be the joint publication by Johnston, a Canadian architectural historian and Erh, a Shanghai-based photographer. In that book, the authors explicitly expressed great concerns – by means of photographs of the fine architecture of monumental sites - over the destructive development and regretted the rapid disappearance of the historic landscape of Shanghai.

**Literature on globalization and the postmodern**

The focus of this thesis is on the socio-cultural aspect of development and conservation, rather than technical issues, in order to give a present-day context to the current development and conservation in Shanghai. To this end, the thesis examines the way in which political and economic imperatives have been woven into the process of globalization and how such joint forces pushed forward the urban transformation of Shanghai.

The significance of socio-cultural elements in the study of developing cities was highlighted by scholars such as King (1990), Askew and Logan (1994) and Logan (2002c). As social issues and built environment, argued King, became increasingly related to each other, the understanding of such issues was vital to professionals. It would be an ‘empty task’, as Askew and Logan observed, to identify a geographical source for contemporary change in developing societies, when the global state of modernity sets a context in which such societies were inextricably embedded (Askew and Logan 1994b). For this reason, Askew, Logan and others undertook a set of case studies. They researched the impact of modernization and globalization on the urban landscape and traditions in South East Asian countries, where development was advancing at the expense of traditional urban and social fabric. Inquiries were raised about the way in which recent urban changes were taking place, as well as the relationship between cultural identity and urban development in these countries.
Askew and Logan sharply perceived that, in the context of globalization, the source of urban transformation in developing countries lies inside the society, in the form of the ‘impulse to change’. This perception indicated the intricate relationship between globalization and nationalism in the post-colonial era, and is worth pursuing further, as it is relevant to all emerging economies including China.

Globalization is seen in such aspects as ethoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes (Appadurai 1990:296). As a result, we seem to be facing a ‘global culture’, ‘global economy’ and ‘global finance’. Science, technology, media and capital flow have made it possible for powerful economies to stretch their influences even to the remotest corner of the world. For instance, it is now possible for people to consume goods made far from their own countries. For the same reason, spatial forms are likely to be shaped by forces from a far distance, instead of by local people. The assumption that the world is getting increasingly smaller, is operating in a unified and standardized system, and that people are more and more likely to consume the same goods, to speak the same language (English?) and to do the same thing (making money?) is part of a world phenomenon.

As a cultural phenomenon during the last decades of the twentieth century, ‘global culture’ was widely discussed with various assumptions and interpretations. To some, international capital flew from economic centres to the peripheral regions, and it had triggered flows of commodities, media, as well as ideology. People with this view assumed that ‘global culture’ was the result of an internationalization of cultures, mainly of the world’s economic centres, which was so pervasive on a worldwide scale that it influenced people through all aspects of their lives. In this sense, global culture was said to be likely to compress the world into a single unit through various ways including hegemony of one or a group of superpowers (Robertson 1990). Global culture was also seen as being established by cross-national professionals, who had the access to cultures other than their own, working with standardized technological, financial and other professional regulations and introducing and interpreting foreign cultures to their home countries. These people, moving backwards or forwards between different cultures, were regarded as a new category of professionals (Featherstone 1990:7). These people not only contributed to trans-national companies’
operation in charting and formalising the newly globaslised economic space, but also would be largely responsible for the way in which these cultures were presented.

Nonetheless, while in theory the globalization process could place the world under a singular cultural system centred with cultures of economic powers, such a tendency towards cultural uniformity faced strong resistance, and the notion of homogeneity was challenged. Again in theory, the totalising logic that saw the world as one place with a unified and homogeneous system was considered very problematic and flawed. (Featherstone 1996:102). ‘Culture’ was something belonging to a group of people who had a shared history, and it had a particular historical and spatial meaning. In comparison, a ‘global culture’, if homogeneous by nature, was placeless and timeless, and therefore was unsustainable (Smith 1990). Some people like Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schuman, hold an all-negative view about globalization, warning that globalization was a myth. Instead of global unity, they maintained, globalization increased global inequity and, with the erosion of the nation-state identity in front of the pervasive world capital, globalization put the world under threats of global crises (Matin and Schumann 1997).

It has to be recognized that globalization of the economy as well as culture is phenomenal, although indeed the phenomenon has inspired heated debates. The core issue under debate is whether, in such a phenomenon, the world is becoming a smaller place with an increasingly unified system – a ‘world system’ – or it is becoming a smaller place with multi-systems and increased cultural diversities. It was maintained by some that the shift towards the idea of the homogeneous unitary nation-state since the 1880s is manifested in many aspects of globalization, such as the increase in the numbers of international agencies and institutions, the increasing global forms of communication, the acceptance of unified global time, the development of global competitions and prizes, the development of standard notions of citizenship, and the rights and conceptions of mankind (Robertson 1990). While these aspects of globalization do suggest a tendency towards a unitary world order, it remains questionable whether the world as a whole is moving towards uniformity, and whether all societies accept that they have to fully adopt the set standards. In terms of a world economic operation, for example, it is said that capital and commodity flows are circulated from economic centres to peripheries. Meanwhile, it is also argued that
the world capital is circulating the other way round as the result of the extraction of surplus into the core from the periphery (King 1993:87). Similarly, the world cultural pattern is also a complex one. International agencies and institutions, as well as the global forms of communication and acceptance of unified global time, have made it much easier for cultures to influence each other. Interaction between cultures, however, does not necessarily lead to cultural uniformity. A homogeneous ‘global culture’ will remain in question. After all, the theory of global culture is largely taken from a Western perspective, with an obvious lack in input from non-Western points of view.

Cultural globalization is seen to undermine the identity of the nation-state. The world arena seems to be shrinking, with increasing interactions and exchanges between ‘mainstream’ cultures (such as the world economic centres of Europe and North America, the cultural ‘West’) and ‘peripheral’ cultures (non-economic centres such as those of former colonies, the cultural ‘East’, as well as ethnic, indigenous, and female cultures). Some argue that globalization has represented a significant shift away from the traditional ethnocentricity of the Orientalist debate, and that the sharp contrast between Occident and Orient is an anachronism of the nineteenth century legacy (Turner 1994:103). In contrast, it is argued by others, for example Samuel Huntington, that clashes of civilizations, that is the confrontations between the cultural ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’, will become the main driving force for world conflict in the twenty-first century (Huntington 1996). Western dominance in current world politics, economy and culture faces strong challenges and resistance from non-Western nation-states. China is embracing the world economy by internationalising its finance, technology, industries and services, but in the meantime, it is very much alert to the ‘invasion’ by Western values and ideology, although the notion here is not the same Occidentalism as is described by Turner, where anything to do with the West is rejected (Turner 1994:7). Under the open-door policy, nationalism in China is woven into the process of globalization. With a fast economic growth, China is resisting the power politics of the West and claiming a more important role in international affairs. In the Chinese view, Western powers, especially the United States, are not trustworthy. China believes that ‘some Western countries feel uncomfortable with a stable, progressing and developing China, and see it as a threat’ (Sha 2003). For this
reason, although China is integrating its economy with the global trend, notions about globalization of cultures and values are still very questionable in the Chinese context.

In the area of urban studies, globalization was an important socio-cultural framework for understanding city transformations in Asian countries. The economic reforms, as well as the deterioration of urban environments in East Asian and South East Asian countries were regarded as the direct result of the process of economic globalization (Askew and Logan 1994b; Kim 1997). Urban changes in Delhi, or changes in the internal structure of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area could also, it was thought, be best interpreted through globalization (Firman 1998; King 1993).

It will be worth investigating how the process of globalization impacted on the urban transformation taking place in Shanghai, a city reflecting the speed and scale of national development. As mentioned above, the literature on Shanghai has to date made little reference to the links between globalization and the urban development during the 1990s. One might find some similarities between Shanghai and other Asian cities, but they are not the same, and have not followed the same path to urban modernization. While sharing the colonial experience with such cities as Delhi, Jakarta and Hanoi, Shanghai has a distinctive past, different in many ways from that of other cities. Western powers never obtained full control over the city, and its citizens and foreign residents seldom communicated with people outside their own communities. They were seen as sojourners, the ‘Other’ in the Chinese eyes and, as Sergeant remarked, the relationship between Westerners and Shanghai locals was never the same as that between the British and Indians (Sergeant 1991). If we compare Shanghai and Hanoi, we will find, that although both had colonial experience and later followed the Soviet socialist model in the 1950s-1970s period, they are different cities by nature and function: basically, the former is an economic centre and the latter a political capital. As the framework of globalization may work in a different way in cities of differing pasts and present, the urban transformations in Shanghai have to be interpreted from a particular perspective, taking into consideration the political/economic imperatives that China faces.

This diversity of cultures has been attracting attention today when issues about globalization are being debated. As the globalization process makes cultures more
interdependent, scholars tend to see cultures as complex and specific, rather than simple and generalized (Howe and Logan 2002). For example, ‘Asian’ is often used as a general term to refer to persons and things from regions in that vast continent, while in fact each Asian country is unique, as is each Asian city. They can be similar to each other in various aspects but they will never be the same. The meaning of being ‘Asian’ now is very much different from that in the past and ‘Asian’ cities, for example, will no longer fit the old pictures. Cultural diversity as such is reiterated by Kim, who maintained that East Asian countries would follow different paths to development, rather than a ‘single linear progress toward Western capitalism’ (Kim 1997:1). Furthermore, Kim observed, not only do countries follow different paths, but also cities. A city environment was the manifestation of, and was determined by, the dominating social forces. This could be illustrated by comparing the city environment of Beijing with other East Asian capital cities such as Tokyo and Seoul, or with other Chinese cities such as Shanghai. It could be argued that the layout of Beijing only represents one segment of the Chinese culture, as the city environment of Beijing appears differently to that of Shanghai, and very different cultural messages are conveyed in these two cities.

It could be argued that concerns with cultural diversity in the late decade of the twentieth century derived from concerns over impacts of economic and cultural globalization, and over the tendency towards cultural homogeneity in which economic powers tend to be dominating. In the meantime, ‘diversity’ was regarded as one of the major codes in postmodernism, which became widely adopted in various research areas to review and interpret new social phenomena at the dawn of the new millennium. Postmodern narrative was being used in academic and professional dimensions, such as arts, literature, education, architecture, planning and many others. Cities, such as Los Angles, were observed in the light of the postmodern theory when people attempted to interpret their forms and functions.

Fundamentally, as modes of thinking about the world, postmodernism is a reaction to ‘modernism’. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, modernism came under heavy criticism and, in some people’s view, it was swept away (Logan 2003:19). However modernism clearly prevailed in the first three quarters of the twentieth century and was accompanied by modernity, which Marshall Berman (1983) saw as a
condition or way of life, a maelstrom in which men and women all over the world were caught up at this time. According to Berman, the condition of modernity was fed from many sources – great discoveries in the physical science, the industrialization of production, and the development of systems of mass communication, powerful national states and mass social movements of people and peoples – which, in the twentieth century, became together to be known as the process of ‘modernization’ (Berman 1983:16). Heynen (1999) held a view that focused more on the relationship between the present and the past. According to Heynen, the current, the new and the transient were the three levels of meaning particularly important in the concept of modernity. In this sense, Heynen agreed that modernization was a process of breaking away from tradition, impacting profoundly on people’s way of thinking as well as lifestyle. From the architectural history point of view, Heynen saw modernity epitomized by the Modern Movement, which constituted a ‘legitimate answer’ to the experience of modernity, although modernity in architectural terms did not become as uncompromising and radical as the artistic avant-garde, and therefore was not identical to the latter (Heynen 1999: 28-9). In a way, Heynen shared a common view with Cunninham (1998a), who observed that the nature of the Modern Movement was featured by the rupture with tradition and experiments by its pioneers and successors with new social system, materials and colours. Modernity in an architectural context, argued Cunningham, might therefore be defined as that which is innovative in its social, technical and aesthetic intentions (Cunningham 1998a:15).

Heynen (1999:9) took a view that modernity was an exclusively Western concept that had no equivalent in other civilizations, an argument based on the linear Western view of time, a progressive model that replaced other models. In a globalizing world, however, we have to acknowledge that concepts and notions can hardly be seen as exclusively Western or Eastern, as boundaries between cultures are becoming blurred and cultures are influencing each other. It is arguable that societies all over the world have their experience of modernity and modernization. Nevertheless, it is also arguable that in different cultural contexts, modernity may not necessarily appear in the same form or follow the same model. It may have acquired different meanings and been interpreted in different ways and, indeed, it is important for people to appreciate difference in the meaning of modernity, and the approaches to modernization in different societies.
This thesis discusses modernity and modernization in the light of social changes in China during the twentieth century. In Chinese context, it has been widely accepted that modernization began from the 1840s when the country was forced open to the industrialized West. When the notion of modernity was introduced to China in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese translation for ‘modern’ was ‘modeng’, meaning ‘novel and/or fashionable’. Now this word has two equivalent Chinese phrases, ‘jin dai’ and ‘xian dai’. The former particularly refers to the semi-colonial period in Chinese history from 1840 to 1949, and the later means ‘contemporary times’.

From the Chinese point of view, the term modernity was imported from the West, and things related to modernity were also of Western origin, the term modernity itself is therefore closely linked, if not all equivalent, to science, technology, as well as new ideas and a political system derived from Western civilization and Western types of rationality and reasoning. Like modernity, modern in Chinese context also has the connotation of ‘Western’. As an imported notion that has developed in Chinese context for over a century, modernity has been given meanings that reflect the reality of the Chinese society. Similarly, the Chinese approaches to modernization are different from Western models. In the Mao era from the 1950s to the 1970s, for example, modernization mainly meant industrialization and diminishing the gaps between China and the West in terms industrial productivity.

Such a divergence about modernity did not go unnoticed. Bryna Goodman (1995), in the study on the urban identity of Shanghai, saw the lack of awareness in the West of such divergence. Goodman observed that, from the Western perspective, it was difficult to see the ways in which ‘China’ and ‘modernity’ fit together. ‘Insofar as we model modernity after ourselves, “modern China” will remain an oxymoron with which we interact but to which we refuse admission into our modern pantheon’ (Goodman 1995:309). Peter Rowe and Seng Kuan (Rowe and Kuan 2002:201-5), from an architectural point of view, sought an insight into the adaptation of Western civilization in China under the official principle adopted in the late nineteenth century: Zhongxueweit, Xixueweiyong (Chinese study as essence and Western study as practice), their study came to a conclusion that the process of modernization in China did not take the Western ‘standard model’. Indeed, Chinese modernization took place in a historic context that was entirely different from that in the West. To this
particular process, the fixed standards for modernization widely accepted in the West are not applicable. At the earliest stage of Chinese modernization in the late nineteenth century, this process has been embodied in the official rhetoric of ‘Chinese study as essence and Western study as practice’. During the Mao era, it was ‘Yangweizhongyong’ – foreign things serve Chinese needs, and currently, modernization in China is carried on under the slogan of ‘socialist with Chinese characters’. For this reason, modernization in China follows its own path, as Rowe (ibid) has argued, it is a self-determined process and should not be measured by Western standards.

One may ask, then, did postmodern narrative encompass all societies? If so, what relevance had it to societies of different cultures? King (1995) remarked that both the modern and the postmodern were Euro-American concepts. So be it. Nevertheless, it could be argued that notions of ‘the modern’ and ‘the postmodern’ were becoming increasingly relevant to non-Western societies in the late decades of the twentieth century, as those societies were experiencing the transition towards modernity. In these societies, ‘the modern’ and ‘modernity’ were measured with reference not only to their own past, but also to other societies. It should be noted, however, that notions of the modern and the postmodern might be interpreted in different ways from the different perspectives of differing social and cultural contexts. In the West, postmodernism was seen as the critical review of modernism, which condemned the uniform, patriarchal, rationalist and hierarchical structures of Western modernism, and gave primacy to difference, to heterogeneity, to paradox and contradiction, and to local knowledge (Turner 1994:11). In contrast, postmodernism was interpreted by some Chinese scholars as an anti-modernity trend of thought with a deconstructive, anti-national and anti-science nature, and mainly related to social diseases in Western society (Yu 1997).

Some sociologists and philosophers in the West were concerned about the damaging consequences of modernity to human society and the environment. They hoped that a critical review of modernity would allow the rest of the world to envisage postmodern ways of relating to each other, to the rest of nature, and to the cosmos as a whole. In commenting the preface of the Chinese translation of the _Re-enchantment of Science_ by David Ray Griffin (1995), Han Keqing (2003), one of the leading Chinese
sociologists, acknowledged the goodwill of the former, who expressed his wishes in
the preface that the devastating consequences of modernity could be avoided by China
through lessons learnt by the West in the course of modernization. Nevertheless, Han
maintained that modernity was an indispensable phase in the course of social
development. Han also observed that the gap between China and the West in the
contemporary time was in fact the gap between tradition and modernity, the
modernization process in China was therefore a transitional process from tradition to
modernity, and that modernity, instead of postmodernity, should be the most urgent
issue for China to deal with, as postmodernity had to be based on modernity after all.
It seemed that what concerned scholars in China was the inertia coming from
traditional ways, rather than the uniform, patriarchal, rationalist and hierarchical
structures of Western modernism. Therefore priority should be given to
modernization. Surveying Chinese literature on the issue of modernization, one could
find that this viewpoint was widely shared. For example, Yu Xingtian, a Shanghai
based scholar, suggested that tradition might be restored after the society reached a
certain level of modernity, and articulated his view with the ‘success story of
Singapore’ (Yu 1997:255). In later chapters, one may find that such a viewpoint about
modernization and tradition, in fact, was not confined to the academic circle, but
prevailing in urban modernization practices, although it was regarded as incorrect by
some others outside China, through lessons from other Asian cities including

While interpretations of the postmodern were different between societies, the
postmodern narrative was, after all, based on a Western worldview. Postmodernism
was regarded as the reaction against cultural conformity and hegemony, an effort to
emphasise cultural distinctiveness and diversity. Meanwhile, however, postmodernism was also referred to as a two-edged sword. Steven Connor (1989:234)
saw postmodernism bringing cultural ‘peripheries’ into the ‘centre’ by articulating the
margins and voicing the ‘Other’. Nevertheless, Connor also saw the other aspect of
postmodern theory by quoting Richard Nelly: while postmodern theory rejected the
notion of cultural ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, and recognized differences between
cultures, the risk was that the recognition of cultural differences was based on a
theoretical coding which always reaffirms the primacy of the knowledge of the West
(Connor 1989; Nelly 1987). If so, the postmodern tendency for cultural diversity did
not seem to have moved very far from what had been described by Edward Said as Orientalism — with which the Western ‘Us’ claimed superiority over the Eastern ‘Other’. Such a paradox in postmodern theory could also be found in the international conventions in heritage conservation. While cultural identity and cultural diversity were focal points in heritage issues, European-originated concepts and practices were still asserting dominance.

**Literature on heritage and memory**

In the 1970s the term ‘heritage’ began to be adopted by UNESCO in reference to both the built and natural remnants of the past. Since then, the meaning of heritage has broadened to encompass a wide range of the remnants of the past, material and spiritual, tangible and intangible. Definition of ‘what is heritage’ has also become more complex, varying in different cultural settings. Now an accepted notion is that, by referring to ‘heritage’, people express what they valued in the past (Davison 1991:4-6). As far as cultural heritage is concerned, it may consist of those elements created by a society or community in the past which provided that society or community today with a sense of its own identity and worth (Logan 2000b).

The heritage boom has been interpreted from various perspectives. The heritage boom in the late twentieth century was regarded by some as a kind of reaction against the homogenous structure of modernity. To cultural peripheries, a tolerance for cultural diversity helped to bring back to life the heritage of local minorities (Lim 1998:87). Increasing concerns with urban heritage reflected the rejection of modernism, manifested physically by the similar, bland, pragmatic built form, for example the box-like highrise buildings that were often referred to as of an ‘international style’. The heritage boom was also seen as linked to the terrifying speed of change and the degradation of the quality of life. David Lowenthal observed that the concern about heritage might be regarded as a reaction to the fast moving society and people’s fear of the uncertain future. ‘Mourning past neglect, we cherish islands of security in seas of change’ (Lowenthal 1996:6). In an era when economies and cultures were deeply impacted upon by the globalization process, concerns with heritage reflected the anxiety about the loss of identity. In this sense, the heritage boom in the late decades of the twentieth century, to quote Lowenthal again, mainly functioned to confirm the identity and boost the solidarity of nations (Lowenthal 1994:44).
In a dynamic society such as China, where a rapid development was underway in the late twentieth century, heritage interest and debates have yet other focuses. Literature of Chinese sources after the 1980s showed the rising concerns about threats to cultural heritage including historic townscape. Debates on heritage issues constantly appeared in newspapers, journals and other media forms. A primary focal point of heritage debates in China was the relevance of heritage to modernization, coinciding neatly with the official perception of heritage and conservation, which sees heritage as a new tool to promote national identity and to seek economic benefit. As explained earlier, the modernization process in China is partially a process of catching up with developed countries in the West, and heritage conservation is now considered an aspect of this process. In his speech to an assembly of Chinese mayors, Wen Jiabao, Vice Premier of China\(^1\), maintained that heritage was important because it provided the foundation for modernization, including urban modernization (Wen 2001). The same point was made by heritage professionals (Dong 2001). Furthermore, heritage conservation was regarded as a higher stage of modernization, and a benchmark of a developed society. Wang Jinghui,\(^2\) a leading conservationist, observed that the current situation of heritage conservation did not match China’s status as a great civilization. To illustrate his view, Wang compared China with England, and pointed out the gap between the two in this aspect, with China obviously lagging behind: the registered sites in China were about one fifth of the number in England, although the latter was geographically much smaller (Zhao 2000).

A survey of Chinese literature on heritage conservation, particularly on urban conservation, showed that publication in this area was overwhelmingly by architectural and planning professionals, such as Dong Jianhong and Ruan Yisan (1993), Wang Jinghui (1999) and Zhang Song (2001). Arguments were largely based on international heritage principles. A strong message conveyed in these publications was again that conservation was a part of modernization. What seemed lacking in those publications, however, was a critical examination of those principles and their

---

\(^1\) Wen Jiabao was Vice Premier of China from 1998 to 2003 and became Premier in 2003.

\(^2\) Wang was a senior member of the State Committee for the Conservation of Historical Cultural Cities, also a senior official from the Division of Urban Planning of the State Ministry of Construction.
compatibility to the Chinese situation at the time. With research conducted from the architectural/planning point of view, social and historical studies were often beyond the scope of these publications. Although strong points were made for conservation, often accompanied with harsh criticisms about indiscriminate demolition in the course of urban modernization, little exploration was conducted about the embedded perceptions of cultural heritage among the general public, as well as imperatives for development that faced China. Thus the questions were left largely unanswered about the inconsistency between what officials said and what they actually did to cultural heritage, and about repeated breaches of government regulations as well as professional guidelines on heritage conservation.

Strongly focusing on cultural identity and cultural diversity, heritage concerns and initiatives in the late twentieth century obviously felt the impact of the postmodern worldview. Heritage concepts were found to be enlarged to cover broader notions, and became more inclusive (Davison 1991; Logan 2000b). Along with the booming heritage industry, however, was the growing concern about the uncritical or unintegrated adoption of European-originated heritage concepts and practices in non-Western societies. The issue of cultural diversity in the area of heritage conservation attracted heated debates, with rising voices urging the recognition of such diversity (Larsen 1995; Lowenthal 1996). Already there were voices calling for the awareness of the possible consequence of using international heritage conventions that were strongly affected by Western influences (Sullivan 1991). Also greater variation emerged in terms of heritage philosophies, principles and practices. The Nara Document on Authenticity (The Nara Document), based on presentations and reflections of the participants of the 1994 Nara Conference on Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention, embodied the Conference’s key note – the diversity of cultures and of heritage. The Nara Document, as Knut Einar Larsen put it, marked the change in international heritage endeavours, a shift from a ‘eurocentric approach to a postmodern position characterized by recognition of cultural relativism’ (Larsen 1995:xiii).

History, legacies, memories, heritage and identity, are all interlocked terms which have attracted scholarly examination. As the heritage industry boomed, these issues appeared more interdependent upon each other. David Lowenthal (1996) aimed his
inquiries into the relationship between heritage and history by exploring the reason for and the consequence of the heritage boom, the expectation people have for history and heritage, and the ‘rivalry between history and heritage’. Is heritage more prone to inaccuracy, compared with history? Lowenthal’s argument was that heritage and history had something in common: while heritage was accused of being distorting and selective, history was biased and did not give the truth. Despite the inaccuracy and vulgarity, Lowenthal contended that heritage was important to many for whom historical accuracy was not the primary concern, but rather the establishing of the identity of a group, a community or a nation through particular, unique legacies. Lowenthal claimed that heritage would not lose its value just because of the fact that it was subjective rather than objective. He emphasised that it was selected by people, for the creation of their particular identities, and that there is a common point where heritage and history can complement, rather than undermine each other.

Heritage, as well as history, is by nature selective and biased. This is because, after all, both have to be used for particular purposes. This assumption then leads to other topics such as the roles of memory and identity. Richard Handler (1994:29) stated that there was no unchanging ‘identity’: identity was changing, constructing and reconstructing. If this assumption of identity was acceptable, then it could be also argued that ‘identity’ might be seen as having two sides: the identity in ones own eyes, and the identity in the eyes of the ‘Other’, and there could always be a gap between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ about a particular identity, and the defining process of the identity could be selective. The notion of ‘identity’ is closely linked with nationalism, ethnicity and locality, and is an important element in the dimension of ideology. ‘Identity’ has to be established and maintained through selected memory, history and heritage, to convey certain ideological messages, and to reinforce the integrity of a nation, a community or a group. The case study by Janette Philp (1998) demonstrated the ideological use of heritage in Burma where the military regime was promoting ‘construction of a national identity in which strong links with a Buddhist Burmese heritage have been forged’. Such a filtering process applies to memory, which, too, can be selective and used for certain purposes. That explains such a thing as ‘collective amnesia’ (Gills 1994:7) where certain memories are deliberately erased in heritage selection and interpretation. Again it can be argued that differences remain
between different cultures as to what memory should be retained and what should be discarded, a question to which there was no conforming answer.

*Heritage and tourism*

It is a world trend that heritage issues have stretched beyond the cultural and historical dimensions to take their places in the field of economic operation and development. Interests in built heritage, similarly, do not merely represent academic and scientific concerns over historic sites. Such interests often rise out of economic considerations. Links between interest in historic sites and economic imperatives are most apparent in the area of tourism.

As tourism became a fast growing industry in the later half of the twentieth century, it attracted debates and concerns on an international scale. For a long time tourism and heritage were interdependent with each other. Among heritage professionals, international interest in and concerns over this interdependence could be traced back to as early as the 1970s when ICOMOS members met in Brussels in 1976 and drew up a *Charter of Cultural Tourism*, which was revised in 1999. Such concerns were growing over the time along with the increased exploitation of heritage sites by the tourist industry, which led to the commodification of culture, the destruction of the natural/cultural environment, and the deprivation of people in developing societies of their traditional value and way of life. Warnings were given about the consequences of the commodification of heritage, for example, the ‘Disneyfication’ in which culture and history were transformed into ‘heritage’, as well as the tendency of modern tourism to become “colonialism in another guise” by which local resources and people were heavily exploited (Nicholson-Lord 1997). People were also aware of the extension of conservation into ‘improving’ heritage to fit into images thought to be desired by consumers (Prentice 1993:223) in which the notion of conservation was abused to justify the generation of economic benefits.

In contrast, a prevailing view in China about the growth of tourism was that it was a welcome indication that China’s economy was being shaped into a global framework, Tourism authorities held the view that heritage was a new tourism resource to be explored. Under the pressure of economic imperatives, heritage professionals sometimes had to argue for conservation on the grounds of the economic potential of
heritage sites, for example, as Professor Ruan Yisan did in his experiment with Zhou Zhuang, a small country town near Shanghai (Ruan, Huang, and Cheng 1996). During the 1990s, articles about tourism in China in *Beijing Review* – a major official news bulletin published in foreign languages – gave people a clear message that tourism was an important and effective tool in boosting the national as well as regional economy. Existing publications on China’s tourism, with contributions both by Chinese and foreign scholars, such as Jenkins and Liu (1997), focused mainly on planning and marketing strategies. In cultural tourism, authenticity was one of the major issues and postmodernity was sometimes used to justify the loss of cultural authenticity. Cohen (1995) observed that postmodern tourists were less concerned with the authenticity of the original. This was echoed by Wang Ning (1999a:358-365), a China based scholar, who argued for the ‘existential authenticity’ as an alternative source in tourism. In addition to conventional objective and constructive authenticity, Wang concluded, an ‘existential’ version was an inevitable, and justifiable alternative source for an authentic experience in tourism in postmodern conditions. This argument in fact aimed to legitimate such practice as the creation and replication of heritage to fit the desire of tourists and, though made in a global setting, provided a clue to understanding the current debates over the authenticity of built heritage as well as the beautification, and even re-creation of historic sites in China.

*Legislation, professional guidelines and charters on heritage conservation*

There are numerous international charters on heritage conservation. Among these, the 1964 *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* (The Venice Charter) has been taken as the main conceptual basis for conservation practices internationally. The 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage marked the start of era of the modern conservation movement in a global sense. As mentioned above, with international heritage conventions widely applied to different societies, people became more conscious of the issue of diversity in culture and heritage. Important conservation documents in this sense included *Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance* (The Burra Charter), and the 1995 Nara Document. The Burra Charter, based on the general philosophy of the Venice Charter, made adaptations to suit Australian circumstances, and its core was the respect for the cultural significance of heritage places. The Nara Document, as
mentioned above, was significant because it was radical on the issue of authenticity, arguing for respect for, and recognition of heritage philosophy and practices of non-Western cultures.

In China, heritage conservation has drawn increased attention from state and local authorities since the 1980s. In 1982 the first national heritage law was passed and since then two revisions have been made to the law. Within the general framework of the national heritage law, heritage legislation has been formulated at provincial and municipal levels. In Shanghai, heritage legislation was passed and put into effect in 1991. In addition to heritage legislation, professional guidelines have been developed as a supplement to the national heritage law. It is worth noting that international consultation was sought in the formulation of professional guidelines, and joint ventures have taken place between Chinese and international institutions. The most significant fruit of such joint ventures has been the formulation of the 2002 Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China (The China Principles) issued by China ICOMOS, drawing on both China’s conservation experience and international expertise from the United States and Australia.

How has China been influenced by the international trend of conservation? To what extent has the globalization of culture been reflected in China’s heritage laws and guidelines? How compatible is the international trend of conservation with the Chinese cultural tradition? How compatible is the national law and guidelines with those at provincial and municipal levels, for example in Shanghai? How can effective heritage legislation be implemented under the great pressure for urban modernization? These questions arise where the heritage conservation movement has touched great cities in China such as Shanghai, and are explored in this thesis.

In summary, this thesis is an attempt at cross-disciplinary research, which, while tackling various issues, has as its focal point the impact of globalization on heritage in Shanghai. The existing literature certainly has much information to offer but, as was demonstrated by the above literature review, a link is yet to be built up between the urban transformation of Shanghai and the phenomenon of economic and cultural globalization. This study is intended to help fill in some missing parts of the existing
literature, notably by adding a socio-cultural vision of heritage conservation in China, with a specific reference to Shanghai.

**Overview of the Thesis**

The thesis consists of eight chapters including the introduction (Chapter One). The rest of the thesis will be divided into the following seven chapters to allow investigations from various viewpoints.

*Chapter Two: Shanghai as a semi-colonial city:*

This chapter provides the historic background of Shanghai as one of the first cities in China to be opened to the outside world, a meeting place for both Chinese and Western cultures in the semi-colonial period of Chinese history. The goal of this chapter is to observe the impact of the Western civilization and cultures on Shanghai, from the historic perspective. The interaction between the Western and local cultures resulted in what was called ‘*Hai Pai Wen Hua* (Shanghai Culture)’ which made Shanghai distinctive from any other cities in China. Shanghai does not have a long history, but it is recognized as an historic city by the Central Government. The historical significance of Shanghai obviously lies in its treaty port legacy. This chapter discusses the Chinese-Western interactions and clashes, the way in which foreigners were treated by the Chinese, the way the Chinese were treated by foreigners and the way Shanghai was treated by the rest of the country. This chapter is not merely a narration of the Old Shanghai tales, but rather, it aims to inquire into the economic and cultural impact that the Western settlement left on Shanghai, and the prestige that Shanghai acquired during its modern history.

*Chapter Three: History, memory and heritage in modern China*

These issues are inter-related. In this chapter the term ‘heritage’ covers a broader meaning than just old buildings. The threat to Shanghai’s heritage places during the urban modernization in the 1990s can be seen as an example of the threat to heritage places in the whole country during the same period, and the demolition of the built heritage, in fact, is a reflection of people’s attitudes to the past and its values. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire into the embedded perception of history, tradition and heritage in the current Chinese society. Without such inquiries, the discussion about
the current threat to built heritage will be largely in technical terms. In order to explore the cultural factors that have influenced the current perceptions towards heritage, this chapter discusses the issues of history, tradition and heritage in the light of the major events that China has experienced since the mid-nineteenth century. This is the modernization period in China. It has witnessed turbulence as well as drastic changes in all aspects. During this period, nationalism and communism have brought about new ideas and ideologies, which in turn have impacted strongly upon the outlook of the history, tradition and heritage of the nation.

Chapter Four: Shanghai in the 1990s – heading for modernization.
This chapter demonstrates the scale and speed of urban development in Shanghai and changes in the built environment, under both political and economic imperatives during the 1990s. The 1990s was the decade that witnessed Shanghai’s most rapid and dramatic urban transformation. The chapter places Shanghai in the new settings of China’s economic takeoff in the reform era, when Shanghai was urged by the Chinese government to resume its legacy as an international financial and trade hub, and to become the powerhouse for the nation’s economy. Comparisons have been drawn between Shanghai and other Chinese economic centres such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen in terms of the politic and economic imperatives imposed on each of them. This chapter also outlines the construction of the Pudong New Area and the urban re-development in the original Shanghai proper. It identifies both external factors (such as international investment) and internal factors (such as the pressure of upgrading people’s living standards) contributing to the speed and scale of Shanghai’s urban transformation during the 1990s. By doing so, it helps to lead to discussions on the threats and damages to Shanghai’s heritage places in chapter five.

Chapter Five: Changes in Shanghai’s urban fabric – impact on the built heritage
Based on field visits, literature surveys, media reports, as well as interviews, this chapter aims to identify the impact of the urban redevelopment on Shanghai’s heritage places. As a case study, this chapter has focused upon designated heritage areas that represent Shanghai’s semi-colonial history and the distinct urban culture. These areas include the Old City, the Bund, Nanjing Road, the former KMT Shanghai Municipal Centre and residential quarters in the former International and French Concessions. Most of the designated areas are located in the inner city and have been under the
greatest pressure for development. Since the 1990s they have been the most affected areas in the process of urban renewal. After outlining the historic background and identifying their historic significance, the chapter aims to investigate changes brought to these areas by urban redevelopment, as well as confrontation between conservation and development.

Chapter Six: Heritage conservation system in Shanghai
The key issue to be dealt with in this chapter is the heritage legislation. It focuses on the issue of implementation of the national heritage laws as well as the municipal conservation policy. The chapter has looked into the municipal protection code and its implementation in particular. While introduction of the production code should be regarded as a remarkable achievement, analysis of the document has attempted to identify their weak points. Discussion of the conservation canon in this chapter is conducted in the context of the bureaucratic system and the layout of government agencies involved in conservation efforts, as well as the current lobby mechanism in the Shanghai Municipality. It is argued in this chapter that despite the more liberalized economy, the Chinese political system remains largely a centralized and arbitrating one and, because of this, the government sympathy and government coordination is still a crucial factor in the process of heritage conservation.

Chapter Seven: Tourism and cultural heritage – the Shanghai experience
This chapter discusses the impact of modern tourism on Shanghai’s heritage places. It looks into the development of tourism as a key industry in Shanghai, and the exploitation by tourism operators of Shanghai’s reputation as a ‘historic cultural city’. The chapter aims to investigate the relationship between heritage conservation and tourism demands. This involves the issue of historic truthfulness in renovating and presenting heritage sites to tourists and the pursuit for economic returns at the cost of the historic significance of heritage sites.

Chapter Eight: Heritage conservation in Shanghai – a picture in global setting
Whereas urban transformation in Shanghai has been reviewed in the context of the globalization of the world economy, development pressures and the conservation movement have also been reviewed in a global setting. Comparison has been drawn between the development of the conservation process in China and that in the rest of
the world. China ICOMOS 'Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites' in China has been studied in light of China's integration into the global system. This chapter brings the thesis to a conclusion by arguing that, while economic reform has embraced the global trends of economy, heritage conservation is also increasingly following the global practices in this field, and forms a part of the nation's agenda for 'cultural modernization'.
CHAPTER TWO: SHANGHAI A SEMI-COLONIAL CITY

Shanghai is one of the 101 ‘Cities of historical and cultural significance’ designated by the Chinese Government. However, in Chinese history Shanghai was little known until the late nineteenth century. Over the course of the few thousand years since 221 B.C. when Qin Shihuang unified China, there have been a large number of prestigious cities at different stages. Some of them were political centres, such as Beijing, Nanjing, Xian, Kaifeng and Luoyang; some were places of military significance, such as Xuzhou; while yet others such as Yangzhou, Suzhou and Hangzhou were famous for either natural wealth, intellectual resources or outstanding landscape. Compared with these cities, Shanghai was politically and culturally insignificant and lacked natural beauty. Why then was it given the title of ‘City of Cultural and Historical Significance’? To seek the answer to this question one has to look at the modern history of Shanghai between the 1840s and the 1940s. It was during this period that Shanghai experienced a transformation from a regional trade centre to an international metropolis and the leader of the Chinese economy. This period of one hundred years means too much for the Chinese people to be overlooked, for it witnessed the transition of Chinese society, from a feudalist to a semi-colonial system, from monarchy to republic, and the early efforts of modernization. In this sense Shanghai was a prime example and the mirror of Chinese society in transition. From 1843 onwards, Shanghai played the role of a meeting place of civilizations and cultures. It became a legend in less than one hundred years and was already a world city by the 1920s-1930s. The particular experience of Shanghai made it the birthplace of modern China and the Shanghai legacy has been much referred to and exploited in the current process of Chinese modernization.

This chapter seeks to explain why Shanghai became so quickly a city of historical and cultural significance through:

1. An analysis of the changing status of Shanghai before and after the Opium War;
2. An investigation of the hybrid nature of Shanghai, in particular as the result of conflicts and compromizes between local and foreign cultures.
Shanghai Before 1843

It is now alleged that human habitation in the Shanghai Region can be traced back as far as 6000 years (Zhang 1990:8), but in ancient times Shanghai was not a favourable site for people to live. Due to its closeness to the sea and constant attacks by floods and ocean storms, the soil in the Shanghai area was not suitable for rice growing. This meant land remained uncultivated until the thirteenth century, when inhabitants started growing cotton and slowly started to improve the soil quality. This geographic disadvantage not only prevented Shanghai from being agriculturally productive, but also affected the city’s political status. The region was referred to as ‘Hai Ou Huang Man’ (an uncivilized barren land at a remote corner by the sea), and there was no official administration seat there until the thirteenth century. Actually there would not have been a ‘Shanghai’ at all had it not been for the decline of Qing Long Town, a trade centre at the Songjiang River, which ceased to function because the waterway nearby silted up. In 1267 Shanghai Town was established to replace Qinglong Town as a trade port, and in 1292 Shanghai County was established as a regional administration centre. As a trade port, the rise and fall of Shanghai was subject to the Imperial Court’s maritime transportation policies. During the early years of the Qing Dynasty, maritime transportation and trade were banned, and as a result Shanghai suffered a slump. However, in 1684 the maritime ban was lifted by the Imperial Court and trade was restored in Shanghai. In 1685 the office for a Superintendent of Merchant Ships was established in Shanghai, one of four in China. It was renamed ‘the Grand Customs House’ in 1842 and was the predecessor of the present Shanghai Customs. Shanghai remained a market town and a regional business centre throughout the Qing Dynasty and in 1730 the office of the Taotai (the circuit intendant) of Su-Sung Tai Tao was transferred from Suzhou to Shanghai as the Imperial Court intended to exercise greater control over trade ports. The office was later referred to as Shanghai Tao. The term Tao denoted a government administration unit in the Qing Dynasty, positioned between the levels of provincial government and county magistracy. In the case of Shanghai Tao, it was the administrative centre of twenty counties on the southern part of the lower Yangtze River, in charge of political, military, farming, fishing and taxation affairs.
The region along the lower Yangtze River consists of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and includes major cities such as Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing (Nanking) and Yangzhou, all well known in Chinese history. Thanks to the rich soil, ample water resources and mild climate, this area was among the wealthiest regions of China. The area on the Southern side of the Yangtze, known as Jiangnan, was especially recognized for its prosperity and was referred to as Yu Mi Zhi Xiang (land of fish and rice), a Chinese phrase for a blessed land of abundant agricultural output. Due to the material richness, the living standard of the region was comparatively high and local customs were seen as romantic and exquisite. Belonging to the Wu Kingdom in ancient China, the native culture of this area was known as ‘Wu culture’ and was considered one of the major sub-cultures in Confucian China. It was commented by Leung (1990) that the Wu culture appealed to the elite class because of its emphasis on a taste for art, literature and beauty, and an elegant lifestyle. The Wu culture attached much importance to education and despised menial labour and physical violence, an attitude interpreted by some Chinese as peace-loving and genteel, but by others as weak and inherent cowardice.

As part of the Jiangnan Region Shanghai was much influenced by the ‘Wu culture’, but historically it was never the cultural leader. Instead, during the pre-1843 days, it was considered as culturally insignificant in the region. As the natural conditions of the Shanghai area were not good, the local population had to find ways other than agriculture to survive and that trade turned out to be the main factor contributing to the early development of Shanghai. Trade boosted the local economy and brought Shanghai recognition from the Court for its commercial importance, although this did not necessarily bring Shanghai the same level of recognition from the political and cultural elites of the time. Shanghai was designated a county seat in 1292, which was the lowest level in the hierarchical system of Imperial Court—Province—Prefecture—County, and it remained so designated during the following 500 years. This was primarily due to the geographic location of Shanghai: as was pointed out above, exposure to the open seas effectively prevented it from becoming a political centre. Secondly, the commercial nature of Shanghai was unlikely to be a credit for political claims. Since the main stream of the Chinese culture was built on the institution and ideology of Confucianism, which denied commerce and trade any superior status, Shanghai logically would have little cultural prestige in the context of
Confucianism tradition. In spite of the fact that Shanghai was already a town with a strong economy and commercial importance and was even given a more significant political status when the seat of Tao was transferred there from Suzhou, it was still somewhat looked down upon by cultural elites. Wang Tao, a scholar from Suzhou, for example, remarked in the 1850s that Shanghai locals were ‘rough and rustic, few of whom were worth engaging in converzation’ (Zhang 1990:881). He lamented that the Confucian ‘Li’ (etiquette) was lost in Shanghai despite a handful of Confucian scholars struggling to retain it (Wu 1997:9).

While ignored culturally and politically, Shanghai might have enjoyed more freedom from the influence and constraints of Confucian doctrine, which was the essence of the official belief during feudalist times. For instance, the Confucian ideology required people to exercise self-control and even self-denial if necessary for the benefit of social order and moral propriety. In the sense of material life, one should live in a frugal not an extravagant way, but the sixteenth century witnessed a boom of private gardens in Shanghai, according to Wu (ibid), lavishly built and owned by Bohemian scholars and politicians who were out of Court favour. One outstanding garden was Yu Yuan (Yuan: Chinese for Garden), which was built in 1559. Like most of the gardens at the time, Yu Yuan deteriorated in the mid-seventeenth century and in 1760 was handed over to a business establishment that shared the costs of its refurbishment. Later it was affiliated to the Temple of the City God and opened to the public, at the same time used by its patrons as the office and meeting place. During the Cultural Revolution, Yu Yuan was closed for two years and one of the stone bridges in the garden, Huanlong Bridge, was demolished and part of the garden was used as an air raid shelter. After 1978 Yu Yuan experienced a few major restorations and refurbishments, which were conducted on the basis of the late eighteenth century plan (Chen and Wang 2000:261-3), and the garden remains one of the few Chinese monumental sites in

Figure 2: The Mid-Lake Pavilion in the early 1900s.

(Source: The Scene of Old Shanghai Shanghai Pictorial Publishing House: 2001)
Shanghai today. The structures that acted as the emblems of Yu Yuan were the Mid-Lake Pavilion (Figure 2) standing in the middle of the Lotus Lake and Jiu Qu Qiao, a zigzag bridge leading to the Pavilion over the Lake. The Pavilion, used as a tea-house, is praised by architects today as being free from the Chinese architectural convention, being extraordinarily informal but vivid (Luo 1989).

As a trading port, commercial business inevitably played the key role in the social life of Shanghai. Many streets in the Old City were named after a certain kind of trade such as Dou Shi Jie (Bean Market Street), Hua Shi Jie (Cotton Market Street) and Cai Yi Xiang (Garment Lane). Trade guilds sprang up as a result of commercial prosperity in Shanghai. They were densely located around the Temple of the City God and Yu Yuan, and were used as an office and meeting place since these guilds had contributed to the refurbishment of the Garden. This pragmatic use of such a sacred venue as the temple might have been much frowned upon elsewhere but it was accepted as unproblematic in Shanghai, and the precinct of the Temple is still a busy shopping area today. Pragmatic attitudes such as this were also reflected by scholarly learning and research activities in Shanghai, where science and other practical subjects—for example taxation, hydrology, geography and surveying—became more popular than the pure theoretical studies of the official philosophies from the late sixteenth century onwards (Zhang 1990:910).

As a trading port, external contacts in Shanghai went beyond the commercial realm. Xu Guangqi (1562—1633) was one of the few Shanghai scholars (compared to a much larger number of scholars from Jiangnan Region) who were appointed to important positions in the Imperial Court. Being a prestigious figure of the Shanghai gentry at the time, Xu was only in his 40s when he was put in charge of the Royal Academy in the Imperial Court. Soon he was learning Western science from an Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (1552—1611), and it was Xu who introduced geometry to China for the first time. In addition, Xu and his whole family were converted to Catholicism. After retirement from public service in 1608 Xu invited another Italian, Fazzaro Cattaneo, and other Catholic missionaries to open a church in his native village. The Xu family owned an estate in Shanghai’s western suburb and in later years this estate grew into a village, which gradually became the town of Xujiahui. The estate also became a base of active evangelism and a shelter for Jesuit missionaries as well as Chinese converts (Leung 1990:38).
As a trading centre, Shanghai was also a connecting point to the inland provinces. It was a city of immigrants from the very early stage. The rise in Shanghai’s political and economic status occurred in the seventeenth century, under the reign of Qing Dynasty (1616-1911). For most of the time of that era, China was closed to the outside world, and external commercial exchanges and inter-regional population flow was limited. People would hardly expect anyone else to behave differently from themselves or to speak a different dialect, and they had nicknames for those considered as ‘outsiders’. However, Shanghai had to be more compatible in order to develop since its prosperity relied heavily on trade. Migrants had already been an important component of the Shanghai population before Shanghai was opened for the Western settlement in 1843, and there were a large number of guild houses in the town for people of the same native background or of the same business interest. Most Shanghai citizens today would find their families originated elsewhere if they tracked their family trees back for just two or three generations. This characteristic of immigrant society might have helped Shanghai cope with the Western settlement on its soil after 1843.

1843: Shanghai Was Opened as a Treaty Port

The Treaty of Nanking and Shanghai Land Regulations

In 1842 The Treaty of Nanking was signed between China and Britain, as a result of the Chinese defeat in the Opium War. The Treaty designated Guangzhou (Canton), Fuzhou, Shanghai, Xiamen (Amoy) and Ningbo as trade ports to be opened up to trade and residency by British Nationals. Western settlement in Shanghai in fact began in 1843. In November 1843 George Balfour, the first British consul to Shanghai arrived and started land lease negotiations with Gong Mujiu, Shanghai’s Taotai. After about two years, both sides agreed that the land between Li Jia Chang (now Jingling Road East) and Yang King Pang Creek (now Yanan Road East) was to be leased to the British. In November 1845 Gong Mujiu promulgated the Shanghai Land Regulations as an official document. In 1846 the boundary was finalized for the leased area as follows: the Huangpu River to the east, Boundary Road (now Henan Road South) to the west, Li Jia Chang to the north and Yang Jing Pang to the south. It was assumed that the designation of settlement was more the initiative of Gong
Mujiu, for the Treaty of Nanking and subsequent treaties did not spell out the concept of a definite foreign area (Leung 1990:48). However, records (Inglis 1976; Zhang 1990; Zheng 1999c) suggested that Balfour was already interested in this area after he was instructed by Henry Pottinger, the first Governor to the British colony of Hong Kong (1843-1844), who had led the British occupation of Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai, to choose a suitable location in Shanghai for the purpose of future British settlement soon after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking.

Obviously both Gong Mujiu and Balfour considered the location appropriate for future settlement as an agreement was quickly reached between them. Balfour might have seen the geographic advantage of this area embraced by two key waterways, the Huangpu River and the Wusong River (now the Suzhou Creek), while Gong Mujiu might have thought the location suitable because it was of some distance away from the City (hereafter referred to as the Old City) where the Chinese locals lived. This meant that Chinese residents would not be disturbed by foreigners—something the Taotai would rather not see happening. It was said that Balfour's first night as the British consul to Shanghai was spent in a boat, for the Taotai was reluctant to find him a lodging place in the Old City (Zhu 1992:2). The Taotai, having decided that foreigners were to be settled outside the Old City in order not to disturb the locals, tried to find a way in which foreigners would be appeased yet local society would not be contaminated. While George Balfour and Gong Mujiu agreed upon the location of the Settlement, the hidden contrast between their motivations could be detected. The Consul chose the place in order to build a British colony, while the Taotai chose it in order to limit the influence of the unwelcomed outsider. The British might have seen the location as being significant for future development while the Taotai saw it as no more than a piece of waste land with little hope of prosperity. The condition of the land was indeed not promising from a conventional perspective. It was an inferior lot of wetland cut apart by creeks and streams, covered by reeds and weeds with graves scattered around (Zhang 1990; Zheng 1999b:189; Zheng 1999c). Therefore it would have been logical for the Taotai to expect a quick departure of foreigners when the lease agreement was signed. As far as the designation of foreign settlement was concerned, what Gong Mujiu did was unprecedented in Chinese history, for the Imperial Court was not prepared for this sort of treaty diplomacy and there was no official policy for him to follow at the time. His decision was the typical reaction of a
traditionally trained official to the ‘barbarian’ – giving what they wanted and keeping them away. Gong Mujiu’s work must have been applauded by other officials and approved by the Imperial Court obviously, for he was promoted soon after he finished his tenure of office in Shanghai.

Shanghai Land Regulations included 23 articles, the key points of which were that foreigners should not build houses for the Chinese to use, that the Chinese landlord should have no right to terminate the land lease, and that foreigners should be responsible for the construction of infrastructure and management of the settlement. This indicated that the enclave would be occupied and managed by foreigners for an indefinite period of time. It also indicated that this enclave would appear very different from the ordinary Chinese town, as Westerners would be building their settlement in their own way.

Shortly after the British, the Americans and French rushed into Shanghai and demanded land for their settlements. The Americans started settling themselves in Shanghai in 1849 in Hongkou, an area to the north of the Suzhou Creek and the west of the Huangpu River but with no clear-cut boundaries to its north and west. Later it was merged with the British Settlement and the amalgamated enclave was called the International Settlement. In 1844 the Treaty of Huangpu was signed between China and France, which entitled the French the same rights to trade and residence in China. The French settlement (hereafter referred to as the French Concession) was designated in 1849. Over the years that followed, British, American and French consuls demanded on several occasions the expansion of their settlements, and at one stage the proposal for the expansion of the British Settlement was rejected by the Shanghai Taotai Cai Jun (1893). The British pressed successfully for approval of the expansion from the Imperial Court in Beijing, with a display of their gunboats on the Yangtze near Nanjing in December 1898, and Cai Jun ended up being removed from the office. Consequently foreign settlements in Shanghai grew considerably (Table 1, Figure 3). The International Settlement in 1899 was over 40 times bigger than what it had been in 1845 and the French Concession was enlarged 15 times in the 66 years from 1848 to 1914 (Wu 1997:38-40).
## Table 1: The Extensions of Foreign Concessions in Shanghai, 1845 – 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>No clear boundary</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>No clear boundary</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Amalgamation of British and American Settlement (to become the Foreign Settlement)</td>
<td>5860</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Establishment of International Settlement</td>
<td>10676</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>33503</td>
<td></td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>33503</td>
<td></td>
<td>2125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>33503</td>
<td></td>
<td>15150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>53570</td>
<td></td>
<td>15150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Figure 3: The growth of foreign concessions in Shanghai 1845-1915

Source: (Bergère 2002; Wu 1997; Zheng 1999c)
Foreign Settlement Opened to Chinese Residents

In 1853 the uprising of Xiao Dao Hui (Little Sword Society), a branch that had separated from the Taiping Rebellion, broke out in Shanghai. The Shanghai County Magistrate was killed and the County government was paralysed. The Old City was occupied by the rebels for 17 months and became a battlefield. Shanghai Westerners at first remained neutral between the army of the Qing Court and the rebels, but soon shifted their stance and, serving their own interest, helped to wipe out the rebels. The Little Sword Society uprising and the following battles left thousands of refugees fleeing the Old City and flooding into the foreign enclave for shelters, and the following years saw a mixed residence of the Chinese and Westerners in the Settlement.

At first the influx of Chinese locals caused a dilemma for Western settlers, who on the one hand were unwilling to risk the comfort and peace in their enclave, but on the other, found it hard to resist the attraction of potential profits in renting houses to the Chinese. As money-making was the major motivation for Western tenants to be in Shanghai and profit was the required goal, pragmatic opinions prevailed on the refugee issue. The opinion given by an influential merchant was typical – that he certainly would lease the land, or rent the houses to the Chinese for a profit of 30-40 per cent, which was obviously the best way to invest his money, and that he did not care what happened to Shanghai as long as he could make enough and return home in a couple of years (Alcock 1969). Residence of the Chinese in the Western enclave was thus accepted and in 1854 the British, American and French consuls sat together and revised the Shanghai Land Regulations, with no involvement from the Chinese officials who were fully engaged in retaking the Old City from the rebels. Notable changes to the Shanghai Land Regulations were the removal of the original stipulation forbidding Westerners from building or leasing houses to the Chinese, and the shift of the administration of the settlement, including tax-collection, from the Chinese authority to full foreign control. As an outcome of the changes, population of the Settlement quickly became overwhelmingly Chinese, and remained so in both the International Settlement and the French Concession in later years.
The influx of Chinese residents injected labour and capital into the Settlements and significantly pushed its development. The population of Shanghai grew from 0.25 million in 1840 to 4.5 million in 1936. A real estate boom started in 1854, when over 700 houses were under construction for Chinese residents between June and July. For instance one lease contract was transferred seven times within fifteen years between 1850 and 1862, and there were two occasions when the contract changed hands twice within one day (Zhang 1990:447). Most houses built for Chinese residents were very basic, using simple and flimsy materials such as planks. From 1870 houses of such materials were no longer allowed by the Settlement authorities, for they were too big a fire hazard, and gave way to terraced houses of more solid timber and brick in most cases. They were given the name Shikumen (the stone-framed door). As these houses were built in fishbone-like rows leading off main streets, they were more often referred to as Lilong houses (row houses). From the 1870s to the 1930s thousands of Shikumen houses were built in Shanghai, and mainly occupied by the Chinese residents. According to Hanchao Lu (Lu 1999b), Shanghai’s housing market paralleled the development of Lilong houses. Although originating with Westerners, the later innovation and development of Li Long houses were entirely by the Chinese.

As the Settlements quickly expanded and their population grew, the business centre of Shanghai also quickly shifted from the Old City to the Settlements and the triangle pattern of modern Shanghai – a juxtaposition of the International Settlement, the French Concession and the Chinese City (including the Old City and other Chinese controlled sections) – was formed. This triangle pattern was not in the geographical sense only, but political as well.

*The Shanghai Municipal Council and Extraterritoriality*

In 1844 the United States signed a treaty with China (known in Chinese history as the Treaty of Wangxia) which not only granted the Americans the same rights of residence and trade as enjoyed by the British, but also introduced consular jurisdiction for American settlers. The consular jurisdiction soon became the principle of extraterritoriality and the basic law for foreign settlements in China. Under a jurisdiction system as such, the Chinese authority had no power over foreigners no matter what crime they committed. On the contrary, consuls reserved rights to judge
cases if it involved both foreigners and Chinese, or if the Chinese person involved was employed by foreigners.

In 1853, the uprising of the Little Sword Society paralysed the local administration in Shanghai, which gave Westerners the opportunity to exercise a full autonomy on settlements, and even left the duty of tariff collection in the hands of Westerners. To strengthen the management of the Western precinct the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) was established in 1854 as soon as the British, American and French consuls revised the Land Regulations. The SMC became a ruling body for the International Settlement and the French Concession until 1862 when the French established the ‘Conseil Municipal’ for their enclave. As far as its functions are concerned, the SMC was in charge of legislation, police and jurisdiction, finance, taxation and other administrative work. It had all the divisions necessary for a municipal government and indeed played the role of a government, but its Chinese name was a misleading one: Gong Bu Ju, meaning ‘Bureau of Civic Engineering’. The SMC however never bothered to correct the Chinese translation of its name. Probably it found a humbler name more convenient for management purposes as it caused less agitation among the locals. The Conseil Municipal played almost the same role in the French Concession as the SMC did in the International Settlement, except that it was under the directive of the French consul in Shanghai. The SMC and the Conseil Municipal were politically, juridically and administratively independent of each other and free from Chinese authority, with the result that the settlements consequently became ‘states within a state’. Under such a structure, there was little conformity in Shanghai. Urban infrastructure was of different standards in different sectors. Legislation in one sector did not apply in another. A man wanted by Chinese authority, for example, would find himself a free person once he crossed the border into the French Concession. This confusion of legislative systems was taken as a great advantage by many, and as a result Shanghai was called ‘the paradise for adventurers’, a reputation that suggested not only the chance of making a fortune overnight, but also the worst aspect of Shanghai – a place for gangsters, drug smugglers, gamblers, prostitutes and kidnappers. The ‘states within a state’ status of foreign settlements, especially the extraterritoriality, was considered an ultimate insult to Chinese sovereignty and a national indignity. It became a ‘thorn in the side’ for the Chinese people and
contributed a great deal to the rise of nationalism in the early decades of the twentieth century.

**Interaction and Confrontation between Cultures**

**Meeting with the West**

The period between the late nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century witnessed the growth of Shanghai into one of the most important finance and trade centres in the world, the largest metropolis in the Far East, as well as an international city whose residents were from different parts of China and the world. Consequently Shanghai became a city of diverse cultures. Shanghai was as exotic to the Chinese as it was to Westerners. The blending of different cultures, values, ideology and institutions contributed greatly to what was called ‘Hai Pai Wen Hua’—Shanghai Culture, or the personality of Shanghai.

In the process of Shanghai opening to the outside world in the late nineteenth century, China was a loser in the international arena. The nineteenth century saw the lowest point for Chinese diplomacy, when a series of treaties were signed between China and such foreign powers as Britain, America, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. These treaties were signed as the result of successive losses in wars where China was forced to fight for her sovereignty, and all of the treaties contained items requiring China either to pay the other party compensation or to open certain places for trade, or both. It was with great reluctance that the Imperial Court of the Qing Dynasty designated the five treaty ports for foreigners to reside in and run businesses on Chinese soil. The fact that China was repeatedly defeated by foreigners, who had been seen all the time as inferior to the Chinese, mocked the deep-rooted belief that China would stand as the Middle Kingdom in perpetuity.

After the first shock of being defeated in the Opium War in 1842, the Chinese felt constantly threatened by foreign powers equipped with advanced technology and weaponry. Possibly, the loss of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 added more humiliation to China. For many centuries Japan had been influenced by Chinese culture including Confucian philosophy, but from the nineteenth century Japan developed a pragmatic attitude towards the Confucian orthodoxy and then began to
learn from the West. It was widely recognized, among leading Chinese intellectuals, that the Japanese triumph over China was attributable to Japan’s acceptance of not only Western technologies but also ideas (Chow 1960). In the late nineteenth century there were urges from the radicals in the Imperial Court for China to learn from the West, resulting in what was called the ‘One Hundred Day Reform’ in 1898. The Reform was nevertheless unacceptable to the top authorities in Beijing and was therefore doomed, its leaders either prosecuted or fleeing elsewhere, some of them seeking refuge in Shanghai.

Compared with Beijing, however, Shanghai was a hub for new ideas. It was therefore logical for Shanghai to be the leader in the learning from the West campaign at the turn of the century. The distance of some 1000 kilometres from Beijing kept Shanghai beyond the easy reach of the top authorities during the pre-modern days. Politically, being a seat of Tao, Shanghai was comparatively marginal and therefore enjoyed some free space despite the tight grip of the central control. This control collapsed in 1911 and was not restored until 1927, leaving even more room for Shanghai to develop. Between 1843 and 1943 the ‘states within a state’ administrative structure of Shanghai offered an advantageous environment where it was easier for political dissidents to find refuge from the Chinese authority.

Lacking the Confucian legacy, Shanghai was, in ideological terms, culturally peripheral, and was therefore able to be more tolerant towards new institutions and values. Shanghai was an arena for the Chinese to meet the world – a salad bowl of cultures. The arrival of Westerners stirred up mixed feelings, among Shanghai citizens, including hostility, fear, contempt, bewilderment, and admiration. Westerners arrived as victors since the Chinese Imperial Court was subdued through the Opium War. The triumph-driven arrogance of Western powers inevitably provoked national hostility among the Chinese, who had believed that Pu Tian Zhi Xia, Mo Fei Wang Tu – All the land under the sky belonged to the Emperor. To the Chinese, the reality in the late nineteenth century was appalling: foreigners had won wars, set foot on the Chinese soil and looted Beijing including its royal palaces; they settled down on Chinese soil, bringing in their institutions and technologies, and managing their settlement without interference from the Chinese authority. As a result they were faced with an enormous confidence crisis in the post-Opium War era.
Feeling deeply humiliated and threatened, the Chinese called foreigners devils and barbarians to express their fear and disgust as well as a chauvinistic contempt toward these strong enemies. Designating an area of unproductive land outside the Old City of Shanghai for foreign settlement also indicated the disgust and contempt of the Chinese officials towards the uninvited visitors.

The psychological status of the Chinese bewildered at the loss of national pride at the turn of the nineteenth century was well depicted through the literary figure of Ah Q, created in *The True Story of Ah Q* by Lu Xun, an eminent writer. Down and out, and too frightened to fight back, Ah Q always said to the dominating rivals of his that: My ancestors used to be much better off than you – you are nothing. When defeated, he would pretend that he had been assaulted by his descendants and was convinced that the collapse of moral values was to blame for his loss.

In the early days of Western settlement in Shanghai, it was usual to view Westerners and the Western civilization as culturally inferior. Talking about the lack of accurate records in local archives regarding which foreign power was the first to arrive in Shanghai – the British or the French – Yao Gonghe, a Shanghai-based historian and writer, remarked that people would not bother to distinguish between the British, the French, or any nationality, as foreigners were considered as barbarians after all (Yao 1933:10). In the early stage of the Western settlement, people noticed changes to the skyline along the waterfront of the Huangpu River but thought such changes were not worthy of admiration since they had been made by foreigners. There were rumours in Shanghai about the risks of trying things such as gas, electricity, trams and tap water. Some of the rumours were spread about by officials trying to prevent the local population from using such alien things. In 1844 when the Christian church leased land to build the first Western hospital in Shanghai, it was stipulated in the lease agreement that the hospital should be in the Chinese style to avoid confusion among locals (Chen 1998; Wu 1997). In Nanjing Road, people laughed at cleaners dressed in dark red working on the street, for they believed that only convicts going into exile would wear uniforms of such colour, not realising that these cleaners were required to wear red as a give-way warning to the traffic (Yao 1933:8).
Westerners held no less prejudice and contempt towards the Chinese. It was particularly the case after the defence of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ collapsed so easily under the military challenges from the West. In the book *Shanghai: collision point of cultures 1918-1939*, an Englishman, who had been in Shanghai for some time, told his newly arrived fellow countryman that dealing with the Chinese was just like subduing a buffalo: it was important to exercise some shock tactics and show who was the master (Sergeant 1990:1). The American President wrote to the Chinese Emperor a letter that was couched in terms thought appropriate for addressing a Red Indian Chief (Sergeant 1990:17). A French consul said in his report that the Chinese officials feared any trouble likely to upset the Imperial Court or put their career at risk, and that they would give in and make peace if they found themselves responsible for disputes with foreigners (Zhu 1992:18). Certain perceptions of China and the Chinese as such were typical in the context of colonization, where the East was projected as a cultural “Other” to the West. In the process of colonization, the West was convinced that it had explored, studied, and understood the Eastern Other well enough to civilize, guide and rule those nations and peoples, referred to as the Orientals. The confidence was further strengthened by the consciousness of technological and military domination over the East. Based on this confidence the West posed as a guide, a patron and a father for peoples that were assumed to be incapable of governing themselves (Said 1995:33-55). In this sense colonization during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be read as a doubly meaningful process. It could be seen, on the one hand, as an effort of geographical expansion to fit the economic interests of the West. On the other hand it manifested the cultural confidence held by the West at the time, with other nations subdued into accepting Western products, both material and spiritual. In the case of Shanghai, trade was the basic motivation behind the British demand for settlement but from the beginning the settlement was intended to be built into a Western city, an outpost of Western civilization in the Far East.

*Westernization of Shanghai*

When attracted by the geographic convenience of Shanghai, Westerners might not have been aware of the cultural advantage of choosing Shanghai as a treaty port. Being economically significant but culturally peripheral in the traditional Chinese setting, Shanghai proved quick to adopt Western civilization. Its locals were more
open-minded towards imported goods as well as ideas. Although confused and frightened at the beginning, Shanghai citizens quickly took an objective view of what ‘barbarians’ were doing and then became keen learners of modern technology and civilization. Apart from this, as residents of a trade port, many of them saw business opportunities as their main interest and became more practical in dealing with foreigners. They stopped using the term ‘Yi’ (a derogatory word for ‘foreigner’ in old Chinese) when referring to Westerners and picked up neutral terms such as ‘foreigner’, ‘British’ and ‘French’ (Yang 1994:152) while inland people insisted upon using ‘Yi’ for quite a long time even after the official ban on such terminology. As Yao (1933) remarked, Shanghai residents stopped vocal assaults on foreigners because it was important for them ‘to keep some decency’ as they wanted business after all. It then needs to be appreciated that the Westernization of Shanghai was a process pushed by both foreigners and locals, and the process was by no means advanced in any individual area only. It took place in all sectors of the society: trade, finance, technology as well as the arts, literature, consumption, entertainment and lifestyle, and in both tangible and intangible forms. This section mainly focuses on the cultural penetration of the West and its impact on Shanghai’s built environment.

Catholicism was banned as a cult in China from the mid-seventeenth century until two centuries later. In 1844 the ‘Huangpu Treaty’ between France and China lifted the ban, and it was stipulated in the Treaty that churches should be allowed in the five treaty ports, including Shanghai. The military strength of colonial powers made life much easier for missionaries from those countries, as it allowed them to work openly. Along with the penetration of Catholicism and Christianity into China was the building of churches. In 1847 the site was designated at Shanghai’s Dongjiadu for the Dongjiadu Cathedral and the construction was completed in 1853; then the foundation stone of the Xujiahui Cathedral (St. Ignatius Cathedral) was laid in 1851 and the building was completed in the same year.

Figure 4: Xujiahui Cathedral in the 1930s.
(Source: The Scenes of Old Shanghai, Shanghai Pictorial Publishing House 2001)
(Ge 1997). The church was built in memory of Xu Guangqi, at the side of his tomb. Sixty years later it was replaced by a new one to accommodate the increased Catholic population in Shanghai (Figure 4). Other major churches included the Holy Trinity Church, the Moore Memorial Church, and the Russian Orthodox Mission Church. Apart from churches, schools and hospitals were among the earliest Western buildings in Shanghai and their emergence signalled the beginning of modern education in China.

Building style was considered not only a mirror of culture, but also an index of power. Shanghai’s Westernized built form was regarded as a manifestation of Western dominance in the colonial days. It was pointed out by Wu Jiang, a contemporary architectural historian from Shanghai’s Tongji University, that colonialism and nationalism were in fact behind the contest of styles (Wu 1997:35) in Shanghai from the beginning of the foreign settlement. In the early colonial days both Chinese and Westerners adhered to their own building style, but later, however, Western style prevailed. In 1855 the SMC decided to set up a police station and, although the Chinese building style had been suggested for the purpose of cost efficiency, the SMC chose the Western style despite a much bigger construction budget, which proved 20 times as large as it would have been for the Chinese style. The issue here, remarked Wu, went far beyond the domain of culture, to the colonialism agenda (ibid).

To most Shanghai residents, the prevalence of Western civilization was in a material, tangible way. They quickly adopted Western amenities, well-to-do families choosing to live in concession areas. Over one hundred years, a specific residential pattern and hierarchy evolved in Shanghai, and a person’s social status was partly reflected by the location of his residence. Geographically the French Concession was known as the prime location for a residence and the streetscape in this precinct resembled suburbs in a European city. Upper Corners was the nickname given to the French Concession, contrasting it to the slum-congested Low Corners located at the industrial and fringe areas. There was a wide variety of house styles in this area – French, Spanish, Scandinavian and Californian, classic and modern, rococo and country. Residences of the typical Chinese styles, however, were rarely seen, although the population of the Concession was overwhelmingly Chinese. It might be assumed that as part of modern
urban management, construction of settlements was controlled by the SMC and the Municipal Council of the French Concession. However, it was licensed out to architectural firms and builders – leading names including Palmer & Turner, Messrs. Scott & Carte, Atkinson & Dallas Architects and Civil Engineers Ltd, and Moorhead & Halse. Besides, it can be appreciated that a change of residence style reflected a change in the traditional lifestyle of the Chinese locals in modern Shanghai. A traditional courtyard house in China would normally accommodate a whole household spanning a number of generations. A couple and their children often lived in the same courtyard house with families of the husband’s brothers, parents and sometimes grandparents. In the case of Shanghai however, most of its residents were migrants leaving their big families in the country or inland cities. Life in Shanghai was less guaranteed but more adventurous and a traditional big family would be difficult to fit in the changed lifestyle. It must also be appreciated that a Western-style house was considered a symbol of the modernity that was prevailing in Shanghai during the post-Opium War era, and was therefore embraced by Shanghai citizens. In this sense, to own a dwelling of a modern type in a particular precinct was an indicator of one’s social status. In fact many big names could be found among those villa owners in the French Concession: Li Hongzhang, a grand minister of the Imperial Court; Shen Xuanhuai, Li’s deputy in Shanghai, a leading comprador-official at this time; Jiang Kai-shek, head of the Nationalist Party and President of China; T.V. Soong, Treasurer of the Nationalist Government, also Jiang’s brother-in-law; Rong Zongjing, a leading Shanghai entrepreneur, just to name a few.

Over its semi-colonial years, Shanghai proved to be a place more for cultures to mix rather than dominate. This mixing of cultures resulted in the distinct townscape of Shanghai. Although the Western style was widely adopted in the building industry, Chinese architectural components were often seen in both the exterior and the interior of a building. For example, a comprador’s residence might have a praying room in the form of a Chinese temple on the top. Chinese designs and patterns were not only used by Chinese residents but by Westerners as well. The Hardoon Garden, owned by Silius Hardoon in the French Concession, was said to have copied layouts described in *The Dream of the Red Mansion* (Chen and Zhang 1988:215-218), one of the Chinese literary classics. The Moller’s Residence, a Norwegian structure, used Chinese
building materials such as glazed tiles, lions of Chinese style, and other decorative components.

While villas and apartments strongly represented the penetration as well as acceptance of Western civilization and lifestyle in Shanghai, the Shikumen was an example representing the mixture of cultures. As mentioned already, Shikumen houses were originally built to relieve housing shortages caused by the influx of Chinese refugees during the Taiping and Little Sword uprisings. This mixed style residence later proved economical for land use and inexpensive to build, and therefore dwellings of this type mushroomed in Shanghai during the following years and became the typical local residence of Shanghai. The Shikumen house was indeed a mixture of styles, its layout being more Western than Chinese except for the ‘roofless porch’ that resembled the court yard of the Chinese house. The house often had traditional decoration such as brick or wood carving, with elegant patterns (Figure 5). By 1949, about three quarters of Shanghai residents lived in such dwellings (Luo 1997:97). Johnston and Erh (1993) defined Shikumen in this way:

This Chinese phrase means literally ‘stone framed doors’, the name given to the thousand upon thousands of western-style row houses built in the maze of small intersecting lanes which run off the main thoroughfares all over Shanghai. They were erected in the early part of the twentieth century to accommodate the masses of Chinese refugees who fled to western concessions for the law and order and the relative safety they offered. . . (p.11)

Over decades, Shikumen experienced remarkable changes in both façade and layouts, bearing the increasing impact of the Western architecture. Those built in later decades were of much better quality and no longer called Shikumen, as they had less and less Chinese characteristics and of course the ‘stone framed doors’ were gradually phased out, replaced by Western style iron gates. They were simply called ‘Lilong

Figure 5 Shikumen residence
Photo by Gong Jian
houses’, which meant ‘row houses’. Many of the modern-fashioned row houses were occupied by well-to-do families, and life inside those houses, accordingly, reflected the increasing westernization of Shanghai residents. Tsai Chin, now an American based actress, remembered her childhood residence in Shanghai, which somewhat reminded one of a London townhouse. Located in the French Concession, the house enjoyed leafy surroundings and offered a comfortable living space for the family. Indeed, this type of estate, neither purely Western nor entirely Chinese, was quite typical of Shanghai (Tsai Chin 1989).

In fact Tsai Chin’s family was as much a cultural mixture as the house itself: her great-grandfather was an Irish missionary in Shanghai and her mother was very keen to keep some Western custom at home including giving the children English names. Contradictorily, her father Zhou Xingfang, a most celebrated Peking Opera singer, insisted on maintaining his Chinese lifestyle. However he was so keen on the Western stage technology that he became the founder of the ‘Shanghai School’ of Peking Opera and introduced modern technology into conventional Chinese stage presentation.

It has been officially recognized in China that the Lilong house is the most characteristic built form of Shanghai (Lu 1999a:144). The evolution of the Lilong house not only demonstrated the process of merging Chinese and Western architecture, but also the process of Chinese taking over from Westerners to become the major players in Shanghai’s real estate market. With rapid population growth in Shanghai, the housing shortage intensified, and it was common in Shanghai for a Lilong house originally designed for one family to be remodelled and shared by many families. Many people sublet their dwellings to others and became the ‘second landlords’. Examining the way in which normal residents in Shanghai became involved in the housing market between 1872-1951, Lu (1999a, 1999b) observed that commerce penetrated so deeply into people’s daily life that in many Lilong house neighbourhoods tenants became a type of merchant by subletting space to others.

The Lilong house story, being a typical facet of Shanghai’s commercial culture, also illustrated the hybrid nature of ‘Shanghai culture’. Li maintained that
Western innovation and influence may have served as the first motive power ..., but the later development and innovation were almost entirely Chinese. Haipai (Shanghai) culture, ... is an indication of the persistence of a tradition rooted neither in the Chinese superstructure, nor in an alien culture brought by foreigners, but in the quotidian life of the city’s people (1999a:184).

The strongest physical manifestation of the Western presence in Shanghai is the Huangpu riverfront, better known as the Bund – an Anglo-Indian word for quay – a boat-towing path in the pre-Opium War times. From the beginning of the settlement foreigners made great efforts in the construction of the Bund to secure safety from floods and to facilitate transport and trade, as required in Article Two of the Land Regulations. Early work took place between Yangjingbang Creek and the Suzhou Creek. Apart from being a functioning path to stop flooding and facilitate traffic, the Bund was meant to be a showpiece of commercial strength, a beachhead of Western civilization, and a model of modern infrastructure. It was stipulated in the Land Regulations that in future the path be 7.5 metres wide but the path was soon expanded to 15 metres.

However, early buildings along the Bund had replicated the styles of those British colonies in India, Hong Kong and Singapore, named the compradoric style, with the veranda an indispensable part. It did not take long for tenants to see the impropriety of this style under the Chinese environment, as the climate in Shanghai was very different from those tropical colonies, and consequently these early structures were unbearably cold in the bitter winter, when temperatures would possibly drop to minus 10 Centigrade. It was estimated that from about the 1870s onwards the compradoric style was gradually phased out, replaced by more authentic European forms (Wu 1997:63). The attitudes of tenants towards their settlement gradually changed. As mentioned already, tenants at the early stage of settlement believed in a ‘gold rush’, expecting to make a fortune in Shanghai then leave. They did not care much what the settlement area turned out to be and they tended to ignore quality and style in the early buildings. What happened later was that Shanghai developed rapidly amongst political upheavals in China and became the paradise for adventurers, a place worthy of a long-term plan instead of a short-term gold rush. Logically a handsome appearance to a building meant extra value and reputation to an established company.
As a result of the consistent thriving of real estate in Shanghai in the second half of the nineteenth Century, the Bund was quickly transformed from a muddy towpath into a modern financial precinct, a prime location for firms and banks with a modern city and shopping streets such as Nanjing Road emerging behind it. By the late 1920s the Bund was probably the most Westernized street in China, and was seen as the signature of Shanghai. On the Bund were the British Consulate General, the first public park of Shanghai, the first twin-span steel-girder bridge and the most prestigious banks and firms including Jardine, Matheson and the Company, the North China Herald, the Bank of China, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Other prime properties such as the Sassoon House, the Customs House and the Shanghai Club were also located there (Figure 6). In 1927 one traveller described the Bund as follows:

Banks of lights from faintly delineated skeletons—the skyscrapers of the New York of the Far East—dazzle the traveller approaching Shanghai at night. It is not the towering, Christmas-like magnificence of Hong Kong, nor yet the black giants with glowing coals in their eyes one sees in nocturnal Manhattan, but Shanghai has one of the most impressive front drops in the world, and gradually the skyline is filling in and being built up to rival any port of the West. It already has surpassed many in the architectural beauty and symmetry of its approach, and has no peer in the Orient. The Bund is a jewel in which Shanghai is taking more and more pride (Huebner 1989:130).

A detailed description of the architecture at the Bund is not required in this chapter, but it is worthwhile to take a look at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, which was considered one of the finest buildings in the Far East at the time and the iconic
building on the Bund. Established in 1864 in Hong Kong, the Bank opened its office in Shanghai in the following year. After 1870 the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank became the representative of British capital as well as the leading foreign financial institution in China. It played a key role in Chinese finance in the late half of the nineteenth century, by controlling the currency exchanges in Shanghai, providing loans to all of nine railways in China and, as a major creditor to the Chinese government at the time, holding the government deposit of tariff incomes. It moved from Nanjing Road into a three-storey building at the Bund in 1875. The building was one of the most glamorous at the time but some twenty years later it was considered too humble for the Bank and was demolished in 1920 for the new one. Construction of the new building started in 1926 and it was said that Fengshui theory and practice were applied when laying the cornerstone (Yang 1999:28). The completed building was described by the Far Eastern Review as a

Memorial to the commerce and prosperity of the world. Rising one hundred feet other long line of the roof and a further eighty feet to the final of the massive dome, the whole building stands out clear to the view of the merchant ships of all nations sailing up and down the Huang Pu, a recognition of their courageous industry which has made possible all that this memorial stands for (Huebner 1989:140).

While churches were probably the grandest structures in the Middle Ages, banks always command the finest architecture in a city in modern days. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank was no exception in this sense. With its leading status in the realm of finance, it represented in the Far East the financial power of the British Empire, and the architecture of the building was meant to symbolize such a power. To quote Huebner (ibid) again:

The building has five main storeys, and at the centre of The Bund elevation, which is rusticated at the ground-floor level, there is the triple-arched main entrance, above which are six columns, four of them arranged in pairs, extending through the fourth storey. The keystone of each arch symbolising agriculture and similar ones above the two side arches symbolising industry and shipping. A 62-foot-wide flight of steps, originally flanked by a pair of bronze lions, one in a roaring posture, the other in repose, led from the street to the main entrance.

Apart from the grand exterior, the interior of the new building was considered the most lavish at the time. What attracted the attention was the depiction above the octagonal entrance of all the centres of the Bank in the world: London, Paris, Calcutta,
Bangkok, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo and New York, a strong message of the economic globalization conducted by the Empire, of which Shanghai seemed to have been already a part.

Faced with contrasts between the settlement area and the Old City, Shanghai locals began to follow the Western example in many ways, including infrastructure such as traffic and public facilities in the Chinese enclave. For instance, in 1900 a proposal to demolish the City Wall was put forward by the local establishment. Initially the conservatives objected to the proposal. In 1911 Shanghai responded to the Republican Revolution by overthrowing the commissioners of the Qing Dynasty. Soon after 1911 a pro-capitalist governing body with a modern style administration was established replacing the Royal county seat (Zheng 1999a), while in Beijing a group of conservatives was planning the restoration of the Monarchy. At that stage, since learning from the West was on the rise and Shanghai had become the hub for new ideas, there seemed no reason for the City Wall to stand in Shanghai any longer. Li Pingshu, an outstanding figure of the Shanghai gentry, proposed strongly to the local government that the Wall should be demolished not only for the benefit of commerce, but also for local atmosphere and public hygiene (ibid). Here atmosphere may be interpreted as environment, with both tangible and intangible meanings. First, the Wall was a physical barrier impeding the updating of Shanghai’s infrastructure and the development of the Old City, and restricting the City’s expansion in all directions. Second, the Wall was a piece of feudalist legacy. The Old City circled by the Wall formed a contrast between the Chinese and Western enclaves, a contrast between deterioration and progress, the past and the modern. Third, when the Wall was originally built in the mid-fifteenth century, it was meant to stop invasion by the Japanese, but the late nineteenth century saw China’s failure to stop foreign invasions, no matter whether the invaders were the British or other powers. As a result of foreigners setting foot successfully on Chinese soil, the Wall lost its function as the defence installation and appeared rather ironic to the Shanghai locals. The proposal therefore finally won strong support from locals and a year later demolition was completed, the Wall gave way for modern roads connecting the Old City and settlement areas.
For over one hundred years Shanghai was a destination not only for Western sojourners, but also for Chinese citizens who had a Western education background. While sojourners were called Yang Gui Zi (foreign devils), those who were Western educated were given the nickname of Jia Yang Gui Zi (sham devils), created by Luxun in his novel The True Story of Ah Q, due to their connections to foreigners, keenness to try foreign things and their critical attitudes towards tradition. As a special category of the Chinese society these people contributed greatly to the modernization process in China and presented images of the West to their countrymen. The 1920s and 1930s saw a large number of overseas trained students return home, many of whom chose to stay in Shanghai to develop their careers and to promote new thinking. For instance in the 1920s Shanghai was the home of over fifty percent of the arts institutes in China. Among the four recognized leaders of Chinese modern art, three were of Shanghai origin and another in fact began his career in Shanghai. In 1931, a modern art exhibition was organized by a group of artists newly returned from Europe, and a declaration passed at the exhibition stated that they detested any of the old form or old colour in the practice of fine arts, and that they wanted to present a new spirit with new techniques (Yang 1994:76). This modernization campaign met active responses in the realms of literature, drama and architecture. In Shanghai, twelve out of the thirty-nine architecture firms registered in 1936 were run by Chinese graduates educated in either Europe or America (Lou 1991:112). The Allied Architects, the most productive Chinese Architecture firm for example, was headed by three partners, all graduates from Pennsylvania University. By stating that they would abandon the 'Big Roof' in their designs, these people took a turn away from the Chinese architectural convention and contributed to the formation of the modern townscape of Shanghai (Wu 1997:157).

As far as the general public was concerned, learning from the West was mainly for practical purposes: to be more competent in their career and business. This is more so in Shanghai than in any other city in China, due to Shanghai’s distinctive culture and status. However even in Shanghai, people never gave up their suspicion and contempt when it came to Western ideology and values. Wang Tao (1828-1897), a prestigious educator and reformer of China, was one of the great scholars in China exposed to Western civilization during the late nineteenth century. Wang travelled in Europe for three years in the late 1860s before he took a position as Principal of Shanghai Gezhi
School, a secondary school featuring a non-traditional curriculum with a focus on modern science education. As an influential advocate for Western science and technology, Wang at the same time emphasised in his books that science and technology were tools, not principles and that they should never be taken as the way to manage a state (Zhang 1994). After the late nineteenth century a concept was formed and advocated that people should take Chinese learning for substance and Western learning for practice (Chen 1985).

**Shanghai in Chinese Eyes**

Shanghai grew rapidly into an international metropolis and business centre during the hundred years following its opening as a treaty port. Its political and cultural status was upgraded accordingly. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, it was the hub for modern finance, boasting of the most sophisticated modern economy and industry, the most advanced urban infrastructure and facilities and the most avant-garde arts in China. In 1927 the Chinese enclave of Shanghai was designated as a 'special municipality' under the direct control of the Nationalist Government. However, contradictory to its economic and cultural importance, Shanghai remained a place to be cursed and its local culture denounced, largely due to its semi-colonial experience and its alienation from the Chinese tradition.

The physical difference of Shanghai from other Chinese cities and towns was so striking that a newcomer from the inland would find himself in a totally alien country. Then he would soon find that physically the exoticness of this strange city was not the most difficult thing to be coped with. Mao Dun, one of the greatest literary figures in modern China, depicted an Old Mr Wu, a country gentlemen Wu in his masterpiece *Midnight*. Mr Wu was forced by his eldest son to leave his bandit-harassed hometown for Shanghai. His son, a Shanghai millionaire, was a representative figure of the Chinese modern entrepreneur, who had long been estranged from his father. Wu's life ended on his first day in Shanghai. He was like an unearthed mummy which perished quickly in the open air. To him, Shanghai was a demon in both the physical and moral senses. Ghost-like skyscrapers and dazzling neon lights broke his nerves, and drove him blind and deaf; demonstration of sensuality made him mad. He felt himself crushed under a monster-like machine, and indeed he collapsed, physically and mentally.
Wu was an example of the traditional Chinese who had the whole set of moral and behavioural standards embedded in his mind, including the Confucian virtues, social hierarchy, framework of family and guild, restriction on women and so forth. All this however inevitably confronted challenge in Shanghai, where all cultures co-existed and no one could have absolute dominance. Over the hundred years of Shanghai modern history, Shanghai took a position between the Western power and Chinese authority. It was under the pressure from both sides but took advantage of a peripheral position – it was a city of ‘Other’ to the West and not so much of ‘Us’ to the Chinese. It was, however, this peripheral status that helped Shanghai in becoming a ‘centre’ – it was one of the world’s financial centres as well as China’s economic and cultural centre in the 1930s. Over some one hundred years, Shanghai developed its own culture. Shanghai adopted a Western way of doing things but did it more in the material sense; it was relatively free from the Chinese conventional culture and legacy but it did not challenge the Chinese political institution. Shanghai was inventive, adaptive and modern. After the termination of the Qing Dynasty, many streets in Shanghai with the character ‘Qing’ quickly changed names to get rid of the remnant of the dead Empire, which was remarked upon by Yao (1933) as being culturally ignorant and shallow. Being a meeting place of the Chinese and the West, Shanghai was given the nickname of ‘Shi Li Yang Chang’ meaning a foreign land. In the Chinese eyes, Shanghai was a ‘dyeing pot’ where all new comers would inevitably change their ‘colour’, or in other words people would lose their original virtues and be poisoned by foreign vices. After all, in its semi-colonial days, Shanghai in the Chinese eyes was a place of disgrace rather than glory, and in the first quarter of the twentieth century it became a convenient target for nationalist emotions.

**Rise of Nationalism**

Nationalist emotions in China at the dawn of the twentieth century were evoked by the humiliations that had fallen upon the nation. During this period Chinese national pride was deeply hurt by successive losses at war, treaties between China and foreign powers and the consequent conceding of Chinese territories and sovereignty by the Imperial Court of the Qing Dynasty, all of which directly contributed to the 1911 Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen that overthrew the monarchy. During this period Shanghai was the destination and refuge for revolutionaries and radicals and the birthplace of both Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) and CCP (the Communist
Party). At the same time Shanghai was projected as an example of the national humiliation that resulted from granting privileges to the Western powers. In Shanghai the most notorious instance demonstrating the inequality between the Western and the Chinese residents was said to have been a sign outside the Huangpu Park at the International Settlement, which allegedly read Chinese and dogs not admitted. It is now argued by some that such a sign with these precise words might not have existed at all (Bickers and Wasserstrom 1995:444) and that the sign only stipulated that ‘Chinese were not admitted’ in one article and that ‘dogs not admitted’ in another. From the point of view of the Chinese citizens, however, the key point was not whether they were juxtaposed with dogs in the same article but the fact that they, as much as dogs, were excluded from the access to a public venue. On top of that, in the Chinese language the word dog was often used to indicate inferiority, and this interpretation of the word made the exclusion of Chinese people even more insulting. As a result Chinese and dogs not admitted became a classic example of Western discrimination against the Chinese, on Chinese soil, and a most provoking rhetoric to stir up patriotic emotions among the Chinese citizens.

The first quarter of the twentieth century was a period when voices were raised a great deal, calling for the termination of the mixed court system and takeover of the foreigner-managed enclaves, namely, the International Settlement and the French Concession. Given the fact that the monarchy had been overthrown and the Republic of China was established, Chinese citizens saw the twentieth century as a brand new era, when they would be able to shake off the sheer humiliation imposed on them during the past decades by the impotent Monarch. In 1927 the Nationalist Government, headed by Jiang Kai-shek, took control of China and settled in Nanjing. The Nationalist Government gave full recognition to Shanghai’s significance in the Chinese economy. In the same year therefore, Shanghai was designated as a ‘Special Municipality’ and the Shanghai Municipal Government was established under the direct control of Nanjing. Consequently Western privileges in Shanghai were somewhat reduced. For example the extraterritorial system was terminated in 1930, the number of Chinese representatives were increased in both the SMC and the Municipal Council, and Western street names were changed to Chinese ones. Despite the growing appeal of taking over the foreign settlements, however, Nanjing showed no hurry to do so. Politically Jiang Kai-shek needed the Western
support in his fight against the Communists, while financially he needed revenues drawn from Shanghai. It might have seemed to him, therefore, a better idea not to upset the status quo with regard to the foreign enclaves, even though the Government made a point to the citizens that foreign settlements would be taken over sooner or later.

As a special municipality Shanghai did draw special attention from the national authorities who endorsed major moves to make Shanghai a Chinese city. As soon as the Shanghai Municipal Government was born, initiatives were taken to centralize and strengthen the management of the Chinese enclaves by quickly taking over the administration of these districts. The most remarkable move of the Shanghai Municipal Government was the Plan for the Central District of the Shanghai Municipality (hereafter referred to as the Central Shanghai Plan) issued in 1929 (Figure7). This plan designated an area of some 400 hectares north of the International Settlement as a new central district of Shanghai, with main road systems stretching to the Old City in the south and Wusong Harbour in the north, the latter being expected to replace the Huangpu as Shanghai’s major port. Before this plan, there were a few options for the Shanghai Municipal Government to locate its civil centre. The Municipal Committee for the Construction of Central Shanghai once proposed Pudong but the proposal was soon turned down by the Municipal Government, for fear that Pudong, facing the foreign concessions across the river, would end up being an affiliate of the Settlements (Shen and Chen 1934:365).

The rationale for the Central Shanghai Plan was to construct a prosperous municipality under full Chinese control, and to stop the extension of the foreign settlements. According to the plan, ‘Shanghai’ referred to the Chinese Shanghai, namely all the Chinese areas. Therefore what was expected in terms of development was the growth of the Chinese section rivalling the Western settlements. It was asserted in the plan that the main obstacle to the Shanghai development was caused by the foreign settlement area that cut the city into two halves, and that the more the foreign enclaves grew the more difficult it would be for Shanghai to develop. Based on this rationale, the Municipal Government chose the area north of the International Settlement as the future city centre.
The Central Shanghai Plan conveyed a nationalist message in many ways. The location of the Central City was to be surrounded by the future new port to the north, new suburbs to the north and west, foreign settlements, the Old City to the south and Pudong to the east, therefore providing a dominating position. It was anticipated that the new Central City would sit in the core of the traffic network, radiating from the Central City to the port, rail stations, all suburbs and foreign settlements, to form a pattern where the dominating Centre was circled by satellite sections (ibid). Further more, the plan represented a Confucian notion on the authority and power of the state with its emphasis on the Central position of the administration precinct and the location of the Government Building. However it was also strongly influenced by The Pierre Charles L’Enfant plan for Washington D.C. and Edwin Lutyens’ plan for New Delhi (Balfour and Zheng 2002:75). To address the rising nationalism, the planning and design were much in line with the official principle of adhering to the Chinese form. All the main structures in the administration zone, for example, were of the traditional Chinese style (Figure 8). The plan was the work of Zhao Shen, under the charge of Dong Dayou, both architecture graduates of the University of Pennsylvania, the latter was also responsible for the design of most of the official buildings in Shanghai’s administration precinct at the time, all of them in the Chinese forms. By 1935 phases one and two of the Central Shanghai Plan were almost completed, featuring such monuments as the Government Building, the Municipal Library, the Municipal Museum, the Sport Complex and the Hospital, but the construction came to a halt and was never accomplished due to the Japanese invasion.

In short, the period between 1843 and 1943 saw Shanghai transformed from a business town on the eastern coast of China into a major financial and trade centre of the Far East. The transformation was brought about by a combination of global economics and Chinese politics. Expansion of the Western economies in the late half of the nineteenth century resulted in the early attempts at globalization, which, at that stage, was in the form of the colonization of the peripheral cultures. It was an unprecedented challenge to the deeply embedded belief of China as ‘the Celestial Heaven’ among the Chinese people, where China was the centre of the world civilization and the Emperor was the ruler of the mankind, and it marked a key turning point in the Chinese history. After the 1840s modernization was advocated in
China by open-minded officials and intellectuals, and over a hundred years later Shanghai had become the powerhouse for Chinese modernization.

All parties contributing to the transformation, Westerners, Chinese, merchants, politicians, literati, taipans, coolies, all left memories in Shanghai. What happened to them and what they did formed the Shanghai legend that made Shanghai one of the cities of cultural and historical significance, and the most manifesting form of the Shanghai legend is the urban landscape.

As mentioned in the early part of this chapter, Shanghai did not have the same cultural legacy as prestigious cities in Chinese history. In other words, Shanghai was less influenced by Confucian institutions than the cities of inland China. In fact Shanghai was for a long time a place where early international exchanges took place, both commercial and cultural. This tradition of external contact made Shanghai locals more compatible to foreign civilizations, and the pragmatic attitude of a commerce-oriented society such as existed in Shanghai moderated resistance to other cultures. Although China recognized the military and technological superiority of the West, and the Chinese foreign affairs changed from the tributary system to treaty system, a deeply embedded cultural chauvinism remained in China. Shanghai bore a negative image in Chinese eyes because it was Westernized. As for Shanghai locals, their compatibility to foreign cultures did not necessarily mean that they accepted the imported cultures in a wholesale manner. The Westernization of Shanghai was rather superficial, more in form than in nature. Modernization campaigns in Shanghai, as elsewhere in China, should be seen as driven by a nationalist motivation to compete and rival the West at some day in future.
Figure 7: Shanghai Municipal Centre Zoning Plan, 1929,  
(Source: Chen 1988:17)

Figure 8: The KMT Shanghai Municipal Government House  
(Source: Balfour and Zheng 2000: 76)
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY, MEMORY AND HERITAGE IN MODERN CHINA

The Opium War ended up with Shanghai, as well as four other Chinese cities, becoming treaty ports where foreigners were allowed to trade and live. Foreign invasions during the late nineteenth century deeply impacted upon Chinese society. On the one hand, China was forced open to the world by imperial powers and entered a semi-colonial era. On the other, modern civilization was introduced into China including technology, culture and ideas. For this reason, the year 1842 is officially accepted as the threshold of Chinese modern history. Decades between the late nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century were never peaceful for China. This period witnessed not only foreign invasions and wars, but also revolutions, including the overthrow of the monarchy, the rise of nationalism, the victory of communism, as well as traumatic years in the late 1960s. Accompanied with dramatic events and social upheavals were changes in perceptions of history, memory and heritage.

This chapter investigates changes in Chinese perceptions of history, memory and heritage. In doing so, the chapter focuses on some major events at a few stages in the twentieth century, namely, the early years of the Republic, the Mao era from 1949 to 1976, and the economic reform years in the last two decades of the century. Such investigation may, hopefully, serve as a conceptual tool for later chapters in explaining how conflicts between conservation and development are handled in the course of modernization.

In this chapter, the term ‘heritage’ has broader meaning than tangible items, it includes legacy, tradition and institutions. As discussed in Chapter One, in any society, history, memory and heritage can hardly remain neutral or objective. They are exploited or ignored, highlighted or erased at different stages and times, by different groups to meet different needs. Nor do perceptions of history, tradition and heritage, being very subjective in nature, remain static. In the Chinese context, history is often used to served the needs of the ruling class or, in words of W.F. Jenner (1994:5-8) history was sterilized and filtered by bureaucrats. The most influential histories were those compiled by central governments, generally dealing with a dynasty or dynasties
immediately preceding them, in order to give both the present and the future a standardized, a ‘correct’, view of the rise and fall of past regimes (ibid). Perceptions of, and attitudes towards history have been changing constantly over the twentieth century, in order to respond to changing social, political and economic imperatives. Furthermore, such changes have never been divorced from changes in global, political and economic settings and their influences.

As a very Westernized city in China, Shanghai has a distinct history and heritage. Over decades, Shanghai’s Western legacy was viewed and interpreted in different manners, which reflected the changes in the society’s ideology and the government’s agenda.

Destroy the Old and Establish the New: From the May Fourth Movement to the Cultural Revolution

Perceptions of history and heritage in modern China underwent dramatic changes in the last century, and the May Fourth Movement in 1919 could be seen as a milestone of such changes. The May Fourth Movement, in a narrow sense, refers to an incident on May 4 1919, when college and university students in Beijing and other major cities held demonstrations protesting against the result of the Peace Conference in Versailles, which intended to transfer the lease of China’s Jiaozhou in Shangdong Province from Germany to Japan. The demonstration was initiated and led by students from Peking University, but was actively supported by merchants, industrialists and urban workers, not only in Beijing but also in many big cities. The incident asserted such an enormous pressure on the Chinese Government, as well as the delegation in Paris, that the latter in the end refused to sign the conference treaty.

The May Fourth Movement was seen as the most influential patriotic campaign in Chinese modern history since the 1840s. Now it is widely recognized that the term ‘May Fourth Movement’ in fact covers a much longer time span than just the date of May 4, 1919, and the theme of the Movement is much more diverse than patriotism alone. It was widely accepted that the term ‘May Fourth Movement’, in a broad sense, ‘embraces on the one hand both the social and political activities of the students
and intellectuals, and, on the other, the new literature and new thought movements’ (Chow 1960:2). In this sense, the May Fourth Movement did include the ‘New Culture’ campaign in the first decade of the twentieth century, which was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. More importantly, the May Fourth Movement signalled changes of attitudes, particularly of the young intelligentsia, towards Western civilization and the Chinese cultural heritage. This led to the rise of an anti-traditional tendency, embodied by such rhetoric as ‘Destroy the old and establish the new’.

Economic, social, and political transformations in Chinese society after the 1840s paved the way for the May Fourth Movement. Until the later half of the nineteenth century China was a self-sufficient agricultural economy. After the Opium War foreign economic forces started penetrating into China as an important component of the colonization process. Economic colonization on the one hand undermined the self-sufficient agricultural economy and primitive type of industries, but on the other hand, helped to encourage Chinese national industries to adopt more modern methods. At its birth the national industry of China was competing with, but always dominated by, foreign industries. The outbreak of World War I gave Chinese national industry a boom time as Western powers were preoccupied with the conflict. This golden age for Chinese national industry did not last very long however, as Western powers returned after the end of the War, accompanied by an increased Japanese influence in the Chinese market. Economic confrontation with foreign powers fanned a growing nationalism; in fact, boycotts against foreign goods never stopped in the early twentieth century.

Social and political factors also contributed greatly to trigger the May Fourth Movement. From the 1860s China began to learn modern science and technology from the West, which could be seen as the early modernization efforts. Modernization in that period, however, was not intended to bring fundamental changes to either the state mechanism of China or the stereotyped concepts of the Western civilization. It was mainly material-oriented, aiming to upgrade industry, technology and to fortify the country’s defence. The effort then proved a failure when China was defeated by Japan in 1895. Consequently some of the Chinese elite started thinking of the necessity for China to change its legal and institutional systems after the Western
model. Such thinking was put into action and resulted in the ‘One Hundred Day Reform’ in 1898, initiated by the young Emperor Guangxu and his confidants. The Reform proved no match for the conservative powers in the Court and failed miserably. Attempts to reform continued and resulted in the 1911 revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and established the Republic. However the revolutionaries did not have a new system ready to replace the old one and the following ten years saw China in a political turmoil, with successive scandals of monarchical restoration attempts. Chow (1960:10) contended that throughout the years following the 1911 revolution, Chinese political thinking and behaviour had not been very far from tradition. Most of the people were still the victims of oppressive, ultraconservative officials and were, as before, obedient to authority, to armed force, and to the traditional ethical and political dogmas. A more fundamental change was considered urgently needed.

External crises facing China shattered the deep-rooted loyalty and confidence in tradition and the established institution. From 1842 to 1918 China suffered repeated defeats by Western powers and Japan, which resulted in losses of territories and the payment of heavy compensations, and the humiliations did not end after the establishment of the Republic. In 1915 Japan presented ‘Twenty-one demands’ to the Chinese government, calling for control of an enormous part of the Chinese territory from Manchuria to the Yangtze Valley. The key terms of the treaty were however accepted by the current president, so that the nation was pushed into deeper humiliation. In 1918, despite being a member of the victorious allies, China found herself sold out by Britain and the United States through their secret endorsement of the transfer of German leased Jiaozhou to Japan. This was the last straw for Chinese national dignity and ultimately triggered the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement.

In addition to economic, social and political factors, the introduction of Western style education and the practice of Chinese students studying overseas in the early twentieth century, need to be taken into account in understanding the May Fourth Movement. After the Opium War Western powers not only brought into China modern-style finance and trade, but also tried to exert their influence through education. ‘In the ten years after 1907, when the new Western style educational system started functioning on an appreciable scale, there were some 10,000,000
persons who had received or were receiving the new education in one form or another' (Chow 1960:9). Besides, from 1846 onwards, thousands of young Chinese travelled to Europe, America and Japan for education and training. In 1872 the Chinese Government started to organize and sponsor students studying in America. Shortly afterwards, large numbers of students went to Japan and, from 1908 to 1911, 183 outstanding young people were recruited to study in USA, funded by the Chinese compensation to America (Qian 1996)³.

Hu Shi, one of the students funded by the Chinese compensation and later a leading figure of Chinese intelligentsia, was among many that were deeply influenced by the Western view of the world. Works such as T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* found keen readers among students in China who were exposed to Western thoughts. They could not quite understand Huxley's contribution to scientific and intellectual history, but rather, they grasped the significance of such phrases as 'the strong are victorious and the weak perish' as they applied to international politics. Technical terms like evolution and 'natural selection' became stock words appearing frequently in journals and slogans (Grieder 1970).

While the early groups of Chinese overseas students mainly concentrated on the study of science and technology, students in later years began to be interested in Western law, politics, sociology and cultural studies (Ma 2000). Many of these students became actively involved in Chinese revolutions in the twentieth century and a new generation of the Chinese intellectual elite therefore emerged. This generation tended to be sceptical and critical of Chinese traditions, and enthusiastic in support of cultural and institutional reforms after Western models. They tended not to attribute national humiliation and loss of sovereignty merely to external factors, such as the greedy nature and aggressive behaviour of foreign powers, but to seek explanations from internal factors. They tended to re-examine the whole set of national heritage—the official institutions, ethics, traditions and customs—in the light of science and

³ China was required to pay a heavy compensation to 14 countries, as a result of the Boxer Uprising in 1900. In 1908 America and China signed an agreement that allowed the excessive amount of the Chinese compensation to be used to train a certain number of Chinese students in America.
democracy, and felt it urgent to bring reforms into such domains, in order to save the nation and build a new China.

Whereas the revolution in 1911 resulted in a very visible change in the Chinese society by overthrowing the monarchy, the May Fourth Movement brought about changes in the way of thinking. Established institutions and traditions faced unprecedented challenges. In the first decade of the nineteenth century an anti-traditional trend of thinking was rising in China, pushed by educated elites and embraced by the young generation that was keen to break with traditions of any form. When John Dewey, Hu Shi’s supervisor in America, was on a lecture tour in Beijing and Shanghai in 1919, he noted that

There seems to be no country in the world where students are so unanimously and eagerly interested as in China in what is modern and new in thought, especially about social and economic matters, nowhere the arguments which can be brought in favour of the established order and the status quo have so little weight – indeed, are so unuttered. (Chow 1960:183)

Hu Shi himself, having a good knowledge of the Chinese history and philosophy, but educated in America for seven years, decided that long-established Chinese institutions were responsible for China’s weakness:

Such a civilization which endures the bonds and the coercive power of the material environment and cannot free itself from them, which cannot use man’s reason and intelligence to temper his environment and improve his condition—this is the civilization of a lazy and retarded race. (Grieder 1970:156)

Lu Xun, who had studied Western medicine in Japan but later became a professor of Chinese literature at Peking University, was another leading character of the May Fourth Movement. Compared to Hu Shi, Lu Xun attacked tradition in a more demolishing and ruthless manner. In his short story The Mad Man’s Diary, Lu Xun condemned the whole body of Chinese history through the mouth of the ‘Mad Man’:

I opened the history book, there was no record of years in it. Scribbled on every page was words ‘Benevolence, justice, discipline and virtue’. Unable to sleep I read it until midnight and finally saw the word ‘cannibalism’ written in between the lines in the whole book! (Lu 1980:422)
Critical views of history and tradition as such were widespread in the early twentieth century. At the height of the May Fourth Movement, slogans such as ‘Down with Confucius and his sons’ and ‘Destroy the old and establish the new’ were broadcast by literate elites and much echoed by young intellectuals.

Chen Duxiu, a professor from Peking University, joined Hu Shi in 1918 in condemning the tradition—including old literature, politics and ethics. Like Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu enjoyed tremendous popularity among the young intelligentsia. He was the editor-in-chief of the most radical journal at the time, New Youth. Politically Chen took a more radical stand than Hu. While Hu was an enthusiastic advocate of Western democracy as well as experimentalism and rationalism, Chen called for a thorough reform and was against any kind of compromise with the old institution that would ‘abandon one and preserve the others’. It was during the May Fourth Movement that he turned to Marxism theories and was attracted by the Soviet model of revolution. Two years after the May Fourth Incident, in 1921, Chen moved to Shanghai and convened the first conference of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Among the eleven attendants was Mao Zedong, who was soon to become the leader of the CCP and to establish a communist government in China.

It is worth noting that the May Fourth period was a lively time in Chinese cultural history with a diversity of thoughts and views. This period witnessed intense debates among people holding different views of history and heritage. Although sharing the critical view about Chinese tradition, the reforming intellectuals had different visions about China’s future. Radical representatives like Chen Duxiu believed in Marxist revolution, whereas rationalism advocates like Hu Shi saw Westernization and gradual reforms as the solution to China’s problems. There were conservative voices as well, arguing for the superiority of the Chinese civilization and values over those of the West. Ku Hungming, a Western educated professor at Peking University, was a representative of the conservatives. In his The Spirit of the Chinese People (1922), Ku made strong points about the superiority of Chinese civilization and Confucian Doctrines. Ku’s statement, like that of other conservatives at the time, was in fact an expression of despair towards modernization and the abuse of modern achievements during World War I. Seeing what had happened in Europe, Ku fell back on Chinese civilization for a solution to the problems of mankind. The Chinese, Ku argued, had
enjoyed over two thousand years of harmony, and he went on to attribute this national harmony to Chinese civilization, which was based on good citizenship; and good citizenship was based on the Confucian doctrines of moral values and social hierarchy. To demonstrate his stand for tradition, Ku behaved and dressed as a living antique and his figure in an old fashioned gown and pigtail became a peculiar scene on the campus of post-1919 Peking University.

Despite controversies and conservative opinions, reformer’s voices were overwhelming. Never before in China had history and tradition been subject to such harsh criticism. Negative aspects of national history and tradition were exposed, highlighted and projected as targets for condemnation. To some radicals, Chinese history was a record of institutional tyranny and Chinese civilization a mirror of the society’s backwardness. To shake off national humiliation they were keen to fight against tradition. It was during this period that an iconoclastic narrative upon history prevailed. In the face of national crisis and humiliation new intellectuals tended to accept the ‘survival of the fittest’ principle. It was believed that China could only survive through transformation and modernization, and that old tradition should be done away with as it was in contradiction with modernization. In this sense, perceptual changes to history and tradition should be seen as an indigenous reaction to colonization, and the anti-traditional tendency of thinking was indeed driven by nationalistic emotions. At the same time, however, in highlighting negative aspects of Chinese cultural heritage, radical thinkers during the May Fourth Movement set an anti-traditional narrative. Radicals interpreted gaps between China and Western powers in science and technology as gaps between Chinese and Western civilizations, and concluded that the whole body of Chinese culture and civilization was backward.

The May Fourth Movement was a critical moment in Chinese modern history. The new thoughts during this period left a deep impact on Chinese modern culture. While pushed by nationalistic and patriotic emotions, radical intellectuals dominated the evaluation of Chinese history, tradition and cultural heritage with their negative views. In later years the legacy of the May Fourth Movement was not only constantly referred to and exploited by various interest groups, but also filtered and interpreted into particular versions to serve particular purposes.
The Nationalist regime from 1927 recognized the nationalistic sentiments of the May Fourth Movement, but the anti-tradition tendency of the movement was denounced by Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), as a violation of old ethics, rejection of history, destruction of all disciplines, expansion of individual freedom, and blind worship of foreign countries (Chow 1960). As a reversal of the anti-traditional trend, the KMT launched a new nationalism campaign soon after it established a new regime in 1927. Consequently the 1930s saw re-evaluations of Chinese history, as well as renewed appraisal of Confucius and Confucian principles and admiration of traditional cultures. For example traditional Chinese building styles were restored in buildings of official institutions of the KMT, in the capital city of Nanjing as well as in Shanghai.

The May Fourth Movement was interpreted with full compliments by the CCP. For political reasons, the CCP embraced and developed its radical legacy and its anti-traditional concept. As a major opposition party between 1927 and 1949, the CCP used the rhetoric ‘destroy the old and establish the new’ in publicising its political ambitions. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the date May 4th was designated as the Chinese Youth Day and has since remained so. From the 1950s to the 1970s, when Mao Zedong was the paramount leader of China, the notion ‘destroy the old and establish the new’ was still prevailing in ideological, social and cultural domains, and became deeply embedded among younger generations.

The establishment of the new China was accompanied by a new wave of nationalism. The KMT regime between 1927 and 1949 proved turbulent. During this period China suffered from the Japanese invasion, civil wars, as well as natural disasters and famine. By the time the CCP took over power, the Chinese economy had collapsed and the country was among the poorest in the world. In the early 1950s China also faced sanctions by the West due to the Korean War. Those who had suffered from poverty and humiliation were longing to change their lives; those who led the change were resolved to turn their promises into reality in the shortest possible time and they pledged to build a brand new society on the ruins of the old one. Deeply influenced by the Soviet model of revolution, and anxious to turn China into a competent member of the Soviet Bloc and a strong rival to Western powers, the CCP government set a goal
for the country to be quickly industrialized. The factory chimney became a symbol of industrialization and an advanced society. The story went that Mao Zedong, leader of the new China, vowed, when looking over the flat skyline of Beijing from the gate tower of Tian'anmen, that the flat skyline of the capital city would be replaced within ten years by a forest of chimneys. In short, to Mao himself, the chimney and factory building were the desirable manifestations of modernization (Yang 2000:190). Here the term industrialization was indeed equivalent to modernization, following in many ways the Soviet political and economic model. Even so, however, industrialization in this period was with Chinese characteristics and the course was charted through the Great Leap Forward and the consequence was grave and, in many cases desastrous (Rowe 2002:201). In the case of Beijing, its status as the traditional cultural centre no longer mattered – and quite out of place – because it became a people's capital of the new republic, and its development followed the demands of industrial production and the needs of the Central government (Yang 1994:189).

Consequently Beijing was quickly converted from an imperial capital into one of the key heavy industrial centres of the country, at the expense of its urban heritage. Anything obstructing the modernization process had to be done away with. Despite repeated pleas by leading professionals such as Liang Sicheng⁴ to preserve the Old City, the city walls of Beijing were demolished to make way for wide roads and new national monuments. To the senior authorities, the historic value of the city walls and the urban fabric of Beijing counted little when compared with political and economic imperatives. People like Liang Sicheng, who argued for the conservation of the urban heritage in the capital city, were considered not only conservative, but also politically untrustworthy (Lin 1991).

Mao believed that the country's economy should always follow the political agenda. Filled with ambitions to catch up with Western rivals, Mao and his colleagues copied

---
⁴ Liang Sicheng (1901—1972), one of leading architects in modern China. Liang received his master’s degree in architecture at the University of Pennsylvania. He was professor of architecture in Tsinghua University, China. In the 1950s he wrote to the Central Government objecting the decision to demolish the city walls of Beijing and proposed plans to protect the built heritage in the capital city. However his objection was dumped and his proposals were rejected by the Government.
Soviet model and gave industrial production (especially heavy industries) top priority, and service almost no priority. This policy, ruling for over two decades, was partially based on the deeply embedded tradition of an agricultural society such as China, where people often had low opinions about business and trade. In the Mao era when communist ideology prevailed, this ancient ethics was interpreted and strengthened by new rhetorics of class struggles – and service and consumption were associated with exploitation as well as the already disposed classes: capitalists and landlords as well as their lifestyles.

Mao and his colleagues wanted the new China to be free from the old society in every sense, not only physically but also ideologically. For some thirty years after the establishment of the PRC, historic studies were driven by, and made to conform with, the official propaganda, leaving little room for free debate or academic research. ‘Classes struggle, some classes triumph, some eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of civilization for thousands of years’ (Mao 1969:428). Mao Zedong’s concept on the class struggle was adopted as a guideline for all aspects of life in China, as well as for historical studies. History was told and interpreted from the viewpoint of class struggle, in a ‘proletarian’ narrative. In such a narrative, the humble classes – slaves, peasants and workers should be the main characters of the historic records. However, the existing history of China from ancient time was recorded in such a way that it was dominated by emperors and the social elites. In the Mao era, people were told that such a history was useless, and even poisonous. For similar reasons, memories and heritage that failed to fit into the official translation of history tended to be neglected or eliminated. ‘Destroy the old and establish the new’ was therefore legitimated and became the official rhetoric. Such disrespect for history reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution (1966 –1976), beginning with the nationwide destruction of the cultural heritage, from intangible elements – religion, music, arts and ritual – to tangible components such as sites, built structures and antique objects, in the ‘Destroying Four Olds’ campaign.5

The damage to the cultural heritage by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was unprecedented and immeasurable. The ‘Revolution’ tended not only to damage heritage properties

5 ‘Four Olds’ literally referred to old culture, thoughts, custom and habits.
and items, but also to damage any respect for heritage and history. As mentioned above, this tendency of disrespect for history was led by the ruling regime and became institutionalized during the post-1949 era. Its impact was profound and long-lasting. In the mid-1960s, the history department was demolished or merged into other departments in many Chinese universities. The few history departments that survived only offered courses on the CCP history, history of international communism, the history of peasant wars and history of the imperialist invasion of China. Without due respect for history, memories were subject to distortion or elimination to meet political (later economic as well) imperatives. Heritage objects became meaningless and worthless except for their ideological, or sometimes, technological and aesthetic values. Under the ideological extremism of the Cultural Revolution, even appreciation of the aesthetic value of artwork was labelled bourgeois and was officially discouraged.

**Nationalism, Heritage and Globalization**

The open-door policy of the Chinese Government implemented in 1978 ushered in a new era for China. Deng Xiaoping, the leader of China after Mao from the late 1970s to mid-1990s, was an enthusiastic advocate of economic development as well as the open-door policy, and was referred to as the ‘designer-general’ of the Chinese economic reform. Deng acknowledged with frankness the sluggishness of the Chinese economic status between 1957 and 1977, as well as the people’s low living standard. Under Deng’s leadership, Mao’s class struggle concept was reviewed and discarded, and economic development was given top priority in the Government’s working agenda, replacing ideological campaigns. The whole nation was called on by the Government to concentrate its efforts on economic growth and modernization. This time, however, the meaning of ‘modernization’ went beyond industrialization to cover almost all facets of the society. With the opening-up policy, China was able to see live

---

6 The third plenary session of the Eleventh CCP Congress was held in December 1978. It has been recognized as a turning point of both Chinese and CCP history after 1949. From then on the agenda of CCP and the Chinese Government has been focused on economic development instead of ideological campaigns and an open-door policy has been adopted.
examples of modernity from Hong Kong, Japan and other developed countries in the West. As a result, the modernization process in China during the post-1978 era, compared with the Soviet dominated 1950s, was under much stronger influence from the West. Even so, modernization in the post-reform era is still different from the Western model and is at its infancy. The objective of the first twenty years of post-reform modernization is a ‘well-to-do society’, in other words, a society where people’s basic needs – food, clothes and housing – can be satisfied.

It has to be seen that at Deng’s time China was faced with different international settings from those of the Mao era. Changes in China after the 1980s took place in the context of the Cold War receding. While the Mao era ended up with a multitude of ideological campaigns, Deng aimed to reverse the Maoist mindset of class struggle as well as other extreme ideological notions. Such a relaxed atmosphere was conducive to a restoration of national tradition, and more rational attitudes towards traditional culture seemed to be adopted. For example, in 1982 a proposal was submitted and approved to list the first group of twenty-four cities as ‘cities of historic and cultural significance’. Though traces of Mao’s class struggle rhetoric still remained, the proposal evaluated the national heritage in a positive manner:

(These cities) are either political, economic and cultural centres from ancient times, or important cities in modern history where revolutionary movements and major historic events took place. Large amounts of historic and revolutionary remains from these cities of historic and cultural significance exist either above or under the ground, embodying the long history, glorious revolutionary tradition and magnificent culture of China as a nation (Dong and Ruan 1993:6).

The open-door policy of the Chinese Government, was the result of the rejection of the excesses of the Mao era internally and, China’s response to the trend towards economic globalization externally. The country was expected to make a fresh start in a changed international environment, where the globalization of capital, manufacture, services, consumption and entertainment was already under way. Only at this point did China aim to join the world economic process and to raise the living standards of the nation by boosting the domestic economy. During the following twenty years, poverty and backwardness were to be removed from society as quickly as possible, as well as from the life of every citizen.
The new Government policies opened China’s door to international capital as well as cultures. Toyota and Coca-Cola came in together with Hong Kong TV series and Hollywood movies. The Chinese Government started to send students to study overseas and official or non-official exchanges between China and the outside world increased rapidly. The new era unveiled before China’s eyes a world of updated economy, finance, trade, services, high technology, as well as international trends of consumption and media. The nation found itself under great pressure to catch up with the world. Needless to say, the gaps between anticipation and reality were very wide – often appallingly so.

It was under such circumstances that a new collision between modernity and tradition took place in China. Along with an unprecedented zeal in economic development and a keen desire for modernization, there arose a renewed challenge to Chinese tradition and cultural heritage. While the economic and technological gaps between China and developed countries were obvious, a trend in perceptions emerged that tended to see China as being backward in every sense – not only in its economy and technology, but also in its civilization as a whole. An illustration of such a trend was a TV program *River Elegy* in 1988 on CCTV (China Central Television), one of the Chinese top official mass media agents.

The authors of *River Elegy* based the transcript on interviews with some intellectual elites and a number of government officials. It was declared that the aim of the program was an overall review of national history, civilization and destiny (Su and Wang 1988). The review, however, was conducted using a negative narrative, trying to support the core argument that Chinese history, cultural heritage and civilization were outdated, indicating little but national backwardness. The program projected two contrasting images before its viewers: ‘yellow’ and ‘blue’ civilizations. The yellow was outdated and dying, embodying Chinese cultural heritage and institutions. ‘Yellow’ indicated that Chinese people tend to trace their cultural roots to the Yellow River valleys and the inland areas. In contrast, the ‘blue’ civilization, embodying Western cultures in general, many linked closely to the ocean, was modern and dynamic (Su and Wang 1988:96-116).
It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss *River Elegy*, but as a TV program broadcast by the official media, it reflected to some extent the popular as well as official opinion about the issues it tackled – tradition and modernity, backwardness and progress, China and West, centralism and liberalism. Though remaining controversial for a few years afterwards, and for political reasons banned since 1989 because of the political tendency it demonstrated, *River Elegy* signalled a new rise of anti-traditionalism in the 1980s and the loss of self-pride and self-worth that had been established by the ideology of the Mao era. Whereas their political message was still somewhat ambiguous, the authors of *River Elegy* asserted strongly a disdain for the Chinese tradition and heritage and warned that China would face a deep crisis if it remained obsessed by the old civilization.

In today's world, faced with challenges from Western industrial civilization and cultural globalization, every ancient civilization is confronted with a severe crisis in terms of both reality and tradition. The older the tradition is, the more severe the crisis will be (Su and Wang 1988:10)

Such an anti-traditional rhetoric was nothing new in modern Chinese history. As was discussed above, anti-traditional thought appeared in the early years of the twentieth century and was constantly on the rise. Anti-traditional thought during the May Fourth Movement was coupled with arguments in support of entire Westernization, whereas in the Mao era it was integrated with notions of class struggle. Over the decades, anti-traditional notions such as 'Destroy the old and establish the new' became deeply embedded and prevailing. 'Old' and 'New' are two conflicting concepts. While 'old' is related to backwardness, 'new' is related to progress. It is worth noting here that definitions of 'old' and 'new' differed from time to time. In the eyes of radical reformers during the May Fourth Movement, Chinese traditional culture was "old" and Western science and democracy were 'new'. In the Mao era, the elite culture and past regimes in Chinese history, as well as Western capitalism, belonged to the 'old' while socialism and communism were 'new'. Then in the 1980s, Chinese collectivism and planned economy were "old" and Western democracy and free economy were 'new'. The past was condemned, mocked and ridiculed when China was faced with big social changes in modern history. It was the situation at the time of the May Fourth Movement, the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution, and it was the
same again in the 1980s when China was fully geared up to head for modernization and to take a role in the rising trend of economic globalization.

The anti-traditional tendency in the 1980s, as epitomized by *River Elergy*, reflected the frustration and confusion of many people in China who were faced with challenges from the global economy and cultures. Like the authors of *River Elergy*, young intellectuals in China in the 1980s tended to believe that China’s cultural tradition posed the greatest obstacle to her progress, and they tried to find solutions in the “blue civilization”. Attempts at Westernization were manifested in various domains, but it was the attempt to apply it to politics that brought in the official intervention of June 1989 and the Westernization movement ended up with the Tian’anmen Square incident in the same year. That event, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, put the Chinese Government on guard against the thrust of Western ideologies. Consequently the Government initiated a new ideological strategy, promoting patriotism and nationalism to strengthen national unity, and to remind the nation of past humiliations in order to illustrate the imperialist nature of Western powers.

Rebuilding national pride was vitally important to the Chinese government in the late 1980s, in relation to both domestic and international concerns. Unlike the Mao administration, the Chinese Government in the 1980s did not close the door to the world just because of the ideological confrontation with the West; instead, the Chinese economy continued to advance and China became more involved in the global economic process in the 1990s, trying to become a stronger player. Faced with the accelerating processes of both economic and cultural globalization and the existing domination by the West in world dialogue, boosting national identity was seen as an important agenda for the Chinese Government. Here national identity on the one hand was a consolidated set of institutions, traditions and cultural heritage aimed to strengthen national unity; on the other, it would project China’s new national image in the world as an emerging power.

Coupled with the official patriotism and nationalism campaigns were discourses on history and tradition, as well as orientalism, post-colonialism, and post-modernity in the 1990s (Liu 1998; Shen 1998). An obvious tendency of intellectual discourse in
this period, understandably, was a positive re-evaluation of national tradition and heritage, aimed at rebuilding national pride in the context of cultural globalization. The discourse during this period sought to argue for a greater place for peripheral cultures in the process of globalization, and against the cultural domination of the 'centres'. The focus of the discourse was on the cultural equity between centres and peripheries. The key message was that cultural diversity should be taken as the core agenda of globalization, and equal dialogue should be established between various cultures and traditions to replace the existing cultural domination of one culture over another (Gao and Hu 1998).

The decade after 1989 saw a boost to tradition and heritage in China closely related to economic and commercial goals. Suddenly tradition seemed to be a gold mine. Historic themes were extensively deployed to claim the economic (or political) importance of a region, and were highlighted in local development plans in the form of cultural theme parks, historic towns and memorial sites. For instance in 1992 the local government of Qufu, hometown of Confucius, launched a full-scale city refurbishment. In 1994 the government of Peixian, a less developed county seat in Jiangsu Province, decided to base its development plan on the local history, for Peixian was the hometown of Liu Bang, the first emperor of the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) and as a result, replicas of ancient building styles mushroomed in the town. Apart from history, totems, ancient myths and legends such as dragons and the Romance of Three Kingdoms also became important exploitable themes. Currently Shenzhen, a border city opposite Hong Kong, and Yueyang, an inland city in Hunan Province, have become rivals fighting over a theme park project based on the legend of the dragon, both strongly endorsed by local governments (People's Daily 2000a, 2000b).

The promotion of tradition and heritage however, does not necessarily safeguard the existing heritage items when the importance of heritage items is based primarily on the consideration of their economic (or ideological) significance rather than on a genuine appreciation of and respect for their historic values. Whereas the promotion

---

7 One of the best known Chinese classical novels based on the historic reality of three kingdoms (220-280).
of tradition and heritage is becoming a modern-day phenomenon on the one hand, disdain of tradition and heritage, on the other, remains deeply embedded and not likely to be easily reversed.

**Reinterpretation of Shanghai's Colonial Legacy during the Mao Era**

Under Maoist ideology, the colonial past of Shanghai was reinterpreted within the narrative of class struggles focusing on conflicts between the Chinese people and imperialists, between the working class and capitalists. This situation continued for over thirty years during which China underwent successive ideological campaigns.

China between 1840 and 1949 was referred to by the CCP as a semi-feudalist, semi-colonial society. In terms of the humiliating experiences under Western colonialism, Shanghai was seen as the worst example since it was the city where China’s sovereignty was lost to the Western powers and the city became the outpost of colonialism. Shanghai was exposed to capitalism, capitalist ideology and corrupted lifestyles for over a century. Therefore in Mao’s rhetoric of cleansing old China, Shanghai seemed to need cleaning more than anywhere else.

The establishment of the PRC marked the termination of Western privileges in China. In Shanghai, although the administration of both International Settlement and French Concession was handed back to the Chinese Government under the KMT in 1943, the privileges granted to Westerners were not removed until the CCP was in power.

Under the Cold War climate, China quickly joined the communist block and cut off links with most Western countries. In the early 1950s the Korean War broke out and the Western world became the main enemy of China. Under these deteriorating circumstances, the majority of Western residents left Shanghai.

---

8 The term ‘feudalist’ here is problematic in the Chinese context. The term ‘semi-feudalist, semi-colonial’ was given by Mao in 1921 to define the nature of the current society. It has been argued that China was free from feudalist system in 221 B.C when Emperor Qin Shi Huang unified China and centralised administration of the country. Chinese society after that was in fact under a unified, centralised monarchical tyranny.
To some people Shanghai seemed to change overnight. One such person was Noel Barber, author of *The Fall of Shanghai: The Communist Takeover of 1949*, who noticed that a bookseller suddenly replaced his stock of cheap, pornographic novels with works by Mao Zedong, Lenin and Marx (Barber 1979:162). Indeed the official ideology impacting on Shanghai changed dramatically and rapidly from capitalist to communist under the new government. Within a few years in the 1950s foreign-owned businesses were closed and domestic, privately owned businesses and enterprises were nationalized. The city was morally cleansed: brothels, gambling halls and opium dens were closed and Hollywood movies banned. Shanghai was transformed from 'the paradise for adventurers' to a leading industrial centre under the CCP's planned economic system.

Chen Yi, the first mayor of the communist Shanghai Municipal Government, compared Shanghai to a 'dye vat' — a place that would change the innocent nature of any newcomer — and vowed that he and his comrades would change the colour of Shanghai instead of being dyed in the 'vat' (Sha 1987). The cleaning-up of the colonial remnants was captured in the literature on Shanghai. As Chinese literature generally was brought in line with the official ideology during the Mao era, the literature on Shanghai between the 1950s and 1970s therefore reflected to a large extent the official perceptions of this city. *The Morning of Shanghai*, a novel by Zhou Erfu (1995) was about the socialist reform and the nationalization processes that transformed privately owned business, and confrontations between the CCP-led workers and capitalists who dreamed of reviving the better time of the past. A popular 1964 movie *Guards Under Neon Lights* told a story of how a patrol squad of the CCP's People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Shanghai managed to stand firm against seductions from Shanghai bourgeoisies. It ended up with the PLA's victory over a plot to bomb the city by the American backed KMT. Another 1964 play (later shot as a movie) named *The Harbour* was set in Shanghai. It was about the struggle between the communist officials and their anti-communist rivals over the young generation in Shanghai's waterfront industry. The play was promoted as one of the eight model stage shows during the Cultural Revolution by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife who was in charge of arts and cultural affairs, and it was performed for over ten years all over the country.
Ideological campaigns never stopped in Shanghai between the 1950s and 1970s. For over thirty years Shanghai was a main arena for the campaign of ‘promoting the proletariat and eliminating the bourgeois’ (Yang 1994:304) and a living example for patriotic and nationalistic education. Colonial Shanghai was taken as an illustration of the national humiliation and, under the rhetoric of class struggle, an arena of combat between the Chinese people and Western colonialists.

Memories of Old Shanghai were filtered in order to highlight colonial vices, national humiliation, social injustice and conflict between local Chinese and foreign settlers. In patriotic education, the alleged sign outside the garden on the Bund reading ‘Chinese and Dogs not permitted’ was a classic example of the national humiliation. One of the guild houses, Siming Guild House⁹, was designated in 1959 as a heritage site by the Shanghai Municipal Government to commemorate the bloody incident in 1898 when Shanghai locals attempted to stop the extension of the French Concession (Zhou 1998). A memorial plaque was installed in Nanjing Road in memory of participants who were killed by the foreign police in 1925 during a mass demonstration calling for the end of foreign settlement. Apart from normal functions, the iconic buildings on the Bund were constantly referred to as evidence of the exploitation and plunder of China by imperialists. The most glorious part of Shanghai’s history seemed to be that it was the birthplace of CCP. The building where the first CCP conference had been held was therefore designated as national heritage and became an important site for the purpose of ideological education.

The CCP’s ideological campaigns in Shanghai were successfully integrated with local resentments towards social injustice in colonial days and the nationalistic emotions. Literature on Shanghai, until the 1980s, focused on both of its past vices and its revolutionary tradition—it was the birthplace of the CCP, the arena for anti-colonialist movements. The other side of story—its past prosperity and its diverse culture—was hidden. Moreover, because of its colonial past and its coastal location, Shanghai was considered by the Central Government in Beijing as ideologically insecure and

⁹ Siming Guild House is located in the Old City. Built in 1797 by natives of Ningbo (Zhe Jiang Province) who were living in Shanghai, Siming Guild House was one of the oldest native guild houses in Shanghai.
strategically vulnerable. Therefore it was under the strict control and supervision of authorities in Beijing in every aspect – politics, ideology, economy, finance and human resources. Through constant political and ideological campaigns and rigid administrative control, Shanghai indeed changed both its function as well as its nature.

However the notion ‘destroy the old and establish the new’ was not put into practice in the same way as in Beijing during Mao’s era. Shanghai did not experience the drastic urban development and transformation that Beijing did. The landscape of Shanghai’s city core, as noticed by Harriet Sergeant in the late 1970s, was almost frozen:

Nothing appears to have altered since the pre-war era. Shanghai is bigger, there are more people and a few new skyscrapers but otherwise communism has fallen on the city like a sandstorm, burying and preserving. The street names are different but not the buildings, from the office blocks and hotels on the Bund to the villas in the suburbs. Even the interiors are untouched. The marble lobbies and art-deco swimming pools are pre-war as are the light switches. Communism has mummified Shanghai appearance in a manner inconceivable to a Westerner (Sergeant 1990:5).

The built form of Shanghai proper remained unchanged essentially because the Government saw little point to any change. Shanghai was recognized by the CCP as the most established city with the most advanced facilities in the country, despite the colonial impact in one form or another. The CCP authority seemed to adopt a pragmatic approach to the built legacy of colonial Shanghai. In 1956 Wan Li, the state minister for construction, rejected a proposal by the Shanghai Municipality to ‘transform Shanghai from a former capitalist city into a socialist city’, a transformation that indicated a radical alteration of its built form after the Soviet model. The proposal, Wan commented, was very inappropriate. Shanghai, he argued, had already become a socialist city since its ownership was in the hands of the people. Notions of class struggle, in this sense, were not necessarily applicable to the built form of Shanghai:

Concepts of socialism and capitalism do not apply to buildings. Here only the concept of time applies. An entertainment club is no longer an imperialist club, even though it was built during
the time ruled by imperialists, its style and technique reflects the artistic concepts of those days. (Zhou and Chu 1994:33)

Such an attitude was in conformity with the ‘ultimate utilization’ strategy of the CCP towards Shanghai and other coastal cities. Soon after the CCP takeover, government institutes and offices occupied buildings previously owned by businesses and firms. While the exterior of those buildings changed little, life behind doors was never the same. The building of The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, for example, served as the headquarters of the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for forty years from 1955 to 1995. The older city core, where business and services were concentrated in old days, was regarded as places of capitalist consumption and subject to the need of production. As a result, many buildings were put to uses totally different to, and inappropriate to their original purpose and design. Such changes from the original function of the buildings helped to make an ultimate, practical use of existing built resources, but it can be argued that it also helped to blur or to erase unwelcome memories of the colonial past. For example the St. Francis Xavier Church at Dongjiadu (locally known as Dongjiadu Church) was occupied by a factory, the Sheshan Cathedral became a warehouse for fruit, and the Bearn Apartment on the Avenue Joffre in the former French Concession was converted into a department store. It is not hard to imagine that, by putting a site to a totally different use, the original meaning of the site would be substantially overlooked, and gradually fade away. A fruit warehouse converted from a church would hardly remind people of an imported religion, and a department store converted from a luxurious apartment would be no longer exclusive but became accessible to the public.

Despite the prevailing class struggle notions, attitudes toward Shanghai’s Western legacy were manifold, even during the radical years from the early 1950s to the late 1970s. General Chen Yi labelled Shanghai as a ‘dye vat’. However as the first communist mayor of Shanghai, he was excited on the eve of its takeover, and made a speech to his soldiers before advancing to Shanghai:

Soon we ‘country pumpkins’ will takeover Shanghai! You may have a half-day holiday to visit the Huangpu and the busy streets, just to get some idea about this ‘paradise for adventurers’. (Sha 1987)
To General Chen Yi, Shanghai, despite its vices, was mysterious, challenging and attractive. In fact, many CCP cadres, including Mao Zedong and later Deng Xiaoping, were fond of living in Shanghai. For example, a set of units in Cathay Mansions (now part of the Jing Jiang Hotel) was always reserved for Mao. The KMT treasurer, T.V. Song’s ex-residence was used as a holiday house for Mao’s deputy Lin Biao and Madam Mao. Deng fell into the habit of spending the winter in Shanghai in his later years. It was hard to tell what in Shanghai attracted them, but Shanghai’s advanced facilities, convenience and comfort, as well as its sophisticated culture, certainly counted.

Ordinary Shanghai citizens had mixed feelings towards their hometown and of being Shanghai Ren (Shanghai citizens). In the colonial era, they had felt most deeply hurt by the social injustice and Western domination. Under the modern, western style of management they were more disciplined but more stressed, compared with people in other Chinese cities. At the same time however, they felt proud of being citizens of the most advanced city in the country, and being considered the most competent and clever people in the country. Such pride remained in the post-1949 era, for Shanghai was still the most advanced city in China. Shanghai professionals and skilled workers were sent to inland regions to share their expertise with people there, since they were seen as technological experts and fashion leaders. Above all, in the eyes of the Shanghai citizens, Shanghai was not a city of foreigners, but their own. Shanghai was their home, and its tradition and culture were closely integrated into their lives and their stories. Their emotional attachment to Shanghai was as strong as that of other Chinese people to their home towns, and they always believed that they belonged to Shanghai and that Shanghai belonged to them too.

The other side of reality, however, was that Shanghai in Mao’s era was constantly being targeted for ideological campaigns during the three decades after 1949. Shanghai citizens, particularly those of middle-class background, were therefore made more conscious of the colonial past of their city. This meant that whilst they celebrated freedom from the domination of Western colonialists and expressed their nationalistic emotions, they had always to check themselves at the same time for signs of contamination by the colonial Shanghai, the capitalist ‘dye vat’.

91
Shanghai’s built form never failed to attract admiration and interest. In 1958 a research project on Shanghai’s architectural history was convened and conducted by academics and professionals in Shanghai. The project was originally part of the research on the Chinese architectural history, initiated by the State Ministry of Construction Engineering in corporation with the Chinese Academy of Architectural Science. The objective of the project was a publication on the Chinese history of ancient and modern architecture as well as the architectural achievements within the first decade of PRC. Chen Congzhou, chief convenor of the Shanghai section of the project, observed that Shanghai was an indispensable part of the history of Chinese architecture. Chen’s argument was that Chinese architecture had experienced great changes since 1840 due to the introduction of Western technology and styles, and Shanghai epitomized such changes with the great diversity and excellent techniques of its built forms (Chen and Zhang 1988:1-2). Somehow the project was abandoned in the 1960s, and was not resumed until more than twenty years later. The main reason, as Professor Luo Xiaowei, one of the project team members, recollected, was that the team was suspected of being nostalgic towards the colonial past. Under the revolutionary ideology, nostalgia was considered an unhealthy, petty bourgeois sentiment and attracted strong condemnation and rejection. This was particularly true during the Cultural Revolution, when people were convinced by the official propaganda that they were having the best time ever, and that they should work for an even brighter future. Nostalgia, in circumstances such as these, would not only be seen as an inappropriate attachment to the past, but would also be seen as a dangerous tendency towards distrust, or dissatisfaction with the present, because it might indicate that a person felt either insecure or worse off than in the past.

Shanghai Story Re-told

Compared with Beijing, Shanghai somehow appeared aloof from the ideological liberalism in the late 1980s. Though not China’s political centre, Shanghai seemed more bound to Mao’s legacy during the early years of the post-Mao era. Likewise,

---

10 Chen was an architect and architectural historian, a professor at Tongji University, Shanghai.

11 Interview with Prof. Luo Xiaowei at Tongji University, Shanghai, April 2000.
discourses and debates over modernity and tradition met little response from Shanghai, maybe because it had stopped being an intellectual centre a long time before. Exploitative state economic policies over Shanghai, constant political and ideological campaigns, harsh restrictions on migration into Shanghai, relatively high living standards, were all factors jointly moulding the collective personality of the Shanghai citizens in Mao’s era, making it different from what it had been previously. In this sense Shanghai’s status as an international, multicultural and lively city was greatly reduced during the three decades after 1949. While Shanghai’s glamour quickly faded, it also seemed culturally handicapped. It did not have such a deep-rooted national identity as Beijing had, and it lost its 1930s liveliness and diversity, mainly because the cornerstone of its economy and culture—international business and trade—had been taken away by the centralized planning economy. During the first decade of the open-door policy, Shanghai was not given any privileges by the Central Government, whereas border towns in South China, such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, were designated as Special Economic Zones and quickly grew into economic powers. Shanghai’s status seemed to drop further and the city was referred to, on more than one occasion, as a sinking ship (Yang 1994; Yu 1987; Zhang 1990). The character of Shanghai and its residents tended to become less adventurous and tolerant than in the past, and more conservative and narrow-minded. On the contemporary Chinese stage, there appeared a kind of ‘yes man’ character during the 1980s and the 1990s. This person (normally a middle-aged male) would be clever but not wise, calculating, timid, obedient, short-sighted, caring for his family but indifferent to public affairs. The appearance of this man is often somewhat feminine – clean and tidy, usually wearing an apron if the setting was his home. Invariably this person would speak with a Shanghai accent.

However in the 1980s, when anti-traditional thoughts provoked controversies in Beijing, a root-seeking trend was on the rise in Shanghai. This period saw a flourish of research publications delving into Shanghai history. Apart from the assumption that Shanghai history should be traced back as far as some 6,000 years, much research aimed to re-evaluate the modern history and culture of Shanghai between 1840 and 1949 from a more objective viewpoint. Urban Shanghai in Modern Times: An Elaborated Study (Zhang 1990) was a key research project by the Shanghai Institute of Social Science. Publications by academics from Tongji University and East China
Designing Institute of Civil Architecture, such as *A Brief History of Shanghai’s Modern Architecture* (Chen and Zhang 1988) and *Modern Architecture in Shanghai* (Wang 1989) were the fruits of the research into Shanghai architectural history undertaken during the 1950s. As an extension of this research, the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Construction (SMCC) and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage (SMACH) submitted to the national Ministry of Construction a register of 59 buildings built between 1863 and 1943 and, in 1989, even before the approval was granted from Beijing, designating those buildings as heritage properties. In addition to publications and the registration of historic properties, a museum on the history of Shanghai opened in 1985. The museum was to be a ground-breaking step in regard to the recognition of Shanghai’s status in modern China. While tracing back to the pre-history period, the museum however has a much richer exhibition on Shanghai’s modern history from 1843 to 1949, with due compliments about Shanghai’s success in becoming a world city.

A common message conveyed by these cultural activities—publications, exhibitions, as well as the heritage register, was that Shanghai history was not simply a history of humiliation, but also a history of glory and prosperity. They aimed to bring out the recognition of Shanghai’s success during the past one hundred years. The vital issue here is the evaluation of Western influence on Shanghai. It was self-evident that the past prosperity of Shanghai relied upon its commercial life, and that its commercial prestige in the modern history owed so much to the introduction of Western commercial models and practices. To revive, Shanghai would inevitably have to revive its commercial nature, and in this sense, therefore, it was important to acknowledge Shanghai’s Western legacy, particularly in economic aspects. Here the research by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science (Zhang 1990) could be seen as a quasi-official acknowledgment of the Western contribution in the process of Shanghai’s modern development through clarification of ‘a few theoretical issues’, such as the impact of Western settlement on the process of modernization as well as the conflict, compromise and interaction between cultures.

Despite the re-evaluation of Shanghai’s Western legacy, the colonial past remained a sensitive topic in Shanghai long after the implementation of the open-door policy. The Master Plan of Shanghai was submitted to the national authorities in Beijing in 1984.
and was approved in 1986. The plan included items concerning the ‘conservation of revolutionary heritage sites and historic properties’ but was cautious about the colonial heritage in Shanghai. While prioritising ancient ruins and CCP sites to ‘sustain national cultural heritage and promote patriotism and national pride’, the plan tiptoed in handling colonial heritage properties by placing them on the bottom of the hierarchical list, and only for their ‘artistic values’ (Shanghai Construction Editorial Board 1989). The same cautiousness could be perceived in the heritage registrations of 1989, which put an emphasis mainly on the technological values of registered buildings.

The rising interest in Shanghai’s modern history, as the Shanghai writer Shan Gu explained, indicated the recognition and recollection of Shanghai as the hub of the modern economy. The thriving publications about old Shanghai reflected the collective pride of Shanghai citizens in their city, observed Shan. Such a sentiment however, must have come out of the memory of Shanghai’s rich history and past glory, as it did not exist in newly emerging, economically powerful places such as Shenzhen, as these cities have no burden nor glory about their past (Shan 1998).

Designation of Shanghai as a city of historic and cultural significance by the Central Government in 1986 was a signal of the recognition of Shanghai’s position in Chinese modern history by the state. It should be also regarded as the official recognition of Shanghai’s cultural importance to the country. It seemed, however, insufficient to Shanghai’s citizens who were keen to see their city restored to its former status. The full recognition of the status of Shanghai eventually came in the 1990s, when the Central Government pushed Shanghai to the forefront of economic reform. In urging Shanghai leaders to speed up economic development, Deng Xiaoping regretted having ignored Shanghai in the first decade of economic reform. In his talk with Shanghai CCP cadres and municipal leaders, Deng said he greatly appreciated Old Shanghai as an international trade hub and the significance of the Shanghai legacy to economic prosperity of China in the future:

Finance is vital. It is the key to modern economy. A well managed finance can activate other aspects of economy. Shanghai in the past was a financial centre, where currencies exchanged
freely. We will do the same in future. It will be up to Shanghai for China to acquire her position in international finance (Deng 1993:366).

Consequently, from 1990 onward, Shanghai jumped into a new era of economic development. Though many factors may have contributed to the Central Government's decision to re-develop Shanghai, the Old Shanghai legacy, including its tangible and intangible heritage, provided strong grounds for the Government's development strategy. How the economic development then affected the heritage of Shanghai in the last decade of the twentieth century will be explored in following chapters.
CHAPTER FOUR: SHANGHAI IN THE 1990S: HEADING FOR MODERNIZATION

The last decade of the twentieth century ushered in a new era for Shanghai. In the early 1990s Shanghai was urged by the Central Government to quicken its development, the aim being to become an economic, trade and finance centre of international importance, and to assume the leadership role for the regions along the Yangtze River Valley. It was during this decade that Shanghai experienced the most stunning transformation of the century. The great economic leap forward was accompanied by a full-scale urban renewal, and in less than ten years, comprehensive construction projects gave a totally new look to Shanghai, which then featured a super-highrise skyline—in Deng Xiaoping’s words: Shanghai was growing taller. As a result of this fast development, Shanghai was becoming unrecognisable even to its citizens, who were amazed to see the transformation unfolding. Urban renewal was proceeding at a dazzling speed, with old buildings being flattened by bulldozers to make way for development projects. By the end of the century, a new Shanghai had emerged as an international metropolis.

This chapter aims to explore, in the light of the government open-door policy and economic globalization, the political, economic and social imperatives that have been pushing Shanghai’s development. The chapter also attempts to identify the extent to which economic and cultural globalization contributes to the transformation of Shanghai, and the threat that the built heritage faces from the urban development process.

Political and Economic Imperatives for Shanghai Development

Shanghai’s development took place in the context of political and economic progress in China as well as in the world. To appreciate Chinese economic progress and the impact that economic development has on urban landscapes, one needs to take into account the process of economic globalization in the world, as well as changes in world politics, and the way in which the Chinese government acted in response to those changes.
The late 1980s saw the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc. China, as a result, became one of the few remaining countries with a communist ideology. In 1979 the CCP adopted the open-door policy and since then has been reiterating to the nation the concept of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’—in other words, a market economy under the leadership of the CCP. In fact, while the Soviet Bloc was collapsing in the late 1980s, China was not politically peaceful. The year 1989 saw student demonstrations crushed at Tian’anmen Square. Facing challenges to its leadership by those calling for the introduction of Western democracy, the CCP decided that economic prosperity would be vital to the stability of the state. This was because only with a strong economy and improved living standards could the CCP convince the nation of its leadership. Soon after the Tian’anmen Square incident, Deng Xiaoping called for the nation to concentrate on economic growth, which the people interpreted in their vernacular language as ‘shut up and I’ll make you rich’. In June 1989, Deng urged the government to push the economy forward by substantially accelerating gross national production. Talking to the CCP Politburo members about the goal to be reached before the end of the twentieth century, Deng said,

We should try to expand the economy at a satisfactory speed in the next eleven and a half years. When we have redoubled the GNP in real terms, the people will see that our country and our socialist cause are flourishing (Deng 1994:303).

Economic issues were also integrated into the patriotic campaign launched after the 1989 Tian’anmen Square incident. The Chinese government believed that anti-Chinese forces in the West, especially those in the United States, were acting behind the scenes in the hope of seeing a Chinese version of the Soviet collapse. To raise the morale of the nation, the CCP reiterated the importance of national sovereignty, stability and unity and the urgency for a strong economy and modernization in order to secure China’s position in the world. National humiliations during the semi-colonial years were reiterated frequently in official propaganda to warn the nation against the threat of neo-colonialism. However, unlike the first generation of CCP leaders, Deng and his supporters decided that self-isolation would take China nowhere, and that the only way to become a strong nation was to open up and exploit every opportunity in the world’s economic operations.
Apart from political imperatives, the opening-up policy was formulated and adopted within the particular climate of a world economy. The process of economic globalization has pushed and accelerated the flow of world capital and labour. Multi-national corporations have been pursuing cheaper labour sources and larger markets for ever increasing profit. China, as a developing country with an enormous population, was therefore able to attract international capital. In history, attempts to open up the Chinese market were made by economic powers in the nineteenth century using warships. The attempts, however, were never very successful and the Chinese market remained inaccessible except for such treaty ports as Shanghai. At the turn of the twentieth century, China opened up her market to the world, as China at that time was no longer the same as it had been one hundred years before, nor what it was during the Cold War era. Since the opening-up policy, Chinese economy became increasingly integrated into global economic operations, and China aimed to obtain international capital to boost its economy. Although Deng Xiaoping and his fellow advocates of economic reform faced accusations from conservatives within the CCP that China was taking a capitalist turn by adopting a market economy, they pushed the open-door policy persistently and won credit through remarkable economic achievements. To make sure that the opening-up policy and economic reform would be carried out, Deng vowed to select ‘sensible people’ – namely, officials who were active and efficient in implementing the open-door policy and economic reforms – to fill important positions in the Party as well as in the government. To demonstrate their commitment to economic development, leading officials needed to announce a certain number of projects during their time in office, and the completion of those projects was considered a vital criterion in the assessment of their performance.

In the face of the trend towards economic globalization, the Chinese government pledged to exploit opportunities by opening up the Chinese economy and market. Since the 1980s international trade has become an increasing proportion of the Chinese national economy. In 1978, international trade was only 9.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and it grew to 45.4% in 1994 (Wu 2000). It became one of the top tasks for governments at all levels, those of developed regions and major cities in particular, to attract international investment.
The first wave of economic growth in China had a remarkable impact on cities in South China, but had little effect on Shanghai. Using the early economic reform as an experiment, the Chinese government designated four special economic zones (SEZ), Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. The SEzs, whilst having a low economic profile, all boasted favourable locations because of their closeness to either Hong Kong or Macau. As a pilot step the Government introduced various preferential policies into the SEzs, including tax breaks, the opening up of business sectors to foreign investors, and a reduction in the local revenues to the national coffers. Within less than ten years, in consequence, these zones grew at what was called ‘miraculous speed’. As the economy in the region surged, urban development transformed humble coastal towns such as Shenzhen into China’s most modern metropolitan centres, and the speed and scale of the urbanization of Shenzhen became a model for other cities to follow.

Obviously the experiment with the market economy in South China in the 1980s was the initial effort of China to embrace the trend of global economy. In relation to urban development, this economic reform was accompanied by somewhat relaxed government control and administration, as well as by increased independence for investors and developers. Municipal governments, heavily responsible for urban modernization, found themselves facing the issue of how to facilitate development because, ‘as centres for economic growth, city governments are responsible for creating a better investment environment through comprehensive planning and the provision of improved urban physical infrastructure’ (Ng and Xu 2000:411). To equip city governments with financial resources for the new tasks as well as to meet demands from international investors, cities in South China led reforms in land use rights. This brought about a big change in the land use system through the commoditization of state-owned urban land, requiring much greater independence for land users from government control. As a bold experiment, the reform took place at first in Shenzhen but soon spread out to other cities because of the immense commercial return it generated. The experiment managed to win sympathy and endorsement at a national level and in 1988 commoditization of land use rights was recognized by national law (ibid).
In the process of economic globalization, state and government controls over the economy were slowly reduced in the path of the progressive expansions of multinational companies, thereby allowing the flow of world capital and labour. Once China launched its program of economic reform, it was inevitable that the government would liberalize what had been a highly centralized economy. Recognition of the land market in the state law paved the way for full-scale urban development in other Chinese cities, most remarkably Shanghai, in the 1990s.

**Shanghai’s Urban Transformation: Pudong**

In comparison with newly emerged strong economies in South China, Shanghai faced a tough task in launching its economic takeoff. Likewise, urban development in Shanghai involved more complicated issues. As Shanghai had been overworked for some 40 years under the planned economy, urban development would mean, above all, improving its aged infrastructure and housing situation. Before discussing urban development in Shanghai in the 1990s, a brief look back at Shanghai in the era of planned economy would allow a better appreciation of the pressure for urban development in later years.

Domestic and international scholars shared a view that Shanghai lost its position as an economic driving force to the SEZs in south China in the 1980s (Chen 2000; Yang 1994; Yatsko 2001; Yu 1987). Looking back at the role that Shanghai played in the four decades after the establishment of the PRC, one can see that such a loss in a new era was inevitable for Shanghai. Many factors contributed to the decline of Shanghai, but, as Wu concluded from his analyses of the urban problems of Shanghai after 1949, the main factors responsible were the government’s bias towards the productive sectors in urban management, and its exploitative policies towards Shanghai (Wu 1985). Although a forerunner under the planned economy, Shanghai lost the essential leadership role that had previously characterized it.

Soon after the establishment of the PRC, Shanghai was designated as one of three municipalities to come under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government (the other two being Beijing the national capital and Tianjing, a port city 200 kilometres
from Beijing). Its status was of similar importance to its former position as the special municipality under the KMT administration. Indeed, ‘being the largest commercial and industrial centre of China, Shanghai has always attracted the attention of each of the regimes which ruled China’ (Wu 1985:111). Designation of Shanghai as a key city of the state was obviously based on an appreciation of its economic and financial significance. In the early 1950s the Minister of Construction officially recognized that Shanghai was a hub of industry, commerce and trade, transport and communication, culture and education (Wan 1994). However the government’s top investment priorities during that period were given to newly-established industrial centres, while Shanghai, having been regarded as an established city, was virtually denied infrastructure upgrades except for the expansion of industrial quarters and a few workers’ residential villages in the northern suburbs.

The Central Government’s policy towards Shanghai was focused on an ultimate utilization of its existing resources, including financial assets, public facilities, infrastructure and a skilled workforce. Under the planned economy Shanghai was rapidly converted from a key player in the international market to a hard worker under the direct supervision of the Central Government; from an international trade centre to a domestic base for manufacturing industries. For the following forty years, Shanghai acted as a major supplier of consumer products and the top revenue contributor to the Central Government. Contributing to the national coffers approximately 22 percent of the total annual national revenue, Shanghai did more than any province or municipality in terms of the industrial output of the nation (Wu 1985). However, compared with its contribution, Shanghai received little in return from the Central Government. For the thirty years after 1949, the investment that Shanghai received from the central government for capital construction was about 7.38 percent of what it had remitted to the national coffers, while investment for non-productive purposes was even smaller, about 1.23 percent of Shanghai’s revenue contribution (Yang 1994:315).

Shanghai remained silent about the gross imbalance between contribution and compensation until the early 1980s. In 1980 a researcher from the Shanghai Institute of Social Science published a lengthy article in the official municipal newspaper Jie Fang Daily. The article stated that, although Shanghai in the 1980s was still the
national number one city as far as industrial output, exports and revenue contribution were concerned, it had become the worst city in terms of population density, per capita public space and housing space. It also had the highest level of environmental pollution. It was pointed out in the article that an unreasonable bias towards production and excessive resources exploitation and revenue contribution over past decades were responsible for Shanghai’s sluggish economy and for the deterioration of its infrastructure in recent years (Shen 1980). Nevertheless, Shanghai did not receive much sympathy from the Central Government and the above article was criticised as the ‘signal of a localism tendency’ (Yang 1994:313).

By the end of the 1980s, Shanghai’s situation was such that it was referred to as ‘a beauty of yesterday’ or ‘a sinking ship’ (Yang 1994:313-321). While some movie crews were delighted by the intact townscape of Shanghai, which served as an ideal place to shoot movies based on 1930s stories, Shanghai citizens felt deeply dismayed with the outdated infrastructure, worn-out buildings and filthy slum areas of their hometown. Having been an obedient follower of the central government for many decades, the Shanghai Municipality would not take any bold step forward without the consent of the Central Government, and could do little to reverse the declining situation without the latter’s endorsement. Shanghai in the 1980s was therefore disappointing to its citizens because it lagged behind the newly emerging economic powers in South China and the situation changed little until the 1990s when the Central Government decided to develop Pudong.

After the successful experiment with the market economy in SEZs in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping decided to launch a new wave of economic development. The increasing involvement of China in the world economic processes signaled further reform in major economic arenas such as finance and trade. Believing that modern finance was the key issue to future development and that China had to open up its finance market in order to attract more international capital, Deng turned to Shanghai for its past experience as a financial hub in Far East. He pledged to restore the city to its previous status as an international finance and trade centre. Unlike the development of the South China SEZs, development of Shanghai was not meant to be experimental; rather, Deng argued that
Shanghai used to be a financial center where different currencies were freely exchanged, and it should become so again. If China is to acquire international status in finance, we should depend primarily on Shanghai (Deng 1994:353).

The Shanghai Municipal Government (hereafter referred to as SMG) was then urged by the Central Government to facilitate Shanghai’s development. In April 1990, the Central Government announced its decision to establish the Pudong Economic Development Zone, better known in Shanghai as Pudong New Area (hereafter referred to as Pudong). This was a 522 square kilometre area with a population of 1.4 million on the eastern side of Huangpu River opposite urban Shanghai (Figure 9). Again in 1992 Jiang Zemin, the Secretary General of the CCP and President of China, reiterated at the Fourteenth National Congress of CCP that the development of Shanghai should be treated as one of the top tasks on the government agenda. Jiang asserted that the ultimate goal of developing Pudong was to pave the way for Shanghai to become an international economic centre. Jiang also pointed out that the development of Pudong would push ahead the economy of the regions along the Yangtze River Valley (Jiang 1992).

![Figure 9: Pudong New Area](image)

1. Lujiazui Financial Zone
2. Zhangjiang High-tech Park
3. Jingqiao Export Processing Zone
4. Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone

104
The Pudong development had been dreamed about for many decades. As mentioned in Chapter Two, from the 1840s to the 1980s, urban Shanghai meant only that area along the west bank of the Huangpu River. The east bank (Pudong) was left undeveloped except for a small quarter called Lujiazui immediately opposite the Bund, which was occupied by some factories, dockyards and warehouses. Western settlers were reluctant to invest their money in Pudong because of inconvenient transport over the Huangpu. The KMT Shanghai Municipal Government had incorporated initiatives for the Pudong development in its ‘Great Shanghai Plan’ but the initiatives were never implemented under the KMT administration in mainland China. For more than forty years after 1949, Shanghai was not on the Central Government’s investment list and Pudong, consisting of two county seats, served mainly as the supplier of agricultural products to urban Shanghai. For more than one hundred years the only means of transport between the Metropolitan Shanghai and Pudong was a ferry boat. Shanghai citizens were unwilling to either work or live in Pudong due to the poor transport and limited civic facilities there. In the early 1980s Shanghai municipal leaders had tried to lobby the central government to develop Pudong but received little response until the 1990s. The Central Government’s decision to develop Pudong was therefore a long-awaited one and became a vital issue in Shanghai’s economic renaissance.

Being relatively undeveloped, Pudong seemed likely to offer an opportunity for Shanghai’s growth and modernization without the high economic and social costs of redeveloping the city’s crowded, under-serviced downtown (McLemore 1995). Being the backyard of Shanghai as well as the entrance to the broad hinterland along the Yangtze Valley Region, Pudong was regarded as more strategically significant than the SEZs in South China (Wang 1992). Apart from economic imperatives, political environment in the late 1980s was obviously taken into account in the process of decision-making. The Central Government’s decision to develop Pudong follows closely the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Incident, which, in the eyes of those outside China, was no coincidence (Arnold 1992). Soon after the Tian’anmen Square Incident, international investment in China plunged and ‘Chinese authorities had to rebuild foreign investor confidence by stepping up its commitment to turn Pudong into China’s showcase city with a massive new investment plan. ‘Pudong was a
statement to inform China and the world that Beijing was committed to reform’ (Wu 1998a).

The Pudong development was the result of the initiative of top authorities of the CCP and the Central Government. Despite the growth of a free market, government control over and intervention into the economy remain strong. In this sense, China is regarded as being drawn into what is referred to as the East Asian model of development. The Pudong project aimed to take Shanghai into the twenty-first century, when Shanghai could expect to become the ‘dragon’s head’ to the Yangtze Valley Region, and to re-claim its former position as a financial hub of international importance. Moreover, as mentioned previously, Pudong development was politically significant to the Central Government, it had its symbolic and ideological meanings, and the officials from the state Ministry of Construction claimed that Pudong should be considered not only as a strategically significant part of Shanghai, but as a showcase as well, symbolising a city of modernity in the twenty-first century, as well as a model to support the CCP’s concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Wang 1992).

As economic issues were tied to the government’s political agenda, developing Pudong as well as the whole of Shanghai therefore attracted the support of the Central Government through a set of preferential policies. These policies included allowing foreign banks located in Pudong to conduct business in local currency, granting projects the status of ‘priority national projects’, allocating government loans to the area worth 700 million yuan (US$90 million) annually (Yatsko 2001:23), thereby establishing major new lucrative projects. From 1990 to 1995, foreign banks operating businesses in Shanghai were required by the SMG to be registered in Pudong. In 1998, the eighth anniversary of Pudong’s opening, Shanghai’s official media reported that foreign investment in Pudong had increased seven times during the eight year period. The investment was concentrated mainly in four of the eight key function zones, that is, finance, free trade, high technology and export manufacturing (Wang 1998a).

12 Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Associate Chief Engineer, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau; member of Shanghai Urban Planning Committee, June, 1998
The built environment always reflects the economic, social and political situation of the time. In the past Pudong was mainly an agricultural supply base for urban Shanghai, supplying the residents’ food requirements. Such a supply system was common in China during Mao’s time. Under the system, suburbs surrounding cities were the main providers of vegetables, meat and diary products for the cities they were affiliated to. This system reflects the essence of the economic policy of ‘self-sustenance’ during the Mao era. In the new era, however, Pudong was to take a different role. It was to act as Shanghai’s new economic pumping house, and its new image would be the manifestation of the opening-up policy under which ‘internationalization’ was the prevailing concept in all fields, including urban development.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, ‘international metropolis’ became a stock phrase among the city authorities in China, and the concept of a ‘world city’ attracted interest from both researchers and decision makers in China - over 40 Chinese municipal governments reportedly indicated their intention of building their cities into international metropolizes, if not ‘world cities’ (Gu and Sun 1999). It was not clear whether such intention was fed from new thinking on urban studies in the West, such as John Friedmann’s ‘world city hypothesis’ (Friedmann 1995), or Saskia Sassen’s notion of ‘global cities’ – sites that agglomerate central functions in the international economic order (Sassen 2001:5). However it is arguable that, in claiming the position of international metropolis and centres of whatever kind, Chinese decision makers were well aware about the new strategic role for major cities and the restructuring hierarchical order of cities in the context of globalization.

As a ‘dragon’s head’, Shanghai was indeed striving to become an international metropolis, and was expected by the nation to reach this goal. Sassen (2002:9) observed that economic globalization has created a cross-border dynamic in a network of places, particularly cities. Since China’s opening-up to the world, Shanghai has increasingly becoming a part of global circuits in the current world. The spatial re-arrangement and the new built form of Pudong had to serve Chinese authorities’ ambition of having a control site in China on the world economy, and Pudong was supposed to be suitably equipped for international business operations in Shanghai. It was this, Wu (1998a) maintained, that explained the grand and ambitious nature of its
development scheme. Not less importantly, the built environment of Pudong was to convey a strong message of nationalism. This was because, among other things, a mighty and modern built landscape would be taken as a demonstration and tangible evidence of the strong resolution and capability of the nation to get rid of poverty and advance towards modernization.

While the rapid development of Shenzhen was referred to as a miracle, Pudong’s development was conducted at an even more dazzling speed. Within less than ten years from 1990 to 1999, Pudong was linked to urban Shanghai by means of a set of multi-layered ring roads, tunnels, subway lines, and three bridges. In the same period, construction of the second international airport, the Pudong International Airport was completed. Most striking of all, in this period, a brand new city emerged at the Lujiazui waterfront opposite the old Bund. Being of 28 square kilometres in size, Lujiazui was designed to be the new financial heart of Shanghai attracting big business names from all over the world. In addition, it is the main gate to, and the showcase of the Pudong New Area. The construction of Lujiazui, therefore, aimed to establish a ‘striking, mighty urban image’ through modern infrastructure with business facilities on a grand scale and of glamorous appearance (Huang 1997a). Reflecting the quick pace of development, some seventy skyscrapers were either completed or under construction in the Lujiazui precinct in less than eight years. With great density, they were concentrated in three sub-zones with a total area of 3.02 square kilometers (Figure 10). The modern, international city of super-high towers, including the monumental Oriental Pearl TV Tower and Jingmao Building, rivaled the colonial-style skyline of the Bund, and boasted the new icon of Shanghai.

Figure 10: The skyline of Lujiazui waterfront, Pudong
To reflect the Central Government’s open door policy, Pudong’s development involved international efforts by means of finance as well as ideas. To take Lujiazui as an example, the drawing up of its development plan was partly influenced by officials from the Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Île de France. This was the result of a 1986 agreement between the French institute and the Shanghai Municipal Government under which the French would provide technical assistance on metropolitan planning issues (Olds 1997). The Lujiazui plan was also an integration of international consultations involving such names as Massimiliano Fuksas, Toyo Ito, Dominique Perrault and Richard Rogers (Huang 1997a; Olds 1997). It was observed by Olds that the invitation for international consultation was a clever manoeuvre by Shanghai in attracting overseas investment for the Pudong development, while the final plan selected by the municipal authorities, not surprisingly, was by Chinese designers. The Lujiazui waterfront at one stage was proudly referred to by the local media as ‘Manhattan in the 21st century Shanghai’, indicating that it resembled the finance centre in New York in terms of its function as well as its highrise skyline. Apart from international involvement in the planning of Lujiazui, architectural design in Pudong was also much influenced by international expertise. According to Prestigious Buildings in Shanghai Pudong by the Pudong New Area Administration (1997:83), more than one third of the building projects in Pudong – most of them located at Lujiazui – were designed by foreign firms from the USA, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan and Thailand.

Pudong’s development illustrates influences of the globalization of urban cultures. For example, the 100 metre wide, 5 kilometres long Century Boulevard was designed by a Paris based firm and was meant to be a Chinese equivalent of the ‘Avenue des Champs Elysées’ (Xu 2000). Wu Liangyong, a leading architect of the Chinese Academy of Science, suggested that Pudong could draw on the experiences of the city beautification movement in Western urban history and should feature ‘grand-scale planning’ that would feature civic centres, squares, boulevards and big parks (Wang 1992). His proposal, as a result, is reflected in the Century Boulevard and the Century Park at Lujiazui. Pudong’s construction demonstrated the Chinese efforts to meet international standards in technology and design as well as China’s embrace of international consumer culture and life style. This could be perceived in many aspects of the new infrastructure, from the automobile-oriented road system, the Grand Hyatt
Shanghai in the Jingmao Building, the fancy apartments and villas, to the 18-hole Thomson Golf Course and other leisure and entertainment facilities.

With a number of projects claiming to be of the highest standard in Asia and in the world, Lujiazui is indeed taken as a symbol of China’s progress in the course of modernization, as well as national pride. It was taken as the manifestation of the achievements of the CCP through its economic reform and open-door policy. To quote one of the Shanghai senior officials,

Now that Pudong has become an epitome of China’s economic progress, the height these buildings have reached represents not simply the height in an architectural sense but in economic and political senses alike. The development of Shanghai Pudong is the pivot and symbol of China’s reform in the 1990s, just as President Jiang Zemin has put it (Pudong New Area Administration and China Intercontinental Communication Center 1997:2)\(^\text{13}\).

To become a new city, Lujiazui was totally transformed, and so too was the rest of Pudong. Pudong was seen as ‘virgin land’ by its developers as well as decision-makers (Wang 1992:14) in spite of the existence of several built-up areas. These consisted of industrial and residential quarters and some sites of historic and architectural significance, such as the British-American Tobacco Company established in 1898, and the Chen Guichun Residence in 1922. In the course of Pudong’s development, industrial enterprises, commercial shops and thousands of residents were relocated to make way for development projects. Lujiazui’s development, as Olds commented, was

\[\text{like London Docklands, the historic layers of built form and social formation have been devalued and replaced by what could be conceptualized as an international standard land strip to lure in deregulated foreign finance capital to build the office space that would lure major financial institutions to set up operations (Olds 1997:114).}\]

\(^{13}\) quoted from the original English version of the article.
Shanghai's Transformation: Puxi

The urbanization of Pudong, in fact, provided the momentum for the redevelopment of Puxi, the original metropolitan Shanghai. The proposal to redevelop Puxi was discussed along with the Pudong development plan in the late 1980s, though it took a few years before it was implemented. Jiang Zemin was mayor of Shanghai before he was selected as Deng's successor to lead China in 1989. He was reported to have said that the modernization of Pudong should be conducted in such a way as to expedite the process of modernization in the original metropolitan area (Wenhuibao Editorial 18 April 1998). When the Pudong development was launched, it was time for Puxi to undergo a full-scale urban renewal. In a way, the comprehensive redevelopment and the construction of super-scaled highrise buildings reflected this change of status. While Pudong was rapidly urbanized and modernized, Puxi also underwent a comprehensive transformation, as a signal of its renaissance. Along with the building boom in Pudong, Puxi was quickly turned into a massive construction site. Puxi's renewal included major infrastructure projects, housing projects and the refurbishment of the old business districts. Key government projects included two metro lines; an elevated, multi-decked ring road system connecting Puxi and Pudong that circled the inner city of Shanghai; commercial and tourism facilities; and a housing relief program to remove 3.65 million square meters of shanty dwellings.

Whereas the Pudong development was mainly pushed by the Central Government, largely through preferential policies and financial support, Puxi's renewal came from greater market pressures and social demands, on top of government intervention. Although both central and municipal governments made great efforts to channel investments to Pudong and promoted the new area as the central business district (CBD) for the twentieth-first century, investors found that it would be some time before Lujiazui obtained the business reputation that Puxi already possessed. Therefore Puxi attracted international developers who clearly thought it was likely to offer more lucrative opportunities through its redevelopment. In 1998, returning to Shanghai only one year after my visit there in 1997, I noted that more changes had

---

14 'Puxi' in Chinese means 'the west bank of the Huangpu River'. Normally it refers to the area of the original urban Shanghai proper.
taken place in Puxi’s built landscape over the past year than in that of Pudong. Even though a great part of the modern infrastructure and international standard urban facilities in Pudong had been completed and were in operation, Pudong by that stage was still considered to be ‘no match to Puxi as far as business environment was concerned’.

Puxi’s redevelopment was also executed under extremely high social pressure. At the end of the 1980s, Shanghai virtually remained in its 1930s urban form and its image as the symbol of modernity had faded away. While Shanghai citizens felt their city unbearably outdated, visitors also felt disappointed and confused with the situation, particularly when comparing it with newly emerged cities in South China, or with Beijing. Yang Dongping, a journalist-writer, quoted an unnamed writer who said that:

A city of skyscrapers should have been the grand Shanghai, but now is Beijing. The feeling of obsolescence and inaccessibility once belonged to the aged capital Beijing has now been perceived in Shanghai, once a modern, international metropolis! (Yang 1994)

However development funds were not available for Shanghai until the 1990s. In the previous four decades Shanghai had been given little chance for infrastructure upgrading and maintenance, and its road conditions, public transport and other civic facilities were so old that they often could not even meet safety requirements. In April 1986, traffic in Sichuan Zhong Road – one of the busy roads in the Shanghai CBD – was paralysed due to a sudden subsidence of the road surface. In May the same year a water supply pipe in the city north broke, leaving an area of 300,000 square meters under flood. In December 1987, a thick morning fog caused a traffic catastrophe at the overcrowded Lujiazui ferry, which claimed 16 lives and left over 70 people suffering from serious injuries. In late 1991 the city was hit by a sudden cold wave, causing without warning an extensive supply disruption that left thousands of households without water or gas due to the breakage of supply pipes. Shanghai officials were so concerned about the shaky condition of Shanghai’s urban facilities that they sometimes found themselves obsessed by strong emotions. Huang Ju, the CCP Party Secretary of Shanghai, recalled that Ni Tianzeng (the late deputy mayor of Shanghai

---

15 Interview with Li Chao, urban planner, Pudong New Area Administration, June 1998.
during the late 1980s to the early 1990s) could hardly hold back his tears when reporting to the central authorities in Beijing in 1987 about the infrastructure deficiencies in Shanghai (Huang 1993).

As well as headaches over infrastructure, the housing shortage was another thorny issue for municipal authorities. Shanghai residents were outraged with the housing shortage, which had become notorious in the country. In 1980 the average housing space per capita was 4.3 square metres, and 60% of Shanghai families fell below this average (Yang 1994). However the actual housing shortage in Shanghai was worse than had been indicated by government statistics. Xu Guoquan for example, a skilled worker at Shanghai’s Baida Knitware Factory, lived with his wife in a 7-square metre dwelling in the southern suburbs for over 40 years until 1997. The room was so small that there was no space for any solid furniture other than a bed, which was used as a couch during the day. The dwelling had neither kitchen nor bathroom, as was the case in over sixty per cent of Shanghai homes. His wife, living with him all this time, was not officially recognized as a Shanghai resident until 1993 because she was from the rural area in the nearby province and, consequently, had to wait for over thirty years before becoming a registered resident. As his wife was not counted as a resident, Xu’s living space was recorded under his name only, and he was therefore officially regarded as enjoying an above average housing standard, thereby missing all of the few chances for improvement16. Xu was one of the many who had made the unfortunate mistake of marrying someone from outside Shanghai! For those standard families – namely, families whose members were all registered Shanghai residents – things weren’t necessarily any better, since it was very common in Shanghai for seven or eight families to share a dwelling that had been originally designed for one family only. Pamela Yatsko, a Shanghai-based correspondent for the Far East Economic Review, noted during her stay in Shanghai in the early 1990s that many of her Chinese friends failed to reciprocate her invitations to them to visit her Shanghai home (Yatsko 2001). After a few visits to Chinese families she appreciated the difficulty, or embarrassment, that had prevented her friends from inviting foreign visitors to their crowded, often crumpled homes.

16 From interview with Xu Guoquan, retired worker of Baida Knitware, Shanghai, June, 1998.
Under great pressure for urban modernization and the improvement of living standards, the SMG had to look for ways to secure investment from both domestic and international sources. The Central Government’s decision to develop Pudong, unleashed the opening up of a land market in Shanghai. As in Shenzhen, the opening-up of the land market in Shanghai was pushed by the imperatives of attracting investments in urban development. Following the Shenzhen model, Shanghai opened its land market in the form of land lease, and the first plot of land was leased in 1988. Tan Qikun, director of the Shanghai Land Administrative Bureau observed that the establishment of the Shanghai land market and related laws involved a close study of the land use system in Hong Kong. The Shanghai land lease system, Tan argued, not only aimed to fit the market economy in China, but also to meet the requirements of international investment. He wrote:

As opening up is a vital component of the economic development strategy of our country, we should therefore make sure that our land use system is in line with, and serve the needs of the process of economic reform and opening up. In the past, foreign businesses, especially those specialised in real estate, felt it very inconvenient not to be allowed to transfer their land use rights, and found it incompatible with practices of international standards (Tan 1992:4).

Market liberalization, in the context of economic globalization, is an important component of the government economic development strategy. Comoditization of state-owned land in Shanghai was publicised and praised by the official media as the ‘great concept and great deed’ of the Municipal Government (Zheng 1994) which, in the process of opening up the land market, played a decisive role as the representative of the State. Wu Bangguo, Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary of the CCP in the early 1990s, told the media how the land market was treated as a golden goose for the SMG to generate significant urban construction funds:

We have two streams of funds, one is from the state finance to subsidize grains, oil and government institutions. The other is from investment, bank loans and land lease. Land at the central urban area is priced at an average of US$500 per square metre. If the floor space grows fivefold, one square metre of land will be worth US$2,500. In this way we are able to collect a considerable fund for Shanghai urban redevelopment. ... It is the construction fund that has been mobilised and that we are playing magic with (ibid).
In the late 1980s, the SMG managed to grant increased autonomy to district governments\textsuperscript{17} in land market administration and management in order to stimulate the land market growth in urban Shanghai. The new decade of the 1990s ushered in a significant era for Shanghai as the Pudong development was launched and the redevelopment of Puxi was put on the government agenda. The SMG urged all districts of the Shanghai Municipality to put their urban planning under review in order to better accommodate the reform of the land use system. However, the responses made by the district governments were considered too conservative. To quote Zhao Tianzuo, associate chief engineer of the Shanghai Urban Planning Administrative Bureau (SUPAB) and a member of Shanghai Urban Planning Committee,

By the end of 1992, detailed plans made by ten districts have covered eighty per cent of the central urban area. It needs to be clarified that, as one of the international economic centres, Shanghai must be equipped with new infrastructure and facilities compatible to the city’s new role and function. Unfortunately, the impact of the planning economy remains perceivable in the existing district plans. They have paid excessive attentions to land use for housing schemes but failed to address the imperatives of land lease and commercial real estate development, which is not compatible to the socialist market economy (Zhao 1996:24).

Published in \textit{Shanghai Constructio’}, an officially recognized publication on Shanghai economic and cultural affairs, Zhao’s comment was made from an official rather than a personal point of view. After 1991, district governments were required to show greater initiative in opening up the land market in their territories, and were promised greater incentives by the SMG. Under pressure from both senior authorities and investors, and attracted by great potential profit, district governments were increasingly involved in land lease and various kinds of property speculations. Non-profit government agencies, such as housing management offices that used to look after the maintenance of state-owned properties, were converted into government-owned businesses. Their names were also transformed, from ‘housing management office’ to, for example, ‘real estate development corporation’. As a result, land lease increased dramatically in urban Shanghai. Following the lease of the first plot of land

\footnote{\textsuperscript{17} The district government is the level below the municipal government in the Chinese urban administrative hierarchy.}
in 1988, 12 land leases were signed up between 1988 and 1991, amounting to 300,000 square metres and another 12 followed between 1991 and 1992. From 1992-1994, the land market surged irresistibly, with 438 plots leased, amounting to 69 million square metres (Wu 1998b). Land transactions during that period were said to have featured ‘strong demands, massive international investment, full-scale urban refurbishment and capital infrastructure construction’ (ibid).

Land lease heat and the building boom in Puxi were mainly concentrated in the central urban area – namely, the original business and residential precincts – because of their favourable locations as well as their business reputation. According to a senior official of the Shanghai Urban Planning Bureau, metropolitan Shanghai at the end of the twentieth century should feature the Central Business District, three sub-centres and ten traditional local centres (Chai 1989). This concept was clearly outlined in the municipal comprehensive plan and indicated a massive redevelopment of old city areas.

The original business precincts in Shanghai, in the course of urban renewal, proved most appealing to developers who saw the great economic potential in them through increased floor area. For the same reason, development projects in these precincts appeared as most attractive opportunities to investors both at home and overseas. Nevertheless, the other side of the reality was that these precincts also held most of Shanghai’s historic buildings and sites. These included the Old City, the Bund, the central area under the ‘Great Shanghai Plan’ by the KMT administration, the best known commercial precincts such as Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road, and the fine residential quarters in the former French Concession. In the heat of the land rush, heritage properties, old streets and neighbourhoods were razed rapidly to make way for highrise developments. As international investment was anxiously pursued, overseas investors were likely to impose great pressure on local officials in charge of the land market and urban planning with their demands for land and floor-area ratio. As an inevitable consequence, redevelopment of Puxi involved hastiness and anarchism, which was well illustrated by the development of three sub-centres: Xujiahui, North Sichuan Road and the Old City precincts.
Xujiahui District was a prime residential area located in the former French Concession in Shanghai west, enjoying a relatively low population, leafy streets and gardens and low-scale residential quarters featuring colonial style dwellings as well as schools and churches. Soon after it was appointed by the SMG as one of the three sub-centres, Xujiahui underwent comprehensive redevelopment. The urban renewal plan for Xujiahui, reportedly following the examples of business centres in Tokyo and Hong Kong, aimed to convert this precinct into 'another busy, prosperous business centre of Shanghai, adopting modern architectural styles from all over the world' (Tang 1993). In emphasising the notions of modernization and internationalization, an official media article observed that

Xujiahui is to be transformed into an international shopping centre, an epitome of Shanghai modernization. It will feature the most advanced transport, the most contemporary built-scape, as well as the most enjoyable shopping space to meet all standards of an international metropolitan city (Wang 1993).

In 1992 a development site was chosen for a highrise block in Huashan Road, a hundred-year old shopping street boasting over 90 shops on both sides in the business heart of Xujiahui. To make way for the development, old buildings in this precinct were all to be flattened. The new development project, with the total land lease fee of US$100,642 million, was a joint venture between four Hong Kong based companies and the Xuhui District Real Estate Management Corporation, and was claimed to be the largest land lease since the opening-up of the land market in Shanghai. It aimed to erect a super-size shopping mall of 1.35 million square metres – Grand Gateway Plaza – two 53-storey office towers and two 33-storey apartment buildings (Feng and Li 1994). The shopping mall, together with another modern department store, was to replace existing shops on the west side of Huashan Road in 1996. The development progressed so rapidly that just a year after the land lease, the old townscape of Xujiahui had vanished and a new business centre was taking shape. The speed and scale of the Xujiahui re-development were highly praised by the government media as a good example of the big changes in Shanghai (Wang 1993). Development of the other side of Xinhua Road was also launched and, according to the municipal news report, 'there would not be a single brick or tile left from the original street' (Xinwen Evening Editorial 2001).
The impact of the building boom in Shanghai was translated into the slogan of 'A new look each year, a transformation every three years', a stock phrase among Shanghai officials and residents, which allegedly originated from Deng's remarks. The scale and speed of development were unprecedented. The period between October and December in 1993, for instance, saw four super-scale development projects launched in Shanghai simultaneously to build icons at various sub-centres. While the development of Xujiahui was under way, the North Sichuan Road precinct experienced a magic facelift: over 20 businesses and 1600 households were displaced for a super highrise business and office block that was to become the landmark of the precinct. Developers of this 2.7-hectare precinct included a Hong Kong-based company and three local companies.

Compared with sub-centres in the city's north and west, the Nanshi District felt an even greater pressure for urban renewal. Located in the southern part of metropolitan Shanghai, this district consisted of what had been the Old City and its environs. Being the oldest part of urban Shanghai, Nanshi District boasted great tourism resources, including the Yuyuan Garden, the Temple of the City God and numerous shopping streets with many typical traditional stores. But old age also posed the downside of the district: it was one of the shanty areas in Shanghai, with crumpled townhouses and slums taking up more than fifty per cent of the built area. Whereas the favourable location of Nanshi indicated an attractive development potential, residents living in crowded townhouses and slums could not wait to improve their living space. To address the imperatives of boosting the economy and improving living standards, district leaders put their resolutions into the slogan: 'big demolition and big construction, quick demolition and quick construction' (Ma and Dai 1993; Sun 1999). In 1993 the district government confirmed 22 development projects to be conducted in the Old City for the following seven years, including a mall, a shopping street and an entertainment complex.

Redevelopment of Puxi, in reality, took place in the whole inner city area and was conducted intensively in the original business blocks. Along with the re-development of Xujiahui, North Sichuan Road and the Old City, West Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road were also turned into construction sites. A residential block at West Nanjing
Road was demolished to make way for a new business complex, which would feature a 27-storey office building, a shopping plaza and a 15-storey luxurious apartment block. The plot was leased for a 50-year term (which is the standard duration for land lease in Shanghai) at US$55 million and the developers would create a floor area of over 90,000 square metres on this 11,000 square metre plot. At a less than 500 metre long section on Huaihai Road in the Luwan District, one of the prime shopping and residential areas in Shanghai, two development projects began almost on the same day in December 1993, one involving the erection of a 32-storeyed tower for shopping, business, entertainment and hospitality, and the other featuring a pair of twin-towers of 38 storeys. Celebrating the new townscape and a good financial return, the local government hoped that these projects would push forward the re-development of the entire Huaihai Road precinct as well as nearby neighbourhoods’ (Lu and Ma 1993).

This did happen. In 1996, leaders from the Luwan District began to talk with Vincent Lo, developer of the Shui On Plaza on Huaihai Road, who had already been a good friend to those authorities (China Central Television 2002; Li 2002), about the redevelopment of a lot of land south to Huaihai Road. In 1998 a parcel of 52 hectares was leased to Lo, who then invested US$127 million to convert a small part of the leased block – a Lilong house neighbourhood – into an entertainment complex, Xin Tian Di, which occupied an area of thirty thousand square metres. Xin Tian Di project was completed and opened for business in 2001 and Lo was confident in the return that the project was to bring to him:

Xin Tian Di is phase one of the redevelopment project of the Taipingqiao neighbourhood. The total development area covers 52 hectares and the expected floor area is to be 1.6 million square metres. We are going to turn this area into a modernized monumental complex of comprehensive functions. Xin Tian Di project has now become a fond mode of redevelopment, as its impact on real estate market here is obvious: property value in the neighbourhood is surging and our investment on Xin Tian Di is drawing a lucrative return from other real estate projects in this area - by 2002 the price for properties around Xin Tian Di had escalated to US$2,500 per square metre (Li 2002).

While linking into the globalized world economy made international investment more available and labour flow more easily, it also triggered competitions in tapping external funds. Under China’s economic reform, such competitions took place
between regions and municipalities. The 1990s saw not only competitions between Shanghai and other domestic and international economic centres, but also internal competitions within the municipality. Jiang Liang, director of the Changning District, was proud of the fact that his district had managed to be counted as one of the key international trade centres of Shanghai as a result of their efforts to attract international investment (Zhang 1998b). Taking advantage of its closeness to the Hongqiao International Airport in west Shanghai, the Changning District established the ‘Hongqiao Economic and Technology Development Zone (HETDZ)’ in the tract between Shanghai west and the Hongqiao Airport. In just a few years, a concentration of highrise towers was erected at the Hongqiao Economic and Technology Development Zone, featuring blocks of office towers, four or five-star hotels, and luxurious apartment buildings in what had been a country-style residential area with low scale rooflines. The objective of the capital construction, according to Jiang, was to establish a business precinct with the concentration of highrise towers (ibid)

Apart from the development of sub-centres and district centres, Shanghai’s urban renewal involved a comprehensive refurbishment of the infrastructure in the old CBD. The period between 1994 and 1999 witnessed the completion of major development projects, including the refurbishment of the People’s Square and the building of two monuments on the Square – the Shanghai Opera House and the Shanghai Museum (Figures 11-12) – as well as the central shopping zone in Nanjing Road. The most stunning, however, was the construction of the new traffic network in the heart of the metropolitan area, which included underground metro-lines linking Puxi and Pudong, and an elevated ring road system with the total length of 64 kilometres. These projects aimed not only to relieve traffic jams through a three-
dimensional road system, but also to give Shanghai the renewed image of a modern international metropolis.

Inevitably, the implementation of these projects involved extensive demolition of the old built environment. The elevated ring road, for example, caused the relocation of over 35,000 households and 2,800 businesses from central urban areas to the city outskirts. The relocation process for the elevator road was referred to by Shanghai’s official media as one of the most emotional episodes for Shanghai residents in the course of the Puxi renewal (Wang 1999c). To most of the residents affected by the ring road project, relocation meant moving from Shanghai’s most popular precincts to less attractive areas. In general, however, relocation was carried out smoothly with little resistance. For those who were struggling to squeeze into inadequate living space, relocation was not necessarily a bad thing, and in reality many residents felt compensated, as they were offered larger living space with superior facilities. They also had options between moving to the designated area at government cost or, taking compensation money from the government and purchasing new dwellings of their own choice.

It was obvious that, to Shanghai residents, the choice was not hard to make between a spacious new home with proper facilities or a deteriorating old dwelling. A common scene in the 1990s’ Shanghai was that of people packing cheerfully and waiting impatiently for the move. Residents living in the crowded inner city talked excitedly about the possibilities of the demolition of their neighbourhood and their relocation. To people from the West, however, such a large-scale demolition of the urban environment often involving the government might seem alarming, and such excitement among residents was often incomprehensible. In the interpretation of relocations, they were likely to miss the point when attempting to make judgements. Professor Luo Xiaowei from Tongji University told me a story that illustrates the gaps in attitudes:

Some time ago, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal came from the United States. He was assigned a job by his boss to write a report on the resentments, protests and complaints of Shanghai residents about their relocation during recent urban development. Through a friend of mine, the man managed to find me. I took him to a Lilong in the city, and told him to have a look
around by himself first. What happened was that residents there were excited to see us as they thought we were there to tell them news of their relocation, so they asked us when they could move. I said to the man later that he had really been brave, for he would write a whole page about Shanghai, without speaking the language or knowing anyone here. He ended up with a report under a different title, something about changes in Shanghai instead of resident protests. His boss, I said, had been even more brave, for he, being far, far away in America, had come up with such an idea in the first instance!18

The full-scale urban refurbishment in the 1990s was fully endorsed by the Municipal Government. As the national economy grew rapidly at the turn of the century, quick urban development was expected to match the speed of economic growth. ‘Big demolition and big construction, quick demolition and quick construction’ proved to be the short cut to the quick change and, in turn, big changes of old areas were always taken as the sign of progress, which would then be attributed to the competence of local decision makers. From 1991 to 1997, 1,664 highrise buildings were erected in Shanghai, three times the number built by 1991.

However the building boom did not occur without controversy. Collected data showed that most controversies came from academics and professionals in fields such as architecture, planning and urban engineering. They were not against the re-development of Shanghai, but argued for a more rational way in practice. The elevated ring road, for example, attracted debates from the very beginning. There had been proposals that existing ring roads should be broadened as the first measure to ease traffic, so that the elevated road project could be postponed to allow sufficient funding to be located to give time for more informed decisions and for a more sensible design to be made. Other opinions from the professional circle expressed concerns about the landscape of the Bund that would be jeopardized by one of the massive exits from the elevated road. Such proposals and concerns, less exciting in the eyes of the municipal decision makers, failed to resist the escalating enthusiasm for elevated roads. The project was completed at great financial and environmental as well as social costs, and was subsequently referred to as a ‘project of regret’ by some senior planning professionals because the premature conditions gave rise to irreversible defects in its construction (Xu 1998). Such a voice was certainly an odd

18 Interview with Professor Luo Xiaowei, Tongji University, Shanghai, 20 April 2000.
one amidst the development heat, and clarification had to be made in defense of those who held that view: their focus was on a more sustainable development, but not against progress and development.

There were also concerns over the domination of developers' interests in land use management. The Shanghai Urban Planning Administrative Bureau (SUPAB), the municipal planning authority, experienced frustration at the 'clientele capture' phenomena, where developers asserted pressures on local governments for projects in their favor, and intervened in the decision-making processes. It was pointed out by SUPAB that, in the name of urban modernization, development sometimes went out of the control of municipal planning authorities. District governments, equipped with increased autonomy, had considerable authorization in local administration matters, particularly local finance. With their local interests at stake, district governments were more likely to cede to pressures from developers. Consequently, the implementation of planning regulations was often hijacked by developers (Wang and Geng 1999). Geng Yuxiu, senior urban planner from the Shanghai Urban Planning Administrative Bureau, was upset with the anarchism in development and the damage it had done to Shanghai's urban environment. Geng was particularly critical of the careless design and chaotic dispersion of skyscrapers that had mushroomed in recent years, which gravely damaged the built landscape of Shanghai (Geng 2000).

Cultural identity was another issue of concern in the course of urban modernization. After China opened up to the world, international cultures contributed considerably to the transformation of Chinese cities. International involvement in urban planning and design was more direct and of greater scale in major centres such as Beijing and Shanghai. Since the open-up policy was adopted, Shanghai's urban development has been under the influence of developed countries and regions all over the world. International co-operation in Lujiazui's design was a case in point. At the early stage of its development, the skylines of Hong Kong, Singapore, and New York were regarded as models. A super-sized poster of the skyscrapers of Hong Kong was one of the first things meeting visitor's eyes when they walked into the foyer of the newly built tower 'Pearl of the Orient' in the late 1990s, demonstrating the image of the modern city that Shanghai was pursuing. Mega-cities, highrise towers and motor vehicles, along with the global trend of consumerism were introduced and promoted
through both private and official channels in the name of modernization. In a sense, modernization seemed to mean the standardization of everything, including infrastructure and landscape. In the ‘global village’, the world seemed to become smaller, thanks to modern communication and transport. However cultural diversity was not something that could be guaranteed. Many people in the world still felt insecure when confronted with foreign cultures, and would feel more so in modern times. They might come across strange cultures and creatures more easily through modern means of communication and transport and yet be less prepared. In this sense, a bland but standard landscape might be regarded, among other things, as a compromise of cultures.

The popularity of standard, bland built styles was somewhat diminished in the late 1990s, while admiration of things European or ‘continental’ was on rise in Shanghai (as in many other cities and towns as well). In the late 1990s European countries became popular destinations for business tours by both Chinese business people and officials. Meanwhile European expertise was invited to assist in the urban refurbishment in Shanghai. European city models, with gardens, parks, and tree-lined boulevards were regarded as more culturally meaningful than the Hong Kong-style skyscraper city19. The Central Boulevard at Pudong and the Nanjing Road refurbishment project were both designed by Paris-based firms. In the late 1990s, a city beautification campaign was launched aiming at parkland and green space, again justified with the notion of international standards. The SMG was determined to increase parkland and green space by eight million square metres, signaling that some residential areas would be converted into green space. Some newly opened green space appeared on sites that had been cleared up for development but had failed to attract developers. In this sense, the green space campaign actually had a hidden objective. It aimed to relocate residents from central areas to newly developed residential areas in the Shanghai outskirts, which had attracted few buyers, while the inner residential areas, currently evacuated in the name of city beautification, could be used for development in the future. One of the new parks, for example was located at the central business precinct of Yan’an Road and involved vacating 40,000 square metres of residential area and relocating 2,800 households (Wang 1999b). Another

19 Interview with Professor Ruan Yisan, Tongji University, Shanghai, 10 June, 1998
example was a man-made lake, which was part of the Taipingqiao redevelopment project by Vincent Lo’s Hong Kong based company, Shui On. This lake claims to be the first of its kind in Shanghai, and occupies an area of four hectares, on a site of a block of Lilong residences. The sudden campaign for green space, launched in the name of internationalization, in fact marked a u-turn in Shanghai’s urban development. Professor Luo Xiaowei from Shanghai’s Tongji University recollected her battle in the early 1990s against the occupation of the city’s limited green space by development projects. She lost the battle and was told by developers that they would return the green space by planting shrubs and lawns on top of their buildings. Then, less than a decade later, parklands were hastily built in order to meet international standards, but this time at the cost of the built environment.

The practice of copying foreign landscapes in Shanghai has provoked controversies and challenges. The rationality behind the internationalization of the urban landscape was questioned calmly by some. Professor Qi Kang, a member of the China Academy of Science, could see little sense in promoting the European style in Chinese cities. Qi observed that many officials would not be bothered to find out what the ‘European style’ had in store and, in fact, would not be bothered to face the reality that there was no such a thing as a single European style (Qi 1999). Zhao Wanliang, deputy chief engineer of the Shanghai City Planning and Design Research Institute (SCPDRI), was critical of the feverish enthusiasm for big lawns, arguing that it did not fit the Chinese cityscape. The example he gave was a model project at the Sanlin residential compound in Shanghai, where a big lawn was established to add visual beauty to the site, but provided little benefit to residents there, as they were denied entry onto the lawn in case they destroyed the expensive grass. Feeling deeply concerned about the loss of ‘our own culture’ in urban design and planning, Zhao questioned that:

Investors have brought in their cultures with them, but how about our own culture? French lawns, Japanese windows, ... where is Chinese architecture? We have excellent architectural philosophy but now nobody cares, no one bothers to put it into practice.21

---

20 Interview with Prof. Luo Xiaowei, Tongji University, Shanghai, 20 April 2000
21 Interview with Zhao Wanliang, SCPDRI, 16 June, 1998

125
Urban construction and refurbishment were vital components of Shanghai's economic take-off. In pursuit of commercial returns as well as a massive, modern urban image, few people felt interested in cultural issues such as identity and historic continuity. Developers requiring the opening up of the land market, government and government agencies pursuing increased revenues from land speculation, residents demanding higher living standards, all formed an overwhelming force for urban development to which the conservationist's voices proved too weak to match. As has happened to many cities in the world, urban heritage faced a great threat from the bulldozers. Could urban heritage in Shanghai survive the development fever after all and to what extent?
CHAPTER FIVE: CHANGES IN SHANGHAI’S URBAN FABRIC: IMPACT ON THE BUILT HERITAGE

Full-scale urban development and redevelopment in the 1990s resulted in dramatic changes to the built landscape in Shanghai. While a brand new city was rising in Pudong, an urban facelift was under way in Puxi in order to modernize the original metropolitan area. Changes in Shanghai’s built environment took place so rapidly that the city map had to be updated almost monthly from 1992 to 1999 (Mao and Wang 1999). Stories went that even taxi drivers could not find their way home after work. Deng Xiaoping urged in the early 1990s that Shanghai should have ‘a new look each year, a transformation in three years’, this remark was then frequently quoted by government officials as well as the public media to describe the speed of Shanghai’s urban modernization. As new concrete towers mushroomed everywhere, old neighbourhoods, streets and buildings were disappearing quickly before the bulldozers. In this sense, the drastic urban transformation in the 1990s, accompanied by ruthless demolition, embodied a deeply embedded mindset of ‘destroying the old and establishing the new’.

This chapter aims to examine the impact of the 1990s urban re-development on the historic places of Shanghai, in the light of heritage registration during the late 1980s and the 1990s. Although heritage registration aims to buffer these places against the impact of urban re-development, invasion and damage of historic places by development projects happened from time to time. Following heritage registration in Shanghai was the formulation of conservation legislation, which is to be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter focuses on the designated places and quarters, particularly the legendary precincts such as the Bund, Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road, two Chinese precincts – the Old City and the KMT municipal centre – are also discussed, as they represent important layers of Shanghai history. The chapter examines not only colonial buildings, but also vernacular structures such as Lilong houses, because although less monumental, the latter are equally important in terms of cultural significance.
Designation of Heritage Places

Urban development inspired deep concerns over the built heritage and its survival. Such concerns motivated conservation efforts that aimed for the protection of the built heritage of a city. More often than not, however, conservation was brushed aside because it was regarded as contradictory to development interests. A situation like this was not unprecedented. In the early 1950s urban conservation effort to protect the old city of Beijing ended up with the over-all defeat of conservationists in the face of the frenzied enthusiasm to convert Beijing into an industrial city. Later the concept of urban conservation was discarded totally during the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Built monuments in the country suffered damage during the ‘Destruction of Four Olds’ campaign. However, it was during the economic reform era that the cultural landscape of Chinese cities suffered the gravest destruction. Faced with overwhelming demand for urban renewal, and the dazzling speed of both demolition and development, conservationists realized that the historic and cultural identities of Chinese cities were at stake. Wang Jinghui, director of the planning division of the state ministry of construction, pointed out that new crises were emerging for urban heritage, because urban modernization posed new threats to historical cultural cities and demands for big changes in cities posed new challenges to the conservation effort (Wang, Ruan, and Wang 1999).

In 1982, the National Committee for Capital Construction, the State Administration of Cultural Heritage and the National Bureau for Urban Construction jointly submitted to the State Council The Proposal for Protecting China’s Historic Cultural Cities and, in the same year, the State Council issued the official list of the first twenty-four ‘historic cultural cities’. Also in 1982 the first national heritage law was put into effect, which covered the issue of urban conservation by recognizing the concept of ‘historic cultural cities’. According to the national heritage law, historic cultural cities are ‘cities with an unusual wealth of cultural relics of high historical value and major revolutionary significance’ (Article 14). The first inscription of twenty-four historic cultural cities included cities of ancient glories such as Beijing, Nanjing, Xi’an and Suzhou, as well as those significant for the growth of the CCP such as Zunyi and Yan’an. Shanghai, along with another thirty-seven cities, was inscribed in 1986. The nomination of Shanghai was based on its important status in Chinese modern history and its unique urban landscape that was regarded as the physical evidence of its
extraordinary past. However despite its important status in Chinese modern history, Shanghai was not included in the first inscription of the twenty-four cities, and little explanation could be found in literature with this regard, as if it was not an issue. In my opinion, the inscription of historic cultural cities reflected the ideological opening-up in China which, compared with economic opening-up, was a slower process. In 1982 when the first inscription was proclaimed, the official attitudes towards the semi-colonial legacy in China were still in the shadow of the ideology of the Mao era. Although it boasted the birthplace of the CCP, Shanghai was in its past a capitalist metropolis, not a communist shrine like Zuiyi and Yan'an, and that made officials cautious about its inscription. Moreover, inscription of heritage properties in China is always based on an officially acknowledged hierarchical order, as stated in the national heritage law, which gives national and revolutionary heritage top priority.

As an important move in response to Shanghai’s new status as a historic cultural city, the registration of the Shanghai’s colonial heritage places began in 1986, a research group consisting of leading architects, planners and urban historians was convened by the municipal government to designate Shanghai’s colonial heritage sites. Members of the research group came from Shanghai’s Tongji University, Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau and East China Architectural Design Institute as well as Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage. They assembled regularly and reported their discoveries and proposals to SMG through the municipal commission for construction, which was under the charge of Deputy Mayor Ni, an architect and a group member himself. The research led to a submission to the Central Government in 1989 the first list of sixty-one historic properties in Shanghai that they believed should be officially protected. In the submission, the term ‘outstanding modern architecture’ – which is roughly comparable to ‘heritage sites’ – was adopted in reference to the designated places, indicating that all the places were built after Shanghai was open to the Western settlement. Following the first list, the second list of 175 properties was approved by the SMG in 1994, and the third list of 163 properties was approved in 1999. By the end of 2000, there were 399 places registered. Besides, eleven areas in the city were labelled as ‘historic quarters’ and the announcement was made in 1999. The term ‘historic quarters’ refers to those areas in the inner city, which are distinct from other areas with unique townscape of historic
and cultural value, regarded as showcases of the various layers and themes of Shanghai’s history (Liang 1996).

Most colonial style structures remaining in Shanghai were completed between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, with the finest ones erected during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The designated heritage places and historic quarters are the evidence of human settlement in Shanghai by both Chinese and foreigners, financial and commercial prosperity, colonial ambition as well as nationalist pride. They are also mirrors of the hybrid lifestyles of Shanghai residents and sojourners. Like mosaics, these historic patches are expected to represent the life story of Shanghai as a city of unique experience and meaning. Of these designated places and quarters, most are commercial and residential properties and blocks. Indeed, unlike Beijing where palaces form the key element of the built heritage, Shanghai’s historic landscape is mainly represented by commercial structures and residential networks.

**Impact of Redevelopment on Heritage Places and Historic Quarters**

Most of the designated heritage places and historic quarters are located in the inner city where land was the most sought after during the 1990s’ building boom. Besides, having been overused and poorly maintained for decades, these places and quarters were under high pressure for refurbishment and redevelopment.

**The Bund**

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Bund has always been an icon of metropolitan Shanghai and the symbol of her past glamour. The historic zone of the Bund designated by the municipal register covered an area of some 120 hectares including the 1.2 kilometre-long waterfront. This block was often referred to in public as an international architectural expo and was considered the highlight of Shanghai’s colonial landscape.

In colonial days, the development of the Bund reflected Shanghai’s increasing economic importance (Huebner 1989:144). The site was chosen not only by many Western banks and companies for their branches in China, but also by Chinese state-run banks as the location for their head offices. Buildings in this precinct, particularly
the buildings along the waterfront boulevard, were regarded as landmarks in modern Chinese architectural history. Mostly erected between the first two decades of the twentieth century, these buildings not only reflected the finest styles and the advanced building technology of that time in China, including the use of the latest building materials, but also manifested the economic power and ambitions of their owners. The exteriors of these buildings represented a great diversity in styles and articulated attempts by their owners to adapt their Western character to the natural as well as cultural climate in Shanghai. It was noticed by some architectural historians that, whereas the architectural traditions and principles that architects of these buildings followed was predominantly Western, a stylistic synthesis was achieved by these designers by the mixing of various styles (Huebner 1989:145). For example, the Bank of China Building has Chinese-inspired decorative elements in the exterior while the Nisshin Navigation Company Building is distinctive for its ‘modern Japanese-Western’ façade (Yang 1999:17), and the Building of the International Banking Corporation was designed to be ‘both consistent with its home-based architectural programme and yet surreptitious in its new guise as one of Shanghai’s power-sharing and power wielding commercial anchors’ (Cody 2003:71). Being in various shapes and scales but strategically juxtaposed with each other, these buildings demonstrated an outstanding integration of scale and style. Predominantly Western as they are, the buildings showed their designers’ consideration of and respect for local geographic conditions and for the landscape, which led to not only a high quality but also a unique beauty. To quote a professional comment, the Bund architecture, if seen as a whole, ‘came to epitomize what may be referred to as a distinctive “Shanghai style” characterized by the use of angled corners, cupolas, and towers, the emphasis of verticality despite the relatively low height of the buildings, and the balance proportion, mass and form’ (Huebner 1989:146).

Buildings on the Bund were originally used primarily for financial and trade purposes. Of the twenty-three buildings at the Huangpu waterfront, eleven were owned by banks and other financial institutions. By the early 1950s the function of the Bund had experienced a fundamental change as a result of the nationalization of private companies as well as the new role that Shanghai was undertaking under the new regime. Most foreign owned banks and firms closed their business in China and their buildings were taken over by the new SMG and its departments. As a result, the Bund
became the political and administrative centre, instead of the financial heart of Shanghai, for the following forty years. By the 1980s over 21 per cent of the land in the precinct was used by government departments, with only some three per cent used by financial institutions, whereas parallel figures in 1936 were six per cent and 55 per cent respectively (Wang, Ruan, and Wang 1999; Yang 1998). Despite functional changes, however, the landscape of the Bund remained the icon of Shanghai over the decades following the establishment of PRC, and little alteration occurred to either the interiors or exteriors of the buildings. Even during the catastrophic days of the Cultural Revolution, most of the buildings in this precinct remained intact, except for the Holy Trinity Church, whose bell tower was demolished, and some buildings whose decorative elements were removed or covered up under the ideological pressure of the time.

Glamorous as they once were, buildings on the Bund became worn out as the decades passed by. Changes of ownership and function often indicated improper use and insufficient maintenance of the property. Most of the buildings were put into mixed usage after 1949, often involving impracticable arrangements. One building, for example, might be shared by government departments, banks, companies and residents. As the ownership of these buildings all belonged to the state, users had little responsibility other than paying a rent that was set at a very low rate. While the tenants had no intention of damaging these buildings, there was no intention to protect them either. Consequently little maintenance took place and, as a result, many of these buildings became chaotic inside, with facilities worn out, damaged or missing. The exteriors, intact as they were, appeared decayed and dirty.

When Shanghai was assigned by the Central Government to the role of ‘the dragon’s head’ in the 1990s, the legacies of its old time as a cosmopolitan city and the financial hub of the Far East gained higher appreciation from both government and the public. Moreover, such legacies were used as the grounds for Shanghai’s economic takeoff in the new millennium. In the course of Shanghai’s renaissance at the turn of the century, ideological changes in the nation became the context in which colonial landmarks such as the Bund were re-interpreted, with appreciation of their historic, cultural and architectural significance, and the re-interpretation of the Bund was much in line with the open-up policy. In justifying Shanghai’s status as a national historic
and cultural city, Wang Jinghui, a senior official of the state department of construction stated that the Bund was the built evidence of Shanghai’s transition over a hundred years from a trade port into an international financial centre. It also demonstrated the beginning of Chinese modern history. With this ideological changes, the Bund was again widely accepted as the icon of Shanghai’s significant status and also considered by architectural professionals as a sample for research on China’s modern architecture (Wang, Ruan, and Wang 1999).

In 1989, the building of the former Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, together with another six buildings on the Bund were listed as municipal heritage in the first conservation proposal submitted to the authorities in Beijing. A further ten were labeled as municipal heritage by the SMG during the second registration in 1993. In 1996, the Central Government put the Bund in the top category of the heritage hierarchy by inscribing all colonial style buildings and structures at the waterfront as national heritage (Figure 13). Nevertheless, despite the special attention that the Bund attracted from all parties concerned, conservationists pointed out that current registration left out a large number of significant places. A planning official in Shanghai revealed that, by 1998, the registration had covered less than thirty per cent of existing buildings on the Bund precinct. According to the same person, about eighty per cent of buildings in

Figure 13: The Bund in 1998.
the precinct had heritage values and they were virtually missed out by the registration (Wang 1998c).

Conservation efforts were made at the Bund earlier than elsewhere. Technically, height restrictions and guidelines on infill development were applied, and the twenty-three buildings on the waterfront, as national heritage, were protected by strict renovation guidelines, which did not allow either exterior or interior alterations (Shanghai Municipal Government 1991). Special measures were taken to stop demolition in the process of major municipal projects. For example, in 1993 the Signal Tower was found to be in the way of the Bund renovation project whereby the waterfront boulevard would be widened. Opinions were divided on whether to keep or demolish this structure of eighty-two years, the only one of its type in Shanghai. The decision regarding the tower’s fate ended up in the hands of the SMG, which decided that the Tower should be retained. Consequently the Signal Tower was moved some 20 metres in a whole piece, via specially laid rails, to its new location, ‘much to the amazement of the citizens of Shanghai’ (Gao 1996:21), and was converted from a police station into the Bund History Museum.

From 1995 onwards, more and more properties on the Bund were put onto the real estate market by the municipal government with a corresponding shift in their functions. The purpose of the sale for new owners was twofold: restoring the former status of the Bund as the financial heart of Shanghai on the one hand, and collecting renovation funds through the real estate market on the other. Not surprisingly, sales of government properties to overseas buyers caused controversies in the early 1990s, as some people thought the practice was in fact to concede national sovereignty and a sign of the return of colonialism. Despite the debates, however, state-owned properties were increasingly turned into commodities, because of the nation-wide economic reform, particularly the reform in land use rights. In the case of Shanghai, as ‘both government and property users became aware of the economic potential of the prime location of the Bund’ (Ruan 2000:21), more and more buildings changed hands from government sectors to private companies.

It was clarified in the Bund Conservation Plan in 1991 that the original character of the Bund as a financial centre should be restored and, in 1993, the Bund widening project was completed, which aimed to facilitate this goal through urban
beautification. After evaluation and quality assessment procedures by the Municipal Housing Administration, sales of historic properties started in 1995, under the supervision of a special government agent, The Bund Real Estate Company, established in the previous year by the SMG (ibid). The first building that changed ownership was the SMG's head office, formerly the building of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation. The SMG moved to the new office block at the People's Square in 1995, handing this legendary property over to the market. It was said that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intended to go back to its previous home at the Bund, but in the end withdrew its bid, due to the strict renovation restrictions as well as the prohibitive price, and settled in Lujiazui instead. As the building was part of national heritage in Shanghai, alteration or extension by the new owner would not be allowed. Later the building was sold to the Pudong Development Bank, which spent about RMB 450 million (about US$5 million) on the renovation (ibid). By 1999, more than half of the waterfront buildings had gained new owners and, according to a Shanghai-based conservation expert, all were obligated to abide by the renovation guidelines formulated by the municipal government (ibid).

The Bund precinct was the central business district (CBD) in the past and remained a part of the Shanghai CBD after the economic opening-up. Therefore the land value of the Bund was among the highest in the metropolitan area, and was highly attractive to property developers. Apparently, in such a prime area of Shanghai, where land price was staggeringly high, the most effective way for developers to make money would be to undertake highrise development. Despite building restrictions, such development was not impossible. With the liberalization of the land market and the preoccupation with modernity, it was hard for municipal planning authorities, such as the Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau (SUPAB), to prevent massive development at this prime location. From the late 1980s, development at the Bund was under way, along with the government and the public's growing appreciation of the precinct as a heritage area.

At the southern end of the Bund, Lianyi Tower was constructed in the early 1990s. This 103-metre high glass tower is one of the early copies of the Hong Kong style skyscraper. However, this Hong Kong model became the target of criticism by conservationists who considered it totally contradictory to the historic environs as far
as its scale, material and styles were concerned, and therefore a vulgar interruption of the urban fabric of the precinct, spoiling the view of the Bund (Wang, Ruan, and Wang 1999). Lianyi Tower was not the only one of its type. Just a block away, the 120-metre Guangming Building rose in 1993 on the site of the former French Consulate. The massive scale, bland box shape and the glassy exterior of the building again failed to harmonize with its classical environs, but stood as a dominating projection at the precinct, leaving no spatial transition at all between the designated historic block and the contemporary highrises.

Although, as a national heritage site, the waterfront section of the Bund has now been protected from new development, the construction control zone behind it is still being constantly invaded by new projects—for example the office tower of the Wenhui News Group, the 137-metre high Jinglin Building and the new Friendship Store, all built between the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, one of the exits of the elevated ring road network is located at the southern end of the Bund with a multi-decked overpass that is nicknamed ‘the grand slide’. The design of the exit met strong objections from Shanghai’s leading planners such as Huang Fuxiang, who suggested that the exit should be located a block away from the waterfront, instead of sitting at the Bund, but the suggestion failed to win sympathy from the Municipal leaders who insisted the ‘grand slide’ (Figure 14) be placed at the Bund as a landmark of infrastructure modernization.

To protect existing heritage places, SUPAB has established and then modified the construction control zone in relation to new buildings in historic areas. Within the construction control zone, elements such as height, density, style, and colour are now regulated and subject to approval by the planning authority. Technically, new buildings within the construction control zone behind the listed buildings must not be seen by people within the heritage control zone.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, SUPAB, June 1998
The fact is, however, that despite construction control, constructional invasions have taken place and have inevitably impacted upon the built landscape of the protection zone. A site investigation conducted in 1998 jointly by Chinese and Australian researchers revealed that,

For the Bund, the sight line is taken from a line down the centre Huangpu River. A vessel on the river should be able to have a view of the heritage buildings on the street front (the front plane), uninterrupted by modern buildings behind them. After a distance of 200-300 metres behind this plane, buildings may be higher. A ferry trip across to Pudong, however, quickly shows that a number of new developments have infringed this rule (Balderstone, Qian, and Zhang 2002:30).

In addition to visual disturbance to the overall view of the Bund, the current condition of some individual buildings is also of concern. Although buildings on the Bund have been put on the market, quite a number of them have not yet changed ownership, due to high prices and strict renovation controls. This leaves these buildings continuing to
be under-maintained and misused. A site visit in 1998 to Dongfeng Restaurant, formerly the Shanghai Club, revealed that the building was lacking in maintenance, its interior crying out for maintenance and renovation. The current building was erected in 1910, originally belonging to the Shanghai Club, a Shanghai high-class society (Figure 15). After the Liberation it was used by different state-owned businesses, first as offices, then as the International Seamen’s Club, then after 1975 as the Dong Feng Restaurant. The site visit showed that the original layout and art design of the building were easily recognizable, and the London-manufactured lift, installed eighty years before, was still operating. On the ground floor, half of the entrance hall had been converted into a Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant, whose KFC sign and the statue presented an absurd contrast to the otherwise classical fittings of the building. In 1998 it was already obvious that the restaurant was struggling with its business against many new competitors, and my visit to it in 2002 showed that the building, together with the businesses inside, was closed. In contemporary Shanghai, leisure and entertainment are becoming increasingly international, Western style recreation facilities such as bars, bistros, and nightclubs have become a fad among the middle-class and young people. For example the Union Building at Number 4 the Bund, has been renovated by Michael Graves and become a high-end retail place for the fashion industry, art galleries and restaurants for the notable chefs such as Nubiyukin Matsuhisa and Jean Gorges Vongerichten (Michael Graves 2001). Somehow, such a trend towards a leisurely lifestyle did not inject life into such a legendary recreation venue as the Shanghai Club. While a bar in the city adopted the well-known name ‘Long Bar’, originally the exclusive name of the famous 110-foot-long bar in the Shanghai Club, the real long bar disappeared decades ago, gone was also the spendor of the Shanghai Club. During the site visit in 1998, a Shanghai planner remarked that the building would not be renovated unless it found a new owner, but then the chance might be that the new owner would go beyond renovation regulations, do more than necessary and jeopardize the historic essence of the structure. Similar financial pressure on heritage sites in this precinct could also be perceived at the Peace Hotel, the former Sassoon House (Figure 16). The 1990s saw intense competitions between hotels in Shanghai. In the competition, the Peace Hotel was losing ground to newly emerging hospitality companies, especially those hotel groups under international

23 Discussion with Li Chao, Planner, Shanghai Pudong New Area Adminstration, June 1998.
management. To increase business, the management of the Peace Hotel first converted the better half of the ground-floor foyer into a bar, as well as a souvenir shop, and later let that part of the ground floor to banks.

Figure 15.1-2: Shanghai Club

15.1: Shanghai Club in 1994, the sign of KFC is visible. Source (Gao 1996:35).
15.2: Shanghai Club in 2002, closed for renovation.

Figure 16 The Peace Hotel
Nanjing Road

The designation of heritage sites showed that Shanghai’s commercial legacy was counted as a highlight of the city’s modern history. In Shanghai the most renowned retailing and shopping streets were Nanjing Road East (formerly Nanking Road) and Huaihai Road (Formerly Avenue Joffrê). The construction of Nanjing Road, extending west from the Bund from the Peace Hotel, was a Western settlers’ initiative to build a new infrastructure for the International Settlement in Shanghai, with Western designs and materials (Cochran 1999). In 1865, already a the principal retail business street of Shanghai, the street was given the name Nanking Road. In the 1930s, according to an unknown author, Nanking Road was designated by an eminent American writer as one of the seven most interesting streets in the world (All about Shanghai 1983: 48).

With development of the International Settlement in the late nineteenth century, the Nanking Road precinct quickly replaced the Old City and became the new central business district of Shanghai, attracting leading retailers to open their shops there. The period from the early 1910s to the late 1930s witnessed a golden age for Nanking Road. According to Wellinton Chan (Chan 1999), it was during the late 1910s, when the first two department stores – Sincere and Wingon - opened on Nanking Road, that Nanking Road took off and became China’s premier shopping street. In 1926 and 1936, two other department stores, Sun Sun and Dah Sun, joined in and opened their businesses in Nanking Road. While competing intensively with each other, these modern department stores shared some common themes: an open acknowledgement of Western models, boasting the most advanced and fashionable facilities of the time and always producing new ideas. Their buildings were regarded as monuments manifesting Nanking Road’s vitality as the symbol of commercial prosperity and the centre of China’s commercial culture (ibid).

Apart from large Western-style department stores and foreign owned shops, Nanking Road was also the place of small shops displaying a wide range and great diversity of goods. It was commented by the unnamed author, in All about Shanghai, that:
Continuing up Nanking Road from Kiangse Road one begins to encounter with increasing frequency the colourful Chinese shops, with their fascinating displays of silks, embroideries, linens, jewellery and other wares of Chinese manufacture. . . The thin wailing of Chinese music tinkles from the upper floors of these shops and everywhere is the busy clatter of Chinese commercial life (p.48).

After the establishment of the PRC, Nanking Road changed its name to ‘Nanjing Road East’, while Bubbling Well Road, extending west from Nanking Road, was renamed as ‘Nanjing Road West’. Maintaining the pattern where big department stores were juxtaposed to small specialty shops offering diverse goods and services, this precinct continued to be the most prestigious commercial quarter in China for over forty years, even though all businesses were nationalized.

Since the 1990s, large shopping malls have become a fad in Shanghai, as has been the case in other Chinese cities. New shopping complexes were being erected in all sub-centres and districts, taking the place of the traditional local shops. In relation to Shanghai, the boom in shopping malls was occurring at the same time as the process of building up the city as an international metropolis. Major commercial quarters such as Nanjing Road East consequently faced an inevitable transformation. As a result the 1990s saw ten new plazas erected on Nanjing Road East, their contemporary structures overshadowing the old commercial monuments. Meanwhile, many small specialty shops were amalgamated into big plazas, their old buildings quickly demolished. However the plaza boom did not necessarily boost business. Too many plazas of similar designs and services actually deprived Nanjing Road East of its commercial characteristics and the dated traffic infrastructure made the precinct less accessible than other shopping areas. As a result, by the mid-1990s, Nanjing Road East began to face strong challenges from other sub-centres and to lose its leading position as the commercial heart of Shanghai. The pressure to revive the Nanjing Road East commercial quarter intensified, making further large-scale transformation inevitable.

In 1998 the Nanjing Road East Pedestrian Street Project was launched. According to the project leader, Professor Zheng Shilin from Shanghai’s Tongji University, the objective of the project was to turn the precinct into a commercial quarter of
international standards, so as to bring life back to Nanjing Road East. The project, according to Zheng in a media interview, was inspired by the experiences of Western cities such as Munich, Milan, Paris and San Francisco:

As an important part of urban fabric in both Chinese and foreign cities, the pedestrian walk had continued for many centuries before it was disturbed by modern auto-transport system. Now it has come to be an efficient tactic for the revival of central business districts (Xu 1999).

Completed in 1999, the Nanjing Road East Pedestrian Street was a landmark project dedicated to the fiftieth birthday of the PRC (Figure 17). Like the Century Boulevard at Lujiazui, the project was a joint venture between China and France, participants including Tongji University, the People’s Government of Huangpu District and Arte Charpentier et Associates from France. The French design, which had defeated its Japanese competitor, was considered more user-friendly and beautiful (Xu 1999). Covered with burgundy marble tiles, this 1033-metre pedestrian street now boasts to be the finest street in Shanghai. Its design aimed to reduce the spatial congestion and visual chaos caused by the newly erected commercial highrisers (Balfour and Zheng 2002; Xu 1999), by providing easy access to shops, rest facilities such as street chairs, entertainment areas, as well as scenic spots such as flowerbeds and transplanted trees.

Apart from its commercial significance, the Nanjing Road East Project, according to the media, indicated a rising interest among Shanghai citizens in the cultural heritage of Shanghai, as well as a growing enthusiasm for protecting the old CBD (Xu 1999).

However, there seems to be contention with the rising appreciation of heritage. As the small, old retail shops were already being demolished, the modernization and beautification of the precinct in fact has erased much of the evidence which could be found to remind people of the diversity of commercial life in the past. The precinct
has been swamped with new plazas that dominate the whole block, and the heritage buildings of the four old department stores have become unnoticeable. The question of how the Nanjing Road Pedestrian Street would boost tourism and reflect the history of Shanghai as a place where the East met West was answered by the creation of thirty-seven new gutter lids on the Pedestrian Street. These were carved with images of great historic events and monuments, including the Pudong development in the 1990s (ibid).

**Huaihai Road**

Though conservation of the built heritage at Nanjing Road East remains problematic, designation of the precinct as the heritage quarter at least suggests that the historic significance of Nanjing Road East has after all been recognized officially. However some other areas in Shanghai, historically significant as they are, are not even on the official list. One such example is Huaihai Road – known in the 1930s as Avenue Joffré in the French Concession. Huaihai Road now includes extensions to both east and west. In colonial days, Avenue Joffre was the main road in the French Concession and renowned for its exotic character. In contrast to the overwhelming, dazzling glamour of the Bund and Nanking Road that basically presented financial and commercial prosperity, the streetscape of Avenue Joffre conveyed a tranquil elegance. The street was lined mostly by smaller-scale boutiques and retail stores giving a calmer atmosphere, and modulated by the *Li-Long* residential fabric behind the commercial layers (Wang 1996:7). Avenue Joffré was known as the heart of the French Concession but it was culturally diverse at the same time (Figure 18). In *All About Shanghai*, the author commented that ‘the Avenue Joffre section is colloquially known as ‘Little Russia’, for it is here that the thousands of Russians who have settled in Shanghai centre their commercial and domestic lives’ (p.56). Whereas the Bund symbolized Shanghai’s financial success and Nanjing Road her commercial prosperity, Avenue Joffre presented a more civilized aspect of the city and epitomized Western influences on everyday life in Shanghai. An oil painting by a contemporary Shanghai-based artist, named ‘Sunset on Avenue Joffré’, was on display in 1998 at the Shanghai Urban History Exhibition. Attempting to represent the colonial landscape and lifestyle of the old Shanghai, the artist chose the ‘romantic’ precinct of Avenue Joffre as a classic setting, with symbolic objects such as the Citroën sedan, the tram, the coffee shop, a Western lady walking her Maltese dog under the thick
shade of parasol trees. With the rich but beautiful touch of the 'sunset' tone in colour, the painting conveys a strong nostalgic sentiment, though the sub-title of the painting states that the artist wishes to suggest through his work that Western colonization in Shanghai was doomed.

Figure 18: Avenue Joffré in the 1920s
(Source: The Scenes of Old Shanghai, Shanghai Pictorial Publishing House 2001)

For decades following 1949 Huaihai Road remained one of the most popular shopping streets for both Shanghai residents and visitors, specializing in garments, shoes and boutiques. Continuing to be a mixed-use area, its roofline changed little, with Lilong residences juxtaposed with moderate scale shops along the tree-lined street. As in other areas in Shanghai, the infrastructure and housing in the Huaihai Road precinct was poorly maintained over decades until the 1990s, and both the shops and the residences appeared worn out. Faced with the rise in land speculation and urban redevelopment in the opening-up era, this precinct inevitably became a favored quarter for developers. As described in Chapter Four, this area was affected intensively by development projects and the precinct was under a full-scale transformation in the 1990s. As a result of redevelopment, the eastern half of Huaihai Road is a concentration of new department stores, franchise shops of international brands, plazas, restaurants and office buildings. The heavy density of the development has totally changed the Huaihai Road streetscape, most residential buildings having been demolished to make way for commercial highrises (Figures 19). As new
development has changed the original spatial proportions, Huaihai Road today appears much narrower and more crowded than before.

In 1989 three properties on Huaihai Road were listed as municipal heritage and in 1994 another seventeen were added to the list. Built between the late-nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century, these properties were representative of their type, ranging from the public buildings such as former office building of the French Shanghai Municipal Council, to Lilong blocks such as Shangxianfan. Their inscription was based on the definition of ‘outstanding modern structure’, set by the MSG’s conservation legislation - Shanghai Municipal Measures for Conservation of Outstanding structures – which is to be discussed in Chapter Six. As the streetscape of Huaihai Road was greatly modernized during the mid-1990s, many of the registered properties ended up either being dominated by new development, or having their art deco damaged. This was especially the case at the busiest section of the road where development was the heaviest. Besides this, quite a number of historic places had been demolished during the frenetic years in the mid-1990s, even before they could be designated and registered. In some cases old buildings were pulled down in such a hasty and blind manner that the land was cleared of historic sites before development projects were even confirmed. The chances were that the projects might never happen, but those old buildings were lost forever.

The demolition and rebuilding on the Huaihai Road, pushed by the trend of urban modernization, could hardly be constrained by the municipal planning authorities. While acknowledging the inevitability of the Huaihai Road redevelopment, planners were not happy with the insensibility of the heavy-handed facelift of the precinct. A senior planning official bluntly expressed his disapproval of the way in which Huaihai Road was transformed, conceding that the redevelopment was motivated by strong economic interests and was irresistible:

I don’t like high rises being erected there. Huaihai Road is the major street in the former French Concession, and the unique street in Shanghai. The land lease heat during 1991 and 1995 was seen by district governments as gold opportunity for making money, although it has been cooling down now. I object to the undiscriminating demolition and have managed to persuade them to keep some old buildings, for example, the office building of the former Conseil Municipal of the French
Concession. But I understand that the precinct has such a concentration of old buildings as well as population that it needs action, and that the shops on Huaihai Road used to be too small and cramped to meet today’s requirements for modern shopping facilities.  

Whereas Huaihai Road was a prime area for development, its past has come to be seen in recent years as an important asset to be exploited. The official vision of the Huaihai Road development is to build a modern shopping zone rivaling Nanjing Road East. ‘Nanjing Road East is a commercial street left by the old age, but Huaihai Road is to become a modern, international commercial street built by our people under our Party and Government’ (Ma 1999a). In promoting the newly developed Huaihai Road, the 1930s legacy of the precinct was highlighted by the government media to draw attention to its cultural significance. The redevelopment, therefore, was interpreted not only as a revival of its past glamour, but a landmark of the beginning of its new age in the context of Shanghai’s economic takeoff.

In the opening-up era, Shanghai is endeavoring not only to take the leadership in the national economy, but also to restore its status as a pioneer of new culture. This can be perceived in Shanghai’s enthusiasm in building cultural infrastructure such as a library and a theatre. It is also very responsive to the international trend of urban activities. City shows, grand events, and festivals have been vigorously promoted, and are regarded as a manifestation of its cultural importance. Commercial streets such as Huaihai Road are naturally main arenas for various city shows. In October 2000, the District government organized the Huaihai Road Centenary Birthday Celebration, where the 100-year-old Huaihai Road Exhibition was set up at a new shopping plaza.

---

24 Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, 13 June 1998.
The renovation of the former French Municipal Council Building was completed on time as a part of the birthday tribute. To remedy the loss of historic traces, the government of the District took pains to retrieve and collect remnants of the past for such a show. Old street number plates and signs returned to their original places, though not many were left, and some places had their old names replaced. As highlights of the cultural legacy of Huaihai Road, elements of Western design such as art deco and sculptures have been retrieved, reproduced and placed on business buildings, but some copies were made in a rather careless manner, or put in the wrong places. As a result, many of them attracted criticism from artists as well as architectural professionals in Shanghai, who called for greater respect for history and art and urged that the 'malpositioning' of history should not be allowed in new development projects.

**Dominance of Economic Interests: How It Affects the Treatment of Historic Sites and Quarters**

A high expectation of economic return often imposes a direct pressure for development and the relaxation of construction controls. According to a senior official of Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, the scope of construction control zone was adjusted in the 1980s – it was reduced from 50-100 metres to 30-50 metres from the target building. Reduction of the construction control zone might be seen construction control zones have been reduced as a compromise with the development push. While the scope of conservation concern has been extended from individual properties to historic precincts in recent years, which can be taken as a signal of conceptual progress in heritage conservation, the actual reduction of construction control zones represents a contradiction with the new concept of zone protection, since it will allow more free space to developers and greater threats to individual buildings as well as to the historic skyline of the designated area. In reality, even the Bund is not totally free from both environmental and visual damages, as described earlier in this chapter.

---

In the process of urban redevelopment, confrontation between development and conservation occurs more sharply in those areas with high land value and economic potential. As most historic areas in Shanghai are located in premier precincts, protection of these areas tends to be more difficult. Heritage registration, designed to safeguard designated properties and neighborhoods from development threats, cannot necessarily prevent damage from taking place. It has been pointed out, by the municipal planning officials and conservationists in Shanghai, that even when designated as historic places, survival cannot be guaranteed. The fate of the residence of the Pei Family is an example. I.M. Pei, an eminent contemporary architect, being perhaps best known internationally as the designer of the Louvre Pyramid, is of Chinese origin. His family used to own a house in Shanghai at the former French Concession. The property was designated as a municipal heritage in 1994 but faced demolition at the end of the 1990s, as the site was in the development zone of a commercial and business centre. It was reported that the whole neighborhood where the Pei Residence was located had been cleared, leaving the property as one of the few structures left waiting for final action (*Time International* 2001).

Generally, under the cover of heritage registration, most designated properties do have a better chance to survive than those not on the list, but the proper conservation of registered properties, as well as historic precincts, remains a problem. Due to breaches of the construction controls by developers from time to time, many of the registered properties have suffered from drastic alterations, their protection zones invaded by new developments that often cause damage to the historic skyline of the neighborhood (Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Shanghai Municipal Administration for Real Estate, and Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage 1997). The former residence of the Moller Family, which was used by the Shanghai municipal
headquarters of the Communist Youth League until 2001, demonstrates how construction controls could be broken. The property is a spectacular one in Shanghai, an example of the fine integration of European and Chinese architectural elements. It is a Scandinavian-style villa with Chinese glazed tiles and art deco details, fenced in by a brick wall with the same mixture of styles. As an architectural masterpiece, it was registered in the first protection list and was labeled as municipal heritage in 1986. Designation of the house inspired fascination over its extraordinary style and the life story of its original owner, who had made his fortune through the racing industry in Shanghai. Nevertheless, admiration does not necessarily lead to respect. In the mid-1990s development already swamped the area and severely overshadowed the Moller's Residence and its environs (Figure 20). Ironically quite a number of highrises close by actually tried to copy its style by adding a pointed top, as a token gesture to the landscape conformity that was required by the municipal conservation legislation and the accompanying guidelines. However the copies were so poorly made, that they were condemned by some leading architects in Shanghai as an ultimate failure that in fact damaged the streetscape of the precinct (Yao and Wang 1999).

Since the reform of the land use system, which was discussed in Chapter Four, more and more heritage properties have been put on to the real estate market. The consequent dilemma is that the properties would either fail to attract interest from potential buyers due to the high renovation costs and conservation restrictions, or face the risk of improper alteration. The former residence of the leading entrepreneurial family in pre-1949 years, the Rong's, was donated to democratic parties of Shanghai for office use. However a visit to the site in 1998 revealed that the property faced difficulty in finding a new owner after the users at that time moved to a new office building. While the ground floor of the property was leased to a restaurant, the rest of the house was left deserted. The former Russian Orthodox Church located on Xinle Road in the former French Concession was another example in point (Figure 21). The church was designed by a Russian architect A.J. Yaron and built in 1931. In the 1920s, a large number of Russian refugees fled to China to escape the Soviet revolution and Shanghai became one of their principal destinations.
During the Mao era, the building was used as a workshop for a washing machine manufacturer. Being built evidence of the Russian community’s life in Shanghai, and a fine example of this type of architecture, it was designated as a heritage building in 1994 and changed hands from the Shanghai Washing Machine Factory to the Shanghai Security Exchange. Refurbishment of the property followed soon after. Although a smart new look was given to the church, much of its original components – its interior decoration and fittings – were lost. Moreover, the gutted inside was converted into a security transaction room with rows of orange-colored plastic chairs, a cashier desk and an electronic display board glittering with stock prices of the day over what was originally the nave.

It is noticeable that some registered heritage precincts have attracted more conservation efforts than others, due to various factors such as the assessment of their importance, technological and cultural values, economic significance, and tourism potential. Waterfront buildings at the Bund, for example, are placed on top of the heritage hierarchy – the whole block has been designated as national heritage, as are some others of political significance such as the site of the first congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Figure 22). Places like these have been much promoted and conservation funds have been collected from the real estate market, donations and government sources. While renovation of the Bund has mainly relied on income collected from the real estate market, renovation of
the CCP congress site largely came from levies collected from Party members and donations from various sources.

In contrast, places such as the former KMT municipal centre is of a much lower profile. Located in a relatively quiet suburb in the north of Shanghai, the site is little known even to Shanghai residents, let alone its history. The field visit showed that many Shanghai residents did not realize the KMT municipal centre existed. As a manifestation of rising nationalism in the late 1920s, the building of the KMT municipal government and other monuments in this precinct all adopted distinctive traditional Chinese style. Most of them were designed by Dong Dayou, a leading Chinese architect at the time, who once worked closely with Henry K. Murphy, an American architect, and a enthusiastic advocate of Chinese traditional architecture (Cody 2001). Although the monuments were registered as heritage properties, and the precinct designated as a heritage quarter, little conservation effort could be seen. The site visit showed that, unlike the buildings at the Bund that had been scraped and cleaned, or the CCP congress site that had been refurbished and extended, the building of the former KMT Municipal Government apparently lacked attention and care, and the former Municipal Stadium – now a district sports venue – was half deserted (Figure 23). Compared with those popular places in the CBD, this precinct attracted less commercial and media attention. Economically, being somewhat far removed from the business centres, this area had a poor commercial reputation, and therefore it was not as popular for the real estate market as those areas in the inner city. Politically the listed properties here were not given the same importance as some CCP monuments, so there seemed to be little reason for the government to allocate resources to them.

There were some new developments here however – mostly commercial buildings and residential complexes. The original road fabric of the KMT era remains unchanged but new developments in the precinct appear quite chaotic in terms of style and scale, hardly relevant to the old monuments.
Promotion of heritage places certainly helps to enhance the awareness of the historic and cultural values of listed places, but at the same time it attracts more commercial than cultural interest and inspires enthusiasm regarding the economic potential that leads to the exploitation of those areas. While international consumerism is asserting its influence on developing societies including China, urban planning and development are also reflecting the influences of consumerism, under which cities have become centres of consumption, play and entertainment (Featherstone 1991:185). They ‘represent both postmodern social dynamics and symbolic edifices wherein everything (including recreation) is for sale’ (Burns 2001:296). To appeal to the emerging middle-class that seeks to consume in style, developers are refurbishing historic areas into high-class theme streets boasting the most contemporary entertainment and recreation facilities. ‘Old taste’ becomes a highly priced commodity for consumers who want to satisfy their curiosity about the romanticism of old times but may not care about the truth of the past. The refurbishment of historic streets therefore may be carried out in a way that sets a stage. Here history is treated as a drama to be presented to an audience and, in this sense, it may often be filtered, edited, modified, and even invented, to suit the tastes of the audience or the director of the play. Categorized as a cultural product, such a play will be given a price tag. Treated as the tangible setting of history that is presented in this manner, the built evidence of history may also be selected and altered. From the developer’s point of view, the main reason for refurbishing historic areas is the economic return. In the process of refurbishment, conservation guidelines are therefore ignored. Whereas height controls in historic areas have been stricter in recent years, the refurbishment of these areas often turned out to be a heavy-handed facelift, with the likely consequence that the essence of neighborhood life is largely lost.

During 1998 and 1999, the refurbishment projects of Hengshan Road and Yandang Road were much publicised by the Shanghai media as successful examples of blending history with modernity, but the other side of the story is that these projects, especially the Hengshan Road project, have become controversial leading to a questioning of this approach.

Hengshan Road, formerly Avenue Pétain in the French Concession, is one of the main
streets in the Xuhui District of Shanghai west, leading off Huaihai Road to the sub-centre of Xujiahui (Figure 24). Built in the 1920s, the Hengshan Road precinct was one of the prime residential areas of colonial Shanghai featuring leafy streets and fine residences. For many years after 1949 this precinct remained an exclusive residential area for the social elite, although some of the landmark buildings changed their names and functions. Unlike those districts swamped with crumbling dwellings and slums in other areas of Shanghai, this area was considered as the 'upper corner' by Shanghai residents and remained neat, quiet and elegant.

Hengshan Road precinct lies within the designated quarter named the 'Garden Residence of Shanghai'. The quarter, including a number of side-streets off Hengshan Road, has a concentration of some of the finest properties retained from early days. Furthermore, this precinct has now pulled together many of the diplomatic posts in Shanghai, including the consulates of about fourteen countries such as the USA, Australia and France. Therefore, apart from its romantic past, this precinct is considered by district decision-makers as a window onto the world. Historic and cultural features have raised the commercial value of the precinct, which had been appreciated even before it was listed as a heritage quarter, and the development strategy of the district government aimed to exploit its commercial values in order to boost both real estate and tourism (Ma 1999c).

According to Mr Liu, senior engineer from the planning office of Xuhui District, the Hengshan Road refurbishment involved little demolition, except for some early style Lilong residences that were in

---

26 Interview with Liu Shouxiang, senior city planner, Planning and Land Use Management Bureau, Xuhui District, Shanghai, 27 April, 2000.
poor condition. Few highrise buildings have been erected in the precinct and the overall skyline has changed little. Now after the first stage of refurbishment, most street-front properties on Hengshan Road have become high-class hotels, cafes, restaurants, bars and bistros, plus leisure facilities such as a bowling club and a high standard indoor tennis centre. Quiet as it is during the daytime, the street now glitters with neon lights at night attracting fashion-pursuing people who spend their nightlife there. Renovation projects have focused on beautification of the street so that it would become a showcase of a modern, international, affluent lifestyle. For this purpose, new business owners have to pass a careful check by the district authorities to ensure that their outlets meet the demand of high quality consumption—cheap shops such as noodle houses will not be accepted. The commercial administration of the district government is in charge of assessing businesses to be opened there and to supervise their services. As a result, the business premises on Hengshan Road were all renovated to high-class standards. While emphasizing the theme of leisure time, the Hengshan Road project has reportedly demonstrated a ‘Euro-Continental’ style, but here the meaning of ‘Euro-Continental’ can be quite vague and, actually, turns out to be a mixture and confusion of time periods and cultures. A newly built restaurant with French windows has adopted the name ‘Bourbon Street’; a box-shaped new hotel building, with various Western art deco elements on its exterior, is promoted by its advertizers as spectacular for ‘blending the elegance of a bygone age with contemporary design’; Chinese red lanterns are hanging over old-fashioned street lamps (Figure 25). In the street, old fashioned trams and street chairs have been retrieved as decorative elements in the street in order to generate an atmosphere of the past. When referring to the recent emergence of some 260 retail, leisure and entertainment businesses, the official media acknowledged the enormous change of the area and expressed contentment with the fact that it was the place for its patrons to perceive the ‘historic romance of Shanghai’ (Bo 2000). The

Figure 25: ‘Blending the elegance of a bygone age with contemporary design’ - the street-scape of Hengshan Road, 2000
refurbishment project was celebrated by Shanghai’s official media, and received compliments from the municipal officials as a success in marrying the past with the present, by restoring the past romance through redevelopment, but the project provoked criticisms as well. Critics were concerned not only about the loss of the original streetscape and culture of the precinct, but also about the false information that the refurbishment might have passed to visitors about the past. Some regarded the refurbishment as distortion of history and therefore unacceptable because

the precinct of Hengshan Road was previously very quiet and elegant, but not commercial at all. For this reason, we cannot recognize what has been done as heritage conservation, although it is said that the atmosphere of tranquility and elegance was retained.27

The District planning authority, however, argued that the project had followed the heritage conservation guidelines, on the grounds that there was neither a breach of construction control—here mainly referring to height control—nor large scale demolition of old structures28. The second phase of the refurbishment project, according to the same source, would focus on the construction and expansion of parkland, which would involve further changes to the existing streetscape.

While the objective of designating heritage quarters was to preserve the historic fabric of those areas, revitalization of those areas was often targeted at economic return. Redevelopment of the old inner city always results in an overall urban facelift, for it is believed that new infrastructure attracts investment and visitors more easily. Officials in charge of the Old City advocated a major change and therefore fast demolition of old buildings, in order to establish a new business and commercial centre and thereby boosting the local economy. Meanwhile, however, they acknowledged that the cultural heritage of the Old City was an invaluable asset. The historic landscape of the Old City not only included landmark sites such as the 400-year-old Yuyuan Garden, the zig-zag bridge and the Mid-lake Pavilion, but also the vernacular built fabric and townscape embodying the local commercial culture. The district leader claimed success in blending the old with the new through the Old City refurbishment, in which

27 Interview with Professor Luo Xiaowei, Tongji University, Shanghai, 20 April 2000.
28 Interview with Mr Liu Shouxing, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, Planning and Land Management Bureau, Xuhui District, Shanghai, April 2000

155
historic monuments had been retained and vernacular styles were adopted by new developments as a gesture of conservation (Sun 1997). The reality is that redevelopment of the Old City has now transformed the aged precinct into a new commercial quarter: the Yuyuan Tourist Shopping Complex. The key project of the Old City redevelopment was a theme street named ‘the Old Street of Shanghai’ completed in 1999. The theme street was built by widening the original street, and converting the neighborhood into an open market. Comments on the Old City project vary. Some architectural and planning professionals expressed their discomfort with the ‘pseudo-antiques’ that were built into the old precinct, including the Old Street of Shanghai29. A leading heritage architect, who was involved in the renewal project, felt deeply frustrated that the district and municipal authorities dismissed his design of a low-scale built form for the current one, which resulted in new buildings of excessive scales30. Although a report in the official newspaper quoted some foreign tourists that ‘The Old Street of Shanghai’ was what they had imagined about Old Shanghai (Pan 1999b), the site visit revealed that some international tourists were disappointed to see that ‘The Old Street of Shanghai’ turned out to be a brand new street full of shops.

As many historic precincts are being transformed into theme streets, the fate of the old places depends very much on the commercial potential of the specific place. More often than not, the redevelopment of historic properties and neighborhoods aims to stimulate the local economy by creating a new real estate market. In this sense, commercial potential may dominate historic and cultural significance in the decision-making process regarding the redevelopment of historic quarters. For such reasons, the preservation of the early Lilong residence proves to be much harder than that of garden villas, due to the lack of economic incentives.

Mostly built at a high density and often in ordinary materials, the Lilong house is the most typical style of Shanghai’s local residences, and is recognized as one of the most representative styles of the Chinese vernacular architecture. Spreading over the city area of Shanghai, this kind of residence used to be built in blocks, in a fishbone

29 Interview with Professor Huang Fuxiang, Engineer-in-Chief, Shanghai City Planning and Design Institute, 16 June, 1998.
30 Interview with Professor Ruan Yisan, Tongji University, 16 June, 1998
layout, connected to the main streets by lanes and narrow alleyways (Figures 26-27). As a typical kind of Shanghai residence, the Lilong residence reflects the evolution of human settlement in colonial Shanghai, while the development of its styles demonstrates the penetration of Western influences on residential buildings, as well as the adaptation of Western lifestyles by Chinese locals. The most typical type is the one with distinctive Western art deco, as well as a traditional Chinese stone-framed gate and front yard. Towards the 1930s some more modern styles emerged, with the yard removed and the gate replaced by an iron fence, therefore appearing more Westernized. Some high-class ones became semi-detached and had front gardens instead of courtyards. In a sense, the Lilong residence ‘reflects the hybrid urban culture of Shanghai, a mixture of traditional Chinese lifestyle and modern commercial civilization’ (Luo 2000). It is also an important arena of local life in Shanghai. Some blocks would have shops, snack bars, barbers and tailors, even factories, ‘indeed like cities within the city’ (Luo and Wu 1997:2). In this sense, the Lilong residence is regarded as partially responsible for the personality of Shanghai citizens: ‘Shanghainese are said to be worldly, sophisticated and calculating, this is probably because Shanghainese have been living in a complex but minimized society like Lilong, and have been trained to deal with it’ (ibid).

Unlike bank and club buildings, garden villas and apartments, most Lilong houses are not attractive to developers in the process of urban renewal. On the one hand, they are of low height, with no more than three levels, considered today a great waste of land. And on the other hand, living conditions in most of them are very cramped, with
several families sharing one kitchen and bathroom. Some houses built in the early years may even have no bathroom facilities and therefore, there has been little enthusiasm from decision-makers for retaining them, and they have been seen as blocking the path to urban redevelopment and modernization. For example, some of the earliest examples of Lilong blocks which were finely built with mixed styles, were near the Old City. In the process of the Old City redevelopment, district officials could see no point in retaining them, because of their poor condition as well as high cost of renovation. Conservationists in Shanghai were also pessimistic about the fate of the Lilong house, despite the appreciation of its historic and cultural values. Prof Luo Xiaowei predicted that most of the Lilong houses would have to disappear in the future, because it would be technically and financially difficult to preserve them.

Indeed preserving Lilong houses will involve huge costs and be unlikely to bring any good financial return. Most Lilong houses accommodate at lease three or four times the number of households that they were originally designed for. If a Lilong block is to be preserved, most of its residents would have to be removed and the government will have to pay for their relocation, yet the old property would be unlikely to generate sufficient funds to cover the relocation costs. For those who are willing to stay, they will have to pay a large sum of money for both the property and the renovation. At the moment, not much enthusiasm has been expressed by residents to do so.

Experimental projects have been conducted in order to reuse the existing Lilong residences and to improve living conditions at the same time. One of the projects was
a joint venture with a French company. In the project, the interior of the property was renovated and some alteration was done, with no change to the façade except for the painting of the wall. This attempt proved to be too costly as it involved relocating many residents. The second one, in consultation with a Dutch company, involved a minor extension, but the extension was so small that the developer found it insufficiently lucrative to continue. A third project involved adding a new level to the original structure, but this was still not attractive to the developer, who agreed to cooperate only under political pressure. Planning officials in Shanghai preferred the third model, mainly because it would not necessarily involve the relocation of residents. Now this model is used sometimes in the redevelopment of old areas, with residents, developers and the local government sharing the costs. However the focal point of this kind of renovation is to relieve housing shortages at a lower cost, while the conservation issue is not the main concern and few care about the original form of the old structure. Even so, this model has little chance to be widely accepted, as it lacks incentive for local government, developers, or residents.

It seems to be inevitable that the Lilong residences are the most vulnerable to the bulldozer. They were, and are still disappearing quickly, and it seems that only a small number will survive. Up to 1998, five old-fashioned Lilong blocks (Shikumen compounds) – Bugaoli, Yongquanfang, Shangxianfang, Jianyeli and Jixiangli – were registered as heritage places. These blocks, still in reasonable condition, were considered as representative samples of the evolution of the Lilong house. (However the earliest examples of the kind, like Xingren Li in Ningbo Road at the core of the former British settlement, was pulled down in the early 1980s). Shangxian Fang was built in 1921, is an example of change in styles from the original Shikumen structure, featuring a skillful integration of Western architectural elements into Chinese courtyard built style. Jianye Li, also a Shikumen-style compound built in 1930, was an evidence of shifting of layouts of the Shikumen-style house from multi-bay to single-bay units.

31 Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, 13 June 1998.
While a few Lilong blocks have been earmarked as off-limits to developers. Some other Lilong blocks became new targets for urban redevelopment after 1998. Unlike the frenzied demolition in earlier years, redevelopment has been seeking local elements in new projects, which resulted in the trend of gentrifying former residential blocks by turning them into new commercial compounds and through gentrification of those blocks, developers expected to see the rise of land values in their surrounding areas. An example of the point is the redevelopment project of Xin Tian Di, already mentioned in Chapter Four. The project evacuated 15 Li Long blocks built between 1911-1933, modified layouts of the neighbourhood, guttered the buildings and turned the ‘most classic residential neighbourhood in Shanghai into the most avant-garde, and posh space for high-class consumption as well as a new tourist attraction’ (Li 2002).

Economic development inevitably has a remarkable impact on the traditional elements of cities. The impact can be in different forms. In relation to the urban environment and the built heritage, development can mean the demolition of heritage places on the one hand but the exploitation of those places on the other, with the latter often being conducted in the name of heritage conservation. Registration of heritage places has helped by protecting some historic buildings and sites from the developers’ bulldozers, but it is still not enough to resist the destructive development of the 1990s. It was pointed out, in a memorandum jointly drawn up by the municipal authorities for planning, real estate, and heritage, that some heritage places had been demolished despite the Register (Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Shanghai Municipal Administration for Real Estate, and Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage 1997). To balance the notion of ‘sustainable development’, some officials argued for ‘sustainable conservation’, maintaining that conservation should never hold back development32. In other words, heritage conservation is seen as subordinate to development and has to serve the needs of economic growth. Registration of heritage places is an important step in conservation, but conservation also has to be supported by an effective working system, and a strong, workable legislation.

32 Interview with Zhao Wanliang, senior urban planner, Shanghai City Planning and Design Institute, 16 June 1998
CHAPTER SIX: HERITAGE CONSERVATION SYSTEM IN SHANGHAI

Chapters Four and Five examined the extent to which Shanghai was modernized in the 1990s and the impact that urban redevelopment had on the built fabric. While the townscape of Shanghai underwent rapid changes, many historic sites in the city were demolished, and the historic fabric of the city suffered serious damage. Indeed urban redevelopment during the 1990s was often conducted as if ‘flattening all for a new start’. In this context urban conservationists faced an extremely tough task in protecting the built monuments and historic areas of the city, and found themselves constantly under great pressure because of development demands. However, this period also witnessed new initiatives to protect the built heritage and to promote heritage preservation. In addition, advances in conservation concepts resulted in the formulation of heritage planning, legislation and an administration system to implement and enforce the new laws and regulations.

This chapter aims to examine Shanghai’s conservation mechanisms, including the existing heritage planning and legislation, bureaucracy, lobbying system and real estate market in the 1990s. In terms of the rationale, feasibility and effect of conservation legislation, the key document to be studied is the statutory conservation guideline The Shanghai Municipal Measures for Conservation of Outstanding Modern Structures (hereafter referred to as The Conservation Measures). It was revealed in Chapter Five that heritage designation could not necessarily protect listed places from further damage. With rising concerns over the built heritage, conservation legislation was recognized by municipal decision makers as an issue. The Conservation Measures was passed and promulgated by the Municipal People’s Congress on the eve of the building boom, to address the eminent threat to heritage places. It was accepted as the major conservation guideline by planners and heritage professionals because of its statutory status.

Before analyzing the way in which conservation mechanisms operate in Shanghai, a note on the general Chinese context is worth making. In China, the decision making process has been a procedure starting from the higher to the lower level of a
bureaucratic hierarchy. This means that bureaucratic intervention in planning and conservation issues and procedures is inevitable. While the past legacy of central control still remains the rule, changes have taken place in the top-down bureaucratic system since China’s opening-up and economic reform. Such changes are reflected in the relaxation of central control over local affairs, a power redistribution, and an increased autonomy within provincial, municipal and local governments. In such a context, China is experiencing a social transition where relationships are changing between the government and its agencies, and between governments at different levels, between government and communities, becoming more complicated and sometimes more confusing. As far as urban conservation is concerned, such changes have presented new challenges to provincial/municipal conservation plans and legislation by allowing local administration to behave more autonomously and to form partnerships with developers.

While economic and technical initiatives always serve the government’s political agenda, it is important for conservationists to make use of political momentum, and to convince decision-makers, as well as the public, that conservation initiatives will contribute positively to the development process. Although the electorate has less influence on the decision making process in China than in the Western countries, public satisfaction is increasingly a factor to be considered in assessing the achievement of politicians and public servants. It follows that conservation advocacy and initiatives have to be in line with, rather than contradictory to the popular demand for upgraded living standards.

**Progress in the Heritage Protection Process in Shanghai**

The process of heritage conservation in Shanghai evolved through several major stages during the 1990s. After the first registration of ‘outstanding modern architecture’ in 1989, more initiatives were raised in order to protect not only individual structures but also building clusters and quarters. Initiatives included the drawing up of heritage planning, the establishment of Municipal conservation legislation, and the introduction of heritage sites into the real estate market.
Registration of heritage sites in Shanghai can be traced back to 1961, as a response to the establishment of the national guideline of heritage protection, but there was no corresponding legislation at either national or municipal level to support heritage conservation, and the registered sites were not immune from looting and damage during the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the late 1960s. In 1982, the national heritage law was promulgated by the Chinese Government. This legal document, partially revised in 1991 and 2002, has been regarded as the basic law for the protection of both the movable and the immovable heritage. In the national heritage law, cultural heritage, movable or immovable, was referred to as ‘cultural relics’. As far as built heritage is concerned, it was stipulated that

Cultural relics, such as sites related to revolutionary history, memorial buildings, sites of ancient culture, ancient tombs, ancient architectural structures, cave temples, stone carvings, etc., shall be designated as sites to be protected for their historical and cultural value at different levels according to their historical, artistic or scientific value (State Administration of Cultural Heritage 1982: 3).

Obviously the focal point of the national heritage law was the ancient history and revolutionary legacy. In terms of built heritage, ancient and revolutionary monuments are highlighted in the designation and registration processes. In relation to Shanghai, official opinions about the Western settlement and legacy remained ambiguous during the first few years after the promulgation of the national heritage law. As a result, Shanghai’s heritage list before 1986 merely included monuments of local culture as well as communist and anti-colonialist movements. Registered places included the Yuyuan Garden, the Sun Yat-Sen’s Residence, the first CCP Congress site and the tomb of Madam Sun Yat-Sen, whereas colonial monuments were virtually excluded from the list.

The late 1980s witnessed a conceptual advance in heritage conservation, which featured an expansion of the scope of protection. As was pointed out by planning officials in Shanghai, conservation focused for a long period on individual places without much consideration of their environs. In the 1986 Shanghai Municipal

---

33 Interview with Mr Zhao Tianzuo, Associate Chief Engineer, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, June, 1998.
Comprehensive Plan (SMCP), the notion of ‘zone protection’ was proposed to protect concentrations of sites, places, structures and buildings that made up a distinctive streetscape and skyline within a particular area. In the next few years, this notion of ‘zone protection’ was further developed, and resulted in the first heritage plan, The Plan for the Historic Cultural City of Shanghai (Hereafter referred to as the Municipal Heritage Plan) in 1995, which designated eleven neighborhoods as historic quarters. The heritage plan, with its new focus on heritage quarters, was seen as a big step forward in heritage protection and a milestone in the establishment of an extensive protection system (Liang 1996:72).

Conservation initiatives needed support from effective legislation. Although the national heritage law of China was proclaimed in 1982 and was taken as the legal guideline in heritage conservation, little reference could be found in this law addressing immovable heritage until its amendment in 2002, therefore for some twenty years there lacked a benchmark for the conservation of historic sites and towns. Shanghai was ahead of other cities not only in the designation of historic sites, but also in the formulation of heritage legislation addressing the issue of conservation of the built heritage. As a legislative safeguard for the built heritage, a statutory conservation guideline, The Conservation Measures, was formulated and brought into effect by the SMG in 1991, with regard to issues such as the registration process, construction control, renovation requirements, financial resources and penalties on the violation of regulations.

The Conservation Measures was perhaps the first legislation in China dedicated to modern built heritage. It officially adopted the term of ‘outstanding modern architecture’ in referring to historic sites that were built in modern times. It defined the ‘outstanding modern architecture’ as

- a building or a structure, or a group of buildings and structures that was/were built between 1840 and 1949, with historic, artistic and scientific significance, including
  - Buildings important in Chinese history of urban construction and architectural history, is/are of the archival value in architecture science;
  - Masterpieces by prestigious Chinese architect(s);
  - Building(s)/Structure(s) important to the progress in Chinese architectural science and technology;

164
• Icon building(s), Structure(s) and block(s) representing the traditional urban culture, landscape, and local identity of Shanghai (Shanghai Municipal Government 1991:1).

By defining the time frame between 1840 and 1949, the Conservation Measures brought Shanghai’s colonial heritage into the official conservation framework. In this sense, the definition of ‘outstanding modern architecture’ indeed responded to the Central Government’s recognition of the physical dimension of Shanghai’s Western legacy, and provided a legal basis for the conservation of colonial heritage in Shanghai.

Shanghai Municipal Heritage Legislation: A Brief Review

In the end of 1991 the SMG approved and announced The Conservation Measures as the official guideline for protecting and managing the built heritage in Shanghai. Based on the key ideas in the national heritage law, this municipal legislation focused on the conservation of architectural heritage, with modern architecture in particular. As is stated by Article 2 of The Conservation Measures, the term ‘outstanding modern structures’ referred to those structures built between 1840 and 1949, of historic, cultural, scientific, technical and aesthetic values. ‘Masterpieces by prestigious Chinese architects’ was also an important norm in designating ‘outstanding modern structures’. As most of the leading Chinese architects practicing in Shanghai during that period were Western educated and deeply influenced by Western architectural ideas, their designs were essentially Western, though constantly adopting elements of traditional architecture. An exception might be works by Dong Dayou, renowned for his designs for the civic centre of the Greater Shanghai Municipality in the traditional style.

The Conservation Measures addressed various aspects of conservation, including the identification of significance, the hierarchical order of sites and administrative bureaucracy, the designation process and protection guidelines, and the financial arrangements, as well as offences and penalties.
The *Conservation Measures* established three categories of heritage places, in the course of designation (Article 2). These categories were based on the consideration of historic, aesthetic and scientific values of historic places. Hierarchically, the three categories are:

A. National cultural heritage sites. They included sites that have been registered in the State heritage list, including key communist and nationalist monuments, as well as some colonial monuments. In 1996, the waterfront cluster of buildings on the Bund was added to this list.

B. Shanghai municipal cultural heritage sites. This category included most sites, other than those registered as the national heritage, on the first list of 'outstanding modern structures'. The list was approved by the SMG and reported to the Central Government in 1989.

C. Shanghai municipal heritage sites of architectural significance (Shanghai Municipal Government 1991:2). This category included sites on the second and third lists, which were approved by the SMG but was not required to report to the Central Government.

*The Conservation Measures* drew up the conservation system at the municipal level by clarifying the administrative responsibilities of the various government agents. These agents included Shanghai Urban Construction Commission (SUCC),34 Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau (SUPAB), Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage (SMACH), and Shanghai Municipal Administration for Real Estate (SMARE).

*The Conservation Measures* defined the designation and approval procedures, the key players to be involved, their hierarchical relations and their commitments (Figure 28). While the SUCC worked in conjunction with SMACH on designing sites of both categories A and B, and SUPAB with SMARE on sites of category C, an expert team would also be invited to assess prospective sites. Members of the expert team would be invited jointly by the four government agencies mentioned above. Prior to

---

34 Shanghai Urban Construction Commission was amalgamated with Shanghai Urban Engineering Commission in 2001 to form Shanghai Municipal Commission for Urban Construction and Management.
nomination, the Shanghai Urban Construction Commission, SMACH, SUPAB and SMARE would present the designation list to the Expert Team for evaluation and assessment.

**Figure 28: Hierarchical relations between SMG and relevant departments and their roles in conservation**

A number of conservation measurements was proposed, including the establishment of heritage protection zones, as well as construction controls within protection zones around the registered sites, restrictions and requirements regarding the use and renovation responsibilities of owners and users. Four conservation benchmarks were identified, with different levels of restriction according to the particular category of the sites on the protection hierarchy.

The concept of a 'heritage quarter' was spelt out in *The Conservation Measures*, although corresponding policies were not yet available at that stage. It is recommended that heritage quarters, where historic and traditional streetscapes still remain, should be identified and designated. In order to protect these quarters, special attention should be paid to the original pattern of streets and buildings and to the
harmony between new developments and old streetscapes in style, scale and color. In "The Conservation Measures," SUPAB was assigned to the work of the identification and establishment of heritage quarters, as well as to formulating corresponding protection policies. SUPAB did follow it up by designating neighborhoods as heritage quarters in "The Municipal Heritage Plan," approved by the SMG in 1995 (Figure 29). Further on in 1999 "The Conservation Plan for Historic Quarters in Inner Metropolitan Shanghai" (The Inner City Heritage Plan) was completed, covering eight of the eleven designated heritage quarters.

![Map of historic zones](image)

1. The Bund  
2. Sinan Road revolutionary sites  
3. The Old City  
4. The People's Square  
5. Maoming Road  
6. KMT Shanghai Municipal Centre  
7. Nanjing Road  
8. Xuhui garden residential area  
9. Longhua Cemetary  
10. Hongkou residential area  
11. Hongqiao country-style residential area

*Figure 29: Location of Historic Zones*

However, the legislation on the conservation of heritage quarters seemed to lag behind. While heritage plans were developed during the last five years of the 1990s, legislation with detailed regulations on the conservation of heritage quarters was still

168
not available\textsuperscript{35}. The absence of corresponding legislation negatively impacted the implementation of the heritage plans.

*The Conservation Measures* reflected the awareness of the SMG about the growing real estate market. It stipulated procedures and prerequisites for the transaction, leasing and transfer of properties designated as heritage sites, indicating a strong government intervention in the course of the commercialization of heritage properties. In terms of the maintenance of a heritage site, *The Conservation Measures* offered few incentives. Instead, it was explicitly stated that users and owners of designated sites should take financial responsibility for the costs of site maintenance, and that only under very exceptional circumstances should owners/users forward applications to SMACH or SMARE for subsidies. SMACH or SMARE are required to submit annual funding proposals, to be included in the municipal budget (Article 22).

*The Conservation Measures* were formulated under the endorsement of the Shanghai Municipal Government, and therefore this was a document of statutory status. Under the Chinese legislative system, governments of provinces and state-administered municipalities are authorized to formulate local laws that are based on, and in line with the Constitution and relevant national laws. Government of provinces and state-administered municipalities are also authorized to formulate legislative regulations to complement relevant national and local laws. With regard to *The Conservation Measures*, it is based on the national laws on cultural heritage, urban planning and environmental protection, as well as the municipal legislation in relevant aspects. Since coming into effect in 1991, it has been regarded as a legal guideline in dealing with historic sites in Shanghai and solving relevant disputes.

*The Conservation Measures* served as the first municipal legislation in China with a special concern for the conservation of colonial built heritage. Apart from its focus on historic sites, the significance of *The Conservation Measures* lay in its developing and adapting the national heritage law in order to fit the circumstances of Shanghai.

\textsuperscript{35} The municipal legislation on the conservation of heritage quarters was approved and announced by the SMG in July 2002. As it is beyond the timeframe of this thesis, the legislation is not to be discussed here.
Whereas the national heritage law provided only a legal skeleton for the conservation of built heritage, *The Conservation Measures* defined fairly clearly the scope of conservation, as well as the responsibilities of stakeholders.

Moreover, a notable element of *The Conservation Measures* was the modification of the national heritage law in terms of conservation restrictions. In the national heritage law, it was stipulated that

The principle of keeping the cultural relics in their original state must be adhered to in the repairs and maintenance at the sites designated as the ones to be protected for their historical and cultural value and in any removal involving these sites, such as sites related to revolutionary history, memorial buildings, ancient tombs, ancient architectural structures, caves temples, stone carvings, etc. (including attachments to the structures) (Article 14).\(^{36}\)

The national heritage law is the legal guideline on heritage and conservation, and the only national law in this respect. However, an official of SMACH observed that, from a practical point of view, the national heritage law is a difficult one for practitioners to implement:

At first we tried to abide by the national heritage law, but in our practice, we soon found that it was not practicable in many cases. For example, the national law does not allow adaptation of either the exterior or the interior of the object to be protected, which we found very difficult to implement.

In comparison, *The Conservation Measures* set up a guideline that is more flexible and practical than that of the national law for conservation practice, by allowing adaptations to the designated sites that were categorized below the level of national heritage. According to *The Conservation Measures*, conservation could be implemented under four different criteria:

1. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior, structural framework, floor plan and internal fitting and panelling of the place.
2. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior, structural framework, basic floor plan and distinctive internal fitting and panelling of the place; while appropriate adaptation to other parts of the internal fitting and paneling should be allowed.

\(^{36}\) Original translation of the Chinese version.
3. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior of the place. Provided that the original structural framework is retained, appropriate adaptation to the internal should be allowed.

4. Provided that the integrity and the characteristics of the original work are retained, partial adaptation to the exterior, as well as appropriate adaptation to the interior of the place, should be allowed (Article 8).

It was also clarified that Item 4 does not apply to structures classified in categories A and B.

The modification of Article 14 of the national law led to *The Conservation Measures* being regarded as contradictory to the national law and it has never received official recognition from the Central Government. This has not prevented *The Conservation Measures* from becoming an accepted guideline for heritage planners and practitioners in Shanghai. In fact, modification of the national law to suit local circumstances might be regarded as a reflection of a typical aspect of the Shanghai culture: being adaptive to everything whenever necessary. Whilst admitting that *The Conservation Measures* did to some extent contradict the national law in terms of the treatment of the originality of the place, Yang, a senior official of SMACH, argued that a certain adaptation of the national law was inevitable for practical purposes\textsuperscript{37}. Revised municipal legislation on the conservation of colonial heritage is currently under consideration, and it is predictable that the new legislation will again aim to suit the circumstances of Shanghai at the time, which may result in some modification of national law.

However, while adaptations of the national heritage law were made to suit Shanghai’s practical needs, it did not follow that conservationists in Shanghai would ignore the national law; in fact they were quite cautious about achieving a balance between national and local legislation. Article 8 of *The Conservation Measures* was in fact a demonstration of such a balance. Among the four renovation restrictions, the first stipulation virtually echoed Article 14 of the national heritage law by placing a strong stress on the originality of the site. Tight restrictions on alterations were applicable to

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Yang Songping, Deputy Director, Division of Built Heritage, Shanghai Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage, April 2000, Shanghai.
all sites under protection category A (national heritage sites); while the flexibility was mainly applicable to sites of categories B and C (municipal heritage sites).

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, *The Conservation Measures* were drawn up on the eve of the 1990s' building boom in Shanghai. Closely following the approval of the first conservation list, announcement of *The Conservation Measures* suggested that the potential threats to Shanghai's built heritage were perceived and were being addressed. As an attempt to deal with such threats, *The Conservation Measures* reflected the belief of conservationists in careful planning, administrative intervention, government supervision and established policies and rules. Based on such a belief, *The Conservation Measures* put the task on the shoulders of government agencies and experts, in assigning key players for the conservation process, while participation by the general public was not taken into consideration. However, such an ultimate reliance on the elite and bureaucracy proved problematic.

Of the Municipal agencies assigned to conservation duties, SUCC, SUPAB and SMARE were administrative sectors in charge of development management, urban planning, land use and housing issues. Conservation of built heritage was one of the many tasks on their working agendas and was unlikely to be given high priority while urban development, housing relief, and land use reforms needed to be addressed. SMACH was the municipally funded government department in charge of the administration of both movable and immovable heritage. It used to look after underground and excavated relics as well as ancient and revolutionary sites that had been registered. Not until 1986 did it begin to take responsibility for the conservation of 'modern structures'. Compared with SUCC, SUPAB and SMARE, SMACH was less powerful in the developers' eyes, as it was not responsible for monitoring construction and land use, nor did it issue the construction permits that developers need for new projects. It did not have the power to reverse the construction process by imposing bans and penalties as SUPAB did. Therefore, a full time guard as it was to heritage sites, it was often regarded as the weakest link in the conservation network by some senior conservation professionals, who suggested that conservation should be managed by planning, rather than cultural authorities, so as to achieve more efficiency (Ruan 2000:20).
Apart from the key agencies mentioned above, the expert team played an important role in the conservation process by providing professional advice on designation and conservation issues. The team comprised some leading planning and architectural practitioners as well as academics (most of them from Tongji University and Shanghai City Planning and Design Institute), and was convened from time to time. While *The Conservation Measures* merely stipulated that the expert team should be consulted before nomination of prospective places, members of the expert team, many of whom were influential in Shanghai’s society of architecture and planning professionals, were indeed heavily involved in the course of conservation as well as in lobbying procedures. Many of them contributed to the earliest initiative for protecting colonial monuments, which resulted in the first registration of ‘modern structures’.

With acknowledgement of the experts’ role in the conservation legislation, the authority of professionals seemed to be officially confirmed, although in practice, their influence on the decision-making process varied over the years, from project to project.

It was apparent in *The Conservation Measures* that rational, careful planning, together with official administration, made up the core of conservation legislation. And the legislation reflected a widespread belief that conservation issues should be dealt with through a technological-bureaucratic approach. By contrast, there was little involvement of other disciplines in the mechanism established by *The Conservation Measures*. While emphasizing the technical and bureaucratic management of heritage sites conservation, *The Conservation Measures* did not mention public participation. The bias towards the technological, material aspects of historic sites was obvious.

Although the preamble of *The Conservation Measures* stated that this document was formulated ‘with a view to inheriting the splendid historic and cultural legacies’, the focus of the document, as a whole, proved to be merely on the physical soundness of listed objects, and little could be found addressing the more fundamental aspects of conservation – the understanding, appreciation, interpretation of, and respect for historic and cultural values held by those sites. *The Conservation Measures* aimed to prevent damage caused by inappropriate adaptation and dangerous use, but in fact, damage could be caused by many other factors if users and managers lacked understanding of, and respect for the registered sites.
While ‘appropriate’ adaptations of the exterior and interior of heritage places were acceptable in certain circumstances, there was no established principle to safeguard the historic and cultural values of the place, as no definition was given explaining what should be considered ‘appropriate’. According to Articles 9, 11 and 14 of The Conservation Measures, change of use, adaptation, restoration, reconstruction and infill development were not allowed ‘without permission’. In this sense, official consent, instead of the cultural significance of the heritage place, was what people needed to worry about if they wanted to make alterations to the place. Following this logic, change of use, restoration, reconstruction and infill development would be possible as long as official consent was obtained, even if such conduct might adversely affect the cultural significance of the place. The assumption seemed to be that the officials of the four relevant government agencies mentioned above were fully committed to heritage conservation, and powerful enough to assert their influence and stop any attempts that posed threats to heritage sites. Above all, the assumption was that relevant officials had a good understanding of, and due respect for, the historic and cultural significance of listed sites. However, the fact was that most of the designated government agencies were not able to give priority to conservation in their working agendas, and that the municipal control over urban development was reduced in the 1990s when the administration system in Shanghai was re-organized and considerable power transferred to the local level, notably to district and county governments. Formulated in 1991, The Conservation Measures failed to predict the relaxation of government control in the course of economic reform. It also failed to predict the difficult position in which the Municipal administration on land use planning was to be placed in the context of rising demands for development in years to come.

The Conservation Measures merely covered individual sites. Although it recommended that areas with a concentration of historic sites should be designated as heritage quarters, it gave no detailed restrictions or requirements with regard to the protection of the streetscape in such areas. By the end of the 1990s, there had been several versions of heritage plans, including The Municipal Heritage Plan and The Inner City Heritage Plan, with special concerns regarding the conservation of heritage quarters but they were largely theoretical considerations and expressions of intentions to support conservation. Therefore it was unlikely that these planning guidelines
would be effective in conservation practice unless corresponding legislation and
detailed policies were in place. That was why damage to these designated historic
quarters still happened from time to time, as examined in Chapter Five.

Despite the emphasis on technological-bureaucratic management, *The Conservation
Measures* left much room for negotiations and government intervention. For example,
whilst stating that no change of use, nor new construction in the protection zone was
acceptable, *The Conservation Measures* conceded that special needs might receive
special consideration (Article 14). The lack of definition for some ambiguous
wordings such as ‘special needs’ would create considerable space for developers to
lobby for their cases and for the government to maneuver in making decisions. While
development had been given special priority in the government agenda, it was not
difficult for developers and local officials to justify new developments by labeling
them as ‘special’. Consequently *The Conservation Measures* left considerable
loopholes and, in fact, created opportunities for misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the legislation.

In terms of heritage planning and conservation strategies, *The Conservation Measures*
did not include the involvement of authorities at the district level, nor did it show
encouragement of users’ involvement. District authorities and users, therefore, would
continue to have little role to play in the conservation process, other than obeying
municipal rules. The implication and message of *The Conservation Measures*, due to
the lack of encouragement of local and community involvement, seemed to be that
conservation was the responsibility and interest of relevant government agents, as
well as relevant experts, but little to do with the general public. Moreover, *The
Conservation Measures* offered little incentive to conservation efforts. In contrast, it
spelled out penalties in considerable details for breaches of conservation regulations.
This bias towards penalties in conservation management was problematic, for it gave
little encouragement to conservation efforts. As a result, stakeholders in the
development process would consider how to escape penalties, instead of working
productively with conservation legislation and making their project worthy of
incentives. In practice, the effectiveness of penalties remained a question. As *The
Conservation Measures* stipulated that placing the conservation of registered sites in
jeopardy would attract fines ranging from five to twenty percent of the total cost of
the project, it might either push developers to go even further with the project so as to make up for the loss, or end up with a token if the trouble maker turned out to be government institutions.

While developers and property users might be targeted for breaching conservation rules, *The Conservation Measures* did not provide any precaution against government officials should they fail to implement the conservation legislation, or encourage offences against the legislation. While relevant departments were authorized to impose penalties on developers and individual users who breached the rules, they were not authorized to punish bureaucrats who violated conservation rules. This further reduced the viability and effectiveness of the conservation legislation, since many development and refurbishment projects were actually operated directly by Municipal or district leaders, as well as subordinate organizations under their leadership.

**Conservation Mechanism: the Administrative System**

Although various government agencies were assigned by *The Conservation Measures* to specific roles in the conservation process, their responsibilities were stated in general terms with little detail. Besides, there were missing links not only between relevant government agencies, but also between *The Conservation Measures*, other relevant Municipal legislation and the current city plan.

As far as the administrative system was concerned, there were obvious gaps between functional sectors. This consequently reduced the effectiveness of the conservation mechanism. *The Conservation Measures* stipulated that SUPAB and SMACH should jointly identify the construction control zones for sites in category A and B, and that SUPAB and SMARE should jointly identify the construction control zones for sites in category C. This made SUPAB take the major responsibility for construction control. SUPAB was the authority overseeing the implementation and administration of planning, the role assigned by the SMG through the municipal planning legislation. As a municipal department in charge of urban planning, SUPAB is responsible for the implementation of the municipal comprehensive plan as well as detailed plans for
'important areas'. Here 'important areas', according to the municipal planning legislation, refer to areas such as the Central Business District and sub-centres in the inner metropolitan districts, municipal economic and technology development zones, heritage quarters including construction control zones around historic sites, key holiday resorts, military infrastructure, major industrial zones and open space within the outer metropolitan area (Shanghai Municipal People's Congress 1997:22).

To some extent, construction control over heritage sites by the planning authorities at the municipal level would protect those sites from unplanned demolition and development, but it was insufficient to fully guarantee the safety of designated sites. Being a technology oriented agency, SUPAB administered construction control mainly through its intervention in the process of new development projects, including the assessment of the selection and planning of development sites, as well as authorizing development permits. The reality was that, it was often difficult for SUPAB to prevent damage occurring, partially because of the loopholes in the conservation legislation. Since SUPAB was only responsible for the construction control, it could not exert control as long as the proposed project did not involve new development, even though it in fact would reduce the historic value of the site and its environs.

Take the Hengshan Road refurbishment project for example. Despite the salvos from government media promoting the project, it attracted criticism from planning and heritage authorities as well as academics because of its distortion of the historic environment. Nevertheless neither planning nor heritage authorities could stop the project, because it was beyond the scope of their intervention. In dealing with urban refurbishment of this kind, SUPAB was supposed to conduct construction controls, while SMACH was to be consulted for its opinion about conservation matters related to registered buildings and its environs, as well as heritage quarters. Whereas SUPAB was authorized to impose restrictions on new developments in historic areas, it had little influence on so-called refurbishment projects and involved little of the demolition, infill and highrise development, which were usually conducted in the name of refurbishment of historic areas. As far as the Hengshan Road project was concerned, there seemed no room for intervention from planning and heritage authorities: it did not involve new development, nor did it demolish any existing
registered sites, although its implementation changed the culture of the
neighbourhood from a residential area into a commercial quarter, and in fact reduced
the historic value of the precinct. In conducting the project, developers did not need to
apply for development permits from SUPAB, or request a conservation plan from
SMASH, thus the project was quite free from the municipal planning supervision. ‘As
long as they don’t erect a skyscraper there, little could be done against them’, said
Yang, deputy director of SMACH:

If a highrise had been planned (on Henshan Road), we would have intervened with our
opinions regarding the scale, style and colour. But the fact was that they (Xuhui district
authorities) did not plan to build any highrise, therefore neither SUPAB nor ourselves could
do anything to stop the project.38

The reform era witnessed economic decentralization, which posed challenges to the
municipal administration on urban planning and called for a more updated urban plan.
Unfortunately in the 1990s’ Shanghai, amendment of the existing comprehensive plan
seemed to be lagging far behind the fast advancing development. The situation was,
as Shanghai planning officials pointed out, that the whole decade of the 1990s was
actually a period of no plan (Song and Xu 1999:16). This was because the 1986
version of the SMCP, which was supposed to be the general guideline of urban
development for the following two decades, had failed to anticipate the scale and
speed of the urban development that would take place in the 1990s, and a new
comprehensive plan took a long time to come into existence. While Shanghai was
experiencing a ‘planning vacancy’ during the 1990s, the SMG required that districts
and counties within the Shanghai Municipality should produce their own detailed
plans. However in the midst of development fever, district and county governments
did not want to have detailed plans in place because they did not want to be
constrained by them (ibid).

The introduction of a market economy in China brought about big changes in the
traditional roles of government planners and institutions. As a whole, the planning
profession was experiencing a paradox since the opening up and economic reform.

38 Interview with Mr Yang Songping, Deputy Director, Division of Built Heritage, Shanghai Municipal
Administration of Cultural Heritage, April 2000.
Planning departments, such as SUPAB, were in a very complicated situation in dealing with the various interest parties in the society. On the one hand, the 1989 national legislation on urban planning highlighted the importance of the profession by recognizing the authority of planning administration in the course of urban development and renewal, stating in the *City Planning Act of the People's Republic of China* (article 29) that ‘the use of land and all development projects within the city planning area should conform to the city plan and be subjected to planning administration’. On the other hand, planning authorities in China were under unprecedented pressures after the economic reform as it became imperative for planning authorities to fit planning procedure into the liberalized and rapidly growing economy. Faced with confrontations between city plans and development demands, planning officials admitted that they were often compelled to concede to the trends of development\(^{39}\). Moreover, planning authorities were by no means independent of bureaucratic intervention. In Shanghai, SUPAB reported to the SMG, and planning offices at district level were more subject to the administration of district governments. As was mentioned above, the 1990s’ development left a gap between the existing plan and the reality. While an updated urban plan was not yet available, planning officials and professionals had to either draw on their experience and technical expertise in coping with planning problems, or just did what they were told to by municipal or district decision makers. During the frenzied period of the 1990s, planning officials could do little other than bringing their work in line with the ambitions of bureaucrats to make big changes happen.

New challenges to SUPAB’s planning mandate also came from developers. With the market economy advancing in China, government planners often found themselves slipping into a dual role by working for both government as well as private sectors simultaneously. In the 1990s, land use rights were opened to investors through land lease, and development was pushed ahead on such a scale and speed that it got far beyond the working capacity of the government planning sectors. As the government planning sector became unable to cope with heavy planning tasks, developers were allowed to work individually for clients provided that they put the finished plan into

\(^{39}\) Interview with Mr Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, June 1998
the official approval procedure. This led to many government planners being involved in ‘non-government planning activities’ (Zhang 1998a:217) and, as a result, these planners were often controlled by developers who were pursuing the maximum profit out of development projects and thus tended to hijack the government’s construction control.

Whilst planners were playing a dual role, the government planning sector was also under pressures from both government decision-makers and developers:

If coordination (by planning administrators) could not meet expectations from developers, they (developers) would bypass the planning authority and assert influence on district, county and municipal leaders. Pushed by short-term interest, those leaders would then give instructions to planning administrators to concede to developers and, consequently, development would break through the city plan (Song and Xu 1999:16).

The relaxation of the municipal government’s grip over planning and land use in Shanghai was only one aspect of the steady decentralization which, on the one hand, was designed to facilitate foreign investment and urban development, whilst on the other, meant that the municipal government had less control over district authorities. Under the planned economy, urban development was within a highly centralized framework. As a State-administered city, Shanghai was directly and tightly controlled by the Central Government, while its’ districts were strictly controlled by the municipality. It was under this tight, lineal control that Shanghai made its contribution (or rather sacrifice in the eyes of Shanghaiese) to the national economy. In the 1990s, in order to convert Shanghai into a global financial powerhouse, the Central Government modified its policies towards Shanghai by allowing more autonomy whilst at the same time, the administration mechanism within the Shanghai Municipality became remarkably decentralized. This change was most strongly perceived in the mid-1990s when power was transferred to lower levels of the administrative structure in Shanghai. This change was perceived not only by local people, but also by international investors who sometimes felt confused and frustrated at the inconformity in policies between the municipality and districts (Sender 1994).

In order to encourage district governments to take more initiative in the process of Shanghai’s modernization, the new, decentralized system gave district governments
not only the access to an increased share of revenue incomes, but also greater autonomy in various policy areas. This included those relating to urban redevelopment, like transactions of land-use rights and the real estate market. In this context, the decentralization of planning authority was legitimated in 1995 by the municipal planning act, *Shanghai Municipal Regulations for Urban Planning*, which was formulated in line with the national law on city planning. It recognized the autonomy of districts in reshaping their territories by stating that governments at district and county levels were, in principle, responsible for formulating and implementing detailed plans within the areas under their administration. Attracted by increased incentives and higher economic prospects, district governments enjoyed substantially increased power and showed great enthusiasm for urban redevelopment. In fact, most refurbishment projects in historic areas were endorsed and financed by district governments, whose leaders believed that modernizing and commercializing old quarters would not only raise the profile of their districts, but also bring in good revenue incomes.

The new Municipal planning legislation enabled local governments to approve the selection of construction sites and to issue permits for local development projects. With greatly increased autonomy and incentives, local governments wanted to see their territories built up.

While economic decentralization helped a great deal to attract investment and create revenue income, it led to the domination of district interests over the interests of the municipality, and allowed private companies to pursue their interests at the expense of the common good. Conflicts arose inevitably between the comprehensive plan of the municipality and the detailed plans of districts, between the interest of the whole municipality and that of individual districts.

Decentralization affected the implementation of conservation legislation. In Shanghai conservation was monitored and conducted mainly at the municipal level, and restrictions set up by the conservation legislation would more or less affect local development agendas. Whereas municipal government agencies were responsible for the designation, registration and conservation of historic sites and areas, local
sympathy remained in doubt. Interviews with Shanghai planning officials\textsuperscript{40}, as well as government documents, revealed that SUPAB had experienced constant confrontations between municipal conservation efforts and the local demand for development (Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Shanghai Municipal Administration for Real Estate, and Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage 1997). Attracted by immediate incentive in land lease and urban renewal projects, district governments were not always happy to see areas and sites within their territories registered as heritage sites\textsuperscript{41}. The discrimination against conservation could also be perceived in funding allocations by district governments. For example, a district government would finance the relocation assistance for residents who were affected by local development projects, but they would be unwilling to subsidize maintenance costs on heritage sites.

With the economic decentralization, the distinction between official policy and the officials’ preference became ambiguous. Government departments often had their own business arms and government officials could represent, at the same time, their departments and their companies. This mix of public and private interests made it more likely that government sections, particularly those at a local level, conceded to developers’ demands. As far as heritage conservation was concerned, concessions of this kind by the government of one district would not only jeopardize the historic fabric of its own area, but also ruin conservation efforts made by the adjacent districts. Development in the Old City precinct was supposed to abide by height control, which was already a tough task for local planners. However the district launched highrise developments in an area just next to the Old City, without considering the conformity of landscape in the two precincts. As a result, height control in the Old City virtually became pointless (Song and Xu 1999).

Despite economic reform and the relaxation of municipal control over local affairs, government interference in professional areas remained strong in the 1990s and, with

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, June 1998

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, June 1998
the current political regime, this kind of interference seemed unlikely to disappear quickly. Senior officials within the Party and government always had the final say on key issues, including urban development. While urban planning and management processes were by nature both technical and political (Ng and Wu 1995), city plans were very much conceptualized and monitored by the Party and governments at various levels. Professionals, responsible for the technical aspects of planning, were treated as technicians subject to the official will. Take the Shanghai International Convention Centre for example, where the decision on the location and function of the building was totally the result of bureaucratic interference, and the final design simply reflected the will of the officials in control. Professionals felt like puppets in the whole designing and revision procedure and, in the end, less than ten percent of the professionals’ ideas were represented by the finished work (Li and Peng 2000:8). In the process of urban development, Party cadres and government officials not only have the final say in the implementation, but also in the assessment, of particular projects. Whereas the Shanghai International Convention Centre was strongly criticised by planning and architectural professionals, it was endorsed by the municipal authorities in the competition for the major architecture award in 2000, and turned out to be the first prize winner. The Hengshan Road refurbishment project was similar. It was denounced by heritage and planning professionals, but the district officials felt confident that it would become a model project, and it did, since it appealed to a senior Municipal leader.

**Conservation Process: the Lobby System**

As discussed previously, *The Conservation Measures* barely involved either local government or the community in the conservation process. By not including them, *The Conservation Measures* placed conservation tasks on the shoulders of the municipal government as well as professional experts. Urban conservation in Shanghai began from a group of architectural and planning professionals, academics and officials, such as Professor Dong Jianhong, Luo Xiaowei and Ruan Yisan, as well as Mayor Ni. In the late 1990s, more than a decade after the initial conservation efforts, more academic publications and professional opinions were available on urban conservation, but still little voice was heard from the community and ordinary
citizens regarding conservation of historic places. Their opinions were rarely available in newspapers and other forms of media. In this sense, conservation seemed to be a matter of high taste involving merely social elites. The first registration of colonial heritage places was the result of work done by members of the Shanghai Architects Society, a non-government group. Many of its members were actively involved in conservation lobbying. Survival of the Chen Family’s Residence in Pudong is an example of such lobbying. When the Pudong development was first launched, the plot of land on which the estate was built was allocated to the Shanghai Administration for Gardens and Parks for the purpose of creating a parkland project, and the Chen Residence was included in the demolition list. Demolition started quickly and soon stirred up protests from academics at Tongji University, but the developer turned a deaf ear to protests and soon two rows of houses in the Chen Residence were flattened. In desperation protesters had to turn to the government media. Fortunately one of them had a friend working for the Municipal television and a media interview was organized and put on TV. As a result, demolition of the site was discontinued and then, after a cooling-down period, was totally stopped. The drama turned out to be a victory for conservationists. Despite the loss of two rows of houses, the estate survived and was converted into The Exhibition of Pudong Development (Figure 30). Its plain but distinctive façade presented a vivid contrast to the surrounding forest of glass and steel skyscrapers, adding a romantic historic touch to the modern landscape of the Lujiazui precinct.

While preservation of the Chen Family’s Residence was a success story, this was an uncommon occurrence in the process of conservation. In some cases, historic sites were lost in the confusion due to a lack of sympathy as well as coordination. For example, a designated site on the North Shan’an Xi Road had more than one address for its different entrances and one of its addresses might be registered but the others missed out. In the confusion, the site ended up being demolished and the developer argued that what had been pulled down was not the
registered site. To conservationists, the matter of concern was that, although heritage conservation had been advocated for nearly two decades, a grass root conservation advocacy and support system was yet to be established. As far as the appointed experts were concerned, they became involved only when convened by bureaucrats and they worked with the Municipal government on an on-call basis. However, when they needed to voice their opinions, there lacked a regular, accessible system.

Public opinion relied on official channels to be heard because of the top-down system in government operation, but official channels were not always accessible. Personal contacts, in this sense, often proved to be more efficient than the official mechanism. The Shanghai Architects Society, consisting of leading architectural professionals and academics in Shanghai, many from Tongji University, used to have a considerable influence on heritage conservation. According to Professor Luo, the convenor, the Society worked closely with the SMG when Ni Tianzen, vice mayor of Shanghai during the early 1990s, was in office in charge of urban construction. Being an architect himself, Ni in fact had a good personal relationship with members of the Society. He was seen in their eyes as ‘one of us’ and was sympathetic and supportive to urban conservation initiatives. As a senior official of the Municipal Government, Ni was aware of the fact that economic development was the top priority of the government working agenda, which would be pushed ahead by all means, and at any costs. However he advocated for conservation whenever possible and encouraged professionals to voice their opinions. In fact, the appeal for the preservation of the Chen Family’s Residence in Pudong was encouraged by Ni. Nevertheless, personal contact, efficient as it was, tended to work in an irregular, ad hoc manner. Ni died in 1994 and members of the Architects Society deeply regretted that Ni’s role in urban conservation as an enthusiastic advocate and familiar liaison was never fully replaced, and that the link between the Society and the SMG was withering. ‘Things are no longer the same’, Luo remarked. ‘Now I do not know anyone in the Municipal Government, and of course nobody knows me, either’. 42

Political factors were sometimes introduced into conservation lobbying and were used by the municipal planning authority to assert pressure on district governments. Under

---

42 Interview with Professor Luo Xiao Wei, Tongji University, Shanghai, April 2000
the new administration system district governments were granted greater powers to manage local matters, and assigned greater responsibility for boosting the local economy. With the need to meet targeted revenue income, local governments tended to take short cuts for a quick outcome. With regard to urban development, they tended to make concessions to developers to achieve a quicker change and a higher financial return. In such a context, it was often difficult to persuade developers to work for conservation projects that were always insufficiently lucrative. However, political factors may sometimes have added weight to conservation lobbying. For instance, the renovation of the terrace house block at Penglai Road was the result of such political pressure. The SUPAB took the opportunity to use the Municipal Government's initiative of 'do practical deeds for the people'. They approached the development company run by the district government, and managed to persuade the company that it would be politically useful to demonstrate its willingness to 'do practical deeds for the people'. As a result, the block survived demolition and the living conditions of the residents there were improved through renovation and extension.  

Advocacy for heritage conservation in Shanghai began in the 1980s, but more than ten years later, by the end of the 1990s, it rarely involved the participation of the general public. The key players were architectural and planning professionals, academics in related areas and some officials of designated government agencies. Lack of public involvement in conservation was the result of various factors.Primarily, the current decision-making system in China was still a top-down one. Despite economic liberalization and the transfer of power to lower levels, there lacked a mechanism through which the public could effectively influence the decision makers or the decision making process. Public lobbying, if there was any, had to be conducted in an 'organized manner'; namely, to be convened by official representatives of the government, and such lobbying did not often appeared in the public media. A survey of the major municipal newspaper Wenhuibao, found that media reports during the 1990s were overwhelmingly for the urban redevelopment under way, with few critical voices available.

---

43 Interview with Mr Zhao Tianzuo, June 1998.
Secondly, education programs were lacking to help ordinary residents appreciate and value the cultural significance of historic sites. In Shanghai, up to the end of the 1990s, most designated sites were in practical use, occupied by businesses, government institutions, residents and so forth, while some had been converted into museums. Some historic sites were open to the public, mainly for the purpose of ideological and patriotic education, such as the site of the CCP first congress. In such cases, historic sites were treated as vehicles carrying ideological messages while their cultural significance or scientific and aesthetic merits were often ignored. Apart from ideological educational programs, another type of educational program was occasionally organized for university students majoring in architecture, planning or relevant specialties. In these programs designated sites were used as physical examples to illustrate the development of modern architecture. Some courses, for example the conservation course offered by Tongji University\(^{44}\), introduced students to conservation issues, but such programs were not accessible to ordinary residents.

The factor to be considered was that, in the 1990s, Shanghai residents were mostly concerned about their living standards. The ultimate expectation of economic growth was a rise in living standards measured mainly in terms of income and housing conditions. While decision-makers chose the approach of ‘flattening all for a new start’ as a short cut to urban modernization, residents living in crowded areas were convinced that their living standard could hardly be improved without demolishing the old neighborhoods (Wenhuibao Editorial 3 October 1998, 17 January 1998). In this sense, the conservation of historic areas was often regarded as contradictory to modernization and a rise in living standards. To those living in more privileged quarters, the disappearance of historic sites and streetscapes might not be pleasant, but they tended to keep quiet as long as demolition did not affect their living conditions\(^{45}\). This attitude, on the one hand, was typical among ‘petty citizens’- ordinary residents in Shanghai, who would tend to let things drift if such things did not affect them personally; on the other hand, they would not be bothered as they knew well that their voices would not make big changes after all. In June 2001, the television program

\(^{44}\) The information was obtained by the field trips to Tongji University, Shanghai, in 1998 and 2000.  
\(^{45}\) Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Deputy Engineer-in-chief, Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Shanghai, June, 1998
‘Foreign Correspondent’ produced by the Australia Broadcasting Corporation presented an interview by its Shanghai based correspondent. The interview was intended to show citizens’ resentment towards the destruction of the built environment, but in a way it misinterpreted complaints by the residents involved. What residents were angry about was the inadequate government compensation for the demolition of their residences rather than the fact that they had lost the old environment.

Reform of Housing Supply and Its Impact on Conservation

A reduction of the housing shortage was one of the major promises that the SMG made to Shanghai citizens in the course of urban development. It was also one of the major factors that contributed to the comprehensive demolition and construction in Shanghai during the 1990s. Along with the advancing reform in land use, a private real estate market emerged quickly in Shanghai, as in other Chinese cities. The commodification of residential housing followed that of public properties and was pushed ahead rapidly in the late 1990s.

The 1990s saw great changes in the housing supply in Shanghai. During the years before 1990, the housing supply followed the Soviet model, through government allocation. Private ownership of residences was taken over by the state during the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, Shanghai residents, like those in all Chinese cities, relied on the state-owned housing stock, and government housing departments, state-run businesses and companies, and government institutions were the major housing suppliers. Without ownership of their homes, residents paid very low rent and relied on government housing agents, as well as their employers for any maintenance work that occurred. The limited funds available for residential development and day-to-day maintenance, meant that Shanghai was notorious for its substandard of housing until the reform in the housing supply system in the 1990s. The reform occurred essentially through the process of the commodification of housing, as well as land use rights. It proved effective in relieving the housing shortage and by the end of the 1990s, it became the basic mechanism for residence supply in Shanghai. Accompanying the reform, a real estate market took shape and developed rapidly. Consequently, the
government housing allocation system was gradually replaced by the operation of the real estate market.

While residents were encouraged to buy their own homes, various support schemes and strategies, not existing before the reform, were activated to assist residents to pay for the costs of home purchases. Supporting schemes and strategies included consideration of one's working history, employer contributions, government subsidies, mortgages and home loans. While the housing shortage was greatly reduced through commodification of residential properties, the fast growth of the real estate market provided greater choices of housing for residents. With accessible assistance schemes as well as increased income, Shanghai residents became not only less dependent on the government for housing improvement, but also able to buy homes of their own choice instead of waiting for relocation.

Changes in housing arrangements had a dual effect on the urban environment and conservation issues. Its impact on historic areas and sites, both positive and negative, started to be perceived during that period. On the one hand, the booming real estate market stimulated the redevelopment of the inner city, which led to rapid demolition of old urban areas and caused great changes in the built landscape. On the other hand, the real estate market made it possible to retain fine old buildings through property conveyance. The shift of housing supply away from government's housing stock to the real estate market was helpful to the conservation of heritage quarters. In the past, the old areas were either left deteriorating or demolished for new development. In the late 1990s the commercial values of old buildings and the former upper class neighbourhoods became more and more obvious. District governments, real estate companies and developers saw more incentives to revitalize residences in historic areas, which were always well located near the CBD, and offered both good business prospects and a fine residential status. Beginning from the late 1990s, old residences in historic quarters such as Xinghua Road, Maoming Road South and Nanchang Road were evacuated for renovation and residents were given the alternative of either taking compensation and moving out permanently, or paying more to move back (Ma 1999b, 1999c). Given such options, most residents might choose to move permanently, leaving their old residences to be renovated and put on the market. However, with the
emergence of a new gentry class, it is likely that historic buildings would attract new patrons who could afford to own them\textsuperscript{46}.

From another perspective, however, concerns remained about revitalization programs. While the emergence of the real estate market made it possible to evacuate residents and to restore old buildings to their former status, it seemed inevitable that most historic areas would become either commercialized or exclusive, or both. As there was no detailed regulation on the conservation of historic areas, property owners in those areas tended to over-renovate their properties, or put previous residences into commercial use, consequently the original landscape of these areas would be severely affected. In this sense, conservation, if merely supported by the real estate market, seemed more likely to be overshadowed by commercialization and gentrification.

In conclusion, during the 1990s, various mechanisms were developed to assist the implementation of conservation initiatives and strategies. Whereas this could be seen as an advance in the conservation process, problems remained in terms of the effectiveness of these mechanisms. In the context of a rapidly growing economy and the urgent demands for a rise in living conditions, conservation remained a tough task for all involved. Effective heritage conservation required stronger legislation, detailed regulations and rules, cooperation between the agencies and government departments involved, as well as the participation of the general public. Above all, there was a need to foster a respect for history and heritage. Without due respect, even the best conservation efforts might turn out to be hijacked by commercial interests.

\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Professor Luo Xiaowei, Tongji University, Shanghai, April 2000
CHAPTER SEVEN: TOURISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE – THE SHANGHAI EXPERIENCE

The building boom in Shanghai at the turn of the century brought about a drastic transformation of the city and its landscape. Within less than a decade, about three thousand skyscrapers were erected in Shanghai. Deng Xiaoping's compliment, that 'Shanghai has grown taller', was proudly quoted by Shanghai officials and the official media as recognition by the Central Government of the city's progress and the urban transformation of Shanghai was regarded as the epitome of China's modernization (Wenhuibao Editorial 3 October 1998, 17 January 1998, 23 September 1998). While the mid-1990s was the peak time for building modern skyscrapers, it was not until the late 1990s that interest began to emerge from commercial sectors in historic sites and quarters. Such a growth of interest in the historic built landscape can be interpreted in the light of the on-going restructuring of the urban economy. As Shanghai was heading for its goal to be an international centre of finance and trade, traditional industries were being phased out gradually to make way for the new industries to support the city's future role. Consequently a service-oriented economy was replacing the former manufacture-oriented economy. Furthermore, the reorientation of the urban economy called for new resources that would support the development of modern industries. As far as historic sites were concerned, they appeared to become a useful resource not only for the real estate market, but also for tourism.

This chapter attempts to identify the impact of the tourism industry on heritage conservation. Under the opening-up policy the society has been increasingly influenced by the global trend of consumer culture. The growing interest in historic places inevitably involved economic considerations, as built heritage has in a way become a part of a 'new phase of entertaining consumption' which is sweeping across urban landscapes worldwide (Hannigan 1998:1; Warren 1993:174). What concerns me is the motivation behind the marriage of heritage and tourism, rather than profit-making process occurred in this marriage. Is heritage tourism operated with due respect for those historic sites, or is it treating the sites as cash cows? In sought of answers to the question, the chapter examines how heritage conservation was justified
and then used to promote tourism in Shanghai, by bringing the issue into the framework of global consumerism.

Compared with other designated historic cultural cities in China, Shanghai used to have a stereotyped image as a manufacturing centre. In the 1990s, however, Shanghai began to be promoted, along with Xi’an and Beijing, as a tourist destination. Xi’an and Beijing, boasting long histories, were capital cities of several dynasties, Shanghai was significant because it mirrored the country’s modern history (Ma 1997). Although Shanghai lacked ancient monuments and natural charm, its urban culture was seen as an important tourism resource and, as the tangible evidence of the evolution of a modern city, the physical setting for stories and dramas of the past, the built heritage of Shanghai was treated as a key tourism asset.

However, tourism has no historical presence in Shanghai. As was commented in the introduction to All About Shanghai, Old Shanghai had ‘never made any conscious effort to promote the so-called tourist industry’ (Lethbridge 1983:viii). This was despite the fact that each year many thousands of people traveled to Shanghai for both business and pleasure.

The lack of enthusiasm for tourism of this kind remained throughout the Mao era. For decades China was virtually closed to the outside world and therefore only a small number of international tourists visited the country each year. Domestically, tourism was not a key business because the government policy encouraged heavy industries. During those decades, the rural people considered Shanghai the most important industrial centre, synonymous with advanced technology, a skilled workforce, quality products, and wide variety of goods. Therefore, Shanghai was not considered a good destination for sightseeing. The conventional concept of tourism stressed natural landscape as well as ancient monuments and, lacking this, Shanghai seemed unlikely to claim any reputation as a tourist city. By the late 1980s, although having been designated as a historic cultural city, Shanghai remained an industrial city in many

---

47 Xi’an was the capital city of China under Dynasties of Han (206 B.C—220 A.D) and Tang (618—907). Beijing was the capital city under Dynasties of Yuan (1206—1368), Ming (1368—1644), and Qing (1616—1911).
people’s minds. Information booklets about the listed historic cities, such as *A Hundred Historic and Cultural Cities in China* (Hou 1998), somehow, still referred to Shanghai as ‘the largest industrial city of China’, and provided little information about the city’s tourist attractions.

**Tourism in Shanghai: A New Industry in the New Millennium**

The neglect of tourism promotion began to change in the 1990s. During that decade, tourism came to be serious business and was given a high priority by the SMG. The Central Government’s strategy of transforming Shanghai into an international financial and trade centre led to the economic restructuring of the city. As a result, the economic focus of Shanghai was shifting from the secondary to the tertiary industry. While conventional manufacturing industries, such as textiles and machinery-making, were no longer key supporters of the economy and rapidly phased out, service industry increasingly became the major source of municipal revenue income. In this context, tourism began to be regarded as a crucial component of the new industry, and attracted the direct involvement of the CCP’s municipal branch of Shanghai. In early 1997 the CCP Shanghai Working Commission on Tourism and the Shanghai Municipal Tourism Authority were established. The keynote speech made by Huang Ju, CCP municipal chief of Shanghai at the time, at the inauguration of the twin authorities, confirmed that the SMG was to be committed to the promotion of tourism. Notably, media and commercial campaigns were launched under the slogan of ‘millions of people touring in Shanghai’ (Yao 1997b), soon after the establishment of the new municipal tourism authorities.

The government-endorsed tourism boom in Shanghai resulted from the shift of economic focus from manufacturing to service, a shift that was necessary for Shanghai to take its new role in the economic reform. The boom also reflected the international influence of new industries. In the global setting, the late decades of the twentieth century saw tourism as a significant area of the tertiary industry rising to become an important source of revenue income in both developed as well as developing regions. The capacity of tourism as a powerful engine to boost the national economies was widely recognized (Wahab 1997:130-131). As a ‘non-smoking’ industry, tourism was expected to foster new industries and commercial activities, and
to create a new market for them. It was appreciated that tourism had favorable impacts on employment, increased urbanization and helped to raise hard currency incomes in developing regions. Moreover, tourism was regarded as one of the approaches helping to balance international economic activities, through the flow of travel from richer to less privileged regions, and an important approach to stimulate other sectors of the new economic mechanism (ibid).

Apart from imperatives of attracting investment and boosting economy, tourism growth in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific Rim was also a response to the growing domestic consumption, which was made possible by the growing size of the middle class, the acceptance of a five-day working week and the penetration of global entertaining culture. In China, for example, the five-day week was implemented in 1995 and two extra-long weekends (1st-7th May, 1st-7th October) were introduced in 1998. The impact of such changes on the leisure industry was noted by Hannigan (1998), who saw also saw the penetration of American themed commercial culture in the region (ibid:179). After-work entertainment and weekend tour became an urban vogue sought after by newly emerged middle class. Along with the rise of this global trend of consumption was the change of the face of leisure in the postmodern metropolis, and the emergence of the so-called ‘fantasy city’, as well as the frenzied construction of urban entertainment destinations (UED) in metropolitan cities across the world (ibid:1).

Many important cities of the world have experienced the transition from industrial centres to financial and trade hubs in their history. As far as Shanghai is concerned, transition of this kind in the economic reform era is demonstrated by the changing ratio of primary, secondary and tertiary industries in the Shanghai Municipality. Table 2 shows the percentage of primary, secondary and tertiary industries in the overall value of the municipal gross domestic production (GDP). It was obvious that between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, secondary industry in Shanghai was shrinking remarkably to make way for the rapidly growing service sector.48

---

48 The table is based on the Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau: Statistical Year Book of Shanghai, Volumes 1979-1999, China Statistics Publishing House
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Year</th>
<th>Percentage in overall GDP value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The growth of the tertiary industry in Shanghai’s GDP

Based on Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau: Statistical Year Book of Shanghai (1980-1999)

The shift of economic focus during the 1980s and the 1990s, in fact, marked a u-turn in the city’s function. Shanghai experienced a transition from a business metropolis to a manufacturing centre in the 1950s, and then, in the 1990s, another transition back to a business metropolis. The role changes of Shanghai reflected changes in both the political and economic agenda of China’s Central Government. In the Mao era, China virtually closed her door to the West and built the national economy on a self-reliance basis and the Central Government attempted to turn all regional centres into industrial bases, regardless of their past and characteristics, in order to support the national economy. Under the open-door policy, China aimed to become an active participant in economic operations in the world, and economic centres were faced with vigorous competition, not merely among themselves, but also with their overseas counterparts. Economic imperatives made it necessary for cities to adjust their economic focus and to restructure their industrial framework. As economic centres of the country, big cities were expected to facilitate finance and trade, to boost high technology and to attract as much international investment as they possibly could (Gaubatz 1999; Wen 2001). Among these cities, Shanghai was regarded as the most promising because of its advanced economy, skilled workforce, convenient location and, perhaps the most important, its legacy of Western-style service.

With a new economic agenda, decision-makers in Shanghai tended to regard the growth rate in the tertiary industry as a major indicator of urban progress. As so much importance was attached to the tertiary industry, such a growth rate was also regarded
as a major indicator of the performance of governments at both municipal and district levels. Discussing the strategic shift of Shanghai's economic focus in the 1990s, Xia Keqiang, deputy mayor at the time, saw it as an important achievement of the SMG:

Shanghai used to be a city with the most developed tertiary industry in the country before the Liberation, which, however, withered gradually in later years. Since the opening-up and reform, Shanghai has formulated a strategy of 'prioritising tertiary industry, adjusting secondary industry and upgrading primary industry'. Furthermore, tertiary industry in Shanghai has focused on finance, insurance, commerce, trade, real estate, tourism, hospitality and consultancy. During the eighth 'five-year plan', the development of financial, trade and tourism facilities has been incorporated with urban construction and urban redevelopment processes. As a result, Shanghai is emerging before the world as a commercial and tourist metropolis that boasts established services, advanced infrastructure and beautiful environment (Xia 1996).

However, Shanghai faced new tests in building up its reputation as a tourist paradise. It might have little problem with its new role as a commercial centre, which in fact had been the recognized role of Shanghai throughout its modern years, but throughout its history, tourism was never treated seriously. The main question was: Why should tourists come to Shanghai? Shopping possibly, but this certainly would be insufficient to give Shanghai the status of a major tourist city. As a Shanghai journalist pointed out, one indication of Shanghai's lack of tourist attraction was the brevity of the average tourist stay (Ma 1997), which was also one of the main headaches for tourism managers. As Shanghai had been regarded as lacking tourist attractions, the key activity for visitors in Shanghai would be shopping. Many tourists, if going to Shanghai just for this purpose, would complete the trip in a rush. In this sense, an important task for tourist promoters was to develop new tourism resources, including tourism infrastructure.

When tourism became a new economic focus – it claimed 4.7 per cent of Shanghai's GDP in 1998 (Shanghai Morning News: 12 August 1999), municipal officials first had difficulties deciding what in Shanghai should be presented to tourists. Certainly there were the Bund and the Yuyuan Garden, but to become a tourist city Shanghai would need much more than these. Although Shanghai had been labeled as a historic cultural city, it took quite a few years for municipal decision-makers to incorporate
cultural heritage into the tourism industry. For Shanghai, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the honor of being named as a historic cultural city was largely overshadowed by the urgency of urban modernization, while old buildings and blocks were often regarded as obstacles and burdens in the process of urban renewal. At the early stage of urban development, decision-makers in Shanghai were obsessed with a quick transformation, trying to make ‘a new look each year, a transformation in three years’, and the title of a historic cultural city seemed irrelevant to the development imperatives. Leading conservationists Ruan Yisan and Dong Jianhong commented that some cities, in fact, did not care about being inscribed as historic cultural cities, because they could see little economic benefit in it (Dong and Ruan 1993:2).

While the historic townscape was yet to be recognized by decision-makers as a tourism attraction, Disney-style entertainment infrastructure became popular in China during the early 1990s. Its arrival in China was accompanied by American fast food, pop music, and it was regarded as one of the symbols of modern life. Theme parks and miniature gardens came into China in the 1980s via some forefront cities such as Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The idea was enthusiastically adopted by tourism authorities and operators in other cities. As a result, entertainment complexes, equipped with modern technology, mushroomed in Chinese cities, including Shanghai.

Statistics indicated that the number of theme parks in Shanghai, both completed and yet to be completed, came to twenty-eight in 1997, with an estimated building cost of two billion RMB (about US$ 200 million) (Zhuang 1997). These projects fell into roughly two major categories: leisure and entertainment complexes following modern and international fashions, such as ‘European Paradise’, ‘Dream Park’ and ‘Global Park’; and parks with Chinese themes, following the Disney design model. Their themes were based on renowned Chinese fairytales and legends, and facilitated with ultra-modern technology, featuring sound and light effects. Advocates of these projects believed that the key to successful tourism would come out of a creative imagination, generous budgets, and aggressive marketing. Modern tourism, according to these people, was after all a product, which would involve investment, manufacture and packaging procedures, like a grand-budgeted Hollywood movie (Jie 1997).
Despite handsome investment in construction and marketing, the reality of most entertainment complexes in Shanghai was not encouraging. In general, they failed to become sustaining tourist attractions. They might sell well at the beginning, but most of them closed quickly. Some parks were even converted into supermarkets. In fact, even at the early stage of theme park fever, researchers began to question the sustainability and financial viability of the projects. Research by the Department of Tourism, East China Normal University in 1997 identified an enormous discrepancy between market needs and likely numbers of consumers of entertainment parks: to cover building costs, these parks had to attract about 50 million tourists per year, while potential tourists would reach little more than 2.3 million (Zhuang 1997). Not surprisingly, by the mid-1990s Shanghai tourism was struggling between high expectations and low returns. As most theme parks were badly operated, it was time for decision-makers to find new initiatives to develop tourism.

Along with the downslide of theme parks, tourism resources emerged as important issues to be addressed by tourist authorities and researchers. Opinions varied regarding tourism resources in Shanghai. For example, it was suggested by researchers from the East China Normal University that Shanghai should make use of its local culture in developing tourism, instead of exploiting the limited natural resources. Other research conducted by the Shanghai Advanced Tourism School suggested that Shanghai should develop business tourism through large business functions and international-standard hospitality facilities. The research took account of Shanghai’s business legacy, current economic prosperity, convenient transport and world standard convention facilities. Apart from these, Shanghai’s distinct cultural landscape was also considered as an important attraction to business tourists (Tao 1997).

International practices in tourism had a perceivable impact on Chinese tourism marketing strategies. In the 1990s, the notion of ‘tourism product’ became popular among government authorities in charge, tourism managers as well as researchers. Manufacture of tourism products, including the packaging and labeling procedures, was discussed and opinions were often voiced through the official media. As a promotion strategy, tourism resources were streamlined into various themes, covering a wide range of areas people might be interested in (Kong 1999). In doing so, the
selection and classification of tourist resources became important procedures in the ‘manufacturing’ of tourism products and it seemed that, cultural tourism become one of the major categories of tourism products, as the term culture could cover an enormous range of meanings (Logan 1998).

After some confusion about the direction of the development of Shanghai tourism, the municipal decision-makers decided in 1997 that the urban culture of Shanghai should be promoted as the main resource of the Shanghai tourism industry (Huang 1997b). In reviewing the fate of the entertainment parks and mini-landscapes built in previous years, the current CCP municipal chief Huang Ju raised an official voice against the fad of entertainment parks, or ‘artificial landscapes’ as he called them. Huang commented that Shanghai had little to gain by developing artificial landscapes. The argument was made in light of a comparison between Shanghai and Beijing, Xi’an, Shenzhen and Wuxi (one of Shanghai’s neighboring cities). Those cities were forerunners in China in building various parks based on ancient, modern or para-natural themes. Huang warned that Shanghai would lose the competition to these cities if it continued to concentrate resources on this kind of tourism for which the city was disadvantaged in various aspects—Shanghai did not have the same long history as Beijing and Xi’an, nor the lake-side landscape of Wuxi (ibid).

Development of Shanghai’s tourism as an important economic initiative in the late 1990s involved a strong government input. In highlighting ‘urban culture’ as the focal point in identifying tourism resources, the newly established municipal authorities in charge of tourism made it clear that ‘Shanghai characteristics’ should be the main theme in defining tourism programs. Here ‘Shanghai characteristics’ included key cultural elements of both historic and contemporary Shanghai including Shanghai’s cultural heritage. In other words, the new strategy aimed to raise the profile of Shanghai as ‘China’s largest economic hub, a modern international metropolis, and a historic cultural city’ (Yao 1997a).

It was argued that as urban lifestyle and townscape formed the most distinctive aspects of the ‘Shanghai culture’, so Shanghai’s tourism should be labeled as ‘urban tourism’ (Yao 1997a). Decision-makers made the point that, as an important tourism destination, Shanghai should take advantage of its internationalized infrastructure to
attract business tours, conventions, exhibitions, cultural and sports events, as well as urban sightseeing, and shopping for both locals and foreigners (ibid). Of course, international tourists were the most important cohort for the Shanghai tourist industry to target. Numbers of international tourists, their length of stay and the average amount of their spending were recorded as key indices measuring the municipal tourism progress in the official yearbooks of Shanghai. Tourism marketing was conducted both at home and abroad. In 1997, the promotion of Shanghai tourism was launched in North American cities such as Chicago. The advertising campaign was designed to convey a strong message that Shanghai was a place of tourist interest, with a legendary past as well as a promising future (Rong 1997). The city was represented by pictures of built monuments, including the Bund, the People’s Square, the Television Tower ‘Pearl of the Orient’, and the new suspension bridge over the Huangpu.

While the new tourism strategy highlighted urban culture as a tourism resource, the term ‘urban culture’ itself could be very broad in meaning. In relation to Shanghai tourism, the new strategy focused on both the cultural heritage and the modern landscape as main attractions. Here cultural heritage covered both tangible and intangible elements such as historic sites and monuments, as well as the particular lifestyles attached to the built environment. Meanwhile, in contrast with past legacies, contemporary economic achievements were regarded as the city’s new glory to be publicised. In this sense, the flow of tourism was also channeled to new monumental developments by government tourism authorities. The modern townscape, being an ideological manifestation, also had tourist potential in the eyes of senior officials. In one of his public speeches, Huang Ju singled out modern monuments in Pudong as new tourism attractions. He argued that new development in Shanghai could generate wonderful tourism resources, as many of the monumental buildings would claim to be the ‘number one’ in Asia, and become famous in the world (Yao 1997a).

Scholarly opinions about a tourist city were that it should be unique, interesting, popular, entertaining, having cultural attractions and sightseeing advantages (Law 1993:69). However, people’s ideas differ on what is interesting and entertaining. It is necessary, therefore, for cities to identify the expectations of different tourist cohorts. In order to meet expectations from tourists of diverse interests, Shanghai tourist
authorities tried to distinguish domestic tourists from international tourists. For
domestic tourists, Shanghai’s modern, international urban profile appeared to have a
strong pull. For example a questionnaire given to a tourist group from inland China
showed that the majority of the group had chosen ‘the Pearl of the Orient’ and other
highrise towers at Pudong’ in answering the question ‘what do you want to see the
most in Shanghai?’ To them the modern skyline of Shanghai was the most appealing,
as it is regarded as the epitome of future modernity towards which China is advancing
(Gu 1999). Yet it was worth noting that, during the final years of the twentieth
century, interest in local culture and tradition, as well as historic townscape was on
rise. According to Nezar Alsayyad (2001:2), such an interest reflected the demand for
unique cultural experience, which could be seen as the reaction to the monotony of
global high capitalism, and standardized products and services sweeping across the
world. Logan, in his research into the expectations of Western tourists in Hanoi,
Vietnam, pointed out that international travelers were expecting to experience cultural
characteristics. This was despite the fact that Hanoi boasted neither individual
monuments of grand scale, nor natural features – and he concluded that it was the
characteristics of the local way of life, past and present, and the physical settings there
that attracted tourists (Logan 1998). For international tourists in Shanghai, historic
monuments and Lilong neighbourhoods might appear to be a kind of built environment
that promise unique cultural experience – they might be attracted by the co-existence
of opposite things in the city: ‘modernity tempered with a splendid past, birthplace of
capitalism’, ‘birthplace of communism, a famous European façade, a deeply Chinese
soul, a city frozen in an early 20th century futurists’ dream rushing at warp speed
toward the millennium’ (Kanagaratnam 1999:58).

Old Buildings, New Resources: Heritage Tourism in Shanghai

The appreciation of Shanghai’s historic landscape as a new tourism resource came at
the same time as a pursuit of nostalgic sentiment in Shanghai. I say ‘pursuit’ because,
as far as the tourism industry is concerned, it produced a tourism product for targeted
consumers. In a sense, nostalgia was regarded as one of the main motivations for
travel, a commonly-shared sentimentality, when tourists look for an unspoiled natural
environment or a historic place in order to escape from the stressful reality of
everyday work and living (Theobald 1998:1). In cities such as Shanghai, however, it was remarked that nostalgia was mostly for foreigners (Economist editorial 1994). Indeed, for many international travelers in Shanghai, the city sometimes did inspire a personal sentiment. For example, after China re-opened to the West, descendants of former Jewish sojourners, such as the Kadoorie's, visited Shanghai because it was dear to their memory. Many of them were refugees during the World War II and still remembered their Shanghai homes in the International Settlements or the French Concessions.

In the 1990s’ Shanghai, nostalgia did not seem to be for foreigners only. The term nostalgia became popular in Shanghai, among the new gentry class. People of this circle would like to call themselves ‘petty bourgeois’ and sought to live in style. They liked to talk about ‘the old colour’, having an enthusiasm for the past, though that was not necessarily caused by fear or disapproval of the present. In this sense, nostalgia in the 1990s’ Shanghai was a style rather than a sentiment. Chen Danyan, a Shanghai-based writer found that the younger generation liked to imagine the old Shanghai in their mind and they indulged themselves in a romantic atmosphere that they called ‘nostalgic’. This enthusiasm for the old past, however, was often dismissed by the old generation as the result of fantasy, because they believed that young people knew little about the past and therefore had no reason to be nostalgic (Chen 2000:84).

No matter what nostalgia meant to international travelers and local residents, it was related to the image of Old Shanghai, and began to be used by the tourism business, which marked urban tourism with a nostalgic tag. Old Shanghai was then treated as a tourism commodity. In converting Old Shanghai into this commodity, memory had to be manipulated to suit the contemporary climate. For example the word ‘Concession’ was not used, but ‘Shanghai in the 1930s’ became a popular phrase, as it tended to blur the memory of the colonial past. Some old quarters attracted attention from tourist entrepreneurs, because those areas would provide physical settings for the 1930s romance. As a local journalist Ma Meiling wrote in her column in Wenhuibao, along Huaihai Road, every side street, and every old building had its stories, and in the eyes of tourism managers, the old quarters could inspire people’s romantic imagination and therefore were worth developing (Ma 1997).
Modern tourism involves many more activities than just sightseeing, and tourists are most likely to be led by tourism organizers to consume tourism products that are to their particular taste. When ‘culture’ is to be exploited for tourism purposes, its meaning is not to be defined by the local people but by the tourism authorities in order to create a signature image for a perceived advantage (Sofield 2001). For instance, Old Shanghai legends were revived and yet in some way modified, to become tourism products bearing various tags. As an important resource for cultural tourism, both tangible and intangible heritage items tended to be presented in such a way as to facilitate tourist activities such as festivals, art and sport events and other urban spectacles. From the conservation point of view, revitalization of heritage sites could be justified by the tourist potential of the sites but, in turn, revitalization of heritage sites would be expected to suit the needs of tourism. Treating tourism as a modern industry, tourism managers already felt it necessary to package and label their products in line with their marketing strategies. In this sense, historic sites were treated like raw materials, to be polished and packaged, subject to various demands and then put into the market to attract consumers. The procedure of polishing and packaging could be perceived through the way in which revitalization had been achieved in designated quarters such as the Bund and some other blocks in the old metropolitan areas.

As a legendary area in Shanghai, the Bund attracted both domestic and international travelers for decades because it was the most Westernized block in China. To the Chinese people the Bund was a piece of the Western world on their soil, while to foreigners it was a remnant of their Western world in a foreign country. The extraordinary skyline of the waterfront, as well as vessels on the Huangpu of various nationalities, gave Chinese visitors a strong sense of Shanghai as a window onto the world. The Bund gave an intimate feeling to foreign visitors. On her first trip to Shanghai in the 1980s, Pamela Yatsko, the Shanghai Bureau Chief for The Far Eastern Economic Review between 1994 and 1998, found that buildings of former foreign banks at the Bund somehow made her feel at home (Yatsko 2000:3). Besides, the existence of such a classic Western skyline as the Bund in a Chinese city suggested an unusual past that was related to many stories and dramas. Being a financial centre in the first place, then converted into Shanghai’s political heart, and then again claiming back its former profile, the Bund never experienced decline over
the decades, unlike the waterfront of many big cities in the world. On the contrary, it was always the focal point of the metropolitan activities.

During the later decades of the twentieth century, waterfront precincts throughout the world were restored for tourism purposes, as they opened many windows onto a city’s past. They became known as supplementary tourist-historic components (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1990:174). In Shanghai, renovation of waterfront precincts, particularly the Bund, began in the early 1990s. Renovation of the Bund well demonstrated the intention of presenting the Bund as a link between the past, the present and the future. In the early 1990s all the waterfront buildings on the Bund had their exteriors cleaned for the first time since 1949. The Museum of the Bund History was opened in the mid-1990s in order to make the built form of the Bund more meaningful to tourists, by providing them with historic information (Tang 1998:iv). Meanwhile projects were implemented to improve infrastructure as well as to beautify the Bund environs. These included the road broadening project, which was designed to ease the traffic flow on the Bund, as well as create a sightseeing belt for tourists. As a result, a new pedestrian walk and recreation facilities such as street chairs, gardens and flowerbeds appeared on the waterfront. All waterfront buildings were lit up at night with a spectacularly colourful effect, thanks to the ‘lighting-up project’. Renovation of the Bund was celebrated as one of the major achievements in urban renewal, which was credited to the SMG and as well as the reform policy (Lou and Wu 1998:68-73).

Obviously, the registration of historic sites and quarters under the municipal conservation legislation helped the tourism industry to identify new tourism resources. Once identified as a tourism attraction, a historic site would be subject to the modification and packaging procedure. It would be exploited in such way as to embody the new themes of cultural tourism including, for example, ‘Shanghai in the 1930s’ and ‘Euro-Continental romance’. It seemed inevitable that exploitation of the old quarters for tourism purposes would involve redeveloping those places. For example, Yandang Road, a short street in the former French Concession between the busy Huaihai Road and the tranquil Fuxin Park, was one of the first blocks refurbished in order to attract tourists. The project made this residential street into a large out-door café, boasting the first leisure pedestrian precinct in Shanghai.
Consequently the original apartments were all converted into various shops, with the purpose of enabling tourists to wander around and enjoy the amenities.

Similarly, the Hengshan Road precinct was refurbished to attract tourists. The street was planned to be of high status and more exclusive in terms of leisure services and facilities, targeting the newly emerged Chinese middle class and foreigners. As was discussed in Chapter Six, the Hengshan Road renovation project was a creation based partly on history but more on the fantasy of Shanghai’s past as the ‘Paris of the Orient’. As far as both Yandang Road and Hengshan Road were concerned, the Western legacy in the ‘Shanghai culture’ was promoted to attract visitors. In doing so, the physical environment of these areas, including buildings, trees, gardens, street lamps, seats and statues, was refurbished in such a way as to be in conformity with the identified theme of ‘Shanghai in the 1930s’.

Consideration of the economic benefit largely motivated the preserving and revitalization of Shanghai’s heritage sites, and some officials had a sharper awareness than others of that benefit. At the height of urban redevelopment in the mid-1990s, leaders of the Xuhui District made it a policy to protect the neighborhoods with a concentration of colonial-style garden residences, because they saw the potential of those buildings in the local tourism and economy. This policy won compliments from the municipal planning bureau (SUPAB) as being far-sighted 49, although the SUPAB claimed that it would not advocate the exploitation of heritage sites by tourism.

A few historic sites in Shanghai, such as the Yuyuan Garden, the Jing’an Temple and the CCP’s first congress site were used as tourist places over decades. They were promoted because of either their antiquity or revolutionary significance. Shanghai’s semi-colonial past and its hybrid culture were not considered tourism attractions until the 1990s. The revitalization of heritage quarters for tourism purposes was, therefore, a new step, largely following the international trend towards tourism, and motivated by the opening-up policy.

49 Interview with Zhao Tianzuo, Shanghai Urban Planning Administrative Bureau, 1998
Historic monuments and streetscapes were increasingly regarded as tourist attractions in the world. In their research into the tourist-historic city, Ashworth and Tunbridge spelt out two major categories of interest in the built heritage: beauty and antiquity. People might like old buildings because they were beautiful, or because they were old (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1990:22). In other words, tourists came to visit heritage sites and heritage quarters to enjoy the architectural grace and to touch the past. For international tourists in Shanghai, apart from the beauty and antiquity of the built heritage, the ethnicity attached to the beauty and antiquity of historic sites might also be attractive to them. In other words, the particular culture, and the local lifestyles added uniqueness to the historic sites.

It seemed a common view that visual beauty was an important aspect in making heritage sites valuable. However, the aesthetic judgment made by different people at different times might differ greatly. Some people might find the traces of age and the natural decay of a building beautiful, whereas some would be delighted to see the full restoration and refurbishment of an old building. Ruins might be regarded as romantic in some cultures in the West, but unpleasant in some other cultures, for example in China. Also for some people, the beauty of a building, or a neighborhood, might be in its social and cultural indications. Lilong residences were beautiful in the eyes of many, because they were the physical representation of the local way of life and provided rich historic information. ‘Shanghai Long Tang (Shanghai Alleys)’, a 1997 publication about Lilong houses by two architectural academics from Tongji University, sought to review the links between the local settlement and culture of Shanghai. The authors recorded some classic examples of the Lilong houses and the everyday life of the local residents, hoping to raise understanding and appreciation of Shanghai culture. A Shanghai-based artist concentrated much of his work on local streetscapes, such as row houses and side lanes, as they were so beautiful in his eyes that he felt obligated to capture their images before they were flattened by bulldozers (Lu, 1998). In comparison, the norm of ‘what is beautiful’ taken by tourism organizers appeared to be based more on the contemporary trend of consumption. To incorporate the built heritage into cultural tourism, tourism organizers were keen to appeal to clients with glamorously polished products. Judging by what was done to the Bund, Yandang Road, Henshang Road and other designated tourist areas in
Shanghai, it appeared that historic quarters and sites were beautified mainly in order to attract tourists and to accommodate festivals and spectacles.

While a number of historic areas were beautified to attract tourists, more old areas were designated for tourism packaging under various themes during the late 1990s in Shanghai. Building and streets in those areas were expected to satisfy tourists' fascination with historic romance, as well as strengthen the notion that Shanghai was a historically meaningful city. As Shanghai had a relatively short history compared with other Chinese cities, the value of the historic sites could not be simply measured by age, but rather by the historical significance of the sites and the status of their occupants. The Bund, for example, was the built signature of a Far East metropolis. Number 76 Xinye Road was the evidence of the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. The cluster of residences of former literary figures in the Hongkou District, formerly part of the International Settlement, reflected the status of Shanghai as the hub of the New Culture movement in Chinese modern history.

Historic sites could make tourists feel that they were touching history, especially when the site was closely linked to a certain individual and the track of his life, or a particular event in history. This might explain the tendency to use residences of former Shanghai celebrities increasingly as tourism destinations. In the Luwan District alone, there were twenty-two addresses identified as memorial residences by the year 2000 (Wenhuibao Editorial 26 April 1999). Designation of memorial residences in the 1990s reflected the relaxation of the CCP's ideological control. During the Mao era, the opening of a memorial was almost always for the purpose of political propagandas. In Shanghai, the former residences of Sun Yat-sen, Zhou Enlai and Luxun (the leading left-wing writer in the 1930s) were designated as memorials and museums that were used as venues for ideological education. Because of the legacy of the Mao era, when communist ideology guided all cultural activities, few sites in Shanghai were opened to the public until the 1990s.

During the late 1990s, many more sites were designated and opened up as museums to attract tourists. If there happened to be a group of such sites in a neighborhood, then the neighborhood was likely to be labeled as a tourism zone with a particular theme. One example is the Sinan Road precinct in the former French Concession. In
the early years of the twentieth century such side streets as Sinan Road in the foreign enclave provided sanctuaries for both outlaws and revolutionaries. Here one can find the former residences of such important figures in Chinese history as Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, the first Prime Minister of the PRC and, just a few blocks away, a terrace house which once hosted the first Congress of the CCP. As these landmarks were related to early nationalist and communist movements, the precinct was listed as a ‘revolutionary heritage quarter’. In the Hongkou District, part of the former International Settlement, a number of row houses on the side streets used to be occupied by literary celebrities of the colonial Shanghai. These included writers, dramatists and journalists who were major advocates of the ‘New Culture’ after the May Fourth Movement, some of whom later formed the backbone of the ‘Leftwing Writers Association’, which had a great impact on the Chinese modern literature.

Apart from those officially opened, a number of residences were assessed by conservation experts as historically valuable, and were considered by local officials as of tourist potential. These included the former residences of celebrities at various stages in time, such as Madam Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek; and foreign sojourners such as Moller. Although the residences of the social elite began to be seen as tourist attractions, the utilization of them for tourist purposes posed new issues of concern in terms of the operation and management of historic sites (Wenhuibao Editorial 26 April 1999).

The late 1990s saw the issue of cultural identity attracting heated discourses around the world, accompanied by a growing interest in, and diverse views about, ethnic cultures. Exploration of ethnic and local cultures became phenomenal in a world that is embracing postmodernism, and an important reason for people to travel. From the perspective of the tourism industry, local culture was a significant resource attracting increasing attention from tourist operators, and was tapped to facilitate tourism. In a narrower sense, cultural tourism in Shanghai reflected a re-evaluation of Shanghai culture, with an emphasis on Shanghai’s status as an international metropolis in the early twentieth century. The close link between tourist activities and their physical settings then led to the boom of theme streets, displaying various aspects of the urban life of Shanghai (Jing 1998; Wenhuibao Editorial 26 April 1999). These precincts were all located in the old city proper. Among them were those famous ones, whose
‘themes’ were established almost a century before, such as the Bund and Nanjing Road; also there were streets that were not so famous before, and whose theme were created on the basis of their history and features by decision-makers and tourism developers, including Hengshan Road, Duo Lun Road, Xin Tian Di (located in a precinct composed of a number of side streets in Luwan District), and Fangbang Zhong Road (changed the name as ‘The Old Street of Shanghai’ after renovation).

With tourism being recognized as an important industry in Shanghai, strategies were adopted to develop urban activities and events to attract tourists, and heritage quarters increasingly became important settings for the cultural shows designed for various events. From the international perspective, urban events were increasingly linked to city profiles, life quality, and tourism (Law 1993). This international trend, which was considered a remarkable aspect of the postmodern era, could be perceived in all the great cities. A post-modern city was one that not only featured social polarization, finance capital, manufacturing decline and service sector expansion, but which was also an arena where spectacle and commodification were an increasingly important part of the urban economy. In Melbourne, for example, urban festivals such as the Grand Prix were on the government’s economic agenda for the new millennium (Johnson, Logan, and Long 1998). Beginning in the 1990s, this global trend of urban festivals was exerting considerable influence on cities in China, its economic significance being increasingly projected. To boost tourism in Shanghai, the SMG and the tourist authorities launched various urban festivals, the biggest event being the annual Shanghai Tourism Festival beginning in 1997, soon after the establishment of new municipal tourism authorities and the SMG put forward its new tourism strategy (Yao 1997b). Certainly the development of Shanghai’s urban events such as the tourism festival could be seen as a result of official initiatives, as major festivals, and cultural events were designed and promoted by municipal tourism and other authorities. However, in Shanghai, the festival boom could also be regarded as the revival of an early legacy of the city and the reflection of an aspect of ‘Shanghai culture’. In its history, Shanghai was known as a city of spectacles. It used to be a place of events, activities and shows. Horse racing, group weddings, fashion shows, beauty competitions and garden parties, transplanted from, or strongly influenced by Western cultures, became part of local life after adaptation and modification. Such
events were not mentioned in public during the Mao era but they were not necessarily forgotten (Wang 2001; Xue 1996; Yao 1933). When the time came for that past legacy to be retrieved, there was little difficulty in the public embracing urban events. The difference might be that in the old days, those events were not quite so tourist-motivated, and involved much less government input.

For tourism organizers in the 1990s' Shanghai, their enthusiasm for urban festivals was ignited largely by the newly emerging economic imperatives of the time. Urban spectacles in the old Shanghai came along with Western settlement, whose initial purpose was to make life in Shanghai closer to that of home for foreign sojourners. The revived enthusiasm for urban shows in the 1990s could also be seen as a conscientious embrace of the global trend of consumerism and lifestyle. Apart from tourism considerations, urban events in Shanghai, together with new physical monuments, all conveyed a message that Shanghai was again becoming a great city in the world.

New infrastructure was built to suit urban festivals and events. For example the World Convention Centre at Lujiazui was completed in 1999 to accommodate the Fortune Global Forum, held in Shanghai in that year. The structure was originally designed to be an entertainment complex, however soon after the news was broken that the Global Forum was to be held in Shanghai, the plan was altered and the structure became a convention centre, all under the direct intervention of the municipal government (Li and Peng 2002). Historic places were increasingly exploited by tourism festivals. During the Shanghai Tourism Festival 2000, apart from other items such as concerts, the dragon boat and decorated vehicle parade, a tour of historic places was for the first time listed as one of the 'special sightseeing events' (Xinhua News Agency 14 October 2000).

Heritage Conservation and Tourism: A Critique

At the end of the 1990s, there were nearly four hundred buildings and eleven neighborhoods designated as heritage sites or heritage quarters in Shanghai. Conservation issues seemed increasingly related to tourism, as heritage sites and
quarters were increasingly regarded as potential tourism assets. Their association with history and legends was used to facilitate cultural tourism. Heritage quarters, in particular, had great potential for tourism development because, as McKercher and du Cros (2002:113) observed, those precincts created a critical mass of products that facilitates easier use by the tourist. From the conservation point of view, the newly emerging enthusiasm of tourism operators for heritage sites and quarters might have a twofold consequence. On the one hand, again to quote McKercher and du Cros (ibid), strong consumer demand provides a powerful economic reason to protect and conserve heritage areas. It is the commercial tourist appeal of historic precinct in large cities that provides the needed economic argument to foster conservation of heritage places. In this sense, tourism provided economic justifications for heritage conservation, so that historic sites would have a better chance for survival; on the other hand, however, the economic imperative for tourism was such that historic materials tended to be customized to fit the particular needs of tourism. Mutual benefits between conservation and tourism seemed possible, but conflicts between conservation principles and market interests were also inevitable and, it was perceivable that market interests rolled over the principles of conservation. Therefore, while the tourism industry was likely to generate funds for the refurbishment of the heritage sites and quarters, it also posed threats to the heritage environment, through insensitive refurbishment, alteration or even rebuilding. Site visits to selected heritage quarters showed that revitalization of these quarters, while pursuing cosmetic beauty, in fact was jeopardising the historic truthfulness of those quarters.

The issue of the historic truthfulness of a heritage site is closely related to the issue of authenticity. In the opinion of Nobuo Ito, a Japanese scholar, who has long been involved in UNESCO and ICOMOS conservation activities, authenticity can be understood as ‘authority, reliability and genuineness’ (Ito 1995). The authenticity of a heritage site is an important factor in attracting its consumers. In promoting historic sites as tourism destinations, the Shanghai tourism industry tended to advertise particular places in such a language as ‘genuinely the 1930s’ and ‘the authentic townscape of the Old Shanghai’, which sounded like shoemakers advertising their shoes as ‘genuine leather’ in order to attract customers. The reality however often contradicted advertisement. Observers of the tourist scene in Asia and elsewhere had noted that the authentic, the different, the historical and the natural had become highly
problematic notions. At the simplest level, tourists could be presented with something quite new that was labeled ‘authentic’ or ‘historical’. Moreover, the commodification of culture could also have dire consequences for the people involved, ranging from the cheapening of tradition to the wholesale looting of material culture (Cunningham 1998b). While boasting the authenticity of heritage sites, tourist managers, more often than not, would have those sites altered in order to suit the commercial needs of the industry. Indeed, when heritage sites were increasingly linked to economic initiatives, and conservation projects were pushed by commercial motivations, the ‘inflation of the authentic’ (Petzet 1995:86) seemed inevitable, and was regarded by many as fully justifiable. It was here that conservation authorities found themselves constantly at odds with tourism managers and, as discussed in the previous chapter, heritage authorities could do little to stop projects they regarded as inappropriate. Since they argued for the minimum change to heritage places, they were some times ridiculed by tourism planners for treating heritage sites as ‘shrines’ (Song 2000).

Linking history on the one hand and current market on the other, heritage, in the development of tourism, is regarded as becoming more and more ‘demand-oriented’ (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1990:25). Due to its profit-chasing nature, tourism is in fact becoming another enemy to heritage sites, next to ‘destructive development’. When heritage is packaged for consumption in so-called cultural tourism, consumer demands become the major justification for the existence of heritage sites, and the conservation and interpretation of heritage sites are often conducted to fit the tourism market. Heritage quarters and sites, in tourism, are considered no more than attractions for sightseeing and fantasy.

Authenticity is always an issue in cultural tourism, and it has to be admitted that, because of its commercial nature and commodification procedure, cultural tourism seems to be doing more harm than good with regard to the authenticity of hosting cultures in the current world. Criteria for heritage authenticity has inevitably been disregarded in one way or another in order to suit the development of tourism. It is especially the case when we take into account the different interpretations and criteria of authenticity by tourists and conservation professionals, as well as in different cultural and natural settings. McKercher and du Cros (2002: 76) maintained that the tourist may want an authentic experience but may not want to be confronted by
reality. Most often people experiencing a heritage attraction for the first time are assailed with its ‘feeling value’ or apparent authenticity. This is particularly so when tourists know little about the site or the hosting culture. This explains why some projects that transform historic precincts into new urban entertaining destinations (UED) in Shanghai turned out to be successful stories in commercial terms despite their distortion of historic information.

As tourism managers claim the authenticity in those projects, there should be a fundamental respect for heritage sites in terms of the historic and cultural information they have in store. In other words, while renovations and alterations are unavoidable, the truthfulness of heritage sites is not to be ignored and trampled. A tourist product with false historic messages is not only historically meaningless, but also misleading. Therefore it should not be presented to tourists as ‘cultural heritage’. While flexibility about authenticity criteria is necessary in the conservation and presentation of heritage sites, a framework to identify the extent of such flexibility is also needed, which again should be based on respect for heritage sites instead of commercial interests.

Urban renewal in Shanghai in the 1990s projected the necessity for the identification of the extent of ‘flexibility’ in refurbishing heritage quarters, which was yet to be achieved. Refurbishment projects showed that the treatment of heritage quarters was likely to be conducted with little supervision from municipal planning and heritage authorities, and was aimed to generate spectacular effects to raise the commercial (including tourism) profile of those areas.

One such example was ‘The Old Street of Shanghai’, a result of the annexation and redevelopment of the former Fang Bang Zhong Road, which no longer existed. ‘The Old Street of Shanghai’ project involved the comprehensive redevelopment and rebuilding of the precinct, featuring modern replicas of historic buildings and streetscapes. As part of the re-enactment of life in the Old City, shops were furbished with old style furniture and fittings, costumed demonstration such as manual spinning and weaving was introduced in order to enhance the tourists’ experience of history and local culture. Shop buildings along the street were, according to the District
leader, copies of building styles in Ming and Qing Dynasties\textsuperscript{50} (Pan 1999a). It was reported that redevelopment was designed to capture the very essence of the local culture (Pan 1999a).

However, as most of original buildings were demolished in the late 1990s, little traces could be seen of the evolution of the Old City over its seven-hundred-year history. Besides, the conformity of the building style in the precinct of the Old Street of Shanghai virtually wiped out the concept of cultural hybrid, which was the very essence of the 'Shanghai culture'. Although separate from the Western settlement during the colonial days, the Old City was not immune to the influence of Western ideas of urban planning, civil engineering, architecture and building. The physical evidence was the concentration of the earliest terrace houses in

\textbf{Figure 31: Fang Bang Road in the early twentieth century}
(Source: Streets at the Old City: Tourism Postcards, Shanghai Shu Hua Press, 2001)

\textbf{Figure 32: The Old Street of Shanghai}

\textsuperscript{50} This refers to a period of time in the Chinese history from 1368 A.D to 1911 A.D.
the Old City area, which became a significant layer of the local history. Nevertheless, those early terrace houses were exceptionally overcrowded. Although the Old City precinct was regarded as a key tourism destination, those old dwellings were considered unpresentable to tourists (Sun 1999).

In order to improve living standards and to beautify the area, most of the old residences were demolished to make way for commercial developments. As a result, the mixed use of the area by residents and shops was rapidly phased out, leaving the area for commercial and hospitality functions (Figure 31-32). Since little of the original built form survived the renewal, and the particular social fabric at the Old City no longer existed, what appeared to tourists was virtually a new town, and the truthfulness of the Old City as a heritage quarter became problematic.

Nonetheless, the refurbished Old City was successful in attracting tourists, both domestic and abroad, and the precinct became a popular site for spectacles and events. The local government therefore felt justified in claiming success for the redevelopment project, and the building of The Old Street of Shanghai seemed to be a model project for government planners to follow in revitalizing other old blocks for tourism (Sun 1999).

The Old Street of Shanghai project showed that, in the process of refurbishment, historic authenticity was rarely queried. Similar things happened to refurbishment projects in Yandang Road and Hengshan Road, which were discussed in Chapter Five and Six. Historic places were becoming important elements in tourism infrastructure, but in developing such infrastructure, historic authenticity was often subject to alteration in line with commercial needs, and in line with the contemporary consumption trend as well as the judgment of the tourism market.

Along with the campaign of internationalization, the so-called Euro-romance became an urban vogue in Shanghai in the 1990s. Shanghai’s past glamour was retrieved and new glory was promoted to serve cultural tourism. Former concession areas such as the French Concession in particular became ideal stages for such urban shows. Boulevards and garden houses were beautified to attract the visitors’ interest, while roadside cafes, karaoke bars and bowling lounges were taken as the backbone.
infrastructure to create cash return, since Euro-romance, after all, was expected to be converted into commodities.

In creating live spectacles for tourism, historic quarters were often used as the built setting just to produce a particular atmosphere and effect. Sometimes, little relationship could be found between the spectacles and their built settings. Duolun Road (Figure 33) was dressed up in its 1930's look for the tourism festival of 2000, and the opening night at Duolun Road featured decorated vehicles parade. Not surprisingly, the show reportedly attracted some twenty thousand spectators (Wenhui Bao Editorial 25 October 2000), but it was indeed irrelevant to the nature of the street, which was known because a group of literary elites once lived there in the 1930s.

![image](image1.jpg)

**Figure 33:** Newly renovated Duolun Road in 2001 (Duolun Road is located in Hongkou where some Cultural celebrities used to live in the 1930s. After renovation the street began to be referred to as 'Duolun Road the Cultural Street').

![image](image2.jpg)

**Figure 34:** Xin Tian Di Recreation Complex

Next to the site of the first CCP congress, a newly built commercial complex – Xin Tian Di - has become a new tourism attraction. The renovation of the neighbourhood consequently evacuated and gutted all residential buildings, then altered them into leisure places. In the redevelopment, the built form of the Lilong (Shikumen) house was retained and used as a token of the local culture, as well as various decorative elements representing the Old Shanghai. The difference between the
complex and the real *Lilong* is that the complex is nothing but a commercial place (Figures 34-5). It is a new UED, a place designed for leisure and nightlife, occupied by bars, bistros and nightclubs, but having nothing to do with the everyday life of the Shanghai locals it once accommodated. Before its transformation, the neighbourhood was one of the most typical *Lilong* blocks in Shanghai. Ron Gluckman, an American journalist based in Beijing, published his article about Xin Tian Di on his personal website. In the article, Gluckman quoted Benjamin Wood, an American architect who oversaw the US$ 170 million renewal project: ‘I saw the magic of the place. It was amazing. There was laundry hanging everywhere, all these people, parents and kids, flying kites, the whole litany of human experience’ (Gluckman 2003). This is all gone. The neighbourhood today is an exclusive place with a concentration of fashion, boutique and entertaining business, ‘ranging from a Vidal Sassoon to the requisite Starbucks . . . plus nightclubs like Star East, a sort of Planet Hong Kong theme club launched by Jacky Chan and other Cantonese stars (ibid).

Ironically, as Gluckman remarked in the same article, this historic neighbourhood’s rebirth as a ‘hotspot of bourgeoisie splendor’ owes a debt to Chairman Mao. At the heart of the block is the site of the first CCP congress, and visitors can walk into a nightclub at a convenient distance after their pilgrimage to the CCP site. In this sense, the main business of Xin Tian Di poses an amazing paradox to the key monument of the block and all the ideology that the CCP site attempts to convey: revolution, class struggle, and anti-capitalism, but nobody seems bothered. In this sense, the block might well be a practical example of the CCP’s new doctrine in the end of the twentieth century, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’!\[Figure 35: A poster board at Tian Di reads ‘The past the future meet at present’.\]
By restoring the old Lilong blocks and turning them into entertainment venues, Vincent Lo, the developer of Xin Tian Di, was proud that he had given Shanghai a first class UED (CCTV 2002). The reinvigorated Xin Tian Di area was not only applauded by district and municipal officials, but also regarded as a new benchmark for style that is fast being replicated around China. The success of the project meant that it has been taken as a model for historical redevelopment not just in China, but across Asia (ibid).

Projects discussed above, no matter how commercially successful they are, all seem to have dismissed, or distorted the historic and cultural information of the sites involved. In promoting those sites as tourism destinations, tourism developers tended to explore legends and exercise imaginations in site interpretation, rather than conduct serious studies on historic and cultural truth (Bi 2000; Fang 2002; Hu 1999). This resulted in the drastic alteration and even the rebuilding of historic sites. Buildings in some of the theme parks of Shanghai reflected this tendency. The Sheshan area, located at the distant suburb, was renowned for a number of historic sites, particularly the oldest observatory of China dating back to 1898, as well as the Sheshan Cathedral built in 1925, said to be the largest cathedral in the Far East at the time. Thanks to the combination of cultural landscape and pastoral scenery, Sheshan was appointed as a national tourist resort, but the supporting facilities seemed quite irrelevant to the characteristic of the resort. They were based on the tourist organizers’ imagination of so called Western culture, which included a group of modern style holiday villas and an entertainment complex named ‘Europa World Paradise’ (Figure 36). The latter

Figure 36: A promotional photo for Europa Paradise
(Source: Wenhuibao 19 April 1998)
features miniature landscapes of European homes, magic castles and a water maze. To boost the ‘European atmosphere’, tourist managers even organized activities such as a bullfight, which might have been regarded as typically ‘European’ (Figure 37).

Domination by the economic potential of historic sites resulted in biased treatment of those sites. Here The Dong Jia Du Church and the Orthodox Church posed a contrast. Both churches were rare architectural examples in Shanghai. The former was renovated in 1995 and the church and its environs were regarded as one of the tourism highlights by the District Government (Figure 38). The renovation project, designed by Tongji University, Hong Kong University and Princeton University, attempted to re-inscribe the first catholic cathedral in China into the current global, economic and political conditions of Shanghai as well as the local urban fabric and culture (Gandelsonas 2002). By contrast, the Orthodox Church at Changle Road was poorly treated. Despite being a rare example of its kind in Shanghai, it was not as favorably located as the Dongjiadu Church, which stood on Shanghai’s golden belt. After being transferred to the hands of new users, the Orthodox Church was shared by a security firm and a restaurant, and lost most of its original internals through its renovation, as revealed in Chapter Five. Such an insensitive alteration and transformation of use of a heritage site, although much criticised, failed to attract any intervention from either planning or heritage authorities.
Biased treatment of historic sites could happen not only to individual structures, but also to heritage quarters. While the Bund and a few streets in the former concessions and the Old City were heavily renovated—some in fact were over-renovated. Many other areas were either neglected, such as the former Nationalist municipal centre, for example, built under the Greater Shanghai Plan; or opened to the construction of modern office and hospitality facilities such as the designated quarter of Hongqiao. The latter, next to the Hongqiao Economic Development zone, was one of the prime blocks in the real estate market. It was the District’s strategy to turn this area into a sub-centre of trade and business, which seemed more economically promising (Zhang 1998b). Over less than ten years, the low scale skyline of the area, featuring country style villas, underwent great changes, despite the survival of a few designated buildings. With clusters of modern highrise buildings erected in the area, the heritage quarter virtually became a modern business zone.

Over emphasis by the tourism industry on the economic potential of heritage sites caused concern to the heritage and planning officials, who maintained that the significance of heritage sites should not be judged solely in economic terms, and that tourism should not dominate heritage conservation.\(^51\) What happened however, was that once a historic site was recognized as a tourist attraction, it was likely to be renovated just to catch the tourists’ eyes, with little sympathy for its historic significance. A block might be designated as a heritage quarter, but renovation would be concentrated on certain monuments, while the overall environs would often be ignored and swamped by new structures of incompatible style and scale. Furthermore, once designated as a tourism destination, the whole block would rapidly become exclusively commercial, regardless of what had been there before. Consequently the historic context became blurred and destroyed and individual monuments became isolated objects cut off from their original fabric. This kind of tourism development would then jeopardize the industry itself. Hongkou District, formerly part of the International Settlement, used to feature colonial-style residences. Compared with high-grade garden residences in the city west, the residences in this area were moderate in both their exteriors and interiors. Urban redevelopment and beautification changed the townscape of the area. Whereas registered buildings survived demolition

---

\(^51\) Interview with Zhao Wanliang, SUPAB, June, 1998.
and whereas some of them were converted into memorials, their environs were altered to meet commercial needs. Due to the loss of authentic physical settings and poor interpretations, those places were unable to satisfy tourists’ curiosity about the past due to the lack of continuing information (Wenhuibao Editorial 26 April 1999). A tour bus route was initially opened in 1998 to transport tourists between downtown and this block named the ‘Street of Culture’ but, after a short period of prosperity this particular tour declined, and experts pointed out that the lack of an appropriate historic environment was to blame (ibid).

Although tourism was regarded as a vital justification for heritage conservation, it was itself a double-edged sword. In a society where economic development was the overwhelming priority, tourism was largely planned and organized to pursue economic benefits. In this context, heritage tourism was often trapped in a difficult situation. Firstly, there was often a complicated procedure to put a heritage site onto the tourism market. Heritage sites included in the cultural tourism package were required to be physically presentable. In the case of Shanghai, the reality was that a large number of designated sites were overcrowded, occupied by many more users than they were originally designed for. To include these sites in tourism packages would involve such issues as ownership transfer, restoration and property management, all of which would require coordination between various administrative authorities such as tourism, planning and heritage conservation, while an efficient coordinating system was yet to establish. Secondly, compared with the quick money likely to be brought in by land lease and highrise development, the economic benefit from heritage tourism tended to take a longer time to be seen, and heritage tourism often involved more complicated planning procedures, and sometimes also a bigger investment. For developers and decision-makers who were anxious to see quick change and quick money, the benefit derived from heritage sites through a tourism turnover often appeared too slow to be worth the wait. In a word, in ‘cultural tourism’, historic and cultural values of heritage sites were often dominated by economic needs, because heritage objects tended to be used in a demand-oriented context. Without genuine sympathy and respect for heritage conservation, so-called cultural tourism, or heritage tourism, can do more harm than good to heritage sites, as can tourism operators and authorities, who have both money and mandate.
CHAPTER EIGHT: HERITAGE CONSERVATION IN
SHANGHAI – A PICTURE IN GLOBAL SETTING

This thesis has attempted to discuss Shanghai’s urban heritage and the current situation of heritage conservation, in the light of China’s economic reform and the open-door policy. While looking back to Shanghai’s early days and its semi-colonial history, the thesis has focused on the last two decades of the twentieth century, particularly the 1990s, when Shanghai experienced the greatest ever transformation. It is apparent that since China’s economic reform, transnational urban modernization has been rapidly pushed ahead by economic imperatives, demands for a better quality of life and the requirement for upgraded infrastructure. As one of China’s key economic leaders, and one of the major beneficiaries of the economic reform, Shanghai can be seen as an example of a city strongly impacted upon by economic globalization in spatial terms.

Around the world, many cities have had a similar experience with the historic environment coming under threat from the process of urban modernization. This is in spite of the fact that paths to economic growth have tended to vary in different countries – some countries experiencing an industrial revolution, while many others experienced a colonial period and independence before economic takeoff. Despite the lessons drawn by many about the loss of place and identity, the destruction of the historic environment still continued in cities of both West and East. Although awareness of the value of cultural heritage is on the rise, conservation issues are still overshadowed by development demands. In many cases, conservation is regarded as contradictory to economic interests.

In many ways, the transformation process of contemporary Shanghai resembles that of many other cities in the world, especially cities in Asian countries that experienced economic takeoff in the late twentieth century. However, the transformation that Shanghai has experienced is unique, as it is largely attributable to Shanghai’s traditional status as a world city and an international trade harbor, and aims to demonstrate the Chinese government’s economic achievements under the open-door
policy. In this respect, urban development in Shanghai has strong Chinese characteristics.

Colonial Sentiment and Nationalism in Urban Renewal and Conservation

Shanghai’s semi-colonial history has been outlined in Chapter Two. Once a semi-colonial city, Shanghai was a treaty port opened for trade and settlement by industrialized Western powers, to serve the needs of an expanding export market for surplus goods. For this reason, Shanghai, like some other treaty port cities in Asia (such as Nagasaki), prospered initially from trade rather than industry. The built landscape of Shanghai therefore reflected this bias of trade, with the most prestigious monuments being administrative and business offices, entertainment facilities and residences of entrepreneurs and the commercial elite.

However the Shanghai experience was also unique. Unlike other Asian cities colonized by the West, Shanghai was never fully controlled by any particular foreign power. It was a widely accepted view that the juxtaposition of Western and Chinese cultures in Shanghai led to the so-called ‘Shanghai culture’, the defining characteristic of Shanghai. The townscape of Shanghai therefore was the built reflection of the cultural diversity of this city. The uniqueness of the built heritage of Shanghai was not only found in individual structures, but also in its urban settings as a whole, which included both monumental and vernacular architectural works and the built fabric with its historic and local characteristics.

The colonial legacy has always been a sensitive topic for Shanghai. In the decades after 1949 the colonial past in Shanghai was used to illustrate the national humiliation in patriotic education, or sometimes treated with deliberate amnesia. As discussed in previous chapters, under the ideology of the Mao era there was a psychological contradiction among Shanghai residents about the city’s past and, consequently, attitudes towards the Shanghai culture, including the built landscape were ambivalent. The landscape of Shanghai was seen as a physical manifestation of the city’s economic superiority, but also a reminder of the colonial past. Designation of Shanghai as a historic cultural city in 1986 marked the official recognition of Shanghai’s Western townscape as part of China’s cultural heritage, and coincided
with the nation-wide research on semi-colonial cities initiated by the China Academy of Social Science. In 1991 Deng Xiaoping openly urged the restoration of Shanghai’s former status as an international centre for finance and trade and the following years saw changes in attitudes towards Shanghai’s Western legacy. More positive views about foreign settlement in Shanghai could be found in both media and literature. Although the motivation behind foreign settlement was still condemned as imperialist invasion and exploitation, it was largely accepted that foreign settlement in Shanghai, regardless of the original motivation, contributed to the introduction of advanced ideas and technology into China and, ultimately, to the process of modernization.

It needs to be noted, however, that this modified opinion of the Western legacy in Shanghai did not aim at an ideological reconciliation with the colonialism in the past. Instead, it aimed to serve the new agenda of economic progress, which was driven by strong nationalistic emotions. While foreign settlement was accepted as one of the contributing factors to the growth of Shanghai, the research by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences attributed Shanghai’s prosperity to internal factors such as the weaker influence of Chinese cultural tradition in Shanghai, the geographic and economic links between Shanghai and its hinterland and the openness, as well as the adaptability of Shanghai citizens towards imported cultures (Zhang 1990).

The official rhetoric that the modern history of Shanghai was created by the Shanghainese themselves has been embraced by Shanghai citizens, who remained ambivalent about Old Shanghai under Mao’s ideology. As discussed in chapters two and three, they appreciated, more than people elsewhere, the uniqueness of Shanghai and its urban culture, but would not claim that they themselves were part of that culture because it was closely associated with such terms as ‘imperialism’, ‘colonialism’ and ‘capitalism’. With Shanghai’s townscape being recognized as part of China’s cultural heritage (and the Bund as national heritage), Shanghai’s past prosperity being to the credit of Chinese people, Shanghai residents now are able to proudly claim the Old Shanghai legacy as their own heritage. I tend to regard this modification of rhetoric as a reflection of a new nationalism arising out of China’s economic growth. Taking this into account, it can be argued that both the destruction and the conservation of the built heritage in Shanghai during the reform era have demonstrated a new patriotic enthusiasm rather than anti-colonial sentiment. Old
buildings and streets have been razed not because they stand for the colonial past, but because people want them to make way for future modernization. In fact, at the height of urban renewal, the environs of the Chinese Old City experienced an even greater transformation than in the former concessions as urban renewal projects have erased most of the traditional old structures in that area.

Obviously, by designating historic quarters and formulating the Historic Cultural City Conservation Plan, Shanghai became a leading city in China in developing the notion of conservation of the urban environment. Shanghai’s initiative in urban conservation coincided with its ambition to become China’s cultural capital. From the economic point of view, conservation efforts are serving the agenda of economic development. Some old buildings and streets are registered for protection mainly to raise Shanghai’s profile as a modern cosmopolitan city of historic significance. While there is no intention of reconciling the colonial past, there is a perceivable trend towards filtering the memory so that Shanghai’s past can be referred to in shaping Shanghai’s present and future. In this sense, built monuments have been used to embody the Shanghai legend and to boost new industries such as tourism.

**Urban Transformation in Shanghai: Impacts of Economic Globalization**

The 1990s witnessed a comprehensive urban transformation of Shanghai. Chapter Four discussed the major dynamics for Shanghai’s urban transformation and redevelopment. This, as revealed in Chapter Four, owed a great debt to international investment. In this sense, the urban transformation of Shanghai shared the experiences of cities in the West. John R. Logan commented that, like Western market societies, China’s urban development depended upon the country’s global connections (Logan 2002a).

In the 1990s, economic globalization became a remarkable driving force for urban transformation in China. Since then, the open-door policy has exposed the Chinese market to the world, and transformed the Chinese economy into one that relies less on central planning and more on market mechanisms. With the internationalization of the Chinese market, major cities in China – particularly coastal cities such as Beijing,
Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Fuzhou - are undergoing a functional transformation from manufacturing centres to financial and trade hubs. This functional transformation is in turn bringing about a physical transformation in these cities. It is worth noting, however, that the transformation of Shanghai has strong Chinese characteristics. As Zhengji Fu (2002) observed, the transformation of Shanghai did not duplicate the urban restructuring of capitalist countries, which results from the natural evolution of capitalist economic development; nor did it adopt the ‘shock therapy’ of the East European countries, which brought about a drastic change from the planned economy to a capitalist system. It has been a more gradual process, monitored by the Central Government. The process reflected the economic liberalization, as well as the government’s will and ambition.

With China emerging as an important world economic power, Shanghai has become the focus of great expectations from the state. The senior authorities in the Central Government have never forgotten Shanghai’s status as an international financial hub during the early decades of the twentieth century. In this sense the rationale for redeveloping Shanghai was largely based on Shanghai’s past legacy. However, what happened in Shanghai during the 1990s went far beyond restoring the city to its former position: it in fact aimed at a higher goal of building Shanghai into a world city in the new millennium. The brand new Pudong New Area was intended to show that modern Shanghai had outgrown its old self. Shanghai in the semi-colonial days was foreigner-dominated, and during the Mao era it was closed to the world. Today Shanghai attempts to become a new cosmopolitan city, and the driving power for its development comes from inside the country, and from Shanghai citizens.

Economic growth has created enormous pressure for urbanization, as well as for the redevelopment of inner city areas. Such a pressure was experienced by industrial cities in the West first and then by cities in developing countries. Cities in Britain, for example, witnessed the ruthless demolition of old areas under the pressure of industrialization and economic growth. In such cities as Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Leeds the demolition and redevelopment of the inner cities was once seen as the forerunner of a better life (Powell 1981). In Australia, the mining boom as well as international capital investment in the 1960s and 70s resulted in modern skyscrapers replacing old buildings and so dominating the skyline (Marsden 2000). In
Japan, the history of Tokyo, for example, has been seen as one of cycles of meteoric expansion and radical restructuring, with the city’s landscape being transformed alongside Japan’s manufacturing boom in the postwar years, as well as with the development of the new technology and concentration of corporate headquarters in later decades of the twentieth century (Douglass 1993; Hill and Fujita 1993). During the late twentieth century, pressure for urbanization, coming from both economic imperatives and demands for a rise in living standards, was experienced by developing countries in Asia and such pressure was strongly perceivable through urban development in some metropolitan cities such as Manila, Phenon Penh, Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, as well as Shanghai (Askew and Logan 1994a; Logan 2002c). In China, the introduction of international capital, as one of the key dimensions of the economic reform, generated a strong urbanization process and accelerated the pace of development. The pressure for the development of Shanghai was also caused by heated competition: on the one hand, Shanghai aimed to overtake other major centres in China in the course of its modernization, while on the other hand, Shanghai was competing with great cities around the world. It was this pressure, combined with a strong ambition that drove Shanghai’s urban development in the 1990s.

A landmark step taken by the Central Government in the course of urban modernization was the reform in land use rights, which opened up the land market to both domestic and overseas investors, and impacted strongly upon the process of urbanization and the redevelopment of the inner city. During the reform era, governments at various levels urged construction of urban infrastructure to accommodate investors’ needs such as office space and, at the same time, encouraged investors to be involved in urban renewal by investing in development projects. In the words of some officials, government strategies changed from ‘building the nest to attract the birds’ to ‘attracting the birds to build the nest’ (Kremzner 1998).

Commodification of land use rights was implemented in order to channel international capital into urban development and urban renewal projects, with the hope of boosting the local economy. In Shanghai, the commodification of land use rights was conducted in the form of land lease, which reached its height in the mid-1990s. Land lease in Shanghai contributed to the drastic transformation of the urban landscape and involved not only the private sector but local government agencies as well. It generated enormous construction funds on the one hand, and caused uncoordinated
construction on the other. Whereas the Central Government initiated and endorsed land use reform in cities through national laws, it lost the control over urban land use that it had in the pre-reform era. Instead, it had to contend with challenges posed by local authorities and commercial interests (ibid).

With a market economy prevailing in China, the ideological factor is no longer as strong as it was in the Mao era, and is giving way to commercial imperatives. In the course of transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the growth of market, along with the competition for market shares between stakeholders, is accompanied by the erosion of the authority of the Central Government. Economic reform, while leading to economic (and administrative) decentralization, has given governments at lower levels much greater power over the local and regional economy. During the economic transition, government agencies found their roles more complex than before, and they often found themselves not only monitors but also stakeholders in certain development schemes and projects. Despite a government presence in the process of urban development, which resembles the situation in some other Asian cities such as Taipei and Singapore, the state control over land use in Shanghai was considerably reduced. When development became a top priority, and state laws and policies were formulated to facilitate development, urban renewal projects advanced in an irresistible manner and were often pushed forward at the cost of the city’s cultural and historic environment.

**Urban Conservation: Another Step towards Modernization**

Urban modernization in Shanghai during the 1990s was accompanied by the rapid disappearance of the historic environment and the domination of highrise development, which in turn caused concerns over the city’s cultural identity and its built heritage. The impact of urban redevelopment on Shanghai’s cultural townscape has been revealed in Chapter Five. Paradoxically the 1990s saw not only the most astonishing urban development in Shanghai, but also the establishment of a systematic conservation mechanism. The first municipal legislation concerning the conservation of historic sites was formulated when land lease and urban redevelopment were unleashed. Whilst the full-scale urban renewal in Shanghai was apparently pushed
ahead by the trend towards global economy, it could also be argued that the conservation initiatives were raised in a broad context of global culture, and influenced by the international conservation movement.

The preservation of cultural heritage can be motivated by various factors including the pursuit for national pride and unity, as well as the growing awareness of its commercial potential. In the context of globalization, the preservation of cultural heritage and cultural memory is regarded as a response at the national or regional level to cultural domination by powerful nations, and it is therefore part of cultural competition and negotiation in a global setting (Crane 2002). From a nation-state perspective, the preservation of cultural heritage has been incorporated into the process of an international power struggle. Heritage conservation, when taken as an element of the nation’s economic and cultural agenda, goes beyond scientific, technical and artistic concerns, and becomes politically and economically meaningful. The attachment of ideological and economic significance to cultural heritage can be found in both developed and developing societies. In Singapore, for instance, heritage landscapes have been considered as a stabilizing element unifying the society, and the conservation of heritage landscapes is seen as an important approach in helping Singaporeans in their current search for a national identity (Eng 1994). Moreover, preservation of the urban heritage is in fact conducted in order to re-imagine history and re-image the city-state of Singapore, hereby projecting its profile as the core of the so-called ‘New Asian Renaissance’ (Kwok and Low 2002). In Australia, the conservation of Aboriginal heritage is an important step towards reconciliation. Sometimes, however “heritage conservation” seems not only to involve the preservation of historic traces, but also leads to their erasure. Historic sites can be demolished to filter the memory of the past, and to re-image the nation. For example in South Korea, the former Japanese Government-General building in Seoul was torn down, not because it was physically dysfunctional, but because it reminded people of the previous Japanese dominance of the country (AsiaWeek 2000; Rii 1997).

Conservation initiatives in Shanghai in the 1990s were inseparable from the state’s political and economic agenda at the time. Conservation initiatives aimed to add weight to Shanghai’s claim to be an economic powerhouse of world class. With China’s fast economic growth in the 1980s and the 1990s, and its rising international
profile, cultural issues began to be stressed by state authorities as an important component of modernization. It was argued by Wen Jiabao, deputy Prime Minister at the time, that historic continuity is an indispensable part of urban modernity and a reflection of civilization, and that China should follow the example of some of the great cities of the world and “integrate historic heritage with urban modernization” (Wen 2001). In this sense, conservation of built heritage in contemporary China should be viewed in the context of the economic takeoff during the reform era. Heritage conservation was motivated more by the aspiration for modernization, than by an attachment to the past and aesthetic consideration. This indeed posed a contrast to the early conservation movement in the West, which was regarded as partially reflecting resentment towards and uneasiness about the rapid change of society, and as a counter-balance to feelings of rootlessness (Hareven and Langenbach 1981).

In Shanghai conservation of the built heritage served the official goal of raising Shanghai’s profile as a great international metropolis and an economic centre of world class. Protection of the built environment and maintenance of historic continuity began to be referred to as benchmarks for a great city. As economic development achieved remarkable progress, considerable attention was paid to promoting the cultural identity of the city. Shanghai was and is still competing with Beijing for cultural status. In the 1930s Shanghai was considered the cultural capital of China, but after 1949 Shanghai lost this reputation to Beijing, as the latter claimed the best artists and cultural infrastructure in the country. In the 1990s, Shanghai began to build its new cultural infrastructure, including monumental buildings such as the Shanghai Library, the Shanghai Museum and the Grand Theatre of Shanghai. It was stated by Xu Kuangdi, mayor of Shanghai between 1995 and 2001, that Shanghai wanted not only to improve the economy, but the cultural environment as well. According to Xu, Shanghai did not want to become an economically great city, but a cultural desert. Therefore raising Shanghai’s cultural level was even more important (Yatsko 2001:141).

The significance of Shanghai’s designation as one of the historic cultural cities was the official recognition to the city’s cultural importance. The historic landscape of Shanghai, epitomized by the built form of the Bund, demonstrates the past glory of the city that serves as a basis for the economic takeoff in the new era. If comparing
the amended *Shanghai Municipal Comprehensive Plan* (*Shanghai Construction Editorial Board 1996*) with its 1986 version, one can find that in the late 1990s, conservation of historic buildings and quarters was regarded as an integral part of the task of building Shanghai into an international metropolis, as the cultural environment was recognized as an important aspect of urban modernization (*Zhao 1996*).

Moreover, conservation of the built heritage increasingly became justified by economic imperatives such as revenues from tourism, especially as Shanghai was shifting its economic focus from manufacturing to services.

Although the conservation of built monuments and the environment could be traced back for centuries, the world-wide, organized, systematic attempt to preserve the past built environment is widely recognized as a recent phenomenon (*Davison 1991; Jokilehto 1998; Lowenthal 1996; Musitelli 2002*). Since the drawing up of the Athens Charter at the International Congress of Modern Architecture City Planning in 1932, conservation of the built environment has evolved into an international movement, attracting increasing sympathies and participation from societies of different cultural and historic backgrounds. It also gradually came to involve a wide range of disciplines from architecture, history, geography to anthropology, sociology, and many others. In recent decades, the international conservation movement itself has become part of the process of cultural globalization. UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre, The Convention Concerning the Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Heritage Convention) adopted in 1972, and the inscription of World Heritage sites, all together have made heritage conservation a global industry. International standards for conservation practice and assessment have been largely based on Western heritage philosophy and principles. As an aspect of cultural globalization, which comes hand-in-hand with economic globalization, economic powers are leading the trend in heritage conservation and asserting influence on heritage industries in non-Western cultures, despite voices calling for cultural diversity.

China’s development of modern concepts and practice in heritage conservation began in the 1930s. It can be argued that from the very beginning, conservation in China was influenced by a Western way of practice. The initial research on Chinese architectural monuments was led by Liang Sicheng and Lin Huiyin, both educated in the United
States. The following generation of architectural historians, who were actively involved in research on architectural monuments in the 1950s, were also exposed to Western (mainly American) education. In the early 1980s, when China adopted the open-door policy, a nation-wide conservation effort was resumed and integrated international trends of practice. In 1981, shortly after China opened up to the world, a delegation of architectural and planning professionals as well as officials was sent to Germany by the Central Government to learn about current conservation practices including the registration system for historic sites and historic towns. One of the delegates, Professor Dong Jianhong from Shanghai’s Tongji University, in his later publication on conservation, recalled this visit as an important learning experience about historic cultural cities. Furthermore, according to Dong, the visit also partially contributed to the designation and proclamation of the first twenty-four historic cultural cities in China by the State Council (Dong and Ruan 1993:1). International charters were widely referred to in establishing China’s conservation law and guidelines. The influence of the Venice Charter is perceivable in the national heritage law and, according to Wang Jinghui, director of the Planning Department, the State Ministry of Construction (Wang 1998b), the designation of historic cultural cities was conducted in light of the concept of ‘historic monument’ defined by the Venice Charter (Article 1), the concept ‘embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural settings’ (International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments 1964).

Since the 1980s international involvement in China’s conservation effort has been increasing. In 1985 China became a signatory of the World Heritage Convention and in 1987 the first six Chinese sites were inscribed as world heritage sites. One of the landmark joint ventures in this area was the formulation of the Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China (hereinafter referred to as ‘the China Principles’), by the State Administration for Cultural Heritage (SACH) of China, the Getty Conservation Institute (GCI) of the United States and the Australia Heritage Commission (AHC). Completed and ratified by SACH and issued by the China ICOMOS in 2000, the Principles aim to become the national code of practice for professional cultural heritage managers and specialists (Sullivan 2001; The Getty Conservation Institute 2000). The fact that China is following international trends in conservation has both cultural and political significance. Internationally, it can be
regarded as the reflection of China’s desire to demonstrate ‘good citizenship’ to the world (Sullivan 2001); from a Chinese point of view, it is the embodiment of the Chinese Government’s opening-up policy. Furthermore, the inscription of Chinese sites into UNESCO’s World Heritage list has been seen not only as the growing recognition, by the modern world, of China as a great civilization, but as the demonstration of China’s integration into the global culture (Wang, Ruan, and Wang 1999)

Interactions between Economic Growth and Conservation

Conservation initiatives often face confrontation from development interests. Kuah Khun Eng pointed out that the desire to preserve is often perceived as being at odds with the objectives of development and rapid modernization and, in developing countries, it is often economic rationalism that wins the day (Eng 1994). In the process of China’s economic development, the demand for raising living standards has always posed an overwhelming pressure on decision-makers and has been regarded as the top priority. In Shanghai, upgrading the dated infrastructure and the elimination of shanty areas were among the many promises made to Shanghai citizens by the municipal government in the late 1990s, and the municipal leaders were proud to announce the progress that had been achieved (Huang 1997c). Municipal and district decision-makers were preoccupied with such daunting tasks. In a sense, such rhetoric as “flattening all for a new start” sounded appealing to many, not only because it demonstrated the decision-makers resolution about modernization, but also because it provided Shanghai citizens with the hope for a quick improvement in living conditions. From the financial point of view, inner city renewal appeared to be the quick way to generate development funds (Zheng 1994), whereas the view was held by many decision makers that urban conservation was an expensive effort that would impose unwanted restrictions on the modernization of urban areas (Zhou 2002).

Although the concept of heritage conservation has been accepted by decision-makers in principle, and state funding has been increasing since the 1980s, effective conservation of heritage sites remains a tough task for professionals and managers due to the pressure for development and prejudice against conservation from decision
makers. Opinions remain divided among stakeholders. While some officials stand for conservation and argue that the destruction of the historic environment will virtually deprive younger generations of their cultural heritage, others contend that conservation would deprive young generations of space for future development (Wang and Feng 2000). In opposition to the notion of sustainable development is the notion of 'sustainable conservation', which means conservation should be conducted in such a way that would allow development to go ahead (Tong 2002). Urban modernization, to decision makers as well as the public, was a strong manifestation of the success achieved by the Chinese government's open-door policy and economic reform. This message has been strongly voiced through China's official media, publications and other forms of literature. As mentioned previously, there has been a prejudice against conservation among decision makers and the public, and conservationists are sometimes mocked and referred to as conservatives standing in the way of modernization. Take for example one of the frustrating experience of Professor Ruan Yisan. When he tried to present his conservation plan for a country town near Shanghai in the early 1990s, officials from the local government bluntly told him that he, together with his conservation proposal, were not welcome there, as the local government wanted a modernized new city, not a town with an unchanged, old landscape (Ruan 1998).

Conflicts between modernization and heritage conservation exist in almost every society. Threats to heritage sites are always enormous when development becomes a priority for a society. Economic growth not only generates funds but also asserts pressure for urban renewal. To some extent, the historic environment seems able to survive better in a society under a slow economy, but the survival of historic sites in such a situation may only be attributed to the lack of development funds, or negligence, rather than a filial piety to one's heritage. The 1930s landscape of Shanghai almost remained intact during the pre-reform era because no funds were available for urban renewal. In contemporary China, city-scape is regarded as a strong manifestation of a city's economic status. Lack of change in the built landscape is regarded as an indication of poor economic performance. A senior planning official in

---

52 Also from discussions with planning officials from SCPDRI, June 1998.
Shanghai was unconvinced by the celebrated conservation achievements of Xidi\(^{53}\), suggesting that the intact status of the historic built form of the ancient village could only demonstrate a lack of economic dynamism and low living standards in the region\(^{54}\).

Shanghai’s urbanization process in the 1990s has demonstrated both the positive and negative impacts of economic growth on conservation: while economic development has imposed threats to historic sites mainly through urban development imperatives, the modernization process has contributed to conservation efforts, with the heritage industry being increasingly accepted as a part of modernization. Moreover, the process of urban modernization has generated the funds needed for conservation, without which conservation legislation would remain merely an expression of good will. Most listed sites in Shanghai remain poorly maintained and it is unlikely that the state will provide substantial subsidies for their maintenance. New hopes arose in the late 1990s as the liberalization of the land market and privatization of housing began to generate the funds needed for conserving historic sites. In fact conservation came to be more and more dependent on resources other than state funding. The Shanghai experience has suggested that, under a developing economy, conservation tends to be closely linked to economic interests, and is increasingly backed and shaped by economic imperatives at the same time. This kind of link has been demonstrated particularly through the integration of historic elements into tourism, and the way in which heritage sites have been customized to suit tourism requirements.

**Conservation Advocacy and Management: A Top-down System**

The conservation mechanism in Shanghai is analyzed in details in Chapter Six. It is obvious that, despite the trend of internationalization in economic as well as cultural activities, the conservation system and administration in Shanghai, as in other Chinese cities, demonstrates strong Chinese characteristics. The continuing strong role of the state in China put conservation matters under the administration of various government departments. This state-dominated conservation system gives government

---

\(^{53}\) Xidi is in Anhui Province.

\(^{54}\) Interview with Mr Zhao Wannian, SCPDRI, June 1998
officials greater authority than professionals over the decision-making process. In the West, the conservation movement was originally pushed ahead by the social elite or ‘passionate minorities’, comprising both professionals and amateurs, and was motivated by nostalgic romanticism (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1990: 9). It later won increased sympathy and involvement within the general society in a reaction to rapid urbanization and industrialization. In China, although conservation efforts have always been made by professionals, and influenced by Western practices from the very beginning, since the 1950s conservation research and practice has been organized and monitored by various government departments. The study of the heritage management mechanism in previous chapters has shown that, though professionals have contributed greatly to conservation initiatives, it was the government authorities who had the final say. In the decades since 1949, the conservation of cultural heritage has been an official operation initiated and managed by governments from the state to local level. Although economic growth and decentralization of the state administration system during the reform era have prompted a desire for a change in the upside-down conservation system (Ruan and Yan 1998), it is still widely accepted in China that governments should take the key responsibility for conservation matters at the current stage. The conservation of historic quarters, in the words of a planning professional from Tongji University, Shanghai, ‘would be impossible without the government support’ (Geng 1998). This was because the conservation of historic quarters would involve various aspects of political, economic and cultural activity within a city, and therefore would require cooperation between various players and stakeholders from both public and private sectors. Under the current political system, multi-departmental cooperation has to be coordinated and led by particular government representatives and agents (ibid). Non-government organizations, such as ICOMOS, would be unlikely to operate in the same way as they do in Western countries. To operate in China, these non-government organizations would need support from, and the involvement of government representatives. Without adequate endorsement from the government, non-government organizations could hardly assert any influence. The Chinese national committee of ICOMOS, for instance, has been convened by the SACH in China, and one of the SACH’s vice directors, Zhang Bai, holds the concurrent position of the president of China ICOMOS.
It was demonstrated earlier in the thesis that the conservation system in Shanghai was one in which government and government agencies, as well as professional elites, played a key role. Despite the growing appreciation of Shanghai’s historic townscape by citizens, conservation in Shanghai remained a matter remote from the general public. The lack of public involvement in conservation initiatives was explored from various perspectives in Chapter Six. This situation could be found in many other Chinese cities undergoing urban redevelopment. To the general public, the most immediate goal was an upgrading of living standards, and people were made to believe that development projects would create a good opportunity for them to improve their living conditions in the near future. As a case study, Chapter Four discussed the average living conditions for Shanghai residents. For the majority of them, the upgrading of living conditions was so urgent that it was not difficult for them to choose whether to take the relocation package and move to new apartment buildings, or to remain in the overcrowded residences. Having to share a bathroom with one’s neighbour certainly was far more disturbing than losing the courtyard in which one’s childhood had been spent. Attracted by the notion of modernization, the public tended to cooperate, instead of protesting against development projects, as they could see more benefit from development than from conservation.

Apart from a keen desire for upgrading living standards, the chronic lack of respect for cultural heritage embedded among the general public contributed to the lack of public sympathy for conservation. People tend to regard quick, major changes in the city’s landscape as symbols of progress. This enthusiasm in major transformation—the urban facelift—is among government officials as well as ordinary citizens. In listing achievements in urban development between 1991 and 1995, SUPAB leaders highlighted great plans and projects in key inner city areas: Nanjing Road, Huaihai Road, Sichuan Road North, and the Old City, which had experienced major renovation procedures including demolition and thorough refurbishment of the neighbourhood to achieve a ‘brand new look’ (Zhao 1996:25).

Moreover, urban residents in China relied on the government housing system until the late 1990s. Government and state-run businesses were responsible for the allocation of housing and land use, while a real estate market did not exist. The fact was people
cared little about the condition and the physical survival of historic buildings as they were not owners. The emotional attachment between tenant and dwelling certainly tended to be much weaker than that between a house owner and his property. However historically significant a building was, it would receive little care if shared by, for instance, ten users who had little to do with the history of the building.

Finally, in the current Chinese society, the concept of community – one of the basic concepts in a civil society – is yet to be established, and ordinary people remained subject to any major actions of the government. Lack of consultation with ordinary people is a part of the legacy from the Mao era, as well as the legacy from all regimes before that. Community debate and intervention in conservation issues, as well as other issues, is still not a common practice in China. It is a common scene in Western cities for local people to protest against development initiatives in order to ‘save’ their neighbourhood, but in Shanghai, as well as in other Chinese cities, community action against development is rarely found. It is particularly so if the project is endorsed by the local or Municipal Government as a major project. When a site is threatened by new development, its fate falls into the hands of developers, local or municipal leadership, and other stakeholders, but not into the hands of the general public.

This situation of professional and official dominance in conservation might change gradually in future, with education and advocacy campaigns, a more democratic administration system and greater affluence within the society. It is noteworthy that in Shanghai, a new upper class formed by successful entrepreneurs, professionals, business and cultural elites is emerging. In the words of Huang Fuxiang, former planner-in-chief from Shanghai City Planning and Design Research Institute, the newly emerging middle class is becoming an important patron of the heritage market including antiques and fine old buildings 55. The occupation of prime addresses in the city by wealthy clients is gradually leading to the gentrification of historic areas, where designated buildings will be renovated, and current residents given the option of being relocated or purchasing the renovated property. Occupation of historic properties by the wealthy may prevent historic buildings from being demolished and

55 Discussion with planning officials from SCPDRI, June 1998.
neglected, but it may lead to the gentrification of historic quarters and make conservation issues even more remote from ordinary residents, most of whom will lose their home in the inner city through relocation and property conveyance. It seems that in some of the districts, rich in architectural heritage, decision-makers tend to protect heritage quarters through real estate market. However, the market strategy might also impact negatively on heritage sites if those sites are merely considered new attractions for real estate clients.

**Perceptions of Heritage and Views of History, Antiquity and Aesthetics**

As conservation became an issue related to the notion of modernization, international conservation practices and management began to be introduced in China, and efforts were made to establish heritage legislation, codes of practice and marketing strategies. Late in 2002 the revised national heritage law was passed and put into effect. According to Shan Jixiang, head of the SACH, the revised heritage law was based on the experience of the previous twenty years, and aimed at suiting the changes brought about by China's adoption of market economics (Shi 2002). Shan pointed out that, compared with the 1982 version, the new heritage law was much more comprehensive and detailed, with the addition of forty-seven new articles. However, despite heritage legislation at national and provincial/municipal levels, and various conservation initiatives, grass-root conservation efforts and effective implementation of heritage legislation remain issues to be addressed. The key question here seems to be whether there is a genuine respect for heritage among the general public. The ruthless demolition in Shanghai was by no means a local phenomenon. Rather, what happened in Shanghai was typical in China's urbanization process and, indeed, demolition of historic sites in cities by new development was a world phenomenon.

In many cultures, attitudes towards the cultural heritage can be ambivalent. Freedom from past encumbrance was seen as a 'revolutionary dogma' by Americans who were establishing a new life in Frontier circumstances (Lowenthal 1985:90-105). Cultural heritage may sometimes represent a physical obstacle and a psychological burden, but may also be taken as the ground to promote national identity and pride. It can be questioned, modified and distorted to suit particular needs. It is not rare to find that cultural heritage is worshiped and despized at the same time. While being emotionally
and morally attached to their heritage on the one hand, people may also regard getting rid of the heritage as a signal of progress on the other. This thesis, particularly Chapter Three, has showed that, at various stages of modern China’s history, despising the past was interpreted as a manifestation of the resolution to progress. Such an attitude towards the past existed in China throughout the twentieth century in various forms and under various guises. When urban development and redevelopment was at the height demolition of the historic environment was often conducted in the name of urban modernization, as the old built form was often considered a physical reminder of backwardness and poverty. To many, the past is incompatible with the future, and to achieve modernization the past has to be left behind. ‘Destroying the old to establish the new’, was a popular rhetorical slogan at the time of the May Fourth Movement as well as during the Cultural Revolution and is still appealing to many nowadays.

Although the study of built heritage in China can be traced back to the 1930s, substantial initiatives of conservation did not appear until the 1980s. It is a long tradition in China for people to collect and preserve movable heritage objects. In the Chinese language they were referred to as ‘wenwu’ – cultural relics – although later the term also included immovable heritage. For several decades, government offices in charge of cultural relics were mainly committed to collecting and managing movable heritage objects. For example the Shanghai Municipal Administration for Cultural Heritage began to deal with built heritage only after 1986. In Chinese tradition, the beauty of age and antiquity has been appreciated mostly in archaeological relics, and conservation activities used to be concentrated on this type of heritage. An aged house, unlike an aged artefact, tends to be associated with dysfunction, lack of care and resources, and poverty. Professional opinion is that Chinese traditional architecture is unlike its Western counterpart, for it uses simple materials such as timber, brick, mud, and thatch, and buildings are more vulnerable to natural and human damage and therefore require periodic renovation and rebuilding. Renovation and reconstruction are ways to ensure that the structure is presentable and functional. In this sense, demolishing old buildings to make way for newer and bigger

56 Discussion with planning officials from Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute, June 1998
ones is a normal practice that evokes little concern in the Chinese culture. Compared with vernacular structures, monumental structures, such as pagodas and temples, would have a better chance of survival, due to their better building materials and acknowledged significance. Compared with individual historic sites, the notion of a historic townscape is still new to the general public. Although historic cities/quarters have been designated, people are yet to be convinced about the extension of conservation practices from monuments to settlements. This bias towards individual monuments has already posed problems and difficulties in the conservation of the historic quarters of Shanghai, for not all of the buildings in heritage quarters are necessarily monuments, rather, most of them are very ordinary ones.

It seems, therefore, that official opinions and guidelines on conservation in China are following international standards of practice rather than reflecting the views of the general public. This tendency is perceivable not only in the old and new versions of the national heritage law and local legislation, but also in the China Principles, the newly formulated national guideline for conservation professionals.

The China Principles: A ‘Well-baked Charter’

The adoption of the China Principles can be regarded as a landmark in the internationalization of heritage conservation practice in China. In his introduction to the English version of the China Principles published by the GCI in 2002, Zhang Bai, Chairman of the Chinese National Committee of ICOMOS at the time, attributed the China Principles to China’s integration into the global system of cultural affairs. By working closely with the GCI and the AHC, and adopting ideas from Australia’s Burra Charter in addressing the issue of living sites and their contemporary value, the Chinese conservation authorities showed a strong intent to bring China’s conservation policies and practice into line with international standards (Sullivan 2001). As Zhang Bai pointed out, in the course of drawing up the China Principles, ‘a common perspective was achieved on the internationally recognized theoretical concepts and principles’ (Zhang 2002).
Chinese ownership of the China Principles was supposed to be achieved by the acknowledgement of Chinese conditions. The China Principles, while adopting Western conservation philosophies and concepts, are said to be based on a vast amount of experience, and they aim to reflect comprehensively the practice of conservation as it exists in China. For this reason, the China Principles are recognized, as a "well baked" charter, and from the Chinese point of view, the document is China’s contribution to international conservation theory, because it is basically Chinese, following Chinese practice and fitting into Chinese culture (Agnew and Demas 2002; Sullivan 2001).

While the notion of Chinese ownership should be underlined, the China Principles have nevertheless shown a clear tendency towards Western conservation philosophy, and form a contrast to the 1994 Nara Document on Authenticity (Nara Document). The Nara Document was a result of the Nara Conference on Authenticity held in 1994, aiming to discuss the application of the test of authenticity in nominating World Heritage (McBryde 1997). Regarded as an expansion of the conservation framework established by the Venice Charter (Stovel 1995), the Nara Document challenged the Western-dominated international conservation concept on authenticity and argued that significance might be based on factors other than originality of the fabric. This document called for acknowledgment of and respect for cultural diversity in conservation, and brought non-Western philosophies of heritage – particularly the Japanese approach to conservation, which allowed the replacement of old materials with new – to people’s attention as an important aspect of cultural diversity in the profession.

Being an East Asian culture, China might perhaps have been expected to share Japan’s approach to heritage concepts and practice, especially on the question of authenticity. The system of periodic reconstruction at the Ise Shrine, Japan, is said to be based on Asian religious custom (Ito 1995:39-43), while in China, it is observed that the esteem for the tradition goes hand in hand with the recurrent destruction of material remains (Lowenthal 1996:20). It is arguable that Chinese and Japanese cultures, in a way, share a common source from the ancient Chinese civilization and they have many similarities to each other, for example the written language, rituals, traditional architecture, costume, arts and religion; but they diverged from each other
to become different cultures. Indeed, the so-called Asian culture is a multi-faceted domain and each particular culture is unique. In terms of heritage conservation, the Japanese ‘Ise shrine approach’ reflects Japanese cultural identity but is not typical of all Asia.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, conservation practice in China was influenced by Western practice in the very beginning. It was initiated in the 1930s, based on the Western approaches to conservation, which were the only models available at the time. Decades from the 1950s to the 1980s saw China isolated from international trends and approaches and when the national heritage law was proclaimed in 1982, it adopted the most influential international conservation code, the Venice Charter. It is not surprising, therefore, that the China Principles are following Western approaches to heritage conservation, rather than being typically ‘Asian’ by adopting the Japanese approaches. This tendency towards the Western approach may be seen in the China Principles in various ways, particularly in their emphasis on original fabrics and restrictions on reconstruction. Article 21, for example, requires that any restoration must be guided by respect for the significance of the physical remains. Article 23 states that the aesthetic value of a site derives from its historic authenticity. In Article 25 it is regulated that a building that no longer survives should not be reconstructed except for special cases, and Article 30 aims to prevent any conservation practice that would damage the original fabric of a site.

Having adopted the Western approach to conservation where fabric authenticity is highly valued, and having adopted a conservation model based on the Burra Charter, the China Principles somehow seem to have put less emphasis on the issue of respect for the cultural significance of sites. What distinguishes the Burra Charter is its aim to retain the cultural significance of heritage sites. Indeed, emphasis on the respect for, and the understanding of cultural significance is integral to the Burra Charter. While acknowledging the value of the existing fabric and requesting respect for it, the Burra Charter advocates the thorough and unbiased understanding of all aspects of the cultural significance of a place. Moreover, the 1999 revision of the Burra Charter broadened the understanding of what is cultural significance by recognizing that significance may lie in more than just the fabric of a place (Australia ICOMOS 1999). In comparison, while emphasizing authenticity of all the elements of the entire
heritage site and the originality of the physical fabric, the China Principles do not seem to be advocating an understanding of and respect for cultural significance in the same way as the Burra Charter. The Burra Charter claims that the aim of conservation is to retain the cultural significance of a place (Article 2.2), whereas the China Principles state that the aim of conservation is to preserve the authenticity of all the elements of the entire heritage site and to retain for the future its historic information and all its values (Article 2). In defining the cultural significance of heritage sites, the Burra Charter provides a broader scope than the China Principles to include aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations (Article 1.2); while the China Principles adopted the term ‘heritage value’ to cover a narrower scope of elements, including historical, artistic and scientific values (Article 3). Being an integral theme of the Burra Charter, the respect for, and understanding of cultural significance are brought forward in various articles as the basis for good practice (for example, Articles 6.1-2, 15.4, 26.3). In contrast, the China Principles regarded assessment of a site as the key issue that should be given the highest priority throughout the entire conservation process (Article 5), which seems to focus more on academic and technical work, rather than due obligation to the site.

China principles have been recognized as the most complete and most systematic set of conservation criteria (Lu 2002). It is for the first time that a Western originated planning methodology is adapted into Chinese legal and bureaucratic systems. Being Chinese owned, the China Principles certainly have a remarkably Chinese character. This is expressed in the stress on the dominance of the national law, the involvement of the conservation bureaucracy at various levels and a degree of flexibility in the implementation of the principles that would allow considerable room for bureaucrats to intervene in conservation to suit special needs, particularly economic imperatives. Article 18 of the China Principles stipulates that conservation must be undertaken in situ. Nevertheless it concedes that relocation may be allowed in the face of uncontrollable natural threats or ‘when development of national importance is undertaken’. Section 13 of the commentary provides detailed instructions on relocation issues and allows for special approval to be given for relocation in some circumstances. Similar flexibility can be found in the China Principles regarding reconstruction. It seems that such flexibility has to be given to suit China’s economic development. For example, the Three Gorges Dam Project has involved the relocation
of several heritage sites. Certain flexibility can be found in relevant items of both the Venice Charter (Article 7) and the Burra Charter (Article 9) regarding relocation, but in principle, relocation was regarded as 'unacceptable'. In comparison, the China Principles place less restriction on this approach. According to the China Principles, although relocation is seen as a rare intervention, it is applicable with certain approval procedures.

An important issue following the proclamation of the China Principles will be their practical implementation. Whereas the status of the China Principles as the national guideline for the conservation profession has been established, the same recognition of this status is yet to be achieved at municipal and local levels. As far as Shanghai is concerned, the evidence from interviews with Shanghai municipal and local heritage officials, as well as academics, in year 2000 revealed that they knew very little about the formulation of the China Principles, and showed less enthusiasm than might have been expected. In that year, the work on the China Principles had been carried out for three years and the draft document had already taken shape. It was therefore surprising to find that a conservation guideline of national importance had received little publicity at the municipal level.

It is hard to predict how the China Principles will be implemented in the conservation of historic cultural cities, such as Shanghai. The issues involved may be more complicated than simply adopting a set of professional guidelines in conservation. The China Principles were drawn up by China ICOMOS and approved by the State Administration of Cultural Heritage (SACH), but China ICOMOS, which is supposed to be a non-governmental organization of professionals, currently has to be affiliated to the SACH, and the drawing up of the China Principles in fact involves the direct participation of the SACH. ICOMOS has not yet had any branch at a provincial or municipal level, so the recommendation and promotion of the China Principles have to be done through the SACH. As mentioned above, heritage offices in China used to be mainly committed to the preservation of movable heritage, while the conservation of historic sites, particularly the conservation of historic cities, has been mainly under the charge of government planning and conservation sectors. In Shanghai, for example, the municipal heritage administration (SMACH) began to be involved in urban conservation only after 1986. Its role in the management of historic townscape
is still minor compared with the municipal planning administration (SUPAB). While SUPAB plays a leading role in establishing Shanghai’s urban conservation system, it does not have a direct working relationship with the SACH. Therefore there will be less chance to see it influenced by the SACH approved documents such as the China Principles. From an administrative point of view, SMACH is mainly financed by the municipal government (SMG) and reports to SMG. It has a loose working relationship with the SACH but the relationship has not always been smooth, partly because of Shanghai’s independent stand on conservation perceptions and methods. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the municipal legislation on conservation has never been officially recognized by the SACH due to its different notions and approaches.

As far as Shanghai is concerned, the gap is apparent between its current conservation approaches and the China Principles. In Shanghai heritage sites have been classified hierarchically according to their different level of significance and, through conservation legislation, conservation benchmarks have been established for sites of different levels of significance – which consequently allowed the adaptation of most sites that are not listed as national heritage. However this system with different treatments of different sites appears to be in conflict with the China Principles. The latter, though accepting the classification of heritage sites as reflecting the assessment of their significance and corresponding legal status, stipulates that conservation principles apply to all sites regardless of their levels (Commentary 2.4.1).

The key question in implementing the China Principles may be their authoritative nature. As professional guidelines, The China Principles established benchmarks for conservation practice, but do not have the same legal status as the national heritage law, and the heritage legislation at provincial/municipal level such as the Shanghai Municipal Measures for Conservation. The dominance of legislation (regardless of which level) over professional guidelines is acknowledged by the China Principles, by stating that conservation practice must conform strictly with relevant legal regulations and provisions, that is to say, if conflicts arise between the China Principles and heritage legislation, the latter will prevail.

Shanghai’s conservation legislation can be regarded as typical of the way Shanghai deals with contradictions with the state. In principle, Shanghai does not oppose the
state on major issues, but Shanghai is good at manoeuvering within safe limits. Its conservation legislation can be seen as such an example: it complies with the national heritage law in dealing with national heritage sites but leaves plenty of administrative room for municipal authorities by setting up different rules for the conservation of other registered sites. Will Shanghai modify its conservation legislation in line with the stand of the China Principles or will Shanghai continue to find its own way to handle conservation without offending the national authorities? The way in which Shanghai will deal with these questions will certainly affect the fate of its heritage properties and, very likely, will set an example to many other cities.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, projects for new urban entertainment destination such Xin Tian Di have attracted developers’ interests because of their commercial success and have become a model for many to follow. Moreover, such projects have been highly commended and endorsed not only by local decision makers, but also encouraged by some leading professionals such as Zheng Shiling and Luo Xiaowei. Luo, involved in the project as a consultant on architectural history, commended that Shui On Company was far-sighted in retaining the built fabric of the neighbourhood (China Central Television 2002). Stating that she was not advocating the Xin Tian Di mode, Luo conceded that it was a practical approach to redevelopment of historic areas. Moreover, a persistent advocate for conservation of historic townscape, Luo somehow regarded the opinions for the retention of the original use of the site as a ‘narrow view’ (ibid). The popularity and commercial success of Xin Tian Di raise a concern: the commercialization of historic precincts in big cities seems quickly on rise but regulations on conservation of those precincts remain too vague and general to curb the widespread commercialization. As far as the China Principles are concerned, their major focus seems to be on individual structures and sites, while few items seem applicable to historic cities, towns and precincts.

As mentioned earlier, heritage conservation in China has been under the charge of various government agencies. At the national level, there are the Ministry of Construction and the SACH (which is affiliated to the Ministry of Culture), at provincial and municipal levels, more government branches may be involved. Such a multi-departmental system often results in fragmentation and inconsistency in heritage policies, as well as duplication, as well as gaps in administration of
conservation practices. For example, the SACH is now in charge of designation and assessment of national heritage sites, but conservation practice, such as construction control, is the responsibility of planning authorities at various levels, which mainly report to the Ministry of Construction. Article 37 of the China Principles makes clear that while the principles are applicable to historical cultural cities, the urban/historic town category of heritage essentially lies outside their scope. This indicates that, in drawing up the China Principles, the SACH was conscious about the roles of itself as well as that of the Ministry of Construction and did not want to take over the role of the latter. In this context, the limited mandatory of the China Principles is predictable and the situation makes it very necessary for China to have a set of more universal conservation code for conservation practice.

The China Principles provide conservation guidelines for heritage professionals. The principles stipulated reflect professional views regarding key issues including in heritage philosophy and practice, such as significance, authenticity, interpretation and management. However, from previous chapters, it is arguable that gaps remain between professional and public views in heritage conservation. The professional criticism and public fondness of some redevelopment projects are examples in point. While experts try to retain historic condition and prevent alterations for cosmetic purpose and completeness, the general public still holds a traditional aesthetic view, which values the completeness and neatness, even freshness of historic attractions, instead of ruins (Ruan 1998). This is also noted by Western scholars, ‘some Chinese visitors would even consider the newness of the attraction as commendable and the proper way to commemorate historical cultural values’ (McKercher and du Cross 2002: 77). Predictably, such division of public and professional views may, to some extent, hinder the implementation of the China Principles.

Implementation of the China Principles also involves the issue of professional independence, which is yet to be established in China. The China Principles are professional guidelines to be observed by all those who work in heritage conservation on matters of professional practice and ethics. In China, however, a large proportion of conservation professionals are government employees, and are expected to act in the government interest. In the case of conflicts between government actions and professional guidelines, they will be more subject to official rules than professional
guidelines. The fact that China ICOMOS remains affiliated (and subordinated) to the SACH underlines the current lack of professional independence in China and this lack of professional independence may affect the effective implementation of the China Principles.

Other Considerations

With a strong economic growth, China’s urbanization process is accelerating, and more cities are undergoing transformation to become modern and internationalized metropolizes. Threats to historic townscapes come hand in hand with urban development and destruction of heritage sites takes place from time to time. Conflicts between urban development and conservation lead to debate over heritage issues. Shanghai at the turn of the twentieth century can be regarded as an outstanding example of a Chinese city under pressure from modernization. It needs to be stressed that development and conservation in Shanghai must be viewed in a global setting, as the Central Government’s open-door policy has brought China into the world economy. The scale and speed of urban transformation in Shanghai therefore reflects the impact of economic globalization. Moreover, the rise of a heritage industry in China in the last decade reflected the cultural aspect of the globalization process. While bringing China into the world economy, the Chinese government is bringing China into the world culture as well.

Attitudes towards international standards of conservation are mixed. On the one hand, integration with international trends of practice is regarded as part of the modernization process, and the government is keen to demonstrate its openness towards cultural globalization by actively adopting Western heritage concepts. On the other hand, given imperatives of economic development, effective implementation of heritage law and conservation principles will remain problematic. On top of conflicts between conservation ethics and economic interests, there are conceptual and practical gaps between key players in the heritage industry. While the national heritage authority embraces Western approaches to conservation, it may not be able to convince officials and practitioners to act accordingly. Even the national heritage law has been criticised as not being suitable to the country’s situation and therefore hard
to implement. Professional opinions insist that conservation in China has never copied the practice of any foreign model in particular and should not do so in future.

Although the conservation of built heritage has been promoted by the Central Government as part the modernization agenda, sympathy and support from stakeholders and communities is yet to be strengthened. Take Shanghai for example, the newly emerging interest in historic buildings and quarters has derived primarily from the economic potential of those places, rather than genuine concern for cultural diversity and the built past. Therefore, despite the protection list, heritage places are still threatened by urban redevelopment, and many are jeopardized even in the name of conservation itself. Although the significance of urban heritage has been officially recognized in the form of national laws, and the importance of conservation acknowledged in official rhetoric, an effective conservation process is yet to be established – it will be a framework more comprehensive than simply technobureaucratic codes and guidelines. Apart from legislation and bureaucratic systems, the following issues have to be addressed to achieve this goal:

1. More emphasis on the respect for historic and cultural significance in conservation guidelines and regulations, instead of the current bias towards technological issues. Without respect for heritage places, conservation projects tend to be hijacked despite excellent techniques.

2. Education programs for the public to reinforce respect for history and heritage, and to win sympathy for the conservation effort. Education programs should enable the public, particularly the younger generation, to read history with the help of heritage sites, so as to treat them as physical evidence rather than decorations of history.

3. Education programs for decision-makers about the significance of cultural heritage, and its management so as to raise respect for the cultural significance of the sites at higher administrative levels. Decision-makers should understand that cultural heritage belongs to the whole society and that the significance of cultural heritage cannot be measured by its economic potential alone. Only with a true understanding of cultural heritage can real sympathy for conservation be secured. Education of

---

57 Interview with Professor Luo Xiaowei, Shanghai Tongji University, April 2000
decision-makers has to be stressed because of the existing upside-down administration system and the fact that this system will not change quickly.

4. Publicity of heritage sites from various perspectives through appropriate interpretation. Appreciation of heritage sites should involve the interpretation of the scientific, cultural, historic and artistic significance of the sites, rather than mere ideological meanings.

5. Regular and accurate explanations of conservation codes to the public. This will eventually reduce the dependence on government intervention in dealing with conflicts between development imperatives and conservation principles.

6. Multi-disciplinary approaches in conservation education and practices. Heritage places need to be interpreted from various perspectives including science as well as the humanities, and conservation should involve expertise not only from the architectural and planning professions, but also from other professions such as history, arts, law and tourism.

Among these issues, respect for the cultural significance of heritage sites is vital. This thesis has demonstrated that this issue is closely related to attitudes towards history. After a full-scale building boom, remnants of the historic townscape are increasingly regarded as the treasure of a city. In Shanghai, for example, after a decade long building boom, the infrastructure has been considerably modernized and the living standards for its citizens remarkably improved, leading to a slowdown in this drastic urban transformation. Although a 466-meter-high Global Finance Centre is about to be erected at the Pudong waterfront and by 2005 will be able to claim the status of the world's number one tower, the Shanghai Municipal Government has decided, in principle, to cool down the heat of super-highrise development and begin to pay more attention to the conservation of historic quarters. Restoration of the northern Bund — what used to be part of the International Settlement — is underway, aiming at building a new recreation zone.

In China, systematic research into the historic townscape can be traced back to the early 1950s, based on research into historic sites. Such research was prompted by academic interest, and was resumed in the 1980s after being interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Since then, however, attention to the built heritage has involved various rationales and has been led by trends in modern society. Historic townscape
are becoming a popular commodity for modern consumption. It would be dangerous, however, if a heritage place is treated merely as a new cash cow. Conservation might be justified by economic rationales, but it should not be measured only in terms of the latter. The primary factor in conservation should be, above all, a true respect for history and cultural diversity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Balderstone, S., Qian, F., and Zhang, B., 2002, Shanghai Reincarnated, in Logan, W. S., ed., The Disappearing 'Asian' City, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-34.


Bi, Z., 2000, Gu Cheng Feng Mao, Ri Xing Yue Yi (Ancient City Landscape Changes with Each Passing Day), *People's Daily*, 20 October, p. 4.


Ge, Z., 1997, Shanghai Diqu Zong Jiao Wen Hua Gou Chen (History of Religious Culture in Shanghai Region), *Shanghai Institute of Social Science Quarterly* 1997 (2): pp. 150-158.


Han, K., 2003, Xian Dai Xing, Hou Xian Dai Zhu Yi he Zhong Guo de Xian Dai Hua (Modernity, Postmodernity and China's Modernisation), cited May 28, 2003,
Available from


Jing, T., 1998, Yong Wen Hua Bian Zhi Feng Jing Xian (Developing Scenic Belts with Culture), Wenhuibao, 20 October, p. 4.


Logan, W. S., 2002b, Globalizing Heritage: World Heritage as a Manifestation of Modernism and the Challenge from the Periphery, in 20th Century Heritage -


Logan, W. S., ed., 2002c, The Disappearing 'Asian' City, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.


Lu, Y., and Ma, M., 1993, Huaihai Lu Gai Zao Zhong Tou Xi Jing Jie Mu (Key Project of Huaihai Road Renewal Launched Today), Wenhuibao, 8 December 1993, p. 2.


Luo, X., 1997, Shanghai Longtang, Shanghai Ren, Shanghai Wenhua (Shanghai's Alleys, Shanghaiese and Shanghai Culture), Wenhuai Daily, 25 November, p. 15.


Ma, M., 1997, Yandanglu Jiang Jian Cheng Shen Cheng Bu Xing Xiu Xian Jie (Yandang Road to become a leisure pedestrian walk of Shanghai), Wenhuibao, 30 March, p. 2.

Ma, M., 1999a, Guan Guang Ya Zhi De Huaihai Lu (Strolling Along the Elegant Huaihai Road), Wenhuibao, 18 September, p. 11.

Ma, M., 1999b, Hua Yuan Zhu Zhai Gai Zao Ye Neng Chu Xin Yi (New Ideas for the Renovation of Garden Residences), Wenhuibao, 24 April, p. 5.


Pan, Q., 1999a, Shanghai Lao Jie Wu Yue Tong Ni Jian Mian (The Old Street of Shanghai opens in May), *Wenhuibao*, 4 February, p. 8.

Pan, Q., 1999b, Shanghai Lao Jie Xi Ying Ba Fang Lai Bing (The Old Street of Shanghai: The Grand Opening), *Wenhuibao*, 29 June, p. 8.

People's Daily, 2000a, China's Oriental Dragon, 9 September, p. 3.


266


Song, Z., 2000, Jia Xing Zhuang Yuan Fu Qu Yi Pang Huang (Grand Scholar's Residence Facing Dilemma), *Wenhuibao*, 18 April, p. 4.


267


Sun, W., 1997, Fa Yang Chuan Tong Wen Hua You Shi, Zai Chuan Xian Dai Du Shi Wen Min (Promoting traditional culture and producing a modern urban civilisation), *Wenhuibao*, 29 October, p. 12.


Tong, D., 2002, Ren De Shen Cun Fa Zhan Quan Da Yu Wen Wu Bao Hu (Rights to sustain takes priority over conservation), China Youth Daily, 12 August, p. 3.


Wakeman, F., and Yeh, W., eds., 1992, Shanghai Sojourners, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.


Wang, Y., 1999b, Shanghai Shi Wei Shi Fu Hua Qian Mai Huang Jin (SMG to spend millions on environment), *Wenhuibao*, 22 October, 1999, p. 2.

Wang, Y., 1999c, Xin Chao Peng Pai Hua 'Sheng' Zi (Passions on Ring Roads), *Wenhuibao*, 16 September, 1999, p. 2.


270

Wenhuibao Editorial, 26 April 1999, Ming Ren Gu Ju He Shi Hong Huo (Residences of Former Celebrities: When To Be Popular?), p. 4.


Xu, B., 2000, Da Dao Tong Wang Xing Shi Ji (A Boulevard Leading to the New Century), Shanghai News, 18 April 2000, p. 5.


Xu, M., 1999, Shanghai De Jing Se Di Dai (The Golden Belt of Shanghai), Wenhuibao, 18 September 1999, p. 5.
Xue, L., 1996, Xian Hua Shanghai (Tales of Shanghai). Shanghai: Shanghai Shu Dian Press.


Yao, G., 1933, Shanghai Xian Hua (Shanghai Gossips). Shanghai: Commercial Press.

Yao, H., 1997a, Ming Que Ding Wei, Jia Kuai Fa Zhan, Xin Cheng Du Shi Xin Lu You Te Se (Urban Tourism to Pick Up Paces), Wenhuibao, 16 April, p. 1.

Yao, H., 1997b, Xi Ying Qian Bai Wan Ren You Shanghai (Attracting Millions of People Touring in Shanghai), Wenhuibao, 11 June, p. 2.

Yao, S., and Wang, Y., 1999, Ying Zao 21 Shi Ji De Cheng Shi Kong Jian (Planning a City for the 21st Century: Interview with Prof Zheng Shiling, Vice President of Tongji University), Wenhuibao, 5 March, p. 10.


Zhang, H., 1998b, Jia Qi Tong Wang Xing Shi Ji De Cai Hong (Building a Bridge to the New Century: Interview with Jiang Liang, Director of Changning District), *Xinmin Wanbao*, 1 April 1998, p. B1.


Zhou, K., 1998, Si Ming Gong Suo Za Yi (A few words about the Si Ming Gild House), *Xing Ming Evening*, 9 June, p. 6.


APPENDICES

Interview Questions for Officials and Staff from Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Bureau, Shanghai City Planning and Design Institute, Professor Ruan Yisan from Tongji University, June 1998

1. What is your view of current situation of Shanghai’s urban heritage?
2. How is the conservation legislation applied in Shanghai?
3. If there is a buffer zone around registered properties, how big is it?
4. Is it likely that designated buildings be demolished before they are officially registered as heritage sites?
5. What are experiences and lessons in conservation of heritage sites?
6. What are your comments about the new development in Huaihai Road?
7. How about the buildings on the Bund, are they all occupied?
8. Shanghai was listed as a historic cultural city in 1986. Are there any changes in perceptions about heritage conservation since then?
9. What are the attitudes of district governments towards historic zones? Are they happy to have these zones in their districts?
10. Is tourism the major motivation to protect historic buildings?
11. In Australia, decisions by planning authorities are often objected to by residents and planners. For example residents are against any highrise development in their neighbourhood. Do you have similar problem?
12. What are the attitudes of district governments towards historic areas? Are they happy to see designation of historic areas in their districts?
13. What are the attitudes of the community towards urban heritage?
14. What do you think of traffic in the Old Concessions in future? We saw streets seem narrow with highrises on both sides.
15. Xidi (in Anhui Province) is a national model in conservation of historic townscape, what has Shanghai learned from their experience?
16. Are guildhalls in the Old City included in the protection list?
17. What do you think of the future Shanghai? Will Yuyuan and the Bund the only things left?
Questions for Interview with Professor Luo Xiaowei from Shanghai Tongji University, April 2000

1. You were involved in designating Shanghai's modern heritage sites in the 1980s. What was the background for heritage registration at that time?

2. Now that Mr Ni Tianzeng has passed away, is there anyone in the SMG who can take his place and role in urban conservation?

3. I have visited the theme street of Hengshan Road. What is your opinion of the project?

4. How about Wujiaochang Area? It used to be the KMT’s municipal centre.

5. How do you relate Shanghai’s transformation in recent years with the trend of globalization?

6. In one of your publications you mentioned that Shanghai was peripheral to Confucianism and its legacy. What do you mean by that?

7. You seem to see works by local architects as reflection of the so-called ‘Shanghai culture’, in what way is Shanghai culture manifested in its built form?

8. New development in the 1990s has made great changes in Shanghai’s built landscape. Do you think the development in the 1990s still reflects Shanghai culture?

9. Who makes the final decision of selection of designs for major projects (such as the Shanghai International Convention Centre)?

10. To what extent do you see international principles and practices impact in China?

11. How compatible do you think international principles and practices are with the Chinese context?

12. (You said some new owners have spent a great deal of money on restoration of heritage buildings), what future do you see of those that have been registered but failed to attract wealthy buyers?
Questions for Interview with Yang Songping, Deputy director, Shanghai Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage, April 2000

1. How many buildings in Shanghai have been registered as ‘modern outstanding architecture’ up to now? Will there be more?
2. Is there any recent change in the government’s subsidy policy with regard to conservation of heritage sites?
3. When did SMACH begin to be involved in built heritage?
4. Is it likely for China ICOMOS to establish its branch in Shanghai?
5. How is the national heritage law applied in urban conservation?
6. Would you like to tell me something about international exchange programs between Shanghai and other cities in the world in terms of urban conservation?
7. In what way was SMACH involved in the refurbishment of historic neighbourhood? What is its role in the development of theme streets such as Yandang Road and Hengshan Road?
8. How do you personally look at Hengshan Road project?
Questions for Interview with Liu Shouxiang, Deputy engineer-in-chief, Planning Division, Xuhui District, April 2000

1. Would you like to tell me something about the context of Hengshan Road project?

2. According to the municipal guideline of conservation, the buff zone of 30 m² was required for registered sites. Does this rule apply in Hengshan Road?

3. What department in the district is responsible for the procedure of commercializing historic properties? What is the procedure?

4. What is the key objective of the Hengshan Road refurbishment?

5. What is the next step of the project?

6. Who pays for the project?

7. What kind of management is applied to Hengshan Road Theme Street?

8. How is the project incorporated with tourism initiatives?

9. What is the community’s response to the project?

10. In practice, what difference do you see between conservation and preservation of historic sites?
Interview Questions for Shanghai Residents, June 1998, April 2000

1. How long have you lived here?
2. Do you own or rent this house?
3. How many people are living in this house?
4. What is the best thing of this place? What is the worst thing of the place?
5. Have you been told whether/when this house/neighbourhood will be demolished?
6. What is the compensation/subsidy for relocation?
7. Who talks to you about compensation/subsidy arrangements?
8. When did you move here? Where did you used to live?
9. How has/will the relocation changed/change your way of life?
10. How do you like your new place? What was your old place like?
11. In what way do you think the re-development has affected your neighbourhood and your life?
12. How do you look at Shanghai’s transformation in recent years?
The Shanghai Municipal Measures for the Conservation of Outstanding Modern Structures\textsuperscript{58}
Proclaimed by The People's Government of Shanghai Municipality on the 5\textsuperscript{th} of December, 1991

Article 1. The measures are formulated on the basis of stipulations from relevant national laws and policies, as well as the specific conditions of Shanghai, with the objective to carry on historical and cultural heritage, and to strengthen the protection and management of outstanding modern structures.

Article 2. The term outstanding modern structure in the measures refers to a building or a structure, or a group of buildings and structures that was/were built between 1840 and 1949, with historic, artistic and scientific significance, including

- Buildings important in Chinese history of urban construction and architectural history, and of archival value in architecture science;
- Masterpieces by prestigious Chinese architect(s);
- Building(s)/Structure(s) important to the progress in Chinese architectural science and technology;
- Icon building(s), Structure(s) and block(s) representing the traditional urban culture, landscape, and local identity of Shanghai

Article 3. Outstanding modern structures are categorized into the following three levels:

- National cultural heritage site
- Shanghai municipal cultural heritage site
- Shanghai municipal cultural heritage site of architectural significance

Article 4. The municipal administration for cultural heritage (SMACH) takes charge of the conservational management of cultural heritage sites. The municipal

\textsuperscript{58} Translation by the author of Articles 1-20. There are 30 articles in the original Chinese text.
administration for real estate (SMARE) takes charge of the conservational management of municipal heritage sites of architectural significance. The municipal urban planning administration bureau (SUPAB) takes charge of the planning management of outstanding modern structures.

Article 5. Outstanding modern structures in the category of Shanghai municipal cultural heritage site of architectural significance are to be listed jointly by SUPAB and SMARE, and the list should be submitted to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for approval and proclamation.

Outstanding modern structures in the category of Shanghai municipal cultural heritage site are to be listed jointly by Shanghai Urban Construction Commission (SUCC) and SMACH, and the list should be submitted to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for approval and proclamation, and submitted to the State Council for record.

Outstanding modern structures in the category of national cultural heritage site are to be listed jointly by SUCC and SMACH, the list should be submitted to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for assessment prior to being submitted to the State Council for approval and proclamation.

Article 6. Prior to the inscription, operated in compliance with Article 5, of outstanding modern structures, SUCC, SMACH, SUPAB and SUPAB should invite the Conservation Expert Team for Outstanding Modern Structures (The Expert Team) to assess the designated sites.

Members of The Expert Team should be invited jointly by SUCC, SMACH, SUPAB and SUPAB.

Article 7. A heritage protection zone and a construction control zone should be identified for an outstanding modern structure.
SUPAB, in collaboration with SMARE, is responsible for identifying the protection zones and construction control zones for the Shanghai municipal cultural heritage sites of architectural significance.

SUPAB, in collaboration with SMACH, is responsible to propose the protection zones and construction control zones for the cultural heritage sites, and to submit the proposal to the People's Government of Shanghai Municipality for approval. Proposals concerning the protection zones of national heritage sites should be submitted by SMACH and SUPAB to the relevant department(s) at state level for record.

Article 8. The criteria for the conservation of the outstanding modern structure are identified at the following four levels:

5. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior, structural framework, floor plan and internal fitting and panelling of the place.

6. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior, structural framework, basic floor plan and distinctive internal fitting and panelling of the place; while appropriate adaptation to other parts of the internal fitting and panelling should be allowed.

7. There must be no adaptation of the original exterior of the place. Provided that the original structural framework is retained, appropriate adaptation to the internal should be allowed.

8. Provided that the integrity and the characteristics of the original work are retained, partial adaptation to the exterior, as well as appropriate adaptation to the interior of the place, should be allowed.

The application of the conservation criteria, to an outstanding modern structure categorized as a cultural heritage site of architectural significance, is to be formulated by SUPAB, in collaboration with SMARE, taking into accounts the category, as well as the condition of usage of the site. The application of the conservation criteria, to an outstanding modern structure categorized as a cultural heritage site, is to be formulated by SUPAB, in collaboration with SMACH, taking into accounts the
category, as well as the condition of usage of the site. Nevertheless, item 4 of the
previous article is not applicable to cultural heritage sites.

Article 9. The owner and the user of the outstanding modern structure (the owner and
the user) should abide to the conservation criteria in conservation operations, and
should not change without permission the current use of the structure. In the case that
the change of use is absolute necessary, permission should be obtained from SMACH
for the municipal heritage site, prior to which permission should be obtained from
SMARE if the site is publicly owned; permission should be obtained from SMARE
for the municipal heritage site of architectural significance. If the change is of urban
planning concerns, agreement should be obtained by SMACH and SMACH from
SUPAB.

In case that the current use is not in compliance with that of the original design, and
has adversely affected, or is likely to adversely affect, the conservation of the site,
SMACH or SMARE may enforce correction of, or restriction on the use.

Article 10. The owner and the user should not carry out the following activities that
will threaten the safety of the outstanding modern structure:

1. Storage inside the structure flammable, explosive and corrosive and any other
dangerous and harmful objects.
2. Installation without permit any motor contrivance.
3. Any other behaviours that threaten the safety of the outstanding modern
structure.

The owner and the user should not change the use of the infrastructure, garden and
open space attached to the outstanding modern structure.

Article 11. The owner and the user should carry out regular restoration so as to retain
the original appearance of the structure and keep the structure in good condition. The
criteria for restoration are set by SMARE, the criteria for restoration concerning
heritage sites are set by SMARE, in corporation with SMACH.
Article 12. The owner and the user should designate organization or personnel dedicated to the day-to-day management of the outstanding modern structure.

Article 13. Restoration, alteration, extension and major restoration that will change the load-bearing mechanism of the main structure should not be carried out without permission.

Restoration (including major restoration that does not change the load-bearing mechanism of the main structure) should be reported to SMACH or SMARE for approval.

The alteration, extension and alteration that will change the load-bearing mechanism of the main structure, which are permissible in Article 8, should be reported to SUPAB for approval after permission is obtained from SMACH or SMARE.

Article 14. New development, alteration and extension should not be allowed in the protection zone of the outstanding modern structure. In case of special needs, permission should be obtained from SUPAB should a municipal cultural heritage of architectural significance be affected; proposal should be reviewed and reported, by SMACH and SUPAB, to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for approval should a municipal cultural heritage site be affected; proposal should be reviewed and reported, by SMACH and SUPAB, to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality, as well as the relevant department at the State level for approval should a national cultural heritage site be affected.

Article 15. New development, alteration and extension in the construction control zone of the outstanding modern structure are subject to the approval by SUPAB, and the plan should be agreed by SMACH should a cultural heritage site be affected.

Article 16. New development, altered and extended structures in the construction control zone should be harmonious with the outstanding modern structure in terms of scale, size, height and colour, and should not damage the original landscape. New development, alteration and extension projects that will pose major impact on the cultural environment should be reviewed by the Expert Team.
Article 17. Roadwork, underground construction and other civil infrastructure in the construction control zone should meet the requirements by SUPAB to adopt effective conservation approaches, should not jeopardize outstanding modern structures and the cultural environment.

Article 18. The demolition or relocation of outstanding modern structure, necessitated by special demands from development of national importance, should be reviewed by SUPAB, in collaboration with SMACH or SMARE, and reported to the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality for approval. If the site affected is national heritage, approval should be obtained from the State Council by the People’s Government of Shanghai Municipality.

Article 19. Heritage quarters may be designated in areas with concentration of outstanding modern structures.

Within the boundary of heritage quarters, cultural environment that embodies the city’s tradition and local identity should be conserved. The built fabric of original neighbourhoods should be retained. New development, alteration, extension of buildings and structures should be harmonious with the cultural environment of the area. Any buildings and structures jeopardising the cultural environment should be demolished or altered according to urban planning.

SUPAB is responsible for the drawing up of the detailed conservation requirements for heritage quarters.

Article 20. Private owners of outstanding modern structures should apply to SMACH or SMARE for the transaction, transfer and lease of the property. Approval should be obtained prior to the undertaking of transaction, transfer and lease. The government has the priority to purchase outstanding modern structures whose restoration is funded by the government.