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The Australia-Indonesia Security Relationship

by

Jonathan Mead

MA, Master of Management

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Deakin University, December 2004
I certify that the thesis entitled: The Australia-Indonesia Security Relationship

submitted for the degree of: Doctor of Philosophy, is the result of my own work and that where reference is made to the work of others, due acknowledgment is given.

I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by any other university or institution is identified in the text.

Full Name: Jonathan Mead  
(Please Print)

Signed:  

Date: 8 August 2005
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Finally, I am beholden to my wife, Fran – who endured the journey. Without her support, wisdom, patience and mentoring, this thesis would not have been possible.
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<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia; Armed forces</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>Agreement for Maintaining Security</td>
</tr>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand United States Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASR</td>
<td>Australian Strategic Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bobas aktif</td>
<td>Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine; free and active</td>
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<td>CONEFOS</td>
<td>Conference of the New Emerging Forces</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>DIO</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>DPT</td>
<td>Democratic Peace Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drohende Kriegsgefahr</td>
<td>The appearance that war is imminent</td>
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<td>dwifungsi</td>
<td>Dual function; Doctrine of TNI</td>
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<td>ETRA</td>
<td>East Timor Relief Association</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Agreement</td>
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<td>Fretlin</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>G30S</td>
<td>Attempted Indonesian coup of 30 September 1965</td>
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<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 states</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<td>GANEFOS</td>
<td>Games of the New Emerging Forces</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GESTAPU</td>
<td>Gerakan September Tiga Puluh; 30 September Movement</td>
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<td>GOC</td>
<td>Good Offices Commission</td>
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<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Functional Groups; Indonesian Political Party</td>
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<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>Mutual help</td>
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<td>Hankamrata</td>
<td>Total Peoples Defence; Doctrine of TNI</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marhaenism</td>
<td>Sukarno's indigenous form of economic socialism</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly</td>
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<td>NEFOS</td>
<td>New Emerging Forces</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Government Organisations</td>
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<td>NSCC</td>
<td>National Security Committee of Cabinet</td>
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<td>OLDEFOS</td>
<td>Old Established Forces</td>
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<td>ONA</td>
<td>Office National Assessments</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka; Free Papua Movement</td>
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<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Indonesian state ideology</td>
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<td>NASAKOM</td>
<td>Nationalism Religion Communism; Sukarno ideology</td>
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<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party</td>
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<td>PRRI</td>
<td>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia; Sulawesi revolt</td>
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<td>Sapta Marga</td>
<td>TNI soldier's oath</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Trikora</td>
<td>Threefold command</td>
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<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>UN Industrial Development Organisation</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td><em>Wawasan Nusantara</em></td>
<td>Archipelagic outlook; Indonesian strategic policy</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the Garden of Gethsemane the Lord warned the sword-wielding Peter: 'he who lives by the sword, dies by the sword.'¹ For centuries, scholars have been arguing the true interpretation of this verse, but one undeniable point relating to this theme is the pervasive nature of conflict in society. With the advent of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, the modern state has displayed a similar propensity for engaging in conflict with its neighbouring (and at times non-neighbouring) states. More recently, the 20th century was witness to a paradoxical phenomenon; a progression in liberal democratic values, which was counterbalanced by a wave of primordial interstate conflict. To that end and specific to this thesis, Australia and Indonesia have enjoyed a fluctuating and complex security relationship, which has been characterised by lows of military conflict and highs of intense diplomatic cooperation.

In short, the aim of this thesis is to provide the reader with a new interpretation of the Australia-Indonesia relationship – one seen through a theoretical prism of security. It will start with an examination of some of the key security theories/concepts/models, which have dominated the discourse over the past centuries. Following on from this theoretical examination will be an analysis of five specific events that have influenced the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. The events which will be analysed are: the Republic’s war against the Dutch (1945-49), the dispute over West Irian (1950-62), Indonesia’s campaign of Confrontation against the new state of Malaysia (1963-66), Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor (1974-76) and East Timor’s subsequent vote for independence (1998-1999). In analysing these episodes (in chronological order for ease of reading), the aim is not to provide another historical overview of the relationship, nor is it to test a single hypothesis, but rather, it is to attempt to better understand the motivations of both states through a range of established security concepts. As part of this discussion, it will be necessary to examine structural dynamics and specifically the interplay between Australia, Indonesia

¹ Bible John 16: V 10-11.
and the great powers\textsuperscript{2}. For instance, it would be superficial to examine the events of 1999 without reference to the post Cold War change in global and regional dynamics.

Without preempting the forthcoming analysis, but rather to set the stage, a number of preliminary observations can be made about the security relationship. First, emphasis placed on the relationship has not been evenly distributed. Australia, for a variety of reasons, has perceived Indonesia to be a central focus of its security strategy. A belief that any threat to the mainland had to come through Indonesia’s archipelago has seen Canberra at times view Indonesia as a form of outer protection whilst at other times as a source of threat. Conversely, Indonesia has had to deal with a security environment which has been composed of internal and external dynamics. Underpinning Indonesia’s threat perceptions has been Jakarta’s belief (up until 1999) that the south (and to a lesser degree the east and west) has been an area free of threats. Jakarta’s relative indifference to Australia has continually frustrated Canberra’s policy makers – this condition I have labelled as a “security contrast”. Paradoxically, from a strategic perspective, Jakarta’s relative indifference (up to 1999) should have reassured Canberra that its northern neighbour had no inimical desires on Australia; an enviable situation that a number of other co-located states could only have wished for (ie: India v Pakistan, India v China, the two Koreas, etc). The reasons why Australia continued to fear Indonesia, despite there being no substantive threat, may partly be explained by its historical fear of invasion and its xenophobic attitude towards Asians; this theme will be taken up in Chapter Two.

Second and inter related to the first point, the five security affairs which have been analysed did not, with the exception of the last, involve Australia as a “party principal”. The first four incidents revolved around Indonesia and European colonial powers (Netherlands x 2, Britain and Portugal), yet Australia has felt compelled and at times

\textsuperscript{2} This thesis will debate at length the role and influence of great powers and their relationship with middle and small powers. Martin Wight provides one of the best definitions of what constitutes these powers. He argued that great powers are those 'which have a distinct superiority over their neighbours', middle powers have 'sufficient strength and authority to stand on their own', whilst small powers 'cannot stand by themselves but need the protection and support of others. See: Wight M., 1978, \textit{Power Politics}, Penguin, London, pp 299-300. For this study, the US, USSR, China (toward the later part of the era in question) and Britain (during the early part of the era) are defined as great powers. Middle powers include Australia and the Netherlands. Indonesia poses a unique set of conditions. At the start, the Republic would be classified as a small power. However, it progressed with time, reaching middle power status during the West Irian crisis.
demanded a consultative role in the negotiating process. The extent to which Australia's self-imposed role has influenced the final decision in these incidents is problematic. Indeed, analyses of these events could lead to the conclusion that despite Australia's consternation that any decision would impact on its security, ultimately, Canberra's political influence on Jakarta (up to 1999) has been marginal. This leads to the third observation – the role of external states/NGOs. Notwithstanding Indonesia's much famed foreign policy of "bebas aktif" (non-aligned and active), the US, the USSR and China have all exerted varying degrees of influence on Indonesia throughout the period and ipso facto on the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. Conversely, the final issue of East Timor's independence vote of 1999 demonstrated the role of non-state actors in an era of reduced great power competition.

**THESIS METHODOLOGY**

As previously mentioned, this thesis is not a history of the Australia-Indonesia security relationship, nor is the aim of this thesis to solely examine specific international issues that involved both states. The former study is best left to historians, and the latter has already been completed by such eminent scholars as George, Bone, Legge and Mackie. Rather, this thesis aims to evaluate the security relationship between Australia and Indonesia through the prism of a number of significant events and will use key International Relations theories and concepts as the framework for the evaluation. Thus, the emphasis of this thesis is not to re-describe what happened, but rather to interpret, through secondary literature, these key events within an analysis of security conflict and cooperation specifically between Australia and Indonesia.

Each chapter follows a similar structure. At the start is an introduction. This will be followed by a review of the relevant literature pertaining to the chapter. The core of the

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research then commences with an examination of the interstate security linkages of the key states. The following diagrammatic model will be used throughout this thesis to represent the security linkages:

**Diagram 2: Interstate security linkages**

--- conflictual relationships
— cooperative relationships
----------------- Principal protagonists

Some of these linkages are quite simple (the above model reflects the inter-state security linkages during the Republic's war for independence), whilst other models are more complex (as chapter 4, Confrontation will illustrate). These models frame the security linkages under the rubric of either conflict or cooperation. The impetus with which Australia sought to develop alliances and develop its cooperative security network is a prominent feature in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. These alliances were a manifestation of the wider conflictual state of Cold War politics.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

This thesis will attempt to deepen the contemporary debate on this security relationship. Primarily, the bulk of data pertaining to this thesis was sourced from the following areas: Deakin University library, Monash University library, State Library of NSW, National
Library of Australia, various Australian Defence Force libraries, the National Archives collection in Canberra and second hand bookshops. As well, a number of field trips to Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Yogyakarta were conducted. The Internet was not widely used throughout this thesis, though some contemporary data (late 1990s) was obtained from this source.

The bibliography includes nearly 500 publications; however, many more works were researched, only to find that their relevance to this thesis was negligible. Interviews were not extensively used for a number of reasons. Firstly, the time span of this thesis precluded interviews being conducted over the early period of the security relationship. Most of these people have unfortunately passed on. Secondly, the more contemporary security events of East Timor 1975 and 1999 have been, and continue to be, highly sensitive issues, not only to the major players, but also to the general public. Thus, when approached, personnel were reluctant to give an interview. This has had no deleterious impact on this thesis. Most of these players' views are already in the public domain through their memoirs, biographies, media statements and Senate Inquiries. This thesis is not seeking new primary data but rather to develop a deeper theoretically informed understanding of the Australian and Indonesian relationship on security matters.

Whilst each chapter will examine specific publications, a number of works stand out. Chapter 1 outlines a range of security theories and divides them into two categories; theories that emphasise conflict and cooperation - works by Waltz, Morgenthau, Jervis, Walt, Bull and Mearsheimer are notable. The seminal publication that stands out in chapter 2 is the series of works by Dorling and Lee. These are a compilation of

cablegrams from the Australian Department of External Affairs relating to the Republic's war against the Dutch. The most prominent account on the West Irian dispute (chapter 3) is given by Bone. Mackie's research is widely recognised as the definitive version of events for Confrontation; his work is central to chapter 4. The early release of DFAT archival documents from 1974-1976 under the banner of Australia and the Indonesian incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 is the most accurate work published on East Timor and thus was a key source for chapter 5. Finally, DFAT's volume on East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian policy challenge was an invaluable source of data for chapter 6 on East Timor's independence struggle of 1999.

In addition, particular mention must be made of the series of works by Greenwood & Harper (Australia in World Affairs 1950-1955, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70, 71-74), Evans Edwards and Goldsworthy.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP - AN OVERVIEW

By way of introducing the forthcoming analysis, it is timely to highlight the key themes of the five events which form the basis of this thesis and to note mainstream thinking of the security relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

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Australia and Indonesia's Independence The Transfer of Sovereignty Documents 1949, Australian Govt Pub Service, Canberra.

Bone R., 1958, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea Problem, Cornell, Ithaca. [Noting that Bone published his work in 1959 prior to the events of the early 1960s his thesis does have some notable omissions].


In August 1945, the Japanese Army was close to capitulation. Acknowledging that defeat was nigh, a paradoxical gesture by the Japanese occupying forces in Java gave Sukarno and Hatta the opportunity to declare independence on 17 August. Whilst the maelstrom of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was still to eventuate, Sukarno’s proclamation was the genesis for the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The significance of Sukarno’s actions went unnoticed in Canberra – the proclamation was not even recorded during Parliamentary Debates. However the relationship between the newly independent state of Indonesia was to develop into one of Australia’s most difficult. The Republic’s euphoria over claiming independence was short lived with Dutch forces intent on reestablishing their sovereignty over the archipelago. This was the catalyst for a four year war that ultimately ended on 27 December 1949 when control of the islands was handed over to Republican forces. Throughout this dispute, Australia and the emerging Indonesian state forged a cooperative relationship, which was born out of a realisation that each needed the other.

As part of the Round Table Conference in 1949, the island of West Irian\(^{22}\) was left in Dutch hands with a final resolution over its status to be determined in 12 months. This 12 month period eventually dragged out to 12 years; as a consequence, the Netherlands and Indonesia became embroiled in a bitter political dispute, which saw Australia stridently favour the Dutch. This dispute, coupled with Menzies’ suspicion about Sukarno’s communist affiliations and Jakarta’s growing concern about Western imperial powers, saw the Australia-Indonesia security relationship deteriorate to a state of diplomatic conflict - but one stopping well short of military conflict as the US sought to accommodate Sukarno and prevent the Indonesian state from moving closer to the Communist orbit.

Shortly after the successful transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, Sukarno embarked upon another militant campaign – this time over the fledgling state of Malaysia. Principally, Confrontation involved Britain and Indonesia and again Australia sided against its northern neighbour. Confrontation was notable in that Australian and Indonesian combat forces engaged in military clashes, and for its time, it was Asia and Australia’s most dangerous


\(^{22}\) The Dutch knew the island as West New Guinea, whilst Indonesian nationalists called it West Irian. This thesis will use the Indonesian term.
dispute. This dispute saw the security relationship reach new lows, this time to a state of deep conflict, which only ended after the attempted coup and counter coup of 30 September 1965.

After GESTAPU\textsuperscript{23}, the introduction of a moderate, technocratic and Western leaning government in Indonesia sparked a renaissance in the security relationship with Australia. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, both Jakarta and Canberra attempted to bring some stability to the relationship. This stability was sorely tested in 1975/76 when Indonesia invaded and subsequently incorporated the province of Portuguese Timor. Both Whitlam and Suharto were cautious in their actions, lest they destabilise the fine balancing arrangement that had existed between both states. Ultimately, Whitlam acceded to Suharto’s actions in the name of fostering stronger relations between the two states. Despite the controversy, East Timor did not rupture the bilateral cooperation which had been developing since the introduction of the New Order.

From the mid 1970s, successive Australian governments attempted to add a degree of “ballast” to the security relationship. The issue of East Timor was placed in “cold storage” whilst other relations including the political, strategic and economic were permitted to flourish. Strategically, a host of Australian Defence Reviews continued to espouse the intrinsic importance of Indonesia to Australian security. However, in 1997 the Asian economic crisis set in train a course of events that was unthinkable only months earlier. Central to this was the fall of Suharto and the appointment of the eccentric Habibie as Indonesia’s third President. In an attempt to stamp his imprimatur on Indonesian society, Habibie initiated a wide-ranging reform process that included: democratic elections, economic reform, administrative decentralisation and the offer of autonomy to East Timor. The latter aspect was an attempt to remove a recurring international irritant that had persistently exerted external pressure on Indonesia – this pressure encompassed NGOs, the European Union, sections of the US Congress and the Catholic Church. Midstream, Habibie left open the option of independence to the East Timorese – who readily accepted the offer through a ballot held in August 1999. This ballot invoked a sense of deep

\textsuperscript{23} Gerakan September Tiga Puluh; The Indonesian term used to denote the alleged PKI coup of 30 September 1965.
frustration and animosity within certain sections of Indonesian society (not unlike the resentment shown post 30 September 1965). Australia's role in leading the international force (INTERFET) had a deleterious impact on the security relationship which saw it plummet to lows not seen since the mid 1960s – in sum, back to a state of conflict, with a strong potential for a direct clash of armed forces.

Interpretations of the security relationship have typically underscored the complexity and fluctuating nature of this association and the challenges and obstacles that each state (though Australia in particular) have faced. In 1958, Werner Levi considered that 'it was not surprising that Indonesia and Malaya attracted the interests of so many Australians.' In 1963, Greenwood and Harper's five yearly analysis of Australian foreign policy, concluded, 'Australia's attitudes and policy towards Indonesia since 1950 shows clearly the dominance of sentiments which were strongly felt but rarely well informed or far sighted.' In their next review of 1968, they made claim that 'Australian diplomacy over many years was devoted to over rigid positions.' In addition, their analysis of West Irian in the early 1960s determined that 'while alarmed about the prospect of Indonesian occupation of West New Guinea the government recognised the importance to Australia of good relations with Indonesia.' This point is important because it indicates that Australia's penchant for favourable relations with Indonesia stems back to the early 1960s and indeed even further to the founding of the Indonesian state. Writing during the heady days of the transition from Old to New Order, B D Beddie claimed, 'Australia's ability to influence Indonesia has been limited.' He argued that Indonesia's problems were too great to be influenced by the building up of goodwill or of admonition from Australia. There is a sense of irony in this statement in that Gareth Evans long argued in the 1990s about the need to add “ballast” as a means of preventing any single issue from destabilising

24 Levi W, 1958, Australia's outlook on Asia, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p 179.
27 ibid, p 103.
29 ibid.
the relationship.\textsuperscript{30} Despite this “ballast”, the events of 1999 saw a rapid decline in the security relationship, adding credence to Beddie’s claim some 30 years earlier.

Max Teichmann noted that ‘Australian evaluations of Indonesia were contaminated by the attitudes which led us to intervene in Asia – anti-communism and suspicion of neighbouring states who had not patently sided with the West.’\textsuperscript{31} In 1974, Angel claimed, ‘despite Australia’s previous alliance with what Indonesia viewed as the opposing camp, Jakarta had not generally felt obliged to confront Australia over policy differences.’\textsuperscript{32} In 1977, Ingleston’s review of East Timor concluded, ‘the Australian government considered good relations with Indonesia far more important than supporting a cause of no real consequence for Australian interests.’\textsuperscript{33} Nancy Viviani made the point that public opinion plays a significant role in the Australia-Indonesia relationship, which in turn makes it particularly difficult for any Australian government to manage.\textsuperscript{34} In 1978, T B Millar articulated a theme that Gareth Evans would subsequently pick up on when he declared, ‘it would be hard to think of two neighbouring states anywhere more dissimilar than Australia and Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{35} In 1986, Paul Dibb, commissioned by the government to review Australia’s defence policy, asserted that a primary national objective must be to improve the state of affairs between the two states.\textsuperscript{36} Habib summarised the security relationship as never being close or very friendly.\textsuperscript{37} At the same time, Bill Morrison, a previous Ambassador to Indonesia, made the claim that Australia and Indonesia were involved in a ‘small relationship.’\textsuperscript{38} By this, he was referring to a lack of legal, political, administrative,

\textsuperscript{30} Evans G & Grant B, 1981, \textit{op cit}, p 204.
\textsuperscript{31} Teichmann M, 1973, Clogs to Clogs in Three Decades, in Clark C, \textit{Australia Foreign Policy Towards a Reassessment}, Cassell, Sydney, p 44.
\textsuperscript{35} Millar T B, 1978, \textit{Australia in Peace and War}, ANU Press, Canberra, p 236.
\textsuperscript{38} Morrison, B, Australia, as cited in, Hasnib Habib, Australia Indonesia relations: The politico defence dimension, as cited in, Ball D & Wilson H, 1991, \textit{Strange Neighbours The Australia Indonesia relationship}, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, p 245.
linguistic, historical, institutional and trade similarities. This argument is analogous with Hedley Bull's theory of "society", which will be examined in more detail later in this chapter.

In 1986, two researchers from the University of Sydney surveyed Indonesian press coverage of Australia from June 1985 to June 1986. The researchers' findings indicated that Australia did not feature prominently in any of the newspapers surveyed; in stark contrast to Australian press coverage of Indonesia which "was ongoing." This theme is an elementary and consistent thread, which will be highlighted in the ensuing chapters. In particular, the lack of Indonesian commentary on Australia, in chapters 3 and 4 on the West Irian dispute and Confrontation, demonstrates Indonesia's historical indifference to Australia. One of the more significant paradoxes of this relationship was Indonesia's nonchalant approach to the fact it was warring with its southern neighbour from 1964-65. With both states sustaining military deaths, Australia's attitude was vastly different to Indonesia's.

For Australia, its strategic isolation has historically made it feel ill at ease with its geographical surroundings. This theme will be explored in chapter 3. Habib noted that "the fear of invasion from the north has always been the factor exercising a conditioning effect upon Australia's external outlook." Australia's predisposition to looking northward has been a strong theme in the commentary on the security relationship. Ingleson summarised this sentiment by declaring in 1977 that "Australian governments invariably have looked at Southeast Asia with Indonesia as their foremost consideration." Smith, Cox and Burchill amplified this theme even further by commenting on the Dibb Report that "on the one hand a threat from the archipelago to the north is codec for an Indonesia threat, on the other hand, the idea of a threat through the archipelago implies an

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Indonesia subdued by an external power.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, Andrew Macintyre concluded, 'notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, security considerations have always been at the heart of Australian interest in the relationship with Indonesia.'\textsuperscript{44} In a way, this fascination with the north is understandable. Ironically, it was General Benny Murdani, the 1980s Commander of ABRI, who succinctly placed Australia's motifs of fear from northern invasion in perspective when he stated - 'well no one is going to attack them from the South Pole.'\textsuperscript{45}

In 1991, Macintyre maintained that 'Australia has regularly been disappointed by Jakarta's seeming unwillingness to make equally strong efforts to build linkages and prop up the relationship in the face of challenge.'\textsuperscript{46} Anton Lucas highlighted this strategic indifference by noting that in Australia there were approximately 266 Australia "Indonesianists", whilst in Indonesia there are only two or three Australia specialists.\textsuperscript{47} The imbalance in which each state has viewed the other has at times seen Canberra labelled a courtier to Jakarta. However, from a strategic perspective, Indonesia's historical indifference towards Australia could be interpreted as a message of reassurance. J Soedjati Djiwandono claimed that Jakarta's tendency to take Canberra for granted could be a compliment in the sense that 'Indonesia never regarded Australia as a source of trouble or posing a threat to its national security and survival.'\textsuperscript{48} The fact that the majority of observations in this section emanated from Australian commentators is testament to this predicament.


\textsuperscript{44} MacIntyre A, Australia Indonesia Relations towards a more stable footing, as cited in, Anderson D, 1991, \textit{Australia and Indonesia a partnership in the making}, Pacific Security Research Institute, Institute of Public Affairs Limited, Sydney, p 52.

\textsuperscript{45} Crouch H, Domestic lobby groups and foreign policy, as cited in, Sulaiman I & Hanafi & Sofyan G & Smith S, 1998, 'Development: Bridging the Arafura Sea Australia Indonesia relations in prosperity and adversity', Issues No 10, National Centre for Development Studies, NLA, Canberra, p 22.

\textsuperscript{46} MacIntyre A, Australia Indonesia relations, as cited in, Ball D & Wilson H, 1991, \textit{Strange Neighbours The Australia Indonesia relationship}, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, p 150.

\textsuperscript{47} Lucas A, 1996, 'Half a century of Indonesia Australia Interaction', Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph No 6, Flinders University, South Australia, p 86.

In 1991, Robert Hill, the then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, noted, ‘Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has been characterised by a roller coaster ride of highs and lows.’ 49 Macintyre warned against expecting too much in the relationship, as it resembled a plant that had been overfertilised. 50 In 1996, Colin Brown’s analysis of the relationship reached a similar conclusion – ‘relations between Australia and Indonesia have rarely been smooth or untroubled.’ 51 The economist Dobbs-Higginson made the observation that ‘Australia’s desire to remain true to its European cultural roots, its desire to have a special relationship with the US, particularly with regard to defence and security issues and its concurrent desire to have a special trade based relationship with Asia leave it wanting to be all things to all people.’ 52 This finding is similar to Huntington’s assertion of Australia being a torn state 53 - a concept that will be explored in more depth later in this chapter. In response to the 1995 Agreement for Maintaining Security, Ali Alatas stated that the Agreement was a pillar in a ‘series of pillars.’ 54 In 1997, Nancy Viviani saw the relationship as ‘unsettled and easily derailed.’ 55 Meanwhile, Australia’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, A Downer, contended that ‘Indonesia has always been a major player in Southeast Asia and we have developed a broadly based and complex relationship over the last 50 years.’ 56 Heinz Arndt claimed, ‘when Australians look North, the first country they see is Indonesia; when Indonesians look North, they turn their backs on Australia and this difference dominates the relationship.’ 57 In 1999, the Secretary of DFAT, Dr Ashton Calvert, claimed that ‘relations between Australia and Indonesia have gone from hostility

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and suspicion to close engagement in the past 40 years.\textsuperscript{58} whilst in 2000, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Australia, Arizal Effendi, alluded to the ‘cyclic fluctuation that has characterised our relations.’ \textsuperscript{59}

In summary, mainstream thought on the relationship has focused on a number of themes. Firstly, that the relationship has meant different things for each state. Whilst Australia has been predisposed with events to its immediate north, Indonesia has not reciprocated this strategic gaze. To a degree, Australians have historically seen Indonesia as the “image of its desires”. Secondly, the relationship has been dogged by challenges and obstacles, which have stymied the development of a strong cordial relationship. Finally, the relationship has been cyclic – punctuated by peaks of cooperation and troughs of conflict. These perceptions will be teased out and analysed in depth throughout this thesis.


\textsuperscript{59} Effendi A, Address to The Australia Institute of International Affairs, 3 February 2000, Sydney.
SECURITY: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION

In 50 BC Publilius Syrus exclaimed: ‘he is best secure from dangers who is on his guard even when he seems safe.’ Syrus’ morbid fascination with security has been an enduring societal theme throughout the centuries and despite the supposed directionality of mankind, conflict has continued to challenge the state system; right up to the 21st century. Arising from this security tradition has been a diverse and rich array of literature, which has generally been dominated by the realist and liberal camps.

In order to establish some background for the subsequent case studies, this chapter will examine a host of security theories, which have inspired the study of International Relations (IR) in recent centuries. These theories will be delineated under the rubric of those that foster conflict and those that stimulate cooperation. This approach will illuminate the interesting and often contradictory categorisations of IR theory. Moreover, this framework, whilst open to debate, adds a degree of fidelity to the ongoing analysis. Broadly, 12 theoretical perspectives will be used in this thesis: realism, alliance formation, neo-realism, the security dilemma, revolutionary theory, civilisation fault lines, the North South divide, liberalism, international society, international political economy, Democratic Peace Theory and security communities. These concepts should not be viewed in isolation, but rather, there are a number of clusters and linkages within each. For example, alliance formation is part of the broader realism and neo-realism discourse, whilst security communities and democratic peace are part of the challenge to the realism argument.

Whilst some of these security concepts have the individual and or the system as the central actor, it is important to emphasise that this thesis sees the state as the core actor in security relationships. This thesis is not about the Menzies-Sukarno or Keating-Suharto security relationship, nor is it about the global balance of power. These forces all played an integral
part in shaping the Australia-Indonesia security relationship, but nevertheless it should be understood that the state is central to these analyses.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the main, classical IR literature has tended to marginalise the argument into two fields: realism and challenges to realism. Renowned academics who have commented on the realist discourse or derivatives thereof include: Waltz, Morgenthau, Jervis, Walt, Mearsheimer, Carr, Bull, Said and Huntington. Their interpretations are an essential element to the front section of this chapter which looks at the conflictual aspects of security. On the contrary, Buzan, Wight, Fukuyama, Adler and Barnett and Acharya have significantly contributed to the discussion which attempts to counterbalance realism’s more extreme and pessimistic virtues.

SECURITY AND THE STATE

The theories that are outlined in the next two sections cover a broad span. Part of this span includes the “level” at which each theory approaches the analysis problem. This “level of analysis” is a methodology, which has been extremely influential in the recent discourse of

1 Heinl R, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 1966, United States Naval Institute, Maryland, p 291.
7 Carr E, 1939, The Twenty Years Crisis, Harper and Row, London.
International Relations. Buzan claimed it was a way to identify sources of explanation for observed phenomena.\textsuperscript{16} Waltz made this methodology famous in 1954 where he divided these sources into three distinct spheres: individual, state and systemic.\textsuperscript{17} Waltz's "First Image" focused on man's struggle for power.\textsuperscript{18} Waltz was not convinced about the validity of the "First Image", stating that 'First Image optimists betray a naivety in politics that vitiates their efforts to construct a new and better world."\textsuperscript{19} The "Second Image" he classified as the internal organisation of states.\textsuperscript{20} In particular, Waltz argued that according to the "Second Image", internal defects within the state might explain conflict.\textsuperscript{21} In evaluating Waltz's conclusions it is apparent that he identified the Second Image with varying manifestations of political ideology such as, authoritarianism, fascism, communism, democracy, tribal loyalties and feudalism (to name but a few).\textsuperscript{22} With respect to the "Third Image", Waltz was more enthusiastic, noting that 'wars occur because nothing prevents them in anarchy.'\textsuperscript{23} In conclusion, he used the analogy that 'if harmony is to exist in anarchy not only then I must be perfectly rational but I must be able to assume that everyone is too.'\textsuperscript{24}

In later years, Waltz expanded his theory of the "Third Image"; which was highlighted in his 1979 work \textit{The Theory of International Politics}. Waltz's approach became known as neo-realism. In this discourse, Waltz understood international political theory as operating at two levels; the individual or national level, which he referred to as reductionism and the international level which he denoted as systemic.\textsuperscript{25} Morton Kaplan continued on with the "levels" methodology in his 1957 book \textit{System and Process in International Relations}. Unlike Waltz, Kaplan favoured a state level approach.\textsuperscript{26} Barry Buzan contended that there

\textsuperscript{17} Waltz K, 1954, \textit{op cit}.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid, p 34.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid, p 39.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} ibid, p 82.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid, pp 80-84.
\textsuperscript{23} ibid, p 188.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid, p 169.
\textsuperscript{25} Waltz, 1979, \textit{op cit}, p 18.
\textsuperscript{26} Buzan B, 1995, \textit{op cit}, p 212.
were five “levels” from which conflict could be viewed through: system, sub system, unit, bureaucracy, and individual.27 Determining the validity of these models is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, analysing the problem through a multiple “level” approach is a powerful technique, which will be used in this study.

The next part of this section will draw heavily on Buzan’s informative work *People, States and Fear*.28 It will attempt to put the role of the state and its association with security into context. Regardless of whether one supports the state based and power-related theory of realism or the more ideal notion of liberal democracy, the state remains an inescapable medium and focal point for security. Buzan defined the state as comprising a physical base of population and territory, having institutions such as the machinery of government and having some idea of the state, which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of the people.29 In Buzan’s analysis, he characterised states as belonging to one of four types: nation-state, state-nation, imperial-state and part nation-state. Notwithstanding his caveat that the linkage between state and nation is not simple, his model provides a useful reference for analysing Australia and Indonesia.30

In his analysis of state institutions, Buzan concluded that ‘Governments can draw legitimacy from identifying with an ideology because it ties them to ideas and purposes larger than their own self interests’.31 Ideology has been a defining and at times dominant feature of many post colonial states. These states have often succumbed to a ‘vacuum of ideas’ after the disintegration of xenophobia post independence, thus leaving ‘arbitrarily defined populations occupying post colonial states with no firm political foundations of their own’.32 Sukarno’s exploitation of ideology (discussed in length in chapter 4) served to validate his own regime. The concepts of Pancasila33 (which was enshrined as part of the

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27 ibid.
28 ibid.
30 ibid, p 72.
31 ibid, p 85.
32 ibid, p 98.
33 Indonesian state ideology that expresses the ideals of the Indonesian nation as contained in the preamble to the 1945 constitution. It consists of five principles: Belief in One God, Just Humanity, Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice.
preamble to the Indonesian Constitution), NASAKOM\textsuperscript{34}, NEFOS/OLDEFOS\textsuperscript{35} and Sukarnoism were interwoven with the machinery of government. Thus, to criticise Sukarno or his government was to criticise the very pillars on which the state rested.

In concluding his analysis, Buzan characterised the state according to the following model; weak and strong powers and weak and strong states.\textsuperscript{36} Power referred to a country’s military and economic infrastructure, whilst state referred to the stability and cohesiveness of governing institutions.\textsuperscript{37} Using Buzan’s template, postcolonial Third World states are examples of weak powers and weak states, whilst established First World countries are the reverse. Buzan noted that ‘whatever the reasons for weak states their principal distinguishing feature is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government.’\textsuperscript{38} This has certainly been a feature of Indonesia’s history. That said, as this thesis will demonstrate in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, whilst domestically generated threats have been an important part of Indonesia’s security paradigm, perceptions of external threats, primarily from the north have been influential in Jakarta’s strategic outlook.

With respect to states that are both strong states and powers, Buzan claimed that their defining feature is that they have less vulnerability.\textsuperscript{39} However over the years, Australia has demonstrated traits, which would refute Buzan’s generalised classification. Indeed, since colonisation, Australia has had an exaggerated threat perception, which has manifested into a conviction of strategic vulnerability. During the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Australians feared invasion and/or intrusion from the French, Germans, Indonesians and Americans. Blainey cited the example of the city of Perth, which was settled due to a ‘fear of Indonesian pirates on the north coast and fear of French ambitions on the West Coast.’\textsuperscript{40}

During the American Civil War of 1861-65, there were concerns that opportunist privateers from the Northern States might seek to plunder Australia’s coasts. During the

\textsuperscript{34} Nationalism Religion Communism; Sukarno ideology.
\textsuperscript{35} New Emerging Forces, Old Established Forces.
\textsuperscript{37} ibid, p 97-98.
\textsuperscript{38} ibid, p 99.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid, p 113.
20th century, Canberra's fears centred on Russian, Japanese, German, Japanese again, Soviet then Chinese desires to invade Australia; only one of these fears [Japan] appears to have been well founded. Indonesia's actions over West Irian and Confrontation did nothing to ameliorate these fears and vulnerabilities. Spender's comment that 'instead of living in a tranquil corner of the globe, we are now on the verge of the most unsettled region in the world' encapsulated Australia's fear.41 In sum, Australia has been indiscriminate in identifying a threat - crossing political, economic, cultural and ideological boundaries. These historical fears from invasion will be examined in chapter 3, whilst the notion of Australia's exaggerated threat perceptions will be an argument scrutinised throughout this thesis.

Interests, Threats and Strategy

Fundamental to a state's security is the interests that it claims assumes primacy. These interests will vary from state to state, from leader to leader and from time to time. Interests are intimately linked to varying styles of political philosophy, which a state is founded upon. A realist state would perceive its national interest to be inter alia the acquisition of power, a neo realist state would argue that the maintenance of the balance of power was an essential part of its security framework, whilst a rationalist state would prefer to see the crystallisation of an "international society", which includes the tenets of order and justice. Conversely, a more liberal state would strive for the protection of individuals, human rights and freedom of speech. Which type of outlook a state adopts is not a random process, rather, it is interwoven with the type of regime that exists within it. Muthiah Alagappa's study Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia the quest for Moral Authority42 attempted to identify and isolate the constituent elements of political legitimacy of seven Asian states - though his theoretical analysis can be extrapolated out to other states/regimes/governments. In his study he argued that states could be characterised according to three broad categories: authoritarian, democratic and Marxist-Leninist. Alagappa stated that 'the basis on which legitimacy is claimed will influence the structure

40 ibid, p 93.
42 Alagappa M, 1995, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The moral quest for authority, Stanford University, California.
of domination\textsuperscript{43} and thus, this will influence a state’s interests. With respect to authoritarian states, Alagappa stated:

Authoritarian governments usually acquire power through negative legitimacy: the military — or a civilian leader with the support of the military — usurps power with the declared purpose of saving the country or its revered institutions in order to clean up the mess, to restore law and order, to protect the country from a security threat.\textsuperscript{44}

However, unlike democratic states ‘authoritarian regimes by their very nature are prone to legitimacy crisis.’\textsuperscript{45} In other words, regime’s and government’s are fused, and thus, ‘contestation of a regime’s legitimacy will translate into contestation of the government’s legitimacy’ and vice versa.\textsuperscript{46} Alagappa’s findings indicated the following:

More often as in Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, and to a lesser degree, in Indonesia, autocratic rulers have been more concerned with preserving their own power rather than institutionalizing a regime.\textsuperscript{47}

Furthermore, Alagappa claimed that as part of this process, rulers attempted to modify ideologies and institutions associated with popular sovereignty (Thai style democracy, Guided Democracy, Pancasila democracy, Burmese socialism and Barangay democracy).\textsuperscript{48} One conclusion that can be drawn from Alagappa’s research is that historically (up to 1999) Indonesia’s national interests have been, to a degree, influenced by the Old and New Order’s quest to remain in power and legitimise its authority.

Complementing interests are threats, or the aspects that are seen to pose a danger to these interests. In effect, the two concepts are directly related. As a state’s security interests change so to will its perceived threats. If a state’s perceived threats are linked to its

\textsuperscript{43} ibid, p 3.
\textsuperscript{44} ibid, p 61.
\textsuperscript{45} ibid, p 62.
\textsuperscript{46} ibid, p 59.
\textsuperscript{47} ibid, p 330.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid, p 310.
interests, it is axiomatic to conclude that threats will vary according to the type of regime in force – whether this be authoritarian, democratic or Marxist-Leninist.

Since federation, Australia has perceived that it has been under threat from a range of states/entities including: a fear of unfriendly foreign powers, a suspicion of Asians (epitomised by Australia’s White Australia Policy), a feeling of strategic isolation (highlighted by a desire to develop alliances with other powers – ANZUS, SEATO, FPDA), a fear of Chinese hegemony (China’s rise in the 1960s and its affiliation with the PKI⁴⁹), an apprehension towards communism (Menzies attempt to outlaw the Australian Communist Party in the early 1950s), regional instability (the possibility of an inimical government being located close to Australia) and of late combating terrorism from non-state actors (Australia’s invocation of the ANZUS alliance to support the US Global War on Terror in 2001). Of note, Canberra has tended to believe that all these threats were to its north.

As part of Indonesia’s strategic construct its threat perceptions have been a fusion of external and internal dynamics. Specifically, the “China Threat”, imperialism, communist insurgency (the Madura Affair of 1948), secessionist movements (the PRRI incident of 1958), quasi civil war (G30S), regional separatist movements in Aceh (GAM), Papua (OPM), East Timor, Sulawesi, Moluccas, religious uprisings (Islam), ethnic tension (Javanese dominance and suppression of other islands), racial disparity (free market place dominated by Chinese traders) and democratic organisations seeking liberalism (student riots of 1998), have all challenged the Indonesian state. With such a diverse, complex and numerous array of external and internal challenges, there is little wonder that Indonesia has not placed the same degree of importance on the security relationship as Australia.

The final element of a state’s security perspective is the strategy it employs to deal with real or perceived threats. For the United States, during the era 1950 – 1970, this could be interpreted as its grand plan of containment. For the USSR, its security strategy could be recognised (in part) as its attempt to exert influence within the developing world. Threat perceptions, interests and strategies are the forces that produce a state’s security

⁴⁹ Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party.
perspective. When one state’s security perspective intersects with those of another state a security relationship is formed. Accordingly, there are two key forces that influence this relationship: perception and geographical reach.

**Perception and Geographic Reach**

Perception has an important role in International Politics. Sprouts identified that a ‘person consciously responds to his milieu through perception and in no other way.’ In 1962, Leon Festinger published a theory of cognitive dissonance, in which he noted:

Cognitive dissonance theory holds that when a deeply held value or belief is contradicted by a new message from the environment (a dissonant cognition) the message will be rejected and the value or belief retained. This may not take the form of outright rejection of the discrepant message; rather, it may take the alternative form of reinterpretation of the datum, to make it consistent with existing belief. But the effect is the same; the individual’s value and belief system protects itself from external alteration.

Festinger’s research on perception has utility in this thesis because it assists in understanding some of the actions of pivotal actors during the period under examination. For example, Suharto’s rigid and deeply held anticomunist beliefs can be traced back to his formative years of military training. Elson noted that by 1958, ‘Suharto’s gathering concern was the expansion of communist influence.’ The PKI’s role and Suharto’s subsequent involvement in the coup and counter coup of 30 September 1965 had a major impact on his cognition.

With respect to military reach, Buzan argued that threats operate more potently over short distances and that security interactions with neighbours will tend to have first priority. Furthermore, he noted that the spatial placement of threats could be seen in terms of

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range.\textsuperscript{54} Intuitively this is correct. Neighbours such as India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Kuwait and Iraq and Germany and France are examples of the potency of short distance threats. A case study of threats operating more potently over short distances is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. During this incident, US threat perceptions increased dramatically when Soviet nuclear forces were stationed in Cuba as opposed to mainland Russia.

That said, the relative placement of threats offers a more accurate method from which threats to the state can be gauged. During the early phases of the Cold War the US was the only nuclear capable state. Thus, the threat posed by the USSR whilst significant to US national interests in Europe was significantly less than that posed by the US to the USSR. The geographic separation of the two states meant that a conventional Soviet invasion of mainland USA was a remote prospect. However, when the USSR achieved nuclear parity the strategic equation changed. In a brief period of time the US became vulnerable to a USSR nuclear threat. In some cases, there will be a coincidence in relative and absolute proximity -- India and Pakistan being a notable example. In other cases, there will be a dislocation in this synergy such as the US influence in the Middle East or Russian intervention in Southeast Asia. This reach may not necessarily be military reach, it could be political, social or economic, though, military reach has been a fundamental driver in the security relationships of a large number of states throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In sum, if threats, interests, security strategies, perception and geographical reach are the forces that act on the security relationship, then the resultant outcomes can be characterised by: degree and mutuality of engagement, the degree of commonality and the pattern of conflict/cooperation.

**Engagement, Commonality and Conflict/Cooperation**

Security relationships are intimately linked to threat perceptions and interests and where there is an absence of these forces then a relationship is unlikely to develop. For example, Australia has traditionally had little security engagement with the Latin American states. Similarly, Indonesia has had little engagement with South Pacific states. The point is, that describing a security relationship between two or more states as high, weak or moderate, is

\textsuperscript{54} ibid, p 135.
too generalised and lacks fidelity as it attempts to combine the differing attitudes of independent sovereign states. The Australia-Indonesia security relationship is a prime example of the divergent attitudes of both states. For the most part, Australia has been far more focused and has injected more energy into the security relationship than has Indonesia. This has partly been a manifestation of its threat perceptions which has at times seen Indonesia as a threat whilst at other times seen Indonesia as a defence against northern threats. Conversely, Indonesia has displayed less enthusiasm towards the security relationship as its threat perceptions have emanated from within and from the north. Thus, to characterise the Australia-Indonesia security relationship as either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ is simplistic. A more accurate barometer is to separate the degree of engagement between states into two components reflecting each side’s perspective. For example the India/Pakistan, and the two Koreas’ security relationships could be classified as high/high, whilst some of the smaller NATO states and the US could be deemed to be low/high.

Commonality relates to the degree of similarity between respective states. It incorporates such concepts as political ideology (democratic v authoritarian v totalitarian), economic planning models (capitalism v socialism), culture (Christian v Islam, Hindu v Sino), military/power similarities (First World v Third World v superpower v middle power), and historical heritage (colonial v ex colonial) and wealth (North v South). States with similar features will generally have a common security perspective. Notwithstanding Waltz’s notion that states are ‘like units’55, a range of commentators contend that in some respect states are not like units. Morgenthau, Huntington, Said, Boeke, Toynbee, Fukuyama, Doyle, Michael Taylor, Deutsch, Adler, Barnett, Buzan, Walt, and Alagappa, all subscribe to the notion, that, to varying degrees, commonality between states may facilitate and indeed stimulate interstate cooperation. There is much evidence, both theoretical and empirical, to suggest that commonality plays an important role in interstate cooperation and conflict.

The final measure of a security relationship is the level of conflict or cooperation exhibited between states. The very expression ‘security relationship’ is an extremely ambiguous term. Indeed, during the researching of this thesis there was a general lack of substantive

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55 Waltz, 1979, op cit, p 93.
literature on this term. In a general sense, security relationships, akin to personal relationships, are causal – that is, the action of one’s state has an effect on another’s state. This thesis defines a security relationship as existing where the actions of a state influence the security perspectives of another state.

Buzan claimed that ‘in defining regional security the principal elements that must be added to power relations is the pattern of amity and enmity among states.’\textsuperscript{56} Dougherty’s analysis was similar – he maintained that ‘just as there is no uncomplicated personal relationship between individuals so there is no international relationship between sovereign states which is without its elements of antagonism.’\textsuperscript{57} He went on and asserted that the history of interstate relations is one of conflict and cooperation.\textsuperscript{58} Yet, as chapter 4 details, only one security issue between these states actually eventuated into military engagement – albeit low level engagement. Thus, the term conflict can be misleading. In 1921, Park and Burgess defined ‘conflict as the conscious, intermittent, and personal struggle for status.’\textsuperscript{59} Deutsch stated that conflict comprised ‘incompatible activities; conflict occurs when one’s actions are interfering, frustrating, obstructing or in some way making another’s actions less effective.’\textsuperscript{60} This element of obstruction was picked up by Himes who noted that ‘an essential element in social conflict is the belief of one collective actor that another is the obstacle to its having the values that it desires.’\textsuperscript{61} Himes further claimed that ‘the purpose of conflict is to gain or retain desired values which are usually believed to be in scarce supply because others own or control them.’\textsuperscript{62} Suseno saw conflict as the ‘disturbance of harmony.’\textsuperscript{63} De Reuck defined conflict as a situation between parties ‘who perceive that they possess mutually incompatible objectives.’\textsuperscript{64} De Reuck expanded upon this concept

\textsuperscript{56} Buzan, 1993, \textit{op cit}, p 189.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
and noted that 'conflict is always about change' and the 'legitimate distribution of future costs and benefits among men.' Mack and Synder noted that conflict was 'an ability to control the opponent.' Ho Won Jeong described conflict as a 'contentious process of interpersonal or intergroup interaction that takes place within a larger social context.' Put simply, Ho saw conflict as 'an incompatibility of goals between parties.' Dougherty explained conflict as 'a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.'

Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast interpreted conflict to be characterised by differing stages: initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation and termination. In their study, they concluded that conflict could be distinguished according to the following appearances: latent conflicts, manifest conflict processes (MCP) and aggressive manifest conflict processes (AMCP). Latent conflicts are those which have not developed in an observable manner, MCPs are conflicts that have developed to a stage where they are observable but not expressed in a violent manner and AMCP have escalated to a violent level of expression. These definitions provide scope to define the period during the West Irian dispute as an era of conflict, even though military engagement between Australia and Indonesia did not eventuate. Ho Won Jeong advanced this theme of latent conflict and deduced that for this form of conflict to become manifest a divergence of interests, motives and attitudes has to be perceived by actors. Finally, Himes believed that in the sociology of social conflict, there existed four different types of conflict: private conflict, civil strife, social control and international war.

65 ibid, p 99.
66 ibid, p 100.
69 ibid, p 12.
70 Dougherty J & Pfaltzgraff R, 1971, op cit, p 139.
72 ibid, p 40.
73 ibid.
74 Ho Won Jeong, 1999, op cit, p 12.
De Reuck's definition of a cooperative situation (one in which the activity of one party confers benefits upon another) will be used in this thesis.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, during the Republic's war for independence, cooperation was evident as each state's actions subsequently conferred a benefit upon the other (for Australia this was regional stability and security, for Indonesia it was independence). There is an important point about De Reuck's definition which should be emphasised. Cooperation does not imply that states act together to confer a similar benefit. If this were the case, then Australia and Indonesia could rarely be described as being in a cooperative relationship. Indeed, this goal divergence has been a constant theme in their relationship.

The above mentioned review of the discourse of conflict and cooperation highlights a number of points. Firstly, conflict is not simply just the waging of war nor is it confined to the interstate arena. Himes' understanding of conflict existing at many levels has particular relevance to the analysis contained within this thesis. Whilst the security issues that form the nucleus of this research are confined to Himes' "international war", the ideas of civil strife and social control are ones that have plagued Indonesian society since independence.

Second, Chodelin, Druckman and Fast's analysis of latent conflict is engaging because it helps identify some of the characteristics of the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. Whilst AMCP has been observable only once during the Australia and Indonesia's history, their relationship has been undermined, at times, by a latent tension which has posed hurdles for the development of a cooperative security relationship.

To summarise, Diagram 4 (overleaf), encapsulates the preceding analysis of security relationships.

CONFLICTING SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

Sorel noted that security was the eternal dispute. His conundrum of war and peace, reality and utopia, conflict and cooperation, underlines some of the challenges inherent in security relationships. At one level, security relationships can foster cooperation between neighbouring states and regions; conversely, they can be a source of mistrust and conflict between states. To some degree, the Australia-Indonesia security relationship has been indicative of this ‘eternal dispute’, with the relationship oscillating through peaks of cooperation to troughs of conflict, including a brief moment of military engagement from 1964-65.

The remainder of this section will focus on theoretical security concepts that are generally linked to conflict. That said, a note of caution needs to be offered in categorising theories strictly under the rubric of either conflict or cooperation. Specifically, some of these
theories are fluid and theorists could argue that they offer an understanding of both. For instance, Waltz would contend that neo-realism in a bipolar world promotes stability.\textsuperscript{78} Nevertheless, this classification provides a useful method of allocating theories into separate fields from which further analysis can be undertaken. A second and perhaps more poignant point is that of the role of theory. Dougherty observed that 'theory properly conceived always aims at generalization.'\textsuperscript{79} This edict reminds us that no theory is absolute nor can it cover all permutations.

**Realism**

The theory of realism has had a profound influence on international politics. Originating with Thucydides (The History of the Peloponnesian War) through to Machiavelli in 1513 (The Prince and Discourses), Hobbes (Leviathan 1651) and culminating in a school of 20\textsuperscript{th} century adherents including, Carr, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Kennan,\textsuperscript{80} and Kissinger. The realist tradition focussed on the nation state as the principal actor in International Relations and the acquisition of power as a pre-eminent goal for all states in an existing hostile geo-strategic environment. Realism's rubric with anarchy, conflict, power and the centrality of the state has found much favour amongst theorists throughout the last century. Traditional realism assumes the following:

- States are the most important actors in international politics.
- Anarchy is the distinguishing feature of international life.
- States seek to maximise their power.
- States assume that other states aim to achieve power.
- States will use military force to secure their objectives.


\textsuperscript{78} Waltz's point is that multipolar worlds as highly stable yet prone to conflict whilst bipolar worlds are highly peaceful but less stable.

\textsuperscript{79} Dougherty J & Pfaltzgraff R, 1971, op cit, p 45.

\textsuperscript{80} Conventional literature lists Kennan as a realist. His Long Telegram and Sources of Soviet Conduct in Foreign Affairs in 1947 were synonymous with the US foreign policy of containment. However, in reviewing his memoirs (Kennan G, Memoirs 1950-1963, Hutchinson, London) his strategic outlook later on in his diplomatic career was far more along rationalist lines.
States believe in the distribution of power in international politics. The prominence of the state has been fundamental to realism. The underlying premise supporting this hypothesis was that all states were essentially similar in respect to their security concerns, fears and ambitions. J Ann Tickner, described the realist paradigm as follows:

For realists the meaning of security was subsumed under the rubric of power. Conceptually it was synonymous with the security of the state against external dangers.

With respect to power, Carr argued that it was an essential element of politics and that "the exercise of power always appears to beget the appetite for more power." In identifying the inherent tension between status quo and revisionist states, he noted:

The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is identifiable with the interest of each individual nation helped politicians and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a fundamental divergence of interest between nations desirous of maintaining the status quo and nations desirous of changing it.

Finally, he concluded that the struggle of interests was not about a struggle between morality and power but was a natural event in international politics.

Whilst Carr's study of international politics in 1939 was more a critique of the 'prevailing wisdom of the day', Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations attempted a more rigorous analysis of international politics. Morgenthau identified six principles that international politics was governed by: objective laws, power, the concept of interest remaining

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84 ibid, p 112.
85 ibid, p 53.
86 ibid, p 105.
consistent, principles not guiding state behaviour, no universally agreed set of moral principles and an autonomous political sphere. Ultimately, Morgenthau perceived that politics was a struggle for power, which had its roots in human nature. For Morgenthau, conflict was a natural part of international politics. He stated:

All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised violence in the form of war.

Thus, states were locked into a perpetual cycle of pursuing or keeping power and accordingly they could be classified into three categories: those that were intent on keeping power (states quo), those states which sought to increase their power (imperial powers) and those states which sought to demonstrate their power (prestige powers). In essence, there was an inherent tension between states that were either attempting to maintain the current system or those attempting to change the system. Illustrative of Morgenthau’s power model was the tension between Australia and Indonesia during the 1950s and early 1960s. Australia’s alliance with the US and its place within the Western geopolitical orbit dictated that Canberra had a vested interest in preserving the international political order. Conversely, Sukarno’s anti-imperial passion, epitomised by his NEFOS/OLDEFOS dialectic, drove Indonesia down the revisionist path.

More recently, some theorists have divided realism along two lines: offensive and defensive. Offensive realism attests that the international system fosters conflict and aggression, whilst defensive realists argue that the international system does not stimulate conflict, per se. Mearsheimer (a self-proclaimed offensive realist) pioneered this theory and argued that under offensive realism great powers inevitably look for the opportunity to gain power at each other’s expense. Jervis depicted the two different schools of thought as follows:

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88 ibid, pp 74-76.
90 ibid, p 4.
91 ibid, p 36.
92 ibid, p 37.
The offensive realist thinks that conflict represents real incompatibility between desired states, \(^{94}\) whilst the defensive realist argues that a great deal depends on whether the state is facing a like minded partner or an expansionist.\(^ {95}\)

**Neo-realism**

Neo-realism gained prominence after WWII with the advent of bipolarity and the introduction of nuclear weapons. Its leading proponent, Kenneth Waltz, believed that the global political structure guides the way a state behaves, ‘regardless of the way the state is constructed or the attitudes of the state’s inhabitants.’\(^ {96}\) He noted the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics are, ‘the structure of the systems and its interacting units.’\(^ {97}\) This methodology of systemic or structural forces became synonymous with the term neo-realism. As Burchill noted, neo-realism ‘regarded the advent of nuclear weapons and the rough parity between east and west as a source of stability and pacification during the Cold War.’\(^ {98}\) In 1990, Waltz stated:

> By depicting an international system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neo-realism establishes the autonomy of international politics and makes theory about it possible …international structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking actions while propelling them toward others.\(^ {99}\)

Part of Waltz’s rationale for his neo realist theory was that states are ‘like units’,\(^ {100}\) and that as a consequence, these ‘like units’ strive to maintain a measure of independence.\(^ {101}\) As states worried about self-gains, the degree of international cooperation between states was limited.\(^ {102}\) Waltz perceived that conflict is common as the international system creates

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\(^ {95}\) ibid, p 50.

\(^ {96}\) Waltz, 1954, *op cit*.

\(^ {97}\) Waltz, 1979, *op cit*, p 99.


\(^ {100}\) Waltz, 1979, *op cit*, p 93.

\(^ {101}\) ibid, p 104.

\(^ {102}\) ibid, p 106.
'powerful incentives for aggression.'\textsuperscript{103} A defining feature of Waltz's theory was the importance of the "balance of power". He noted that 'balance of power politics prevail wherever two and only two requirements are met; that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.'\textsuperscript{104} Unlike Morgenthau who saw states in a never ending struggle for power, Waltz claimed that "the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system."\textsuperscript{105} Accordingly, states will tend to flock to the weaker side in order to maintain this balance.\textsuperscript{106} Waltz viewed multipolar worlds as highly stable yet prone to conflict whilst bipolar worlds are highly peaceful but less stable.\textsuperscript{107}

Neo-realism has come under criticism due to its inability to factor in other security tenets, including domestic issues, the economy and the environment. Further, by definition, the neo-realist assertion of the primacy of cohesive sovereign and unitary states excludes the internal pressures and domestic realities of weak or developing states.

In 1978, Morrison and Suhurke conducted a comparative analysis of the geopolitical and strategic interchange between Asian states and the great powers.\textsuperscript{108} They identified that these linkages could be classified according to the following criteria: intensity and systemic quality.\textsuperscript{109} In a systemic linkage the state is the focal point of competition amongst great powers whilst a partial linkage represents a state that is relatively isolated from great power competition.\textsuperscript{110} Using this model, Morrison and Suhurke classified Korea and Vietnam as systemic states, whilst Singapore and Malaysia were more closely associated to the partial paradigm; Indonesia and Thailand were somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. With reference to the moderate systemic paragon the authors claimed:

\textsuperscript{104} Waltz, 1979, \textit{op cit}, p 121.
\textsuperscript{105} ibid, p 126.
\textsuperscript{106} ibid, p 127.
\textsuperscript{109} ibid, p 290.
\textsuperscript{110} ibid, p 4.
Their relations with the large powers were shaped by the Cold War and were sensitive to changes in the relationship among the major powers...but it was relatively moderate compared to the Korean and Vietnamese cases.\textsuperscript{111}

Of particular relevance to this thesis they argued that non-aligned states such as Indonesia have one advantage over a larger state in that it can easily switch allegiances\textsuperscript{112} and thus can bargain from its ability to alter its alliance patterns.\textsuperscript{113} This model is a powerful application of neo realist theory. Morrison and Suhrke argued that as Indonesia remained non-aligned, its comparative size and potential worth as a great power ally afforded it enormous leverage during the Cold War. As the following chapters will demonstrate, Indonesia’s status as a non-aligned and moderate systemic state helped shape the great powers’ policies in a number of security circumstances. For example, during the Republic’s war against the Dutch, the Soviets gave political support to the nationalists at a time when the US was backing the Netherlands. Thus, in one respect moderate systemic states act as “force multipliers” as they can exert far more influence on larger powers than can allied states.

Security Alliances

Alliance formation is a central element of interstate politics and is interwoven with the tenets of realism and neo-realism; whilst not strictly an individual theoretical tradition, it is worthy of particular examination. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff noted that ‘although a sense of community may reinforce alliances or coalitions it seldom brings them into existence.’\textsuperscript{114} Morgenthau explored the relationship between alliances and states at length in his seminal work \textit{Politics among Nations}. He stated that ‘an alliance adds precision especially in the form of limitation to an existing community of interest and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them.’\textsuperscript{115} However, whilst states may ally to counter another state, often their mutual objectives are obscure. Morgenthau claimed:

\textsuperscript{111} ibid, p 292.
\textsuperscript{112} ibid p 293.
\textsuperscript{113} ibid, p 296.
\textsuperscript{115} Morgenthau, 1967, \textit{op cit}, p 176.
The typical interest which unites two nations against a third are both more definite as concerns the determination of the enemy and less precise as concerns the objectives to be sought and the policies to be pursued.\textsuperscript{116}

Martin Wight delineated alliances into three categories: those which embody a common interest in relation to the balance of power, associations that are a residue of changes in the balance of power and alliances which are thought to arise from community of doctrine or ideology.\textsuperscript{117} Wight concluded that "the oldest classification is into equal and unequal according to the relative status and power of the allies".\textsuperscript{118}

Steven Walt's study, \textit{The Origin of Alliances}\textsuperscript{119} reinvigorated the debate on alliance formation. Whilst it is true that Australia and Indonesia have never entered into a formal alliance, Walt's theory is still useful, as a comparative tool, for analysing the security relationship in that it may explain why both states have at times moved closer together and at other times further apart.

He argued that 'alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats and thus when entering an alliance states may either balance or bandwagon.'\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, he postulated the idea that weak states are more likely to bandwagon when allies are simply unavailable.\textsuperscript{121} As chapter 3 will analyse, Australia maintained a firm "line in the sand" on its policy on West Irian. In 1950, Spender argued that "in the future of West New Guinea, Australia has direct and vital interests and feels strongly that those interests are to be considered."\textsuperscript{122} For 10 years, Australia attempted to court US support for its position on West Irian with little effect. Notwithstanding the prevailing alliance arrangements that the United States had with the Netherlands and Australia, the US State Department was

\textsuperscript{116} ibid, p 177.
\textsuperscript{118} Wight, 1978, \textit{op cit}, p 122.
\textsuperscript{121} ibid, p 222.
reluctant to intervene in the dispute over West Irian for fear of upsetting the strategic status quo.

Another part of Walt's study included ideological alliances - whereby states sharing political, cultural or other traits are more likely to ally.\textsuperscript{123} Walt placed a caveat on the power of ideology by claiming, 'security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude.'\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, Morgenthau argued that whilst symmetry in ideology was a positive for alliances, without some form of material interest 'the alliance would be stillborn.'\textsuperscript{125} Further developing this theme, George Liska and William Riker's research into alliance formation concluded that alliances disband once they have achieved their objective because 'they are formed against and only derivatively for someone or something.'\textsuperscript{126} An example of this hypothesis was the US and USSR interaction during WWII. Their ideological differences were overridden for the sake of forming an alliance against the Axis powers; however, once Germany had been defeated, the two powers subsequently spiralled into a conflictual security relationship. An obverse example is that of NATO post 1991.\textsuperscript{127} After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the objective of NATO ceased to exist. However, the large degree of ideological symmetry between the Europeans and Americans assisted the continuance of this cooperative security relationship. When ideologically disparate states enter into an alliance, treaty, or agreement the longevity of cooperation will generally last as long as the alliance remains relevant.

Schweller's research on alliances introduced the concept of omnibalancing. In this scenario, leaders appease secondary adversaries in order to balance against internal and

\textsuperscript{123} Walt S, 1995, \textit{op cit}, p 224.
\textsuperscript{124} ibid, p 229.
\textsuperscript{125} Morgenthau, 1967, \textit{op cit}, p 178.
\textsuperscript{127} On 1 July 1991, Gorbachev authorised the signature of a protocol dissolving the Warsaw Pact – the structural military basis which created the East West divide. Thus, this thesis uses 1991 as the year when the Cold War ended.
external threats in order to survive in power. To that end, he put forward two claims: firstly that the Third World often ‘bandwagon with hostile powers to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats,’ and secondly that the ‘fragile elite often bandwagon with secondary adversaries to counter their principal domestic threats.’ Sukarno’s political behaviour during the late 1950s and 1960s could be interpreted as a form of omnibalancing. The linkage between Sukarno, the PKI, the Army and China was a complex arrangement which did not appear consistent with Indonesia’s doctrine of bebas aktif. Questions have always been asked as to why Sukarno veered off the rails of non-alignment, why did he attempt to form an ‘axis’ with Peking and why did he align himself internally with the PKI. The answer to the last question of his alignment with the PKI has often been that he attempted to offset the power of the Army; thus he saw himself as the fulcrum of a delicate internal power arrangement. The PKI’s affinity with China was commonly known in Indonesian circles. Using Schweller’s omnibalancing analogy, Sukarno’s alignment with Peking could be explained as a way of strengthening the PKI, which ipso facto would strengthen his own position.

Whilst Indonesia’s doctrine of bebas aktif has restricted Jakarta from entering into a range of formal alliances, Canberra has been far more enthusiastic in establishing defence and strategic commitments with other states, including: ANZUS, SEATO, and the FPDA. On 1 September 1951, Australia signed a tripartite security pact with the United States and New Zealand (ANZUS Treaty). ANZUS fulfilled three of Australia’s security objectives. Firstly, it placed Australia under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Secondly, it satisfied its security agenda within the Pacific arena. Finally, it provided a sense of protection to mainland Australia. However, as Casey noted ‘a gap remained in Southeast Asia and it was to meet this gap that the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was drawn up at Manila.’ Menzies regarded the deteriorating regional situation and communist spread as so serious that he was prepared to offer military support for the defence of Southeast Asian states against communism. He stated:

129 ibid p 255.
130 ibid.
Before long we may be forced to regard the Communist frontier as lying on the southern shores of Indo-China. This gloomy view can be falsified if, we are able not only to give economic and spiritual encouragement to the non-communist elements in Indo-China, but also to rally the weighty opinion and influence of the great new democracies of South and South-East Asia.  

Subsequently, on 8 September 1954, members from Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States signed SEATO. Established under Western auspices after the French withdrawal from Indochina, SEATO was created to oppose further Communist gains in Southeast Asia. It was ultimately disbanded in 1977.

On 1 November 1971, the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was concluded; incorporating Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. The FPDA required these nations to consult in the event of a threat to Singapore or Malaysia and again the origins of the FPDA stem less from Cold War structural dynamics and more with Indonesia’s campaign of “Confrontation” against the new state of Malaysia in 1964.

More recently, Mearsheimer introduced the concept of buck passing. In this case, balancing and bandwagoning are broken because some states attempt to pass off their commitments to fellow states. For this situation to occur, Mearsheimer believed that balanced multipolar systems were generally required because "no aggressor is powerful enough to defeat all the other great powers and dominate the entire system." In summary, a range of complex dynamics influence alliance formation.

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135 ibid.
The Security Dilemma

As with alliance formation, it is generally recognised that the security dilemma is a subset of the realist interpretation of international politics, however, again its significance with respect to the security relationship warrants special mention. Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth saw the security dilemma as the uncertainty in statesmen’s minds when the military preparations of one state cannot be defined as defensive or offensive.\(^{136}\)

One of the foremost examples of uncertainty, or as Robert Jervis would coin it, “misperception”, was the US portrayal of why NATO was formed during the late 1940s. As US Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952 George Kennan scripted a detailed appreciation of the US State Department’s misguided portrayal of the Soviet Union. Kennan questioned: ‘how far has this misinterpretation affected their policies?’ – ‘it had probably caused them to intensify their military preparations.’\(^{137}\) He concluded by observing: ‘it had in this way weakened what little usefulness might otherwise have been present in the institution of diplomatic relations between Russia and the West.’\(^{138}\) This depiction is a classic case of security dilemma.

Alexander Wendt noted that states do not begin their relationship in a security dilemma but it is something that statesmen construct through their interactions.\(^{139}\) Collins maintained that the security dilemma is seen to have two characteristics: uncertainty and benign intent.\(^{140}\) Hertz described it as ‘the mere instinct of self preservation which leads to competition for more power in a vicious circle.’\(^{141}\) Commentators researching the security dilemma note that states that try to increase their relative power in a zero sum game foster competition both regionally and internationally, thus creating local unstable security networks. In turn, increasing one’s absolute power may not necessarily increase its


\(^{138}\) ibid.


\(^{140}\) ibid, p 5.

relative power, as neighbouring states may react to this increase with an increase of their own power hence decreasing the original state’s security.

Robert Jervis re-examined the security dilemma in his work *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*. Jervis suggested that tight linkages between domestic and foreign policies may act as a catalyst for states to interfere preemptively in the domestic affairs of other states. In his examination, Jervis identified the difference between the deterrence and the spiral model. In the deterrence model the adversary’s intentions are malign, conversely the spiral model relates to benign intent. Jervis further added that the side that can credibly threaten to disrupt the relationship, unless its demands are met, could exploit the other. He deduced that this situation might not be stable since the frequent use of threats may be incompatible with the maintenance of a cooperative relationship.

During the 1990s, a new angle pertaining to the security dilemma was explored; the insecurity dilemma. Job depicted the insecurity dilemma as equivalent to intra-state security spirals. In this situation, ‘escalating repression is perpetuated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the states precludes its resort to less violent alternatives.’ Job argued that because ‘weak states are concerned with their internal security, neighbouring weak states do not pose a security threat to one another and therefore the dynamics of the security dilemma do not operate.’ Collins examined a number of Asian case studies and found that Indonesia’s transmigration program of the 1960-90s increased ethnocentric tension and in effect was a form of internal security dilemma. At times during its relationship with Indonesia, Australia has been vulnerable to some aspects of the “security dilemma”, which has led to a limited “arms race” between the two protagonists. This aspect will be explored in subsequent chapters.

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143 ibid.
148 ibid, p 174.
Revolution

The theory of international revolution has its origins in Marx and Engels' discourse of communism. In 1917, Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized on this discourse and attempted to export their own brand of revolution to an international audience. Lenin stated 'we knew that our efforts were inevitably leading to a world wide revolution.'\(^{149}\) The Soviet historian, Richard Pipes, commented:

> It cannot be stressed strongly enough and often enough that the Bolsheviks seized power not to change Russia but to use Russia as a springboard for a world revolution.\(^ {150}\)

In essence, Pipes argued that the Soviets encouraged and indeed organised 'revolutionary movements wherever the opportunity presented itself.'\(^ {151}\) During the latter part of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Martin Wight expanded upon this theme of international revolution in his work *Power Politics*.\(^ {152}\) Wight defined revolution as 'a violent change in regime within a single state.'\(^ {153}\) To that end, he saw revolutionary powers as ones that wish 'to alter the foundations of international society' and consequently attempt to 'take advantage of the potential stratification of loyalties within other countries.'\(^ {154}\) More importantly though, he saw revolution as having an international aspect.\(^ {155}\) Wight saw this 'domestic-international linkage' as pertaining to the way wars cause revolutions and vice versa.\(^ {157}\) He wrote:

> National revolutions are connected with a series of organised movements for revolutionizing, not simply a single state but international society as a whole.\(^ {158}\)


\(^{151}\) ibid, p 167.

\(^{152}\) Wight M, 1978, *op cit*.

\(^{153}\) ibid, p 81.

\(^{154}\) ibid, p 88.

\(^{155}\) ibid, p 81.


\(^{157}\) ibid.

\(^{158}\) Wight, 1978, *op cit*, p 82.
Wight saw three periods of doctrinal conflagration: the Reformation, the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution.\textsuperscript{159} From this premise, he concluded that the periods between 1517-1648, 1792-1871 and 1914-60 were revolutionary.\textsuperscript{160} These periods he characterised as ‘recurrent waves of international revolution or organised attempts to transform international society by forces, by war or revolution.’\textsuperscript{161} This notion of organised movement is the centrepiece of international revolution theory. In summing up his theory of revolution Wight deduced:

A revolutionary power is morally and psychologically at war with its neighbours all the time even if legally peace prevails because it believes it has a mission to transform international society by conversion or coercion.\textsuperscript{162}

Building on this proposition, Halliday noted that for much of history ‘relations between states have been determined not by normal factors, but by abnormal revolutionary ones.’\textsuperscript{163} Furthermore, he claimed that ‘the greatest mistake would be to maintain the idea that conflict at the international level can be isolated from that within states.’\textsuperscript{164} Fairbairn believed that international revolution was inextricably linked to Bolshevik politics, which sought to influence under-developed countries primarily in the Asian region.\textsuperscript{165} Underscoring the vulnerability of the Asian region to revolutionary behaviour, Fairbairn noted that in the period from 1958-1965, there were 150 worldwide examples of revolutionary violence of which almost all had occurred in Asia.\textsuperscript{166} Writing in 1963, C Nortcote Parkinson postulated ‘that revolutionary guerilla warfare poses one of the greatest political problems in the world today.’\textsuperscript{167}

Offering a contrary view to the domestic-international linkage, Rudolph Rummell ran a series of correlations, of 77 nations over 4 years (1955-57) to ascertain the relationship

\textsuperscript{159} Wight, 1978, \textit{op cit}, p 82.
\textsuperscript{160} ibid, p 92.
\textsuperscript{161} ibid, p 86.
\textsuperscript{162} Wight, 1978, \textit{op cit}, p 90.
\textsuperscript{163} Halliday F., 1994, \textit{op cit} p 132.
\textsuperscript{164} ibid, p 144.
\textsuperscript{166} ibid, p 25.
between internal upheaval and a state’s foreign policy. His findings indicated that this correlation was problematic. Notwithstanding, Wight’s last wave of revolutionary behaviour is of importance to this thesis. He attributed the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the rise of Fascism, WWII, the Cold War and a spate of Third World revolutions including China, Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam as a manifestation of this revolutionary period. Importantly, the theory of international revolution has parallels with Sukarno’s revolutionary fervour of the early 1960s – when he attempted to disrupt the global political structure with his doctrine of NEFOS/OLDEFOS.

Civilisation Fault Lines

The theme of conflict through cultural differences is not an established International Relations “tradition”. That said, there is an array of literature, which has perceived a struggle between Western civilisations and the “rest” [to use Samuel Huntington’s phrase]. D H Lawrence summarised a sentiment held by many of his genre when he claimed ‘better Christ than Buddha.’ Of late, Huntington’s work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and Edward Said’s Orientalism have re-ignited the debate pertaining to cultural differences. Specifically, Huntington defined the world as being culturally bipolar – one of them and us – East and West. The essence of his argument revolved around the theory that cultural commonalties promote cohesion whilst cultural differences facilitate cleavages. These cultural differences result from fault lines between Islamic, Orthodox, Hindu, African and Christian societies. On a macro scale, Huntington claimed that the major civilisation fault line occurs between Western and ‘other’ societies. He postulated that relations between ‘groups from different civilisations will never be close, usually cool and often hostile’ and that international conflict emanates from suspicion between varying civilisations and specifically between Islamic

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167 ibid, p 130.
169 Halliday F, 1994, op cit, p 133.
170 Fairbairn G, 1967, op cit, p 64.
171 Huntington S, 1996, op cit, p 32.
172 ibid, p 128.
173 ibid, p 183.
174 ibid, p 205.
and Western culture. Ultimately, like the realist and neo realist paradigm of balance of power theory, Huntington argued that ‘countries tend to bandwagon with countries of similar cultural and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality.’\(^{175}\)

From a cultural perspective Huntington classified states along the following lines: core, lone, cleft and torn. The last two categories have particular application to Indonesia and Australia. He noted that ‘cleft countries territory bestrides the fault lines between civilizations and as such they face particular problems maintaining their unity.’\(^{176}\) In this respect, Indonesia with its ethnic diversity could be deemed a cleft country. Put simply, the government’s objective of a cleft state is to fuse many nations into one. Conversely, Huntington made specific mention of Australia being a “torn” state – where a “single predominant culture which places it in one civilisation but its leaders want to shift it to another civilisation.”\(^{177}\) In effect, cleft states akin to Indonesia are a reverse image of torn states (Australia). Australia’s attempt to move closer to Asia during the 1990s was seen by Huntington as a divisive issue. He predicted that if Australia were to defect away from the West and bandwagon with rising non-Western civilisations then it would be engulfed in a cultural schizophrenia,\(^{178}\) which would lead to it being a permanent ‘torn country.’\(^{179}\)

On a similar note to Huntington, but having no less profound influence on cultural thinking has been Edward Said’s work *Orientalism*.\(^{180}\) Put simply, his work depicted the inherent struggle between East and West.\(^{181}\) Said’s analysis whilst absorbing and complex had a distinct theme – that of the relationship between Orient and Occident – which he determined was based on power and domination.\(^{182}\) He believed that this dialectic could be traced back to the spread of Muhammadism throughout the Middle East and Asia at around the 6th century. Said claimed that ‘Orientalism is a western style for dominating,

\(^{175}\) ibid p 155.
\(^{176}\) ibid, p 137.
\(^{177}\) ibid, p 138.
\(^{178}\) ibid, p 153.
\(^{179}\) ibid.
\(^{181}\) The term East and West as defined by Said related to the cultures of Orient and Occident.
restructuring and having authority over the Orient.\textsuperscript{183} He noted that in the minds of Westerners there were two civilisations; one comprising the West and the other the Orient.\textsuperscript{184} This cultural construction guided Westerners to believe that the ‘former dominate and the latter must be dominated.’\textsuperscript{185} Strictly speaking, Said’s work was a focus on the history of conflict, tension and master-servant relationship between an Islamic Middle East and Asia and a Western European society. Notwithstanding this geographic boundary, his theme of cultural differences resulting in power domination relationships has utility for this thesis.

It is timely to highlight that whilst Huntington in 1996 was declaring that the clash between Islam and the West was gaining momentum, Said’s analysis of 1995 noted the opposite – ‘there is now at least a general acceptance that these represent not an eternal order but an historical experience whose end or at least partial abatement may be at hand.’\textsuperscript{186} Huntington and Said’s theories have significantly enhanced the debate of culture and its role in international politics. Both commentators profess that cultural differences create cleavages between civilisations which in turn can foster conflict.

\textbf{North South Divide}

The disparity between the wealthy Western states with those of the “Third World” has given rise to the North South divide. Its origin can be traced back to the post WWII reconstruction period that was largely guided by Western states and before then to the history of colonialism and imperialism.

In 1944, in Bretton Woods, USA, the principal instruments of international economic management (GATT, IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)) were established. In 1955, Sukarno in conjunction with Nehru hosted the first meeting of non-aligned states in Bandung, Indonesia – this meeting recognised the political independence of a range of disparate states. Accordingly, a call was made for a

\textsuperscript{183} ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} ibid. p 36.
\textsuperscript{185} ibid.
New International Economic Order (NIEO) in response for a more favourable distribution of the world’s resources and income, and a belief by ex-colonial states that fundamental inequities in the basic structure of institutions of the existing international economy were working against them. This call was made at a time when UN membership had risen from 51 in 1945 to 100 in 1960 – largely due to the decolonisation process occurring in Southeast Asia and African territories. In 1962, the UN General Assembly, now dominated by non-industrialised states, called for a conference of trade and development. Consequently in 1964, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was commissioned. UNCTAD assigned states to specific groupings: Group A for Asian and African members, Group B for Western Europe, Japan, Australia and NZ, Group C for Latin America and Group D for Eastern Europe. Shortly thereafter, Groups A and C joined forces and became known as the Group of 77 (G77).

Pertinent to this thesis and to the broader study of security theory, was the notion that despite ideological differences, these Third World states were able to unite against what they perceived to be a dominant Northern grouping. To that end, the very phrase North South inferred that economic disparity between developed and developing states had replaced super power rivalry as the major source of international tension and conflict. Speaking at the Afro Asian Economic Seminar in 1955, the President of Algeria Ben Bella, declared:

Real independence required economic liberation as well as political independence that colonialism and imperialism have appeared in new forms to perpetuate their domination to preserve through channels of economic and even cultural relations certain ties by means of which they prevent the development of countries which were under its direct influence.

186 ibid, p 354.  
188 ibid, p 1.  
190 ibid, p 2.  
191 Global Digest Hong Kong, May 1965 - statements made at the opening session of the Afro Asian Economic seminar in February 1965.
As an offshoot to UNCTAD, the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) came into being in 1966. Meetings of UNIDO in 1975 (Lima) and 1980 (New Delhi) 'ended in acrimonious North South confrontation.'\(^{192}\) Jones claimed that 'North South dialogue' is very much a phrase of the 1970s. He reasoned that Arab oil power and American humiliation in Southeast Asia coupled to see Third World states adopt a strategy of peaceful confrontation against the West.\(^{193}\) Jones further claimed that many Third World states seemed 'locked in a vicious circle where their best efforts to increase their productivity of labour were simply siphoned off through the mechanism of international trade and accrued as rents to capital and labour in the rich North.'\(^{194}\)

Mercantilism has been posited as one explanation for Sukarno’s Confrontation against Malaysia in the early 1960s. As chapter 4 will articulate, the roots of this theory are that Sukarno viewed the world as a tripolar economic bloc led by the US, Russia and China. Hence Sukarno’s crusade was to unite the new and small nations in the spirit of 'gotong royong and musjawarah and in such a manner not to antagonise the three super powers.'\(^{195}\) It is suggested that Sukarno stated that 'with one hundred and five million people Indonesia together with the peoples of the New Emerging Forces will create their own economic orbit.'\(^{196}\)

Stephen Krasner's work titled *Structural Conflict*\(^{197}\) cited the growing disparities in GNP of the states since 1830. Krasner observed that by 1970 the entire Third World could account for only 11 percent of the world GNP.\(^{198}\) This economic weakness conditioned Southern states to alter international regimes — placing them at variance to status quo states. Krasner argued that a state's economic asymmetry and structural weakness fosters

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194 ibid, p 17.
196 ibid, p 275.
198 ibid, p 33.
a mindset, whereby the external environment is viewed as ‘inherently threatening.’ He concluded his study by proposing:

The conflict between North and South is endemic. It is a product of deep asymmetries of power that leave almost all developing countries exposed to shocks from the external environment. This structural situation compels the Third World to attempt to alter the rules of the game in ways that would lessen their vulnerability.

Of specific relevance to this thesis, Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, commented in 1992, that it is the North–South relationship that still constitutes the fundamental bipolar divide in the international community. In sum, the North-South divide is a theoretical understanding of global economic management, which is exemplified by the G77 and their attempt to alter the changing economic structure. This division has generated a degree of conflict between states on either side of the divide and this thesis will be considering the role of this division in the development of Australia-Indonesia conflict (in particular during Indonesia’s campaign of Confrontation against the new state of Malaysia).

COOPERATIVE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

In contrast to the arguments and perspectives put forward in the previous section, this forthcoming analysis will focus on theories which emphasise and seek to account for interstate cooperation. Mearsheimer believed that states can cooperate, although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. That said, his interpretation is typical of the realist’s outlook of global politics. This section will commence with an overview of the most fundamental theory of cooperation, liberalism, which will also include a contemporary examination of Fukuyama’s ideas of democracy. This will be followed by an analysis of rationalism as understood by the English School and more importantly Hedley Bull’s theory of “international society”. Michael Doyle’s

199 ibid, p 153.
200 ibid, p 294.
theories of democracy, capitalism and peace will be examined. Next will follow a
discussion of the International Political Economy through the prism of cooperation rather
than conflict. Following on will be Deutsch and Acharya’s proposition of the existence or
otherwise of security communities. Again, empirical examples relating to Australia and
Indonesia will be used as a way of foreshadowing the discussion in forthcoming chapters.

Liberalism

Whereas realism and in particular neo-realism assumes an ‘outside in’ approach to
international politics, liberalism has been classified as an ‘inside out approach’. Leading
liberals have included: Locke, Toynbee, Angell, Simmern, Bentham, Rousseau, Kant, Mill
and more recently Fukuyama. Between them, they have professed inter alia that,
governments not people cause wars, that democracy is the highest expression of the will of
the people and that a “natural harmony of interests” occurs within and between states.

For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. Immanuel Kant believed that a perpetual
peace could exist where a pacific union would see an end to interstate conflict. Contrary
to realist and neo realist theory, liberals regarded the ‘balance of power as the most
pernicious aspect of secret diplomacy.’ To that end, liberals ‘believed that the
destructive forces of international anarchy could only be brought to an end if the
international system was regulated the same as domestic society.’

With détente in the 1970s, globalisation in the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Empire
and demise of Soviet communism in the early 1990s, liberalism gained greater
prominence. This euphoria was epitomised in Fukuyama’s work The End of History and
The Last Man, where he argued that the endpoint of human political development and
the struggle of ideas about the fundamental constitution of society had been reached. The

204 ibid, p 31.
205 Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, op cit, p 121.
207 ibid, p 41.
crux of Fukuyama’s thesis was his attempt to link capitalism with democracy. He claimed that ‘looking around the world there appears a very strong correlation between advancing socio-economic modernisation and the emergence of new democracies’.209 Fukuyama explained that states that adopt capitalism generate wealth, and this provides the opportunity for universal education and as a consequence, middle class societies emerge. Fukuyama commented that ‘the link between education and liberal democracies has been frequently noted.’210 The link that joins education with liberal democracy is man’s “thymos”. He observed that “thymos” provides ‘an all-powerful emotional support to the process of valuing and evolution and allows human beings to overcome their most powerful natural instincts for the sake of what they believe is right or just.’211 In essence, he concluded that ‘the struggle for recognition is a concept as old as political philosophy’.212 Fukuyama predicated that ultimately the transformation to liberal democracy would mean the end of history – which ‘would mean the end of bloody wars and bloody revolutions.’213 Notwithstanding the euphoria surrounding his hypothesis, Fukuyama placed a caveat on his directionality in that ‘culture in the form of resistance to the transformation of certain traditional values and to those of democracy thus can constitute an obstacle to democratisation.’214 He noted that a country’s national, ethnic and racial consciousness can militate against the development of democracy – ‘a strong sense of national unity is therefore necessary prior to the emergence of stable democracy.’215 Eventually man’s “thymos” would lead him to demand freedom of speech and ipso facto democracy. The end result was ‘men with no chests’.216 By this comment Fukuyama was referring to the peaceful relations between men as a result of the widespread presence of democracy. Thus, history was not only directional but it favoured the notion of a pacific union.217

209 ibid, p 112.
210 ibid, p 116.
211 ibid p 171.
212 ibid, p 145.
213 ibid, p 311.
214 ibid, p 215.
215 ibid.
216 ibid, p 300.
217 The notion of history being directional is highly debatable. E.H. Carr’s seminal work What is History (chapter 5) discusses this issue at length.
International Society

Rationalism, in its claim to be the middle way between realism and liberalism, recognises that the condition of anarchy forces states to provide their own security whilst acknowledging the notions of international morality. This field of study was made famous by Grotius, Wight and more recently Bull. Wight believed that the fundamental task of all states was ‘to provide order and security from which law, justice and prosperity may afterwards develop.’

In 1977, Hedley Bull made a significant contribution to the study of rationalism through his work *The Anarchical Society*. Bull claimed that international politics had matured to the stage whereby a society of states exists. Firstly, he defined an international system whereby ‘two states have sufficient contact between them to cause them to behave at least in some measure as part of a whole.’ Diplomatic, political, societal, academic, cultural and military interactions between states are indicative of Bull’s international system. Bull claimed that these interactions might:

> Take the form of co-operation, but also of conflict or even neutrality or indifference with regard to one another’s objectives. The interactions may be present over a whole range of activities – political, strategic, economic and social.

More crucial to his study and to this thesis was his concept of an “international society” which he represented as thus:

> When a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions.

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219 ibid, p 95.
221 ibid, p 9.
222 ibid, p 10.
223 ibid, p 13.
Bull reasoned that instead of a civilisation common to all members, a ‘diplomatic culture’ exists between states, which acts as the glue for this society. Fundamental to Bull’s theory, are four universal goals which he claimed an “international society” represents: the preservation of the system and society of states, maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, the goal of peace, and the goal of keeping promises. Bull contended that even during the turbulent periods of Hitler, Stalin and Mao, these states decided to remain in the society:

Even at the height of a great war or ideological conflict the idea of international society does not disappear so much as go underground.

Implied in Bull’s thesis is that “international society” acts as a brake on hostility as states maintain their monopoly of violence and deny the right to employ it to other groups. In effect, this restriction of violence fosters a sense of order (which is assisted by rules that spell out the kind of behaviour that is orderly). Bull believed that there is a complex set of rules that regulate cooperation among states. Thus, states that act within the society framework are more likely to engage in cooperative activities. That is not to infer that Bull regarded all states as part of the “international society”. In the post WWII explosion of decolonisation, Bull noted:

These pseudo states or quasi states within international society of today, whether we regard it as good or bad, inevitable or avoidable makes for a weakening of cohesion.

Further, he added that we have to note the extent to which coexistence has not proved possible among the anti-colonial or Third World states.

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225 Ibid p 7.
227 ibid, p 42.
228 Ibid.
229 ibid, p 54.
230 ibid p 70.
232 Ibid, p 431
Bull and Adam Watson argued that "the most striking feature of the global international society of today is the extent to which the states of Asia and Africa have embraced such basic elements of European international society." Bull's argument raises two points. First, despite the rise of a kaleidoscope of states (in varying political forms) after WWII, the "international society" remained intact. Bull sought to refute the often-cited argument that clashes such as the North/South divide and the dichotomy between Democracy/Communism and Capitalism/Marxist economies is evidence that a "society" does not exist. He claimed that in the first part of the 20th century, when the global structure was heavily influenced by the European system of rule, that global conflict (as evidenced by WWI and WWII) was endemic, but since 1945, global politics has been characterised by relative order. The second point relates to Bull's notion that "coexistence" amongst the Third World or between anti-colonial states has not always proved possible. Thus, Bull acknowledged that in some local instances a society might not be realistic. This is a key aspect of "international society" because as this thesis will demonstrate, there have been times during Australia and Indonesia's security relationship which were inconsistent with Bull's "society".

The extent that states can come together without a common culture is at the core of Bull's idea of society. Alderson argued that Bull's society 'does not in any way imply that relations among states are necessarily peaceful, stable or harmonious. It is not the levels of conflict or cooperation per se that matters for Bull. The relevant question is whether and to what extent these conflicts occur against the backdrop of shared institutions.' Bull's concept is fundamentally about states achieving a degree of harmony between each other. This harmony is enshrined in Bull's third goal of peace; He continued, "if we consider the state system not as a single moment but in motion throughout the whole of its life (say from 1648) then we shall find that every state that has survived the period has at some time or other been disposed to war with every other one."

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234 Ibid, p 432.
Bull’s notion of an international society has not been universally accepted. Buzan noted that the idea of ‘society requires that some substantial perception of equal status exists among its members.’ Furthermore, Buzan claimed, ‘weak states will find it more difficult to generate and support international society than strong states.’ Therefore, as long as ‘weak states constitute a significant proportion of the international community high levels of insecurity in much of the system will be unavoidable.’ Similarly, J D B Miller remarked in the Cold War period:

Perhaps the best way to see the current situation is to regard the system as containing two international societies, one headed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. The Soviet one consists of Eastern European states, Cuba, Vietnam, China and those Third World states skeptical of US intentions. The American society consists of the US and its Western allies.

Another concept that will be explored in this thesis is the dilemma between order and justice. Bull declared that in a society of states there is a fundamental tension between order (and the preservation of the status quo) and the adherence of justice, especially where the locus of this justice is at the individual level. He asserted that ‘the framework of international order is inhospitable to projects for the realisation of world justice.’ Bull cited the military action taken by India in wresting Goa from Portugal in 1961 and by Indonesia in West Irian in 1962 as but two examples of the contradictions inherent in order and justice. Similarly, Linklater saw the sacrifice of Poland in the 18th century and the failure of the League of Nations to defend Abyssinia from Italian aggression in the 1930s as an indication of how order and justice could clash.

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239 ibid, p 175.
240 ibid, p 157.
243 ibid, p 87.
244 ibid, p 96.
Sometimes the distinction between order and justice is blurred. Jackson and Sorensen used the case study of the 1990 Gulf War to illustrate the point that the United Nations intervention was based on national, international and humanitarian reasons.\textsuperscript{246} The dilemma over order and justice was highlighted in Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. After the Indonesian invasion of 1975, the Fraser government, in part, based its policy of detachment around the notion of good relations in the interests of peace and regional stability.\textsuperscript{247} Thus, order was deemed to be superior to justice. Indonesia, similarly used order to justify its invasion. Jakarta claimed that an unstable East Timor could lead to regional disorder and thus Indonesia’s focus lay in the ‘peace and stability of Timor.’\textsuperscript{248}

Democratic Peace Theory

Within the international system the emergence of democratic governments has given rise to a belief that conflict between these same states is unlikely. Michael Doyle’s most recent research renewed the debate on Democratic Peace Theory (DPT).\textsuperscript{249} This theory is particularly apt for two reasons. Firstly, it may offer some insight into the oscillating nature of conflict between Australia and Indonesia. Secondly, interpretative analysis of this theory would indicate that Australia and Indonesia’s relations should move toward a state of cooperation as Indonesia similarly progresses towards greater democratisation.

In his argument, Doyle observed that non-democratic institutions have shown a propensity for conflict with other non-democratic institutions. For example, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, China’s cyclic altercations with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, North Korea’s belligerent aggression towards its southern counterpart in 1950, Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaya in the early 1960s and North Vietnam’s guerilla war against the South during the 1960s. Similarly, he reasoned that democratic states have a tendency to feud with non democratic states. He therefore concluded that ‘the apparent absence of war between


\textsuperscript{247} \textit{The Canberra Times}, 15 October 1976.

\textsuperscript{248} \textit{East Timor and the International Community}, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume 10, p 63.

liberal states, whether adjacent or not for almost 200 years thus may have significance. He brought his argument to an end by stating that ‘liberals have indeed established a separate peace – but only among themselves.’

Two explanations are offered in support of Democratic Peace Theory. The first is that authoritarian leaders are not accountable to the public. In this case, democratically elected governments are more hesitant to wage war because the citizens of the state, which have to pay the price of war, have a greater say in the decision making process. An example of the former situation maybe Indonesia during the Old and New Order. Under this interpretation, Sukarno and Suharto were able to wage war against the state of Malaya and East Timor because the constraints of public accountability were absent. Opponents of DPT contend that this theory is flawed ‘because there is no evidence to suggest that democratic people are less likely to entertain war.’ The United States/Allied intervention during the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf Wars and Britain’s battle against Argentine forces in 1982, are a testament to some of the security conflicts that have arisen between states of differing political persuasion.

The second argument put forward to explain DPT is that of transnational respect for democratic rights and that democratic states are loathe to impose a foreign regime on a democratic state by force. As chapter 2 will highlight, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia during the Republic’s war for independence was cooperative. Australia supported the birth of a democratic Indonesian state, yet, coincidentally, as Indonesia was regressing towards Guided Democracy, the nature of the security relationship was simultaneously changing to one of conflict. During Confrontation, both states engaged in military conflict with each other (though at the low end of intensity). In this case, a democratic state entered into conflict with a non-democratic state. However in 1999,

251 ibid.
253 ibid.
254 ibid.
Indonesia’s path to democratisation may have had a restraining effect on each state and thus inhibited direct military conflict.

Critics of DPT such as Mearsheimer, claim that the forces of nationalism and religious fundamentalism generally override this argument and that states never know when another democratic state may revert back to authoritarianism.\(^{255}\) Other critics have noted the low number of democracies over the past 200 years; as a consequence the possibility of a democratic dyad becoming involved in war was minor, in particular, as these dyads possessed little opportunity or reason for conflict.\(^{256}\) Further refuting the notion of DPT as a valid theory of international relations, Layne analysed four test cases to determine whether DPT prevented democratic dyads from entering into conflict: the US and Great Britain in 1861 (the Trent Affair), the US and Great Britain in 1895 (the Venezuela crisis), France and Great Britain in 1898 (the Fashoda crisis) and France and Germany in 1923 (Ruhr crisis).\(^{257}\) His analysis concluded that ‘realism not DPT provides the most compelling explanation of why war was avoided.’\(^{258}\) Layne suggested that ‘DPT is looking through the wrong end of the telescope.’\(^{259}\) He believed that high threat environment states gravitated towards autocratic regimes, which enhanced their strategic posture.\(^{260}\) Notwithstanding the criticism of DPT, it remains a potentially useful tool in analysing state interactions, including Australia-Indonesia relations.

**Liberal International Political Economy**

The previous section described how mercantilists interpreted the international political economy as a zero sum game of politics which fostered conflict between states rather than an area of cooperation and mutual gain.\(^{261}\) On the other end of the economic scale,

\(^{255}\) ibid.
\(^{258}\) ibid, p 320.
\(^{259}\) ibid, p 327.
\(^{260}\) ibid.
supporters of the liberal International Political Economy (IPE) 'believe in economic progress and an assumption of mutual gain from free exchange.' They reject the mercantilist view that the state is the central actor and do not accept the notion that 'one state’s economic gain necessarily is another state’s economic loss.' Moreover, economic liberals see the 'market economy as an autonomous sphere of society which operates according to its own economic laws.'

Susan Strange, a leading advocate of liberal IPE considered that the integration of world economics was inevitable. She claimed that the successor states of the old USSR, China, Iran, Vietnam and South Africa have more or less accepted the fact (of economic liberalisation) and acted accordingly to invite foreign owned firms to invest in their economies.

In 1966, at the start of the transition from Old Order to New Order, the Indonesian economy was in a state of disrepair; Sukarno’s economic model of Marhaenism had simply failed to work. The advent of Suharto’s New Order saw a change in priorities. Muthiah Alagappa recorded that the ‘New Order government did not take political order and economic sufficiency for granted [and that] its principal concern was to establish political stability and reconstruct the economy.’ Subsequently, the ‘government adopted a judicious mix of controlled, open door and liberal policies.’ The net result was that the Indonesian economy grew at approximately 7% per year, productivity increased sharply, self-sufficiency in rice was achieved in 1984 and between 1966 and 1991 Indonesia’s real GDP expanded by 450%. A case can be made that Indonesia’s adoption of an open market helped facilitate cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. During this period, there was a substantial level of trade, as Keating noted that 'during the 5 years to 1993,'

262 ibid, p 181.
263 ibid, p 182.
264 ibid, p 183.
266 ibid.
267 Alagappa M, 1995, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The moral quest for authority, Stanford University, California, p 247.
268 ibid, p 249.
269 Keating, 2000, op cit, p 126.
Australia's exports to Indonesia almost doubled to $1.8 billion with Indonesia our tenth largest export market. In the same period, Indonesian exports to Australia have more than doubled to $1.2 billion.\textsuperscript{270}

From an IPE perspective, this phenomenon was pivotal to the success of the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. An open market place, an increase in transparency in each state’s economy and greater trading dependence nullified the enmity which had traditionally been associated with the relationship – which in turn was replaced by a greater degree of amity. The central claim of neo liberals that free trade will promote interstate cooperation may be supported by the events of 1995 when the Agreement for Maintaining Security (AMS) was signed. The genesis of how the AMS came to fruition is best explained in Keating's book \textit{Engagement}.\textsuperscript{271} Keating claimed that the relationship between the two countries had made considerable inroads, none the least the rapidly expanding trade association [rising at a trend rate of 22\% by the early 1990s].\textsuperscript{272} This prompted Keating to declare in June 1994 that ‘no country is more important to Australia than Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{273} However, if this economic interchange and greater inter governmental awareness were the building blocks for the relationship, then, to use Keating’s expression a “roof” was needed.\textsuperscript{274} This roof was achieved through the signing of the AMS in December 1995 (of note, this was the first time that Indonesia had entered into a security agreement since independence). These issues will be analysed in chapter 6.

Notwithstanding the powerful arguments presented by IPE, the events of East Timor 1999 indicate that its utility as a cooperative theory may be limited. Despite Australia and Indonesia establishing and then deepening their economic linkages during the 1990s, these same linkages were unable to prevent the bilateral relationship moving to a state of conflict in 1999.

\textsuperscript{270} ibid, p 203.  
\textsuperscript{271} Keating, 2000, \textit{op cit}, pp 123-158.  
\textsuperscript{272} ibid, p 136.  
\textsuperscript{273} One assumes his remark was centred on the economic relationship.  
\textsuperscript{274} Keating, 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 140.
Security Communities

The genesis of security community theory stems back to Karl Deutsch’s study in 1957 titled *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* Deutsch concluded that a security community was defined as ‘a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of the community will not fight each other.’ Accordingly, Deutsch suggested that states could overcome the security dilemma. Michael Taylor expanded on Deutsch’s community model in 1982 whilst a recent study of security communities has been conducted by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.

Adler and Barnett identified two types of security community: loosely and tightly coupled. They argued that members of the former expect no bellicose activities from other members and therefore practise self-restraint, whereas tightly coupled communities have a mutual aid society in which they construct a collective system arrangement. Central to the contemporary interpretation of security community is the notion that such a community has shared identities, values and meanings. Put simply, for a security community to work, collective identity and mutual trust are sine qua non.

As part of their research, Adler and Barnett perceived security communities travelling through three phases: nascent, ascendant and mature. In the nascent phase, ‘governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community instead they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security.’ The ascendant phase was defined by ‘increasingly dense networks that reflect tighter military

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276 ibid, p 7.
277 ibid, p 5.
280 ibid, p 5.
281 ibid.
282 ibid.
283 ibid.
284 ibid, p 50.
cooperation and a decreased fear that the other represents a threat and the emergence of collective identities that encourage peaceful change.\textsuperscript{285} Finally, a mature community was characterised by 'regional actors who share an identity and therefore war becomes improbable.'\textsuperscript{286} However, this phasing can be reversible as Adler and Barnett highlighted:

Because compatibility of core values and a collective identity are necessary for the development of security communities and values and identities are not static but are susceptible to change the same forces that build up security communities can tear them down.\textsuperscript{287}

Amitav Acharya utilised the concepts put forward by Deutsch and orientated them for an Asian context. In his analysis, Acharya noted that 'what is perhaps more important is the Deutschian assumption that political values applicable to the North Atlantic context are a necessary background condition of the emergence of a security community.'\textsuperscript{288} Acharya argued that no attempt had been made to test the veracity of Deutsch's model outside the geographic area of North America/Europe.\textsuperscript{289} Furthermore, Acharya claimed that 'with the exception of ASEAN all other security communities mentioned in the literature are to be found in the developed world.'\textsuperscript{290} Of particular bearing to this study he noted that between 1945-1986 there were 127 significant wars. Out of these only 'two took place in Europe, Latin America accounted for 26, Africa 31, Middle East 24 and Asia 44 - the Third World was the scene of more than 98% of all international conflicts.'\textsuperscript{291} Consequently, Acharya focused on developing a range of security models that were broader in scope than that postulated by Deutsch. To that end, he developed the concept of a security regime and a defence community to augment Deutsch's security community.

The guiding requirements for each community/regime are listed below:

\textsuperscript{285} ibid, p 53.
\textsuperscript{286} ibid, p 55.
\textsuperscript{287} ibid, p 58.
\textsuperscript{289} ibid.
\textsuperscript{290} ibid, p 167.
\textsuperscript{291} ibid.
Security community

- Strict and observed norms concerning non-use of force
- No competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning against any other members within the grouping
- Institutions and processes for the pacific settlement of disputes
- Significant functional cooperation and integration

Security regime

- Principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be retrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate.
- Competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning usually continue within the regime although specific regimes might be created to limit the spread of weapons and military capabilities
- The interest of the actors in peace are not fundamentally unambiguous and long term in nature

Defence community

- Common perception of external threats
- Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies
- Significant military inter operability
- The condition of a security community may or may not exist\textsuperscript{292}

Acharya described the security regime as a situation in which the interests of the actors are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive.\textsuperscript{293} From this model, he considered that the regional security system in Southeast Asia resembled a security regime rather than a security community.\textsuperscript{294} ASEAN was formed on 8 August 1967 with five member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines; its membership has since

\textsuperscript{292} ibid pp 152-53.
\textsuperscript{293} ibid p 151.
\textsuperscript{294} ibid p 165.
expanded to ASEAN 10. Careful not to be perceived as a successor to the defunct US sponsored military alliance SEATO, ASEAN members have been reluctant to engage in formal multilateral security consultations and collaboration.\textsuperscript{295}

ASEAN’s norms included a mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, the right of states to conduct their own affairs without external interference, non interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful rather than hostile resolution of disputes. These states have typically been focused toward counter insurgency scenarios, which have resulted in no clearly defined external threat. Acharya noted, that ‘during the Cold War the notion of a common internal enemy -- communist insurgency in particular helped not only to dampen interstate rivalry within ASEAN but also led governments to develop cooperative security relationships.’\textsuperscript{296} One of the key principles which excludes ASEAN from being a true security community is the fact that competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning occurs between member states; in particular, Singapore and Malaysia have exhibited signs of arms spiral since the early 1970s.

Notwithstanding the above mentioned analysis, the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) represented a closer move towards a security community. ARF is a multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacific region. Acharya claimed that this ‘multilateral forum has been viewed in some quarters as a desirable long term alternative to balance of power security concepts.’\textsuperscript{297} Gareth Evans noted that ARF represented a multi dimensional approach involving the establishment of a complex web of relationships extending across government to government and people to people activity.\textsuperscript{298}

**Summary**

This chapter has attempted to examine a range of security theories that will be utilised throughout this thesis. As a way of identifying with the principal theme in this study, these


\textsuperscript{296} ibid, p 17.


theories were categorised under the rubric of conflict and cooperation. The diversity and
richness of the above mentioned theories illustrates the wide span of the security debate.
Using realism, liberalism and rationalism as baseline theories, a number of derivative
concepts and ideas were also explored. The forthcoming chapters will use these concepts
to provide a deeper theoretical understanding of the Australia-Indonesia security
relationship.

The types of theories employed, will to a large degree, depend upon the nature of the issues
being examined. For example, the first issue to be analysed, Australia’s relationship with
the Republic’s quest for independence, will use theories that are affiliated with cooperation
(in respect to the “convergence in interests” of Australia and the Republic). Conversely,
the dispute over West Irian, which saw the security relationship deteriorate, will naturally
focus on those theories associated with conflict. That said, some theories will feature more
than others regardless of the nature of the event; Bull’s “society”, Waltz’s “levels”,
alliance theory and the influence of the major powers, are but some which will be a
recurring theme throughout this study.

The next chapter will explore the origins of the Australia-Indonesia security relationship
which developed in response to the Republican struggle against a returning Dutch colonial
force in 1945. It will illustrate the distinct phases that this relationship travelled through
and how, for varying reasons, each state became strategically reliant on the other,
culminating in a state of cooperation.
THE CREATION OF INDONESIA: A COOPERATIVE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION

The Republic's war for independence provided the first insight to what would be a complex and fluctuating security relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Before WWII, Australia's foreign policy was in effect an extension of British foreign policy. Joan Beaumont's analysis concluded that 'Australia's voice in the world could be best guaranteed by it being part of the wider British Empire.' With respect to Indonesia, Margaret George noted, 'Australian foreign policy first paid serious attention to the Netherlands East Indies when it failed to provide a bulwark to Australia's security in the war against Japan.' Thus, 1945 was a watershed for Australia and the Republic, as it marked the commencement of their security relationship, albeit one that had no international recognition.

The Republican struggle occurred during a unique and defining era of the 20th century. The declaration of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945 and the subsequent battle against Dutch forces until 27 December 1949 were inextricably linked to structural great power politics. In particular, the divergence of the world into two distinct power blocs and the start of the Cold War, saw Soviet, American, Dutch and Australian policies influenced by the forces of realism and neo-realism.

By 1947, Canberra perceived Dutch colonial rule in the East Indies to be contributing to local and regional instability. As a consequence, Australia went to great lengths to support the Republican cause of independence. Paradoxically, in 1949 at the Round Table

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1 Beaumont J, 1989, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1945, AIJA, Occasional Paper No 1, Deakin University, Melbourne, p 22. Whilst not detracting from Beaumont’s analysis, Australia’s disagreement with Britain over the Singapore Base pre WWII indicates that there was at least a seminal degree of independence in Australian foreign policy.

Conference, it perceived that continuing Dutch influence and sovereignty over one part of the East Indies, West Irian, would facilitate Australian security (Britain came to the same conclusion). In harmony with Australia's support for Indonesian independence, was a growing realisation in Canberra of the importance of the Asian region – in particular towards security matters. In essence, the Republic's battle with the Dutch, and Australia's Asian awareness were feeding off each other. As the dispute intensified, so did the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley's, the Minister for External Affairs, H.V Evatt's and the Secretary of the Department for External Affairs, J.W Burton's, regional consciousness, ultimately manifesting into an understanding that Indonesian independence was in the long-term interest of Australia.

By 1949, and as a consequence of the independence conflict, Australia had developed a foreign policy that viewed the Asian region as more important than the European theatre. For the Indonesian nationalists, the dispute marked the severance of 300 years of Dutch colonial rule and an opportunity to exert influence on the world stage as a state inheriting the boundaries of a colonial power. Kahin observed that "while bringing about a basic change in the political status of Indonesia, the revolution brought with it significant and widespread changes in the character of the Indonesian people."\(^3\)

In sum, Australia had become more focused on the Indonesian archipelago as a key element of its own security framework, whilst Indonesia viewed Australia as but one part of a more complex security structure. As chapter 1 noted, this "security contrast" (or attitude of indifference by Indonesia to Australia), whilst not a dominant feature during this event can nevertheless be traced back to the period 1945-49. Notwithstanding, Australia and Indonesia entered into a cooperative security relationship based principally on Australia's diplomatic activism to advance the nationalist cause with Indonesian leaders welcoming this support.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

From an Australian perspective there is a rich array of primary information relating to this incident, including: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Australian government archives, the Department of External Affairs cables and Australian Department of Defence minutes. Specifically, the trilogy of books by Dorling and Lee,4 (the definitive collection of official Australian correspondence from 1947-49), offers a unique insight into the thinking (and fears) of bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians.

With respect to secondary literature, there are some works, such as Margaret George’s5 text, which analyses Australia’s involvement in the Republican struggle. A host of literature from Greenwood,6 Legge,7 Pettit,8 Lee,9 Crowley,10 and Grant,11 focus either on political relations between the two states, or on Australia’s security doctrine post WWII. Classic texts by Feith and Castle,12 Weinstein,13 Grant,14 Reid,15 Dahn,16 Adams,17 Hanifah,18 Jeffrey,19 Harsono,20 Kahin,21 Cribb,22 Crouch,23 Mackie,24 Abdulgani25 and Ide...
Anak's concentrate on nationalism, independence, foreign policy, the Army and Sukarno. This chapter will attempt to tease out some of the major strands of thought and relate these to the Australia-Indonesia security relationship.

INTERSTATE SECURITY LINKAGES

The Republic's war for independence against the Netherlands was subject to the influences of three other states: the US, the USSR and Australia. This structural interface was a composition of cooperative and conflictual security relationships, which are depicted in Diagram 1.

Diagram 1: Interstate Security Relationships

--- conflictual relationships
--- cooperative relationships
Principal protagonists

Australia           Indonesia           Netherlands

USA

USSR

It is important to understand that these security linkages were primarily a product of the East-West schism and the start of bipolarity. After WWII, states old and new were under

25 Abdulgani R, 1973, Nationalism Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia, Centre of South East Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne.
pressure to align with their respective superpower ally. Whilst the above diagram denotes that a cooperative relationship existed between East and West, this is more to highlight that immediately after WWII whatever cooperative elements existed were rapidly transformed into conflictual relationships. As Kissinger noted ‘the collapse of Nazi Germany and the need to fill the resulting power vacuum led to the disintegration of the wartime partnership.’ 27 These relationships were arguably influenced by what Waltz labelled as “structuralism”, whereby the global state structure guides the way a state will behave. 28 Waltz’s theory and Morrison and Suhrke’s thesis on the ability of ‘moderate systemic states’ 29 to switch allegiances during periods of great power competition, are compelling arguments which help to explain the actions of the greater and lesser powers during this period. However, a degree of caution needs to be registered on Waltz’s claim that structuralism guides the way a state will behave regardless of individuals or the way the state is constructed. This chapter will demonstrate that individual forces such as Sukarno’s beliefs and state drivers such as nationalism and a fear of communism and of “Asians”, were defining forces that influenced, in different ways, the actions of Indonesia and Australia.

From the outset, the Republicans who were fighting under the banner of Indonesia, and the Netherlands, the colonial power, were the party principals to the dispute. That said, neither state had the political, economic or military power necessary to force a decisive outcome without external support. The Netherlands whilst a strong state 30 was no longer a global power in the aftermath of the war in Europe, and was reliant on US political support (via the UN), economic aid (through the Marshall Plan) and military assistance (in the form of NATO to bolster its own security framework). The Republic, neither a strong state, nor a strong power was similarly dependent on external assistance, which it achieved through a complex diplomatic arrangement. With no other means to defeat a superior force, the Republicans adopted a “guerilla warfare” strategy (akin to Mao’s tactics in mainland China) – this had the effect of prolonging the war and made any resolution of the dispute.

30 As defined by Buzan.

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unlikely without the intervention of the great powers. Australian policy makers were cognisant of this situation and feared that this intervention would come in the guise of Soviet interference – a possibility, which in 1947 was looking more likely and one which was totally unacceptable to Canberra.

**United States**

Immediately after WWII the US emerged as one of two superpowers, however, President Truman was cognisant of the state of war weariness within America. Realising that it could no longer adopt an isolationist approach to world affairs the White House embarked on a task of global rebuilding as reflected in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Leffler observed that ‘Truman’s geostrategic vision saw national security in terms of power – power that was defined as the control of resources, industrial infrastructure and overseas bases.' In respect to the growing threat from the Soviets, Leffler noted that the ‘US were driven less by a desire to help others than an ideological conviction that their own political economy of freedom would be jeopardised if a totalitarian foe became too powerful.' Truman claimed that ‘we must face the fact that peace must be built upon power as well as upon good will and good deeds.' In 1946, Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” defined a new philosophical outlook toward Soviet motives. As part of this philosophy, Kennan explained that Soviet foreign policy was a function of its ‘long held perception of the outside world.' Thus, whilst Stalin saw the emerging East West conflict as a manifestation of two inimical economic systems, US foreign policy analysts viewed the dispute as a function of a deeply entrenched legacy of Tsarist/Politburo cognitive beliefs. In July 1947, *Foreign Affairs* published Kennan’s “X” article on Soviet foreign policy. This article argued that ‘the only way to deal with the Soviets was by a policy of firm containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter forces at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable

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32 ibid.
33 ibid.
world. Kissinger argued that as a result of Kennan’s strategic concept of containment, coupled with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, ‘the American political objective was deemed to be the preservation of the status quo.’

Initially, Indonesia was not seen as a vital link in the US strategic grand plan. High on the State Department’s agenda was the plan to strengthen the Western alliance as a balance against Soviet hegemony. This was reflected in the UNSC voting of 1947, which saw the US vote against the Republic’s cause. However, the Soviet Union’s decision to support Indonesian independence in 1947 and a belief that the USSR was preparing to exert influence in the developing world and specifically Southeast Asia, guided the State Department to adopt a new more conciliatory attitude towards Indonesian independence.

As the dispute lingered, the possibility that inimical forces may leverage off the vulnerability of a non-aligned state caused the US to alter its position on Indonesia. Ultimately, the US believed that the ‘loss of Indonesia to the communists would deprive the United States of an area of the highest political, economic and strategic importance.’

In the end, the US brought enough pressure to bear on the Dutch – resulting in a settlement in Indonesia’s favour. That said, the decision to support Indonesia should not be seen as Washington championing the causes of self-determination, decolonisation or independence of the Indonesian state. International politics during this era was far too enmeshed in Realpolitik to allow such sentiments to dominate US foreign policy. Rather, America’s strategy was a way of countering the Soviet Union’s interests and can be best understood as comprising the tenets of realism and neo-realism.

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36 Kissinger H, 1994, op cit, p 455.
38 Ibid.
39 Military Assistance Program to Fiscal Year 1951 for Indonesia, 1950, US Department of State, FRUS, p 1.
USSR

Unlike the US, which initially opposed Indonesian independence, the Soviets supported the Republic's quest. This was primarily a manifestation of opposing Western hegemony within Asia. Whilst during the 1950s the Soviets and to a lesser degree the Chinese saw the Asian region as fertile ground which could be toiled by Communist forces, the period directly after WWII saw different dynamics at play in Southeast Asia. Jukes' analysis of the Soviet Union's influence in Asia concluded:

The newly independent nonaligned governments of Asia and Africa held no important place in Soviet thinking until Stalin's death - he refused to believe in the reality of decolonisation or to contribute economic aid to the development of the former colonies.40

It was not until September 1947 when the Soviets declared that the world was divided into 'two camps';41 that Southeast Asia became an area of potential superpower competition. After the enunciation of Zhdanov's 'two camps' theory, the USSR provided the Republicans with its UN vote.42

Netherlands

Part of understanding some of the dynamics operating in the archipelago can be traced to 300 years of Dutch rule in the East Indies. Frank Darling's analysis of Western influence on Asian states revealed that the method of rule that the Netherlands employed in Indonesia was unique in comparison to the other colonial powers of the US, the UK, Japan, France and Spain.43 Specifically, the Netherlands injected a low political, administrative and social impact whilst injecting a high economic influence.44 This form of 'eclectic-pragmatic' colonial rule coupled with low transferable political and administrative

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41 ibid, p 11.
44 ibid.
structures created a number of conditions.\textsuperscript{45} In the first case, the degree of harshness in colonial Indonesia was considerably higher than in many other colonial states. In the second case, this level of severity inflicted, in Indonesian society, a strong distrust against Western states – this stigmatisation was to be a recurring feature in the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. In the third case, a manifestation of this distrust and hardship was the crystallisation of a unique brand of nationalism within the archipelago. Finally, the highly transferable economic structures imposed by the Dutch were reflective of their reliance on the East Indies for revenue.

After WWII and as way of justifying their intervention, senior Republican leaders and Sukarno in particular, were labelled as Japanese quislings and collaborators. The Netherlands reliance on external financial aid post WWII was reflected in the US brokered Marshall Plan. To that end, the Netherlands faced a dilemma when the US shifted its allegiance during the final phases of the war. The threat to withdraw Marshall Aid was juxtaposed with the potential loss of such a rich source of income in the Dutch East Indies. Ultimately, the Netherlands was forced to accept Republican demands for independence.

**COURSE OF EVENTS**

The period from 1945-49 saw the Australia-Indonesia security relationship mature from passivity to engagement. This section will provide an overview of the key events (though primarily from an Australian perspective) during the Republic’s war against the Dutch.

**1945 – The Year of Passivity**

In 1945, Australia did not think through the implications of a new state to its near north and the relationship that would come into being. For obvious reasons, Chifley’s Labor government was preoccupied with the transition from war to rebuilding. In fact, Indonesia’s declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 was not mentioned during any

of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates of that year. Australia’s primary interest in Indonesia lay in the military transition from Japanese to Allied rule.

On 25 September 1945, a divergence in the Labor government and the Liberal opposition’s foreign policy towards Indonesia began to emerge. Highlighting this divergence was a dispute on the Brisbane waterfront where Indonesian seamen refused to load Dutch ships. Complicating the issue was the request by the Brisbane branch of the Australian Council of Trade Unions for a suspension of the penalty sections of the Immigration Act. This seemingly innocuous request was the catalyst for the formation of each party’s policy towards Indonesia. In addition, it quickly illustrated the differing stances of the key players in each party. For the Labor government (in particular Chifley and Evatt) it highlighted, in part, their sympathetic approach to the nationalist aspirations of emerging Asian nations. Conversely, the Menzies’ dominated Liberal Country Party adopted a differing approach to regional affairs. Menzies’ abhorrence of communism, his unequivocal support for the Allied nations and his fear that Asian nationalism could threaten Australia’s security synergised into a policy which denounced Indonesian nationalism and independence. On 25 September 1945 Menzies stated:

There is extensive waterside trouble in Sydney, which in the last 24 hours has included an imprudent attempt by Communists in the Waterside Workers Federation to intervene in the domestic affairs of a foreign country, namely, the Netherlands East Indies.  

Of note was Menzies’ denial of Indonesian sovereignty and his emphasis of a nexus with communism. Chifley was continually pressured by the Liberals who urged him to take strong action against the waterfront workers and to expedite the loading of arms and food supplies for the Dutch ships. In response to the waterfront dispute, Chifley adopted a policy of evasion as he continually dodged attempts by the Opposition for his government to acquiesce to the Dutch. In response to Liberal questions over the waterfront dispute he

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46 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1945 various – The majority of the debates during this period focused on peace, rebuilding and communism.
uttered: ‘I shall not go into that matter’48, ‘I cannot give complete details’49 and ‘I could say a lot about that too, but I will not.’50 In fact, this evasion allowed the government time to develop a more coherent strategy on Indonesia.

1946 – The Year of Active Neutralism

In 1946, the Australian government shifted its policy on Indonesia from passivity to one I have defined as “active neutralism”. For Chifley and Evatt, it became obvious that the continuation of colonial dominance within the Asian arena was doomed. Rising regional nationalism led the government to accept the fact that the strategic landscape of Asia would never represent that of pre-WWII. Chifley noted:

It is also true, I think that the old order in Indonesia will not go on after the final settlement has been made.51

The government was faced with a serious dilemma as it risked alienating its strongest allies in Britain and the United States if it opposed Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia; this division was seen as a possible risk to the fusion of Western solidarity in the Northern Hemisphere. On the other hand, both Chifley and Evatt supported self-determination and realised the inevitability of Indonesia’s independence – with or without Australian support. Hence, the government adopted a dual approach towards the Republic; it supported self-government of the Indonesian people whilst retaining Dutch sovereignty. Evatt summarised the government’s neutral stance when he stated in Parliament:

The most recent proposal of the Netherlands East Indies government scem[s] to mark a great advance toward a satisfactory settlement. Whilst Dutch sovereignty is retained, provision is made for a great increase in local self-government.... Australia has a vital interest in the preservation of the war time friendship with the Dutch in relation to the

48 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 185, 28 September 1945, p 6129.
49 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 185, 2 October 1945, p 6211.
50 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 185, 3 October 1945, p 6345.
Netherlands East Indies. At the same time it is important to do everything possible with
the Indonesian and other developing peoples of the world who are advancing towards a far
greater degree of self-government.\textsuperscript{52}

This policy of strategic duality was reinforced even further, when in November 1946 Evatt stated:

Our idea is that Dutch sovereignty should not be terminated but that the people of
Indonesia should obtain a substantial measure of self-government.\textsuperscript{53}

During this period, the Liberal Country Party became more vitriolic in their opposition to
any form of compromise for Indonesian independence. In March 1946 Menzies tabled a
motion of no confidence in Parliament over ‘the relations of Australia with the Netherlands
East Indies’,\textsuperscript{54} in which he labelled Sukarno as a ‘Japanese collaborator’.\textsuperscript{55} In arguing
against Indonesian self-government he stated:

I say that Australia must look to its security. Instead of having, in a political sense a barrier
reef in the north-west Australia will have a potential base of attack against itself\textsuperscript{56}.... In
other words we must visualise that phase of our defence as if we were establishing a
defensive axis between Australia and Malaya and on the lines of communication the
Netherlands East Indies are of supreme importance.\textsuperscript{57}

Menzies’ comment about a defensive axis was a prelude to a strategic policy which was to
dominate Australian security thinking during the 1950s and 1960s. As the next chapter on
the West Irian dispute will highlight, this axis was part of Australia’s “perimeter defence
concept” which encompassed a ring of friendly states to Australia’s north.

\textsuperscript{52} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 186, 13 March 1946, p 201.
\textsuperscript{53} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 189, House of Representatives, 15 November 1946, p 339.
\textsuperscript{54} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 189, House of Representatives, 15 November 1946, p 339.
\textsuperscript{55} ibid, p 8.
\textsuperscript{56} ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} ibid, p 9.
As it became more evident that the dispute was destined for a protracted political and military struggle, Canberra’s Labor administration came to the conclusion that Australia’s vital security interests were intimately linked to Southeast Asia in general and with Indonesia in particular. This view was disputed by the Australian Defence Department, which adopted a Eurocentric position. In February 1946, Defence was tasked with formulating an appreciation for Australian security planning. In summary, it recommended planning for a global war and specifically for operations in Europe against Russia.\textsuperscript{58} Regional conflicts involving minor powers, including China, were discounted. Defence concluded that a war caused by Soviet aggression, ‘could result in Australia becoming involved because of ties with the United Kingdom or because it felt that Australian participation was essential in order to protect her ultimate position.’\textsuperscript{59}

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in April 1946, the UK aimed for ‘a coordinated global system of Commonwealth defence’\textsuperscript{60} pitched against an aggressive Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{61} Conversely, Evatt and Chifley debated that Australia’s defence concerns lay in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{62} Burton argued against the Australian Defence Department’s global perceptions and contended that military commitments should not be undertaken beyond the ‘near Southeast Asian area.’\textsuperscript{63}

By the end of 1946, a division had emerged in Australian politics regarding its security relationship with a contested Indonesia. The Liberal Country Party feared regional self-determination and viewed it as inimical to Australia’s long term security interests. On the contrary, the ruling Labor Party adopted a dual policy. One aspect aimed at satisfying Allied solidarity whilst the other focused on fostering a long-term relationship with the Indonesian people.

\textsuperscript{58} Australian Defence Department Chiefs of Staff Committee minute 12/1946 of February 1946.
\textsuperscript{59} ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference, 23 April 1946.
\textsuperscript{61} Lee, 1995, \textit{op cit}, p 76.
\textsuperscript{62} ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Lee, 1995, \textit{op cit}, p 82.
1947 – The Year of Support

1947 marked the beginning of the Labor Party’s deviation away from conventional Western solidarity to a position that supported the Republic’s cause. Emanating from this newfound policy was a fear that inaction, specifically by Australia, could undermine the long-term security interests of Western states within the region. Burton concluded that peace within Southeast Asia could lead to political stability, which in turn could oppose any form of expansionism. 64

Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia changed on 20 July 1947, when Dutch forces launched a carefully orchestrated “Police Action” against Republican units. In the face of an imminent move by India to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, Australia embarked upon the first stage of its campaign for Indonesian autonomy and specifically a cease-fire within the archipelago. 65 Subsequently, Australia referred the matter to the UN under the auspices of a different charter, which eventually led to the establishment of the Good Offices Commission. Australia’s motives were strategic. Burton believed that Indonesian independence was inevitable and if Australia failed to take a leading role in the matter the outcome could be detrimental to its security interests. Furthermore, the Australian government realised the fragility in having a colonial regime in power with a hostile and belligerent local populace. Instead, the Philippines model was seen as providing Australia the best chance of forward defence. Beasley, the Minister for Defence, summarised some of the government’s motives towards Indonesia in an address to Parliament in October 1947, when he declared:

I believe that the political situation at present existing in the Philippines is the ideal one for the islands of the north of Australia. If Dutch sovereignty is restored in Indonesia by military action which would involve the complete suppression of the Indonesian revolution we should not imagine whatever we may think of that possibility - that it is an acceptable

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64 Cablegram Burton to Evatt, as cited in Darling Philip, 1994, Diplomasi: Australia & Indonesia’s independence, 1947, Australian Govt Pub Service, Canberra, p 139.
65 Australia referred the matter under Article 39 of the UN Charter (Action with respect to threats of the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression). India contemplated referring the matter under Chapter VI of the UN (Pacific Settlement Dispute) but withdraw its reference in favour of the more aggressive Australian stance.
solution of the people. Our experience of the fortified positions which are surrounded by a hostile population teaches us that those fortifications will last only about as long as they did in the Netherlands East Indies in 1941, when they lasted about five days.\textsuperscript{65}

1948 – The Year of Regional Engagement

Throughout 1948, the government embarked on a policy of regional engagement which saw it defy US and UK opinion vis a vis the Republic’s quest for independence. Chifley and Evatt’s defiance and disregard of Dutch interests threatened the solidarity of the Western alliance. Arising from the Indonesian conflict, Australia, for probably the first time, embarked on a foreign policy that was clearly independent.

In 1948, Evatt’s Department assessed that Southeast Asia and in particular China, would be crucial aspects in Australian foreign policy. Under Dutch rule, instability within Indonesia was seen as a potential breeding ground for communist activity. The Madiun Affair, a communist uprising led by Musso in 1948, provided evidence that as long as the struggle for independence continued, the greater the potential for successful communist insurgency. The Department of External Affairs assessed that an independent Indonesia which had been “guided” by Australia would nullify future communist uprisings within the archipelago and ipso facto prevent Indonesia from falling under the umbrella of the Chinese Communist Party. Throughout the year, the UK and US maintained their previous position of supporting the Dutch. In the UN, both countries continually voted against the Republic’s cause, which left Australia initially in the unenviable position of being the only Western State siding with the Republic.\textsuperscript{67} Finally, at the UN vote in New York in December 1948, Australia, along with New Zealand, helped pass the resolution whilst the US voted against and the UK abstained.\textsuperscript{68} In essence, US and UK strategic perceptions failed to accord with those of Australia. Burton feared that the Pacific and Australia was

\textsuperscript{65} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 193, 1 October 1947, p 416.

\textsuperscript{67} Those that voted for postponement: Netherlands, UK, New Zealand, France the Philippines and US. Those that voted against postponement: India, Australia, Pakistan, the USSR and Burma.

seen as becoming a 'by product of European events.'\textsuperscript{69} Whilst the containment of communism in Southeast Asia was in principle a US/UK objective, it failed to garner the political support it required because of other overriding strategic priorities which included the maintenance of the Western alliance [in this case the Netherlands].

1949 – The Year of Settlement

Australia's relationship with Indonesia reached its apogee (at least until the 1970s) in 1949. Dogged determination by the Department of External Affairs, unwavering lobbying to the UN, the UK and the US, and a realisation that Asia represented Australia's geostrategic future extricated the Indonesian issue from its hiatus to final settlement. Evatt predicted that continued unrest would 'set the whole of Southeast Asia in a ferment,'\textsuperscript{70} whilst Beasley calculated that the Indonesian question be assessed under a strategic framework. He stated that 'the day is past when European nations could dominate Asiatics.'\textsuperscript{71} In this respect, he, along with his fellow Ministers, determined that this wave of Asian nationalism could be harnessed for Australia's benefit.

In January 1949, Australia (the only Western nation to be invited) attended a regional conference in India. This invitation stemmed from a perception amongst Asian states that Australia was sympathetic to their nationalistic cause. Dorling noted that Nehru's 'genuine impatience'\textsuperscript{72} with the 'poor showing'\textsuperscript{73} of other nations on the Security Council was a catalyst for the conference (the other Asian states perceived the Security Council as a 'broken reed'\textsuperscript{74}). British intransigence towards the conference culminated in a frank assessment by Burton that 'this is a regional matter of vital importance to us and the United Kingdom has failed to appreciate our primary concern and to give support.'\textsuperscript{75} Evatt believed that the conference had the potential to become a forum for Asian opposition

\textsuperscript{69} Cablegram Burton to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, op cit, p 401.
\textsuperscript{70} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 201, 17 February 1949, p 475.
\textsuperscript{71} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 201, 15 February 1949, p 278.
\textsuperscript{72} Lee D, 1998, Australia and Indonesia's Independence The Transfer of Sovereignty Documents 1949, AGPS, Canberra, p 2.
\textsuperscript{73} ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Cablegram Burton to Evatt, as cited in, Lee D, 1998, op cit, p 2.
against the Western Union and that without Australian leadership and direction, outcomes from the conference could have ‘serious repercussions against European powers.’

The same month saw Australia’s resolve for Indonesian independence rewarded with the Security Council passing a resolution demanding the reinstatement of the Republican government. Furthermore, the Dutch were pressured to accept a full transfer of authority of the archipelago to the Indonesians by 1 July 1950. As a consequence, the Round Table Conference was held in The Hague from 23 August to 2 November 1949, to determine the means by which the transfer could be accomplished – subsequently agreed as 27 December 1949. However, during the Conference two particularly difficult questions slowed down the negotiations; the status of West New Guinea, which remained under Dutch control and the size of debts owed by Indonesia to the Netherlands. The former issue was of utmost concern to Australian policy makers. In July 1949, Horace Truscott, the Second Secretary in the Pacific Division of the External Affairs sent a minute to his senior, L McIntyre, outlining the ‘very considerable importance’ of Netherlands New Guinea to Australia. Of note was a conclusion that any decision on the Netherlands New Guinea should ‘not prejudice Australia’s interests.’ On 28 July 1949, another minute within the Department was tabled this time emphasising the ‘critical importance’ of Western New Guinea. The crux of the Department’s analysis was:

- Western New Guinea occupied a position of strategic and tactical importance for Australia;
- control by Indonesia might result in a large influx of Asiatic people to Papua and New Guinea;
- that self government by the province would be impossible before 1960; and
- that Indonesia would be technically and administratively incapable of controlling Western New Guinea.

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77 Minute Truscott to McIntyre, as cited in, Lee D, 1998, op cit, p 493.
78 Ibid.
79 Minute Pyman to McIntyre, as cited in, Lee D, 1998, op cit, p 500.
80 There was a touch of irony and prophesy in this point, as Indonesia failed to reclaim the province until 1962.
The Department urged Critchley to press the Netherlands to continue administering the province, whilst simultaneously pressuring Hatta to consider postponement of the problem as a financial quid pro quo.\textsuperscript{82} Canberra assessed Australia's strategic priorities would be jeopardised if the Republic seized control of the province. During the Round Table Talks in August, September and October 1949, Australia adopted a "wait and see" policy with respect to Dutch New Guinea. The Australian delegation played the New Guinea issue diplomatically - careful that the Indonesians did not surmise Australia's true motives. Australia suggested that a 'postponement of the issue'\textsuperscript{83} would be the most practical way of avoiding a fruitless dispute - in effect though a postponement of the issue was what Australia was after.\textsuperscript{84} Eventually, the Indonesians accepted an Australian brokered proposal, which maintained the status quo of New Guinea with the stipulation that within a year of the transfer of sovereignty the matter would be resolved.\textsuperscript{85}

Australia's security relationship with Indonesia began slowly and gradually evolved from a position of passivity to a dynamic and independent policy of regionalism. Specifically, a fear of communist expansion and a realisation of Australia's vulnerability to northern invasion were fundamental factors that drove Canberra to adopt a philosophy of regional engagement.

\textbf{ASSESSING AUSTRALIA'S MOTIVATION}

To understand Australia's actions during the Republic's struggle for freedom, it is necessary to appreciate the context of Australia's security interests and threats. It is trite to say that WWII reconfirmed the importance of the protection of Australian sovereign territory. As an adjunct, and in support of this core national interest, Evatt claimed that Australia would be vitally concerned as to who shall live in, develop and control the arc of


\textsuperscript{83} Cablegram Critchley to Department of External Affairs, as cited in, Lee D, 1998, \textit{op cit}, p 570.

\textsuperscript{84} This policy of postponement was subsequently transferred into a policy of cold storage, which the Liberal government of the 1950s strictly adhered to. Chapter 3 examines this concept.

\textsuperscript{85} Cablegram Critchley to Department of External Affairs, as cited in, Lee D, 1998, \textit{op cit}, p 592.
islands to Australia’s North. Essentially, Australia’s policy towards Indonesian independence, whilst in harmony with the notions of self-determination and decolonisation, was steeped in realism. This was reflected in Evatt’s notion of forming a ‘harmonious association of democratic states’ in Southeast Asia as a way of providing stability to the region and ipso facto strengthening Australian security.

However, whilst Australia’s security interests may have been relatively simple its threat perceptions were far more complex. These threat perceptions were derived from a combination of sources, rational and irrational, including: a fear of foreign invasion, apprehension over communism and a growing concern over Soviet/Chinese regional hegemony within the region. Common to all these threat perceptions was what Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans termed the ‘gravity theory’. No matter what the threat, its origin was to the north and invariably this threat would move southward towards Australia. Australia’s exaggerated fears were eloquently expressed by Alan Renouf who labelled Australia “the frightened country” in his book on Australian foreign policy.

**Fear of Foreign Invasion**

Australians have historically felt vulnerable to invasion due to their strategic isolation from Britain. Max Teichmann observed that ‘the Pacific has meant an invasion route, by water.’ This fear has been well documented by both Levi and Blainey. One manifestation of this strategic isolation was Australia’s propensity to identify foreign enemies. Blainey cited the example of the city of Perth, which was settled due to a ‘fear of Indonesian pirates on the north coast and fear of French ambitions on the West Coast.’ Indeed, a number of present day Australian cities owe their origins to the fear of French

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87 Ibid, p 159.
93 Ibid, p 93.
colonisation in the early 19th century (Hobart, Western Port).\textsuperscript{94} When the French corvettes \textit{Geographe} and \textit{Naturaliste} commenced surveying in Bass Strait, Governor King sent the \textit{Cumberland} to colonise King Island. During the Crimean War gun emplacements were erected on the island of Pinchgut (now Fort Denison) in Sydney Harbour. Throughout the American Civil War of 1861-65 there were concerns that opportunist privateers from the Northern States might seek to plunder Australia's coasts.

In concert with this fear of foreign predators, Australia's suspicion of Asians was heightened during the mid 19th century when the country was witness to a large influx of 'Orientals', who arrived in response to the NSW and Victorian gold rush of the 1850s.\textsuperscript{95} These prospectors were described in the Australian press as 'swarms of human locusts', whilst Mongolians were viewed as 'repulsive to the feelings of Christians.'\textsuperscript{96} A recent government funded study into the era concluded that 'there were campaigns to oust the Chinese from the goldfields' which was motivated by 'racism'.\textsuperscript{97} Dr Charles H Pearson's book of 1893, \textit{National Life and Character; a Forecast}, portrayed a gloomy future for the West and in particular Australia, citing that 'some day hordes of Asians would descend from the North.'\textsuperscript{98}

Japan's naval victory at Tsushima in 1905 is generally regarded as the trigger for the "Australian crisis."\textsuperscript{99} For the first time in the modern era, a "white" power had been defeated by a "coloured" one. Quick to latch onto this newfound threat, the Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, declared that Japan was now a defence threat to the country.\textsuperscript{100} Joan Beaumont noted that this fear was fanned by hysteria made popular by such fiction as \textit{The Australian Crisis}, which depicted a Japanese invasion.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{94} ibid, p 92.
\textsuperscript{95} In 1852 alone, 370,000 immigrants arrived in Australia. Australia's total population trebled from 430,000 in 1851 to 1.7 million in 1871.
\textsuperscript{96} Levi W, 1958, \textit{Australia's outlook on Asia}, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p 13.
\textsuperscript{97} see http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/goldrush dated 2 Sep 04.
\textsuperscript{98} Blainey, 1966, \textit{op cit}, p 316.
\textsuperscript{100} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 November 1905, p 5346.
first decade after Federation Australian newspapers regularly ran commentaries exclaiming the dangers of Japanese imperialism.\textsuperscript{102} Shortly thereafter, Deakin suggested that the ‘colonial powers of Southeast Asia should agree to an extension of the Monroe Doctrine as a way of curbing Japanese power.’\textsuperscript{103} Edwards highlighted that ‘Australians had taken comfort from the presence of European colonial powers throughout Southeast Asia as a barrier against Asian threats.’\textsuperscript{104} Not content with depicting the Japanese as a threat to Australian security, a theme emerged at the turn of the century that Germany’s \textit{Weltpolitik} was now a danger to Australian interests.\textsuperscript{105} At the same time as Japan’s victory over Russia, Australian newspaper articles began to comment on Germany’s intention to acquire Portuguese Timor.\textsuperscript{106} To that end, it was argued that this acquisition would give a rival power a foothold contrary to Australian interests.\textsuperscript{107} Some have even claimed that fear of Japanese expansion into the Pacific delayed Australian troops from deploying to the European front.\textsuperscript{108} In parallel, the Great War in Europe reinvigorated the Prussian threat. Hughes argued that Australia was one of the targets in a decades long German conspiracy aimed at the colony and the Southern Seas.\textsuperscript{109}

In 1930, as Japan continued to exert its influence in the Pacific, Australian trade unionists protested at proposals to build a Japanese iron mine in Yampi Sound.\textsuperscript{110} Japan’s entry into WWII, its island hopping campaign southward, the legendary battle at Kokoda, the bombing of Darwin and Broome, the midget submarines off Sydney, the Burma railway episode and the treatment of Australian POWs, only served to heighten Australia’s fears of Japanese imperialism. Humphrey McQueen observed that the attack on Pearl Harbour

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  \item \textsuperscript{102} See: \textit{The Worker}, 20 December 1906 and \textit{The Age}, 15 December 1906.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Beaumont J, 1989, \textit{op cit}, p 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Overack P, Australia reactions to German interests in the Netherlands Indies and Timor prior to 1914, in Moses J & Pugsley C, 2000, \textit{The German Empire and Britain’s Pacific Dominions 1917-1919}, Regina Books, California, p 299.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid, p 300.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Fric H, 1991, \textit{Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth century to World War II}, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p 153.
\end{itemize}
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came as no surprise to Australia but was the fulfillment of the anxieties of a century.  \footnote{111} Reflecting upon Australia’s security concerns, Evatt declared in 1948 that ‘the general picture is one of unrest and instability and as such is most disturbing to Australia.’ \footnote{112}

In 1946, Menzies stated that it would be the ‘very ecstasy of suicide for Australians to assist in the elimination of Western controls from Asia.’ \footnote{113} This statement was in the context of retaining Dutch East Indies influence within the Indonesian archipelago. Spender spoke of ‘the seven million Australians under the constant menace of more than 100 million people of other nations.’ \footnote{114} This attitude was to shape the Opposition’s strategic policies on Indonesia. Even up to 1964, this Asiatic fear was still being debated in Australian books. I.R Sinai made the claim that ‘Western civilization may become an increasingly small gravely threatened minority surrounded by millions upon millions who are openly hostile.’ \footnote{115} Levi summarised Australia’s conundrum as such: ‘Australia had attitudes toward Asia and the Asians before they developed a policy.’ \footnote{116}

**Communism**

The impact of communism in Australian society did not come to the fore until after WWII, with the advent of the global ideological schism. Thereafter, its significance assumed colossal proportions and became one of the defining principles guiding Australia’s strategic policy. Edwards made the point that by 1949 ‘many Australians came to see communism as the major threat to their security.’ \footnote{117} This statement, written immediately after Mao’s successful Communist China revolution, set the tone for Australia’s security relations with Indonesia into the 1950s.

\footnote{113}{Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 September 1946, pp 176-7.}
\footnote{114}{Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 November 1946, p 183.}
\footnote{116}{Levi, 1958, op cit, p 197.}
\footnote{117}{Edwards P, 1992, op cit, p 3.}
In the late 1940s, Australian officials feared that protraction of the Indonesian conflict would weaken the already fragile Republican government.\textsuperscript{118} This was accentuated by the return to Indonesia of the Soviet aligned communist Musso in 1948. The inability of Hatta to resolve the conflict was the catalyst for the fragmentation of the Indonesian political structure – which hence spawned a plethora of internal factions. A belief existed in Canberra that as a result of the political stalemate, the state of Indonesia had become increasingly favourable to left wing agitation. Previously, domestic conflicts had been obscured in the exigencies of national policy. Paradoxically, it was now national policy that had germinated a wave of domestic unrest and the possibility of a left wing government. After Musso’s return he formulated his own national revolution. He gained control of the SOBSI (Central Organisation of Indonesian Labor) and commenced a series of political attacks on America and the Western nations. On 22 August 1948, the SOBSI declared inter alia a rejection of the American – Australian compromise proposals.\textsuperscript{119}

In late August 1948, Australia’s GOC representative, Tom Critchley, cabled the Department of External Affairs with an assessment that stated ‘the atmosphere in Indonesia is deteriorating rapidly.’\textsuperscript{120} The cable further explained that the ‘Hatta government is subject to increasing pressure from the left and are advocating acceptance of the Russian offer.’\textsuperscript{121} On 2 September 1948, Eaton cabled the Department of External Affairs with a grave analysis of the domestic political situation within Indonesia.

You will be aware of the demand of Republican left wing group for the resignation of the Hatta government and the formation of a parliamentary cabinet. Excluded from the government the left wing groups have developed an increasingly militant and extremist position in regard to both domestic and external politics, particularly since the arrival from Moscow of the Indonesian communist Musso.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118} The Sjarifuddin government had capitulated over the Renville agreement. Subsequently, Sukarno asked Hatta to form a new Cabinet.


\textsuperscript{120} Cablegram Critchley to Department of External Affairs, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, \textit{op cit.} p 268.

\textsuperscript{121} ibid.

\textsuperscript{122} Cablegram Eaton to Department of External Affairs, ibid, p 271.
On 9 November 1948, Chifley announced in Parliament that ‘the communists are now adding to the difficulties there.’ Consequently, Canberra deemed that protraction of the Indonesian problem could only play into the hands of communist subversive elements. The possibility that the PKI could form a Republican government was not discounted.

**Soviet/Chinese Regional Hegemony**

After WWII, the decolonisation of Asia and the rise of Asian nationalism deepened Australia’s threat perceptions. The departure of Western powers within the region had a twofold effect. It left the region vulnerable to inimical influences whilst simultaneously it created a power vacuum within the decolonised states. Australia feared that continued conflict within the Indonesian archipelago would ferment instability around the periphery of the Southeast Asian region. In a memorandum from the Department of External Affairs on 15 April 1948, titled *Australian Policy on Indonesia*, the Department declared:

This prospect alone is enough to justify Australia in maintaining a sympathetic and helpful attitude toward the Republic leader. Australia has a legitimate interest in seeing that they [Dutch] do not try to prolong the prewar status quo in circumstance which make it impracticable and by means which can only make for continued unrest and disorganisation in an area of prime importance to Australia.\(^{124}\)

On 1 July 1948, a departmental dispatch from the Australian Consul General in Batavia, Group Captain Eaton, to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, J Burton, warned of the ‘grave reaction throughout the East against America and England’\(^{125}\) if the United Nations failed to implement the recommendations from the Committee of Good Offices.

\(^{123}\) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 199, 9 November 1948, p 2636.


\(^{125}\) Departmental Dispatch, *ibid*, p 239.
As previously mentioned, Australia's rationale during the defining year of 1948 was to a large degree focused on curtailing Soviet/Chinese interference in Southeast Asia. In particular, Chifley's statement below provides some insight into the government's thinking, he declared:

The outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia will have most serious effects throughout South East Asia and will call in the direct or indirect intervention of parties, which we, the United Kingdom and the US have been endeavoring to exclude from Southeast Asia.126

The DEA cautioned that it was 'anxious to prevent an Eastern power raising the matter at the Security Council and championing the cause of the Republic.'127 With respect to Chinese influence it concluded:

A communist dominated China which could result from the present confused political situation in China and which could follow quickly on the commencement of an East-West conflict, would certainly aim at acquiring the use of resources of South East Asia, not by military action, but by internal action, using Chinese populations and the already organised political groupings of secret societies.128

The fragile regional strategic balance was seen as vulnerable to Soviet inspired revolutionary behaviour. As early as January 1948, Beasley, Evatt and Bevin (the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) declared that the Dutch 'were breaking a line of countries from Australia to China in which relations between Western countries and nationalist movements could be satisfactory.'129 When the Republicans initiated political overtures to the USSR for diplomatic support, Canberra feared that the Communist bloc would migrate and permeate to other states within the region.

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126 Cablegram Chifley to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, op cit, p 347.
127 Cablegram, Burton to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, op cit, p 275.
128 Political Appreciation, 30 September 1948 CRS A1068/T4, DL 47/5/1.
129 Cablegram Beasley to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, op cit, p 17.
Finally, in an address to Parliament on 2 December 1948, Evatt stated that, ‘the absence of a settlement has caused unrest which is being felt throughout Southeast Asia.’

Canberra assessed that continued uncertainty within Indonesia would precipitate a migration of instability and rebellion to the periphery of the region.

Summary

The preceding analysis of Australia’s security motivations outlined a complex array of threats that Canberra perceived as inimical to its national interests. Specifically, Australia’s threat perceptions identified an amalgam of individual, state and systemic forces. By the late 1940s, Australia had identified the French, Germans, Dutch, Asians, Russians, Japanese, Soviets, Chinese and the Indonesians as potential threat sources. To combat the Antipodes, Australia erected geographic, strategic and cultural barriers that served to combat newfound security threats. Indeed, looking back over the period 1800-1945, one may conclude that Australians had a heightened, even exaggerated sense of strategic vulnerability, which in turn manifested into a complex set of threat perceptions. Whilst concerns about Japan were realised in December 1941, many of the remaining threat perceptions appear, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight, to have been unfounded.

This sense of strategic vulnerability was a defining influence in Australia’s security calculations. From a realist perspective, Australia desired to keep Soviet, Chinese and other inimical forces out of Southeast Asia in order to protect its own national interests. Whilst the colonial system within the Republic was collapsing Canberra deemed that the best course of action was to align with Indonesia as means of thwarting communist expansion.

INDONESIA’S MOTIVATION

During the period 1945-49, Indonesia’s security interests were relatively simple – independence and the withdrawal of Dutch military and political power. Similarly, its

130 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Volume 200, 2 December 1948, p 3904.
threat perceptions had a single tangible focus: a returning Dutch colonial army. To understand the Republic's motivations during this period an examination of the two most influential forces in Indonesian society is necessary: Sukarno and nationalism.

**Sukarno**

Morrison and Suhrke concluded that 'Indonesia's foreign policies have been heavily influenced by domestic politics and by the idiosyncratic beliefs and personalities of the nation's leaders.' To that end, Sukarno’s role and influence on Indonesian politics, its foreign policy and its security perspectives was without match. No other institution or individual contributed more to Indonesia's security focus — hence his predilections and more importantly rationale for adopting specific policies are fundamental to understanding Indonesia's security perspectives. Bernhard Dahm postulated that Sukarno's political thinking was a synthesis of three specific tenets. Firstly, he was under the spell of the 'Djajabaja syndrome' — his underlying belief in the cyclic movement of history. This Javanese mysticism was instrumental in guiding his foreign policies. In his autobiography, his belief in preordainment is striking, quoting a scene where his mother informed him of his birth:

Son you are looking at the sunrise, and you my son will be a man of glory, a great leader of his people, because your mother gave birth to you at dawn. We Javanese believe that one born at the moment of sunrise is predestined... My birthday is double six. June six. It is my supreme good fortune to have been born under Gemini, the sign of twins.133

Sukarno's belief that he was a 'god with supernatural healing powers' influenced key policy decisions that were to impact on both Australia and Indonesia. In his analysis of the revolution, Abu Hanifah, a former Indonesian politician, diplomat and Sukarno friend, noted that his conditioning by the mystic had its roots in his early youth. Further, he

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emphasised that Sukarno’s actions were often influenced by Dukuns (Javanese soothsayers). Hanifah commented in his work *Tales of a Revolution*:

It is very important to understand fully, that Sukarno’s thinking and mental make up were very much conditioned by these mystical beliefs of his youth... Sukarno believed absolutely in the powers of these dukuns. As long as he believed that the mystics favoured him, nothing could discourage him. All Sukarno’s actions must be viewed in this light.\(^\text{134}\)

Next was Sukarno’s stubborn and unwavering devotion to a set of ideals, which were developed in the 1920s. This approach would lock Sukarno into external and domestic policies that were not congruent with the contemporary geo-political environment. Hence, Sukarno’s dictum was not temporal and instead was fixated around preconceived ideas, norms and notions. In fact, he alluded to this ahistorical perspective in his autobiography when explaining the concepts of marhaenism, socialism, and nationalism as the framework for his spirit of gotong royong. He claimed that “these concepts which I put forward in the 20s and from which I have never deviated don’t fall neatly into a box.”\(^\text{135}\)

Sukarno’s statement of not deviating away from preconceived ideas is consistent with Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance. (discussed in chapter 1).\(^\text{136}\) This facet of Sukarno is important to note; in particular this trait was to trouble the Australia-Indonesia security relationship in later years when he consistently viewed the “imperial world” as hostile. In addition to these above-mentioned traits Sukarno’s egocentric personality was to shape Indonesia’s security calculations. The opening paragraph of his autobiography commenced with:

The simplest way to describe Sukarno is to say he is a great lover. He loves his country, he loves his people, he loves women, he loves art and best of all he loves himself.\(^\text{137}\)


\(^{135}\) ibid.


Unfortunately, the Western states never fully grasped Sukarno’s egocentrism. He exclaimed:

The West always accuses me turning too sweet a face to the Socialist states. They say there goes Sukarno playing friendly to the Eastern bloc again. Well why not. The Russians never permitted anyone to jeer at me in print. The Chinese always praise Sukarno. They don’t embarrass me around the world or treat me like a spoiled child in public by refusing any more candy unless I’m a good boy... Thank you people from the East, for always showing me friendship for not trying to hurt me.\textsuperscript{138}

In Weber’s seminal study of the economy and society he posited the notion of ‘charismatic domination.’\textsuperscript{139} Weber defined this form of rule as arising ‘from collective excitements produced by extraordinary events and from surrender to egoism of any kind.’\textsuperscript{140} This enabled the ruler to govern ‘from the highly personal experience of divine grace and god like heroic strength.’\textsuperscript{141} Weber’s interpretation of charismatic domination is reflected in the type of rule Sukarno employed during the 1950s.

Sukarno’s preeminence in Indonesian politics had both a positive and a negative impact on the Indonesian state. His dominance and his ability to rally disparate masses provided a degree of cohesion within the archipelago – in particular during the war for independence – when he undoubtedly provided firm leadership at a crucial time in Indonesia’s history. However, his dominance and the fusion between himself, the government and the state, meant that the Western world could not distinguish between the three. This inability to discern between individual and state was particularly acute in Australia (Menzies and the LCP were extremely sensitive to this condition). Thus, any of Sukarno’s perceived flaws were translated into flaws of the Indonesian state per se.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} ibid, p 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} ibid, p 1121.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} ibid, p 1115.
\end{itemize}
Nationalism

Whilst nationality and patriotism can be traced back to the earliest of civilisations, nationalism as we currently know it, is a modern phenomenon. European nationalism gained strength after the Middle Ages, and by the turn of the 20th century, Western Civilisation had for over 300 years been ordained with a sense of national consciousness. Featherston’s examination of 19th century nationalism concluded that ‘self-conscious nations are in the main a modern phenomenon.’

In 1933, J H C Hayes wrote a seminal work on nationalism, which he defined as ‘the condition of mind.’ In his study, he noted that nationalism was characterised by three features: language, historic tradition and a distinct cultural society. These attributes helped communities to identify themselves as homogenous and unique. Shortly after Hayes’ study, Carr wrote that nationalism was ‘a sense of community spirit, which differentiated from that of an association.’

Specific to this thesis, the 20th century marked a turning point for Asian nationalism. Wilson’s expression of self-determination as outlined in his Fourteen Points at Versailles, coincided with China’s nationalist movement led by Dr Sun Yat Sen and India’s independence movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. Nationalism within Southeast Asia was rooted in the need for self-definition amid a hostile colonial rule and specific to Indonesia, a host of political currents at the turn of the last century were caught on the tide of this nationalism. In his famous oratory Indonesia Accuses, in which Sukarno defended himself at trial before the Bandung District Court in 1930, he stated:

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144 Hayes J H C, 1933, op cit, p 6.
In short, with this nationalism our people will have a soul, will live, will no longer be like corpses as they are now.\textsuperscript{148}

The hypnotic effect of Indonesian nationalism helped glue a diverse multitude of ethnic and regional groups into a coherent homogeneous entity. Feith noted:

It is also undeniable that the feeling of unity was powerful at the time - despite the multiplicity of parties, the compromise or no compromise, fight or negotiate arguments, the ideological disagreements and the frequently falling cabinets – thanks principally to common hostility to the Dutch.\textsuperscript{149}

During Dutch rule, the governing power, similar to other colonial governments, attempted to suppress nationalism on the grounds that it would provoke widespread anti-Dutch sentiment. The Japanese occupation of the archipelago stimulated a constellation of forces against colonial rule. Ironically, it was the Japanese regime that provided a strong impetus for this national consciousness. Decades of economic and cultural coercion, abrogation of democratic freedoms and repressive Western political rule had influenced this consciousness.

After WWII, nationalism within Southeast Asia gathered new life. A rapid withdrawal by colonial forces from the region saw a wave of independence movements gather momentum: the Philippines in 1946, Burma in 1948, Vietnam in 1954 and Malaya in 1957. Macmahon Ball concluded that Asian nationalism or as he defined it ‘the revolution in East Asia’, was the product of a ‘revolt against colonisation, it is a social and economic revolt and it is a racial – revolt or Asian unity.’\textsuperscript{150} In more recent times, the Australian Senate committee noted that ‘nationalism was the driving force for the independence movements in Southeast Asia’.\textsuperscript{151}


\textsuperscript{149} ibid.

\textsuperscript{150} Macmahon Ball, 1952, \textit{Nationalism and Communism in East Asia}, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p 1.

Whilst nationalism was one of the primary forces galvanising, and in turn, driving Asian states towards independence, this had a potential upside for the Western powers as it provided these same states with an ideal medium to combat the growing threat of communism in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{152} In 1948, nationalist Republican forces quickly defeated the communist led Madiun Revolt in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{153} This victory was not lost on the US, which soon thereafter gave diplomatic support to the Republican movement. In sum, Asian nationalism generally and Indonesian nationalism specifically, granted positive benefits for both Australia and the fledgling independence movement in the archipelago; provided Australia could accept the inevitability of colonisation’s demise.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP - FROM INDIFFERENCE TO COOPERATION

In Chapter One Buzan’s approach of what constituted a state was highlighted; a physical base of population and territory, having institutions of some sort such as the machinery of government and having some idea of the state which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of the people.\textsuperscript{154} Throughout the turbulent period of the Revolutionary War, the Republic’s physical base was hotly contested; indeed, this physical base was the genesis of the war. Buzan’s next point of governmental institutions again raises the question of whether the Republic could claim to be a state from 1945; despite claiming independence in that year. In effect, a proxy and loose coalition of elite actors organised the Republic’s domestic and international affairs; this coalition could hardly be categorised as representing a modern government. Finally, whilst the struggle against the Dutch went some way to forging together the idea of “state”, events such as the Madiun Affair indicate that this idea was still embryonic. Accordingly, to conclude that Indonesia was a state (using Buzan’s framework) from 1945 is questionable.

\textsuperscript{152} Macmahon Ball, 1952, \textit{op cit}, p 152.
\textsuperscript{153} ibid, p 153.
\textsuperscript{154} ibid, p 66.
The Emergence of Co-operation

As previously discussed, Australia’s decision to side with the Republic was founded on strategic reasons and was in large, based on the realist outlook of international relations. However, this decision was strongly opposed by the Menzies’ led conservative Liberal-Country Party coalition. Menzies’ stance was in part a manifestation of the conservative element within Australian society. In Parliament, he stated:

We cannot sensibly expect to maintain our own territorial integrity and our own national racial and economic policies if we take sides against European nations. In plain terms we have been assisting to put the Dutch out of the East Indies. If we continue to do that the same process will no doubt in due course eject the British from Malaya, and the Australians from Papua New Guinea.

With respect to the tension between European and Asiatic cultures he declared:

I want to say plainly that this Government has accepted a policy in relation to the Netherlands East Indies of driving the white man out of the Netherlands East Indies just as their policy is to be pliant and complaisant in respect of elements which would drive the white man out of South East Asia and indeed out of the whole Asian continent.

Menzies’ sentiments have remarkable resonance with Said’s argument on Orientalism. Said noted:

The premise there was that since the Orientals were ignorant of self government they had better be kept that way for their own good. Since the White Man, like the Orientalist, lived very close to the line of tension keeping coloreds at bay he felt it incumbent on him readily to define and redefine the domain he surveyed.

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135 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 February 1949, p 269.
136 ibid.
138 Said E, 1985, op cit, p 228.
Other members of Menzies’ party were no less vitriolic in their opposition to Asian races. Senator O’Sullivan argued that the Dutch people of the Netherlands East Indies are the ‘one white hope standing between us and the hundreds of million coloured peoples to our North.’159 O’Sullivan’s House of Representatives colleague Blain, was even more blunt:

Of course if we treat the Japanese as civilised... They are barbarians. It will be 200 years before they will have been able to assimilate our way of life our democracy. No white man can get inside the Japanese mind.160

This form of Orientalism was not solely confined to Menzies and his party, but rather, was part of the mindset of the Australian public that had its genesis in the 1850s during the gold rush era. Thus, Chifley, Evatt and Burton were faced with a strategic dilemma. On one hand, Australians feared or at the very least were less inclined to engage with Asians and Asian states than they were with European cultures/countries – the White Australia Policy a testament to this point. However, the Labor government viewed the threat of Soviet/Chinese interference and the rise of communism as an even greater threat - so faced with competing pressures they chose the lesser “evil”.

Under a typical neo realist framework, one might have expected Canberra to “balance” against the Indonesian nationalist movement and support the colonial order. However, it became increasingly obvious to the Chifley government that the dispute would not be easily reconciled and any delay would only pave the way for communist influence in Southeast Asia. Further, the Department of External Affairs concluded that peace could lead to political stability and thus prevent Soviet/Chinese expansion.161 The continued protraction of the Indonesian dispute convinced the Australian government that it needed Indonesia’s support for its security framework – this support would not be forthcoming under Dutch rule. Changing strategic circumstances were driving Australia’s foreign policy away from an automatic allegiance to the West. After its overt support for Indonesian sovereignty, Australia’s security framework became suddenly more complex.

159 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 March 1949, p 826.
161 Cablegram Burton to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip, 1994, op cit, p 139.
On a global level, it still perceived the US/Western orbit as intrinsic to its stability and security, yet, on a local level it opted for an alternative institution over the Western alliance.

Canberra feared that regional sentiment for Western states was eroding, hence, Asian states would defect away from Australia’s sphere of influence. Without Australian support, Indonesia could have rightly claimed that its independence was solely attributed to Asian backing. Gordon Greenwood succinctly summarised this when he stated:

This action had been taken in the knowledge that India would in any case have done the same and in the belief that it would be better for Australia’s future relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{162}

Transcripts from the DEA of December 1948 support this point. The Department stated, ‘we have persistently tried to build a bridge between the West and the Asians in circumstances where nationalism has been running in the opposite direction.’\textsuperscript{163} The final assessment was even blunter – ‘the blow to the prestige of the West in Asia may be irreparable, failure of Western powers to deter the Dutch will have repercussions throughout Asia.’\textsuperscript{164} Greenwood noted:

The major question the government had to decide was whether the Dutch or the Indonesians or some combination of both could best guarantee Indonesian security and by doing so present an effective shield against attacks on Australia itself.\textsuperscript{165}

USSR intervention at the Security Council dramatically accelerated and intensified Australia’s drive for Indonesian independence. As early as January 1948, the US State Department expressed concern about ‘USSR participation’\textsuperscript{166} in the Good Offices Committee. In February 1948, the Australian delegation to the United Nations reported

\textsuperscript{164} ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Greenwood G, 1974, \textit{Approaches to Asia: Australia postwar policies and attitudes}, McGraw Hill, Canberra, p 287.
that the USSR Deputy Foreign Minister, Gromyko, had asserted that ‘some members of the Security Council had never intended that the council should stop real aggression.’\textsuperscript{167} Gromyko was vitriolic in his veiled attack on the Western states claiming that the GOC report was ‘one sided’\textsuperscript{168} and was a ‘betrayal to the people of Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{169} Implicit in Gromyko’s statements was a proposal for establishing an alternative commission – one led by the USSR – and one that might drive the Republic into the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet dilemma was to intensify in May 1948, when reports were received from Radio Moscow that an ‘agreement for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic and the USSR’\textsuperscript{170} had been concluded. The ramifications of this agreement were twofold. Internally, within Indonesia, this gave left wing factions further impetus and credibility in establishing a communist cabinet. Externally, it signalled that the Hatta government was prepared to move closer toward Soviet influence with independence being the quid pro quo. The Soviet factor did nothing but exasperate an already complex situation. The Dutch used the ‘communist bug’\textsuperscript{171} as justification for further police actions – this threat only hardened Hatta’s resolve who declared ‘the Republican will fight for years and years.’\textsuperscript{172} Canberra immediately saw the danger in any extension in hostilities – the longer the conflict continued the greater the chance the Republic would fall under the Soviet sphere.

In September 1948, Burton requested that Evatt approach the Dutch in order to explain Australia’s strategic priorities within the region and of the danger in letting the Soviets establish a foothold within Southeast Asia. The Department was ‘anxious to prevent an Eastern power raising the matter at the Security Council and championing the cause of the Republic.’\textsuperscript{173} Burton correctly assessed that delays in negotiating a settlement would

\textsuperscript{166} Cablegram Plimsoll to Burton, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, \textit{op cit}, p 18.
\textsuperscript{167} Cablegram Australia delegation, United Nations, to Department of External Affairs, ibid, p 84.
\textsuperscript{168} ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Cablegram Eaton to Department of External Affairs, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, \textit{op cit}, p 180.
\textsuperscript{171} ibid, p 175.
\textsuperscript{172} ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Cablegram, Burton to Evatt, as cited in Dorling Philip & David Lee, 1996, \textit{op cit}, p 275.
mitigate Australia’s influence on the Republic. He stated ‘we are losing that influence because of delays in settlement.’

Australia’s desire to forge closer relations with an ideologically dissimilar state is explained by Walt’s study, which concluded that ‘security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude.’ Walt claimed that ideology, whilst a contributing factor toward alliance formation, is not the defining force. Indeed, Morgenthau’s statement that alliances which are born without a form of material interests are stillborn, is relevant to this discussion.

Independent Foreign Policies

During the war, the Republican movement adopted a two pronged approach to its security objectives. Internally, it waged a guerilla war campaign against the Dutch whilst externally it sought international support for foreign intervention, which entailed the formation of a complex alliance network. During the development of this alliance labyrinth, Indonesia was able to court both communist and Western diplomatic support. Moreover, the “revolution” marked a unique period in Indonesia’s history of foreign policy. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung encapsulated the Republic’s foreign policy objectives when he commented:

The foreign policy of the Republic in this era prior to the transfer of power was directed solely to mustering support, sympathy, and goodwill in its struggle for independence against the Dutch. It succeeded in gaining that support, sympathy and goodwill from the United Nations, the Asian and Arab countries and such other countries as the US, Australia and the USSR.

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174 ibid.
176 Ide further comments that after internationalising the dispute Indonesia’s relations were very close with those countries which had played a role at the Security Council and those which had supported it ever since its proclamation of independence. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 1973, op cit, p 71-74.
In Morrison and Suhrke’s study they argued that small non-aligned states such as Indonesia have one advantage over a large state in that it can easily switch allegiances and thus can bargain from its ability to alter its alliance patterns. The Republic’s quest for independence is a case study that supports moderate systemic theory. As indicated earlier, Indonesia’s non-aligned policy meant that it was able to solicit support from both superpowers. For example, it attained the USSR’s UN vote in 1947 – a resolution which the US voted against. However, instead of openly aligning with the USSR in recognition for its UN vote, the Republic maintained its policy of non-alignment. Indeed, Indonesia in conjunction with the Netherlands, elected the US as the third member of the GOC. In 1949, the US voted in favour of the Republic’s cause.

As chapter 3 will highlight, Southeast Asia was becoming inextricably linked to Australia’s national interests. Indeed, the strategy towards West Irian was founded on Canberra’s premise that Dutch rule over this island was vital to the defence of Australia. Furthermore, another theme began to emerge – that of a coherent national policy as opposed to an imperial one - Australia’s foreign policy assessments, interest and threats were now at variance to those of Britain. Beaumont concluded that it was Evatt who made the impact on the international stage – asserting the rights of small powers at the San Francisco conference in 1945. As such ‘this gave Australia the capacity for the first time to conduct a truly independent foreign policy’ In essence, through Chifley, Evatt and Burton’s guidance, Australia’s foreign policy was maturing into an independent strategy, which placed Australia’s national interests above those of the UK.

Summary

The Republic’s war for independence was a watershed for both Australia and Indonesia. During this period the two states developed a cooperative security relationship – one that would not be replicated again until the 1970s. For the USSR, Indonesia’s case represented

178 ibid, p 296.
180 ibid.
an opportunity to split Western solidarity and to exert its influence in the developing world. For the US, it represented a foreign policy dilemma. Initially, it adopted a cautious approach, one that favoured the Dutch, lest it be seen that chinks were appearing in the Western alliance. However, once the Soviets tendered their support to the Republic and as the situation within the archipelago deepened (with the First Police Action), the US realised that their stance was tenuous. As the fighting continued (and specifically the Second Police Action of 1948), the US concluded that Indonesia, as a global strategic asset, was more important than Dutch solidarity. This is not to infer that the US viewed Indonesia as more important than Australia and the Netherlands. Rather and in accordance with moderate systemic relationships, the allegiances of the Australia and Dutch were never in question; thus, this resolute alignment afforded the US some lateral movement in the way it handled the Indonesian issue. Regardless of the outcome, the US was cognisant that both Australia and the Netherlands would remain in the Western orbit. What was debatable was the direction in which Indonesia would turn. These points indicate that the optimism and energy in which Western states embraced decolonisation may have been more a function of structural factors as opposed to a belief in the morality of self-determination.

Australia’s threat perceptions reflected a mixture of individual, state and systemic forces. In parallel with Australia’s more conciliatory policy towards Indonesia, was a growing realisation in Canberra of the importance of the Asian region. Specifically, Chifley and Evatt determined that Australia’s strategic interests primarily lay in Asia as opposed to the European arena and the principal threat facing Australia was not war on the continent but rather a war in Asia (The Korean War was to galvanise this mindset in 1950). With this strategic reorientation, Australia began to develop its own unique and independent foreign policy. This is important to note, because in 1948, Hatta was exclaiming Indonesia’s own brand of foreign policy, which became known as “bebas aktif”. By 1949, both states had formulated unique foreign policies, which reflected their security outlooks. For Australia, it was an Asian consciousness and a geographic awareness that it was situated on the periphery of the Asian region with no large Western power nearby. This awareness meant
that Australia was to become increasingly focused on events to its immediate north. The events of West Irian from 1950-1962 confirmed this northern focus.
3
WEST IRIAN: A MOVEMENT TOWARDS CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The West Irian dispute (1950-1962) saw a seachange in the Australia-Indonesia security relationship – one from cooperation to conflict. After the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, Sukarno embarked upon the next part of his revolutionary campaign, which entailed acquiring the province of Dutch controlled West New Guinea. This chapter examines, from a theoretical perspective, the reasons for both Australia and Indonesia’s positions during the dispute.

Intrinsically, the issue was between Indonesia and the Netherlands, though a number of peripheral states exerted varying degrees of influence on the principal parties. Canberra’s primary concern was a belief that West Irian was an integral link in an island chain barrier to Australia’s north - a chain that would protect the mainland from approaching threats. Menzies, Spender and Casey perceived that Dutch sovereignty of West Irian was vital to Australia’s security interests - a theme that was to persist throughout the dispute until Australia realised it would not succeed. For Indonesia and specifically Sukarno, West Irian represented more than an inhospitable tract of mountain land inhabited by non-Malay peoples, specifically, it was a continuation of the revolution. “Administrators” such as Hatta viewed independence as the end of the struggle, conversely, “solidarity makers” such as Sukarno perceived Indonesian sovereignty of West Irian as interwoven with this revolution. As Sukarno became increasingly aware that the tool of diplomacy was doomed he adopted a more militant stance – though this militancy was more in style than substance.

The role of the US in this dispute is an interesting case study of Realpolitik and of global politics presiding over regional politics. From the outset, the US adopted a policy of cautious neutrality. Careful not to alienate its NATO and ANZUS allies whilst simultaneously maintaining cordial relations with a fledgling and vulnerable Asian state,

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the US allowed the dispute to progress without its direct intervention. However, complicating Washington’s position was Moscow’s unequivocal political support for Jakarta’s stance on West Irian. As identified in the previous chapter, Indonesia’s position as a moderate nonaligned state in an era of great power competition afforded it a significant degree of flexibility and leverage; this situation shaped the policies of both the US (in the 1960s) and the USSR (1950s) as both courted Sukarno’s support and thwarted repeated attempts by Canberra to influence Washington’s position. In sum, West Irian presented a political and strategic dilemma to a range of states. Ultimately, the net result was the transfer of sovereignty of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia, which Australia reluctantly accepted.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The best account of the West Irian debate is given by Bone, however, his examination does not account for Australia’s perspective. Similarly, Mackie provides the most comprehensive version of Australia’s actions, though, he does not delve into any type of security analysis. The Australian political perspective is best seen through the biographies, autobiographies and speeches of Menzies, Casey, Barwick and Spender. Current Notes provides some key insights into the Department of External Affairs and the Australian government’s handling of the crisis.

The literature pertaining to Indonesia’s interpretation of events is scarce and there is no comprehensive study of Indonesia’s security motivation throughout this era. The vast bulk

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4 Menzies, R, 1967, Afternoon Light, Cassell, Melbourne
6 Barwick G, 1964, Australia Defence and Foreign Policy, Angus and Robertson, Canberra.
7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, various.
8 Current Notes, Volume 21, 1950, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra. 
Current Notes, Volume 23, 1952, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra.
Current Notes, Volume 32 1961, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra.
Current Notes, Volume 25 1954, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra.
Current Notes, Volume 24 1953, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra.
of literature is centred on political works from Sukarno,\textsuperscript{9} Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung\textsuperscript{10} and Subandrio\textsuperscript{11} during the guided democracy period. Other sources include works on Indonesian Communism,\textsuperscript{12} the TNI\textsuperscript{13} and extracts from the Indonesian Department of Information and Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{14} However, the analytical value of some of these sources is problematic. In particular, the majority of literature published by Indonesian government departments is highly subjective. Sukarno’s autobiography\textsuperscript{15} provides a useful insight into the leader’s perceptions and justifications. The best first hand perspective (though from a Western account) of Indonesia’s conduct during this period comes from Howard Palfrey Jones, during his role as US Ambassador to Indonesia in the Guided Democracy era.\textsuperscript{16}

Literature on China and the USSR’s involvement in the dispute is limited and primarily comes from newspaper accounts and memoirs from such leaders as Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{17} Theoretical security literature on West Irian is the area that has been least examined. Morrison and Suhrke\textsuperscript{18} explore Indonesia under the spotlight of moderate systemic relationships, though, their analysis does not account for all the peculiarities of what happened during the West Irian debate. Buzan,\textsuperscript{19} Collins,\textsuperscript{20} Rengger,\textsuperscript{21} Rothstein,\textsuperscript{22} Waltz,\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Current Notes}, Volume 22 1951, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra

\textsuperscript{9} Sukarno, 1965, \textit{Sukarno}, an autobiography as told to Cindy Adams, Bobbs Merrill, New York.


\textsuperscript{11} Subandrio, 1964, \textit{Indonesia Foreign Policy}, Jakarta.


\textsuperscript{14} Indonesia Army Information, 1961, \textit{West Irian an appalling Dutch Injustice}, Djakarta; Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Indonesia on the march} Volume 11; Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{The Case of West Irian}, Djakarta; Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{The Autonomous Province of West Irian}, Djakarta; Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{West Irian and the World}, Djakarta.

\textsuperscript{15} Sukarno, 1965, \textit{op cit.}

\textsuperscript{16} Jones HP, 1973, \textit{Indonesia: The Possible Dream}, Hoover Institute, Singapore.

\textsuperscript{17} Khrushchev, 1971, \textit{Khrushchev Remembers}, André Deutsch, London.


\textsuperscript{19} Buzan B, 1993, People States and Fear an agenda for International security studies in the post Cold War era, Harvester, London.

\textsuperscript{20} Collins A, 1990, \textit{The Security Dilemmas of South East Asia}, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
and Deutsch\textsuperscript{24} all touch on the security debate, though, none with particular reference to Australia, Indonesia or West Irian. In summary, this chapter's major challenge is to extract the key findings from some of these security commentators, relate them to the events pertaining to West Irian and in turn develop a new understanding of the security relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

**COURSE OF EVENTS**

The West Irian dispute was to prove one of the most vexing in the history of Australian foreign policy, which was grounded on historical anti-Asian prejudices, a perceived vulnerability of foreign invasion and an emerging consternation of China's future regional intentions. Conversely, Indonesia saw its struggle against colonialism incomplete without the successful handover of West Irian.

The resolution of West Irian at the Round Table Conference in 1949 was ambiguous. The conference stated:

\begin{quote}
The status quo of the Residency of Netherlands New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the USI the question of the political status of Netherlands New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the USI and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

Indonesia interpreted this to mean that West Irian would be handed back to the Motherland within 12 months. The Netherlands interpreted it to mean that the future of West Irian was open for debate — on Dutch terms. Coincidentally, at the same time as the Round Table Conference, the conservative Menzies led Liberal Country Party came to power in Australia. Menzies' views on Indonesia in general and Sukarno in particular were widely recorded during the Republic's quest for independence. Amongst other indictments, he

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Idc Anak Agung Gde Agung, 1973, *op cit*, p 70.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
claimed Sukarno to be a communist or at least sympathetic to communism and that Indonesia was in the fold of the Soviet Union and/or Mao's China.\textsuperscript{26}

The genesis of Australia's policy can be traced back to Percy Spender's speech to Parliament on 9 March 1950. During this defining address he declared that 'New Guinea is an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian defence.'\textsuperscript{27} Further, on the 8 June 1950, he announced:

For security and strategic reasons Australia had a vital interest in the question of the status of West New Guinea...in the future of West New Guinea Australia has direct and vital interests and feels strongly that those interests are to be considered.\textsuperscript{28}

Spender was to reiterate Australia's stance to the Dutch two months later when he informed The Hague that 'Dutch New Guinea was vital to Australia's security considerations.'\textsuperscript{29} By mid 1950, Australia had drawn its own "line in the sand" over West Irian. Terms such as "vital" and "absolutely essential" were used to capture Canberra's security focus and in order to implement this security course, Canberra adopted a policy of 'cold storage', which entailed not raising the issue internationally, if possible.\textsuperscript{30}

In 1952, the new Minister for External Affairs, R G Casey, visited Sukarno. During the meeting Sukarno explained to Casey that 'every Indonesian political party had West New Guinea in its policy platform and that no government could last that did not include it.'\textsuperscript{31} After this exchange, Casey recalled in his memoirs that 'Australians were living in a fools

\textsuperscript{26} See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives during the period 1946-49.
\textsuperscript{27} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March 1950.
\textsuperscript{29} Greenwood G, 1974, Approaches to Asia: Australia postwar policies and attitudes, McGraw Hill, Sydney, p 308.
\textsuperscript{30} Watt, 1968, op cit, p 252. The expression 'cold storage' has been widely misrepresented. Most commentators of the West Irian dispute (see: Watt, op cit, p 252, and Greenwood G, 1974, op cit, p 291 to name but two) use the term to denote that Australia wanted to 'shelve' the issue – similar to placing an item at the back of a 'freezer'. However, Casey used the phrase cold storage in a different context. The full paragraph of his speech is: "Considerable efforts have been made to reduce the international 'temperatures' on this subject – to keep the problem of Dutch New Guinea in 'cold storage' \("CN, 1952, Volume 23, pp 91-92). In short, Casey used the term as a means to diffuse an explosive situation rather than as a means to ignore the issue.
\textsuperscript{31} Greenwood, 1974, op cit, p 311.
paradise of ignorance over the East. Furthermore, he confessed that it was 'extremely difficult to get a realistic discussion about affairs in the East in matters that vitally affect Australia's future.'

Throughout the 1950s Indonesia sought to "internationalise" the West Irian dispute through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions titled "The Question of West Irian" debated the legitimacy of Indonesia's claim to the island, with a view to recommending a satisfactory outcome – in effect Indonesia was looking for pro votes whilst the Dutch were aiming for anti or at the very least for states to abstain, (the resolution required a two thirds majority vote to pass). An outcome of these deliberations saw Indonesia fail in its attempt to muster the required two thirds support during the 9th session in 1954, the 10th session in 1955, the 11th session in early 1957 and the 12th session in November 1957. Adding fuel to the debate, Australia and the Netherlands issued a joint statement pertaining to the territories of West Irian and East New Guinea on 6 November 1957; the statement made Indonesia aware of a "new firmness" in Dutch policy towards West Irian.

Within Indonesia, the domestic political landscape was undergoing a radical transformation. The political reign of the second Ali Cabinet (known by Feith as "administrators") ended on 14 March 1957 when Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo returned his mandate to the President. Immediately afterwards (at 1030 AM), the President proclaimed a nationwide state of war and siege. Sukarno's period of 'Guided Democracy' had been ushered in and accordingly the "solidarity makers" now dominated the political environment. Whereas the previous incumbent "administrators" had sought to

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32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 Bone notes that with The Netherlands only requiring 20 votes to block the 1954 resolution its passage was doomed from the start. The Western Union would provide at least 15 votes with only 5 left to court. See: Bone R, 1958, op cit, p 125.
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
defuse political unrest, the "solidarity makers" sought to channel this anger for national and revolutionary lines.\textsuperscript{40}

On 8 November 1957, Sukarno announced "that in the event of defeat [the forthcoming United Nations ballot programmed for 29 November 1957] we will use a new way in our struggle which will surprise the nations of the world."\textsuperscript{41} After the failure of the 12\textsuperscript{th} ballot Sukarno's "solidarity makers" initiated a widespread nationalistic campaign designed to channel societal unrest into a fervour of anti-Dutch opinion; this culminated in acts of vandalism and intimidation against the Dutch. On 30 November 1957, an assassination attempt was made on Sukarno. Shortly thereafter, on 2 December 1957, a nationwide 24-hour strike was organised. Fuelled by the wave of jingoistic anti-Dutch sentiment, the workers of the Dutch shipping line KPM read a proclamation "taking over" the company. Justice Minister Maengkon declared that all Dutchmen who were not in employment must leave the country. After this announcement, takeovers of Dutch companies began to snowball.\textsuperscript{42} As Feith recorded, "the stress after 1958 was not on assessed performance but on perceived image."\textsuperscript{43} He noted that "people were identified by their values and symbols of national culture and national prestige."\textsuperscript{44}

In response to this nationalistic euphoria, Indonesia's path towards armed conflict over West Irian accelerated. Jongh argued that Indonesia's leaders, civil as well as military, made frequent statements from which observers were bound to conclude that an invasion of West Irian was imminent.\textsuperscript{45} On 21 December 1957, Subandrio claimed that "Australia was becoming aware that their political or military security depends very much on Indonesia's course in those matters."\textsuperscript{46} He concluded that the West Irian issue would not only normalise relations with the Netherlands but also be in the 'real interests of the

\textsuperscript{39} Sukarno's Guided Democracy had striking parallels with Mao's New Democracy. This issue has not been previously analysed. For a contrast of the two political ideologies see: Mao Tse Tung, 1965, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Volume II, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, pp 339-384.


\textsuperscript{41} ibid, p 383.

\textsuperscript{42} The majority of these companies were formally nationalised in February 1959.

\textsuperscript{43} Feith, 1962, op cit, p 595.

\textsuperscript{44} ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} Jongh R C, 1967, op cit, p 111.

\textsuperscript{46} Indonesia on the March, 1965, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta p 39.
international community including of course our neighbour Australia."47 In February 1959, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Subandrio, visited Australia for talks with Casey. In what was seen as a major shift in Australia's stance a joint communique was issued:

That if any agreement were reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties principal arrived at by peaceful processes Australia would not oppose such an agreement.48

More significant was Menzies' speech to Parliament shortly after Subandrio's visit. Menzies declared:

We would desire that Indonesia affirm that force will not be resorted to in order to establish territorial claims. *This principle is vital to Australia and her own security.* [Author's Italics].49

Menzies' last sentence represented a real shift in Australia's stance over West Irian. Terminology such as "vital" and "security" which had originally been linked to Dutch sovereignty of West Irian had now adopted a new meaning - they were now only linked to the use of force. Thus, Canberra's "line in the sand", which had been so precisely defined in 1950-52, had been redrawn - keeping West Irian out of Indonesian control was no longer portrayed as vital to Australia's security.

In 1960, Sukarno ordered a begrudging General Nasution to Moscow for arms talks - the end result being a $US450 million arms deal.50 On 6 January 1961, Moscow and Jakarta signed an instrument to defend peace and friendship in Southeast Asia.51 The crescendo of Sukarno's plan came late in 1961 when Jakarta signalled its intent to purchase further arms from Moscow. Several days later, Subandrio made a shock announcement to the UN General Assembly that Indonesia was embarking on a policy of 'total confrontation'.52

50 Nasution's anti communist sentiment, which was reflective of the majority in the Indonesian Army, created a dilemma for his visit to the USSR.
Simultaneously, Indonesia’s other non-aligned pioneer, India, had just seized Goa by force on 18 December 1961. One day later, Sukarno alerted Indonesia’s forces to await his call for the liberation of West New Guinea. A declaration of ‘Trikora’ or threefold command was announced, which entailed; ‘preventing the creation of a mock Papuan state, raising the red and white flag in West Irian and being prepared for total mobilization.’ Subandrio had pledged the government to a policy of confrontation in all fields.

Watt noted that Australia responded to Indonesia’s intent ‘with shock and dismay.’ Conflict over West Irian was Canberra’s worst scenario – though its own course of action may arguably have facilitated this path. Barwick stressed that Indonesia’s actions would be of great significance to countries outside the immediate region. This was a veiled reference to Soviet and Chinese meddling in the aftermath of any conflict. Australia’s policy over West Irian shifted yet again in March 1962. The question over which state controlled West Irian was no longer linked to Australia’s interests, instead, Canberra’s only goal was to avoid a local conflict from developing over the issue. On 15 March 1962, Barwick articulated to Parliament the government’s new approach. He stated:

The government has continued to press upon the parties that the paramount interests of all people concerned is that there should be a just and peaceful settlement.

This new found approach is important to note. Australia’s position at the start of the dispute entailed a belief that it was vital that West Irian remain in Dutch control - Australia shifted its position in the early 1960s to declare that it was vital that force not be used to settle the dispute – Australia shifted again in 1962, declaring that it was vital that a settlement be reached. This movement of Australia’s position will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

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54 Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia on the March Volume 11, p 260.
56 *Current Notes*, Volume 32, *op cit* December, p 17.
On 15 August 1962, the Dutch acquiesced; West Irian would be handed over to Indonesia after an interim UN transition. As if to underscore Australia’s own futile approach over the previous 12 years Barwick summarised Canberra’s position accordingly; ‘in a real sense that result was beyond our control.’

Australia’s and the Netherlands’ volte-face should be seen as a function of great power politics. Whilst both states were resolute in their determination to keep West Irian under Dutch control, both lacked the political and strategic resources to enforce this sovereignty – a similar predicament that the Republic and the Netherlands faced during the war for independence. Both states were reliant on US support and when this support evaporated in the early 1960s Canberra and The Hague had little option but to accept the transfer of sovereignty.

By 1962, any elements of “international society” between Australia and Indonesia had all but dissipated. In particular, the concept of respecting the sovereign territorial rights of another state, which Australia had demonstrated during the war for independence, had now been undermined. In effect, from an Indonesian perspective, Australia had failed the final test. Moreover, instead of each state coordinating their efforts for a mutual aim, each state had acted in isolation against the other’s perceptions of its national interests.

INTERSTATE SECURITY LINKAGES

In addition to Indonesia and the Netherlands, this dispute involved four other states; the US, the USSR, China and Australia. The interaction between the Netherlands, the US, the USSR and China will be discussed below with more detailed analysis of Australia and Indonesia later in the chapter. Diagram 1 represents the linkages between the six states.

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Diagram 1: Interstate Security Relationships

--- conflictual relationships
— cooperative relationships
—— Principal protagonists

Netherlands

The Netherlands’ decision to acquiesce to Indonesia was primarily due to structural dynamics relating to great power competition, though domestic factors certainly contributed to The Hague’s final decision. The Round Table Conference of 1949 and the humiliating retreat of Dutch forces inflicted psychological wounds on the Netherlands. Arend Lijphart’s study into the dispute concluded that the Netherlands’s motives for the retention of West Irian were both subjective and psychological including: the search for national self-esteem, feelings of superiority, egocentrism and resentment.

In 1956, Indonesia abrogated the Netherlands-Indonesia Union and the remaining agreements stemming from the Round Table Conference. The uprising against Dutch

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nationals in Java in 1957 and the nationalisation of Dutch economic interests in the archipelago further deepened the crisis.  

Feith observed that this culminated in acts of vandalism and intimidation against the Dutch from October-November 1958.  

In 1961, Jakarta shut down diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.

Complicating the Netherlands' position was Belgium's experience in the Congo and India's acquisition of Goa from Portugal in 1961. In 1962, with skirmishing off West Irian intensifying, the Netherlands dispatched reinforcements, however, these forces were refused landing and transit rights by the US and Japan.  

As Greenwood noted this was a clear indication of which way US policy was heading.  

Realising that it was now politically isolated and in response to pressure from the Dutch Reformed Church, an opposition Labor Party, and business groups and the press, the government ultimately acquiesced.  

Greenwood concluded that 'the Netherlands recognised that active support from its NATO partners would not be forthcoming and was thus reconciled to accommodation.'  

United States

United States' influence only came to the fore during the latter phases of the dispute. In essence, its clash with the USSR and China and its strategic policy of "containment" dominated its approach to the West Irian issue.  

In February 1950, the now famous edict of National Security Council 64 concluded that Indochina was a 'key area of South East Asia and is under immediate threat' and if Indochina fell 'the balance of South East Asia would be in grave hazard.'  

Subsequently, in April 1954, President Eisenhower outlined in a letter to Churchill that Indonesia, along with other Asian states, was posed on the

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60 ibid, p 288.
62 Feith, op cit, p 583.
64 ibid.
communist knife-edge; worse still was his prediction that this would present a direct threat to Australia. In reference to Indochina he stated:

It is difficult to see how Thailand, Burma and Indonesia could be kept out of Communist hands. This we cannot afford. The threat to Malaya, Australia and New Zealand would be direct.69

Eisenhower's own predilection with domino theory made West Irian all the more complex. The US State Department wanted to maintain good relations with the three protagonists: Indonesia, the Netherlands and Australia. However, it considered that good relations with the Netherlands and Australia were not dependent on the outcome of the West Irian dispute, but those with Indonesia were. This situation was summarised by the US Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Palfrey Jones, who concluded:

The question that I and the Administration in Washington had to ask and answer was, what position on our part represented the optimum in terms of our national interests. Here a balance of opposing considerations had to be drawn up.70

Consequently, America adopted a policy of "cautious neutrality,"71 which was directed at stabilising the situation in Southeast Asia.72

Notwithstanding the US declared policy on Indonesia, there is evidence to indicate that the CIA had financed Sumatran rebels during the PRRI Affair of 1958; to the extent that trained US pilots were flying bombing missions against the Sukarno government. This embarrassing situation was sheeted home when Allen Pope, a US citizen, was shot down whilst conducting such flying missions. Pope's capture initiated an immediate response from President Eisenhower who declared on 30 April 1958, 'our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through so as not to be taking sides where it is

71 Greenwood, 1968, op cit, p 321. The US State Department used the term passive neutrality.
72 Greenwood, 1968, op cit, p 325.
none of our business." 73 Despite the Indonesian government obtaining concessions from the US over the incident, Sukarno could not resist the temptation to publicly humiliate a Western state. On 27 May 1958 Pope and his incriminating documents were presented to the world – in turn contradicting the previous statement of the US President. 74

On 17 August 1960 Sukarno stated that the ‘time had come to carry out the policy for the liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner.’ 75 On 7 December 1960 he declared that ‘before the cock crows to sing in the New Year, West Irian will be restored to Indonesia sovereignty, provided we stay truly united.’ 76 This rhetoric was not lost on the US, who viewed Sukarno’s threats as credible. Ambassador Jones told the US that ‘it was clear to us in Jakarta that the Indonesians were not bluffing that we had the makings of a major military crisis on our hands.’ 77

Nasution’s visit to Moscow in January 1961 where he received a pledge for $US400 million worth of arms further alarmed the US. Washington feared that Sukarno was prepared to plunge West Irian and more importantly Southeast Asia into conflict. As 1961 progressed it became more and more apparent that American mediation was the only alternative to war. 78 President Kennedy stated ‘West New Guinea was not a part of the world where great powers should be rationally engaged.’ 79 Sukarno was well aware of Washington’s fears and calculated that the likelihood of a serious armed clash would speed American moves for a settlement acceptable to Indonesia. 80 The dilemma facing the White House was stark. In November of that year Robert Komer, a US White House staffer, summarised this predicament as such:

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74 ibid, pp 145-156.
75 ibid, p 188.
76 ibid, p 190
77 ibid, p 191.
78 ibid, p 200.
Inevitably West Irian will go sooner or later to Indonesia. The only question is will it go with our help and in such a way that we get some credit for it or will this issue be left on a silver pallet for the bloc... We the Dutch and Australia must face up to the fact that in time we'll have to accept Indonesian hegemony over West Irian anyway and might as well roll with the punch.\textsuperscript{81}

Archival State Department documents indicate that Washington saw the West Irian stalemate as an entry gate for further Soviet involvement in Indonesian affairs.\textsuperscript{82} Pledges of massive Soviet military assistance to Indonesia led US officials to believe that 'it was unlikely that the Dutch would stand a chance even against an unsupported Indonesia in an all out armed confrontation over West Irian.'\textsuperscript{83} In sum, the US approach towards the West Irian issue was a mixture of Realpolitik and diplomacy. During the 1950s it was content to quietly maintain the status quo whilst not upsetting a potential ally in Indonesia. However, its alliance relationships with the Netherlands and Australia were ultimately overridden by a more geo-strategic imperative – containment of Soviet expansionism.

USSR

From early on in the dispute the Soviets expressed 'profound sympathy' and support for the reunification of West Irian - which it described as part of Indonesia's original territory.\textsuperscript{84} The Soviet policy toward West Irian was a manifestation of its broader Asian strategic plan. Specifically, the Soviets had adopted an aggressive policy that supported all national liberation movements.\textsuperscript{85} The objectives of this policy were threefold:

- opposition to colonialism as a way to weaken its main opponent - the US.
- a Southeast Asia contest with China for ideological and political influence.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} Osbourne, 1985, \textit{op cit}, p 27.
\textsuperscript{82} \url{www.agancy.org/oppgaver}, dated 13 April 2003, c2 p 2.
\textsuperscript{83} \url{www.agancy.org/oppgaver}, dated 13 April 2003, FRUS, 1961-63 XXIII, p 239.
\textsuperscript{84} Osbourne, 1985, \textit{op cit}, p 23.
• transition of the liberated peoples to socialism and communism.\textsuperscript{87}

The Soviet purpose of weakening its key opponent (the USA) and guiding embryonic states down the socialist path saw it adopt a more pro-active policy than the US. Strengthening its position was the burgeoning influence of the PKI that had the largest membership of any communist party outside the USSR and China. Whilst Eisenhower was focused on the external dimensions of communist influence (domino theory), Moscow concentrated its energies on the internal dimensions. However, despite Soviet attempts to nurture Indonesia, Sukarno played a delicate balancing arrangement with the communists.

Russia’s widening rift with China during the late 1950s further complicated the security fabric of Southeast Asia. The large numbers of indigenous Chinese that lived in Malaysia and Indonesia exacerbated Khrushchev’s concern. In his memoirs Khrushchev outlined Mao’s quest:

\begin{quote}
He's a nationalist and at least when I knew him he was bursting with an impatient desire to rule the world. His plan was to rule first China then Asia, then what? There are seven hundred million people in China and in other countries like Malaysia about half the population is Chinese.\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

Aware of the growing affinity between Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party and the widening rift between his own state and China, Khrushchev focused his attention on Indonesia with a view to making that country the cornerstone of Soviet policy in Asia.\textsuperscript{89}

During the 9\textsuperscript{th}, 11\textsuperscript{th} and 12\textsuperscript{th} sessions of the UN General Assembly votes on West Irian, the Soviet bloc voted each time in favour of Indonesia’s cause. As the West Irian crisis reached its crescendo in the 1960s, the USSR assumed a more militant position, which encompassed tacit encouragement to Indonesia to adopt a non-peaceful settlement to the


\textsuperscript{89} Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 1973, \textit{op cit}, p 294.
dispute. By way of example, Radio Moscow, in a broadcast to Indonesia, warned that 'US mediation on West Irian is a trick, a wicked and treacherous game.' In January 1961, Russia signed a military agreement with Indonesia. In 1962, Soviet diplomats, Mikoyan and Vershynin, visited Indonesia and reconfirmed Soviet support of Indonesia's stand.

In an enlightening statistical study into the geopolitics of the superpowers, Jan Nijman concluded that the strategies of the two superpowers were distinct. For the US, the most important years in its quest to contain Soviet imperialism and accordingly develop its sphere of influence was in the early 1950s. Within the Asian region, the US had commitments from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaya via the UK. This expansion gave the US a significant advantage over its superpower rival. Conversely, the Soviets did not actively attempt to expand into the Eurasian theatre until after Stalin's death in 1953 and specifically from 1955 onwards. This discrepancy was to be a defining characteristic of the superpower's policies towards Southeast Asian in general and Indonesia in particular. It meant that (using Morgenthau's model) the US assumed a posture of a status quo power, whilst the USSR was a revisionist power in its attempt to attain a degree of parity with its rival.

**China**

China's raison d'être rested in its quest for a sphere of influence in Asia. This sphere of influence was a manifestation of China's re-awakening after Mao's communist victory in 1948. In addition, the deepening Sino-Soviet rift of the late 1950s accelerated China's campaign to win Indonesia's allegiance. China's first international step into the West Irian dispute occurred during the *Asian African Conference of 18-24 April 1955*; much to the

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94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.
chagrin of Moscow Peking had been invited to the Conference. China supported the final
Communiqué of the Conference:

The Asian African Conference in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of
colonialism supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the
relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands.96
Thereafter, a convergence of Indonesian and Chinese interests saw the relationship
flourish. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister during the 1950s, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung,
succinctly summarised this relationship:

Indonesia was drawn to Peking by a mutuality of interests and a common objective: to
terminate the western presence in Asia and to emerge themselves as the two leading
powers in Asia each with a sphere of influence.97

Sukarno’s overseas ventures during the 1950s and in particular his visit to Peking to see
Mao was the blueprint from which Guided Democracy emanated.98 In November 1957,
Sukarno exclaimed that he felt fortunate to have been able ‘to shake hands with Chairman
Mao as a brother, a friend, a comrade.’99 Sukarno was awed by the national consciousness
within the Chinese People’s Republic. He added:

What I would like to have for Indonesia is a guided democracy ...especially in the way I
saw it in the Chinese People’s Republic.100

As the second Ali Cabinet of 1956-57 capitulated, Sukarno immediately declared a
nationwide ‘state of war and siege’101 and soon thereafter Parliamentary Democracy gave

96 Collected Documents of the Asia African Conference. April 18-24, 1955, Center for the study of Asian
African and developing countries, Department of foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 1983, p 142.
98 On his return from Peking Sukarno uttered ‘China under communism can serve as a good thing for
Indonesia. For example it was very well known in the past you could see flies everywhere in China, but
when I visited the Chinese People’s Republic I did not see any flies’ (Brackman, 1963, op cit, p 227). More
than anything else this statement offers some clues into the thought processes and logic of Sukarno’s new
political construct.
100 ibid.
way to Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy.” This reorder of the political landscape significantly bolstered the role of the PKI. During the early 1960s, China sought to bring Indonesia further into its fold, which involved diplomatic and economic concessions. In 1961, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marshal Chen Yi, visited Indonesia and two months later Sukarno conducted a second state visit to Peking – culminating in a $30 million loan to Indonesia.

AUSTRALIA’S MOTIVATION

The previous chapter highlighted Australia’s threat perceptions as a complex mixture of anxieties including a fear of invasion, an apprehension over communism, a perception of its own strategic vulnerability, Japanese imperialism and Soviet and Chinese regional hegemony. Unfortunately, Indonesia’s independence did not bring Australia the strategic benefits that it had hoped for. Indonesia’s policy of bebas aktif, Sukarno’s sympathy for China and its socialist principles, and an internal political order that was confused and unstable all militated against Canberra accepting Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian. As Levi noted, ‘Menzies had greater trust in Western powers for security, and was fearful that independence combined with weakness, instability and inexperience might lead to an easy victory for communism.’

China’s participation in the Korean War in 1951 coupled with the significant presence of Chinese nationals in many Asian states amplified Australia’s threat perceptions. In 1950, Spender announced that ‘the Chinese have a ready made instrument in the form of the many millions of Chinese scattered throughout all countries of Southeast Asia.’ Levi articulated a sentiment amongst some of the Australian public in 1950 by stating that ‘the bellicose statements emanating from China indicated clearly that Southeast Asia would not

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102 Hatta labelled the concept as ‘misguided’ democracy.
103 ibid, p 430.
105 ibid, p 157.
be left alone. The Korean War led some commentators to argue that ‘many Australians felt that the fatal hour was approaching when their country’s future would be decided in the near north.’ On 2 December 1950, Spender argued that the loss of the Korean War would ‘not mean Asia for the Asians but Asia for the communists.’ The same year, Casey summarised Australia’s position within Asia as:

Instead of living in a tranquil corner of the globe, we are now on the verge of the most unsettled region in the world.

Australia’s worst fears were being realised – a totalitarian political ideology had been adopted by what many colonists of the 19th century saw as a ‘noxious’ cultural race.

Accentuating Canberra’s fears was the rapid rise of the PKI and its position as a legitimate political force within Indonesia. Certainly, Menzies and Casey were acutely aware of the PKI’s influence within Indonesian politics. Hudson’s biography of Casey noted that ‘what concerned him more than personalities, though, was the rapid growth of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea.’ Further, Casey believed that ‘as long as there seemed a real danger of a communist government in Jakarta, Indonesia was seen as a potential enemy.’

In September 1954, the Australian Minister for Defence, Sir Phillip McBride, outlined to Parliament that ‘the aim of our Defence Policy is to cooperate in repelling Communist aggression.’ In view of the regional and global concern at the growth of Chinese communism, eight nations signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty in Manila on 8 September 1954. This Treaty whilst committing nations to armed conflict was

108 ibid, p 884.
111 ibid.
112 ibid, p 255.
113 Current Notes, Volume 25 1954, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 661.
114 The nations were: Australia, France, NZ, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, UK, and US.
designed to curb and possibly thwart Chinese expansion within the region.\footnote{For a more detailed analysis of the Treaty see: Current Notes, Volume 25 1954, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 738.} In outlining to Parliament the rationale of this Treaty, Menzies stated:

It might be asked why Australia need concern itself with what happens in Southeast Asia. If the whole of Indo China fell to the Communist, Thailand would be gravely exposed. If Thailand were to fall, the road would be open to Malaya and Singapore. From the Malay Peninsula the Communists could dominate the northern approaches to Australia and even cut our lifelines with Europe.\footnote{Ibid.}

During the same speech, Menzies linked Asian independence with communism. On this point he noted:

They [Asian states] see their recent history as a struggle to gain independence from Western rule – with the result that the old issue of colonialism is more present in their minds than the more modern menace of communism. The Communists have skillfully exploited this attitude and their propaganda harps constantly on the theme of western domination or intervention.\footnote{Ibid, p 739.}

Australia’s threat perceptions were shaped by a confluence of irrational and rational drivers. Moreover, the island of West Irian reflected a fusion of Australia’s historic and contemporary fears, prejudices and vulnerabilities. Red (communist) and Yellow (Asian) biases manifested themselves into a unique strategic policy. This policy refuted the notion of peaceful co-existence with an Indonesian controlled West Irian. Instead, West Irian’s sovereignty had become interwoven with Australia’s security. The fact that Chinese irredentism failed to materialise and that domino theory was more perception than reality did not deter Menzies from espousing the evils of “Red” and “Yellow”. In order to protect Australia’s national interests from these threats, the government adopted a strategy I have labelled as the “perimeter defence concept”.

\footnote{Ibid.}
Perimeter Defence Concept

Spender's statement to Parliament on 9 March 1950 about West Irian being a vital strategic interest to Australia was in fact the culmination of a succession of claims made by Australia about its northern islands. Australia’s preoccupation with its strategic isolation and the need to secure a safe geographic perimeter through the acquisition of neighbouring islands, or, at least the acquisition of these islands by friendly states dates back to the earliest years of the colony. An editorial in the *Sydney Gazette* of 1827 claimed that 'Australia needed a safety region surrounding the continent; no foreign power must therefore be permitted to gain influence among the islands in the immediate neighbourhood of Australia.'\(^{118}\) In 1872, Henry Parkes, the Premier of New South Wales, requested the British government annex New Britain, the Solomons, New Hebrides, Marshall, Gilbert and Ellice Islands. He commented:

> A more extended dominions in these waters would lead to the tranquility and peace of these Australian colonies.\(^{119}\)

Shortly thereafter, a sentiment emerged about the ‘wealth of Australia’ which in effect extended Australia’s sovereignty beyond its shores and encompassed the surrounding Pacific states.\(^{120}\) In 1883, *The Age* newspaper came to the following conclusion:

> It is at least as important to Australia that New Guinea should be annexed as it was that New Zealand should be secured. The unappropriated parts of the world are rapidly being seized upon ... England can afford to disregard the extension of French colonies in distant areas [but] our security is at stake. Sooner or later it must come to something like a Monroe doctrine for Australia; and we shall have to intimate unmistakably that no foreign annexations will be permitted in countries south of the [equatorial] line.\(^{121}\)

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\(^{121}\) *The Age*, 29 May 1883.
The same year, an inter-colonial convention was held in Sydney. One of the outcomes from the convention was a demand that no foreign power should be allowed to annex territory south of the equator. This conference and others like it spawned a sentiment amongst Australians that security and protection against foreign powers could only be achieved through a federated approach.

Levi noted that during WWI Australian's believed that the 'belt of Pacific islands surrounding Australia had traditionally been considered an Australia preserve', he further claimed that any 'foreign interference with them had always aroused resentment among the Australia people'. In 1919, at the Versailles Peace Conference, Prime Minister Hughes declared:

Strategically the Pacific Islands encompassed Australia like a fortress. New Guinea was only 82 miles from the mainland. South East of it was a string of islands suitable for coaling and submarine bases from which Australia could be attacked. Any strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia.

Hughes believed that without some form of intervention New Guinea would become a 'Japanese or Japanese and German country' within ten years. Consequently, he succeeded in getting the former German Islands south of the equator classified as C class mandates for Australia. In 1943, Evatt claimed that the 'arc of islands to the north and north east of the continent was of “very special concern” and Australia would want to have a special position in shaping their future.'

It is an axiom that Japan's successful island "hopping" campaign reconfirmed the importance of these northern islands to Australia's security. Evatt subsequently suggested to America:

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124 Sissons D, 1956, Attitudes to Japan and Defence 1890-1923, MA thesis, Melbourne University, p 89.
The two nations should divide control of the Pacific between them along a natural line of defence stretching from Timor, through Dutch and Australian New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, the Solomons, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{127}

In January 1944, Nelson Johnson, the US Minister in Canberra, wrote to Washington and claimed, "we are told by another Australian cabinet member that Evatt has definitely in mind Australian sovereignty over all Solomons, Hebrides and Fiji groups."\textsuperscript{128} In essence, Australia sought to impose its own co-prosperity sphere within the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. In July 1944, in what would be representative of Menzies\' position during the 1950s, he declared that the Dutch East Indies was "a military and political barrier rear to North Western Australia."\textsuperscript{129} Menzies expanded upon this claim by stating, "the Indonesian archipelago is a vital sector in Australia\'s northern area of defence."\textsuperscript{130}

On 29 August 1950, Spender drew a correlation with New Guinea and the forces of communism. He announced that "communism has not got any foothold yet in Australia New Guinea. Australia is determined insofar as it can to ensure that it will not."\textsuperscript{131} This represented an important foreign policy statement. Hitherto, New Guinea had been linked to Australia\'s security primarily as a bulwark against foreign forces. Spender had refined Australia\'s position, in that whilst iminical political forces were still unwelcome in New Guinea, communist ideology was now seen as an additional threat to New Guinea and ipso facto Australia. In 1952, Casey and Sukarno held talks in Jakarta over West Irian. Casey was blunt. He outlined Australia\'s historical preoccupation with New Guinea and other northern islands.\textsuperscript{132} Casey then described how West Irian was essential to Australia\'s plan to thwart more contemporary threats – that of Chinese communism.

By far the greatest menace that all of us face in this part of world was that of Chinese Communism coming South. To cope with this, we all had to be in the most confident and

\textsuperscript{128} Bell, 1973, \textit{op cit}, p 19.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives}, 18 July 1944.
\textsuperscript{130} ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Current Notes}, Volume 21, 1950, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 593.
\textsuperscript{132} Greenwood, 1974, \textit{op cit.}, p 309.
close relationship. Nothing was likely to disturb this relationship so quickly or so gravely
as Indonesia getting sovereignty over West New Guinea.\(^\text{133}\)

In 1954, at the 9\(^\text{th}\) session of the United Nations General Assembly, Casey argued that an
“equilibrium” had been reached in Australia’s immediate north and any attempt to alter the
status of Netherlands New Guinea would disturb this balance.\(^\text{134}\) This sentiment had deep
realist tones to it in the classic Morgenthau sense of states attempting to preserve the status
quo and maintain the balance of power.

Australian Defence archival records of the era refer to linkages between Indonesia,
communism and West Irian. In a 1956 Top Secret Australian Defence Committee strategic
paper titled, *The Importance of Indonesia to Australia and Regional Defence*,\(^\text{135}\) the
Committee concluded inter alia that “so long as it is assessed that there is a likelihood of
Indonesia becoming communist, it is strategically unacceptable for Indonesia to control
Dutch New Guinea.”\(^\text{136}\) The report referenced another paper *The Strategic Basis of
Australian Defence Policy*, which declared:

Should Malaya be lost, Australia’s forward defence would have to be carried out in the
North West approaches to Australia. This should be based on North Western Australia and
areas in Dutch New Guinea including the Vogelkop Peninsula, which link up, through the
Philippines with the United States Island Chain.\(^\text{137}\)

Australia’s geo-strategic policy was based on a “perimeter defence concept” with West
Irian central to this notion. It consisted of an impregnable barrier of surrounding islands
which would thwart communist forces emerging from the north, from within Indonesia, or
through other inimical powers. Malaya and West Irian were continually cited as “vital” to
this barrier and ipso facto Australia’s security. Hence, any threat to the sovereignty of
these areas represented a direct threat to Australian security – so the thinking went.

\(^\text{133}\) ibid, p 310.
\(^\text{134}\) *Current Notes*, Volume 25 1954, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 650.
\(^\text{135}\) Australian Archives 1945/39 248/7/11.
\(^\text{136}\) ibid.
Australia saw Malaya as vulnerable to communist forces and in the event that Malaya was lost, it saw the island chain concept, which had proved so successful for the Japanese in WWII, as the key to its security. Indeed, Spender highlighted Malaya’s vulnerabilities in Parliament in 1950, by declaring that ‘by having Dutch New Guinea, East New Guinea and the Philippines island chain under Western control then this communist “thrust” could be thwarted.’ In essence, it had become an ‘axiom that West New Guinea in Indonesian hands would mean an intolerable weakening of Australia security.’ In a 1954 statement of Australian defence policy, the government stated that ‘while Southeast Asia is held, defence in depth is provided to Australia and there will be no direct threat.’ These statements reflected Canberra’s belief that Australia’s security was dependent on the maintenance of this “Perimeter”.

Bipartisan Support?

The previous analysis has claimed that the Australian government’s threat perceptions in general and Menzies’ anxieties in particular, were important drivers shaping Australia’s policy on West Irian. However, throughout the West Irian issue the Labor Party’s position was far less compromising than that of the government. As soon as it entered the other side of the bench and when the new Parliament met for the first time in 1950, Labor speakers ‘joined in the vehement denunciation of the Republican leader’s claims to New Guinea.’ At every turn Calwell attempted to attack Spender’s statements as a shocking surrender. Greenwood and Harper noted that ‘Evatt was primarily concerned that there should be no change in the status of Dutch New Guinea without the full consent of Australia.’ As the government began to shift its “line in the sand”, the Labor Party remained steadfast. In particular, it attacked the 1959 joint communiqué with vengeance, with Calwell moving for a censure motion to be passed on the government. To that end, the Labor Party’s position had solicited a considerable degree of sympathy with the Australian

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137 Australian Archives, Defence Committee Minute 215/1956.
139 Ibid.
141 Current Notes, Volume 25 1954, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 290.
press. Edwards highlighted that "in Parliament and the press the Casey Subandrio communiqué was denounced as a sellout and compared to the Munich settlement."\textsuperscript{144}

**Australia’s Strategic Shift**

In 1950, as the dispute with Indonesia over West Irian had just began, Spender described Australia’s foreign policy as ‘our first and constant interest in the area must be the security of our homeland and the maintenance of peace in the area in which our country is geographically placed.’\textsuperscript{145} Menzies’ views were no different, stating ‘our foreign policy should be to cultivate friendly relations with our neighbours, to help in their development and stability, to avoid war and to play our part in helping to prevent tension among our neighbours.’\textsuperscript{146} However, Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s claim over West Irian was contrary to this foreign policy goal. As a consequence of its stance on West Irian, Australia was unwittingly fermenting instability in the region.

Since 1950, Casey had emphasised Australia’s “line in the sand” over West Irian, yet, by mid 1962, Australia had given its assent to Indonesia’s incorporation of West Irian. Implicit in Australia’s strategic shift was the assumption that one or more of the threat perceptions driving this policy had changed. That said, there is little evidence to verify that any of these perceptions had markedly altered. Indeed, in the minds of Canberra’s statesmen, Indonesia, China and communism had significantly converged. Furthermore, events such as the PRRI affair, Sukarno’s experiment with “Guided Democracy”, the rapid rise of the PKI within Indonesia, and America’s neutral posture only served to heighten Australia’s concern about Indonesian instability. Yet, Australia’s attitude toward Indonesia and West Irian began to change from 1958. The following table (next page) illustrates Indonesia’s growing militancy towards West Irian and contrasts them with Australia’s reaction.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, p 286
\textsuperscript{145} *Current Notes*, Volume 21, 1950, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 154.
\textsuperscript{146} Menzies, 1970, *op cit*, p 44.
### Diagram 2: Indonesia and Australia action/reaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Indonesia’s Action</th>
<th>Australia’s reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1959</td>
<td>Subandrio’s visit to Australia</td>
<td>Australia Indonesia joint communiqué – Australia would not oppose West Irian incorporation into Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1961</td>
<td>Moscow/Jakarta sign instrument to defend peace and friendship in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Barwick declares to <em>Melbourne Herald</em>: Dutch sovereignty is no longer of importance to the defence of Australia¹⁴⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1961</td>
<td>Nasution’s visit to Canberra inquiring about Australia’s military pact with the Netherlands</td>
<td>Australia refutes military pact with the Netherlands. Menzies speech to Parliament: Regional conflict could encourage communist activity and bring disaster to Southeast Asia¹⁴⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1961</td>
<td>Jakarta/Moscow arms deal. Subandrio’s policy of total Confrontation</td>
<td>Plimsoll’s speech to Parliament: Australia had a vital interest in peace and stability of the area.¹⁴⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1961</td>
<td>Sukarno’s declaration of a Trikora.</td>
<td>Barwick announces: armed conflict would encourage communism in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia requests Australia’s position toward West Irian</td>
<td>Jan 1962 Menzies/Barwick announces that it wanted a peaceful solution to the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1962</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spender: Australia’s interests rest in a peaceful settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1962</td>
<td>Dutch acquiesces to Indonesia</td>
<td>21 Aug 1962 Barwick: “in a real sense the result was beyond our control”¹⁵⁰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴⁸ *Current Notes*, Volume 32 1961, Department of External Affairs, AGPS Canberra, p 54.
¹⁴⁹ ibid, p 34.

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This table demonstrates Indonesia and Australia's strategic thinking towards the end of the West Irian crisis. Firstly, Australia remained intent on keeping the issue in "cold storage". This stance was in line with the earlier analysis of Australia's belief in the regional status quo. Secondly, unlike Australia, Indonesia was not satisfied with the status quo and as a consequence it adopted a pro-active posture. Thirdly, as diplomacy failed, Indonesia adopted a more aggressive policy. Finally, Australia's reaction to each one of Indonesia's actions is the key to understanding Canberra's strategic shift. As Sukarno and Nasution's policy transformed from diplomacy to military action, Australia's foreign policy transformed from belligerence to accommodation – in turn Australia kept on redrawing the "line in the sand". In sum, as Australia had no great power allies, the more pressure Indonesia applied, the more conciliatory Australia became.

Hitherto, Indonesia's policy of diplomacy had allowed Canberra the luxury of adhering to this policy of "cold storage". Australia's foreign policy goal of regional peace and stability was not threatened and West Irian could remain a vital asset for protection of the homeland. Thus, Indonesia's former policy satisfied both of Australia's foreign policy goals. As Indonesia moved toward a policy that threatened regional peace and stability, Australia's "cold storage" approach was now inimical to its foreign policy goals. Australia was left with two options, opt for regional peace and stability at the expense of West Irian or confront Indonesia with military action.

Australia's attitude towards West Irian was dominated by its security fears - in turn, these fears compounded an already existing strategic mindset, which dictated that islands to its north were the domain of Australia or its allies. One could surmise that Australia's strategic policy was an ambiguous mixture of Monroe Doctrine and Co-Prosperity Sphere. On the one hand, Canberra claimed that it had the right to influence the sovereignty of nearby states, whilst simultaneously, it sought to drag in allied powers who could assist in the establishment of a friendly region. The experiences of WWII and its alliance obligations with the US imbued a belief within Canberra that its allies would rush to its aid if needed. The challenge facing Australia was convincing the US that West Irian fell within their mutual security interests. This mindset was placed under enormous pressure in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Indonesia assumed a militant policy. Faced with a situation where the peace and stability of the region was at risk and where Australia would
need to challenge Indonesia without US support, Australia ultimately modified its objectives.

INDONESIA'S MOTIVATION

The previous discussion on Australia’s motivations during the West Irian crisis highlighted Canberra’s growing concern of Indonesian bellicosity. The recorded literature on this event, both primary and secondary, is extensive and abundantly makes clear Australia’s official position and subsequent movement throughout the 12-year period. The same cannot be said of Indonesian commentary of Australia. Indeed, there is a general paucity of both praise and criticism of Australia from Indonesian luminaries such as Sukarno or Subandrio. That said, Indonesian leaders did form and articulate some views of Australia during this era.

As the dispute was just gathering steam in 1950, Sukarno told a press conference, ‘tell Australia we don’t want East New Guinea but must have West New Guinea.’\textsuperscript{151} It was not for another two years that Jakarta made mention of Australia’s involvement in this issue. Specifically, the matter was raised during Casey’s call on Sukarno in 1952, with the Indonesian leader outlining the government’s view of the importance of West Irian.\textsuperscript{152} By 1956 and in response to Canberra’s vehement opposition to Indonesia’s claim for West Irian an Indonesian Foreign Ministry statement concluded inter alia:

Casey’s recent international junket was given much notice here and came in for much criticism. Australia used to have a lot of sympathetic ‘capital’ here because of its original support to Indonesia independence, though this was somewhat tempered by its lily white Australia policy. Today Australia stock in Indonesia is low, due mainly to its stand on the West Irian question.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{151} Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1950.
\textsuperscript{152} Greenwood, 1974, op cit, p 311.
\textsuperscript{153} Goldberg II, 1956, Foreign Observers on the Question of West Irian, Ministry of information Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, p 6.
In recognition of mounting press coverage of a secret Netherlands-Australia military alliance, Subandrio commented, ‘Indonesia could not remain passive’ if such an event eventuated.\(^{154}\) The most significant interaction between Australia and Indonesia was Subandrio’s visit to Canberra in February 1959; often coined as Australia’s first plunge into solo treaty making.\(^{155}\) By way of dispelling the growing perception in Australia of Indonesian militancy, Subandrio declared ‘you need have no fear of attack from Indonesia as we have no fear of attack from you.’\(^{156}\) Later that year, Menzies reciprocated the visit, by calling on Sukarno in December. Bruce Grant noted it was ‘a genuine attempt by two countries thrown together by geopolitics to find a modus vivendi.’\(^{157}\) In April 1961, Subandrio made a fleeting stopover in Canberra, though this time it was reported he displayed an air of confidence on West Irian. Finally, as the dispute was reaching a crescendo, Subandrio declared that the West Irian issue would not only normalise relations with the Netherlands but also be in the ‘real interests of the international community including of course our neighbour Australia.’\(^{158}\) From this analysis it is apparent that Indonesia was conservative in its criticism of Australia; even as Jakarta was preparing for military incursions into the territory of West Irian.

There are three reasons that might explain this phenomenon. First, is the Javanese tradition of not openly critiquing one’s opponents. Benton and Setiadi’s study of mediation and conflict management in Indonesia argued that Indonesians are socially programmed along the following lines; the ‘objective of the consensually validated approach is to achieve mufakat (consensus) by using a collectively endorsed procedure known as musyawarah (collective deliberation).’\(^{159}\) The processes of mufakat and musyawarah form an integral part of the reconciliation procedure either at the private level or at the international level. Ultimately, ‘the primary test of a successful musyawarah process is whether or nor a compromise of the outcome meets the need to produce some form of workable solution

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\(^{154}\) *Sydney Sun*, 29 August 1958.


\(^{156}\) ibid.

\(^{157}\) ibid, p 309.


and is also able to maintain harmony in the relationships involved.160 In sum, Indonesian society is composed of a hierarchical structure of behavioural code, which is evident in their social system.161 This social conditioning resulted in a "dampening" in Indonesia's open opposition to Australia.

Second, Indonesia's indifference to Australia was a manifestation of the "security contrast" between the two states. Whilst Australia looked northward for its security and its perceived threats, so too did Indonesia. Heinz Arndt's following claim is particularly relevant to this discussion: 'when Australians look North, the first country they see is Indonesia; when Indonesians look North, they turn their backs on Australia and this difference dominates the relationship.'162 Thus, whilst there was a cooling in the relationship which resulted in the disappearance in some elements of "international, society", from an Indonesian perspective this was partly due to its unwillingness to engage with Australia as opposed to outright hostility to its southern neighbour.

Third, notwithstanding Indonesia's indifference to Australia, there was nevertheless a divergence in relations between the two states. Sukarno and Subandrio collectively grouped colonial states together under the OLDEFOS banner. Sukarno's concern over West Irian was a motivating factor in the development of his dogma of the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Order. This dogma saw a contradiction of the existing system and divided the world into two hostile camps.163 During the mid 1950s, Sukarno viewed the world as a tripolar power bloc – West, East and Non-aligned. However, continued frustration at what he perceived to be Western attempts to maintain the status quo of imperialism had altered Sukarno's outlook. By 1961, Sukarno viewed the world as comprising two camps; Western (which represented imperialism) and a new bloc that was an aggregation of Eastern and non-aligned states.164 An example of Indonesia's generalised

161 ibid, p 227.
164 Sukarno's ideological shift was evident in 1959 when he adopted a pro Peking stance over Sino-Indian exchanges in Tibet in 1959.
criticism of the OLDEFOS was a document published by the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs in 1961, stating:

If alliances of Western powers are directed against Indonesia the whole psychology of Indonesia and perhaps of Asia and Africa as a whole with regard to the West might be imbued with new doubts. Were this to happen it would be tragic indeed for all of us.165

Put simply, whilst Indonesia did not oppose Australia directly, there was a degree of indirect criticism, as any condemnation of the OLDEFOS group naturally extended to Australia.

The Power of Ideology

No examination of Indonesia’s actions during this era would be complete without touching on the power of ideology, which Sukarno effectively exploited to further the West Irian quest. Weinstein’s research indicated that Sukarno viewed the outside world as basically exploitative and one that was dominated by forces seeking to subjugate the country.166 This fear was primarily linked to Western imperialism. Abdulgani claimed that Sukarno perceived the greatest threat coming from ‘Dutch colonialism which sought to break up Indonesian unity by inciting separation from West Irian with the help of imperialist powers such as the USA and Britain.’167 After Indonesia achieved independence in 1949, a seachange occurred within the state. A wave of latent forces, which had been masked by a strong nationalistic sentiment during the war, now percolated to the fore of Indonesian society. This situation gave rise to a highly unstable and fragile political and societal order.

Indonesia faced similar challenges to the majority of other Third World states attempting to develop state and nation immediately after independence. Specifically, state-building and nation-building were seen as fundamental building blocks for internal security. However, the way Sukarno tackled the West Irian dispute was contrary to Ayoob’s

165 West Irian: An essential part of Indonesia, 1961, Tentara Negara Indonesia, Bandung, p 21.
167 Abdulgani R, 1973, Nationalism Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia, Centre of South East Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, p 43.
suggestion that state-making must precede nation-making. Sukarno used the West Irian issue as a means of galvanising Indonesia’s nationalistic spirit. Simultaneously, he harnessed this nationalism as a means of acquiring territory. For Sukarno state-making and nation-making operated in parallel, each supporting and relying on the other. Finally, the way Sukarno utilised the rhetoric of the West Irian campaign to strengthen the nation and his own rule, is consistent with Buzan’s conclusion that ‘governments can draw legitimacy from identifying with an ideology because it ties them to ideas and purposes larger than their own self interests.’\(^{168}\)

Pender and Hering noted, ‘for Sukarno it was a matter of principle to demand the joining of West Irian to the republic.’\(^{169}\) Subandrio outlined his country’s foreign policy as such: ‘our foreign policy is based more on the laws of the revolution rather than upon the rule of quid pro quo\(^{170}\). In respect to West Irian, ‘our motive was one of principle.’\(^{171}\) In 1960, Subandrio asserted that ‘henceforth our diplomacy has another aspect and that is diplomacy as an instrument of revolution.’\(^{172}\) Further, Sukarno saw West Irian as a continuation of his revolution. Legge claimed that ‘West Irian provided an avenue for a continuance of the struggle.’\(^{173}\) It is important to note that Sukarno’s interpretation of revolution encompassed more than the convention principle of new states occupying the void left by colonial powers. As chapter 4 will demonstrate, Sukarno saw revolution as comprising a new world order, where the OLDEFOS had been replaced with NEFOS powers.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP – FROM COOPERATION TO CONFLICT

The West Irian dispute resulted in a definite cooling in security relations between Australia and Indonesia, though its impact on each state was substantially different. For Australia, events of the 1950s saw Canberra’s threat perceptions mature in response to a growing

\(^{171}\) ibid, p 6.
apprehension of Indonesia's territorial ambitions. As previously noted, Indonesia displayed a sense of ambivalence toward Australia and any official commentary that did emanate from Jakarta was both limited and moderate. That said, this act of “distancing” and moderation should not be interpreted as Indonesia’s acceptance of Australia’s position. Rather and in the language of Hedley Bull, elements of “international society” had all but disappeared by 1962. There are a number of possible reasons which could explain this decline in “international society”.

First, during the war for independence both states were conscious of certain common interests, yet, during the West Irian issue both states had contrary interests.\(^{174}\) Canberra sought to prevent Jakarta from acquiring West Irian whilst Jakarta was intent on bringing West Irian under Indonesian sovereignty.

Second, Buzan claimed that one of the most obvious causes of a fragile international society is the prevalence of weak states (those with low levels of sociopolitical cohesion). By 1960, Indonesia’s sociopolitical cohesion had been challenged by a range of internal forces, resulting in a fragile social construct - exemplified by the demise of Parliamentary Democracy. Buzan believed that international security ‘will remain problematic as long as the structure of anarchy is flawed by the presence of weak states.’\(^{175}\) In sum, Buzan concluded that "weak states can make the formation of security communities extremely difficult."\(^{176}\) Thus, whilst Buzan may have been mixing apples with oranges (society and community), one could explain the demise in “society” as a function of the highly unstable and weak political order of Indonesia during this period.

Third, one of Bull’s criteria for his “international society” was adherence to ‘the rules of coexistence,’\(^{177}\) This rule dictates that states respect the sovereign territory of other states.\(^{178}\) During the Republic’s war for independence, Australia accepted the sovereign right of the indigenous people of the Dutch East Indies as the sole, rightful and legal

\(^{174}\) ibid, p 13.

\(^{175}\) Buzan, 1993, op cit, p 106.

\(^{176}\) Buzan, 1993, op cit, p 106.

\(^{177}\) Bull, 1977, op cit, p 67.

\(^{178}\) ibid.
inhabitants of the archipelago. During the West Irian dispute, Australia did not believe that Indonesia had any sovereign claim over West Irian.

Fourth, from 1960-62, Sukarno’s ideology of OLDEFOS/NEFOS was beginning to crystallise. Hitherto, Sukarno accepted the role played by Western and Eastern states. Moreover, he saw the non-aligned movement as an independent body that represented the rights of the Third World. During this period, Asian and Indonesian nationalism become synonymous with the term “uncommitted”. Hatta first espoused this notion in 1948 when declaring that Indonesia’s foreign policy was active and non-aligned. The terminology non-aligned was specific in that it referred to the “East-West” struggle. What the Western states failed to understand was that in terms of the other “struggle”, against colonialism, these non-aligned states remained very much committed. As European states were the major benefactors of colonialism they rejected the ideals of the non-aligned movement.

Fifth, whilst Sukarno’s ideology was demonstrated to be a divisive influence in the security relationship, the rise of the Australian LCP in general and Menzies reign as Prime Minister in particular, contributed to the erosion of an “international society”. Menzies’ views on Asians and communists have already been articulated. His personal vilification of Sukarno during the 1940s was indicative of his cognitive beliefs – beliefs that were entrenched in his persona.

Sixth, Bull’s last goal pertaining to “society” centered on the notion of states keeping promises. On this point, Bull was referring to treaties, obligations and international law, which he saw as the glue binding states together. In 1950, Spender claimed ‘Australia has direct and vital interests in the matter of West New Guinea.’ It is the term vital interests that poses a contradiction to Bull’s society. In Carr’s seminal work on realism, written after the crucible of the post Versailles utopian period, he argued that the principle of ‘vital interests’ was a well established legal maxim which states could invoke to justify non

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fulfillment of international obligations.\textsuperscript{182} Carr believed that 'nobody can be called on to perform the impossible; and the impossible is sometimes in international law to include acts detriment to the vital interests of the state.'\textsuperscript{183} Under a realist framework, Spender's axiom of vital interests, (repeated continually throughout the dispute) was at variance to Bull's notion of "society" as it allowed states the flexibility (Carr used the term elasticity) to step outside international norms if a state perceived its interests to be threatened. In the case of West Irian, it is unclear whether Spender used the phrase with specific reference to the idiosyncrasies of international relations – probably not – but regardless, the point is that Australia used this reasoning to justify its opposing stance. Notwithstanding the obvious decline in the "society" between the two states, some aspects of their relations were indicative of Bull's "society". Notably, the joint communiqué between Subandrio and Casey in 1958 is indicative of Bull's notion that states act and work together under common rules, procedure and protocols.

Interlinked with this demise of "international society" was the ever-widening gap in emphasis on the security relationship. Chapter 1 identified that one measure of a security relationship is the degree and mutuality of engagement between respective states. During the West Irian dispute, Australia's security interests became increasingly focused towards Indonesia. Moreover, not only did Australia adopt a more regional security perspective, it adopted a very local one, however, Indonesia did not reciprocate this focus of attention. Sukarno's attempt to internationalise the West Irian issue at the UN, Jakarta's strategic dealings with Moscow and Washington, and Sukarno's new found strategic doctrine of NEFOS/OLDEFOS, were examples of this international outlook. One manifestation of this more global outlook was Indonesia's "disinterest" in Australia. This was reflected in the foreign travelling of Sukarno during the late 1950s and early 1960s. By way of illustration, during the period 1959-1962, Sukarno was overseas on diplomatic missions for 319 days in 41 states. He devoted 30% of his time to the states of North America and Western Europe, 50% to Asia, Africa and Latin America and 20% to communist states; during this entire period Sukarno did not once visit Australia.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{182} Carr, 1939, \textit{op cit}, p 184.
\textsuperscript{183} ibid.
Asymmetric Alliances

One consequence of Canberra’s preoccupation with regional security was the ANZUS Treaty. ANZUS provided Australia with a security umbrella that it so desperately sought. Australia and the US signed the Treaty for significantly differing reasons. The US saw Southeast Asia and specifically Japan as vulnerable to communist aggression and as such viewed the Treaty as a bulwark against communist influence in Southeast Asia.\(^{185}\) Conversely, Australia perceived Japan as posing a threat to Australian security.\(^{186}\) Throughout the 1950s, Australia viewed West Irian as falling within the obligations of ANZUS. However, despite Australia’s consternation at the deteriorating situation in Indonesia, the Eisenhower Administration refused its request for ANZUS support. During the 1957 ANZUS conference Dulles informed Casey that the US had no treaty obligation to defend West Irian.\(^{187}\)

Indonesia’s strategic circumstances were a reverse image of Australia’s. Whilst Canberra’s efforts to influence US resolve toward West Irian were having little impact, Jakarta was having far greater success in shaping superpower policies. In 1958, in response to Jakarta’s acquisition of arms from Poland and Czechoslovakia, the US arranged for light arms to be sold to the Indonesian Army.\(^{188}\) Jones recalls that in his first interview with Sukarno the Indonesian President emphasised the following:

> If the United States Government will change its position on West Irian and support our claim, I will abandon neutrality between the two blocs and take sides with America – like that as he snapped his fingers.\(^{189}\)


\(^{186}\) See William Tow’s appreciation of the origins of the ANZUS alliance in Tow W, ANZUS as viewed from Southeast Asia: asset or irritant, The United States – Australian Alliance in an East Asian Context, conference, 29-30 June 2001, University of Sydney, Sydney, p p 107-126, and Coral Bell’s analysis in Bell C, Australia, America and East Asia, The United States – Australian Alliance in an East Asian Context, conference, 29-30 June 2001, University of Sydney, Sydney, pp 127-158.


\(^{188}\) Pemberton G, 1987, All the Way: Australia Road to Vietnam, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, p 77.

This sentiment ran through every interview Jones and other Americans had with Sukarno for the next four years.\textsuperscript{150} Accordingly, Jones recommended a policy to ‘head off the new communists and strengthen responsible elements of the new Indonesia society.’\textsuperscript{161} When Eisenhower rejected Indonesia’s request for large amounts of military assistance in 1960, Sukarno dispatched Nasution to Moscow to secure $450 million in weapons.\textsuperscript{192}

On 19 December 1961, Sukarno declared his Trikora (threefold command) to the Indonesian people, which stipulated that mobilisation was imminent.\textsuperscript{193} Jones noted that Sukarno was a master at painting himself into a corner and waiting for someone to rescue him.\textsuperscript{194} In this situation, with the help of the Russians, he created a real threat of war.\textsuperscript{195} His manipulation of Indonesia’s non-aligned and moderate systemic position gave the state considerable leverage amongst the superpowers.\textsuperscript{196} Morrison and Suhrke noted that ‘the smaller state has one basic bargaining tool that intensely linked states do not have – it can credibly threaten to change its large power alignments.’\textsuperscript{197} This conclusion has parallels with Howard Jones’ interview of Sukarno who declared he would abandon neutrality and take sides with America if the US changed its position.\textsuperscript{198} Thus, Indonesia was able to court superpower support in the form of Soviet military aid to Indonesia, US military aid to the Indonesian Army and ultimately Washington’s assistance to broker a deal with the Dutch. Karl Lagerberg observed that the State Department increasingly came to the understanding that ‘whatever the cost the US had to prevent Indonesia from turning communist.’\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{150} ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} This aid included: Sverdlovsk class cruiser, destroyers, W class submarines, PT boats, missiles, torpedoes, antiaircraft guns, MIG 21 fighter planes and TU 16 bombers Morrison and Suhrke, 1978, op cit, p 206.
\textsuperscript{153} Jones, 1973, op cit, p 207.
\textsuperscript{154} ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Morrison C & Suhrke A, 1978, op cit, p 293.
\textsuperscript{158} Jones, 1973, op cit, p 179.
\textsuperscript{159} Lagerberg, 1979, op cit, p 77.
The US decision to side with Indonesia at the expense of its ANZUS partner's declared national interest was difficult for Australian policy makers to comprehend. This dilemma was to arise again during Confrontation. Rothstein's research into small/great power alliances concluded:

The great power tends to ally in terms of a threat to the balance of the whole system; the small power in the terms of a threat to the local balance.\(^{200}\)

During the West Irian issue, Menzies and Casey viewed the dispute through a local lens. West Irian was part of Australia's "perimeter defence concept" and thus Dutch retention would bolster Australian security. In turn, Canberra asked for ANZUS aid in response to a local threat. In a speech in October 1958 Casey argued Australia's position on West Irian and declared that 'Australia has to give a regional emphasis to its defence and foreign policy, whilst America being a global power had global policies and concerns\(^{201}\) - (a similar conclusion as Rothstein).

To underscore this US global focus, the US National Security Council came to the following conclusion:

A pro-bloc (if not communist) Indonesia is an indefinitely greater threat to them [Australia] and us than Indo possession of a few thousands miles of cannibal land.\(^{202}\)

Bunning's thesis of President Kennedy's administration judged that the US decision to cooperate with Sukarno was derived from Indonesia's importance to US global policies in particular those relating to the communist movement.\(^{203}\) Rothstein additionally noted that when states are faced with contrary interests, 'conflicts in perspective inevitably emerge.\(^{204}\) The West Irian dispute and as the next chapter will illustrate, Confrontation, were examples of these differing perspectives.

\(^{204}\) ibid, p 62.
Australia’s actions towards the end of the 1950s and early 1960s was indicative of Walt’s proposition that weak states will bandwagon “when allies are simply unavailable.” Diagram 2 highlighted the action/reaction cycle of Indonesia and Australia during the dispute. It should be pointed out that Australia’s reactions to Indonesia’s actions did not influence Jakarta – in effect a limited spiraling was evident. These events should be viewed in the context of great power arrangements (noted in Diagram 1). Underlying all of Australia’s policy decisions was the uncomfortable realisation that the US would not provide it (or the Dutch) with military support. Faced with the situation of having no allies and in effect being politically and strategically isolated, Australia ultimately accepted Indonesia’s incorporation of West Irian.

Morgenthau was cognisant of the dilemma facing small or weak states in an asymmetric relationship. He noted:

The distribution of benefits is thus likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance as is the determination of policies. A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies.

In highlighting this dilemma, Morgenthau observed that ‘the relationship between the US and South Korea and Formosa exemplifies this situation.’ Just as South Korea and Taiwan were subject to this unequal distribution of benefits, Australia was faced with a similar predicament. Unwilling to reconcile Canberra’s strategic interests, the US-Australia accord saw each state assume a dominant-subordinate relationship.

The Struggle for Power

The actions of the US, the USSR, China, Indonesia, the Netherlands and Australia can be linked to Morgenthau’s thesis of the ‘struggle for power.’ For the majority of the period

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207 ibid.
208 Morgenthau, 1967, op cit, p 41.
in question, the three Western states attempted to maintain the regional construct and thus could be described as status quo powers. Conversely, the USSR and China sought to extend their influence within Southeast Asia and ipso facto endeavoured to reverse the power relations between themselves and the Western sphere; thus intent on increasing their power.\textsuperscript{209} Finally, Sukarno’s policies had traits of Morgenthau’s theory of demonstrating power.\textsuperscript{210} Under this framework, states claim that foreigners are inspired by aspirations of power whilst one’s own state is free from such ‘motives and rather pursues more ideal objectives.\textsuperscript{211}

The migration of powers into distinct spheres initiated a push-pull effect, with each sphere attempting to assert its dominance. The three Western powers sought to keep their dominance through the Balance of Power system. On a global scale their endeavours were to contain USSR imperialism. On a local level, Australia attempted to maintain Western influence within the region and deny China regional hegemony. Conversely, the communist states main focus was to extend their influence throughout Asia and the developing world. Finally, Indonesia’s labours centred around overhauling the prevailing geo-political framework. Its policies were a manifestation of Sukarno’s belief that Indonesia deserved a dominant seat in the world political and strategic stage.

**Misperception**

Throughout the West Irian dispute both states misperceived each other’s motives, framing them in the context of their own prejudices. This peculiarity is highlighted in Robert Jervis’ seminal work on misperceptions in international politics. Jervis noted that ‘actors injure others more than they mean to because they do not see the degree to which their policies conflict with the other’s interests.\textsuperscript{212} Thus, the White Australia Policy, when viewed through Australia’s eyes, was a policy aimed at protecting the integrity of Australian society. However, when viewed through the Indonesian prism it represented

\textsuperscript{209} ibid.
\textsuperscript{210} ibid, p 90.
\textsuperscript{211} ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Jervis R., 1975, *op cit*, p 354.
another imperial policy. Similarly, Indonesia's open mindedness towards China and its socialist principles was misperceived by Australia to mean strategic alignment.

Perhaps the most significant issue of misperception was that of Sukarno's alliance with the PKI. T B Millar pointed out that during the late 1950s Canberra became increasingly alarmed at the growth of the PKI and its influence over Sukarno.\(^{213}\) As Sukarno lacked a political organisation of his own he adopted the PKI in order to balance the Army. Feith noted:

In order to maximise his [Sukarno] influence toward the army he needed to find support from political groups hostile to the army. The PKI provided him with his best organised and vociferous and reliable body of support.\(^{214}\)

Throughout the early to mid 1950s, Indonesia sought to internationalise the West Irian problem and hope for UN reconciliation – much the same as Pakistan had sought over Kashmir. When it became evident that Indonesia could not garner the required United Nations General Assembly support it adopted a militant stance. However, this militant stance was more style than substance.

\textit{drohende Kriegsgefahren}

Contrary to popular belief, Indonesia's strategic policy toward West Irian was to create the appearance of a 'threatening state of war'; this policy was similar in style to the German Army's lead-up to WWI\(^{215}\). Commonly referred to as, \textit{drohende Kriegsgefahren}, it was used by the Germans to give the appearance that war was imminent.\(^{216}\) It is important to note that Jakarta never used the term \textit{drohende Kriegsgefahren}, but it is the claim of this author that tenets of this policy were used throughout the West Irian dispute.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{214}{Feith, 1962, \textit{op cit}, p 592.}
\footnotetext{216}{For specific references to Germany's strategic policy of drohende kriegsgefahren see the following archival documents: Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914, Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St Petersburg on July 31st, 1914 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914.}
\end{footnotes}
This is not to infer that Sukarno’s intention through the latter stages of the West Irian crisis was to demonstrate that Indonesia was prepared to go to war. It differed to the German doctrine in that instead of seeking deterrence it sought attainment. Indonesia hoped that the Netherlands would acquiesce and that Australia and the US would ameliorate their stance when threatened with the prospect of war. Indicative of drohende Kriegsgefahr was Indonesia’s military incursions into West Irian, which could only be described as amateurish and certainly not representing the rhetoric that Sukarno was espousing. Failed paratroop drops in the Fak Fak area on 27 April and 15 May 1962 and at Merauke on 23 June and 13 August 1962, were followed up by a series of sc3 infiltration blunders on 18 July and 7, 8, 9 and 13 August 1962. DC Watt described Indonesia’s military incursions as such:

In no case were more than 80 men involved. The operations were militarily without plan, sense or effect.217

Despite the nature of these military incursions, they achieved their political objective. The US rushed to broker the issue, the Netherlands capitulated and Australia acquiesced in the achievement of Indonesia’s goals.

The most common perception of Indonesia’s actions during West Irian was that it employed a delicate mix of diplomacy and militarism. However, this is an oversimplification as the doctrine of drohende Kriegsgefahr by its very nature aims to project the threat of war whilst simultaneously restraining from formal warlike actions. Indications are that Indonesia never intended to conduct full-scale war over West Irian, but rather, it sought to deceive the international community into believing that war was imminent.

Summary

West Irian was a strategic milestone for both Indonesia and Australia. For Indonesia, it represented its first foreign policy challenge as a sovereign state – a challenge which it took up with gusto. Conversely, Australia’s “line in the sand” over West Irian placed it at odds with Indonesia. As the dispute intensified so too did the level of mistrust and suspicion between the two states. Examination of the US, China, the USSR and the Netherlands’ security policies indicate that West Irian was a surrogate through which major global and regional states attempted to outmanoeuvre each other for their respective interests.

Analysis of Australia’s security perspectives showed that a range of drivers from the individual through to state dynamics and finally structural forces influenced Canberra’s stance on West Irian. These fears led Australia to regard the islands to its north as intrinsic to its security. As Australia’s reliance on the US for protection intensified, its ability to influence and indeed garner strategic favour diminished. Put simply, West Irian highlighted the unique nature of alliances between asymmetric states. In any great/small power relationship, the smaller power will tend to move into a reactive role. During the West Irian dispute, the US policy was structured around global security arrangements, whilst Australia was focused on local security issues.

Within Indonesia, Sukarno manipulated nationalistic fervour amongst the populace to unify the state and as a consequence the quest for West Irian was a natural element of this strategy. Furthermore, Jakarta viewed the regional system as hostile and inimical to its national interests. That said, until 1957, these security perspectives failed to translate into military action because of the role of “administrators” and Parliamentary Democracy within Jakarta. After 1957, the rise of the “solidarity makers” and the introduction of “Guided Democracy” synthesised into a strategic policy that saw aggressiveness and militancy as viable options to liberate West Irian.

Fundamentally, the West Irian dispute undermined what in 1949 was a maturing relationship. Whilst superficially both Jakarta and Canberra maintained that little damage had been done to the security relationship, there is no doubt that there had been a
divergence rather than a convergence of security interests. That said, it is important to understand that whilst Australia was in diplomatic conflict with Indonesia, this did not escalate to military confrontation. Furthermore, once Australia ultimately accepted Indonesia's position on West Irian, the conflict between the two states quickly eroded. As soon as the Bunker Agreement had been finalised, Australia accepted Indonesian sovereignty and thus in effect ameliorated, to a degree, some of the conflict between the two countries. As the West Irian dispute was reaching a conclusion, Radio Moscow declared the following commentary: 'the West Irian people's struggle for reunification with the Indonesia republic and the struggle of those in East New Guinea for freedom are both anticolonial movements. Australia in their colonial plundering look with great fear at the approaching storm.' This message was hardly what Canberra was hoping for. On the other hand, Indonesia and Sukarno faced a different dilemma. As Abdul Nasser of Egypt described, Indonesia faced a crisis of milestones, whereby 'one revolution obliges us to unite in one phalanx and forget the past and another revolution which demands that we restore lost dignity to our moral values by not forgetting the past.' Sukarno opted for the latter path and hence, within 18 months both states would become embroiled in another security dispute – Confrontation. This campaign will be examined in-depth in the next chapter.

INTRODUCTION

As a consequence of Indonesia's campaign of Confrontation against the new state of Malaysia, the Australia-Indonesia security relationship reached its lowest point since 1945. Whilst Confrontation was soon overshadowed by the Vietnam War, for its moment, Britain and Australia's conflict with Indonesia was the most dangerous dispute in East Asia. Further, Confrontation was notable for it was the only time in the relationship that Australia engaged in direct military conflict with Indonesian forces. In sum, 23 Australians were killed, even of these on operations, and 108 wounded, whilst two New Zealand soldiers also died in the conflict.¹

The events from 1962-1966 have been well recorded. Starting with the Brunei Revolt in December 1962, Indonesia commenced its policy of Confrontation. The failure of Maphilindo in 1963 led to a number of small-scale incursions into Malaysian territory, which ultimately led to Australia's deployment of troops to assist other Commonwealth forces. As Sukarno moved further to the "left", Canberra's fears intensified, however, the coup and counter-coup of 30 September 1965 changed Indonesian politics and as Sukarno's influence declined, so too did the degree of intensity of Confrontation - eventually leading to an end to hostilities in August 1966.

This issue was essentially a conflict between Britain and Indonesia over the proposed state of Malaysia. Intertwined were a number of other states namely; the US, the USSR, China and Australia. However, the interstate security linkages of Confrontation were significantly different to those pertaining to West Irian. That said, Washington's attitude during this dispute displayed some similarities with its previous policy on West Irian, in that the US was not prepared to offer political or military support to Australia. It acted

with restraint and indeed imposed a degree of self-control on the Commonwealth countries. In particular, the US did not wish the dispute to escalate out of control, at a time when the crisis in Vietnam was gaining momentum. For the USSR, Confrontation posed a foreign policy dilemma. Hitherto, the Soviet Union's policy had been to support Third World states. In particular, post Stalin and the introduction of Khrushchev, the developing world was seen as fertile ground that could be toiled. To that end, during the West Irian dispute, the Soviets were able to provide Indonesia with unequivocal support. However, the USSR could not openly back Indonesia's position on Confrontation, which was at variance to Malaysian independence. Ultimately, the Soviets adopted a low-level approach to Confrontation, neither supporting Indonesia nor condemning its actions.

China's role and influence throughout this dispute was significantly greater than during the debate over West Irian. As Confrontation progressed, so too did the famed "Jakarta-Peking axis" and in turn China's indirect influence on Indonesia and Australia. The Sino-Soviet split enabled and indeed gave the Chinese an opportunity to actively exploit the delicate geo-strategic environment in Southeast Asia. As Sukarno aligned himself more with Peking, Australia's consternation increased. By 1965, some Australian politicians perceived Indonesia as being a satellite state of China.

Whilst Australia and Britain's strategic objectives were similar, both states ran to a different timeline with respect to Indonesia. For Britain, its military campaign against Indonesian forces could be seen to be its last political venture into Southeast Asia, whereas for Australia, it had to shape its policies under an indefinite continuum of relations with Jakarta. To a degree, this explains why Britain was less cautious in escalating the dispute than was Australia or the US.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Subritzky\(^2\) offers the broadest summary of the security interactions of the key Western states. In particular, the US, UK and Australia’s political dimensions are well researched, Professor Mackie’s seminal book *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*\(^3\), is often quoted as the authoritative work on this event. From a purely historical perspective, Mackie’s book is unsurpassed. However, for this study it has a paucity of information pertaining to Australia and does not analyse security concepts in depth.

A number of books have been written on Sukarno with the most detailed and authoritative is Legge’s book *Sukarno*\(^4\). Cindy Adams autobiography\(^5\) of Sukarno offers some revealing insights into his own personality and psyche - which proved so influential during the dispute. Adil’s\(^6\) work on Australia’s political policy towards Indonesia during Confrontation comes closest to examining the strategic mindset, which dominated Canberra’s policy makers.

The largest source of Australian primary material can be found in Australian archives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) and the *Current Notes*\(^7\) series. These sources reveal that Australia’s politicians and bureaucrats were becoming increasingly concerned about Chinese expansion; the Vietnam War only served to deepen these fears. Thus, Confrontation could not have come at worse time for Canberra and indeed it only heightened the degree of suspicion toward Indonesia, China, communism and the region.

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\(^5\) The fact that Sukarno allowed Cindy Adams to write his autobiography is testament to Sukarno’s egocentric and sexually driven personality. Adams recalls how she had to stave off numerous advances by Sukarno before and during the biographical sessions.


\(^7\) *Current Notes* Volume 35 1964, Department of External Affairs, AGPS, Canberra.
Leifer's study of Indonesian foreign policy is illuminating, though no direct reference is made to Indonesia's security perspectives. On a personal note, Gani Harsono's recollections of his time with Sukarno offers an understanding which has not been explored in any other literature on Confrontation. For instance, Harsono maintained that Confrontation grew from a fear that Indonesia was becoming economically ensnared by the US, the USSR and China. Though there is little evidence to substantiate Harsono's claim, it nevertheless provides another possibility which should not be readily discounted.

Theoretical security literature is primarily examined through the works of Bull, Buzan, Glasner, Jervis, and Morgenthau. These eminent authors have contributed significantly to the security debate and each offers different philosophies on security interactions and geo-strategic theory. The theories of ideology, revolution and nationalism are primarily analysed using the models of David, Jervis, Lipschultz, Morrison and Suharko and Van Evera, whilst Sukarno's fascination with the romanticism of ideology is well documented in Modelski's compilation of speeches throughout the era. All provide useful starting points from which Indonesia's security motives can be examined. Overall, Confrontation has given birth to a diverse spectrum of literature on the historical aspects of the dispute, though, there is limited research on the security perspectives of both Australia and Indonesia.

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INTERSTATE SECURITY LINKAGES

Confrontation involved six protagonists: Britain, China, the USSR, the US, Australia and Indonesia. The complex and confused interaction between the six will be discussed below, with more detailed analysis of Australia and Indonesia later in the chapter. Diagram 1 represents the linkages between the six states.

Diagram 1: Interstate Security Linkages
--- conflictual relationships
— cooperative relationships
[Diagram showing linkages between United States, USSR, Australia, Indonesia, Britain/Malaysia, and China]

Britain

Britain’s motives during Confrontation were primarily based on geo-strategic concerns as it realised that the growing wave of anti-imperial rhetoric within Southeast Asia could only be nullified through rapid decolonisation. However, during the early 1960s Britain still regarded itself as a great power. Hence decolonisation did not mean withdrawal, but rather Britain attempted to legitimise its presence through the basing of military forces on the territory of newly granted independent states.

Strategically, Britain viewed Chinese communism as a significant threat to its interests
within the region. The point to be emphasised is that Malaya's independence was not spawned from Britain's acknowledgment of self-determination, but rather, as a vehicle to protect its interests within the region while allowing for the pressures of decolonisation.

Whilst Confrontation ultimately exposed Indonesia's military weakness, it similarly exposed Britain's force projection fragility. Sukarno's campaign of sporadic attacks, which were at times comical in planning and execution, were enough for Britain to request Commonwealth and US assistance. From early on in the campaign the UK wanted Australia and New Zealand to make a formal treaty with Malaysia so that US involvement would be invoked through ANZUS.

In September 1964, Britain threatened to bomb Naval and Air Force bases in Indonesia.\(^{21}\) Notwithstanding some of the possible ramifications of such an action, (which could have included: undermining Afro-Asian support, engaging the PKI, and isolating moderate Indonesian elements) this threat provoked a strong response by the US State Department. On 2 September 1964, the US Secretary of State, Rusk, argued that 'the US would not deal with the UK on the basis of Britain's concept of limited liability.'\(^{22}\) This concept of limited liability implied that the UK was not able to fully support its campaign in Malaysia. Bombing Indonesian sovereign territory would undoubtedly have escalated the conflict - a consequence that Britain could only have handled with US military backing. On the one hand, Britain hoped to remain a pre-eminent actor in world affairs, on the other hand, it lacked the political and military strength to support such a proposition.

Nineteen sixty-five was a watershed in British foreign relations. Indeed, it ushered in a change in strategic thinking, which was to have wide reaching ramifications for Australia. A new Labor government in Britain introduced a change in sentiment towards Malaysia. The Sterling was undergoing a major confidence crisis and the British Exchequer came to the conclusion that supporting distant colonies was not financially viable. The British Foreign office concluded that Asian nationalism was the best measure to contain


communism whilst simultaneously the Exchequer argued that colonialism was an aspiration beyond the grasp of the British state.\textsuperscript{23}

Subritzky's analysis of Confrontation concluded that Britain sought to 'disengage through a policy of pre- eminent influence'\textsuperscript{24} and in turn, this would sustain their position within the region and resolve problems with the Exchequer.\textsuperscript{25} In essence, this marked the beginning of its "East of Suez" foreign policy. By way of garnering international support for its cause, the British incited fears of further Indonesian expansion. Stressing this policy, Edwards noted that 'during Confrontation the British argued that Sukarno was seeking the remaining half of New Guinea and was intent on becoming a Pacific power.'\textsuperscript{26}

In summary, the British campaign to protect the new state of Malaysia was successful, though resolution of the dispute was primarily a function of the Indonesian coup and counter coup of 30 September 1965. What it did highlight was Britain's limited capacity to embark upon military ventures outside Europe.

\textbf{China}

Right from the outset, China attacked the Maphilindo idea, and throughout the ensuing dispute urged Sukarno not to give up his efforts to Crush Malaysia.\textsuperscript{27} This strategic attitude, was in part, a function of China's earnest desire to exert its influence within the region. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s provided Peking with the opportunity to pursue its own interests, an element of which was the elimination of Western powers from the region. In this respect, Peking shared a similar strategic interest as Jakarta and this synergy was the catalyst for closer relations between the two during Confrontation.

\textsuperscript{23} Subritzky J, 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 145.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid, p 149.
\textsuperscript{25} ibid, p 188.
Coral Bell described this era of Chinese foreign policy as the ‘open and polemical divergence period’. She saw China’s foreign policy as being inextricably involved with the vast Chinese domestic upheaval of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Her analysis concluded that China’s foreign policy might be regarded as a by-product of the domestic frenzy which included: the burning down of the British Embassy, the physical mistreatment of foreign diplomats and the re-education of teenage Red Guards. China’s existing world order of the two camp theory had been ‘transmuted into a three camp world whereby China saw itself as the leader of the Third World.’ Paradoxically, this new policy was operating in parallel with Sukarno’s New World Order, which saw the progression from a three camp world to a two camp world.

China was perceived by all the Western powers as the greatest threat to regional security. As Diagram 1 illustrated, China had a number of conflictual security relationships (Australia, Britain, the US and a growing rivalry with the USSR). By the mid 1960s, the fear of Chinese communist expansion was at its zenith. Britain saw China as the primary threat to Malaya and its regional interests, whilst Australia viewed China as a direct threat to its own security.

Drawing on Morgenthau’s methodology of reducing political phenomena to three basic types (keeping power, increasing power, and demonstrating power), it is apparent that China’s aim was to increase its regional power whilst the Western powers sought to maintain their regional power. Indeed, during Confrontation, US regional strategy was to contain Chinese communism. One pithy summary of the US position come from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff, who declared to President Johnson in 1964 that: ‘at the very time when we’re carrying the whole burden of protecting Southeast Asia

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29 Bell, 1984, op cit, p 259.
from the chicos [Chinese Communists], Sukarno should seem to embrace the chicos and declare war on the US.  

**USSR**

As China’s influence and role during Confrontation steadily increased, the Soviet’s role steadily decreased. Sukarno’s political (dis)-orientation convinced Moscow that supporting Indonesia would not guarantee it an increased sphere of influence within the region. Confrontation was inimical to its much-vaunted policy of supporting all national liberation movements and at risk was not just Malaya, but, a host of other Third World Afro-Asian states, which it feared would move away from the Soviet orbit. Recalling his experiences as US Ambassador to Indonesia, Jones noted that the ‘Russians were not so vocal’.

Aside from the strategic contradiction that Confrontation posed, Moscow saw no advantage in openly supporting Indonesia as it was perceived that conflict would be exploited by China. Consequently, the Soviets adopted a policy of “interested onlooker”.

**United States**

During this era, the US was becoming increasingly pre-occupied with Asian security arrangements. Specifically, US Far Eastern thinking was influenced by two factors during Confrontation; the Vietnam War and the burgeoning spread of Chinese communism. The latter was given a new sense of urgency on 16 October 1964 when China detonated its first atomic bomb.

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37 Ibid.

38 Author’s quote.
During the West Irian dispute, US foreign policy was directed at containing communism and the Soviet Empire. However, the first stages of East-West détente highlighted by the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 25 July 1963 changed the focus of the Pentagon and the State Department. Détente served to accelerate the Sino-Soviet split, as Khrushchev’s dogma of peaceful co-existence did not sit comfortably with the Chinese. Roger Hillsman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs argued:

If the dispute proceeds rapidly to an open break we might find ourselves facing not one but two great power centres each vying with the other in aggressive rivalry towards the West.30

It was perceived that the threat now emanated from Asia and the US believed the best way to counter this threat was to solicit support from the Afro-Asian states – a similar doctrine that China entertained.

In accordance with this newfound view, the US feared that hostilities between Jakarta and the new state of Malaysia would be destructive and could lead to a takeover in Indonesia by the PKI and subsequently regional instability.40 In Goldsworthy’s analysis of Australian engagement with Asia he concluded that Washington’s aim was to minimise the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party – this being far more important than supporting what they saw as a risky ambitious British undertaking of state building.41 Furthermore, he noted the ‘US wanted Australia to extend its military role in Asia against China but not against Sukarno’s Indonesia, which the US was anxious to keep out of the communist bloc.’42 This analysis was shared by Subritzky, who claimed that Kennedy and his advisors were not hostile to Malaysia per se, however, they viewed Indonesia as more important.43 Finally, Edwards claimed the US had made it clear that it was concerned in not jeopardising its long-term relationship with Indonesia.44

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30 Subritzky J, 2000, op cit, p 58.
41 ibid, p 271 (Cablegram 2583, Washington to Canberra 27 Sep 1963 A1838 3006/4/7 part 14 NAA).
42 ibid.
43 Subritzky J, 2000, op cit, p 189.
To that end, a focus on Asian stability coupled with its military and political preoccupation with Vietnam helped shape US policy on Confrontation. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that a break with Jakarta would have severe military implications for the US - ultimately having an adverse impact on the US military posture in Southeast Asia.\(^{45}\) Even as late as 1964, when Sukarno’s rhetoric had intensified, the US National Security Council argued ‘with Vietnam and Laos already on our Southeast Asian plate we can ill afford a major crisis with Indonesia too just now.’\(^{46}\)

For Washington, Confrontation posed a different set of strategic dynamics than had been present during the West Irian issue. Specifically, military intervention by its closest ally of Great Britain presented the US with a number of challenges. Whilst the US saw Malaya as falling within the strategic remit of Britain, it feared that escalation of the dispute could introduce communist client states to the dispute and that “military spillover” may occur from the core to the periphery of the region. Thus, the US State Department adopted a position of “detachment” - this concept of detachment infers a policy of distancing.

In addition, the US not only acted with restraint during the dispute but it also sought to limit the military options of the Commonwealth forces. The US State Department used such terms as “limited liability” and “residual responsibility” to indicate to Britain that it would not be prepared to intervene should the dispute escalate out of control of Commonwealth forces. This dampening effect was strikingly evident when Britain developed contingency plans to bomb Indonesian Air Force and Naval bases. In response, the US firmly warned Britain against such a dangerous ploy by arguing that this action would surely escalate the dispute to a level beyond the control of UK military services; Britain ultimately discarded the bombing plan. Overall, US policy during Confrontation was a mixture of strategic detachment, firm and unequivocal guidance to Britain and Australia and a degree of ambiguity towards Indonesia.

\(^{45}\) US National Archives and Records Administration, US Foreign Relations 1964-68, Volume XXVI, Indonesia-Malaysia, Memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defence McNamara, August 26 1964.

\(^{46}\) US National Archives and Records Administration, US Foreign Relations 1964-68, Volume XXVI, Indonesia-Malaysia, Memorandum from Presidents Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Johnson, August 31 1964.

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AUSTRALIA'S MOTIVATION

The end of Confrontation saw the beginning of a new strategic era – one where Australia's great power allies of the UK and US demonstrated a reluctance to engage in the Southeast Asian region (excluding Indochina). Britain's "East of Suez" withdrawal program and Nixon's famed "Guam Doctrine" could be said to have originated during this era. The timing of Confrontation (straight after the West Irian dispute) coupled with Indonesia's affinity with Communist China gave rise to a view within Australia that Sukarno's ambition was regional hegemony. The seriousness of this situation was highlighted by Edwards who observed that by 1964 Confrontation had become the 'primary focus of Australia's attention for policy makers as well as the general public.'

As a consequence, Australia attempted to invoke US military commitment through ANZUS obligations. On several occasions the US made firm statements that no ground forces would be committed. Highlighting the difference in opinion over ANZUS, Barwick stated on 17 April 1963, 'an attack on Australia servicemen in Malaysia would come within the terms of ANZUS.' In response the US State Department declared that they would not commit to such 'hypothetical situations.'

China, Indonesia and the Perimeter Defence Concept

The "realists" within Canberra viewed the dispute through a geo-strategic lens. Keith Waller, First Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, encapsulated this theme when he explained to Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia, Shann, 'the problem is we cannot look only at Malaysia, our strategic reserve and in fact our whole defence policy is involved.' Waller went further and declared, 'all our strategy as you know is based on our forward position in Southeast Asia and we would be cutting our own throats if we were to pull out of Malaya.'

In Goldsworthy's analysis, he observed that 'Australia's

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48 ibid, p 272.
49 Ibid.
50 ibid.
52 ibid.
motivation was driven by a desire to maintain a forward position in a British influenced state.\textsuperscript{53} Hence, the theme of forward defence or as I have described in chapter 3, the “perimeter defence concept”, was at the forefront of Australia’s strategic policy. Adil concluded that ‘Malaysia [was] part of Australia’s defence in depth strategy.’\textsuperscript{54} Cabinet clarified this strategic sentiment on 5 March 1963 when it determined:

Having in mind not only the possible risk of military involvement in Indonesia but also the fact that Australia military strategy is based on the maintenance of a forward position in Southeast Asia, Australia should continue to support the creation of Malaysia and to accept the risk that whereby we may cause tension in our relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{55}

Notwithstanding the immediate concerns with Indonesia, some Australian politicians believed there was a place for Indonesia in this “strategic perimeter”. Hasluck claimed that “the natural and desirable future to which we look is an Indonesia that is joined in a chain of friendship from India through Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia to Australia.”\textsuperscript{56}

Late in 1963, in response to British pressure for an Australian military presence, Menzies committed Australian servicemen. On 25 September 1963, Menzies announced:

We shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon by the government of Malaysia add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the UK in the defence of Malaysia territorial integrity and political independence.\textsuperscript{57}

Within Parliament there was bipartisan support for the government’s stance. Calwell announced in the House, ‘overriding all these possibilities is the common threat from Communist China and that is, a threat Malaysia shares in common with Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia.’\textsuperscript{58} This fear was to influence Australia’s decision making process throughout the remainder of the conflict.

\textsuperscript{53} Goldsworthy, D, 2001, \textit{op cit}, p 270.
\textsuperscript{55} Goldsworthy D, 2001, \textit{op cit}, p 267 (Cabinet Decision 675 5 March 1963, A4940, C3640, NAA)
\textsuperscript{57} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 Sep 1963, Volume 40, p 1339.
\textsuperscript{58} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 Sep 1963, Volume 40, p 1372.
During 1964, Australia’s involvement in Malaysia became increasingly connected and interrelated with its desire to prevent the spread of Chinese communism. It appeared that Malaysia would be Australia’s “regional domino”. In October 1964, Hasluck stated ‘the disruption of such hopes arises from Indonesian aggression against Malaysia and we are also disturbed by the rise of a strong communist party looking toward Peking.’ He went further by stating, ‘it is most important that Australia maintain her dual role and policy.’ This dual policy encompassed conflict in Malaya and cooperation within the Indonesian archipelago.

Australia’s strategic vision was further complicated with its burgeoning involvement in the Vietnam War. It is impossible to analyse Australia’s involvement in either Confrontation or Vietnam in isolation, rather, both conflicts from Australia’s perspective were intimately related. On 23 March 1965, Hasluck asserted that ‘the real enemy was not communist insurgency in Vietnam - it was Chinese aggression.’ Moreover, Hasluck explained that ‘this deterioration arises from increased Communist pressures in the area as a whole and in particular in South Vietnam, Laos and from Indonesia’s policy of Confrontation against our neighbour Malaysia.’ Shortly thereafter, Menzies pronounced that ‘the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.’ Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes claimed, ‘the campaign against Malaysia is just the holding and diverting strategy in the South.’

The concern over an Indo-Sino bloc reached a zenith in August 1965 with China’s detonation of another atomic weapon. Labor claimed, ‘China has atomic weapons. Indonesia is now boasting of what she will do when she has the atomic bomb and it is idle for us to say that Indonesia will not do something about atomic weapons.’ In response,

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the government claimed that Australia had never been in greater danger. Finally, on 19 October 1965, the Australian Cabinet confirmed that the centre of a possible general war had moved from Europe to Asia and that the emergence of China would present the main political and military problems for the world in the next few decades. Thus, by the end of 1965, China and Indonesia had become one in the eyes of Canberra’s policy makers. B D Beddie, writing in 1968, concluded that during Confrontation Australian public opinion was either actively or potentially hostile against Indonesia. In sum, Confrontation was perceived as a threat to Australia’s northern security perimeter and as such it represented a geo-strategic operation, which Australia had to win.

**Regional Hegemony**

More so than at any period since 1945, was the belief that Australia’s security was under threat. Within some Australian circles an opinion existed that Sukarno’s real ambition was regional hegemony. As the Japanese had successfully demonstrated in the early 1940s, “island hopping” via forceful state acquisition was a proven method of achieving a form of regional hegemony. In 1964, Menzies declared to the House, ‘I think the Indonesians are almost impertinent enough to regard themselves as long-term partners of Peking, with themselves dominant on the waters on the Pacific while China masters the mainland.’ In 1965, Fraser claimed that ‘the Indonesian objective is to dominate the waters and territories of the South West Pacific region.’ In Greenwood’s five yearly analysis of Australian foreign policy, he concluded, ‘Indonesia sought under the banner of anti-colonialism, to lead a movement which would eliminate the British military presence, oust British influence, and so enable Indonesia to become the dominant power in Southeast Asia.’ Further developing this theme of regional hegemony, Greenwood put forward the idea that Sukarno’s revolutionary change was directed ‘towards the achievement of Indonesian

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hegemony in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{72} Edwards’ exposition of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts noted, ‘Sukarno was seen as an unpredictable dictator who was using Soviet funds to build up huge armed forces for no obvious defensive purpose.’\textsuperscript{73} Finally, in Goldsworthy’s analysis he claimed, ‘Australia feared that Indonesia might sever its trade routes and lines of communication.’\textsuperscript{74}

Thus, leading politicians from both sides of the spectrum and a section of contemporary historians have argued that Confrontation was a manifestation of Sukarno’s appetite for regional dominance. This argument is understandable when taken in the context of Australia’s history and of Sukarno’s belligerent actions of the 1960s. The previous chapters have already highlighted Australia’s historic fear of foreign invasion, encapsulated by Levi’s claim that fear is the ‘leitmotif’ of Australian thinking, and this fear arguably gave rise to an exaggerated sense of threat perceptions. Further deepening this feeling was Indonesia’s acquisition of West Irian, which whilst accepted by Australia, was nevertheless depicted by some as a precursor to a more adventurous campaign. Hence, by the start of Confrontation, a range of rational and irrational dynamics had been set in place, which gave Sukarno’s quest a more complex dimension. From 1962, Sukarno’s strategic dialectic of NEFOS/OLDEFOS, Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN, the maturing “Jakarta-Peking axis”, the rise of the PKI within Indonesia and a host of belligerent Sukarno rhetoric all galvanised a perception in Australia that Confrontation was part of a more sinister crusade for regional hegemony.

The British Alliance

Much has been made in this thesis of Australia’s earnest desire to form alliances with powerful states as a method of enhancing its own security. Specific to Britain, its place in Southeast Asia provided Australia with a number of building blocks in its “perimeter defence concept”. The British dominions of Malaya and Singapore provided it with an enduring naval presence in the region. Gelber noted that the British presence fulfilled a

\textsuperscript{72} ibid, p 98.  
\textsuperscript{73} Edwards P, 1992, \textit{op cit}, p 263.  
\textsuperscript{74} Goldsworthy D, 2001, \textit{op cit}, p 275.
twofold security requirement; defence of Australia and contributing to the general stability of the region.\textsuperscript{75}

Consequently, this "great and powerful friend" offered Australia a range of strategic benefits. Re-affirming this unqualified support to Britain, Menzies stated on 25 September 1963:

\begin{quote}
We know and she knows that in this part of the world we look to her and she looks to us. We each apply in a spirit of mutual confidence a golden rule of mutual obligation.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Further, Menzies made mention that there would be no action affecting "the safety of Australia except in concert with our great and powerful friends."\textsuperscript{77} In other words, Australia would be prepared to entertain military engagement but only if it could garner allied support.

However, this is not to infer that Australia's strategic policy was similar to Britain's. Indeed, there were some fundamental differences, notably Australia's earnest wish to not escalate the conflict with Indonesia. Barwick, in particular, took up this challenge with much gusto to the point that Australia's approach has often been labelled as a "dual policy"; one combining subtle diplomacy and military engagement.\textsuperscript{78} In sum, Southeast Asia's deteriorating strategic situation had less of an impact on Britain that it did for Australia.

\textsuperscript{75} Gelber H, \textit{Britain's Withdrawal from Asia: Its implications for Australia}, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, p 78.
\textsuperscript{77} ibid, p 282.
INDONESIA'S MOTIVATION

Indonesia's campaign of Confrontation against Malaysia marked the high point of Sukarno's political career, however, it was also the last time that he would exert international influence, as the events of 30 September 1965 were to reshape Indonesian politics. What commenced as a campaign of harassment against its northern neighbour, culminated with a temporary fracturing of the non-aligned movement, a split in Afro-Asian solidarity and the regional isolation of Indonesia. There appears to be three recognised schools of thought surrounding Sukarno's rationale for Confrontation. The first interpretation focuses on Sukarno's zeal for ideology and revolution. The second account views Sukarno's actions as a manifestation of a quest for regional hegemony. The third definition holds that Sukarno's campaign against Malaysia was a crude mechanism to maintain and legitimise power within Indonesia. These interpretations can be subdivided as thus: one external account, one internal account and one account that lies somewhere in the middle.

Ideological Revolution

The proposition that ideology was the dominating determinant in Indonesia's quest to "Crush Malaysia" has the widest field of support amongst political theorists. One cannot escape the omnipresent nature of ideology throughout Indonesia's modern history, whether it be Sukarno's Independence Day speeches, Subandrio's foreign policy edicts or even Sukarno's famous trial of 1928. Unlike traditional Marxist-Leninist theory which viewed revolution as a class based struggle which would lead to the state 'withering away', Sukarno saw the consolidation of the state as the first and most integral phase of a more expansive revolution.

80 The concept of the state is one of the more significant conundrums in modern communism. Whilst Marxist-Leninist ideology calls for the state to 'wither away' the communist states of the USSR and China continued to flourish. It is axiomatic to conclude that the ruling elite's in both states were reluctant to forfeit power. Thus, these same leaders were faced with a dilemma. At the 18th Congress of the Communist Party, Stalin explained that the State was essential, and indeed would have to be further strengthened, until 'capitalist encirclement is liquidated and the danger of foreign military attach has disappeared'. Mao picked up on this reasoning in 1950 and cited the rationale for the state's existence as such: 'we cannot afford to
Hyde contended that Sukarno’s concept of the ‘confrontation of the old established forces by the new emerging forces’ was of the very essence of Marx’s dialectical materialism.\textsuperscript{81} However, whilst Sukarno adopted some of Engels and Marx’s philosophies it would be erroneous to conclude that Indonesia’s ideology was purely based on communist principles. Indeed, to some degree, both of these ideologies were the antithesis of each other. Whereas, Engels and Lenin viewed the state as ultimately dispensable, Sukarno viewed the state as indispensable. Sukarno’s ideology of revolution focused around two distinct yet interrelated frames: the internal dimension and the external dimension. In an anti-Malaysia rally in Jogjakarta on 25 September 1963 Sukarno claimed that the revolution entailed: the establishment of the Unitary State, the development of a just and prosperous society and the creation of a New World for all mankind.\textsuperscript{82}

In part, Sukarno’s revolution centred on the development of the nation-state. The Republic’s struggle for independence was but one phase, though, an important one, in the development of the nation-state. Paul Sigmund’s examination of ideology in the developing world concluded that ‘national independence was the first step, on their road to development.’\textsuperscript{83} This principle was prevalent amongst the majority of Asian African nationalist leaders of the post WWII era.\textsuperscript{84} In a 1960 speech, titled \textit{the Dynamism of Revolution}, Sukarno declared:

\begin{quote}
In the life struggle of a given nation in its growth and its consolidation, fifteen years is in fact only a beginning. Fifteen years is only a first phase – at the most it constitutes the end of the first phase at most the end of the beginning – which must be followed by other phases no less great and tremendous.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{82} Modelski G, 1963, \textit{op cit}, p 82.
\textsuperscript{84} The quest to develop a nation state amongst a host of fissiparous forces has plagued most Third World nationalist leaders and states. Congo, India, Ghana and Nigeria (along with Indonesia) were such examples.
In chapter 1, part of the discourse examined Wight’s theory of international revolution and the domestic-international linkage. In effect, Wight saw national revolution as a subset of international revolution, which in turn would influence the global society of states. Confrontation occurred during a turbulent era of international politics; the Cold War had reached its peak in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis, Indonesia had previously wrested West Irian away from the Netherlands, India had annexed Goa from Portugal, the Sino-Soviet split had occurred, the conflict in Vietnam was gaining momentum, and Chinese troops has swept through the Indian North East Frontier. The aggregation of these isolated incidents could in fact be construed to be part of a wider revolutionary movement. Sukarno’s affinity for revolution was deeply entrenched by the start of Confrontation. The following extracts are a precis of Indonesia’s revolutionary rhetoric during this period:

**Sukarno:** I have said that the revolution is not to be measured by days or years, revolution is to be measured by decades or multiples of decades.

**Sukarno:** the time had come to carry out the policy for the liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner.

**Feith:** Whereas the previous incumbent administrators had sought to diffuse political unrest the solidarity makers sought to channel this anger for national and revolutionary lines.

**Howard Palfrey Jones:** It was a matter of principle, patriotism and completing their revolution.

**Subandrio:** henceforth our diplomacy has another aspect and that is diplomacy as an instrument of revolution.

**Subandrio:** our foreign policy is based more on the laws of the revolution rather than upon the rule of quid pro quo.

**Subandrio:** The revolution involves three quarters of mankind and moves towards the building of a New World.

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89 ibid, p 188.
These extracts illustrate that a strong revolutionary sentiment existed within key elements of Indonesian politics. Sukarno believed it was his duty to continue with the revolution—though defining this revolution was never fully articulated. Wight would probably have concluded that Sukarno’s zeal for revolution and Indonesia’s campaign of Confrontation against Malaya were part of this last wave of revolutionary behaviour.

Weatherbee described Sukarno’s last phase of the revolution as a ‘retooling process’.95 This retooling ‘called for a fundamental social, economic and political reordering to be effected through violence’.96 “Crush Malaysia” was part of this process in that Sukarno linked the establishment of Malaysia to Indonesia’s own revolution.97 Another aspect of this revolution was a belief that imperial forces were encircling Indonesia. On 13 February 1963, in a speech to the National Front in Jakarta, Sukarno claimed that Indonesia was ‘being encircled’ and in his autobiography, Sukarno made direct reference to the threat posed by Malaysia. He claimed, ‘it became obvious Malaysia was not to be a friendly country’98 and that ‘their gift of independence was wrapped in a form of new colonialism’.99 Further, in Jogjakarta on 25 September 1963, Sukarno declared, ‘we are convinced that Malaysia is an imperialist scheme that Malaysia is neo colonialism.’100 William Tow concluded that Indonesia was not confronting the prospect of invasion by a foreign power but rather was ‘most concerned about external influences that may threaten internal harmony.’101

A subset of this interpretation is the notion that economic power blocs were attempting to isolate the Indonesian economy. There are no authors of note who have considered this theory and it stems from the memoirs of an Indonesian diplomat in the Sukarno era, Gani

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94 Models, 1963, op cit, p 44.
95 Weatherbee, 1969, op cit, p 46.
96 ibid, p 88.
97 Legge J, 1972, op cit, p 367.
98 ibid, p 302.
99 ibid.
100 Models, 1963, op cit, p 80.
Harsono. Harsono recounts a conversation which alleged that Sukarno stated, ‘with one hundred and five million people Indonesia together with the peoples of the New Emerging Forces will create their own economic orbit.’ Harsono affirmed that Sukarno viewed the world as a tri-polar economic bloc that would be led by the US, the USSR and China. Hence, Sukarno’s crusade was to unite the new and small nations in the spirit of ‘gotong royong and musjawarah and in such a manner not to antagonise the three super powers.’ He noted this would ensure that the progress and development of these new and small nations would not be easily jeopardised by the individual policies of any of the super three. This hypothesis is only supported by one obscure reference where Sukarno declared in a National Front meeting of February 1963 that, ‘Malaysia is to be set up to save tin for the imperialists. Malaysia is to be established to save rubber for the imperialists. Malaysia is founded to save oil for the imperialists.’

Sukarno’s perception of the New World Order was no more apparent than at the 1964 Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo. During the conference Sukarno explicitly rejected non-alignment and peaceful coexistence and believed both doctrines to be irrelevant to the NEFOS-OLDEFOS clash. This conference marked a turning point in Sukarno’s attempt to secure international endorsement of Confrontation against Malaysia. Leifer illustrated Indonesia’s predicament as such:

Indonesia’s employment of the formula which had been tried and tested in the case of West Irian was unsuccessful because in the main members of both the Afro Asian fraternity and the nonaligned movement refused to perceive Malaysia as a manifestation of neo colonialism.

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103 ibid, p 275.
104 ibid, p 276.
105 ibid.
106 Legge J, 1972, op cit, p 364.
A joint Indonesia-China statement on 29 January 1965, declared that no peaceful coexistence is possible between the NEFOS and OLDEFO.¹⁰⁹ The irony of Sukarno’s ideology is that by 1964 the Soviets had dispelled the notion of the inevitability of conflict and instead had embraced a less confronting doctrine of peaceful coexistence. In Mackie’s definitive examination of Confrontation, he concluded that it was an ‘unwanted and indeed unnecessary phase of Indonesian politics, which was thrusted upon Sukarno.’¹¹⁰

Regional Hegemony

The assertion that Indonesia embarked upon its Ganjang Malaysia crusade as a precursor to regional hegemony is given some credence by key authors. Bernard Gordon appears to be the leading advocate of such a theory and explains that Confrontation was a function of a set of external goals.¹¹¹ In Gordon Greenwood’s seminal examination of Australian foreign policy through the early 1960s he made a number of claims that Sukarno’s campaign of Confrontation was linked with a desire for Indonesian regional hegemony.¹¹² As previously noted, at this time there was a school of thought within Australia which believed that Indonesia’s campaign against Malaysia was but a subset of a grander plan of regional domination.

During the era, Sukarno made reference to “Indonesia Raja” in a 1965 speech titled ‘Oceania.’ He claimed inter alia:

To our East in Oceania the people must be given their chance to become masters in their own homes and manage their own affairs...do not be shocked if a time comes when the Pacific Ocean explodes and rebels and the peoples then set up their own independent countries.¹¹³

¹¹³ Adil H, 1970, op cit, p 70.
Offering a contrary opinion, Harold Crouch refuted the notion that Indonesia was set on regional hegemony. He argued, ‘Indonesia’s past policies have never been motivated by a simple desire to acquire new territories.’

**Domestic Power Balancing**

This final perspective argues that Confrontation was a mechanism that Sukarno used to maintain and indeed legitimise his rule over the Indonesian people. Legge posited that Confrontation was an example of Sukarno’s style of constant movement, which prevented his opponents from formulating a challenge to his authority. Legge stated:

> Essential to his domestic style was the element of constant movement – the sudden unpredictable maneuvers catching opponents or doubters off their guard and the resourceful responses to potential challenges. Sudden switches of policy thus had a systemic function to fulfil and the whole apparatus of negotiation, détente, demarche, Confrontation, the sudden advances and the retreats was an integral part of the his political method.\(^{115}\)

Measures to justify this proposition are all highly subjective, though, there is little empirical evidence in Sukarno’s speeches or autobiography that could absolutely validate this hypothesis. Mackie claimed that ‘the doctrine of the NEFOS not only served to justify the dispute with Malaysia in Indonesia’s eyes, it also made it politically necessary and thus acceptable to the public.’\(^{116}\) Similarly, Weatherbee asserted that the ideology of the Indonesian revolution was a successful vehicle of political legitimisation.\(^{117}\)

Writing during the maelstrom of 1967, Soedjatmoko observed that Confrontation was much more ‘directed inwardly than outwardly.’\(^{118}\) He believed that the Army’s prime focus was balancing the PKI and hence it never seriously considered throwing its main

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115 Legge J, 1972, _op cit_, p 373.
force into a major operation against Malaysia.\textsuperscript{119} Whilst the TNI displayed a sense of intransigence in deploying their best units ashore, the left wing Air Force was more enthusiastic about Confrontation. Finally, Crouch believed that Confrontation was as much related to the domestic struggle for power as to external objectives.\textsuperscript{120}

**Summary**

The diversity and ambiguous nature of Sukarno’s speeches and writings allows for many different conclusions to be drawn about why he embarked upon Confrontation. Any researcher sifting through the volume of material on Confrontation will find evidence to support many theories. Notwithstanding this caveat, a number of generalisations can be made (and they are only generalisations as the true motives of past leaders can never be completely known).

The perception of Indonesian regional hegemony was certainly a defining force within Australia at the time of Confrontation. Coming almost immediately after the West Irian dispute, coupled with the rise of the PKI, Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN and the momentum of the “Jakarta-Peking axis”, there is little wonder that some Australians felt that Sukarno’s ambitions were unlimited. However, countering this argument is the calculating and extremely selective way in which Sukarno embarked upon his campaigns and the fact that the much smaller and vulnerable colony of Portuguese Timor was ignored; behaviour inconsistent with a desire for regional hegemony.

Legge’s interpretation of domestic power balancing cannot be easily discounted for any other reason than its author was one of the leading commentators of Indonesian politics during this era. During the West Irian dispute, both the PKI and TNI supported the cause, however, Confrontation did not enjoy such bipartisan support. During the latter case the TNI were hesitant to embark upon such a “frenzied” campaign; Confrontation only served to polarise Indonesia’s political landscape even further. Ultimately, this polarisation underpinned the events of 30 September 1965.

\textsuperscript{119} ibid.

The final account of ideology and revolution seems to have the largest field of support by historians. Sukarno’s much vaunted ideology of revolution and his dialectical clash of NEFOS and OLDEFOS were the building blocks for Jakarta’s foreign policy. By 1964, Sukarno had embarked upon the final phase of Indonesia’s revolutionary process.

THE AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: FROM CONFLICT TO THE BRINK OF WAR

In a similar fashion as the West Irian dispute, Confrontation produced two distinct security phenomena. Within Australia there was widespread condemnation and criticism of Indonesia’s campaign of Confrontation from government agencies and non-government organisations: Indonesia was increasingly viewed as the most dangerous threat to Australian security. However, Indonesia’s direct response to Australia’s participation and role in Confrontation was muted. As ADF soldiers were being killed, paranoia within Australia reached fever pitch, yet paradoxically, the deployment and deaths of TNI personnel failed to initiate any significant response in Jakarta—indeed Sukarno accepted this notion as a normal outcome of international politics.

In perhaps the most substantial contribution to the literature on the Australia-Indonesia relationship (during this event) Greenwood managed to make only one mention of Indonesia’s reaction to Australia; claiming the Indonesian President continued to ‘echo polite statements reiterating the need for closer cooperation.’ Greenwood’s lack of analysis of Indonesia’s response to Australia is puzzling and can only have two

\[121\] Sukarno’s theory of ideology and revolution has been well documented by both Weatherbee and Modelski (see: Weatherbee W, 1966, Ideology in Indonesia, Sukarno’s Indonesia revolution, Yale University, Michigan and Modelski G, 1963, The New Emerging Forces, Documents on the ideology of Indonesia foreign policy, ANU, Canberra). That said, the origin of his clash of OLDEFOS and NEFOS has not been established by either author. This clash can be traced to the Marxist doctrine of the ‘Universality of Contradiction’ and the ‘Particularity of Contradiction’. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao all professed to this dogma. In essence, contradiction is the ‘law of opposites’. We know that Sukarno was a scholar of Marx and Lenin and he closely followed the revolutionary track of Mao in the 1940s. NEFOS and OLDEFOS are mutually exclusive or contradictory. Mao argued that every form of ideology has its own particular contradiction (see: Mao Tse Tung, 1965, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Volume I, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, p 320). This thesis contends that Sukarno’s clash of NEFOS and OLDEFOS or imperialism and anti-imperialism is an offshoot of Mao’s writings on contradiction.

\[122\] James Angel observed that there was only a small element of criticism from Indonesia of Australia’s support to Malaysia. See: Greenwood G & Harper N, 1968, op cit, p 378.

\[123\] Ibid, p 372.
explanations; that there was indeed a gap in his research or that Greenwood’s omission reflected Indonesia’s ambivalence. In reviewing all of the primary and secondary data written on this topic, this thesis supports the latter proposition.

Whilst there was little in the way of outright censure from Sukarno or Subandrio towards Australia or Menzies, it would be erroneous to conclude that Jakarta was satisfied with Canberra’s policy toward Confrontation. As the issue deepened, Sukarno’s dialectic ideology of NEFOS/OLDEFOS began to dominate Indonesia’s foreign policy; culminating in his famous 1964 Independence Day speech of *The Year of Living Dangerously*. Sukarno perceived the geo-strategic climate as a great antithesis in world history, incorporating World Revolution, Universal Revolution, and the Revolution of Mankind.124 Whilst Australia was never classified as an OLDEFOS state, there was no doubt, based on NEFOS ideology, that Indonesia and Australia were in opposing camps.125 As a manifestation of this classification, Australia’s sovereignty of PNG placed it at odds with Indonesia. Indeed, Australia had joined an elite band of states such as Portugal, Spain, South Africa and Britain; contrary to Afro Asian solidarity.

In analysing Sukarno’s speeches over the period, there is an apparent absence of direct and explicit criticism of Australia. Apart from his infamous remark, “to hell with your aid”, (directed at the US), Sukarno’s negative rhetoric primarily consisted of generalised statements which grouped the US, Britain and Australia in the same faction (OLDEFOS). As cited in chapter 3, this method of indirect disapproval may have been a function of Sukarno’s Javanese character. Of course, another reason for Indonesia’s failure to acknowledge Australia was its indifferent attitude towards what it regarded as a minor actor in the dispute. By 1965, Indonesia’s strategic focus was firmly locked on its own borders and to its north.

Notwithstanding their differing approaches to Confrontation, there was a severance in security relations between Australia and Indonesia. That said, it is important to note that just as Australia placed more emphasis on the relationship, Indonesia’s disharmony with

124 ibid, p 356.
125 ibid, p 358.
Australia was somewhat ameliorated. This point is important when placed in the context of the ensuing discussion.

From a theoretical viewpoint Bull’s “society” was undermined as a result of Sukarno’s disregard for the ‘rules of coexistence’.\(^{126}\) As part of his theory of “international society”, Bull posited that ‘states at most times pay such respect to the basic rules of coexistence.’\(^{127}\) By early 1965, Sukarno’s actions reflected the very antithesis of coexistence. His dialectical ideology of NEFOS and OLDEFO\(S\) and his attempt to overturn the strategic status quo placed Indonesia squarely at odds with Australia’s position.

The fracturing of “society” was nowhere more evident than in January 1965, when Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations.\(^{128}\) Bull argued that a fundamental element of ‘international society was the adherence to such institutions as the United Nations.’\(^{129}\) He noted that even ‘when the Cold War was being prosecuted most vigorously the US and the Soviet Union did not cause the break up of the United Nations.’\(^{130}\) Put simply, these institutions served to symbolise the existence of an international society.\(^{131}\)

Whilst Sukarno was attempting to reorder international institutions he was similarly changing Indonesia’s domestic structures.\(^{132}\) This tendency to organise institutions along ideological lines was examined by Buzan who concluded that ‘the institutions of the state will have to be structured so as to express and amplify the ideology.’\(^{133}\) Bull did acknowledge that some Asian states had rejected the legal norms of an “international society” as part of their revolutionary change.\(^{134}\) He reasoned that “society” as a whole

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\(^{128}\) For a first hand account of this issue, see, Howard Palfrey Jones, 1973, \textit{op cit}, p 359. In his book he noted that most Westerners remarked ‘Has Sukarno gone mad’ when hearing the news of Indonesia’s actions.


\(^{130}\) ibid 43.

\(^{131}\) ibid, p 74.

\(^{132}\) For example, Sukarnoism was incorporated as part of state education.

\(^{133}\) Buzan, 1993, \textit{op cit}, p 86.

\(^{134}\) Bull, 1977, \textit{op cit}, p 139.
had not broken down nor had the international legal system, but rather a local breakdown had taken place.\textsuperscript{135}

In sum, the "international society" between Australia and Indonesia was fractured as a result of Sukarno's disdain for the prevailing norms of international institutions, his inability to coexist with OLDEFOS states, his disregard for legal rules and his desire to reorder the international political construct. Taken to another level of understanding, Sukarno's actions saw him reject the notion of "international society" and instead replaced it with what was merely a "system of states". In this case, the behaviour of Australia and Indonesia was a 'necessary element in the calculations of the other.'\textsuperscript{136} However, they were not bound by common interests or values, nor were they bound by common rules nor were they co-operating in the working of common institutions\textsuperscript{137} and thus were not part of an "international society".

\textbf{Alliances}

Indonesia's relationship with the great powers during Confrontation was significantly different than during the West Irian dispute. In Leifer's summary of Indonesia's foreign policy he claimed, "neither the Soviet Union nor the US was seriously interested in competing for the political affections of Indonesia."\textsuperscript{138} Yet, this statement is inconsistent with the analysis by Morrison and Suhrke who claimed that Indonesia's moderate systemic nature enabled it to maximise large power support via its ability to switch allegiances.

In chapter 3 it was shown that Indonesia's moderate systemic nature enabled it to solicit great power support during the West Irian dispute. However, by 1964 Jakarta's growing allegiance with Peking, and Sukarno's division of the world into two camps (OLDEFOS and NEFOS) nullified, to a degree, Indonesia's bargaining position. In fact, using Morrison and Suhrke's model, Indonesia had moved from a moderate/systemic state to an intense/partial state. As China's influence on Indonesia increased, Jakarta's ability to

\textsuperscript{135} ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} ibid, p 14.
extract concessions diminished. Simply put, Indonesia's geo-political shift during Confrontation affected the way it was able to influence the great powers.

As with the West Irian dispute, Australia's interests and actions during Confrontation were shaped by its perceived need for an alliance with the US and Britain. In essence, Australia's focus was to keep the US and the British engaged in the region. Subritzky deduced that Canberra's paramount objective was to encourage as much as its influence would allow an American commitment to the region, as it did not believe that that a regional self-supporting security system was practicable.

Archival evidence clearly indicates that Kennedy and the State Department were determined to limit United States ANZUS commitments - the US Secretary of State spoke about "residual responsibility." By this he was indicating that the US would not act as a backup power should the British and Australia escalate this dispute beyond their means to control it. He stated that the 'US simply could not accept such situations where others did not take strong measures to carry out their share of responsibility – this was the main point and that it must be clearly understood by Australia and others.' Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" of 1969 was being spelled out to Canberra as early as 1964.

Australia's deep anxiety about the US alliance during Confrontation was striking. Barwick was reluctant to take action against Indonesia without unequivocal US backing. In 1964, in Parliament he declared:

> In the South West Pacific, Australia and NZ have allies including Great Britain and the US who are rich in power and goodwill. Without them Australia's task in defending so vast a territory with so few people would be a fearful one.

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142 ibid.
143 Goldsworthy D, 2001, *op cit*, p 267 (A 1838, 3034/7/1 part 1, NAA).
Australia and the US shared similar strategic concerns, however, both states had differing interpretations of how containment was to be achieved. The US saw Vietnam as the primary area to be contained, whilst Australia viewed Malaysia as more important, as it perceived this to be closer to the homeland. This perception is intrinsic to local security interactions. Buzan noted that the closer a state the more it tends to dominate the host state’s priorities, as threats operate more potently over short distances.\footnote{Buzan B, 1993, People States and Fear: An agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York p 191.}

The detached stance by the US towards its ANZUS commitments, coupled with a hardline attitude towards British and Australian residual responsibility and its determination to solicit Australian support for its Vietnam campaign is symbolic of asymmetric security relationships. In such a relationship the small state’s security interests are often undermined to accommodate those of the larger state. Confrontation demonstrated this phenomenon.

\textit{drohende Kriegsgefahr}

Analysis of the West Irian dispute in chapter 3 illustrated that Indonesia had adopted a concept known as \textit{drohende Kriegsgefahr}. Hyde and Mackie’s research into Confrontation revealed that Indonesia adopted a similar strategy as that employed during West Irian.\footnote{Hyde and Mackie do not mention nor allude to Jakarta’s strategy of \textit{drohende Kriegsgefahr}, this is an hypothesis made by the author.} From April 1963 - June 1964 there were 250 raiding incidents in Sabah and Sarawak, of which the vast majority involved parties of only 70 men.\footnote{Hyde D, 1965, \textit{op cit}, p 72.} Mackie’s data indicated that from 1963-1964, 18 out of 152 raids in Sarawak involved parties no greater than 40 men and only 3 comprised parties greater than 50.\footnote{Mackie J, 1986, Low level military incursions: Lessons of the Indonesia Malaysia confrontation episode 1963-1966, ANU, Canberra, p 21.}

Modelski claimed that the term Confrontation was first used in West Irian and may be interpreted as the threat and use of force short of outright war.\footnote{Modelski G, 1963, \textit{op cit}, p 73.} To support the
hypothesis of *drohende Kriegsgefahr*, Shann reported to Canberra in 1964 ‘that Indonesia did not want war but that in living dangerously they might provoke one.’

**Spiral Theory**

As Australia’s commitment to Malaysia deepened, so too did its suspicion towards Indonesia. In particular, Indonesia’s rapid acquisition of arms from the USSR (1964) alarmed Canberra. Throughout 1964, Menzies and the Opposition made a series of Parliamentary announcements relating to Australia’s military program. In March 1964, the Labor Party stated:

> We know that Indonesia is armed with the most effective strike bombers that Russia can supply while we in Australia have the obsolescent Canberra bombers. If we compared our forces with Indonesia we should not sleep very comfortably at night.

In November 1964, Menzies declared with particular reference to Indonesia, that as a result of the increasing tensions in Southeast Asia, Australia’s defence program would undergo a major expansion that included ‘an increase of 58% on our actual total expenditure in the past 3 years.’ Finally, both parties joined the anti-nuclear chorus. Cairns claimed that ‘if the Chinese Communists obtain nuclear weapons they intend to launch thermo-nuclear war and destroy half of mankind.’ Similarly, Menzies made several references towards Indonesia’s ‘planned atomic bomb test in 1965.’

Australia’s reaction to Indonesia’s arms acquisitions is typical of what Robert Jervis termed “spiral theory”. Jervis stated that ‘when states seek the ability to defend themselves they get too much and too little – too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others being menaced will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.’ The key to Jervis’ theory is that states often misperceive

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150 Goldsworthy D, 2001, *op cit*, p 275 (Cablegram 885, Shann to Canberra, 7 Sep 64, A1838, TS 687/6/8 part 1 NAA).
152 *Current Notes*, Volume 35 1964, Department of External Affairs, AGPS, Canberra, p 34.
154 *Current Notes*, Volume 35 1964, November, Department of External Affairs, Canberra p 35.

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the intentions of other states. He observed that ‘states overestimate the degree to which they are the focus of other’s policy.’\textsuperscript{156} Specific to this study, the following diagram represents the limited misperception spiral of Australia and Indonesia.

**Diagram 2: Australia-Indonesia Misperception Spiral (limited)**

The genesis of this spiral was Sukarno’s ideological revolution. Prestige and a belief that such purchases could be used for ventures such as West Irian and Confrontation appeared to be the dominating determinants for Jakarta’s arms acquisitions. These arms purchases acted in parallel with Canberra’s over estimation of its importance to Indonesia and its misperception that Indonesia was about to embark upon a militant foreign policy – Confrontation being a striking example of this militancy.

Consequently, Australia initiated its own military program, however, unlike typical spiral theory, Australia’s military expansion and its military intervention in Confrontation did not create an action-reaction-action result. Whilst Australia was pre-occupied with Indonesia the reverse was not the case. Indonesia and Sukarno were embarking upon a campaign that included domestic, regional and international overtones - Australia’s place in this multifaceted campaign was minor.

\textsuperscript{156} ibid, p 350.
Summary

Confrontation proved to be a disturbing issue for all the key protagonists. Britain, having to balance between the indigenous aspirations of self-determination and that of maintaining some form of presence in the region opted for a process of decolonisation. On the other hand, the USSR distanced itself from the campaign against Malaysia. Confrontation neither served its national interests nor did it fit into its ideological dogma. Indeed, Confrontation posed a conundrum for the Soviets — how could the Kremlin deny the right of a fledgling Third World state to self-determination. Similar to its policy during West Irian, the US acted with restraint throughout the dispute and indeed despite its alliance treaty with Australia, the State Department was resolved not to enter into the fray. Deepening the US will was its burgeoning involvement in Vietnam. The US could not afford to be fighting an Asian state on two fronts. Akin to Britain's "East of Suez" policy, the White House began transmitting dire signals to Canberra as early as 1964 that it intended to make states more responsible for their own security. Concepts such as "creative ambiguity", "limited liability" and "residual responsibility" were used to demonstrate the White House's resolve in this matter. In the spate of a few years, both of Australia's erstwhile allies (the UK and the US) were to indicate, via their "East of Suez" and "Guam Doctrines", that Australia would have to assume more of a burden for Southeast Asian security. Finally, China played a significant, though indirect role during Confrontation. The crystallisation of the "Jakarta-Peking axis", and the rise of the China orientated PKI within the Indonesian archipelago fermented unrest between Australia and Indonesia. Notwithstanding China's inflammatory role, Confrontation was essentially a regional dispute resolved through regional measures. Robert Kennedy noted that the disputants should assume "Asian roles" and devise an "Asian solution" for this "Asian problem". It is notable, that the three great powers of the US, the USSR and China opted to not directly interfere in the dispute.

In line with Australia's motives during the West Irian dispute, Canberra saw Confrontation as primarily a threat to its strategic objectives. Issues such as self-determination were secondary to Australia's primary objective of regional stability and suppression of Chinese

communism. These objectives were threatened by Sukarno's bellicose actions. In order to implement its strategic objectives, Australia sought to enact obligations under the ANZUS Treaty. From a military perspective, Australia did not need US assistance to combat Indonesian insurgency in Malaysia which was contained by British power. In particular, British, Malaysian and Australian forces were more than a match for their poorly trained and disorganised Indonesian counterparts. Notwithstanding this superiority, Australia went to great lengths to solicit US guarantees of support (ostensibly through ANZUS commitments), which was not forthcoming.

As the instigator of Confrontation, Sukarno must bear the brunt of responsibility for its eventual outcome. In as much as the Soviets had accepted the notion of peaceful coexistence, Sukarno denounced such a theory, in turn moving Indonesia into the imperialist arena. The war of independence against the Dutch and the acquisition of West Irian could be seen to be the first phase of Sukarno's revolutionary doctrine. The second external phase, that of World Reorder and the emancipation of all oppressed people, was neatly encapsulated by Confrontation. As a medium to project his message, Sukarno manipulated the idioms of Sukarnoism, NASAKOM and OLDEFOS. Sukarno's security thinking was paradoxical - he claimed that there were no real internal threats and that the real threat lay from external sources, however, this dogma was a mirror image of reality. Unfortunately, rather than facilitating the development of Indonesia's national consciousness, this political extremism only served to divide key factions in the regime's ruling elite. Before long, Sukarno's delicate balancing arrangement imploded because the two competing forces of the PKI and the Army could no longer live together resulting in a wave of violent primordial uprising and ultimately the collapse of the system as a whole.

Sukarno's motives and methods were not unique. In analysing Confrontation and its aftermath, it appears that leaders who rely on ideological imperialism and modernising nationalism as a framework for state development can only sustain state cohesion for a finite time. The long-term survival of a state founded on such principles is problematic. A consequence of adhering to such principles is that states have a predisposition for internal security.

Misperception by both Australia and Indonesia were key dynamics that influenced the way
they acted. Sukarno wrongly believed that a collective of colonial states was seeking to influence Indonesia, whilst Menzies saw Indonesia as bent on regional dominance. This misperception spiral is different to an arms spiral, which by definition has a tangible outcome—the production of offensive and defensive mechanisms. Throughout this dispute, Canberra became more focused on Jakarta’s actions, however, as in the case with West Irian, this strategic gaze was not reciprocated. There was very little outright censure, either in Sukarno’s speeches or from Indonesia’s policy makers, of Australian foreign policy. This point is interesting as it once again highlights the “security contrast” between the two states. Australia did not pose a direct threat to Indonesian security, however, its position within the imperial league militated against its security relationship with Indonesia. Importantly, Australia did not have the political, military or strategic influence to seriously threaten Indonesia’s national interests.

The next chapter will analyse the Australia-Indonesia security relationship during the East Timor dispute of 1974-76. This came after a cataclysmic shift in the security relationship, primarily due to changing dynamics within Indonesia and to a lesser degree Australia.
EAST TIMOR 1975: ACCOMMODATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

After the fall of Sukarno, the New Order ushered in a new approach to Australia-Indonesia relations. At the same time, Australia was undergoing its own transition from old to new with the transfer of power from Menzies to Holt. Despite the stark political contrast between the two neighbours both states now harboured similar threat perceptions; Communist China. This commonality facilitated a reemergence in some elements of “international society”, the development of a security regime and in whole a more cooperative relationship emerged. In 1974, after eight years of gradualist cooperation the security relationship was to be severely tested as a result of the developing crisis in Portuguese Timor.

In the main, Australia’s policy towards East Timor, after the collapse of Portuguese rule, was a subset of its policy towards Indonesia. On the one hand, Canberra perceived that its national interests would be best served through Indonesian incorporation of East Timor. On the other hand, it claimed that the way to achieve this was through a vote of self-determination. Thus, to a degree, the competing tenets of realism and liberal internationalism were at the heart of Australian policy. However, overriding all other considerations, the Whitlam and Fraser governments believed that cooperative relations with Indonesia should take priority.

For Indonesia, the events of 30 September 1965 had stigmatised Sukarno and the political and elite. Blame for the coup was laid solely upon the PKI, who were systemically decimated in a wave of violence arising from the attempted coup d'état. This had a two-fold effect on Indonesiam politics and its foreign policy. Firstly, Suharto’s continued opposition to the PKI legitimised his own authority in the New Order. Second, this opposition had a cascading impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The “Jakarta-Peking” axis was no longer germane, indeed, it was in the interests of the New Order to oppose
China. In turn, Jakarta viewed Chinese communism as a fundamental threat to its national interests.¹

Finally, the international dynamics of these events were significantly different to those of previous case studies. During the Republic’s war for independence Australia was one of many states that sought to influence the final outcome, ultimately playing an active diplomatic role in advancing the nationalist cause (see chapter 2). During the debate over West Irian Australia was very much a peripheral diplomatic actor and Confrontation was principally between Indonesia and Britain, although Australia contributed troops and suffered casualties. However, the East Timor crisis occurred during a unique period of international politics, characterised by US-Soviet détente and American rapprochement with China. As a result of the “Guam Doctrine” and Britain’s “East of Suez” withdrawal, Australia had to assume a greater responsibility for its own security and that of the region. Consequently, one fundamental difference between this dispute and previous security issues was the significant diplomatic role that Australia played during the period 1974-75.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been a large volume of literature written on events in East Timor. To a degree, the media and the Australian public’s fascination over Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and more specifically Australia’s perceived complicity has been an underlying factor contributing to the East Timor debate. Viviani noted that Australian public opinion played a significant role for the Australia-Indonesia relationship, which made it a particularly difficult one for the Australian government to manage.² Within Australia, Dunn,³ Jolliffe⁴ and Taylor⁵ are notable commentators that have researched Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor.

After 1975, a school of thought developed that suggested a “Jakarta Lobby” existed within Australia. Scott Burchill, one of the leading proponents of this theory, asserted that the “Lobby” was ‘an informal group of like minded bureaucrats (DFAT, AUSAID, Defence), intelligence officers (DIO, ONA) as well as journalists and academics, who argued that Indonesia under General Suharto should be judged by a different standard to the one applied to other governments. Burchill identified the foreign editor of the Australian, Greg Sheridan, veteran Indonesian analyst, Bruce Grant, academic, Harold Crouch, Sinologist, Stephen Fitzgerald, former Ambassadors, Richard Woolcott and Rawdon Dalrymple, and journalist, Peter Hartcher as belonging to this “Lobby”.

According to Burchill, their objectives were to protect each state from criticism, to exaggerate Indonesian strategic vulnerability, provide diplomatic protection at the UN and to legitimise military influenced authoritarian regimes. Other commentators indicated that the origins of this “Lobby” could be traced back to a 1975 group of Indonesian specialists at ANU in Canberra.

Nancy Viviani claimed that ‘former Ambassadors to Australia, Shann, Furlonger and Jockel (Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation), Feakes (Head of the Southeast Asia division) and Woolcott (current Ambassador) presented a formidable, experienced elite of high ranking officials all intensely interested in Indonesian policy.’ Specific to East Timor, Viviani claimed that the “Timor Lobby” remained the most vocal expression of Australian opinion on this issue. In 1986, Richard Robison writing in ‘Australian Outlook’ claimed:

The formulation of Australia’s policy towards Indonesia since 1972 has been dominated by elements within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the universities broadly known as the Indonesia lobby.

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8 ibid.
In 1999 journalist Brian Toohey wrote that it was time to rout the "Jakarta Lobby". Amongst other things, he alleged that this group had sided with anti-democratic forces in Indonesia and of being apologists for heinous crimes committed by the TNI.\textsuperscript{12} In the 1999 Senate Inquiry into East Timor, Alan Renouf (former Secretary of DFAT) acknowledged that successive Australian Ambassadors to Indonesia had preferred Whitlam’s approach, but that the major influence on these people was an objective analysis of the situation and was ‘not dominated by a disposition to go along with Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{13} The debate of the existence of a “Jakarta Lobby” was resurrected in a ‘Bulletin’ article in 2004 when an Australian Intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins and the ADF’s appointed Investigating Officer, Captain Martin Toohey, claimed that such a “Lobby” was responsible for Australia’s slow response to the plight of the East Timorese in 1999.

The existence of this “Lobby” has not been universally agreed upon. In 2000, the author conducted interviews with ex-Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Rawdon Dalrymple\textsuperscript{14} (an alleged member of the Lobby) and Alan Behm,\textsuperscript{15} who was instrumental in shaping the ADF’s strategic policy on Indonesia in 1999. Dalrymple claimed the idea that an elite group of commentators and or policy makers conspiring together to influence either Australian public opinion or foreign policy in favour of Indonesia was erroneous. With respect to East Timor he argued that ‘media reporting had been over the top’.\textsuperscript{16} Behm similarly contended that such a “Lobby” did not exist, at least within Defence, and that there had been no appeasement by Australian officials, but rather that the relationship had been ‘carefully managed.’\textsuperscript{17} In the second installment of George Kennan’s memoirs, which depicted his experiences during the heady days of McCarthyism, he described in detail the existence of a “China Lobby” within the US State Department.\textsuperscript{18} His opinion is notable, as it indicates that the debate within Australia may not have been a domestic

\textsuperscript{12} Toohey B, \textit{The West Australian}, 27 September 1999.
\textsuperscript{14} Dalrymple R, personal interview, 22 February 2000.
\textsuperscript{15} Behm A, phone interview, 24 February 2000.
\textsuperscript{16} Dalrymple R, personal interview, 22 February 2000.
\textsuperscript{17} Behm A, phone interview, 24 February 2000.
political aberration, but rather indicative of Western (liberal democratic) sensitivity associated with the development of a state's foreign policy.

Whilst the conspiratorial element of the "Jakarta Lobby" is difficult to justify, there is little doubt that Australia's policymakers were sympathetic to the expansion of the bilateral relationship and thus saw this as more important than self-determination for the East Timorese. Evans and Keating's expression of the importance of Indonesia and the need to develop better ties and more "ballast" is fundamental to this debate. Michale E Salla summarised the East Timor issue by concluding that it had been driven by pragmatic assessments by key decision makers in DFAT. To that end, the "Lobby" can be seen in a different light; as a like minded group of bureaucrats who espoused the political notions of realism or rationalism. If this is the case, then the "Lobby" should be understood as a normal phenomenon in international relations. Whilst the preceding discussion has made much of the "Lobby", its importance should not be overestimated. Even accounting for the disparate range of people who have been accused of being part of this "Lobby" no organizational structure existed within this group. In effect, the "Lobby", if it did exist, was an incoherent voice which echoed the personal views of a number of individuals.

Another viewpoint of the ongoing debate over East Timor comes from a set of writings by Australian political actors. Gareth Evans summed up his pragmatic role when he declared, 'there was little or nothing any Australian government could have done at the time.' In Whitlam's 1985 autobiography, he insisted that 'Australia took every opportunity to help with Timor's political development.' Woolcott is another that has staunchly defended his advice to the Australian government in 1975. Similarly, Malcolm Fraser stands by his government's actions, in particular, during the lead up to Indonesia's invasion in December 1975. He commented to the author that his government had neither the flexibility nor latitude with respect to East Timor (during the Indonesian invasion), as the Liberals were


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in caretaker mode and thus could not change the policies of the previous Whitlam government.\textsuperscript{24}

In 1999, the Australian government established a Senate Inquiry into East Timor, further fueling the debate.\textsuperscript{25} Discussions with Gough Whitlam's personal advisers indicated that this inquiry was commissioned to 'set the record straight' on East Timor.\textsuperscript{26} In 2000, DFAT made the exceptional decision to release archival documents from 1974-1976 early (published as \textit{Australia and the Indonesian incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976}\textsuperscript{27}) in order to satisfy public curiosity over East Timor.

Within Indonesia, acute sensitivity over its incorporation of East Timor effectively stymied any reasonable debate within the archipelago. There has been no release of archival documents in Indonesia, nor has there been any form of judicial or legislative inquiry. In Suharto's 500 page autobiography,\textsuperscript{28} he made only a fleeting reference to East Timor (1 page). Finally, the New Order's interpretation of the events of 1975, as published in its document \textit{East Timor after Integration},\textsuperscript{29} is narrow and self-serving.

\textsuperscript{24} Fraser M, email, 20 August 2003.
\textsuperscript{26} Whitlam G, telephone conversation with personal assistant, 10 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{28} Soeharto, 1991, Soeharto, my thoughts, words and deeds: an autobiography, Pt Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{East Timor After Integration}, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia.
INTERSTATE SECURITY LINKAGES

During the debate over East Timor, six states/blocs were influential in the final outcome: the US, ASEAN, the USSR, China, Australia and Indonesia. This issue was unique in that Indonesia was not opposed by any state, except in a mild and ambiguous way by Australia’s opposition to its incorporation by force. Portugal’s indifference and preoccupation with its own domestic issues effectively divorced it from the diplomatic debate. Finally, the East Timorese were denied a voice during the deliberations and the UN’s role was limited. This left Indonesia relatively unconstrained in its actions; Diagram 1 represents the linkages between the six.

Diagram 1: Interstate Security Relationships

--- conflictual relationships
— cooperative relationships

United States

Australia

Indonesia

USSR

ASEAN

China

The coup and counter coup of 30 September 1965 opened the door for closer relations with the Indonesian state. After the PKI had been uprooted and with Suharto’s New Order establishing itself, the US came to the view that Indonesia, whilst non-aligned, was pro-
Washington. In 1969, the US National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, briefed Nixon on his impending call on Suharto; coincidentally at the same time that the West Irian “Act of Free Choice” was occurring. Kissinger perceived Indonesia’s security interests as similar to America’s, which entailed playing a role to ‘counter Chinese power in Asia after Vietnam.’

In parallel, President Nixon had come to the realisation that the Vietnam War could not be won – thus he embarked upon a program of military withdrawal. In July the same year, Nixon declared his much-famed “Guam Doctrine,” which dictated that US foreign policy was to ‘tailor American commitments to American interests and not the other way around.’ Simultaneously, Washington’s policy towards China was undergoing a metamorphosis that concluded with the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Peking. Globally, the United States moved towards détente with the Soviets entering into a range of agreements including strategic arms reduction, commercial trade and the settlement of post war Eastern Europe at Helsinki. Coupled together and underpinned by its defeat in Vietnam, the US acknowledged the limits of its power and began moving away from the strategic policies of confrontation and containment. Arising from this newfound policy was a commitment that ‘it would never again become involved in a land war in Asia’. This commitment became a major driver in US foreign policy towards Indonesia and its incorporation of East Timor.

On 12 August 1975, at the US State Department’s Secretary’s Principal and Regional Staff Meeting, Kissinger agreed that the US should express no public opinion over reports of a coup in Portuguese Timor. Kissinger concluded that ‘it is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later. But in any event the

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32 ibid, p 163.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Meaney N, 1977, op cit, p 163.
36 The Secretary’s Principal’s and Regional Staff Meeting, August 12 1975. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/ dated 2 September 2003.
important thing is that we should not get ourselves sucked into this one by having opinions.\textsuperscript{37}

On the 21 November 1975, a US State Department briefing paper on East Timor stated inter alia:

We have taken the position that the USA should eschew involvement in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the Indonesian, Portuguese, Australians and the Timorese themselves.\textsuperscript{38}

On 5 December 1975 whilst in Beijing, President Ford received information that Indonesia had plans to invade East Timor.\textsuperscript{39} The next day, during bilateral Indonesian/US discussions Suharto informed the US President that Indonesia was preparing to take drastic and immediate action toward East Timor.\textsuperscript{40} Ford and Kissinger’s response was to request that the invasion be delayed until their return to the US;\textsuperscript{41} Indonesia invaded the following day. Publicly, US response was mute. Abiding by its principle of distancing itself from Southeast Asian regional engagements, coupled with its awareness of its own strategic/military limitations and in conjunction with Kissinger’s penchant for realist solutions the US quietly accepted Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor.

Whilst publicly its response was low key, behind the scenes the US lobbied not to internationalise the issue – thus risk it being embroiled in another Asian dispute. In his 1978 memoirs, the US United Nations Ambassador, Daniel Moynihan, explained:

The US wished things to turn out as they did and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever

\textsuperscript{37} ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Conversation between Suharto and Ford in Jakarta, 6 December 1975, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv dated 2 September 2003.
\textsuperscript{41} ibid.
measures it undertook. The task was given to me and I carried it forward with considerable success.42

Another reason cited for Washington’s decision to accept Indonesian incorporation was East Timor’s location near the strategic deep water Ombai-Wetar straits. Taylor’s book on East Timor argued that American interests lay in the straits to East Timor’s north, which facilitated the passage of its nuclear submarines.43 Taylor concluded by declaring ‘paramount in American security interests was the use of the Ombai-Wetar straits.’44 This argument appeared in a number of newspapers and political commentaries in 1975 and in 1976.45 In 1999, the Australian Senate debated this point. The Inquiry stated inter alia:

The State Department had also been alerted to the importance of the deepwater straits between Timor and Wetar for unimpeded submarine passage between the Pacific and Indian oceans.46

The author has not been able to verify the veracity of the Ombai-Wetar claim. No official US document cites this reason for America’s decision. However, this is understandable as this point would fall under the umbrella of national security consideration and thus would be constrained under the 50-year embargo rule.

44 ibid, p 74.
45 McCquire M, The geopolitical importance of strategic waterways in the Asian Pacific region, Orbis, vol 19, no 3, Fall 1975, pp 1058-76; Richardson M, Jakarta rules the way: why Indonesia good will is vital to American’s Indian Ocean submarine force, The Age, 4 August 1976, as cited in Australia Senate Inquiry into East Timor 1999, Australia Parliament House, Canberra, p 136.

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ASEAN

On 8 August 1967 ASEAN was established comprising: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Amongst other things, ASEAN was seen as a vehicle through which regional order could prevail without the intrusion of foreign powers such as the Soviet Union.\(^{47}\) One of the guiding principles of ASEAN was its belief in the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Generally, ASEAN states accepted East Timor’s incorporation as inevitable.\(^{48}\) This was a manifestation of their fear over the spread of communism, specific concerns over Vietnam and Cambodia and a deference to Indonesia’s standing within the regional community. As with Australia, the fractious relations between Indonesia and some of the ASEAN states during Sukarno’s era played heavily on the minds of ASEAN politicians.

On 2 September 1975 the Australian Foreign Affairs Department reported that the ‘Malaysian government believed that in the long term interests of the area the best solution is for Portuguese Timor to merge with Indonesia.’\(^{49}\) During discussions between Whitlam and Tun Abdul Razak in October 1975, the Malaysian Prime Minister stated that an independent East Timor would not be viable and that he sympathised with Suharto.\(^{50}\) In a submission to Peacock in November 1975 it was deduced that ‘the other ASEAN countries also attach great importance to the views of Indonesia.’\(^{51}\) Whitlam claimed that both Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, would have nothing to do with East Timor.\(^{52}\) In a cablegram to Canberra in March 1975 the Malaysian Ambassador to Australia was quoted as saying that ‘Malaysia’s


relations with Indonesia were far more important to it than what happened in Portuguese Timor.\textsuperscript{53}

ASEAN’s muted response and support for Indonesia was not surprising. Singapore and Thailand initially abstained, whilst the Philippines and Malaysia had their own issues of insurgency to deal with. The Philippines had problems with the suppression of Muslim dissidents in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, whilst, Malaysia saw Brunei as a possible replication of the Timor problem. In July 1975, Australian diplomatic reporting indicated that Portuguese Timor was becoming a taboo subject amongst the ASEAN states.\textsuperscript{54} In James Cotton’s examination of East Timor, he observed that ASEAN states always voted with Indonesia\textsuperscript{55} and thus displayed a lack of interest in this issue.\textsuperscript{56} This may miss the point, as ASEAN’s deference to Indonesia over East Timor should not be interpreted as indifference, but rather in demonstrating solidarity over a security challenge which rivalled Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.

USSR

The Soviet Union’s relations with Indonesia suffered after G30S\textsuperscript{57}. During the communist purges of 1966-68 Moscow hoped that anti-PKI sentiment could be prevented from developing into a generalised sentiment of anti-communism.\textsuperscript{58} However, by April 1967, a downgrading of relations with Indonesia was apparent. The slogans of May Day 1967 included only ‘friendly greetings to the workers of Indonesia’ as compared with those of October 1965 which had ‘warm greetings to the great Indonesia people.’\textsuperscript{59} This divergence was further highlighted in the USSR’s 24\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress of 1971, where fifteen Asian

\textsuperscript{55} Except for Singapore which abstained in the UNGA votes of 1975 and 1976.
\textsuperscript{57} G30S is an abbreviation for GESTAPU of 30 September 1965, often used in Indonesian parlance to describe the coup/countercoup.
\textsuperscript{59} Moscow Radio, 17-18 April 1967.
countries were mentioned but not a single word was said about Indonesia. As a consequence, the Soviet Union was not an active diplomatic participant in the East Timor dispute, though, its voting throughout the United Nations series of resolutions from 1975-1982 indicated Moscow's dissatisfaction with Indonesia's actions.

China

Akin to the Soviets, China's relations with Indonesia were severely setback after Gestapu. In 1965, at the apex of the relationship, the much-famed "Asian axis" of Peking and Jakarta appeared inevitable. In September 1965, the Chinese Defence Minister Lin Piao's manifesto on Peoples War spoke of "encircling" the world industrial powers by revolution throughout the Third World. The nexus between Sukarno's revolution and Lin Piao's manifesto was strikingly obvious. However, the domestic upheaval following the coup and counter coup cascaded into the international arena. The New Order's relations with Peking were "frozen" and remained so up to and beyond the East Timor dispute. In 1975 China remained relatively quiet, however, during the subsequent United Nations General Assembly voting on East Timor China consistently (with one exception) voted against Indonesia.

AUSTRALIA'S MOTIVATION

During the 1960s and early 1970s, before the crisis in Portuguese colonialism, Canberra determined that it was logical for Portuguese Timor, at some stage, to become part of Indonesia. In 1974, the Department of Foreign Affairs saw an independent East Timor as

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61 From 1975-1982 at the UNGA the USSR consistently voted against Indonesia, though this vote should not be seen as support for East Timor independence but rather as a function of Indonesia's swing to the Western orbit. East Timor and the International Community, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume 10, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
potentially politically unstable.\textsuperscript{65} However, this did not imply that Australia feared Chinese intervention – as it had feared during both the West Irian and Confrontation disputes. Renouf claimed that 'from our experience with China we doubted that China would wish to make mischief in Portuguese Timor.'\textsuperscript{66} Far more pressing was the desire within the Department to maintain good relations with Indonesia. On 2 September 1974, the Department stated:

You could conclude by saying that Portuguese Timor should not become an obstacle to good relations between Australia and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{67}

This view was emphasised in December 1974, when a Foreign Affairs briefing paper concluded:

Our main objective should be to try to prevent Portuguese Timor from becoming an obstacle to good relations between Australia and Indonesia and to prevent disappointments over Portuguese Timor from turning the Indonesians away from the highly responsible regional policies they have followed since Sukarno's downfall.\textsuperscript{68}

As early as 1974, a DFAT submission to Willesee concluded that 'our preference is for the association of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia and self-determination.'\textsuperscript{69}

As the events of East Timor reached a crescendo in 1975, Canberra became increasingly concerned that the issue could develop into a running sore between the two states.\textsuperscript{70} The primary concern of the Australian government was the preservation and promotion of the

close and mutually advantageous relationship between the two countries. Australia's position of non-involvement was further entrenched in April 1975 when Woolcott assumed the role as Ambassador to Indonesia. In one of his first cablegrams back to Australia, he emphasised the 'long term importance of the Australia/Indonesia relationship' and concluded 'my own belief is that we should seek to disengage ourselves as much as possible from the Portuguese Timor situation.' Australia's position and desire for good relations with Indonesia can be illustrated by the following extracts of Canberra/Jakarta cablegrams:

(Jun 75) In the event of the use of force by Indonesia as far as possible I would see Australian interests as being able to modify Australian opposition as far as possible and to minimize the impact on the long term need for a close and secure relationship with Indonesia... (July 75) Australia should remain as uninvolved as possible... (Aug 75) the Australian government does not regard itself as a party principal in Portuguese Timor... (Sep 75) It is now highly unlikely there will ever be a proper act of determination in East Timor... Is it not time we accepted the likelihood that sooner or later one way or another East Timor is destined to be part of Indonesia... (Oct 75) All countries to a greater or lesser extent subjugate their principles at times to these factors.

After the invasion of 7 December 1975, DFAT accepted 'that incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was becoming an established fact and that Australia should not resist this trend.'

73 ibid.
Notwithstanding the government’s desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia, on 12 December 1975, Australia voted in support of a resolution at the UNGA which deplored Indonesian intervention in Timor. Of significance, Australia voted without the benefit of its Atlantic allies or other ASEAN states (except Singapore). Indonesia’s displeasure at Australia’s actions was voiced by Adam Malik who accused Australia of helping Fretillan send small arms to Timor.\(^{80}\) Nancy Viviani noted that Australia’s action at the UN was, in part, a response to ‘strong public attention and involvement.’\(^{81}\) Once Australia made this symbolic gesture, it quickly went to significant lengths to ensure that any damage that might have been done was repaired.

In 1976, the Australian Department of Defence still believed that Australia’s policy would be best served through disengagement.\(^{82}\) It stated that ‘Australia’s interests lay in hastening not obstructing the spread of Indonesian control.’\(^{83}\) On 14 October 1976, Fraser claimed the need for ‘good relations with Indonesia in the interest of peace and stability in the region.’\(^{84}\) In essence, the Liberal government’s policy towards East Timor mirrored that of its predecessor the Labor government.

The above-cited information from 1974-76 illustrates that a range of forces within the bureaucracy influenced Australian policymaking. Woolcott, the Secretary for the Prime Minister’s Department, Sir John Bunting, the Secretary of the Defence Department, Sir Arthur Tange, the Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Frederick Wheeler and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, were all unanimous that Australia’s interests would be best served through Indonesian incorporation of East Timor.\(^{85}\)

Offsetting this approach was Whitlam’s proposal for East Timorese self-determination – which his government stipulated would be acceptable if it was both genuine and had an

\(^{80}\) The Age, 17 December 1975.


\(^{84}\) The Canberra Times, 15 October 1976.
international mandate. This is a typically Wilsonian approach to the same problem. However, whilst Whitlam’s preference was for a ‘voluntary union’, Canberra made no further efforts to progress self-determination, though, it did emphasise to Jakarta that it would not condone the use of force. This is an important point, which can be contrasted to the West Irian dispute. During the early 1960s, as Sukarno’s rhetoric become more belligerent and his actions more militant, Canberra feared that an outbreak in hostility would promote regional disorder, even worse it might lead to the intervention by foreign powers (non Western); accordingly Australia modified its previous hard line stance. In 1975, Whitlam echoing the opinion of Caucus was mindful that whilst its preference was for Indonesia not to use force, it would not interfere in this process if Indonesia so decided. The origin of this quest for good relations was in part due to Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine”. Neville Meaney commented that “this made a considerable impact on Australia’s policy makers.” He noted that after Nixon’s 1969 speech, ‘there was a marked increase in Australian diplomatic activity in the region’ – in particular to Singapore and Indonesia. Writing in 1975, Nancy Viviani stated, ‘the maintenance of the bilateral relationship is the paramount consideration in policy even when Australian and Indonesian interests are in direct conflict.’ She went on to conclude:

Because of Indonesia’s capacity to disturb or enhance the regional balance of power, because Indonesia can facilitate or check Australia’s entrée to regional political forums and because great power interests in Indonesia, Australia diplomats have been loath to offend Indonesia by too forceful a statement.

87 ibid.
88 ibid, p 122.
89 ibid, p 123.
91 ibid, p 176.
93 ibid.
In essence, this meant that setbacks would disproportionately hurt Australia more than Indonesia.93

Arguably, one of the by-products of the "Guam Doctrine" was paranoia in some Australian circles of the denouement over ANZUS. The Australian government was disturbed by this new limitation on US commitments to the region.94 American foreign policy had developed a sense of maturity in that ideology, containment and confrontation were no longer the driving forces that they had previously been, and ipso facto, Australian foreign policy was forced to adopt this new-found approach. In 1973, Whitlam commented that one of the lessons arising from Vietnam was that a balance had to be struck between 'a nation's commitments and a nation's power.'95 At the same conference, he claimed, "the importance of Indonesia to Australia is indisputable."96 In his submission to the 1999 Senate Inquiry into East Timor, Gareth Evans stated, "there was nothing as the Indonesians well knew, that Australia could credibly have done to back its word with action – there was no public mood, after Vietnam, for involvement in another Asian imbroglio and the United States was anything but supportive of throwing the gauntlet down to Jakarta."97

It appears the turning points in Indonesia's decision making over a military style incorporation of East Timor occurred during the talks between Whitlam and Suharto in Townsville from 3-5 April 1975 and after Whitlam's downfall on 11 November 1975. Indonesia's consternation with an unstable Vietnam and the geographic reality that another communist hub now existed relatively close to its borders began to influence Jakarta's foreign policy. In April 1975, the Indonesian delegation claimed:

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93 ibid.
96 ibid. p 5.
Neither Thailand nor Indonesia had the necessary national resilience to withstand a serious challenge. Indonesia had based its strategic assessments and its national economic planning on the assumption of 20 years of divided Indo China.\(^98\)

Minutes of the meeting recorded, ‘Indonesia had concluded that integration with Indonesia was the best solution’\(^99\). In response, Whitlam affirmed “that Australia did not want to be seen as having a primary responsibility for the outcome in Portuguese Timor.”\(^100\) Furthermore, Whitlam stated, ‘he strongly desired closer and more cordial relations with Indonesia and would ensure that our actions in regard to Portuguese Timor would always be guided by the principle that good relations with Indonesia were of paramount importance to Australia.’\(^101\)

The 1999 Senate Inquiry determined that ‘after the meeting between Prime Minister Whitlam and Suharto in Townsville it become clear that Indonesia was bent on incorporation and had secured Portuguese acquiescence to this.’\(^102\) Suharto’s visit to Australia in 1975 had parallels with Subandrio’s 1959 visit during the West Irian dispute. In 1959, as Indonesia’s policy on West Irian was moving from diplomacy to militancy, Subandrio was sent to Canberra to gauge Australia’s attitude towards Indonesia’s actions. The culmination of that visit was the Joint Communiqué – which signalled that Australia would not oppose Indonesia’s incorporation of West Irian. Suharto’s visit in 1975 can be seen in the same light. Until 1975, Suharto had informed the Portuguese that Indonesia harboured no intentions of colonising East Timor.\(^103\) As the events of 1975 unfolded Suharto was cognisant of international opinion.

During the lead up to November 1975, Whitlam had made it clear that Australia was opposed to the use of force, but, the political events of 11 November 1975 facilitated Suharto’s “solution” for East Timor. With Whitlam and his government out of office,
Suharto was no longer bound by the ambiguous pledges that he had previously given to Canberra. In Whitlam's autobiography, he concluded that from 11 November 1975, 'any action of Jakarta under the rubric of anti-communism would neutralise any previous undertakings that he made to the Whitlam government.'\textsuperscript{104} Just two days after the fall of the Whitlam government, Renouf submitted a brief to Peacock about Australia's relations with Indonesia over Portuguese Timor. This brief stated inter alia:

Hitherto, there have been two strands in the Australia government policy on Portuguese Timor: (a) a recognition that the territory was part of the Indonesia world and would best be incorporated in Indonesia, provided (b) this could be achieved in accordance with the right of the people of the territory to decide their own political future. The Australia government's relations with Indonesia would no doubt improve – at least in the short term – if the government were now publicly to concentrate on strand (a) in the existing policy and exclude strand (b). Such a step would, in effect, represent a new policy toward Portuguese Timor. It would encourage the Indonesians in their military plans.\textsuperscript{105}

In effect, Renouf was presenting an option for the Fraser government, one that would pave the way for better relations with Indonesia. Seven days later the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs cabled Woolcott with the following message:

The Prime Minister wants you to say that he recognises the need for Indonesia to have an appropriate solution of the problem of Portuguese Timor.\textsuperscript{106}

The cable also made it clear that the interim government 'would not, repeat not receive Ramos Horta.'\textsuperscript{107} Shortly after, on 7 December 1975, Indonesia invaded Dili.

To sum up, Australian foreign policy was being driven by a range of competing forces. In order to accommodate some of the more liberal aspects, the government adopted a policy

\textsuperscript{104} Whitlam G, 1985, \textit{op cit}, p 111
\textsuperscript{105} Submission to Peacock 13 November, Relations with Indonesia: Portuguese Timor, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 567.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
of ‘detachment.’ This entailed Australia ‘remaining as uninvolved as possible.’ Woolcott’s advice, which was subsequently adopted by Whitlam, included inter alia:

I would suggest that our policies should be based on disengaging ourselves as far as possible from the Timor question; getting Australians presently there out of Timor; leave events to take their course; and if and when Indonesia does intervene act in a way which would be designed to minimise the public impact in Australia and show privately understanding to Indonesia of the problems.

By choosing this detached option, Canberra hoped not to be seen as complicit in Indonesia’s actions and in effect it could maintain a degree of liberal credibility in the international and domestic community.

INDONESIA’S MOTIVATION

In 1974, Jakarta saw a weak and independent East Timor as ripe for communist insurgency, which in turn could destabilise the Indonesian archipelago. Jakarta’s policy makers were quoted as saying that an independent East Timor was a ‘communist beachhead in Indonesia’s belly.’ Ironically, the fear of communism, which had so dramatically influenced Australia’s policy during the West Irian and Confrontation disputes, was now the guiding dogma that influenced Jakarta’s decisions.

As early as July 1974, Harry Tjan of the Jakarta Centre for Strategic and International Studies, stressed that an independent Timor ‘would scarcely be viable.’ On 2 September 1974, Suharto informed Australian officials that he did not want ‘to introduce a weak and

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111 Dispatch to Willessee, 2 June 1975, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, _op cit_, p 266.
impoverished state into the region, which would be a tempting client for China.\footnote{Letter from l’urlonger to Whitlam, 2 September 1974 as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 94.} On 6 September 1974, Suharto declared that, ‘there was a big danger that a communist country, China or the Soviet Union, might gain the opportunity to intervene.’\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 95.} Suharto further elaborated on this concept. He claimed that ‘the right to protect oneself from threats was a moral basic right’\footnote{ibid.} and that ‘Indonesia saw independent Portuguese Timor as a certain threat to her own security and therefore would not allow it.’\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 95} Thus, from the earliest phases of the dispute, Indonesia had linked the threat of communism to an independent East Timor.

In parallel, there were a growing number of unofficial reports emanating from Jakarta, which implied the Chinese government intended to manipulate the issue. In September 1974, an Indonesian newspaper report claimed that members of the banned PKI were seeking shelter in East Timor.\footnote{R Muntu, \textit{Tiny Timor sets a Problem, The Sarawak Tribune, Kuching, September 7 1974.}} Simultaneously, the Army reported that Chinese communists (PRC) in Dili were collaborating with Fretilin in organising anti-Indonesia rallies.\footnote{Justus M van der Kroef, \textit{Indonesia and East Timor: The Politics of Phased Annexation, ‘Solidarity’, September-December 1976, Volume X Nos 5-6, Manila, p 20.}

During the Yogyakarta talks of September 1974, Suharto told Whitlam that there was a danger that communist countries like China or the USSR might intervene.\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 95} On 29 October 1974, Djajadiningrat, from Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, briefed Renouf that Indonesia had evidence that Chinese communist influence was on the increase in East Timor. Furthermore, he cited Malaysia’s dilemma where a large indigenous Chinese population could ferment unrest without the external assistance of China.\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 97} It was perceived by some in the Indonesian military that the Chinese business community in

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\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 95.}
\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 95}
\footnote{R Muntu, \textit{Tiny Timor sets a Problem, The Sarawak Tribune, Kuching, September 7 1974.}}
\footnote{Record of meeting with Whitlam and Suharto, 6 September 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, \textit{op cit}, p 97.}
Portuguese Timor was a potential ally of Peking - which would assist in the infiltration into Indonesia.\textsuperscript{121} In February 1975, the Golkar sponsored newspaper *Antara* stated that a 'hate Indonesia campaign' was beginning to intensify in East Timor.\textsuperscript{122} This campaign aimed to impose 'total Communism on the 600,000 people in East Timor.'\textsuperscript{123}

In early March 1975, the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Hcr Tasning, explained to Whitlam that the 'presence of the Chinese was one reason for Indonesia's fear of external Chinese inspired subversion.'\textsuperscript{124} This view was reflected in cablegrams from Australia's embassy in Jakarta. On 10 March 1975, the Embassy explained:

> Ever present in the back of the minds of the many senior Indonesians was the belief that communism had taken over in Indo China and would soon threaten Thailand and Malaysia. If the communists were to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia the world balance would be upset not just the balance in the region.\textsuperscript{125}

Other Indonesian fears included the possibility that East Timor would end up being "another Cuba."\textsuperscript{126} During the same month, the Indonesian Armed Forces newspaper *Angkatan Bersenjata*, published an editorial charging that a program of 'communisation and a hate Indonesia campaign' was underway in East Timor.\textsuperscript{127} The editorial argued that 'we need to eliminate the source of danger for the sake of the security of our country.'\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{120} Record of Australia Indonesia talks, 29 October 1974, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, *op cit*, p 130.
\textsuperscript{121} Cablegram to Canberra, 10 July 1975, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, *op cit*, p 290.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Record of conversation between Tjan and Taylor, 10 March 1975, as cited in, Way W & Browne D & Johnson V (eds), 2000, *op cit*, p 220.
\textsuperscript{127} Justus M van der Kroef, 1976, *op cit*, p 20
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
In July 1975, Suharto briefed President Ford that 'those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those which are almost communists.' A CIA cablegram of 8 September 1975, expressed the view that 'Suharto would prefer military action because he has an overwhelming fear of communist subversion in Indonesia.' Even Whitlam acknowledged that the Indonesians were obsessed by the 'possibility of communism.' On 6 December 1975, Suharto conducted bilateral talks with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. Suharto told Ford that military actions in East Timor were imminent and requested US understanding. Ford responded as such:

We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have.

For Indonesia, the East Timor crisis was notable for the lack of external state involvement, indeed because of this, Jakarta was given a free hand to resolve the dispute through force. Its actions throughout the 1974-75 period were premised on a fear that a weak East Timor could become a client state for China. Whilst this view was rejected by Australia and indeed it appears that China had little interest in the island, this perspective, however misguided, dominated Indonesia's political elite, academics, diplomatic core, Armed Forces, media and the bureaucracy.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Australia's approach to the East Timor issue reflected the importance that Canberra placed on good relations with its northern neighbour. Indicative of this was Cotton's observation that 'East Timor has been the largest influence on the subsequent Canberra-Jakarta relations.' The fact that Australia and Indonesia were able to resolve the issue amicably

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133 ibid.

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demonstrated that the relationship had progressed from conflict to cooperation – and arguably signalled a renaissance in “international society” between the two states. I use the word arguably because many would contend that Australia’s policy of sacrificing the welfare of a smaller state for the more important motive of stabilising relations with a larger state are realist in nature. Indeed Woolcott (whom I refer to later as embodying some rationalist traits) is often seen as symbolizing the archetypal realist. These points should not be discounted and there is no doubt that on a sliding scale from realism to liberalism, Australia’s policy in 1975 lay closer to the Machiavellian edge. The theme of the forthcoming discussion is that compared to the 1950s and 1960s Australia’s position toward Indonesia had shifted significantly. Furthermore, whilst Australia’s policy toward the East Timorese was enmeshed in Realpolitik, its policy toward Indonesia had moved from enmity to amity. Purely realist states see the world through a prism of mistrust and accordingly adopt a zero sum approach to geopolitics. Australia’s significant military aid program to Indonesia throughout this era is not consistent with Realpolitik. As a way of capturing and explaining this shift through an IR prism Bull’s thesis of “society” is a useful comparative tool.

From Indonesia’s side, the reason for this progression had its roots in the immediate post Sukarno era, when the New Order was implementing a transition from a revolutionary “left” leaning regime to a technocratic Western aligned government. Similarly, from Australia’s perspective, it was wary about the relationship regressing back to the days of Sukarno. Hence, it went to great lengths to foster cordial relations with its neighbour. In that respect, Australia’s vote against Indonesia in the UNGA in December 1975 was a mere aberration in the developing cooperative nature of the relationship.

The Evolution of “International Society” and the Impact of East Timor

Within Indonesia, the changes after 30 September 1965 were momentous. The ensuing social revolution in Indonesia after G30S saw the PKI uprooted – where an estimated 750,000 members or affiliates were killed and up to three million alleged members of the communist party were outlawed, imprisoned, or tortured. The New Order viewed the West as the only source of redemption for its ailing economy, thus, it rapidly shifted its political leaning from left of centre to right of centre. This Western political inclination
did not represent a movement towards Parliamentary Democracy. In 1969, the New Order merged hundreds of disparate functional groups together into a single entity – Golkar. As Mochtar Pabottingi noted, Golkar was the child of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.\textsuperscript{135} Sukarno’s Guided Democracy had not been swept away inasmuch as the “Guides” had now changed. Notwithstanding Jakarta’s political swing towards the West, it would be erroneous to conclude that Indonesia feared a monolithic communist movement. Suharto was acutely cognisant of the difference between communism, the Soviet Union and China. In 1975, he explained to the US President that ‘the Soviet Union and the Chinese don’t work together - they are competing to expand their own individual influence in the region.’\textsuperscript{136} Jakarta perceived China as the principal source of external threat.\textsuperscript{137} Further, Indonesia did not fear a direct military attack from China, rather, Suharto entertained his own version of the Domino Theory. This theory was founded on the assumption that subversion and insurgency\textsuperscript{138} in peripheral states would erode Indonesia’s outer defence perimeter.\textsuperscript{139} Consequently, when the political order in East Timor began to crumble, Indonesia believed that this erosion could spread from the fringe of the region to the core (Java). Ironically, Jakarta had developed its own form of the “perimeter defence concept”.

Assisting the development of bilateral cooperation was the fact that, Gorton (1968), McMahon (1972) and Whitlam (1973 and 1974) visited Indonesia, whilst Suharto made a reciprocal trip in 1972 and 1975. After Suharto’s 1972 visit an institution of annual consultations was announced.\textsuperscript{140} Aid to Indonesia increased significantly during this period - Australia’s contribution to the entire Southeast Asian region in 1974 totalled $36.9 million of which Indonesia was allocated $21.2 million.\textsuperscript{141} As part of the “washup” to Suharto’s visit a joint communiqué was issued. In recognition of this dispatch, the

\textsuperscript{135} Mochtar Pabottingi, in Alagappa M, 1995, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The moral quest for authority, Stanford University, California, p 248.


\textsuperscript{137} Leifer M, 1983, op cit, p 130.

\textsuperscript{138} ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} ibid, p 132.


\textsuperscript{141} ibid, p 287.
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigel Bowen, noted that ‘the communiqué made clear the special relationship that exists between Australia and Indonesia across a broad range of political, economic and security interests.\textsuperscript{142}

On 9 October 1972, Australia and Indonesia signed a seabed boundary agreement and on 12 February 1973 another was signed delineating the boundary between Papua New Guinea and West Irian.\textsuperscript{143} In late 1972, the progressive Whitlam government ended 23 years of conservative Liberal Party rule. Whitlam’s long established affinity for Indonesia and his pragmatic approach to international relations became the hallmark of Australian foreign policy. This was strikingly demonstrated by Australia’s recognition of China in 1972 - as Wilson observed the ‘China threat’ evaporated quickly once this crucial step had been taken.\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, since Gestapu and the downfall of the Old Order, successive Australian governments viewed the New Order as a regime that was aligned to Australian national interests. Whitlam’s 1973 strategic objectives were indicative of Australia’s newfound approach to Indonesia. In a speech to the Australian Institute of Political Science in Canberra, Whitlam stipulated that Labor’s priorities were: national security, security of PNG, closer relations with Indonesia and a peaceful neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{145} Thus, whilst there had been a divergence in the security relationship between the two states during the Old Order, the New Order represented a “convergence of interests”:

Australia’s desire to maintain cooperative relations with its northern neighbour, its continuing development of an “international society” with Indonesia and its strategic objective of a peaceful neighbourhood can be linked to Canberra’s perennial “perimeter defence concept”. In Dunn’s research of the East Timor problem, he concluded that Whitlam’s fear of the Balkanisation of Asia in general and Indonesia in particular were motivating forces behind his decisions.\textsuperscript{146} East Timorese independence and ipso facto having an unstable and fragile independent state close to Australia would violate this

\textsuperscript{142} Bowen, N, statement to Parliament 9 May 1972, as listed in Clark C, Australia Foreign Policy Towards a Reassessment, Cassell, Sydney, p 182.

\textsuperscript{143} ibid.


\textsuperscript{145} Whitlam G, Address on 27 January 1973, in opening the Australia Institute of Political Science In Canberra, as listed in Clark C, Australia Foreign Policy Towards a Reassessment, Cassell, Sydney, p 172.

\textsuperscript{146} Dunn J, 1983, op cit, p 150.
perimeter concept. By 1974, Canberra and Jakarta had worked hard to improve their security relationship. This ascendancy was based on an understanding of mutual respect for each other’s domestic and foreign policies. The adjustments in the domestic situation in both states removed a major source of threat to cooperative Australia-Indonesia relations.\(^{147}\) Hence, bureaucrats from both sides of the Arafura Sea were careful not to jeopardise the security relationship and consequently plunge both states back to the days of the Old Order.

**Order and Justice**

During the period 1974-75, both Australia and Indonesia justified their policies on the need to preserve regional “order”. In 1974 the Australian embassy in Jakarta expressed its opinion that no one wanted to ‘coexist’ with a new neighbour for the indefinite future.\(^{148}\) After the Indonesian invasion of 1975, the Fraser government, in part, based its policy around the notion of good relations in the interest of ‘peace and stability in the region.’\(^{149}\) Similarly, Indonesia used equivalent rationale to justify its actions in East Timor. Jakarta claimed that an unstable East Timor could lead to regional disorder and thus Indonesia’s focus lay in ‘peace and stability of Timor.’\(^{150}\)

This notion of “order” is a fundamental argument in the theory of rationalism and specifically of Bull’s “international society”. Bull’s logic was that justice (in some of its various manifestations) was incompatible with order. He wrote that “there is an inherent tension between order provided by the system and society of states and the various aspirations of justice.”\(^{151}\) With specific reference to international justice he observed that “all nations are equally entitled to the rights of national self-determination.”\(^{152}\) He elaborated on this theme by commenting that “international society is not basically


\(^{149}\) *The Canberra Times*, 15 October 1976.

\(^{150}\) East Timor and the International Community, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume 10, p 63

unfriendly to notions of international justice.\textsuperscript{153} Bull was making the point that individual justice and world justice are outside the boundaries of order, but, international justice can coexist with order and forms part of his “international society”.\textsuperscript{154}

At first sight, the East Timorese expression of self-determination in 1975 would appear to fall within Bull’s definition of international justice and hence Indonesia’s actions (and Australian implicit support) constituted a breach of international law.\textsuperscript{155} Bull understood that this would create a dilemma in interstate politics as ‘the rights of states may of course conflict with the rights of nations.’\textsuperscript{156} The crucial part of the analysis of international justice is defining what constitutes a nation. In 1975, as Portuguese political support waned, civil war broke out between the UDT, the conservative group, and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), a Catholic based group wanting full independence supporting more leftist ideals. In November 1975, Fretilin declared unilateral independence. The civil war and the country’s inability to express its ideas as one, lend credence to the notion that East Timor was in fact neither a state nor a nation. If this is the case, then Indonesia’s invasion would not have violated Bull’s second goal of “international society” (maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states)\textsuperscript{157} nor would it have violated his idea of international justice.

Another point about Bull’s theory was the use of war as a legitimate means to maintain “order”. He pointed out that ‘war plays a central role in the maintenance of international order in the enforcement of international law’.\textsuperscript{158} Conversely, he saw the dangers of war being used as an instrument for ‘overthrowing rules of international law’.\textsuperscript{159} Just where Indonesia’s actions of 7 December 1975 fits into this spectrum is open to interpretation. If one views East Timor as not fitting into the framework of international justice then Indonesia’s invasion was in fact a legitimate means of preserving order in accordance with

\textsuperscript{152} ibid, p 78.
\textsuperscript{153} ibid, p 87.
\textsuperscript{154} ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Bull, 1977, \textit{op cit}, p 78.
\textsuperscript{157} ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} ibid.
international law. On the other hand, a contrary perspective is that Jakarta used the military as a medium to usurp the prevailing norms of "international society." Bull also observed that states might resort to force for political motives such as the "fear of other states."\(^{160}\)

Notwithstanding the debate of whether Indonesia's actions conformed to Bull's notion of a just war founded on the principles of international law, there is little doubt that Jakarta's motives were political in nature and stemmed from a fear of the destabilising effects of a third state. Nevertheless, Indonesia's forceful intervention was contradictory to its previous struggle during the war against the Dutch. In this case, many nations fought as one for self-determination under the banner of Indonesian nationalism. Its raison d'etre was that an imperial power had no legitimacy in the affairs of state, of a group of like minded indigenous races. Exactly 30 years later Indonesia had now assumed the mantle of an imperial power seeking to import its own brand of colonialism onto a small power.

One final point that needs to be emphasised is the role played by Australia's diplomats and bureaucrats during this period. The start of this chapter highlighted a perception in some quarters of the existence of a "Jakarta Lobby" which was composed of such people as Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott. Indeed, Woolcott's role has generally been examined with greater scrutiny than most other policy makers involved in the East Timor debate. His famous remark that Australia should adopt a policy based on pragmatism rather than principle\(^{161}\) has been widely criticised by opponents of the "Lobby". In his study, Bull made particular mention of the role of the 'ideal ambassador'.\(^{162}\) He argued that this 'ideal ambassador' is a person governed by reason rather than passion, and this reflects the axiom that states have objective rather than perceived interests - he believed that these attributes of diplomatic theory were bound up in the canons of rationalism.\(^{163}\) Thus, using Bull's model, Woolcott's advice to the Australian government could be understood as embodying the principles of an "ideal ambassador."

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\(^{163}\) Ibid.
The Development of a Defence Community

Along with the reemergence of "international society" the East Timor crisis showed some facets of a local security community between both states. In the language of Adler and Barnett this community had now reached an ascendant phase. More specific to the Asian area and importing a degree of fidelity to the analysis, Acharya's model of a Defence community is a useful tool in evaluating the relationship. Acharya deduced that such a community was comprised of the following canons:

- Common perception of external threats
- Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies
- Significant military interoperability
- The condition of a security community may or may not exist

In relation to the first aspect of a common threat, the period from 1966-1972 marked a unique era in the security relationship – in that both states could identify with a common enemy and both had similar objectives in thwarting this mutual threat. After 1965, Indonesia's threat perceptions were squarely focused on China. The PKI's role in the coup of 30 September 1965 was portrayed by the military elite as a proxy for Communist China, which was seeking to subvert the Indonesian state. Writing in 1969, Colonel Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo, the General Staff Officer Operations for the TNI noted:

Southeast Asia being a rich and significant part of Asia with about 15 million inhabitant of Chinese origin is a logical objective for China in her endeavors to enlarge her influence. He elaborated on this theme by claiming that China was an aggressive state, which could use atomic weapons in any future regional conflict. Surjohadiprodjo claimed that in order to mitigate against this threat, Indonesia's best strategy was to promote cooperation

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164 ibid, p 53.
166 ibid, pp 152-53.
168 ibid, p 239.
and peace between the Southeast Asian nations. In concert with the identification of this newfound threat, Australia’s security concern remained unchanged (Communist China) and thus both states now entertained a common foe. Speaking to Parliament in October 1965, Australia’s Defence Minister, Sir Shane Patridge, stated:

In our part of the world the major threat to international peace and the security of our peoples comes from Communist China.

Accordingly, he noted that ‘the security of Australia to be pursued is part of a system of collective defence in cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia.’ Indicative of this collective perception, Cotton observed, ‘by 1967 a profound reassessment of Indonesia had occurred in Australia.’ In sum, during the late 1960s Australia and Indonesia shared a common enemy. Whilst Australia’s rapprochement with China in 1972, ameliorated to a degree this threat, Canberra still harboured suspicions about Chinese motives for the remainder of the decade.

The second point of Acharya’s defence community pertains to reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies. This point cannot be validated. The third point of military interoperability was symbolised by Australia bequeathing significant defence aid to Indonesia, including a $20 million grant, 16 Sabre fighters, naval patrol boats and Nomad aircraft. In the author’s interview with Dalrymple, he noted that the gifting of this defence equipment marked a watershed in the security relationship between the two states. Dalrymple’s assessment should not be underestimated. Ten years earlier, Australia was intent on purchasing front line bombers (F-111) as a deterrent against Sukarno’s militant Indonesia and if necessary to strike Jakarta. Simultaneously, Indonesia was embarking on its own massive military procurement program, which fundamentally comprised Soviet equipment.

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169 ibid, p 236.
171 ibid, p 316.
This evaluation leads to the conclusion that notwithstanding the aspect of military obligations, the security relationship had made remarkable inroads in a short period of time and was representative of a Defence community.

**The Levels of Analysis**

A range of dynamics, including the individual, the state and the systemic, influenced Australia and Indonesia’s actions during the East Timor case. At the individual level, Whitlam and Suharto’s cognitive beliefs, environmental upbringing and strong personalities were key drivers shaping both states’ security policies. Since the early 1950s Whitlam had been a strong supporter of Indonesia. The episode of West Irian appears to have crystallised his perception that relations with Indonesia should not be jeopardised over East Timor. Whitlam argued:

> We learned the lessons of West New Guinea the hard way – we must not become bogged down in another futile argument over sovereignty.\(^{174}\)

In part, he viewed the development of the Jakarta/Canberra connection as a primary goal of his government’s foreign policy.\(^{175}\) It is interesting to contrast Menzies vocal perceptions on communism, the Indonesian leadership and Asian self-determination with Whitlam’s more sanguine and balanced outlook on International Relations. In many ways, Menzies and Whitlam represented opposing poles of the IR spectrum. The point to be gleaned from this review is that Canberra’s security motives oscillated with the movement in Australian political leadership, or as Waltz would claim to a First Image force.

Just as Whitlam was a dominant force in Australia’s decision making cycle, so too was Suharto’s influence within Indonesia. Akin to Sukarno’s autocratic regime, Suharto’s New Order foreign policy was to a large degree a manifestation of his personal prejudices and bias. Tracing Suharto’s rise to power unearths some of these prejudices. In his


\(^{174}\) ibid, p 134.

\(^{175}\) ibid, p 135.
autobiography, Suharto made very little reference to his early exposure to communism. He cited the Madiun Affair of 1948 and his peripheral involvement but offers no opinion on the virtues or otherwise of the PKI. Elson noted that by 1958, 'Suharto’s gathering concern was the expansion of communist influence.' In 1959, Suharto commenced his Army Staff and Command School training when he came into contact with Colonel Suwarto, who was the deputy commander of the school. Under Suwarto’s influence ‘Suharto began developing a set of ideas that greatly challenged the fast expanding Communist Party.’ After Gestapu, the PKI became a rallying point, which ‘served to justify the increasingly aggressive and authoritarian tactics of elements of the government.’ This was demonstrated by the creation of the Kopkamtib – which was a special body designed to uproot the remnants of communism. In 1975, Lew Kuan Yew recalls a conversation with Suharto, in which the Indonesian President noted, ‘Indonesia’s bad experiences with Beijing.’ Furthermore, he claimed that if ASEAN did not act as one, the will to stand up to communist would be lost. Thus, by 1974, Suharto’s indoctrination by the school of anti-communism, his battle against the PKI in the early 1960s, and the perceived role of the PKI in Gestapu, helped shape his beliefs, which in turn forged Indonesia’s security focus.

At a state level or using Waltz’s terminology the Second Image, a number of forces were at play that guided Indonesia’s security strategy. Whilst it was highlighted that Suharto was a strong and vehement anti communist, his views were shared by other members of the New Order apparatchik. This situation can be traced back to the 1960s when the TNI was locked in a protracted and complex power struggle with the PKI. Ultimately, as the events after 30 September 1965 demonstrated, the TNI assumed the role of primus inter pares in

178 ibid, p 76.
179 ibid.
180 ibid, p 177.
183 ibid.
Indonesian society. Further shaping Indonesia’s security posture was the role of the Golkar Party, which was comprised and influenced by a number of key Indonesian military Generals. To some extent, ‘anti communism was the legitimising principle that underpinned the Suharto regime.184

Similar to the Second Image force operating in Indonesia, Australia’s policy on East Timor was clearly driven not just by Whitlam, but by a body of like minded bureaucrats who believed that good relations with Indonesia was a priority. Discussion at the start of this chapter outlined the influence that the “Jakarta Lobby” had on Australian decision making. This group could be interpreted as either a Second Level Image or a Third Level Image. With reference to the former, Australia’s policy could be viewed as a response to state Level forces. Another perspective is that Australia’s stance was driven by the structural politics of regional security; Canberra remained concerned about regional instability and the possibility that conflict in the archipelago would spill over closer to mainland Australia. Jakarta was no less affected by structural determinants. Its concern over Chinese hegemony and the global balance of power had a significant impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy. This concern had its genesis in the attempted PKI coup of 1965, which Jakarta perceived was a subset of China’s wider expansionist plan.

In reviewing the foregoing critique, the East Timor case study serves to highlight that Waltz’s claim that ‘wars occur because nothing prevents them in anarchy,’185 may lack an element of sophistication. In 1975, the forces that shaped each state’s security perspectives and ultimately the relationship, was a combination of the three “Images”, as opposed to a dependence on the Third.

Summary

During the East Timor crisis, Australia’s preference was for Indonesian incorporation of Portuguese Timor. An adjunct of this policy was for the East Timorese to be afforded the right to self-determination. However, above all else the Australian government’s policy

was to maintain good relations with Indonesia. Conversely, Indonesia's response to the crisis resembled Australia's attitude 10 years earlier – of a Chinese predator power seeking to influence the region. One of the significant differences between East Timor and previous security issues including Confrontation and West Irian was the lack of great power involvement. Neither, the USA, the USSR or China, exerted any real influence from 1974-76. Thus, without the intervention of a global power to exert some form of regional order or influence, the crisis brought Australia and Indonesia closer together. This was reflected in the more influential role that Australia played throughout the dispute.

185 Waltz, 1954, *op cit*, p 188.
INTRODUCTION

From the perspectives of both Canberra and Jakarta, East Timor’s independence was an extremely unexpected event in international politics; and was not on the radar of either side until sudden political and economic developments in 1997. Until then, both states had been content to follow a realist/rationalist line of thinking in the name of good relations, and flowing from this cooperation was a “convergence of interests”. This “convergence” was no where better illustrated than in the 1995 Agreement for Maintaining Security (AMS). Notwithstanding this “convergence”, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the stimulus for a dramatic re-orientation in the Indonesian domestic landscape, which had a significant knock on effect for Australia. Habibie’s rise to power saw a fresh approach to the East Timor question, culminating in the East Timorese voting for independence on 30 August 1999. Although the Indonesian government agreed to this plebiscite and to UN intervention in the aftermath of a deteriorating security situation in Dili, the end result was a breakdown in strategic relations between Australia and Indonesia. Cotton noted that ‘events in East Timor coloured the entire Australia Indonesia relationship.’

Precipitating this crisis was the sudden Asian economic downturn in 1997, which manifested itself in a wave of violent domestic unrest in Jakarta (primarily led by the student movement). As the Indonesian Rupiah plummeted, which induced state and private foreign debt to rapidly escalate, Suharto’s legitimacy and that of the New Order was brought into question; as a result he was forced to abdicate power over to his eccentric Vice President, B J Habibie, in May 1998. Whilst this occasion of power transfer did not mark the same degree of “revolutionary behaviour” as that of 1965/66, there was nevertheless a number of second order changes associated with Habibie’s rise. In response

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to increasing international pressure from a host of government and non-government organisations, which now saw an opportunity for change within Indonesia, Habibie floated the idea of an autonomy package for the East Timorese.

In December 1998, under advice from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Howard wrote to Habibie advising him that Australia supported Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, but, that an opportunity now presented itself for East Timorese autonomy. In January 1999, Habibie signalled that if autonomy to the East Timorese was not acceptable, then he would let the province go. This statement set in train a sequence of events that Jakarta did not expect, nor was it equipped to deal with, to the satisfaction of the international community. Habibie’s offer polarised East Timor’s small community; the majority of the population were resolute in their desire for self-determination, whilst a minority favoured a continuation of the political status quo. It appears that factions of ABRI who did not want to see the province attain independence sponsored a core group of this minority. As a result, the internal security situation in East Timor rapidly deteriorated – this stimulated the international community into a realisation that foreign intervention was the only means by which stability could be restored to Dili and surrounds.

Under the Good Offices of the UN and in difficult and dangerous circumstances, the UNAMET ballot was held on 30 August 1999. Almost 80% of the population voted in favour of independence – this sparked a new wave of violence, primarily led by small “gangs” of armed militia. In response, a conglomeration of international, religious, economic and political groups began to exert even more pressure on the Reform government to allow the presence of foreign peacekeepers in the province. Ultimately, Habibie had little choice but to accept the offer of an international peacekeeping force; in particular the threat of IMF aid being withdrawn was a deciding factor in Jakarta’s calculations. As a direct result of Australia’s vocal support for a peacekeeping force, Indonesia abrogated the AMS on 16 September 1999; a typically realist response. On 20 September 1999, INTERFET, led by Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove, commenced its operations in East Timor – and in the perspective of many Indonesians the first time that a foreign military force had “violated” Indonesian sovereignty since colonial Dutch forces in 1949 (notwithstanding the undeclared CIA role in the PRRI affair of
1958). Apart from the abrogation of the AMS, Australia’s role in INTERFET sparked mass demonstrations outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the Consulate General in Surabaya (again organised by the student movement), its military relationship with ABRI was “frozen”, Indonesian officials demanded a severing of diplomatic relations with Canberra and a definite cooling in the security relationship had developed.

This period of Australia-Indonesia tension took place in a vastly different international setting to that which prevailed in the Cold War. First, with the movement away from bipolarity to multipolarity and the ideological rift between East and West now over, Indonesia was no longer seen as vital to the strategic interests of either the US or Russia, as the successor state to the USSR. Indeed, with the balkanisation of the Soviet Empire, Russia was far more focused on internal issues than on extending its influence into Southeast Asia. The post Cold War dynamics meant that for the first time Australia and Indonesia were the key actors in the dispute. Second, another feature of this New World Order was the role played by non-state actors. Whilst multipolarity is generally associated with the diffusion of power to three or more states, in this instance, multipolarity represented a more complex world of state and non-state actors which traditional realism would find hard to comprehend. Since 1975, a concerted international campaign led primarily by Ramos Horta sought to galvanise international opinion in favour of the East Timorese cause. A range of individual groups were targeted including: the UN, the EU, US Congress, Catholic Church, Amnesty International, media organisations and a number of other NGOs. During the Suharto era, support for East Timorese independence was somewhat splintered, however, the change in Indonesia’s internal dynamics in 1998 facilitated the development of a unified international opinion.

Whilst one tangible and successful outcome from the ballot and INTERFET was East Timorese independence, a less positive consequence was a fracturing in what had been a cooperative security relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The events of 1999 generated another wave of literature pertaining to East Timor’s independence movement. Goldsworthy made the claim that ‘so significant was the issue in
Australian regional policy making, that a full chapter is devoted to it here, the chapter constitutes the most detailed case study in the entire two volume work:\textsuperscript{2} The DFAT volume \textit{East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge}\textsuperscript{3}, the Australian Senate Report into East Timor of 2000\textsuperscript{4}, Edwards and Goldsworthy's\textsuperscript{5} second volume of \textit{Facing North} and Cotton's\textsuperscript{6} critique of Australian regional policy, offers some of the best writings into East Timor's quest for self-determination. Cotton's book in particular provides the most independent analysis of Australia's involvement in East Timor from 1974 through to 2000 - devoting considerable resources to critiquing DFATs and the Australian Senate's version of events.

The Australian magazine 'Inside Indonesia' is an enlightening publication as it has consistently been a medium from which the suppressed East Timorcse were able to voice their beliefs and concerns. The INTERNET was not widely used in this chapter as a source of information, though it was used to access speeches held by official government websites.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Australian government conducted a number of strategic reviews including: \textit{Australia Defence 1976},\textsuperscript{7} the \textit{Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities} of 1986,\textsuperscript{8} \textit{The Defence of Australia} (1987),\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Defending Australia Defence White Paper} (1994),\textsuperscript{10} and the DFAT White Paper of 1997.\textsuperscript{11} These reviews deliver a valuable insight into Canberra's strategic thinking during the post East Timor period of

\textsuperscript{5} Edwards P & Goldsworthy D, 2003, \textit{op cit}.
\textsuperscript{6} Cotton I, 2004, \textit{op cit}.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{DFAT White Paper}, 1997, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AGPS, Canberra.
1975 and how Australia’s attitude towards Indonesia matured. With each subsequent strategic review, the importance of Indonesia to Australian security was further emphasised.

Peter Chalk’s study into Australia’s foreign and defence policy is a robust summary of the political aftermath of Australia’s INTERFET intervention. Cristalis, Dunn, Haigh, McDonald and Tiffen have all written on either the East Timor issue or on Australian strategic policy. These works tend to focus on the liberal internationalist and human rights dimension of East Timor. Greenless and Garran’s evaluation of Australia’s role in 1999 is an excellent source of analytical information. Both journalists conducted a range of interviews with leading policy makers, which provide some rare insights into Canberra’s strategic thinking. Finally, Keating’s autobiography, Evans’ book on foreign policy and Ricklefs’s series of essays on the Howard years are important sources of information into the mindset of Australia’s leading policy makers.

INTERSTATE SECURITY LINKAGES

East Timor’s independence took place under unique circumstances, resulting in a turnaround in the security relationship between Australia and Indonesia. The cooperative elements of the relationship, which had been developing through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were thrown into disarray in 1999. Apart from Australia and Indonesia being the key

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12 Chalk Peter, 2001, Australian foreign and defense policy in the wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor intervention, Rand, Santa Monica, CA.
16 McDonald Hamish, 2002, Masters of terror: Indonesia’s military and violence in East Timor in 1999, Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.
actors during this dispute, the events of 1999 were distinguished by the role of NGOs in helping to shape the final outcome. Diagram 1 below represents the interstate/non-state security linkages.

Diagram 1: Interstate Security Linkages

--- conflictual relationships
- - cooperative relationships

A range of differing dynamics shaped this linkage construct. First, with the Cold War over, great power rivalry was no longer a dominant theme, thus the intensity of Realpolitik had to some degree been ameliorated. Whereas hitherto, the US, USSR, and China all saw geopolitical advantage in courting Indonesia, the global and regional strategic order of 1999 did not lend itself to such interference and the engagement of great power interests. To that end, the role of non-state actors was both unique and significant. Finally, the approach of the United States is worthy of comment. The US policy towards Indonesia was consistent with its broader approach to issues regarding Southeast Asia – a policy dating back to 1945. As Goldsworthy observed, US intransigence in providing direct troop support for deployment to East Timor was understandable as it ‘seemed unlikely that Washington in light of its historical experience would allow any of its armed forces to be drawn into a frontline role in Southeast Asia.’ Since 1945, Australia sought political and to a degree military support from the US on issues pertaining to Indonesia, including: the latter part of the 1940s, the early 1960s over West Irian and Confrontation and finally in 1999 over East Timor. On each occasion, Canberra’s request for direct military support was rebuffed – indicative of the problems facing powers in an asymmetric security relationship.

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United Nations

The role of the UN was crucial in the lead up and aftermath of East Timor's vote for independence. From 1975, East Timor was debated annually at the UN, though, in the face of continued disinterest from some of the key states the body did not deliberate the matter after 1982. Diagram 2 illustrates the voting patterns of a number of states in relation to Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.

Diagram 2: UNGA Resolutions on East Timor 1975-82

In this case, ticks indicate condemnation of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor and crosses denote support for Indonesia.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the East Timorese developed a comprehensive plan which targeted UN delegates with an aim of applying multilateral pressure on Indonesia. Jose Ramos Horta noted that post 1975 'he would plod down to the United Nations.' In his political discourse on the East Timorese struggle he recalled his days at the UN as 'meeting with as many diplomatic missions as I could from different regions of the world, particularly Africans and Latin Americans, each of us had a particular assignment, a number of delegates to contact each day.'

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25 'Inside Indonesia', No 59, July-September 1999, p 18.
In December 1995, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘called for international
human rights non-governmental organisations full access to Indonesia and East Timor.’\(^{27}\)
In March 1997, the Chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights, reiterated
concerns about the human rights situation in East Timor and called on the ‘Indonesian
government to implement undertakings contained in previous Chairman’s statements,
including the release of East Timorese detained in connection with the 1991 Santa Cruz
massacre in Dili.’\(^{28}\) In 1998, the UN Secretary-General appointed a Personal
Representative on East Timor who visited Indonesia and East Timor. In January 1998,
following a visit to Portugal to interview East Timorese refugees, the UN Special
Rapporteur on torture reported that there were ‘continuing credible allegations of torture
and ill-treatment in East Timor.’\(^{29}\)

In reaction to Habibie’s offer of independence/autonomy the UNSC unanimously voted in
June 1999 to establish the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee
the referendum; its role ceased on 30 August 1999 when the ballot was completed. After
the ballot, violence once again flared up in the province, fuelled even further on 4
September when the results of the ballot indicated that an overwhelming majority had
voted in favour of independence. From 5–8 September 1999, the remaining UNAMET
staff were evacuated from Dili and a UN Mission was immediately dispatched to East
Timor to assess and report back on the security situation. After receiving the Mission’s
report, the UN Secretary General called on the Indonesian President to accept an
international peacekeeping force for East Timor; which Habibie reluctantly agreed to on 12
September. On 15 September, the UNSC unanimously passed UNSCR 1264, authorising a
multinational force to restore security in East Timor. Major General Mike Smith noted that
this resolution was ‘one of the most strongly worded mandates ever given by the Security
Council.’\(^{30}\) In sum, during 1999 the UNSC passed 13 resolutions (UNSCR 1480, 1473,
1414, 1410, 1392, 1338, 1319, 1272, 1264, 1262, 1257, 1246, 1236), either in favour of
East Timor or condemning Indonesia for its handling of the situation.\(^{31}\) The fact that China,

\(^{27}\) ibid.


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Russia, the Western powers and the non-aligned movement all voted against Indonesia represented a significant victory for the East Timorese.

Human Rights Groups

Human rights organisations and lobby groups played a significant role both domestically in Australia and internationally in keeping the plight of the East Timorese to the fore of public opinion. Michael E Salla provided a comprehensive account of the Labor Party’s human rights campaign during the Hawke era – an era he defined as characterised by human rights diplomacy. From 1975-1983 the ALP consistently passed resolutions at its Biennial National Conferences calling for the removal of Indonesian forces and the observance of ‘basic human rights.’ Salla noted that with the election of the Hawke government, the ALP conference exerted pressure on the government over human rights - and this subsequently became a ‘source of friction’ for the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

More than any other event, the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991 served to galvanise the human rights community in their quest for greater freedom within East Timor. An early morning mass marking the death of Sebastiao Gomes, who was killed by the ABRI two weeks earlier, was followed by a nationalist march to the cemetery of Santa Cruz by several thousand people. The crowd was subsequently fired upon by Indonesian soldiers, killing at least 100 civilians. This incident was witnessed by several foreign journalists who immediately filed still and video footage back to their respective countries, which depicted ABRI as violating the human rights of the East Timorese. The very next day, General Try Sutrisno, head of ABRI, strongly defended the actions of his soldiers and uttered the military’s intention to ‘exterminate anyone who disrupts stability.’ Australian Prime Minister, Hawke, retorted that Sutrisno’s comments were ‘repugnant in the

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, p 169.
Smith observed that ‘such human rights abuses prevented the Indonesians from gaining the trust and confidence of the people and strengthened the East Timorese and international resentment against Indonesia’s occupation of the territory.’ Santa Cruz came to represent all that was wrong with ABRI and their complicity in human rights violations in East Timor, and more importantly served as a rallying point from which the liberation movement gathered support – this was the pebble in the shoe!

In July 1994, Amnesty International presented a report on East Timor to the UN Committee on Decolonisation. The report concluded that ‘in the 12 months since Amnesty International last addressed this Committee the organisation has received reports of scores of East Timorese tortured or ill treated by Indonesian security forces.’ From 19-26 January 1996, Noam Chomsky toured Australia and gave a series of speeches on The Great Powers and Human Rights, which focused on the plight of the East Timorese; a tour organised by the East Timor Relief Association (ETRA). Later that year, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) conducted investigations into land and labor disputes, allegations of ill treatment and unlawful killings. In June 1998, the International Labour Organisation’s Committee on the Application of Standards expressed concern about continuing restrictions on freedom of association for workers in Indonesia. That same month, an oral statement to the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation by Amnesty International outlined its concerns regarding East Timor and called for the establishment of human rights monitoring and investigative mechanisms. Overall, the combined efforts of the human rights community culminated in diplomatic representation by Australia and other governments. Keating noted in his autobiography that ‘at almost every meeting we held I spoke to him [Suharto] about East Timor and human rights.’

36 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
Similarly, Evans highlighted the number of government human rights representations made to Indonesia on the behest of delegations of human rights experts. 43

Catholic Church

The Catholic Church was a unique entity within East Timor as it was the only institution able to communicate independently with the outside world. Its appeal with the Catholic community made it a readily identifiable organisation, in particular, Bishop Belo and Monsignor Lopes were seen to represent the masses. Their views were conveyed widely around the world and subsequently back to Indonesia. In 1989, Belo sent a letter to the United Nations seeking a referendum. In 1990, Xanana Gusmao claimed that ‘the Catholic Church has a moral as well as a political role and is involved in the popular resistance.’44 Emphasising the role of the Catholic Church, Habibie claimed any dialogue over East Timor’s independence would only be conducted through the ‘two Bishops’ of the Church.

The Ongoing Struggle in East Timor and International Support

Ironically, Indonesia’s military rule in East Timor had the same effect on the local citizens as Dutch rule did on Indonesian society during the early part of the 20th century. In particular, Indonesian and ABRI harshness helped to develop a sense of East Timorese nationalism. In response to this growing national consciousness, a number of solidarity groups began to emerge, including, the UDT (the Timorese Democratic Union), FREtilin (The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) the Jakarta financed integrationist group of Apodeti, the East Timor Students Solidarity Council and the Jakarta based Solidamor.45 In part, these groups had particular appeal to the international student movement. This was indirectly displayed during the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 where Indonesian students led the revolt against the Suharto government, primarily through protests and riots in Jakarta. This movement was not lost on the Australian student

43 Evans G & Grant B, 1991, op cit, p 159.
45 These solidarity groups were widely reported in the Australian magazine ‘Inside Indonesia’. In particular, during the 1990s the magazine was both a rallying point and a medium from which disenfranchised groups could air their concerns, in an era when the Indonesian press was tightly controlled by the New Order government.

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community who emerged as a strong and vocal opponent of the Suharto government’s incorporation of East Timor.

In 1990, Xanana Gusmao declared that ‘we do not separate our people from the rest of the struggles and anything that happens in favour of the rights of these people is also of benefit to us (South Africa, Baltic Republics and Cambodia).’\(^{46}\) Whilst he was imprisoned he received a call from Nelson Mandela. Thus, to some sections of the international community parallels with South Africa and East Timor had began to emerge.

**European Union**

At the same time that Ramos Horta was campaigning to the United Nations, his colleagues were applying similar pressure to the European Union. Horta realised that through influencing this power bloc they might succeed in isolating Jakarta.\(^{47}\) In 1999, the European Community voted overwhelmingly (167 for, 7 against and 4 abstentions) to condemn Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. In addition, the former Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Principe formed a coalition and argued that East Timor was primarily a question of decolonisation.

**IMF and World Bank**

The 1997 Asian economic crisis had two significant consequences for Australia and Indonesia. Firstly, after a wave of popular unrest Suharto was forced to hand power over to his Vice President. Secondly, Indonesia’s economy plummeted. In an attempt to avert financial disaster Jakarta requested IMF assistance in the form of a multi billion dollar loan.\(^{48}\) This package was perceived as vital for Indonesia’s continued economic viability. As the East Timor crisis reached its climax in 1999, Howard and Clinton met with Indonesia’s Minister for Coordinating Economics and Finance, Ginandjar Kartasamita, during the APEC summit in September. It was reported that both leaders urged

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\(^{46}\) 'Inside Indonesia', No 25, December 1990, p 9.

\(^{47}\) 'Inside Indonesia', No 34, March 1993, p 16.

\(^{48}\) US $40 billion.
Kartasamita that ‘Indonesia must accept international assistance to restore security in East Timor. If it failed to do so there would be implications for its future access to international financing.’

Shortly after this event and with Habibie still displaying some reluctance in allowing an international force into East Timor, James Wolfensohn President of the World Bank and Michel Camdessus of the IMF made a point of describing East Timor as a matter of paramount concern. Later Wolfensohn wrote a letter to Habibic, which stated:

For the international financial community to be able to continue its full support it is critical that you act swiftly to restore order and that your government carry through on its public commitment to honour the referendum outcome.

Within days of receiving this letter Habibie acquiesced to international pressure and allowed the presence of international peacekeepers.

**Media**

Since the death of five journalists in Balibo in 1975, there has been a belief within some Indonesian circles that the Australian media has embarked on a crusade against the New Order. In 1986, the *Sydney Morning Herald* published an article by journalist David Jenkins which condemned the Suharto family and portrayed them as resembling the Marcos dynasty who were plundering billions from the Philippine’s economy. In response, the Indonesian government lodged an official protest, cancelled ministerial visits, froze the issuing of visas and in general reacted most unfavourably to the report. Some of Indonesia’s leading politicians have attributed this ongoing disharmony to the Australian media. The author asked Indonesia’s Ambassadors to Australia of 1999 and 2002 what were some of the key forces preventing better relations between the two states. Both Ambassadors were quick to respond that Australian press reporting had not been helpful.

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51 ibid.

52 The five journalists were: Greg Shackleton, Gary Cunningham, Tony Stewart, Malcolm Renny, Brian Peters. It is believed they were killed on 16 October 1975.

towards mending the relationship.\textsuperscript{54} Certainly, the Australian media raised the profile of East Timor both within Australia and within the broader international community. However, it would be erroneous to conclude that the Australian media acted in isolation. Indeed, since Santa Cruz in 1991, the international media had began to pay more attention to East Timor. As the security deteriorated in August and September 1999, CNN and other conglomerates merged on the province to provide live broadcasting of “Indonesian sponsored atrocities”.

\textbf{Waltz and Non-State Actors}

Chapter 1 analysed Waltz’s examination of the ‘levels of analysis’. Initially, Waltz deduced that three levels existed; individual, state and system. He refined his theory in 1979 to include only two levels; reductionism and structuralism.\textsuperscript{55} Despite refining his theory in latter years, Waltz’s conclusion on the driving force behind conflict remained consistent – this being the Third Image of structural forces. Fundamental to Waltz’s theory on structuralism was the premise that the state is the central actor in International Relations. He wrote that international structures are defined in terms of ‘the primary political units of an era, be they city, states, empires or nations.’\textsuperscript{56} However, as the events of East Timor demonstrated the external forces acting on Indonesia were primarily a fusion of non-state international organisations. This is not to say that Waltz discounted the role of non-state actors in International Relations. In his discourse on the theory of international politics he stated that the ‘importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious.’\textsuperscript{57} However, Waltz’s interpretation of non-state actors was narrowly limited to economic units. Ironically, in 1979 he made the flawed prediction that ‘states are the units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems – who is

\textsuperscript{54} During these conversations another point was emphasised - that of megaphone or noisy diplomacy. Indonesian politicians use the term noisy diplomacy to define the manner in which Australian policy makers often criticise Indonesian policy in the public domain. The term has become part of the Asian lexicon pertaining to Australian politicians. Ironically, the term is not new. Indeed, its origins can be traced back to a Western term used to describe Sukarno’s diplomatic actions during the 1960s. The US Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Palfrey Jones, stated that: ‘I had been optimistic longer than most Americans, that even with his offensive “noisy diplomacy”, Sukarno would finally come around’. See: Jones HP, 1973, \textit{Indonesia: The Possible Dream}, Hoover Institute, Singapore, p 358.


\textsuperscript{57} ibid, p 94.
likely to be around 100 years from now -- the US, the Soviet Union, France or Ford, IBM, Shell.\textsuperscript{58} From an IR perspective, realism and its associated tenet of the state as the central actor cannot fully explain the actions of Indonesia and Australia during East Timor's movement toward independence in 1999.

**THE CHANGING DYNAMICS**

The political exchange between the two states from 1976 to 1997 saw the development of a "convergence of interests". Shortly after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, Australia announced a review of its defence strategy. The 1976 *Defence Review* defined Australian defence activity as:

Limited to the areas closer to home, these are our adjacent maritime areas, the SW Pacific countries and territories, PNG, Indonesia and the Southeast Asia region.\textsuperscript{59}

Indonesia was characterised as a 'central element of Australia’s strategy in any conceivable offensive military strategy against the mainland.'\textsuperscript{60} In 1986, the government commissioned Professor Paul Dibb to conduct another review of Australia’s defence policy. This review was heralded as the first to fully recognise the importance of the Asian region in general and Indonesia in particular. It concluded:

The promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours (Indonesia, PNG, the nearby island states of the SW Pacific and NZ) this is Australia’s area of direct military interest.\textsuperscript{61} Priority should be given to Indonesia which is the most important of our neighbours. The Indonesian archipelago forms a protective barrier to Australia’s northern approaches.\textsuperscript{62}

With respect to Indonesia, the review highlighted three main themes. Firstly, Indonesia was strategically identified as regionally primus inter pares. Whilst this strategic thinking

\textsuperscript{58} ibid, p 95.
\textsuperscript{59} Australia Defence 1976, op cit, p 6.
\textsuperscript{60} ibid, p 7
was not new, it nevertheless reinforced the view that cordial relations with Indonesia were essential to Australia’s national interests. Secondly, Dibb emphasised that Indonesia and its many islands formed a protective barrier to Australia’s north. This tenet was similar to the notion of the “perimeter defence concept” – a concept that had dominated Australian strategic thinking since colonisation. Finally, in synthesising these stands of thought, Dibb put forward the idea of a strategic community. This theme represented a significant development in Australian security thinking. In 1987, the Australian government subsequently accepted the Dibb Review with some minor amendments. This White Paper identified Australia’s area of direct military interest as including ‘Australia its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia PNG, NZ and other nearby countries of the SW Pacific.”

Hayden’s retirement as Foreign Affairs Minister in 1988 and the introduction of Evans into the portfolio reinvigorated the government’s Indonesian agenda. In 1989, Evans spoke of the nexus of Indonesian and Australian security and the importance of shared interests. In 1991, Evans stated:

The last six years have been a period of rapid expansion as both Australia and Indonesia came to realise that they share an ever-expanding range of fundamental interests. The value of the ballast that has been laid down in recent times is that it should prevent any single problem in the relationship from assuming too much importance.

Evans had in mind the need to develop the relationship to such an extent that incidents such as the “Jenkins Affair” would never again destabilise relations between the two states. He believed that the way to achieve this ballast was ‘through layer by layer of a wide range

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62 ibid, p 48.
63 ibid.
65 Evans G, 1989, Australia and Indonesia a developing relationship, address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 4 December 1989.
of activities including defence, culture and commerce.\textsuperscript{67} Arising from this was the establishment of annual talks between senior government officials.

At the same time, Ali Alatas assumed the mantle as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister. During one of his first speeches, at the National Press Club of Australia, he uttered ‘let us stop desperately keeping alive the non issue built around a non existent cause, the so called East Timor question.’\textsuperscript{68} Whilst Evans was arguing for ballast, Alatas’ interpretation of the East Timor situation was such: ‘let us not allow one drop of vinegar to spoil the entire bowl of milk.’\textsuperscript{69}

Throughout this period politico-economic relations between the two states flourished. The Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty was signed in 1989 and came into force in 1991. Trade between both states grew substantially throughout Evans’ tenure, as did Australian tourism to Indonesia. From 1988 to 1994 there were 87 ministerial visits between the two states – 35 from Indonesia and 52 from Australia.\textsuperscript{70} In 1992, Keating and Suharto agreed to establish the Australia Indonesia Ministerial Forum as a vehicle for the long-term development of trade and commerce.\textsuperscript{71} The same year Keating stated in a press conference that ‘President Suharto’s administration is one of the most significant and beneficial events in Australian strategic history.’\textsuperscript{72} During the next two years Keating visited Jakarta three times. Evans argued that by adopting this multilayered approach Australia’s voice would be more effectively heard in Indonesia. Specifically, with reference to East Timor, Evans claimed:

\begin{footnotes}
\item[67] ibid, p 201.
\item[69] ibid, p 501.
\item[70] ibid, p 202.
\item[71] ibid.
\end{footnotes}
We have taken the point that human rights situation in East Timor can be much better advanced and much more usefully advocated in an environment where Australia does have a working relationship with Indonesia and one that accepts the reality of the inevitable.\footnote{Salla M, Australia Foreign Policy and East Timor, in Cotton J, East Timor and Australia, 2000, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, p 170.}

Strategically, Evans contended that military capability is but one of many instruments of national policy. In his book he wrote:

> The most effective regional security policy for Australia is a multi dimensional policy, in which all the components of Australia network of relations in the region – military and politico-military capability, diplomacy; economic links, assistance with development and so called non military threat; and the exchange of people and ideas – work together to help shape a security environment which is favourable to Australia interests.\footnote{Evans G and Grant B, 1991, op cit, p 113.}

Evans rejected the previously espoused notion that security should be seen purely in military terms with a view of turning to the US or UK in times of trouble. Rather, he held the belief that coordinated and vigorous engagement with the region was the ‘best possible chance of safeguarding our national security into the next century.’\footnote{Ibid, p 116.}

Indonesia’s importance to Australia was subsequently reflected in a number of strategic and military reviews. The 1993 Australian Strategic Review (ASR) declared a growing importance in the relationship with Indonesia. The review stated inter alia, ‘more than any other nation a sound strategic relationship with Indonesia does most for Australian security.’\footnote{Keating P, 2000, op cit, p 147.} Moreover, it concluded that Australia and Indonesia have similar defence outlooks and needs.\footnote{Ibid, p 147.} Consequently, Australia and Indonesia’s military forces commenced a rapid expansion in bilateral exercises, military exchange programs and high level visits. That said, the Australian government’s enthusiasm towards Indonesia was not shared by some academics. In the same year as the ASR, Bob Lowry published a book on

\footnote{Australia relations with Indonesia: Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 1993, AGPS, Canberra, p 68.}
Indonesia’s defence and security policies.\textsuperscript{78} He concluded that ‘Australia is sometimes seen to pose a threat to internal security through the promotion of western liberal democratic values generally and specifically through the promotion of human rights.’\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, he deduced, ‘internal security is the most immediate threat’\textsuperscript{80} and that these threats encapsulated activities designed to overthrow or change the nature of the unitary state of Indonesia or threaten national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{81}

Keating’s realisation that Australia needed to better engage with its regional neighbours became a driving force for his government’s foreign policies. During the early 1990s, Keating sought to place Indonesia on the same ranking of importance as the US and Japan.\textsuperscript{82} With reference to East Timor, he argued it should not be allowed to dominate the relationship claiming, ‘I was not prepared to make the whole of our complex relationship with 210 million people subject to this one issue.’\textsuperscript{83} In March 1994, he stated, ‘if we are to turn into reality our policy of seeking defence in and with Asia instead of against Asia, Indonesia is the most important place it will have to be done.’\textsuperscript{84} The 1994 Defence White Paper, titled, \textit{Defending Australia},\textsuperscript{85} claimed, ‘our defence relationship with Indonesia is our most important in the region. It is underpinned by an increasing awareness of our shared strategic interests and perceptions.’\textsuperscript{86} Here, the concept of a sharing of strategic interests was again emphasised. In a speech to \textit{The Sydney Institute} on 19 April 1994, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Australia, Sabam Siagian, noted:

Because our two countries and peoples show such stark asymmetrical characteristics, consequently our symmetry of geopolitical interests in facing a common threat could, unintentionally, place the broad cooperation between Indonesia and Australia as a pointer that real North South cooperation is not an impossible proposition.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{78} Lowry R, 1993, Indonesia Defence Policy and the Indonesia armed forces, SDSC, ANU, Canberra.
\textsuperscript{79} ibid, p 7.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid, p 15.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid, p 10.
\textsuperscript{83} ibid, p 130.
\textsuperscript{84} Keating P, \textit{2000, op cit}, p 147.
\textsuperscript{86} ibid, p 8.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{The Sydney Papers}, Winter 1994, V6 (3), p 54.
The AMS

On 18 December 1995, Suharto and Keating concluded *The Agreement for Maintaining Security* (AMS), which was coordinated in secrecy by Australia’s representatives of General Peter Gration and Allen Gyngell. In Keating’s words he believed:

> The Agreement marks a major step not only in Australia’s relations with our largest neighbour but also in the outlook for regional stability. It expresses a common understanding that we are far stronger together and that we should affirm a common interest.\(^{88}\)

In his autobiography, the former Prime Minister commented, ‘I felt proud of what had been accomplished and what it revealed about the progress we had made in relations with Indonesia.’\(^{89}\) This Agreement found favour with a number of political commentators who believed it was a watermark in Australia-Indonesia security relations. Bilveer Singh claimed that it ‘was the high point of closer defence and security relations between the two countries.’\(^{90}\) Peter Chalk argued, ‘the accord gave the country new and powerful credentials as a state of Southeast Asia something that had long been denied by other influential regional actors.’\(^{91}\) On a separate, yet related note, Alan Dupont asserted that ‘the Agreement is consistent with recent Southeast Asia attempts to shift defence strategy and planning away from threat based premises to interest based calculations.’\(^{92}\) Despite some criticism about the secretive nature of the negotiations, the government and a range of leading political theorists saw the Agreement as the highlight of Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia.

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\(^{90}\) *Defending Australia*, Defence White Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, p 87.


\(^{92}\) Chalk Peter, 2001, *op cit.*, p 27.

Despite some commentary to the contrary, there was no marked shift in Australian policy on Indonesia after Howard assumed power. In 1996, the new Australian Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan, noted that ‘Indonesia is a regional partner of the greatest importance to Australia.’ He further claimed, ‘it is essential to the long term well being of our two countries that we work closely together to promote common security interests.’ DFAT claimed the bilateral relationship as ‘underpinned by shared strategic interests and perceptions illustrated in the signing of the Australia Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security.’

On 16 October 1996, the Leader of the government in the Senate, Senator Robert Hill said:

Successive Australian governments have recognised Indonesia sovereignty over East Timor since 1979. There has been no change to the government’s policy on East Timor including the East Timor right to self-determination.

In 1997, DFAT published its White Paper and noted ‘the overall administration of the province is primarily a matter for the Indonesian government to determine.’ The Australian Defence Department published its own review titled the Australian Strategic Policy 1997. Indonesia was cited as being a ‘key determinant of Australia’s security in the years ahead.’ Australia’s strategic interests within the Asia Pacific region were defined as:

- Helping to avoid destabilising competition between regional powers
- Preventing the emergence of a hegemonic power

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93 Singh makes particular reference to the deterioration in relations between the two states when Howard assumed power in 1986. See: Singh B, 2002, op cit.
94 McLachlan I, A statement on Liberal Defence Policy, Minister for Defence, 1 July 1996.
95 Ibid.
99 Australia’s Strategic Policy, 1997, Australia Department of Defence, AGPS, Canberra.
100 Ibid, p 12.
- Maintaining a benign security environment in which the territorial integrity of the states was safeguarded
- Exclusion of foreign powers which may wish to attack Australia
- Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\textsuperscript{101}

Indonesia delivered its own security policy titled \textit{Indonesian Defence and Security Policy}.\textsuperscript{102} This paper declared that "the Australia Indonesia relationship continues to flourish."\textsuperscript{103} By 1997, Indonesia's strategic policies were a combination of \textit{Wawasan Nusantara}, \textit{Hankamrata} and \textit{National Resilience}.\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Wawasan Nusantara} entailed the principles of archipelagic outlook or a security policy that focused on internal dynamics. \textit{Hankamrata} or Total Peoples Defence Doctrine established strong linkages between the defence of the states and the populace whilst \textit{National Resilience} involved the "integration of all forms of resilience existing in the political economic socio-cultural and defence fields."\textsuperscript{105} In 1997, Indonesia succumbed to the Asian economic crisis. As successive regional economies yielded to the crisis, pressure on the Indonesia rupiah and on Jakarta's economic and financial system steadily increased. Amidst a wave of popular unrest Suharto was forced to hand power over to the Vice President B.J.Habibie in May 1998.

\textbf{Security Regime}

If rationalism and international society is the "middle way" between realism and liberalism, then the emergence of a security community (such as NATO) could be seen to represent a further step along the liberal spectrum. Whilst this community may have an external realist perspective (NATO v Warsaw Pact), internally the member states are bound by similar norms and cooperate in the interests of the group as a whole. The previous chapter argued that significant elements of "international society" developed

\textsuperscript{101} ibid, p 8.
\textsuperscript{103} ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} For a more detailed explanation of these concepts see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 1996, Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata, Australia – Asian Papers No 75, Griffith University.
between Australia and Indonesia during the 1980s and 1990s, and that a Defence community was likely to have existed. Recapping the analysis in chapter 5, Acharya’s model of a Defence community is composed of the following tenets:

- Common perception of external threats.
- Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies.
- Significant military inter operability.
- The condition of a security community may or may not exist.\textsuperscript{106}

It would be true to say that during the 1980s and 1990s Indonesia’s external threat perceptions became less discernible as the China threat lost energy. During this time, Jakarta embraced the notion of regional order and stability, which was epitomised by its concept of regional resilience.\textsuperscript{107} On a similar note, during the same period Australia’s security focus assumed a more regional outlook. The 1997 Australian Strategic Policy concluded that Australia’s interests were inter alia, ‘maintaining a benign security environment in which the territorial integrity of the states was safeguarded.’\textsuperscript{108} This points to the judgement that both states’ external security interests were interlinked.

The 1995 AMS satisfied Acharya’s second tenet of reciprocal military obligations. Whilst the Agreement did not bind either state, it did nevertheless allow for a tangible mechanism for dialogue in the case of a security incident. The final point of military inter-operability was achieved through an extensive military exercise schedule, personnel exchange programs, an increase in senior officer visits and a greater transparency in each state’s strategic objectives. Accordingly, a Defence community between Australia and Indonesia was in operation during the lead up to 1999.

\textsuperscript{107} See the collection of Alatas’ speeches during the 1990s, in, Alatas A, 2001, op cit, pp 54-206.
\textsuperscript{108} Australia’s Strategic Policy, 1997, op cit, p 8
With respect to the existence of a security community or regime the results are less conclusive. Acharya determined that for a security community to exist, the following norms were necessary:\(^{109}\)

- Strict and observed norms concerning non use of force.
- No competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning against any other members within the grouping.
- Institutions and processes for the pacific settlement of disputes.
- Significant functional cooperation and integration.

The first point, in not using force, was not tested until 1999. The second point of competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning cannot be supported, as Australia’s military order of battle and strategic focus remained centred on an Indonesian style low level incursion penetrating Australia’s north (the 4 yearly Kangaroo series of exercises was aimed at testing the ADF’s response to such a scenario). The 1995 AMS could be seen as representative of the third point, though it was never intended as a vehicle to resolve disputes. Finally, with respect to the fourth aspect of functional cooperation and integration, the AMS and Australia’s continued exchange and exercise program with ABRI would suggest that an element of functional cooperation existed. By analysing the relationship, it appears that Acharya’s security community cannot be validated on the grounds that Australia still harboured concerns over Indonesia’s military intent and capability. One step removed from a community was Acharya’s concept of a security regime. In this situation he articulated the following requisites:

- Principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be retrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate.
- Competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning usually continue within the regime although specific regimes might be created to limit the spread of weapons and military capabilities.

The interest of the actors in peace are not fundamentally unambiguous and long term in nature.\textsuperscript{110}

The first point was exemplified in the significant bilateral military exchange program which sought to add a degree of transparency to both states strategic intent. This confidence building measure, primarily led by Australia, included Staff College internships, senior officer visits and a sharing of military doctrine. Canberra’s goal was to shape Indonesian strategic thinking along lines that were in tune with Australian policy. Specific to this model is the idea that contingency planning may still prevail, though, the spread of arms is limited. This more closely reflects Australia’s position during this period. Certainly, it could be said that both states exhibited traits of the first point. The third point is interesting as it implies that peace is a vague concept held by the actors. It infers that each state harboured some elements of malign intent against the other – which is contrary to the analysis of Australia and Indonesia’s strategic perspectives presented in this thesis. Whilst Australia may have displayed some elements of concern over Indonesia, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that Indonesia was intent on anything else but peaceful relations with its southern neighbour. Thus, one conclusion from applying Acharya’s models, is that the Australia-Indonesia relationship lay somewhere between a security regime and a security community and superimposed was a Defence community.

Summary

Australian foreign policy from 1975-1999 can be represented as expressing a clash between the forces of realism and liberal internationalism.\textsuperscript{111} Following the aftermath of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, successive Australian governments accepted the political reality of Indonesian control - firstly, de facto and then de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty of East Timor. From an Australian perspective, this ultimately meant subordinating the interests of the East Timorese. However, whilst the realist school of thought prevailed it would be wrong to conclude that Australia’s policies towards Indonesia were purely a function of Morgenthau’s notion of power, as both states

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} ibid, pp 152-53.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Trood R & McNamara D, 1995, \textit{op cit}, p 171.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
progressively saw each other in a cooperative light. From a neo liberal perspective, the increase in bilateral trade facilitated cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. Similarly, Keating noted that ‘during the 5 years to 1993, Australia’s exports to Indonesia almost doubled to $1.8 billion with Indonesia our tenth largest export market. In the same period, Indonesian exports to Australia have more than doubled to $1.2 billion.’ This closer cooperation represented a “harmony of interests” - comprising peace, collective security and free trade. Leading up to 1998, suspicion and mistrust between the two states was reduced and the relationship was strengthened through a multilateral approach: defence, commerce, second track dialogue, ministerial representations and treaties. On the other hand, both states embraced some elements of realism with the liberal internationalist movement forced to adopt a “wait and see approach” - this opportunity presented itself in 1998.

AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA’S MOTIVATIONS

In 1997, the Asian financial crisis triggered a wave of domestic unrest in Jakarta, which ultimately led to a collapse of confidence in Suharto and the installation of Vice President Habibie as the third President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998. With the arrival of the Reform Order, Indonesia’s political, strategic and economic dynamics changed. The promise of democratic elections along with the decoupling of government and military and an economy that was in desperate need of external assistance saw Indonesia face challenges not seen since 1949 and 1966. Previously, the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 and the demise of Sukarnoism in 1966 saw Jakarta facing a “crisis of milestones”. In the former instance, Sukarno resorted to extreme nationalism, ideology and revolutionary behaviour, whilst in the latter situation it took almost 10 years until the mid 1970s for a degree of stability and progress to be achieved. Consequently, when the issue of East Timor reached its crescendo in 1999 (a little over 12 months after Habibie assumed office), Indonesia’s political, administrative and judicial institutions were ill equipped to deal with such a crisis.

112 ibid, p 203.
113 Burchill, 1996, op cit, p 69.
Habibie's upbringing was markedly different to that of his predecessors and this contrast explains to a degree, the differing approach that his government adopted during East Timor's move toward self-determination. He was not a member of the 1945 Generation and thus was not shaped by nationalist fervour as his predecessors Sukarno and Suharto had been. Unlike both of his presidential ancestors, who had limited exposure to Western ideas, Habibie had spent most of his formative years in Europe undergoing advanced engineering studies where he progressed to be Vice President of the Messerchimit Aviation Company. One observer noted that 'he had a vision of rapid modernisation, a can do philosophy to get things moving quickly, pushing aside if necessary the slow moving government bureaucracy and the careful economic scrutiny of the technocrats.' Habibie once commented that 'I need the CN-235 (a 30-40 passenger short take off plane) as a vehicle where my people will be trained for complex technology.' This upbringing coupled with his widely acknowledged impulsive behaviour and his penchant for lateral solutions (as evidenced by his deep theoretical engineering background) shaped Habibie's political and strategic policies. As Don Greenless reported, Habibie was a zealous reformer. During the 17 months of his rule, the Indonesian Parliament passed 200 pieces of legislation and some believed that Habibie's actions were reflective of his desire to leave a lasting legacy of his presidency.

In Jakarta on 6 June 1998, a Cabinet meeting endorsed a proposal to offer wide ranging autonomy to East Timor in exchange for internal recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, he stated in an interview with the BBC, 'I am ready to consider, as the President, to give East Timor a special status and release all the prisoners.' On 18 June 1998, Foreign Minister Alatas informed the United Nations Secretary General, 'this special status proposal would

115 ibid.
116 MPR - People's Consultative Assembly.
118 ibid, p 92.
120 ibid.
incorporate wide ranging autonomy.\textsuperscript{122} From 8-10 July 1998, Downer visited Jakarta and had discussions on East Timor with Habibie, Alatas and General Wiranto. Downer claimed that during these discussions he pressed the point, 'East Timor stood as a significant obstacle to Indonesian international credibility.'\textsuperscript{123} DFAT records indicated the following discussions:

\begin{quote}
Alatas stated that a future review of East Timor would only prolong the agony.\textsuperscript{124} A settlement needed to be conducted immediately because the window of opportunity in the Indonesia political cycle would not last beyond the next elections.\textsuperscript{125} Future Indonesia governments would be far less able to deal with issues of this character, given the diffusion of power away from the executive and the obstacles inherent in Parliamentary arrangements.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

In August 1998, a series of United Nations Tripartite Talks were convened to try to formulate an appropriate mechanism for future autonomy. The crux of Australia's position was that East Timor's continued association with Indonesia, rather than independence, was not only in Australia's national interests but also in the interests of East Timor and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{127}

Australia's policy vis a vis East Timor assumed a more liberal dimension in late 1998. On 1 December, the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC)\textsuperscript{128} convened to discuss the issue of East Timor, where Downer recommended to Howard that he should encourage the Indonesian government to engage in direct negotiations with the East Timorese leadership on autonomy.\textsuperscript{129} Downer summarised the meeting by the following statement:

\textsuperscript{122} ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} ibid, p 30.
\textsuperscript{128} National Security Committee of Cabinet; the NSCC comprises the PM (Chair), Ministers for Defence, Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Attorney General.
There was no argument about it, the PM asked some questions and enthusiastically agreed to send the letter. It wasn't a 180-degree change of course, it was a 30 degree change.\textsuperscript{130}

Why Australia shifted its position over East Timor has been the source of some debate. DFAT Deputy Secretary, Dauth, testifying at the 1999 Senate Inquiry into East Timor, claimed that a survey conducted by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta revealed a mass support base for independence within the East Timorese elite community.\textsuperscript{131} This explanation is unlikely to have swayed the Australian government, as this sentiment had been widely recorded since Indonesia's invasion in 1975. Adding a degree of intrigue into Dauth's statement, was the Committee's request for DFAT to submit this document, which was subsequently refused. In seeking to explain why the previous government had not acted on East Timor, Gareth Evans declared, 'we were not able to move, because the Realpolitik situation before the 1997 meltdown was just not of a kind which enabled Indonesia to be moved by that kind of pressure.'\textsuperscript{132} This may explain how the Conservative government was able to shift Australian foreign policy, but does not satisfactorily answer why. Cotton insisted that Downer's motivation was fed by the historic opportunity to 'craft a resolution' to this long standing dispute.\textsuperscript{133} This observation is notable as it accords with the commonly held view about Habibie's motivation; that of a charismatic leader paving new opportunities for the disenfranchised.

In March 1999, Downer made the following comments regarding Australia's policy shift:

The resignation of President Suharto last May cleared the way for a resolution of the East Timor question. Before that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War took away a key rationale for Australia's quiet acceptance of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. Successive Australia governments endorsed Indonesia sovereignty over East Timor.


\textsuperscript{131} East Timor final report of the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, December 2000, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p 176.

\textsuperscript{132} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 September 1999, p 10764.

\textsuperscript{133} Cotton, 2000, op cit, pp 13-16.
because Australia did not want to see the balkanisation of Indonesia with the granting of independence fanning separatist sentiment elsewhere in the archipelago.\textsuperscript{134}

DFAT noted that ‘Australia decided that the only policy which could contribute to a lasting solution for East Timor and for which best served Australia’s interests was to encourage the Indonesian government to negotiate an autonomy package with East Timorese leaders which included provision for a future act of self-determination.’\textsuperscript{135} Greenless and Garran’s interviews with Downer in 2000 offer some insight into Australia’s policy shift during 1998. Downer claimed:

Through 1998 Indonesia had been a key topic of discussion in the NSCC. With the demise of Suharto the Indonesia system had become far looser and probably weaker and that those around the new president were prepared to let East Timor go.\textsuperscript{136}

On 19 December 1998, Howard wrote to Habibie outlining Australia’s position of autonomy for the East Timorese. The letter was sent via Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, who subsequently presented a faxed copy to the Indonesian President on 22 December 1998. The letter incorporated a number of points. Firstly, Howard reiterated Australia’s support of Indonesian sovereignty of East Timor – ‘I want to emphasize that Australia’s support for Indonesian sovereignty is unchanged. It has been a longstanding Australian position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia and East Timor are best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{137} Secondly, that dialogue with the East Timorese was deemed as an essential element of the autonomy proposal – ‘if you can reach agreement directly with the East Timorese, then the international dimensions would take care of themselves or at least be much easier to deal with.’\textsuperscript{138} Thirdly, Indonesia could look at the Matignon Accords in New Caledonia as a possible way ahead.

\textsuperscript{134} Downer A, 1 March 1999, lecture, \textit{Responding to Indonesia’s transformation}, Australia Asia Institute, Sydney.
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Alexander Downer 16 February 2000, as cited in Greenless Don and Garran Robert, 2002, \textit{op cit}, p 86.
\textsuperscript{138} ibid.
for East Timor. Finally, Howard advised Habibie that autonomy may not satisfy the East Timorese, ‘on the substance of negotiations the advice I am receiving is that a decisive element of East Timorese opinion is insisting on an act of self-determination.’

Habibie’s reaction was a mixture of tacit acknowledgement and fury. Whilst the letter was reflective of Indonesia’s newfound approach to the East Timor problem, Habibie took umbrage with the analogy of New Caledonia. The notion that Indonesia could be compared and collectively grouped with another colonial power like France, was a humiliating assertion. In refuting Howard’s proposal, Habibie argued that any review mechanism was tantamount to leaving a ‘time bomb for his successor.’ This point offers some insight into his decision in January 1999 where he did raise the possibility of self-determination. On the other hand, Habibie appeared receptive to Australia’s point of consultation with the East Timorese, though this consultation would be limited to the two Timorese bishops; as he argued that the Church was the only unifying element in East Timor. An invitation from Habibie to Bishop Belo to discuss autonomy was subsequently declined. The President’s adviser, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, claimed that this snub had a significant impact on Habibie. She noted: ‘the disappointment with Belo was a major factor... there was no real willingness on the part of the East Timorese to engage with Indonesia.’ Cotton claimed Howard’s letter ‘was an important influence in Indonesian policy making.’

On 12 January 1999, Downer released a press statement, announcing, ‘the Australian Government has decided to make a significant adjustment to that policy.’ Rebutting the government’s claim, Ricklefs observed that the events of 1998 and 1999 were ‘being driven by Indonesian concerns not by the Australian Prime Minister’s carefully worded proposal.’

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139 ibid.
140 ibid.
142 ibid.
143 ibid, p 40.
144 Cotton J, 2004 op cit, p 91.
At a meeting with his advisers on 1 January 1999, Habibie agreed to give the East Timorese independence if they so wished. When Howard’s original letter arrived in late January 1999, it is reported that Habibie wrote the following comments in the margin of the letter:

If the question of East Timor becomes a burden to the struggle and image of the Indonesian people and if after 22 years the East Timor people cannot feel united with the Indonesia people, it would be reasonable and wise if by a decision of the Peoples Consultative Assembly, the 27th province of Indonesia can be honorably separated from the unitary nation of the Republic of Indonesia.

Shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1999, President Habibie’s Information Minister, Yunus Yosfiah, announced that ‘a regional autonomy package will be awarded to East Timor. If this is not accepted by the mass in East Timor, we will suggest to the new membership of the MPR, formed as a result of the next elections, to release East Timor from Indonesia.’ Cotton noted that this emerging policy might have been based on the assumption ‘that many in the military hierarchy had convinced themselves that the autonomy proposal would receive extensive and probably majority support.’ Regardless, in the spate of six months, Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor had shifted from integration to autonomy to possible independence.

DFAT records show that ‘the second half of 1998 saw escalating violence in East Timor and Habibie’s 27 January 1999 announcement had the effect of polarising politics further.’ As a consequence, Canberra became increasingly concerned about the ‘serious humanitarian consequences’ posed by the rise in this violence. On 27 April 1999, Howard met with Habibie in Bali, to discuss the security situation in East Timor. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, recorded part of the dialogue as follows:

150 Cotton J, 2004 op cit, p 60.
152 ibid.

256
Howard pressed a number of times and during the Bali meeting, in fact asked explicitly: Can I ask you, President, will you accept… an international peacekeeping force.

And the President said: You can ask, but the answer is no.

And Howard asked again: The President said: You can ask, but the answer is still no.\textsuperscript{133}

On 5 May 1999, a tripartite agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN was signed, which outlined the modalities for the ballot and Jakarta’s responsibilities toward security. However, Indonesia steadfastly refused any peacekeeping force for East Timor.\textsuperscript{134} This point is not surprising noting Indonesia’s historical paranoia associated with foreign forces, its background of colonisation, its war against the Dutch, its foreign policy of \textit{bebas aktif} and its adherence to ASEAN’s mantra of non interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In June 1999, the Australian Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Riding, met with senior TNI officials to discuss the security situation in East Timor. It was apparent from this meeting that Australia’s reading of the plight of the East Timorese and its recommended strategy of peacekeepers did not have support in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{135} Despite a difference in interpretation, Riding noted that Generals Sugiong and Yudhoyono displayed a degree of openness towards him.\textsuperscript{136} One of the interesting aspects of Riding’s meeting with his TNI counterparts was their belief in the righteousness of the current Indonesian policy toward East Timor.\textsuperscript{137} This point was not lost on Riding – in essence it meant that there was a fundamental difference in the way the TNI and the ADF viewed the security situation in the province. Whilst the TNI perceived the dilemma as implicating the Indonesian state as a whole, the ADF, representative of the Australian government’s view, saw the situation as more localised. Canberra perceived the deteriorating order within the province as a growing humanitarian crisis, which could only be resolved through some form of international intervention. These opposing positions were never reconciled and indeed, as the morass deepened, each state became more polarised in their interpretation of what the crisis actually meant and moreover on how best

\textsuperscript{133} ibid, p 79.
\textsuperscript{134} ibid, p 86.
\textsuperscript{136} Interview Air Marshall Riding, 21 September 2004, Canberra.
to tackle it. This divergence in attitude, can to a degree, be explained by their different cultural and environmental upbringing. For instance, the TNI adhere to such concepts as *dwi fungsi* or dual function,\(^{158}\) the Sapta Marga\(^ {159}\), Pancasila\(^ {160}\) and the Soldier's Oath;\(^ {161}\) themes which are foreign to the ADF soldier. These concepts are essential for understanding how the TNI think and operate - Sapta Marga soldiers 'cannot accept any form of the state other than the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia'.\(^ {162}\)

After Riding’s meeting in June 1999, the “community of interest” that developed for over two decades or more in the strategic and defence relationship began to erode. Riding observed that when he landed in Indonesia in early September 1999 and attempted to call on both Generals again, the response forthcoming from the TNI was ‘that they were too busy’\(^ {163}\).

From 28-31 July 1999, Downer made a visit to Jakarta and Dili – the latter unique in that it was the first time an Australian Minister had made such a call. DFAT noted that by the time of Downer’s visit, suggestions of Australian interference in East Timor had become a constant theme.\(^ {164}\) On 16 August 1999, Habibie stated that Indonesia was committed to resolving the East Timor issue. He commented:

> With regard to the East Timor issue, owing to the fact that the United Nations has not recognised it as part of the unified territory of the Republic of Indonesia and that therefore it has always become a hurdle for us in the international fora, the government has taken an initiative to solve the East Timor issue.\(^ {165}\)

\(^{157}\) ibid.


\(^{159}\) Seven axioms that define their characteristic.

\(^{160}\) Pancasila is the state ideology that expresses the ideals of the Indonesian nation as contained in the preamble to the 1945 constitution. It consists of five principles: Belief in One God, Just Humanity, Unity, Democracy, Social Justice.


\(^{162}\) ibid. p 34.

\(^{163}\) ibid.


\(^{165}\) ibid, p 38.
On 30 August 1999, as violence in the province continued to escalate, the ballot in East Timor was held. On 12 September 1999, Habibie acquiesced to international pressure for the introduction of peacekeepers in East Timor. Subsequently and reflective of a belief that Australia had spearheaded such a campaign, Indonesia abrogated the AMS on 16 September 1999. On 20 September 1999, INTERFET was deployed. Thus, the period between June–September 1999 represented a subtle transition in the security relationship.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: A NORMATIVE SHIFT

**Humanitarian Intervention**

Ricklefs observed that during the period in mention ‘the Australian government found itself facing transformations of unexpected magnitude and speed in Indonesia and spent most of its time trying to keep up.'\(^{166}\) This statement highlights the dilemma that Australia’s policy makers faced during the East Timor crisis. Hitherto, Australia’s approach to East Timor was underpinned by *Realpolitik* with a limited degree of liberal internationalism - this changed in 1999. From 8-12 September 1999, the Security Council Mission that had visited Jakarta and Dili recommended to the United Nations ‘that the humanitarian crisis be given topmost consideration.'\(^{167}\) Shortly thereafter, UNSCR 1264 which provided the framework of international intervention in East Timor proclaimed ‘the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organisations.'\(^{168}\) After Indonesia’s abrogation of the AMS in September 1999, Howard remarked ‘but none of this means that Australia’s objective can be to maintain a good relationship with Indonesia at all costs or at the expense of doing the right thing according to our values.'\(^{169}\) Howard expanded on this theme during Parliamentary Question Time. He stated:


\(^{168}\) UNSCR 1264 (1999), 15 September 1999.

The first truth is that foreign policy needs to be based on a clear sense of the national interest and on our values. Our relationships are most productive when they are realistic.\(^{170}\)

On 21 September 1999, Howard noted that 'national interest cannot be pursued without regard to the values of the Australian community.'\(^{171}\) This reflected a sea change in Australian strategic thinking. In 2000, Downer stated, 'the considerations that drove Australia to respond as it did to the post election violence were essentially humanitarian.'\(^{172}\) Similarly, in 2001, DFAT claimed that INTERFET was mandated by the Security Council to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.\(^{173}\) Alan Dupont observed that 'Australia was placing human rights concerns over East Timor ahead of its vastly more important relationship with Indonesia to the detriment of Australian national strategic interests and those of ASEAN.'\(^{174}\) In effect, 24 years of realist and rationalist thinking had been overturned by a new paradigm heavily influenced by liberal internationalism.

This intervention on humanitarian grounds is worthy of analysis. Bull argued that the society of states had not experimented with humanitarian intervention because of an 'unwillingness to jeopardise the rules of sovereignty and nonintervention by conceding such a right to individual states.'\(^{175}\) Wheeler concluded that in the majority of cases, states using humanitarianism as a means of justifying state intervention were actually motivated by self-interest and power seeking. Supporting this claim, he noted that Hitler reasoned his invasion of Czechoslovakia on humanitarian grounds.\(^{176}\) R J Vincent refuted this apologist approach and claimed that 'states should satisfy certain basic requirements of decency before they qualify for the protection which the principle of non intervention provides.'\(^{177}\) Vincent's point is that if states wish to benefit from society's norms (mutual recognition of sovereignty) then they must abide by a range of liberal statutes. N J Wheeler supported

\(^{170}\) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 September 1999, p 10029.

\(^{171}\) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 September 1999, p 10030.

\(^{172}\) Downer A, Australia Journal of International Affairs, Volume 54, Number 1, April 2000, p 8.


\(^{174}\) Dupont A, Australia Journal of International Affairs, Volume 54, Number 2, July 2000, p 164.


\(^{176}\) ibid, p 30.

Vincent’s thesis – he noted, ‘rules and norms both constrain and enable actors.’

Wheeler’s discourse of the interplay of humanitarianism is an illuminating work. He defined humanitarian intervention as ‘arising in cases where a government has turned the machinery of the state against its own people or where the state has collapsed into lawlessness.’ As a way of establishing a framework for humanitarian intervention, Wheeler contended that four grounds needed to be satisfied: just cause, force must be a last resort, proportionality and a high probability of a positive humanitarian outcome.

Howard, Downer, DFAT and the UNSC, all claimed that INTERFET’s remit was based on humanitarianism – and based on the events which occurred in the province during 1999, the humanitarian cause could easily be justified (at least along Wheeler’s lines). One of the key themes arising from Wheeler’s research was the delineation of humanitarian intervention pre and post 1990. During the Cold War, states were less inclined to act via humanitarian motives in case a superpower crisis evolved, or because one of the permanent members vetoes such resolutions, however, with the decline of bipolarity a new wave of humanitarianism ensued. Wheeler concluded by stating:

The key normative change in the 1990s was that the Security Council under pressure from Western governments – who were themselves responding to the demands of public opinion at home – increasingly interpreted its responsibilities as including the enforcement of global humanitarian norms.

In 1999, Kofi Annan deliberated on a similar theme by claiming, ‘this developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community.’

Endorsing Kofi Annan’s latter point, the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Arizal Effendi, delivered a speech to the National Press Club in 2000 where he stated, ‘what is worrying is the jingoism of using humanitarian pretexts to justify unilateral armed

179 ibid, p 27.
180 ibid, p 34.
181 ibid, p 289.
182 Secretary General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly 20 September 1999, Press Release SG/SM/7136.
intervention into the internal affairs of a developing country.\textsuperscript{183} In sum, it appears that since 1990 the society of states has become more adventurous in humanitarian ventures (Iraq no fly zones and safe havens 1991, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor). Australia, free from the Realpolitik restraints that the New Order had imposed on the relationship, joined this chorus of humanitarianism, culminating in a more liberal internationalist foreign policy and one based on "national values". This contemporary global movement towards humanitarianism carries certain risks that Bull alluded to in 1977. In particular, Bull perceived that the promotion of human rights on a world scale is subversive to "the coexistence among states on which the whole fabric of world order depends."\textsuperscript{184}

**The Demise of a Security Regime**

At the start of this chapter it was concluded that using Acharya’s model as a template, a defence community and a security regime had developed between the two states; in particular throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{185} With respect to the former model, Indonesia’s new found perception of Australia as a potential threat (overturning 45 years of strategic thinking), the inability of both states to cooperate during the deteriorating security situation in Dili, Indonesia’s abrogation of the AMS in September 1999 and Australia’s subsequent “freezing” of military ties in December, underscored the deterioration of this defence community.

Just as there was a demise in Defence community, there was a similar deterioration in the security regime. One consequence of the freezing of military ties was the added degree of opaqueness to what was a relatively transparent defence relationship. This change in focus prevented either state from influencing the other (thus at variance to Acharya’s first goal of a security regime). The second goal of contingency planning continued unabated. The

\textsuperscript{183} ‘Australia Journal of International Affairs’, Volume 54, Number 2, July 2000, p 164.
\textsuperscript{185} By way of reference, Acharya’s Defence community is composed of the following tenets: Common perception of external threats. Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies. Significant military inter operability.
final goal of peace was, in the minds of Indonesia’s statesman, no longer germane as Australia’s actions demonstrated a perceived propensity for militancy. Put simply, the events of 1999 directly led to the demise of a Defence community and security regime between Australia and Indonesia.

The “International Society” – in Decline or Ascendant?

Whilst regional order and “international society” were key attributes of the Australia-Indonesia relationship during the 1990s, the events of 1999 undermined this relationship. The abrogation of the AMS in September 1999, Australia’s severance of military ties in December and the overall hostility emanating from Jakarta characterised the demise of “society”. Wheeler observed that under Bull’s framework ‘the common procedural values of sovereignty and non-intervention enable states to provide for order.’ Put simply, Bull and the English School maintained that these principles constitute stability, certainty and order for “international society”. To that end, an argument could be put forward that ASEAN and its norms of mutual respect of independence and sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states could be considered as an ideal vehicle to develop Bull’s regional order. Refuting such a notion, James Cotton asserted that ASEAN’s position on East Timor fostered an atmosphere of regional disorder. He claimed:

In fact the East Timor case illustrates the major deficiency of regional organizations acting in the role of custodians of regional order, namely that as they generally include interested parties they can act in the global interest only rarely.

Moreover, Cotton noted that ASEAN’s response was ‘indicative of the limitations of this source of regional security order.’ Since ASEAN’s inception it has generally been considered that this forum, whilst not a security medium per se, has added to regional order

188 ibid, p 81.
through the dampening effect on member states. Proponents of the organisation lay claim that since ASEAN’s introduction in 1967 no member states have engaged in conflict, despite the numerous territorial disputes prevalent within the region.

Bull believed that interstate order was a necessary pre condition for intrastate order. Here a dilemma presents itself. In the case of East Timor, regional order which Australia, Indonesia and ASEAN espoused was contrary to justice. It now appears that the region’s ability to suppress the calls for East Timorese self-determination was a failure. This denial of justice only served to undermine the ordered system, which in the end collapsed as a whole, as evident by Australia and Indonesia’s actions/reactions in late 1999. Thus, East Timor presented a conundrum to Bull’s hypothesis; how can intrastate and interstate order coexist, and does order really prevail over justice?

Another point arising from this debate on “society”, is the contradiction between global and local society. At the heart of this debate is the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the province of East Timor. After the invasion in 1975, only the handful of states gave de jure recognition to Indonesia’s claim: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Albania, Benin, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Tanzania. In 1979, Australia became the only Western state to afford Indonesia this recognition. In 1995, the International Court of Justice affirmed that despite its de facto transition to Indonesia, that East Timor, de jure, remained a non self-governing territory with a right to self-determination. In the main, the non-aligned movement, the UN, and the Western Union did not grant de jure status to Indonesia. This leads to the important point, of the role of international law in the “society of states”.

Both Bull and Wight saw international law as ‘the most essential evidence for the existence of international society’. However, in an anarchical and self-help system, states are the prime agents, which determine and or validate such laws. As Wight noted, there is no


“sheriff”191 and there is no judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction.192 Wight’s observations, whilst not specific, allude to the conclusion that he regarded international law as between individual states and not as part of a collective.193 His line of reasoning was that if two states (in this case Australia and Indonesia) acknowledged each other’s sovereign status, then regardless of how peripheral actors viewed the situation, a local society is in existence. Bull’s interpretation of international law was somewhat different. Specific to this argument was Bull’s idea of a shift from “consent” to “consensus”, as the basic source of international law.194 Bull determined:

When there is an overwhelming solidarity in international society in favour of a view that a particular rule or course of action has the status of law, then recognition of its legal status cannot be averted merely because a particular recalcitrant state or group of states withholds its consent.195

Thus, whilst Wight perceived international law as defined by a recognition between individual states, Bull believed that ‘the will of the international community’ was paramount.196 Therefore, under Bull’s reading, Australia’s de jure recognition was in violation of international law, as the majority of international states, the ICJ, and the UN did not grant this same status. Extending this argument even further, one conclusion is that whilst Australia had established a local (and maybe flawed) “society” with Indonesia over a common view on East Timor, their stance was undermining “regional society” (disagreement within ASEAN), “ideological society” (non-aligned movement) and “global society” (the UN/ICJ’s decision to afford East Timor non self governing territory status).

191 There is a touch of irony with this concept and the Bulletin’s article in late 1999 quoting Howard’s Deputy Sheriff approach to regional security.
193 See Wight’s chapter on international society in: Wight, 1978, op cit, pp 105-112.
194 Bull, 1977, op cit, p 156.
195 ibid.
196 ibid.
The Fallout

By late 1999, the Australia-Indonesia security relationship was characterised by mistrust and suspicion, similar to the state of affairs in the mid 1960s. That said, whilst there are some parallels between the lead up to Confrontation and East Timor, the outcomes were different in that military conflict was avoided in the latter case. In May 2002 and March 2004, the author had a series of informal discussions with senior TNI officials in Jakarta. The thrust of their sentiments was similar; the TNI felt isolated over East Timor and Australia’s involvement had created a significant impediment to the establishment of normal relations between the two states. In essence, Australia had usurped the TNI’s long and bloodied history with East Timor and as a consequence the Indonesian military perceived that Australia was accountable for the loss of East Timor. Thus, the TNI’s animosity to Australia related directly to this loss. This view, however, is different to that held by Indonesia’s political elite. Habibie, Alatas and the Department of Foreign Affairs were critical of Australia’s leading role in INTERFET and the sensitive issue of foreign peacekeepers. As part of Jakarta’s rationalisation for its abrogation of the AMS, the Department of Foreign Affairs announced that ‘the attitude and actions of Australia on the questions of East Timor have not been helpful in the efforts to maintain bilateral relations with Indonesia.’ In further emphasising the Department’s disquiet with Australia, Alatas stated ‘but precisely because the change from a country which we perceive to be our friend it became more stark to us this sudden overzealous attitude of wanting to get troops on the ground and being very critical.’ For the political and non military element of Indonesian politics, the crucial issue that undermined cooperative bilateral relations was not the change of sovereignty of East Timor, but rather, the intervention of foreign troops – where Australia assumed a leading role.

In essence, there appears to be two strands of thought within Indonesia about Australia’s role in East Timor’s independence. The political elite’s concern rested on the fact that foreign troops, led by Australia, intervened in a domestic security issue. The TNI were not as discerning and believed that Australia’s role was central to the loss of East Timor per se.

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198 ibid.
The most pressing question arising from the preceding discussion is why, despite the vastly different attitudes of Australia and Indonesia and the likely fact that the militia were being led or supported by TNI senior commanders, that this crisis did not lead to outright military conflict between the two states. To that end, one possible explanation for the absence of military conflict in 1999 rests with Doyle’s Democratic Peace Theory.

**Democratic Peace Theory**

Two centuries ago, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant put forward the notion of a “peaceful union” or a zone of peace between liberal states. In the early 1980s, Michael Doyle reinvigorated the debate on Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and argued that the absence of conflict for the last 200 years between democratic states lends weight to the notion that democracies will not fight other democracies.

As outlined in chapter 1, there are two main bodies of opinion, which seek to explain the principles of DPT. The first school can be labelled the monadic proposition, whereby it is a state’s regime type that determines its propensity to wage war with all other states. In this situation, institutional constraints on leaders in a democracy inhibit their ability to enter into conflict. The other prevailing school and perhaps the more convincing one, is the dyadic proposition, where democracies are less likely to wage war against democracies and are no less likely to wage war against non democracies. Underpinning this hypothesis is the sharing of cultural/democratic norms. Wagner concluded that “states with democratic norms and culture may form a collective identity that prevents the violent escalation of disputes between them.” The question that is relevant to this thesis is; did the forces identified by DPT restrain Australia and Indonesia from entering into outright conflict during the intervention of INTERFET? After 1998, Indonesia commenced the slow walk to democratisation with Habibie holding general elections in late 1999. A DPT

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199 Note: Kant did not specially refer to democratic states.
202 ibid.
203 ibid.
interpretation would suggest that Indonesia's more democratic nature prevented the ADF and ABRI from engaging in conflict as restraints on both states prevented the dispute from escalating. Identifying these restraints is a complex challenge. Buzan noted that these restraints are nearly always 'partial in effect, obscure in operation, and the result of complex interactions among many factors both internal and external.'

Whether a shared democratic perspective prevented Australia and Indonesia from engaging in military conflict is both hypothetical and almost impossible to conclusively prove or disprove. That said, the approach suggests a number of observations can be made about INTERFET and ABRI. Australia's intervention, though done with the assent of Jakarta, undermined ABRI's long and bloodied involvement in maintaining a sense of order in its 27th province. During Confrontation, Australian and Indonesian forces engaged in military conflict over an issue with far less strategic, political, or psychological significance than East Timor's independence. From Australia's vantagepoint, its awareness of Indonesia's movement towards democratisation may, unlike during Confrontation, have restrained military engagement between the ADF and ABRI. For example, the Howard government steadfastly refused to countenance the deployment of INTERFET until Habibie's approval. This is important to note, because there are a number of parallels in the way Jakarta scripted the conflict during Confrontation and East Timor's independence vote. In the former case Sukarno declared that soldiers acting in Borneo were "volunteers", in the latter case, Habibie noted that "militia" were acting in their own interest. This modus operandi of "distancing" itself from conflict has been a common feature in Indonesia's history. The point being, that during Confrontation, Australia did not hesitate to land troops in the disputed Borneo area, in order to engage in combat with Indonesian soldiers. Conversely, in 1999, there was a much more tempered view in Canberra; which may be accounted for by the forces of DPT. In a similar manner, Indonesia's more open and liberal outlook saw the emergence of a distinctly negative sentiment by sections of the populace against ABRI. Indeed, in 2000, the ABRI Commander was replaced by a Navy Admiral (Widono), the first time that such an event had occurred in Indonesian history. The analysis (from

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206 It should be pointed out that during Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in 1975, Suharto similarly exclaimed that volunteers acting on their own behalf were engaging in conflict in the province.
Indonesia’s perspective) supports the monadic proposition, which implies that institutional constraints curtail a state’s desire to wage war.

The Role of ASEAN

The final point to be illustrated in this discourse is the role of ASEAN during 1999. In September 1999, Air Marshall Doug Riding was dispatched on a mission to harvest regional support for INTERFET. Alan Dupont observed, ‘it was the first time that ASEAN members had demonstrated a preparedness to play a significant political and military role in regional conflict management.’\(^{207}\) This is not entirely correct. Firstly, ASEAN as a collaborative political organisation could not, or would not act on the East Timor issue. Even as security in the province rapidly spiralled out of control, ASEAN made no moves to publicly express an opinion either on the situation or on how to resolve it. Secondly, during Riding’s regional tour he was chartered with the responsibility of ascertaining what level of support respective states would provide; the ‘jewel in the crown’ being Malaysia. Its geographic proximity to Indonesia, its distinctive culture and its political weight and influence within ASEAN, made it a prize objective for Australia. Despite repeated assurances that it would provide up to a Battalion group for INTERFET it rescinded on its initial undertaking and withdrew from the force.\(^{208}\) In effect, regional multilateralism was found wanting and in place a series of bilateral dialogues were initiated.

Summary

In 1974, Samuel Huntington dubbed the Portuguese coup the ‘implausible beginning of a world wide movement to democracy.’\(^{209}\) Whilst Huntington may have been premature in his hypothesis, there is no doubt that the coup had a long-term impact on the Australia-Indonesia security relationship. After 1975, successive Australian governments made a conscious effort to stabilise the relationship and in the words of Gareth Evans, add some “ballast” to it. In justifying previous governmental policy, Evans argued that “there was


\(^{208}\) Interview Air Marshall Riding, 21 September 2004, Canberra.

little or nothing any Australian government could have done at the time to limit or reverse the annexation and successive governments since conscious of international realities have accepted its irreversibility. From a theoretical angle, up to 1999, the “convergence of interests” between the two states facilitated the growth in “international society”, Defence community and security regime. In 1997, the Asian economic crisis sparked its own crisis in Indonesia and shortly thereafter Australia.

One machination of East Timor’s independence was the role played by non-state actors. Hitherto, global and regional security incidents were resolved through the exchange, interaction and influence of states as the primary actors in world politics. However, East Timor’s independence can be largely attributed to pressure from a variety of non-state actors. After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Bush’s New World Order saw a global demise in Realpolitik. In turn, this facilitated the horizontal and vertical growth in the influence of non-state actors in International Relations. Canberra’s policy shift on East Timor appeared to be consistent with a global phenomenon of humanitarianism. Howard’s statement that ‘national interest cannot be pursued without regard to the values of the Australian community’ was indicative of Australia’s more liberal attitude. That said, it would be wrong to lay claim that East Timor represented the start of the “end of history”. Importantly, the events of 1999 were only able to occur after the downfall of Suharto – to some degree the latent forces of liberal internationalism had become hostage to the tenets of realism.

Australia’s non-realist action of intervening for humanitarian reasons and thus upsetting its strategic relationship with Indonesia had a spiral impression on Indonesia. Jakarta’s abrogation of the AMS, the ensuing wave of public demonstrations in Jakarta against Australia and the intense degree of hostility and suspicion that was seen amongst Indonesia’s key policy makers had not been seen before in the relationship. For the first time, Jakarta displayed a sense of fear and suspicion about Canberra’s motives. The irony is that Australia understood its policy to be liberal, but, Indonesia interpreted this as a threat to its own security – here a non-realist action had inspired a realist counter reaction.

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The ultimate demise in international society between the two states brings the dilemma of Bull's order and justice to the fore. Despite a regional effort to prevent East Timor's independence movement from threatening this order, the intrastate (dis)order in the province eventually spilled over to the rest of the region, resulting in a condition of regional instability. Notwithstanding this debate, Canberra and Jakarta's mutual acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty of East Timor was shown to be in violation of global and even regional "society". Australia and Indonesia were satisfied that a society existed over East Timor, at a time when the majority of other members of Bull's community were dissatisfied with this interpretation. In essence, Bull's vocabulary of international society can be further developed and refined to include the inherent tension between "exclusive society" and "inclusive society".

Finally, Doyle's hypothesis of DPT was examined, with particular reference to the restraining influence that Indonesia's transition to democracy had on the conflict in East Timor. Under similar circumstances three decades earlier, Australian and Indonesian forces had engaged in conflict, though in 1999, as Jakarta was beginning to dismantle the vestiges of the New Order and transcend the crucible of authoritarianism, military battle was avoided.
ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

INTRODUCTION

In 1939, Carr observed that ‘few things are permanent in history’. This citation underscores the turbulence that has been such a feature in the Australia-Indonesia security relationship - which has been characterised by periods of cooperation, interspersed with rapid phases of decline and conflict. It is no coincidence that of the five security issues analysed, all centred on Indonesia and in only one of these instances was Australia a principal party. However, this has not prevented Australia from viewing issues relating to Indonesian security as relating therefore, to Australian security. This historic preoccupation with Indonesia can be traced back to Australia’s colonial origins, where the population and successive governments harboured fears of a northern invasion from known or unknown states and peoples; a fear brought close to realisation in period 1941-2. As newly independent Indonesia was the closest state, which could initiate, assist or thwart this invasion, it is not surprising that Australia viewed its northern neighbour with such concern.

In a similar manner, Indonesia’s colonial heritage instilled in its many ethnic groupings a deep-seated fear and suspicion of imperial states – though Australia never featured highly in Indonesia’s threat perceptions. It is interesting to contrast Australia and Indonesia’s colonial history since the turn of the 19th century. In Australia’s case, its threat perceptions were, to a large degree, shaped by a fear of predatory foreign and especially Asian powers seeking to influence and at times acquire Australian territory. Correspondingly, up until 1945, the indigenous inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies perceived the rule of a foreign imperial state as their primary threat. By 1945, when Sukarno and Hatta declared independence, there were some parallels as well as some key differences in Australia and Indonesia’s threat perceptions. This combined history explains some of the attitudes that each state brought to the table at the start of their relationship; accordingly, it would have been unrealistic to expect either to immediately dispense with the weight of history, built on assumptions, fears, prejudices and anxieties.
CHAPTER REVIEW

Chapter 1 focused on theoretical security concepts as a way of forming a reference and benchmark for the rest of the thesis. These security perspectives and concepts were divided along two lines of thinking: those that focused on conflict and those that inspire cooperation. As a result, the study analysed the spectrum of IR security theory; including realism, rationalism and at the other end of the security pendulum, liberalism.

Chapter 2 analysed the Republic’s war for independence from 1945–49, and how through Canberra’s activism the birth of the Australia-Indonesia security relationship occurred. Global security arrangements and the ideological divergence between East and West were the distinguishing features of this security environment. Whilst the Republicans were celebrating a newfound independence, Australia was still recovering from a Japanese southward advance which was only halted by an allied effort in New Guinea. There is little wonder then, that Australia viewed the local and regional political order as central to its security planning and thus any change to the geo-strategic status quo was viewed with intense trepidation. Moreover, Indonesia’s independence struggle occurred at a unique moment in history when the two superpowers were pressing states to join their bloc.

Indonesia’s security perspective was both more and less complex than Australia’s. In 1945, the Republican movement’s primary motivation was a desire for independence and threatening this quest was a returning imperial force. Hence, one could argue that Indonesia’s security concerns, at the moment of its creation, were far simpler than Australia’s confused amalgam, however, Indonesia’s war for independence masked a current of latent security issues that were to emerge after 1949. Whilst Indonesia viewed colonialism with intense suspicion, this did not prevent it from entering into de facto alliances with imperial states. For Jakarta, ideology and cultural similarity played no part in its alliance strategy. Further, its moderate systemic status in the emerging bipolar world, facilitated and to some degree heightened the degree of leverage that Jakarta had over Washington and Moscow.

Australia’s WWII alliance with the United States to combat an expansionist Japan, Curtin’s declaration that Australia’s security rested with Washington, the global power
division of East and West and Australia's legacy of strategic isolation acted in way that
Canberra saw Washington as its "great and powerful friend". That said, this asymmetric
alliance did not proffer Australia all the strategic benefits that it had hoped for – this was a
manifestation of Australia's local security focus as opposed to America's more global
outlook.

Ultimately, Australia's decision to support the Republican movement, in initial opposition
to the Western alliance, was grounded on realist principles. Whilst Evatt, Burton and
Chifley shared a degree of anti-colonial sentiment, this was not the primary motivation for
Australia's position. Indeed, Canberra's stance from 1945 to early 1947 saw it support
Dutch rule with a measure of indigenous autonomy as the most suitable "end state" for the
archipelago. Whilst it is problematic to speculate what would have happened if the Dutch
and Republicans had achieved a lasting settlement before the First Police Action in 1947,
indications are that Australia would have been satisfied with this outcome. The vexing
issue for Canberra was that any protraction in the dispute posed a direct threat to
Australian security. An unstable northern neighbour was perceived as fertile ground for
possible insurrection and as the dispute continued the likelihood of communist intervention
increased – so the thinking went. To that end, Canberra determined that a fragile colonial
government would not be able to provide Australia with the necessary protection from
northern threats. Finally, Australia and Indonesia forged a cooperative security
relationship in order to satisfy their individual strategic interests, though, once the war had
been won, the alliance became irrelevant and a chasm began to emerge in the relationship.

Chapter 3 looked at the period from 1950-62 and how the West Irian crisis between
Indonesia and the Netherlands shaped the security relationship between Indonesia and
Australia. From late 1949 to early 1950, a host of simultaneous events unsettled the
cooperative nature of the early relationship. In Australia, the rise to power of the Menzies'
led Liberal Party saw a range of forces percolate to the fore, namely, his nostalgia for
European colonialism coupled with his deep-rooted fear of communism. The forthcoming
Korean War only served to heighten Australia's historic concern about its strategic
vulnerability – this time it perceived a monolithic communist menace to its north as the
primary threat. In concert with these domestic and international circumstances, Canberra
considered West Irian under Dutch control as a fundamental building block in its
“perimeter defence concept”. In addition, Jakarta’s increasingly militant rhetoric, the introduction of “Guided Democracy” and Indonesia’s growing alliance with China, saw Australia identify its neighbour as now a threat to its security rather than a bulwark from approaching threats. Canberra attempted to solicit political and military support from Washington for its West Irian campaign. This support was not forthcoming as Indonesia’s moderate systemic position coupled with America’s determination not to drive Jakarta toward the “left” saw Washington adopt a “detached” and eventually pro Indonesian stance.

Within Indonesia, the events after 1949 were no less tumultuous. As Kahin and Feith observed, the transfer of sovereignty had both a positive and a negative impact on the island chain. As a consequence of independence, a host of divisive forces had now been unleashed. Whilst some of the more conservative “administrators” in Indonesia saw the revolution as complete, Sukarno and his “solidarity makers” viewed the revolution as just beginning - West Irian was to be part of this revolutionary tradition. In the end, Indonesia’s strategic concept of drohende Kriegegefaehr obliged Australia to redraw its supposedly fixed “line in the sand”.

Chapter 4 examined Indonesia’s campaign of Confrontation against the new state of Malaysia. This issue saw Indonesia and Britain as the principal protagonists and for its time, it was the most volatile security issue in the Asian theatre, with Australia joining Britain as part of a Commonwealth effort to defend the new state of Malaysia. Moreover, this dispute was unique, as Australian and Indonesian forces engaged in military conflict. With the “Jakarta-Peking axis” gaining energy, Australia perceived the two states as strategically united. Whilst Australia’s security gaze was now firmly locked on its northern neighbour, Indonesia displayed a sense of strategic “indifference” to Australia – indeed Jakarta’s vision was focused internally and externally to its north. These different orientations prevented the development of a “security spiral” as Australia’s arms build up (epitomised by the decision to acquire the F-111) was ignored by Indonesia. Finally, as in the West Irian case, the US was reluctant to intervene, though it did act as a moderating influence on London.

Chapter 5 analysed Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and the interrelationship with
Australia over this issue. The events of September 1965 initiated a chain reaction within
the archipelago that irrevocably changed the very fabric of Indonesian society. Around the
same time, Menzies handed the Prime Ministership over to Holt. Consequently, the two
key protagonists who had resolutely shaped Australia and Indonesia’s security policies had
departed the scene. Following this, both states worked hard to put the past behind them.
Apart from the change in its domestic landscape, Australia faced a transformed regional
security environment. Nixon’s 1969 "Guam Doctrine", Britain’s "East of Suez" withdrawal, the ongoing war in Vietnam, US détente with the USSR and US
rapprochement with China highlighted, more than ever, the importance of Asian regional
security to Canberra. These dynamics were not lost on Whitlam, who was determined to
form closer political and strategic relations with Jakarta. Similarly, Suharto’s rise
represented a paradigm shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Thus, the period leading up to
1974 saw a “convergence of interests” between Australia and Indonesia.

Portuguese Timor’s political and security deterioration in 1974 was not welcomed by
either Australia or Indonesia – in reality both were intent on preserving the regional status
quo. As it became apparent that this status quo could not be maintained, Australia and
Indonesia embarked on a series of diplomatic discussions to achieve a mutually agreeable
solution. Much has been made of Indonesia ignoring Australia’s call for an act of self-
determination and to a degree this criticism is valid. However, another aspect that is often
overlooked is the fact that for the first time since 1945, Australia and Indonesia entered
into dialogue at the highest level in order to resolve a serious regional security issue.
Throughout this dialogue, Australia’s overriding consideration was the maintenance of
amicable relations with Indonesia and a preference for regional order. Indonesia’s
motivation throughout was in stark contrast to that which it espoused during Confrontation.
Ten years after the height of the Jakarta-Peking alliance, Indonesia’s primary security
anxiety was now centred on Chinese communism. Therefore, both states (though for
different reasons) viewed Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor as the most preferred
option. This event further galvanised elements of international society, which had been
emerging since 1968 and shortly thereafter some elements of a security regime developed
between the two – essentially a sense of cooperation had reemerged in the security
relationship.
Chapter 6 reviewed the period from 1976 to 1999 and specifically East Timor's sudden progression towards independence in 1998-9. After 1975, both states endeavoured to develop a cooperative security relationship, which was highlighted by the 1995 AMS. As Habibie was stamping his imprimatur on the Reform Order, he unleashed a range of restive forces involving East Timor. By the middle of 1999, Australia's foreign policy towards East Timor had changed – this time favouring a more liberal approach of humanitarianism. As the security situation in East Timor deteriorated, pressure from NGOs and a range of diverse groups/organisations steadily mounted on Habibie's fragile order. In response to the Australian led INTERFET, Indonesia abrogated the AMS in September 1999. Here, a non-realist action of humanitarian intervention had a realist consequence on the Indonesian state, whereby, Indonesia now viewed Australia with a degree of trepidation and arguably for the first time, as a source of security concern.

THE GREAT POWERS

The configuration of the great powers and their patterns of amity and enmity over the 50 years of this study undoubtedly influenced the Australia-Indonesia relationship. However, the role of the US, the USSR and China during the five sets of events is noteworthy, less for their direct and declared involvement but rather, for their reluctance to openly intervene in the disputes. Notwithstanding that the USSR trained Musso who led the Madiun Rebellion in 1948, the CIA's role in the PRRI revolt in 1958 and the Chinese-PKI linkage, these states generally displayed a substantial unwillingness to militarily interfere in order to shape a final outcome. Diplomatic lobbying through the UN was common, arms sales during the 1960s was prolific, and subterfuge was evident, but apart from these actions the great powers, whilst influential, did not see benefits in direct military intervention. Diagram 1 illustrates the general level of participation of these three states during Indonesia's war for independence, the dispute over West Irian, Confrontation, Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor and East Timor's independence.
Diagram 1: US, USSR, China - Direct Involvement in Security Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War for independence</td>
<td>Low¹/Involved²</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Irian</td>
<td>Low/Involved</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor 1975</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor 1999</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This diagram shows that generally the US adopted a low-level approach, only intervening at the last moment in two of these issues (Indonesia's war for independence and West Irian). It is a testament to US power, that when it did decide to intervene, these disputes were rapidly resolved. During the Sukarno era, the US was reluctant to openly defy the Jakarta administration lest Indonesia shift its already "left" leaning allegiance further towards Moscow or Peking. In addition, during the 1960s, the US was becoming embroiled in one major conflict in Asia and thus was hesitant to engage on another front. In the 1970s, the White House viewed the pro-Western regime of Suharto as a bulwark against communist expansion (in particular after the defeat in Vietnam). Accordingly, in 1975 the US signalled to Suharto that it would not meddle in East Timor and in turn opted for a detached approach. Finally, in 1999, the US did not directly exert influence on the Habibie government. Generally, these policies did not sit well with successive Australian governments. In the first three cases, Canberra's local strategic objectives were at variance to those of Washington. On a number of occasions (specifically during the West Irian dispute and Confrontation), Australia attempted to invoke ANZUS Treaty obligations, only to be told that the US had no intention of committing military resources to such ventures.

¹ Low meaning detached and non-committed.
² Involved meaning actively pursuing resolution of the dispute through a declaration of interest.
The USSR saw the Republican cause as fertile ground to be toiled in the developing world and thus offered diplomatic support to the nationalist quest. During Indonesia's war for independence and the West Irian dispute it played a key, if not destabilising influence in achieving a solution. Confrontation posed an ideological dilemma for the Soviets and it was forced to remain non-committal. After G30S, and with the advent of détente in the early 1970s, Moscow's influence on Indonesian politics further diminished. By 1999, Russia as the main successor state to the USSR, was far more focused on domestic matters than to intervene in offshore ventures. China's involvement peaked during Confrontation. The Sino-Soviet split saw China compete not only against the US but also against the Soviets for influence within Southeast Asia. However, similar to Moscow, after Indonesia's coup and counter coup of 1965, Peking's influence waned.

Modelski made the point that Southeast Asia could be regarded as subordinate to the world wide international system and that this sub system 'was composed of a cluster of small powers which were peculiarly susceptible to the influence of great powers.' Whilst Modelski's analysis maybe valid, it needs to be placed in context of other regional sub-systems such as Northeast Asia. To that end, Indonesia represented a case study of Realpolitik for the wider Southeast Asian region. Whilst the great powers displayed a willingness to intercede in the affairs of Northeast Asian states (US and China during the Korean War and the US in Vietnam) and South Asian disputes (China in India in 1962), these same powers were reluctant to militarily engage in Indonesia's or Australia's area of strategic concern.

In Nijman's analytical study of superpower competition, he mapped out the worldwide intensity of indirect conflict between the US and USSR from 1945-1992. From 1948-1952 and 1953-1962 he did not record any evidence of indirect activity in Indonesia, from 1963-68 he noted moderate activity (as a result of Confrontation) and from then onwards the two superpowers showed no interest in the archipelago. The nature of interstate relations can,

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3 Modelski, G, 1962, SEATO, Cheshire, Melbourne, p 3
to a degree, explain this condition. Morrison and Suhrke argued that unlike Indonesia, both Korea and Vietnam were intense systemic states – that is they were the focal point of competition amongst the great powers. Conversely, Indonesia’s non-aligned status whilst allowing it a degree of flexibility and leverage amongst the superpowers had an additional upside (for Indonesia) in that the great powers did not feel compelled to intercede through “balance of power” politics. Australian politicians have, at times, not easily accepted this phenomenon. Despite concerted attempts by Australia to drag the US into successive Indonesian crises, the US understandably refused to commit itself.

One conclusion that can be drawn from this, is that since 1945, the Southeast Asian region (excluding Indochina) whilst being subject to great power influence, has nevertheless been immune to great power military conflict as a consequence of its relatively limited strategic value. I use the term relative to denote that in comparison to the European, North Asian and East Asian theatres, its place in the overall “balance of power” has not deemed it worthy of foreign power intervention.

AUSTRALIA’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Australia’s threat perceptions over the period reflected a broad range of individual, state and systemic forces. With the geostrategic climate dominated by the Cold War, Australia’s threat perceptions were focused primarily on the Soviets in the 1940s and the Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s. As these perceived threats had to come through the Indonesian archipelago, Canberra’s strategic focus was clearly on its northern neighbour and the other islands that formed part of Australia’s “perimeter defence concept”. Subsequently, US rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviets in the 1970s made Australia’s threat perceptions less clearly defined and more difficult to discern. By the time of Portugal’s withdrawal from Timor, Australia’s strategic focus centred on regional stability and order. From this premise, Indonesia and its doctrine of “regional resilience” was seen as the most appropriate and best-suited medium to achieve this order.

Chapter 2 highlighted the unique and independent nature of Australian foreign policy during the latter part of the 1940s. During the Republic’s war for independence, Chifley believed that “engaging” with other regional states could best satisfy Australian security.
Throughout the Menzies era, Australian policy was structured around an “Asian threat” and the best defence against this threat was alliances with “great and powerful friends”. After Menzies, Australia opted for a more regional security outlook that culminated in Evans’ notion of “comprehensive engagement” with the Asian region.

In reviewing Australia’s security orientation since 1945, it can be argued that in the first three issues, Canberra’s policies were steeped in realism. Yet it would be erroneous to conclude that Australia was representative of an archetypal realist state whose focus was on maximising power. More accurately, Australia’s intent was to preserve the strategic status quo. The fourth issue discussed (Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975), saw Canberra’s attitude swing slightly towards a rationalist approach – in essence its policy was now more closely aligned to the development of “international society”, though one not recognised by the wider community based on international law. The final security episode culminated in Australia assuming a liberal security outlook – one enmeshed in humanitarianism. The aforementioned evaluation indicates that Australia’s security policy migrated from realism to rationalism and then humanitarian liberalism. It is no coincidence that this oscillation was in harmony with the machinations of great power competition. As this rivalry moderated, Australia’s security policies fluctuated in response – epitomised in 1999, when in the absence of external state interference, Australia embarked on a policy defined by “national values.”

INDONESIA’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Indonesia’s security perspectives were similar to that of many post WWII ex-colonial states. These economically weak countries were left to fuse nation and state together in a complex geo-political environment. Their contempt for colonialism was only matched by their rejection of global bi-polarity. One of the more important points to note from this thesis is the role of external forces on Indonesia’s security perspectives. Typically, Indonesia has been characterised as a state with an internal security outlook, which is explained by its vulnerability to divisive forces operating within its borders. J Ann Tickner summarised this sentiment by claiming that ‘internal security [of Southern states] is the
greatest threat. This view accords with the majority of security literature on Indonesia, which is focused on the internal dimension. One of the leading commentators of Indonesia’s strategic culture, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, noted, ‘it has been mentioned repeatedly that Indonesia’s defence outlook tends to be inward-looking.’ Notwithstanding the credibility of both observers, structural forces have resolutely influenced Indonesia’s security perspectives since 1945. These structural forces have included a war against a colonial power, an aversion to imperialism in the 1950s and 1960s (epitomised by the conflict between NEFOS and OLDEFOS), a fear of Chinese communism in the 1970s and 1980s and the influence of non-state actors in the 1990s. Put simply, the Old, New and Reform Orders have had to deal with a multitude of external security challenges. However, this is not to infer that the Indonesia’s threat perceptions have been exclusively exogenous. Regionalism, separatism and a host of other discordant forces and incidents including, the Madiun Affair, PRRI, G30S, the GAM in Aceh, the OPM in Papua and the East Timorese have been instrumental in shaping Indonesia’s security perspectives. More accurately, Indonesia’s security has been influenced by a fusion of internal and external dynamics. This conclusion is at variance too much mainstream security thinking on Indonesia, which has focused on the internal elements of its threat perceptions.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The previous chapters have systemically sought to assess the events from 1945 -1999 against Bull’s idea of an “international society”. From this comparative analysis a number of themes emerge. First, there was a strong correlation between Bull’s goal of respecting the sovereignty of states and of the conflictual/cooperative state of the security relationship. In periods where both states were in agreement with Indonesian concepts of sovereignty, the relationship was invariably cooperative. For example, Australia’s emphatic attitude towards the nationalist’s cause during the Republic’s war against the Dutch and support for Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor resulted in a cooperative state of affairs. Conversely, when Australia disputed or violated Indonesian perceptions of

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sovereignty, such as during the West Irian issue and East Timor’s independence vote in 1999, then the relationship quickly deteriorated.

Second, a notable omission from the preceding case studies is Confrontation. This issue was unique for a variety of reasons, not just as it was the only dispute that resulted in military conflict between Australia and Indonesia. More relevant to this discussion was the fact that this period of conflict was not intrinsically about Indonesian sovereignty. In this case, it can be argued that it was Sukarno’s unwillingness to adhere to Bull’s concept of co-existence that frustrated the security relationship with Britain and Australia. Sukarno’s withdrawal from the UN in January 1965, his intention to establish a rival organisation known as the CONEFOS (Conference of the New Emerging Forces), his efforts to match the International Olympic Committee with GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces) and the building of an anti-imperialist axis comprising ‘Djakarta-Phnom Pehn-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang’ also reflected the exception to “coexistence”. Put simply, the potential for “international society” between Australia and Indonesia was fractured as a result of Sukarno’s disdain of the prevailing norms of international institutions, his inability to coexist with OLDEFO states and his desire to reorder the international political system. By early 1965, Indonesia had rejected the idea of “international society”. In Bull’s terms, Indonesia had reverted to a country merely functioning in a “system of states” – in this case Australia and Indonesia were not bound by common interests or values, nor were they bound by common rules nor were they co-operating in the working of common institutions.⁶

Third, previous chapters highlighted the dilemma between order and justice. This was particularly relevant during the incorporation and subsequent independence of East Timor. During Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975, both Australia and Indonesia used the pretext of “order” to justify this action. Bull noted, that the ‘basic compact of coexistence between states expressed in the exchange of recognition of sovereign jurisdiction, implies a conspiracy of silence entered into by governments about

⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 1996, Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamraja, Australia-Asian Papers No 75, Griffith University, p 33.
⁷ ibid, p 14.
the rights and duties of their respective citizens." It is important to remember that Bull's vision of order was indicative of rationalism's middle path approach between realism and liberalism. Carr interpreted order as being a condition accepted by the satisfied powers — he claimed that 'order can only be built on a unit of power.' Carr was alluding to the possibility (indeed probability) that dissatisfied powers would never be content with the "ordered system" and consequently these same states would attempt to undermine the status quo. His reasoning was similar to Morgenthau's thesis of revisionist and status quo powers. As chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, whilst Australia was satisfied with the prevailing state of order, Indonesia adopted a contrary view — one held by a dissatisfied and revisionist power.

As chapter 6 demonstrated, interstate order may have been satisfied by Australia and Indonesia's position, but intrastate order was only compounded by such a policy. In turn the intrastate (dis)order served to undermine the order between Australia and Indonesia. One could surmise by the preceding discussion that Australia sought to promote the principles of order whilst Indonesia was predisposed toward justice (in its varying guises). This is too stark a way of judging the actions of the two agents during this period. As Bull noted, the Third World had a stake in international order just as the Western Union embraced certain principles of justice in their security outlook.

Finally, the issue of which state was the rightful ruler of East Timor posed considerable challenges to the international community. Whilst Australia gave de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereign status over East Timor, no doubt in the name of furthering their bilateral relationship and to prevent the "vinegar from spoiling the milk", the absence of widespread agreement on this matter undermined the broader aspects of "international society". As noted in chapter 6, this peculiarity of exclusive and inclusive society, is a derivative of Bull's mainstream argument of "international society".

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SECURITY ALLIANCES

Chapter 1 drew together a range of political theorists who have made a contribution to the debate on alliance formation. Wight, Morgenthau, Walt, and Morrison and Suhrke’s concepts were examined. Morgenthau observed that during an alliance the objectives and policies of the member states are less clear than their identification of a mutual enemy.\(^{11}\) This is reminiscent of the ambiguities that were a feature of ANZUS. In this case, each party had a different interpretation of how and when ANZUS’ obligations would be enacted and this was demonstrated during the West Irian and Confrontation disputes. As a subset of this ambiguity, Australia was forced to bandwagon when it could not muster great power support. Walt understood this dilemma when he posited the idea that “weak states are more likely to bandwagon when allies are simply unavailable.”\(^ {12}\) During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Australia went to great lengths to bring the US into the debate on West Irian against the Indonesians. The province was claimed to be vital to Australian security, yet, when it failed to muster the great power support that it needed, it sided with Indonesia. Two years later the situation was reversed over Malaya. Australia was prepared to engage in conflict (over a state with lesser strategic value than West Irian) because Britain’s role filled the great power vacuum that it needed (this still did not prevent Canberra from attempting to solicit Washington’s support for the cause). This thesis has highlighted the fact that smaller powers in an asymmetric security relationship will generally have their interests subordinated by those of its more powerful ally. In this case Australia’s local interests gave way to America’s global interests.

Paradoxically, Indonesia’s foreign policy dogma of active and non-aligned gave it a remarkable degree of leverage in dealing with the great powers. Indonesia’s position as a moderate systemic state acted as a “force multiplier”, whereby the larger states acted in competition to court Jakarta’s support. This situation was greatest during the period 1945-1970 when superpower competition was at its zenith. It still remained a factor in the early 1970s as demonstrated during Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor when the US signalled to Indonesia that it would not interfere in the dispute. Importantly, as the thaw in

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\(^{11}\) Morgenthau, 1967, op cit, p 177.

\(^{12}\) ibid, p 222.
the Cold War increased Jakarta’s ability to influence the superpowers commensurately declined. This was nowhere better highlighted than in 1999 when the UNSC unanimously voted 14 times against the way Indonesia was handling the East Timor crisis.

WALTZ’S IMAGES

There can be no question as to the influence of great power competition on Australia and Indonesia’s strategic policies. On face value, this supports Waltz’s notion of the primacy of structural forces in guiding state behaviour. In part, Waltz saw the international structure as both “constraining” and “propelling” state actions.\(^{13}\) He concluded the reason behind this was that states were ‘like units’,\(^{14}\) however, this assertion discounts the role played by individual state leaders. The preceding chapters have explored at length the idiosyncrasies of Australian and Indonesian leaders. During the latter part of the 1940s, Chifley and Evatt drove Australia closer toward the Republican movement despite opposition from Conservative political leaders. With a change of government in 1949 Australia’s policy towards Indonesia changed significantly. In parallel, Sukarno almost single-handedly shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy, which was at times contrary and independent of the interests of both Western and Eastern powers. In the late 1960s, Australia and Indonesia’s foreign policies undertook a volte-face — in part a function of the change in political leadership in both states. During the 1990s, Suharto, Alatas, Keating and Evans formed a formidable relationship, which resulted in the 1995 AMS. Despite the strong relationship that existed between the two states, the fall of Suharto and the rise of Habibie was a significant factor in the resulting move from cooperation to conflict.

Throughout this thesis, significant emphasis has been placed on the role of nationalism. In general, nationalism flourished in European societies in the 19th century and Asian nationalism began to crystallise at the turn of the 20th century. Specific to Indonesia, Kahin’s seminal work outlined the conditioning force of nationalism within the Republic and more importantly how it galvanised a range of disparate forces toward the one goal of independence. Sukarno’s ideological revolutionary dogma of the 1950s and 1960s was


\(^{14}\) Waltz, 1979, *op cit*, p 93.
steeped in the more extreme elements of nationalism, which he successfully used to acquire West Irian, and in his objective of “Crushing” Malaysia. To that end and using Waltz’s methodology, nationalism served as a powerful and defining second “level” image. In a similar theme to nationalism, the “Jakarta Lobby” and its opponents represented a collective of voices in Australian politics, academia and media commentary. The success of both groups in influencing and ultimately shaping Australian foreign policy again highlights the nature of the Second Image.

With reference to the Australia-Indonesia security relationship, the findings of this thesis do not support Waltz’s claim that the First Image ‘betrays a naivete in politics’,¹⁵ nor does it support the notion that reductionism is subordinate to structuralism. More accurately and specific to Australia and Indonesia’s interactions, their security relationship has been shaped by a host of forces, encompassing all three “Images”, some rational and some irrational.

CONFLICT OR COOPERATION

In chapter 1, a model was developed which sought to add some rigour in evaluating the security relationship. The model comprised three components: degree and mutuality of engagement, commonality and conflict/cooperation.

Degree and Mutuality of Engagement

The fluctuating nature of the security relationship precludes a singular assessment being made on the degree of engagement. A more accurate evaluation is to break down the relationship into constituent elements, which for this thesis, has been done in a series of chronological security exchanges between the two states. Accordingly, using the previously mentioned model, the degree and mutuality of engagement for Australia and Indonesia was thus:

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Diagram 2: Degree of Mutuality

During the start of their security relationship, both states placed a moderate degree of importance on the relationship, though, during the latter phases of the Republic’s war, Indonesia’s value to Australia outgrew Australia’s significance to Indonesia. In the next two security episodes the relationship was heavily skewed with Australia exhibiting more interest than Indonesia. This situation was defined as a “security contrast”. As Indonesia has traditionally been the magnetic north for Canberra’s local strategic focus, it is understandable why this imbalance could occur. Moreover, during the period under review the Indonesians had issues with the Dutch, the British and the Portuguese. Specific to the latter issue of 1975, Australia assumed a more influential role throughout the process. However, it was not until 1999 that Indonesia placed a significant emphasis on the security relationship, no doubt arising from Australia’s role in East Timor’s independence – something which was inimical to the historic conditioning of the ABRI and the strategic and foreign policy principles of the Indonesian state.

Commonality

Gareth Evans’ statement that ‘no two neighbours anywhere in the world are as comprehensively unalike as Australia and Indonesia’\(^{16}\) reflected the lack of commonality between the two states. Since 1945, the security relationship has been dogged by periods of conflict including outright military confrontation in 1964, however, the relationship has also seen periods of cooperation. Part of Huntington’s claim was that ‘countries tend to

bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality.\textsuperscript{17} As a consequence, relations between groups from different civilisations will be almost never close usually cool and often hostile.\textsuperscript{18} To be accurate, Huntington was referring to the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. Nevertheless, his thesis still remains problematic and is not adequately supported by the findings of this thesis nor is his notion of a ‘hate dynamic’\textsuperscript{19} being at play between the two states.

At the start of the relationship, Australia and Indonesia’s political, economic, social and religious constructs were incongruent. By 1999, this divergence had been somewhat ameliorated. Indonesia’s economic development under Suharto had reduced the North South divide between the two states. In addition, Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1999 saw a closer political alignment between Canberra and Jakarta. However, this convergence did not stop the relationship from rapidly moving to a state of conflict in 1999.

\textbf{Conflict/Cooperation}

The final aspect of this model pertains to whether the relationship was cooperative or conflictual. After the Republic’s success in gaining independence in 1949, the Australia-Indonesia security relationship could be defined as cooperative. This cooperation deteriorated during the West Irian dispute and conflict further deepened during Confrontation, with Australian and Indonesian forces engaging in military combat. After the demise of Sukarno and Menzies, significant inroads were made to strengthen the relationship. The period 1966-1998 was characterised by a “convergence of interests”. Just as the change from the Old to the New Order signified a turnaround in bilateral security relations, the changeover to the Reform Order was no less dramatic. Within 18 months of Habibie taking office the security relationship had been transformed to a state of conflict.

\textsuperscript{17} Huntington, 1996, \textit{op cit}, p 155.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid, p 207.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid, p 266.
THE FUTURE

It is timely to revisit George Kennan who once posed a question 'what sort of Russia would we like to see before us as our partner in the world community.'\textsuperscript{20} Both Australia and Indonesia can now ask the same question. As the bulk of this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, the health of the relationship has fluctuated, with periods of cooperation graced by sudden and unexpected episodes of conflict. It may be that the end of the Cold War offers some clues towards which way the relationship will head. In 1994, President Clinton speaking on the future of US-Russian relations stated that 'democracies don't attack each other.'\textsuperscript{21} This is typical of the forces at play in Democratic Peace Theory. That said, US-Russian relations have steadily improved in unison with Russia's movement towards a more liberal political system. Using this dyad as a guide, supporters of Democratic Peace Theory could argue that Australia and Indonesia's newfound "shared norms" may bring a more cooperative light to the security relationship. Furthermore, removal of the East Timor "irritant" which had perpetuated the ongoing tension between inclusive and exclusive society, offers a sense of optimism for the future Australia-Indonesia security relationship.

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