Picturing *Currere* Towards *currere*:
Rhizo-imaginary for Curriculum

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I certify that the thesis entitled *Picturing Currere Towards cura: Rhizo-imaginary for Curriculum* submitted for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy**

is the result of my own work and that where reference is made to the work of others, due acknowledgment is given.

I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by any university or institution is identified in the text.

Full Name  Warren William Sellers

Signed

Date
Acknowledgments

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A brief note to the reader

Some say that the first five pages of a written work most influence the reader’s impression of its entirety. However, reading pages strictly sequentially is neither necessary nor desirable in some situations and this is one. Noel Gough has described my first language as pictures. For me pictures are symbiotic with text and a seeing-reading approach allowing one’s mindful eyes their freedom to be moved as much by the artist as the writer is helpful. As Gilles Deleuze (in conversation with Claire Parnet) (1987) commends: ‘the good ways of reading today succeed in treating a book as you would treat a record you listen to, a film or a TV programme you watch; any treatment of the book which claims for it a special respect – an attention of another kind – comes from another era and definitively condemns the book’ (pp. 3-4).

I understand Deleuze to mean adopting a more responsive, reflexive and generative view of reading, which allows for reflection, contemplation of diverse aspects, rather than focusing on analytical and consequential expectations of a ‘special respect’. So my rhizo-imaginary has no definite article or pluralisation, which is to remind via negativa that this is no thing but more musical riff–visual gesture–gustatory savour for tasting rather than testing. Sometimes too, when a proper word is elusive or grammar’s rules frustrate me saying what I want, then I write as I mind – enjoy.


**Abstracting**

My reading on the subject of curriculum suggests that it is a concept characterised less by what it is than what it is not. For a term that exerts considerable authority – some say hegemony – over definitions and regulations of learning and teaching, its own definition is the subject of on-going inquiry. This thesis gathers my thinking into writing and *picturing* that explores different understandings that are turning away from the traditional idea of curriculum. I see *rhizomes for knowing* rather than a *tree of knowledge*, and I prefer picturing *lines of flight* to writing lines of logic. I often find that the hegemony of words confines pictures in the margins allowing them only a supporting role to illustrate and illuminate the dominance of words. So my pages draw attention to this dilemma by turning my page from letter to landscape to better accommodate picturing, and by broadening and disrupting the margins to admit wording-picturing partnerships.

It is often said that curriculum is the core of an education system. It defines what why and how teaching works for learning. Alongside others, I contend that education today is a system dominated by economics. Education under this tenet determines investment in *teaching to earn to consume*. Education, in my view, needs to be more ecologically concerned with nourishing *learning for living*. Exploring ways to elaborate this view to perturb standing conventions that promote subservience at the expense of emergent generativity is my endeavour.

My picturing perturbs current concepts of curriculum by thinking very differently about what, why and how curriculum affects and effects education. Mapping curriculum genealogy, from antecedents in a modernist system of method, through a century or so of purposive systematic
Abstracting modifications (traditional curriculum), to more recent critical reconceptualising (currere)\(^1\), provides me with data for looking beyond the present towards views of curriculum becoming (cura)\(^2\). My approach is generative towards coming to being, rather than the determining of what is. I think of this less as working on constructive theory and more as picturing anomaly. Therefore expect no finite conclusion to be given, anticipate instead gifts for continuing inquiring.

...and
I believe the desire to determine what some thing is, suits what Gilles Deleuze (1987) calls ‘another era’ (pp. 3-4). It will become obvious that Deleuze – and Felix Guattari, philosophical mentors in this work, have inspired my thinking and my approach, which adopts their rhizome\(^3\), although I call it imaginary to recognise it being other than a traditional trope.

Imaginary, for me, indicates a characterising affect rather than a mental image referencing some thing, situation or circumstance. This is why I call rhizome imaginary, which I see as image characterising affect, hence my coinage of rhizo-imaginary as a way to put words to my picturing approach.

\(^1\) Pinar and Grumet (1976) use the term currere (the Latin root of ‘curriculum’ in its infinitive form) to characterise a method of reconceptualising curriculum through an autobiographical regathering, projecting, reflecting and rehearsing of learning stories.

\(^2\) cura is my term for reimagining curriculum in which currere is immanent towards performing living-learning.

\(^3\) A rhizome is a plant system, comprising prostrate interconnecting underground stems and roots, which generates bulbs, tubers and leaves. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) use the term rhizome figuratively to suggest dynamic non-hierachical notions of knowing in contrast with an arborescent – treelike – hierarchal structure of knowledge.
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) *line of flight*\(^4\) is also imaginary, and a way for working with complex thinking. Curriculum, for example, is a complicated formulation of complex concepts. It is commonly understood as core-like, structurally prescribing the complicated content, method, manner and purpose of education and schooling. It is less commonly understood as a contested, contextual, contingent and continually changing, complex concepts contributing to learning and teaching. Examples of this latter understanding include: curriculum inquiry, curriculum criticism, curriculum reconceptualising and, curriculum understanding(s), which include *currere*.

However, understandings are also contingent and depend on enculturated interpretations of being and knowing that respectively call upon ontology – belief in being – how a cultural group articulates its worldview and epistemology – coming to knowing – how a cultural group treats its knowledge.

Although ontology and epistemology are usually treated as separate concepts, I follow Bateson’s (1972) view that they co-exist and I prefer to picture them as interdependent and interrelated, or co-implicated in *onto-epistemology*.

Thus, onto-epistemology may be seen as historically and culturally contextual and contingent. In its recent expression, this context/contingence is referred to as the period/perspective of

\[^4\] I understand *line of flight* as a way of deterritorialising constructs; of thinking with virtual concepts that work to explicate incompossibilities; not unlike mathematics use of the imaginary \(i = \sqrt{-1}\) to operate with complex numbers (See, for example, Nahin, 1998).
modernity, which is argued as turning to postmodernity. A helpful heuristic for this notion of historico-cultural context and contingence is to see it as marking a convergence of political, economic and technological events in a moment of inquiry about which a highly significant change in understanding turns. For modernity, Copernicus declaring the solar system to be heliocentric not geocentric\(^5\), was just such a momentous marker. However, as it took another century or so for this turn to be widely understood and accepted, the event should be seen more in terms of a moment on a continuum than an instant.

My thinking draws on philosophical and pedagogical scholarship that is, following Deleuze and Guattari (1994), proposing a plane of immanence\(^6\) in another onto-epistemological turn. If this is to be recognised, it is expected to involve extremes of change, comparable with the turn to modernity. Such change will differ qualitatively in metaphysical characteristics, in that it is likely to be more concerned for integration than the analytic separation modernity is known for.

Just as education propagated modernity, there is no reason for it not to do so for any ensuing turn. Thus my deep interest in notions of inquiry for imagining curriculum differently and, in so doing, seeking heuristics for understanding what this turning might bring for curriculum. I call this imagining-inquiry ‘picturing currere’. It is a journey that rhizomatically maps a

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\(^5\) Aristarchus of Samos argued for a heliocentric system c. 270 BCE. Copernicus cites Aristarchus in an unpublished (but surviving) manuscript (Tassoul & Tassoul, 2004).

\(^6\) For me plane of immanence describes different mindedness. This ‘is not a concept that is or can be thought, but rather the image of thought’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 37).
genealogy from the beginnings of modernity’s curriculum, through the emergent postmodernity pictures of currere, to imagining currere7.

…and
Another line of flight: Educational development and reform in many countries has tended to coincide with policies for managing teaching and delivering learning for knowledge-wealth creation8. These policies work to transform education by scientising9 learning and recasting teaching within a technicist10 regime that eschews the notion of pedagogy as both art and science and valorises technology-based elearning. In such a transformation, curriculum remains the principal focus for reform as it pro/pre-scribes what education involves, its purpose, and for whom, in ways that define the content/methods of a product/service and its consumer markets. Questioning this scientism/technicism of education and curriculum is the preliminary work of my thesis.

Currere, which characterises a reconceptualizing of learning and teaching that has been underway for several decades, challenges educational scientism and technicism. As the infinitive form of the noun curriculum, currere commingles theory, poiesis and praxis to turn the structures of curriculum content, method, and procedure towards understandings of

7 Spaces between the letters are used to suggest an assemblage with poststructural interstices that is rhizomatic, porous and open to lines of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
8 This expression refers to a defining construct of the new economy (Kelly, 1998) that is claimed to have supplanted object-wealth production in the industrial economy.
9 I am using this word in the sense that Lather (2005) discusses whereby the scientificity of learning is objectivised at the expense of philosophical inquiries. For examples of scientising see the growing corpus on ‘learning sciences’ (Sawyer, 2006).
10 See Bowers (1980) for an overview of technicism as an ideological construct, and Finkelstein (1982) for an applied perspective.
learning as contextual, complex and generative processes: ‘to trace the complex path from preconceptual experience to formal intellection’ (Pinar et al., 1995, p. 415). It also releases the dualist tensions between teaching/learning, earning/living and economy/ecology from the constructs of modernity’s philosophy that postmodernist philosophical approaches have moved to critique and perturb.

In this thesis I consider economic, sociological and ecological tensions and their curricular implications as occasions and sites for exploring currere – as and in complex generative learning processes. Currere is both a way to explore situations and an exploratory site with and in which performing knowing is always-already becoming both a temporal object and a locatable subject. Thus, currere is complexly co-implicated in the situativity and as the performativity of subject/object identities and their/its inquiries. Exploring currere is methodologically complex and more responsive to processes that celebrate complexities and co-implication than to procedures that insist on resolute and formal coherence. Rhizomatic paths, hermeneutic readings and heuristic reflexivity are processes that resonate with complexities; hence, more appropriate methodologies include arts-informed inquiry and bricolage, or assemblages of poststructuralist approaches. Accordingly, I map this thesis journey with visual~textual performances about landscapes of plateaus towards cura, which imagines other-ness through and beyond currere. The performing-plateaus rehearse and review

11 I use a tilde symbol (~) between words to show them involving each other in a non-linear continuum. That is to say, like chicken~egg, I see no hierarchical or structural order in their arrangement, they always-already co-exist. My adoption of the tilde is adapted from its use in mathematics to represent equivalence relations and similarity.
currere as evolving on a reconceptualizing discourse continuum that also maps cura’s rhizomatic lines of flight – notional interstitial perturbations – for learning and teaching.

It will be apparent that the geopolitical context for much of the historical and theoretical coverage of curriculum in this thesis is predominantly North American; this is because throughout the twentieth century theoretical positions on curriculum, in the English speaking countries at least, owed much to that context. Furthermore, even though the over-arching coordination of strategic policy and evaluation research in education is managed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States of America, with its powerful allies, maintains a pivotally influential role in this body and its association with the advancement of the so-called global society and its accompanying economy.

It is this awful circumstance of powerful econo-political influences predominant in education, the increasing fragility of controls over the influential power bloc and the potential for catastrophic consequences from over-reliance on such a grand narrative that alarmed me into embarking on my Masters of Education research. This thesis continues that research by bringing to close view an assemblage of petit narratives engaging thinking in picturing learning and teaching worlds very differently.
Many good stories often begin: Once upon a time, in a distant land...
This one is no different: the time is now and the land is the so-called global world where its rulers are educating the young in the ways and wherefores of the, also so-called, knowledge economy, and re-educating the not-so-young to accept that their tenuous employment and lifestyle expectations are subject to, an even yet so-called, lifelong learning.

My story is about journeying in and through the world. Journeys tend to be episodic: they leave from one location/time and arrive at another, from which the next leaves, and so on. Journeys also tend to be regarded as discrete episodes reported in ways that track and trace a chronologic/geographic structure, thus the word journal, which describes the activity and names the object of such reporting. Episodic structure suits an epistemology that uses a teleological lens. I have found, however, an emerging articulate discourse that is challenging not only this epistemological persuasion, but, further, questioning its foundational ontology.

Through these pages you will learn why I subscribe to that challenging and questioning discourse and how I work to perturb the foundational structures that pervade the world I describe. In place of the more conventional practice of tracking/tracing a determined research path from departure point to arrival point and delivering a dissertation on the undertaking, I adopt a rhizomatic approach for exploring many paths, which is explicated through exegeses as need arises. Exegesis, aside from its traditional meaning referring to religious texts, is now
often used by creative disciplines in higher degree research to refer to work in a creative thesis to aid the articulation of art-based research (Fletcher & Mann, 2004).

Following previous work, One track—many paths: Toward a critique of educating for the knowledge economy (Sellers, 2001), I continue my thinking about how a complicated education system effects many imbalances in today’s economically focussed world and how learning and teaching’s complex role might affect ecological balance for the world’s future.

For me the word home describes an ecological concept, or complex that encompasses a psychological sense of belonging to a place and a physical entity – a dwelling place. I liken this dissertation to home in that it discusses how I think about belonging and how I envision dwelling. To continue this analogy, home in the sense of belonging represents ontology in my onto-epistemology picture, and home as dwelling represents epistemology. Further, the door in my home represents (the to and fro of) educational theorising that enables me to be at home in the world. And, the hinge around which my theorising both hangs and turns is curriculum. In this way curriculum becomes both focus and pivot for opening and turning thinking about learning and teaching differently.

Curriculum forms the foundation and structure of today’s Western influenced education system. Although some find the education system today in good shape, others disagree. Similarly, there is both agreement and dispute that its systemic operations are problematic, that they are both complicated and complex, and that a remedial effort in one place often results in
further adverse effects in others. Moreover, even argued causes and effects concerning complications and complexities in a global context are disputed: *global warming* for example.

I see these complications *framing* the complexity of my educational theorising *door* that I refer to above, thus bringing the curriculum hinge hanging the door from the frame into my picturing. Working in this way anticipates perceptive–reflexive–reflective engagement with it, as one would an artwork. That is, rather than reading the text solely in a logical linear way, feel free to move about the whole work and treat it more in a fashion that allows for the curiosities, surprises and happenstances that music, painting and sculpture offer. With that in mind, I am using *folio* as an organising metaphor in place of numbered chapters or sections and these folios are identified by symbols to suggest a more poststructural arrangement. The term folio describes the result of folding a sheet into two leaves, and also refers to this arrangement as a ‘folder’ for containing more sheets. The relevance of this notion of folding and its association with assemblage and plateaus will continue to emerge through the thesis. In the meantime, here is how my exploration unfolds:
Opening words

Curriculum (re)viewing
(conceptions) - introductory review - history - culture - philosophy - critics -
chaos - complexity

literature

Currere workings
(re-conceptions) - thinking otherwise - ethical - economic - ecological self - others - ‘otherness’

methods - theories - methodologies

Curriculum learning
(convenings) - picturer’s exegesis - complexity - communities - communion - generativity -
notions - nexus

synthesising - exegesis

Afterwords…
reflexive-reflective thinking

pausing
Untitled, 1999. Pencil, acrylic wash and oil stick on canvas board, 46 x 70 cm.
To create is to think – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender “thinking” in thought. (Deleuze, 1994, p. 147)

...which is to make of thinking, and in particular philosophic thinking, an enterprise that is truly creative and hence not subordinate to factors that predetermine what this thinking should be. (Bell, 2006, p. 3)

What is my research questioning? It challenges the relevance of established curriculum conventions in the light of curriculum reconceptualising research to consider other possibilities. The painting on the previous page shows how I see myself educationally; torn and tortured by the effecting constructs of others that are utterly at odds with my affective feelings for the world I share with those I love and care for. This picture is a companion to the painting that closes my thesis and the two paintings can be thought of like the nexus joining the non-existent sides of a Möbius strip, as a way of conceptualising what lies between them.

Curriculum is a foundational tenet of modern education that first appeared in the seventeenth century and despite almost constant revision ever since, has, in effect, hardly changed at all.
Curriculum reconceptualising describes recent postmodern and poststructural scholarly inquiries that critique established curriculum conventions and explore further, generative, opportunities.

**why**

One of the first questions asked of me when embarking on this project was: Why are you doing this? The more obvious answers – upskilling, advancement, new career path – didn’t seem applicable to me, and I was a little unsettled by the question. I did remember one examiner commented on my Masters thesis that a PhD was within grasp if I chose to continue, so I was continuing. Prompted further by the questioner who asked whether maybe I had a significant publication, perhaps a book, in mind, and, anxious to respond positively I agreed that I did. Am I any clearer about an answer today? Not especially, because the question is the answer – I am doing this to find out why I am doing this. And I am using this anecdote to contextualise what follows: I am reporting on an exploratory journey, a journaling of a journey, if you like, incorporating explanatory essays. Is this a valid, rigorous research report that may be examined for its contribution to the field? I certainly believe it to be, however, it does ask for a little tolerance, some relaxation of rigidity, kindliness in attitude towards it from the reader to absorb its different voice-vision. Why should that matter? I believe it matters because, as I propose here, learning and teaching is a very personal interaction.
As an example, look at the symbol at the top of page thirteen: is it a letter O, a numeral 0 or something else? Further on there are more symbol arrangements that are similar, but clearly not letters or numerals. By moving about these pages to observe interrelated and associated pictures and passages I want to encourage the reader to think about them more as pictures than figures, more abstractly than concretely, more synthetically than analytically. Rather than asking: What do these mean? I would prefer the question to be: how do I feel about this? Which is a way of thinking that converges with Deleuzian alternatives: what do these do? What do they produce? What experiences do they give me?

When asked what they remember about school, most people will refer to a person – a teacher, or a fellow pupil – and, unless prompted to do so, people rarely refer to something they learned. Obviously school does afford learning and much of it is internalised and becomes tacit knowledge to which further learning aggregates, all in a manner commonly referred to as constructivism.

Constructivism is distinguished from it predecessor behaviourism, by its focus on learning as a contextual activity, which is a shift from focus on the teacher’s dissemination of knowledge and stimulation of its production and rehearsal in learners. In constructivism, ‘rather than the content domain sitting as central, with activity and the “rest” of the context serving a supporting role, the entire gestalt is integral to what is learned’ (Duffy & Cunningham, 1996, p. 171). Duffy and Cunningham note that constructivism is an umbrella term serving diverse views with various labels such as, cognitive, trivial, radical, personal and social. The cognitive
label recognises Jean Piaget’s (1970) contribution to constructivism and emphasises the importance of the individual’s personal knowledge processing for successful learning. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995) elaborated a distinction between personal or trivial constructivism and radical constructivism to consider other affects on knowing and meaning making such as complexity and self-organising systems. The social label is more commonly used in conjunction with the label constructionism, and recognises the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), and Lev Semenovich Vygotsky (1962; 1978), Social constructivism or constructionism emphasises the importance of learning constructed through collaborative knowledge generating activity. Much of the tension between the positions concerns how each theorises processes, that is, a tendency towards interiority for constructivists, and a tendency towards exteriority for social constructionists. Educational complexivist and genealogist, Brent Davis (2004), summarises it like this: ‘core concerns of constructionist discourses are more toward the manner in which the world is jointly construed and the manner in which the world constructs the individual—in contrast to the manner in which the individual construes a personal sense of the world’ (p. 121).

I was introduced to constructivist theory’s intricacies in 1999, while studying for my Masters degree, when I attended a small symposium on post-constructivist education theory. About twenty participants took part in six sessions, including four seminars on enactivism, an emerging theory in education that Davis’ (1996) Teaching mathematics: Toward a sound alternative endorses. Looking back at the documents I collected at the time, I see several references to concepts and scholarship that have become very significant in my subsequent
work. There is, for example, metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), rhizome (Eco, 1984), post-modern curriculum (Doll, 1989), and embodied mind (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993).

The standout paper from the symposium is Andy Begg’s (1999) Enactivism: An emerging theory, because it attempts an introduction to enactivism in response to questions concerning ‘the adequacy of constructivism as a learning theory’ (p. 1). I now appreciate that Begg’s concern about constructivism and response in enactivism is the generative twist that moved me towards the journey documented here. The significance and generativity of the twist is in what Begg terms interrelated concerns affecting knowing, learning and teaching.

Reflecting on my first impressions of the paper, I can see how my desire for more knowledge affected how inadequately I understood the significance of interrelated concerns. Several years later, I see that those two words characterise most of the knowing and learning and teaching I have experienced since.

Why are interrelated concerns so significant? Because most concerns are conceptually extra-related, that is, related, but mainly as separate externalities. Although the word interrelated means to be related or connected to one another, conceptions of that state are usually regarded as one separate thing related or connected to another separate thing, that is, segmented. Even if the term interrelated is used in broader circumstances, such as family interrelationships, the concept still derives in a notion of membership.
Today knowledge is so concentrated on extra-related concerns: peak oil, the price of oil, hybrid vehicles, war in the Middle East, sports utility vehicles, for example; knowing they are all interrelated in a continuum of interrelationships is overlooked. Even the World Wide Web, so-called because it is a network of connections, works to effect human extra-relatedness by replacing physical relationships with virtual ones.

**Criticisms of constructivism**

Recursivity\(^{12}\) is a notable characteristic of interrelatedness, which sustains generative interconnections by keeping thinking in motion. A helpful example of it from my journeying is a comparison of my 2005 reading of John Law’s (2004) recent critique of constructivism in science, technology and society (STS) with my re-reading of Andy Begg’s (1999) criticisms of constructivism as a preferred theory for teaching and learning. Reading Law reminded me of Begg. In re-reading Begg, and then again Law, ideas continued to emerge that seemed to contradict what an educationist would say I was practicing – constructivism.

Begg begins by contextualising educational constructivism as the more recent of several dominant theories that have characterised twentieth century Anglo-American education. He situates this dominance in contrast with other theories that draw on different cultural perspectives and ‘imply…a need to retain a tentativeness with all theories’ (p. 1). From this view he identifies aspects that make constructivism problematic including:

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\(^{12}\) Recursivity draws on an epistemological/pedagogical notion of recursion as a continuum of self-reflecting upon inquiry work in on-going transformation (See, for example, Bruner, 1986, p. 96 and Doll, 1993, p. 177).
• …lack of a critical dimension, which means there is no mechanism to avoid the construction of undesirable outcomes.
• …an undue influence…in what constitutes knowledge by the dominant culture, that is the white middle class.
• …[it] is concerned only with cognitive knowing. It does not explain unformulated or subconscious knowledge…[or] consider how things might be known intuitively or instinctively…how emotions are constructed or their role in learning.
• There do not seem to be explicit links made between constructivism and the learning theories that brain-science or neural biology offer.
• While constructivism has numerous forms with respect to an individual and a social focus, and a relativist or objectivist view of knowledge, no one form of constructivism seems to consider these differences. (p. 2)

Begg finds the first two criticisms are not important ‘because the same is true of other learning theories’, but the other three are important; ‘they highlight the need to consider non-cognitive knowing, biology (and systems theory), and Cartesian dichotomies’ (p. 2). The criticism of constructivism as dichotomies is emphasised in the following figure reproduced from his paper:

![A categorisation of four forms of constructivism. (Begg, 1999, p. 3).](image-url)
Begg uses the Cartesian dichotomies as the thrust of his critique, which enables him to introduce alternative ways to knowing that draw on phenomenology, Oriental philosophies, biology and systems theory, and that contribute to understanding enactivism. Enactivism ‘envisages the learner and the learned, the knower and the known, the self and the other, as co-evolving and being co-implicated…context is neither the setting for a learning activity, nor the place where the student is, but the student is literally part of the context’ (Begg, 1999, p. 8). Enactivism is contrasted with constructivism by ‘emphasizing knowing rather than knowledge’ (p. 8). Whereas constructivist knowledge is a ‘human construction that is evaluated in terms of whether it fits the experience of the knower’ (p. 8), enactivist knowing emphasises the complexity of learning for sharing meanings and understandings. The nub of Begg’s criticism of constructivism concerns positivist structuralism inhering in its modernist foundations, which inhibits consideration of alternatives. Although he makes no explicit reference to poststructuralism, his criticisms are consistent with poststructural critiques of knowledge and its knowing insights.

Law (2004) brings his critique of constructivism to bear on scientific practices by asserting that ‘anthropologists of science are usually more or less constructivist… they argue that scientific knowledge is constructed in scientific practices [which] is not at all the same thing as saying it is constructed by scientists’ (p. 19; original italics). He defines constructivism as:

the claim that scientific statements or truths are constructed in a way that to a large degree (in some versions totally) reflects the social circumstances of their production. Though there is some overlap, the programme of social constructivism is distinguished from the enactment approach of the method assemblage. Construction usually implies that objects
start without fixed identities but that these converge and so gradually become stabilised as singular in the course of practice, negotiation and/or controversy. Enactment does not necessarily imply convergence to singularity, but takes difference and multiplicity to be chronic conditions. (p. 158)

Law reviews Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986) to explain this claim. Using visual perspective as an illustration, he refers to accounts of the Renaissance ‘rediscovery’ of linear perspective, (see my picture), which imagines lines fanning out from the viewer’s eye towards an object in sight (i) forming points on an intermediate viewing surface (ii). The points are then used to construct a representation of the object using a second set of imaginary lines fanning from the viewer’s field of vision towards a distant vanishing point (iii) (Law, 2004, p. 23)

The example demonstrates how a representation of reality is constructed through a practice of representation, which then becomes stabilised, fixed and singular ‘truth’. My insight from recursive readings of Law and Begg is that constructivism, in working towards defining singular concrete representations, attends to extra-related concepts thereby missing, important interrelated complexities and diversities out-there.
Law (2004) makes some interesting observations about this:

I have used a range of metaphors for talking about the ‘out-there’. These have included: hinterland; manifest absence; absence as Othered, fluxes, relations, and resonances. I have avoided using one of the most common terms in the social science literature: that of structure. I hope the reason for this is clear. The idea of ‘structure’ usually implies not simply a generic or primitive version of out-thereness, but additional commitments to independence, anteriority, singularity, and definiteness. To talk of ‘structure’, then, is probably to imply that the real is out-there, in definite form, waiting to be discovered – even if there are major technical difficulties standing in the way of its discovery in practice. (Law, 2004, p. 140)

I find Law’s suggestion of out-thereness a helpful way of indicating that poststructural understandings embrace complementary ideas that supplement rather than supplant structure.

...re-turning to enactivism
My post-constructivist introduction to enactivist theory, in turn, introduced me to other, complementary theories, including subjects such as complexity and chaos, ecology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. My research and thinking around this scholarship eventuated in a Masters thesis, in which I contrasted a critique of educating for the knowledge economy with explorations of enactivist-oriented alternatives contributing to what I called ecological learning.
After discovering post-constructivism I wrote a research essay elaborately titled *Eductive enlightenment: Embodying groundlessness in learning* (Sellers, 2000)\(^{13}\) that prefigured what would become my Masters thesis. On reflection, the essay is significant for several reasons: It was my first longer written academic work; it introduces generative concepts for my subsequent work; it begins a methodological approach that I continue to employ; and it is the first declaration of curriculum as my research field. The essay topic sprang from a long-held concern about education policies and initiatives that focussed on learning for earning at the expense of learning for living. In the manner that I have followed here, I began by posing what, why and how questions, and wrote the following introduction:

Curriculum drives teaching and learning practice. Contemporary curriculum development is seen to cover a range of overlapping orientations extending from outcomes-based to reflective practitioner. The theoretical/philosophical bases for these orientations range from behaviourist (outcomes-based), through constructivist (liberal-progressive), to emerging post-constructivist (reflective-practitioner) (see Hall 1999). Although many aspects across these orientations are incommensurable, outcomes-based (or competency-based) education remains a central focus of curriculum practice.

The impact of postmodern challenges to modern worldviews has paralleled problematic views of behaviourist theory, the development of constructivist theories and the emergence of critical theory. The consolidation of a postmodern worldview has, in turn, raised critiques and problematic views of constructivist theories in education that question the

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\(^{13}\) I coined ‘enductive enlightenment’ to describe a way of knowing and learning that is distinct from *education*, with educative signifying bringing out of latency or potential to generate *enlightenment* as a more inclusive understanding of knowing.
incommensurable aspects of epistemologies and paradigms that form the respective modern and postmodern worldviews.

My research paper aims to accomplish the groundwork necessary for me to undertake deeper research into critical and problematic views of constructivist theories in education and the resulting emergence of post-constructivist education theories, such as enactivism.

The groundwork will form the foundations for deeper research by clarifying key issues that underpin the evolution of constructivist theories towards post-constructivist theories in education. (Sellers, 2000, p. 2, bold in original)

Allowing for shortcomings in this early work, I satisfactorily located my topic, put it in context and presented its grounds of inquiry. In the conclusion I pointed to curriculum as an accomplice of instruction in the prevalent systematic view of education. I noted how this position, based on a positivist worldview where a direction or order is appropriate for an objective outcome, contrasted with alternative post-positivist understandings. In postmodernism, for example, emphasis on independently differentiated and self-discriminatory learning, especially of knowledge and understandings, is accomplished, paradoxically, through more inclusive orientations to knowing and open-ended approaches to understanding. I summarised my criticism of the predominant and prevailing influence of economic imperatives on education as being both systemically and philosophically unsustainable. In closing I wrote, ‘The key issues, demonstrating dichotomies, tensions and criticisms within the current model, that have emerged from the literature reviewed, indicate a chain of consequentiality inevitably leading to the evolution of alternative, transformative models that are more inclusive and sustainable, globally’ (Sellers, 2000, p. 50).
When discussing a proposal for a thesis with my prospective Masters supervisor he suggested the idea of examining how the increasingly influential knowledge economy sat alongside my thoughts about post-constructivist and other alternative learning and teaching models. I took my supervisor’s suggestion and in the thesis abstract I wrote:

the role of education and learning in the so-called knowledge economy is examined in the light of existing and emerging, essentially different ways of perceiving and understanding the world… education is becoming ideologically and practically central to the propagation and implementation of the knowledge economy. Educating for the knowledge economy concerns not only the preparation of ideal economic citizens, it is also regarded as a valuable economic commodity in its own right… however…education and the knowledge economy, while claiming to afford global social transformation, remain grounded in the modern worldview that is being critically challenged by postmodern views and understandings of the world. This is not to say that a modern worldview is 'incorrect', rather…there are postmodern alternatives to carefully consider.

I distinguish 'postmodern' within three positions… one is power-based, another anti-power-based, and yet another ecologically-based…[that there is] a modern worldview and postmodern positions with different worldviews, giving rise to incommensurabilities between the respective understandings of the world each position has. To navigate between these understandings I have engaged with the theory of enactivism. Enactivism enfolds the exploring and performing of learning and teaching theories that embody ecological and complex postmodern characteristics. The many paths of variety and diversity these characteristics reveal are contrasted with modern educational characteristics, before each is
compared to consider the merits, or otherwise, of going down the track of educating for the knowledge economy. (Sellers, 2001, p. iii)

My Masters thesis addressed five statements about the knowledge economy: It is a term with common currency; education is vital to its promotion; it is grounded in a modern worldview; educating for it holds to a modern worldview; there are alternative, postmodern ways of thinking in the world. In the conclusion I wove a summary of the concepts that I had synthesised from the thematic strands I had teased out of the topic. I brought together diverse readings and thinking about a notion of ecological learning as an alternative to educating for the knowledge economy and illustrated how I envisioned a way of turning complicated thinking towards complex understandings, or, as I put it “‘Playing’ with ideas and enacting new thoughts’ (p. 145).

Having made a case for exploring distinctions between modern notions, and postmodern ecological notions of needs and satisfiers, I presented Edmund O’Sullivan’s (1999) matrix, which describes needs and satisfiers, for example health, food, rest, and socialising, and categorises them on two separate axes according to axiological (‘values’) such as protection, affection, identity and freedom, and existential (‘aspects’) given as being, having, doing and interacting. While this matrix helps to categorise needs and their satisfiers as existential aspects and axiological values it also shows the interdependence and interrelatedness of satisfiers for needs, and also illuminates the conflicts between the singular demands of needs and the complexity of capabilities to satisfy them. My insight in respect of this was to look for ways to
see these conflicts and capabilities differently and to try to regard them as interdependently interrelated in learning and knowing through doing and being.

O’Sullivan used a Descartian matrix, which I needed to think differently to look for ways to consider interdependence and interrelatedness in the whole complex. The pictures at left from my notebook show the Descartian matrix and in the centre the matrix twisting. This generated a twisting strand, shown below, and in turn suggested a Möbius strip and the ELT figure.

Above is my picturing of the strand as a twisting continuum, in this I could see M, C Escher’s (1984) Möbius strip, upper left, which put me on a path to the picture upper right. Borrowing an idea from Douglas Hofstadter (1980), I imagined coloured light projected from three directions over an object to produce distinct letters. Thereby illustrating how plural emerges from singular, and how interdependence and interrelatedness is complexly embodied in the world.
My rethinking of the matrix to see it as a twisting continuum made sense as a Möbius strip. To help explain this I turned to M. C. Escher’s graphic art which illustrates how apparently separate, independent and unrelated complicated entities that are held to make up the world are also holistic and interdependent and interrelated and complexly embodied in the world. I brought this thinking to a close with a figure that helps to show how seemingly distinct aspects of thought (ecology, learning, and teaching) may also be complexly embodied and introduce ways towards thinking differently.

Thinking about a PhD

At this intersection in my studies I appreciated that although I seemed to have satisfactorily made my case for exploring alternatives to the knowledge economy track for education, any further exploration would need a pertinent field and an appropriate theoretical and philosophical lens to bring the field into focus.

I found William Pinar’s reconceptualising for curriculum theory, which pointed to other educational theorists with interests in poststructuralism, and I discovered the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Pinar attracted me for two reasons: His early recognition of the relevance of critical theory to understanding curriculum reconceptualising, and his concern for the significance of personal interpretation, or currere, involving thinking autobiographically about curriculum.

Deleuze and Guattari inspired me with their ideas for disrupting reason, by introducing me to a philosophy of creativity and to rhizomes and nomads and plateaus and deterritorialisation and lines of flight and…and…and…. Now, so-called Deleuzian philosophy is becoming more
widely read and attracting many scholarly interpretations. If there is a recurring theme in these interpretations about Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) project it concerns thinking differently – ‘to think reality outside of representation’ (Due, 2007, p. 9).

**how**

...picturing

To think reality outside of representation may be arguably illogical, but is not to artists, and increasingly less so to some philosophers, scientists and social researchers. A common characteristic found among these different thinkers is their use of tropes to render conceptions of reality in ways that escape conventional representation.

My first journal note, in 2003, saw picturing currere thus. However I had previously introduced *picturing* in my contribution *Aubrey Beardsley: Camp Wilde’s picturer* to an article titled *Tales from camp Wilde* (Gough, Gough, Appelbaum, Appelbaum, Doll, & Sellers, 2003). In this I cited reference to the art nouveau artist Beardsley calling his work picturing rather than illustrating and insisting on his artwork standing on its own rather than illustrating contributions (Bernheimer, 2002, cited in Gough et al., 2003, p. 62). The theme of the article was
queer(y)ing environmental education research and its tenor was quite poststructural. My piece was stimulated by having just read Bernheimer’s (2002) *Decadent subjects*, which made me aware of resonances in Beardsley’s pictures with biology and complexity. Bernheimer’s project was a cultural deconstruction of *fin de siècle* in Beardsley’s *Salome* pictures but I stated mine thus:

to re-cognize the symbolic relationship between Salome’s climactic gaze and Gaia’s climatic concern. I suggest that [Beardsley’s] imagery…is a complex graphic representation of both the consequences of collapsing consciousness around modern reductionist science and culture and potentialities for emergent notions of complexity suggested by James Lovelock’s “Gaia” thesis’. (Gough et al., 2003, p. 55)

To picture this I presented Beardsley’s picture titled *The climax* right, from which I selected two detail images to compare with pictures of a Mandelbrot set (See, Gleick, 1987) and spirochettes (Christie Lyons drawing in, Margulis & Guerrero, 1991, p. 63)\(^{14}\). I do not propose any scientific connections between the pictures but I am suggesting there are allusive resonances that picturing opens up for meaning. I concluded by saying ‘The naturally sciential exists *within* picturing being just as well as writing words *about* it’ (p. 57). From this insight I began to draw more ideas about picturing and continued to think reality outside of representation.

\(^{14}\) A keen-eye will note differences between the top and bottom right pictures. Beardsley made two versions of this picture and I have used the alternate version for the detail, as it more closely resembles the spirochettes picture.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), re-thinking reality, employ the concept of a rhizome as an alternative to the firmly rooted trunk and branch arborescent metaphor that pervades representations of knowledge and education. Reproduced below is an endnote from Deleuze and Guattari (1987), which refers to a passage that describes how ‘The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centred or segmented higher unity’ (p.16).

13. See Julien Pacotte, *Le réseau arborescent, schème primordial de la pensée* (Paris: Hermann, 1936). This book analyzes and develops various schemas of the arborescent form, which is presented not as a mere formalism but as the “real foundation of formal thought.” It follows classical thought through to the end. It presents all of the forms of the “One-Two,” the theory of the dipole. The set, trunk-roots-branches, yields the following schema:

![Diagram of arborescent form](image)

By contrast, ‘a rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes… Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout… A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, science, and social struggles.’ (pp. 6-7).

Umberto Eco (1984) also found Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome helpful with regard to his notions of semiotic labyrinth. Describing three types of labyrinth Eco names one as a ‘net’ and,
quoting Deleuze and Guattari (1987), refers to it as like a rhizome: ‘a tangle of bulbs and tubers appearing like “rats squirming one on top of the other”’ (Eco, 1984, p. 81). Like Eco, Thomas Duffy and Donald Cunningham (Duffy & Cunningham, 1996) found rhizome useful for their ‘Mind as Rhizome’ metaphor, which led them to describe learning as ‘constructing and navigating a local situated path through a rhizomous labyrinth, a process of dialogue and negotiation with and within a local sociocultural context’ (p. 177).

Here is my picture of a rhizome drawn before I had read that description (top right). It is important to understand that this tangle of rhizome drawing is not a scientifically accurate, botanical representation of a rhizome. It is my generative picturing of rhizomatically-tangled lines of flight that a rhizome as imaginary suggests. It is my way of thinking reality outside of representation.

The picture (lower right) shows my thinking about the rhizome’s organic processes as metaphor for research. I wrote in my journal: A shift in emphasis away from the visible, towards the hidden: a complex in which growth [generativity] is principal to matter [that is left behind]. We focus on the shoot/stem/flower, but that's only because it's appealing to our eye/mind. It is just part of the plant moving through a different medium: the atmosphere rather than the earth.
John Law (2003), a social scientist working in science studies, presents another picture, at right, and writes: ‘The presenting symptom is easily shown. Look at the picture. And then reflect on the caption: “If this is an awful mess ... then would something less messy make a mess of describing it?” This is a leading question. I’m looking for your agreement. Simplicity, I’m asking you to say, won’t help us to understand mess.’ (p. 1). With these examples I am looking to give the reader some sense of my own preference for using pictures for thinking differently, and to indicate some of the scholarship that affirms my preference.

How does this affect what follows in my thesis? On the next page is a glimpse of the first picture that began to map my PhD journey. Hopefully, some resonances between this image and those that have preceded it suggest that there is potential for thinking differently about ‘method’ in this apparent mess. Because, as Law (2004) proposes, ‘to find ways of living in uncertainty… [w]e need to find ways of elaborating quiet methods, slow methods, or modest methods. In particular, we need to discover ways of making methods without accompanying imperialisms’ (p. 15).
I call this my negotiating towards a picture
**where am I going...becoming?**

...continuum curriculum currere currere c u r a cloudsculpting...

My negotiating curriculum, currere, c u r a picture suggests movement. Read two dimensionally, the drawing appears to be a left to right presentation and there is a sense that its lines tend to flow that way. But as this is a two dimensional rendering of (at least) a three dimensional image, it can be more usefully seen perspectivally, with the central aspects of the image on a diagonal axis that is at right angles to the image plane. In the picture below I have attempted to indicate this by showing the three curricular notions (curriculum, currere and c u r a) as three planes at different distances from the viewer, and by showing the other lines that connect the callout balloons around the periphery of the image as moving on varying degrees of axis across and through the planes.

This picture attempts to indicate how I see viewing the multi-dimensionality of the previous picture. It shows the main constituents as separate planes with the lines suggestive of cross-axial movement. However, there is no intention to show a fixed point of view, rather, it should be seen as a snapshot: one moment of a dynamic continuum that is immanent ‘in the round’ like a hologram.
Cloudsculpting
Here is another way of imagining my picture: by thinking of it as a landscape. In this image curriculum can be seen as a bounded well-defined area, marked like a sports field; currere is an extensive physical environment in which curriculum is located, and cura is the amorphous atmosphere in and through which the complexity of curriculum—currere—cura is continuously and dynamically in transition. In this view it is possible to see how narrowly curriculum is circumscribed to construct and constrain our perspective of the world and how extensive, diverse and holistic our perception needs to become.

There are many ways of imagining the ideas in my picturing; there is never only a single way.

In a similar way, there is no one way of explaining where I am going; there are always many ways of interpreting becoming.
As I continue to picture the ideas I think, I continue to see other ways of picturing them. It is this visual recursion that I find most helpful in extending understandings. In this instance, I pictured the *currere* landscape more ‘realistically’ than before, which called for the same treatment for curriculum as a walled city, and, then reminded me of the link to the ‘connecting, reading, writing collecting’ picture (explained further on my pages 264-267).

And, as an example of how rhizomatically ideas are always-already interconnecting, recurring and resonating, here is a 16th century picture of a student being introduced to the seven liberal arts of scholasticism that is reproduced from David Hamilton’s (1990) monograph on curriculum history (p. 17).
About my negotiating towards c u r a picture

The apparent chaos and complexity of my negotiating towards c u r a picture invoked the following response from Noel Gough (2002): ‘The picture looks a bit like the way the inside of my head feels sometimes...’ (personal communication). I appreciated the comment because it emphasises the sense of confusion and disturbing feelings about complexity that conceptions – and reconceptions – of curriculum can generate. My picture is a complex arrangement that attempts to portray sites and systems that are unfamiliar to received perceptions and common understandings within education, with some exceptions. (See, for example, Abram, 1996; Doll & Alcazar, 1998; Fleener, 2002; Hayles, 1991). An exemplary exception is Kevin Keeffe’s (1991) reporting of the ‘painting the curriculum’ by Australian Aboriginal student teacher’s (Bruno et al., 1989). In his article Keeffe carefully contextualises the origins of the students’ painting and then accompanies their short explanatory narratives with sensitive interpretive comments. The importance of this example, for me, is in what I recognise as the ‘currereal’ complexity of the processes that were engendered, namely: the occasion for making the painting; working on the painting, exhibiting the painting, storytelling the painting (in both Pintupi and English); and Keeffe’s currere/curating of all these processes, which (re)emerge in his article; and my reading of Keeffe; and so on...

Therefore the ever-evolving picture is always-already working on work in process. Here then is a brief overview, followed sketches of the contexts involved in individual plateaus.
Overview
My pictures appear on a two-dimensional plane through a limitation/convenience of conventional representation; they are virtually and/or physically paper bound. However, as I explained above, their conception in my mind is multi-dimensional, like a hologram, for articulating perceptual liminalities – thresholdings – for cognitive changings.

The several dimensions in the pictures are each on different axes, which also intersect a terrain of emergent discourse plateaus, and these are represented by the words curriculum, currere, and cura. These plateaus, beginning with the red circle surrounding ‘curriculum’, which is intersected by the orange part-circle of ‘currere’, become less bounded as they metamorphose across the picture towards cura. They may also be thought of in a metaphor of a cosmological universe. That is, we believe we ‘know’ the curriculum in education, as we believe we ‘know’ the Earth in the solar system. I also propose we are presently conceiving of exploring currere in a stage-like manner similar to the manner of exploring the planets of the solar system. However, my interests are in researching in other ways that might be beyond currere and towards solar systemic ‘complexploring’. 
Each of the several axial dimensions in the big picture, although represented as lines between two points, are conceived as continua passing through positions of tensions, and these continua are complexly interrelated to the emergent discoursing plateaus of curriculum, \textit{currere}, and \textit{cura}. Perturbing all of these notional events-places is a rhizomous environment, indicated by the green querying growths in the vicinity of ‘\textit{currere}’ and ‘\textit{cura}’. Elizabeth St. Pierre (2000) helps me to explain these by citing Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome when she writes of ‘this essay that I am already thinking of as a joyful and playful rhizome’ (p. 261). She also notes, quoting Deleuze and Guattari (1987) that: ‘[r]hizomes encourage deterritorialization; they penetrate what is rooted and put it to “strange new uses”…a rhizome is like a “map and not a tracing... The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged ‘competence’”’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, quoted in St. Pierre, 2000, p. 278).
This rhizomous occurrence also corresponds to nomadic inquiry for exploring hybrid space (See, Alverman, 2000; Braidotti, 1994; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; O’Riley, 2003; St. Pierre, 2000). Furthermore, as Ian Stronach’s (1997) chapter *Fashioning postmodernism, finishing modernism: tales from the fitting room* (p. 14) on the topic of deconstructing body with clothes as metaphors about hybrid space, suggests:

Such a bricolage of possibilities might not be an incongruent tool-box with which to begin to narrate post-modernism’s ‘limits’. It acts not as a definition or frame, but more as a series of semiotic chains, from which, and through which, emerge different readings of the complex and shifting articulations and differences that attend the problematic relationship of modernism/postmodernism (p. 30).

Such tales from Stronach’s fitting room have given me further encouragement for fashioning similar approaches to my inquiring.

**curriculum paradigm plateau**

The flat and bounded image above represents the traditional curriculum field, as an historically situated and objectified modern cultural artefact, employed to prescribe pedagogical praxis – for example, Australia’s ‘Curriculum Organiser’\(^{15}\). Furthermore, the genealogy, evolution, development, and progress of this 'artefactual'/artificial construct are located paradigmatically. The term paradigm fits this construct through its comparative (show side by side) 

\(^{15}\) The *Curriculum Organiser* is a project being conducted for education.au. Its purpose is 'to develop a set of metadata to connect State and Territory learning area frameworks to the learning objects to be developed as part of the Schools Online Curriculum Content Initiative' (Ferguson, 2002, p. 97).
disposition, and, for the purposes of my inquiries, the curriculum paradigm plateau is the embarkation platform of my study.

**currere plateau-sphere**

A *currere* plateau has arisen as an irruption in the modern paradigm of curriculum, by post-positivist, postmodern, and poststructural influences for reconceptualist curricular inquiries (Pinar, 1975a; Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1995). However, my depiction of this phase should be thought of as more like a sphere intersecting a disc. The sphere suggests an appreciative awareness of moving beyond a localised surface towards more complex interpretations about non-linear dynamical systems for teaching and learning interactivities (Doll, 1993). Such interactivities are suggested to include diverse re-conceptions, which are phenomenologically, aesthetically, experientially as well as scientifically interested (Aoki, 1988; Barone & Eisner, 1997; Doll & Alcazar, 1998; Greene, 1997; Grumet, 1988; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1990; Kesson & Oliver, 2002; Lather, 1991; van Manen, 1982).
I use the term speculating (looking forward to) as a generative notion for conceiving other than incommensurable re-conceptions about curriculum-\textit{currere}. In other words, to help towards navigating through thresholds that often hold incommensurable notions of curriculum apart – science experiments and experimental art, for example. Speculating also helps to indicate moments (time-place) looking for thinking beyond the paradigmatic: possibly, a fluid semiotic appearing through and in \textit{cura} (for caring), as a complex navigational heuristic. For example, the speculative semiotic pictured far right is potentially generative for integrative notions of ‘i’ (i)n-quiry being neither subject nor object. The drawing adopts an ancient non-privileging symbol for emergence, which is resonant with notions beyond particular specificity, and speculates towards non-specificity for symbolising gender. It does this by replacing the symbols of female cross and male arrow, as exclusive and unique disruptions to a unitary circumference, with a ubiquitous emergent inclusive perturbation marking emerging through a complexly enfolding circulating continuity.

In summary, \textit{cura} conceives of speculative hybrid spaces beyond the ‘final frontier’ of traditional curriculum conventions, which the next folio reviews.
What is curriculum? Curriculum is the study of any and all educational phenomena. It may draw on any external discipline for methodological help but does not allow the methodology to determine inquiry. Of necessity, it will be methodologically looser and less secure than disciplines with developed “paradigms,” but this is a condition of studying education at this stage and producing knowledge that may have educational value. (Egan, 1978, p. 147)

Curriculum Development: Born: 1918. Died: 1969... The next moment is yours.
(Pinar et al., 1995, p. 6 & 868)

[W]e would be sensible to consider whether or not the problem lies elsewhere, and whether fixing it requires of us the tougher task of rethinking the idea of education we have inherited from ancient and more modern Europe and its tangled history. Starting with answering what the curriculum is, than what educations is, might help, eh? (Egan, 2003, pp. 23-24)
What is curriculum?

I say the curriculum is nothing (not-a-thing) but always-already currere. This is not to evade the question, because I am rethinking what it asks. There was a time when everything was deemed to be definite, or at least definable; today there is not such certainty, because meaning is now more often understood as being contingent, contextual, contested and continuously changing. Thus, I resist defining curriculum as a specific, discrete, concrete construct to interrogate. Instead I prefer to recognise complex and diverse and abstract concepts to explore. However, a disambiguous explanation that represents some approximate interpretation may also be helpful, for example: Curriculum is what schools teach. But, in making that statement I reveal my difficulty: For many, that is a sensible and sufficient, even trite answer. For them the concept of what schools teach follows logic and reason derived from evidence-based research that quantifies and qualifies the significance of information inputs and knowledge outcomes.

This accounting-for-teaching-learning notion of education is also the cornerstone of the knowledge economy and, for some, owes much to the phrase what knowledge is of most worth, which is the chapter title in a book by social Darwinist Herbert Spencer (1862).

As a socio-political scholar and contemporary of Darwin, Spencer’s views on knowledge were held in some regard by increasingly literate Americans who had become so through a complex web of multiple-literacies:

the shift from the eighteenth century onwards has not been from total illiteracy to literacy, but from a hard-to-estimate multiplicity of literacies, a pluralistic idea about literacy as a composite of different skills related to reading and writing for many different purposes and
sections of a society’s population, to a notion of a single, standardized *schooled literacy*.
(Cook-Gumperz, 2006, p. 26, original italics)

I read Cook-Gumperz’s italics to indicate that increasing numbers of different literacies were argued as needing and demanding a schooled education to standardise literacy. Paradoxically, it seems that standardised literacy has diminished literacy’s pluralistic diversity by developing ever increasing specialised multiple-literacies and jargon\(^{16}\). The paradox is that pupils graduate from schooling’s standardised literacy to more specialised literacies that reduce the capability for diverse general understandings and foster the production of special knowledge as a commodity.

Spencer, therefore, usefully locates a major geo-political shift in education that affected what it was and who it was for. However, the meaning of Spencer’s question, ‘What knowledge is of most worth?’ is not what we would take it to mean today. He explained it like this:

> How to live?—that is the essential question for us. Not how to live in the mere material sense only, but in the widest sense. The general problem which comprehends every special problem is—the right ruling of conduct in all directions under all circumstances. In what way to treat the body; in what way to treat the mind; in what way to manage our affairs; in what way to bring up a family; in what way to behave as a citizen; in what way to utilize all those sources of happiness which nature supplies—how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others—how to live completely? And this being the

\(^{16}\) Notably those associated with new communication technology, such as texting and blogging, but also including professional and technical literacy requirements.
great thing needful for us to learn is, by consequence, the great thing which education has to teach. To prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to discharge, and the only rational mode of judging of any educational course is, to judge in what degree it discharges such function… It behooves us to set before ourselves, and ever to keep clearly in view, complete living as the end to be achieved; so that in bringing up our children we may choose subjects and methods of instruction, with deliberate reference to this end. Not only ought we to cease from the mere unthinking adoption of the current fashion in education, which has no better warrant than any other fashion; but we must also rise above that rude, empirical style of judging displayed by those more intelligent people who do bestow some care in overseeing the cultivation of their children’s minds. It must not suffice simply to think that such or such information will be useful in after life, or that this kind of knowledge is of more practical value than that; but we must seek out some process of estimating their respective values, so that as far as possible we may positively know which are most deserving of attention. (Spencer, 1862, pp. 16-17)

Spencer’s main concern was not which particular knowledge is worth most, but what is most worth knowing so as to live. However, as Hamilton (1990) reports, the former concern was more important to an industrialising world dominated by Britain and, increasingly, the United States of America:

In the early years of the twentieth century, schooling in the United States of America was seen as an important political agency. Its reform would aid the assimilation of migrants and, further, would help to discipline the different segments of an increasingly fragmented
Curriculum (re)viewing

labour market… Most of the important changes in curriculum thinking…can be traced back to the political agenda of early twentieth century American schooling. (p. 42)

While few would disapprove of Spencer’s sentiments today, most would retire them to the role of rhetoric supporting the imperative of developing education for the knowledge economy. Spencer’s notion of ‘worth’ in its ‘widest sense’ was supplanted long ago by its proprietary sense, which causes me to turn Spencer’s question, to think about what knowledge is costing knowing. Yet again I see the importance of recursion, by looking back at Spencer, then looking now at what we think we know, and then wondering about knowing.

I see the phrase ‘what is curriculum?’ as rhetorical, not as a question to be answered but as a statement always-already reflected on, which I continue to do after introducing currere.

**Curriculum currere?**

When I find a word’s meaning problematic but nevertheless need to use it I try to visualise it, to envision it generatively rather than analyse it reductively. I use my picturing as a way for helping me work through the practice of sous rature, which shows words under erasure\(^{17}\), struck through by a line. Although I acknowledge that words prevail, rendering them more

\(^{17}\) The Derridean practice of striking through a word to indicate there is différance in the presence and absence of certain meaning in it. Différance poses an onto-epistemological conundrum that challenges the word’s meaning in its use. Work on this conundrum involves deconstruction of the word towards emerging immanent meanings that work with and against a certain held (pre)constructed meaning.
pictorially generates opportunities to think about them differently and connect to other ways of thinking differently...

Pinar proposed *currere* as a theory and a method for reconceptualising curricular experiences, towards what he and Madeleine Grumet called a ‘poor curriculum’ (Pinar & Grumet, 1976) and a poor curriculum was first explicated as one stripped of distractions (p. vii).
‘Poor’ is not used here dichotomously against rich, rather, this sense of poor signals a call for understanding meaning and learning in qualitatively different ways that: recognise richness and poorness as simultaneous sites on a qualitative continuum; that such sites and their differential are socially constructed and; that such differential, measured quantitatively, usually pitches more privileges for few leaving less for many. Thus, Pinar uses poor curriculum as a call to deconstruct sites that construct and maintain their rich privilege over quantitative poverty in a move towards recognising continua of qualitative richness. Nor is ‘stripped’ intended to suggest depleting; as Pinar says, it intends to enhance experience by removing the plethora of distractions that cloak what is there ‘to keep us from seeing’ (p. vii).

Pinar’s notion of curriculum poor-ness calls for reconceptualising perceptions of world-experiencing in ways that, for example, appeal more to ecological awareness of inclusive interdependence than they depend on valuing economic scarcity and exclusivity. Thus reconceptualising curriculum towards poorness is a way for reclaiming diverse richness in qualitative experiences, which are in contrast to mounting claims of poverty in the quantitative outcomes of an overcrowded curriculum where overloading and cramming is becoming increasingly problematised. However, the problematic assumes a quantitative norm for curriculum upset by excessive and/or inappropriate additions and/or subtractions of content. Such an assumption is underpinned by commitment to belief in a hierarchical cause and effect relation in teaching and learning and knowledge and meaning that rehearses curriculum’s persistent dictum, what knowledge is of most worth?
In summary, Pinar’s notion of ‘poor’ challenges normative hierarchical assumptions underpinning the teaching of learning to turn curriculum thinking toward different concepts of understanding meanings for learning.

Pinar (1976a) says, ‘[r]egardless of context, I am running a course. *Currere* is to run’ (p. vii).

Running with *currere* brings to mind an autobiographical moment that remains a vivid picture, which seems to synthesise much of the personal, phenomenological, psychological and existential richness that Pinar and Grumet claimed for *currere*. 
I remember a movie I filmed as a student. It was called Something of Course. (Reid & Sellers, 1967). We never resolved how to say that: was the emphasis on something or course? What I do remember is a short scene where two lovers are running through a pine forest, flitting separately but synchronously through a wood of erect pine trees, over soft hillocks of fallen needles, running towards the camera, until, at the last moment, they merge together.

My memory though is less of the characters and the setting and more of the movement, there’s something about the course they ran that day, they seemed so free to run, not from or to, just free running – as though they were currere-ing in and through their love-making.
Running with currere
The word currere, as the infinitive form of the noun curriculum, turns attention from what constitutes the course of education towards recognising education as coursing. The course of curriculum defines a teaching conduit and its learned contents, whereas currere coursing recognises experiencing learning with teaching running in and through many courses. In other words, currere shifts the emphasis of the curriculum concept from an educational object to experiencing learning and teaching.

This conceptual move emerged with the reconceptualizing of curriculum thinking that occurred in the United States in the 1970s in ‘an effort link the ideas of curriculum theorists to developments in the political and cultural spheres’ (Pinar, 1988d, p. 159). Reconceptualising also has cross-links to a contemporary move in the United Kingdom to articulate a ‘new sociology of education’ (Young, 1998) informed by similar political and cultural spheres of influence.

My next folio, Currere workings, presents a genealogy of currere since its inception by Pinar. It includes summaries and syntheses of discussions that others have entered into about interpretations and significances of currere through subsequent decades. In the meantime, in this folio I introduce currere in a curriculum context.
Curriculum? a curriculum context

A recurring theme in my thesis is that context is contingent. Context avoids determination and is almost always-already open to interpretation. Therefore, I use a rhizomatic approach and grow contextual discussion from the contingent middle of a turning moment…

Pinar (1981; 1988c) and others (Bybee, 1997; Rubin, 1977) map a curriculum genealogy that finds the 1957 launch of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, a pivotal moment for curriculum in the USA ‘because it was at that point that we began comparing the achievement of American youths with the status of our culture and our scientific progress, with the communist block’ (Rubin, 1977, quoted in Marshall, Sears, & Schubert, 2000, p. 41). Furthermore, Rubin recalls:

As a consequence of Sputnik it suddenly became commonplace to use schools as whipping posts—to argue that the nation was in difficulty because schools taught the wrong stuff, and in the wrong ways. Hence... the politicization of the curriculum, among a variety of vested interest groups became fashionable. (p. 42)

Consequently, psychology became the basic educational science. The educational problem was recast in terms of structural method, and ‘[t]he underlying assumption of this point of view is that there is an agreed upon body of knowledge called the curriculum’ (Tanner and Tanner,

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18 For a brief overview of Sputnik as a ‘turning point’ in educational reform, see Roger Bybee (1997).
19 Eric MacPherson (1995) critiques claims for the causal significance of Sputnik, because ‘[p]ointing causes of a myth...is at best a dubious exercise in postdiction’ (p. 272). Drawing on Chaos Theory, MacPherson argues that the changes attributed to Sputnik’s influence were already underway prior to 1957, and suggests that ‘Sputnik may have been a butterfly, but not a cause’ (p. 272). This view does not, however, detract from the notion of Sputnik marking a turning moment for curriculum theory.
1990, quoted in Marshall et al., 2000, p. 56). In short, the notion of curriculum as John Dewey (1902) knew it – the interaction of subject matter, learners and society – was required to pay more attention to ‘a means-ends rationality with predetermined objectives that governed, or at least rationalized systematically designed learning activities’ (Schubert, 1980, quoted in Marshall et al., 2000, p. 57). The main consequence of this turn in attention to education was the 1959 gathering called by the National Academy of Sciences, the Woods Hole Conference. From this conference emerged a relatively slim volume described as ‘a Chairman’s Report–perforce a selective account of what in his view were the major themes, the principal conjectures, and the most striking tentative conclusions reached’ (Bruner, 1960, p. xxi). This was Bruner’s *The Process of Education*, which aspired to its publishers subtitle *A Landmark in Educational Theory* and set out education’s ‘process’ in four chapters: *The importance of structure*, *Readiness for learning*, *Intuitive and analytic thinking*, and *Motives for learning*. A fifth chapter, *Aids to teaching*, discussed the implications of technology for teaching. An influential remark by Bruner was his characterization of the “‘spiral curriculum” that turns back on itself at higher levels’ (p. 13). Bruner’s explication of the spiral curriculum was limited to a short paragraph:

If one respects the ways of thought of the growing child, if one is courteous enough to translate material into his [sic] logical forms and challenging enough to tempt him to advance, then it is possible to introduce him at an early age to the ideas and styles that in later life make an educated man [sic]. We might ask, as a criterion for any subject taught in primary school, whether, when fully developed, it is worth an adult’s knowing, and whether having known it as a child makes a person a better adult. If the answer to both questions is negative or ambiguous, then the material is cluttering the curriculum (p. 52).
The paragraph was preceded by several observations about understanding children’s learning circumstances and situations. These, Bruner observed, although central to designing a curriculum were poorly researched: ‘it seems obvious that here is an area of research that is of first importance’ (p. 52). This assertion is focal for Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman’s (1995) discussion of 1960s expansion, conflict and contraction of the curriculum field (p. 159), and what Marshall et al., (2000) refer to as curriculum development at its zenith (p. 16). Pinar et al’s (1995) reflections on these times and circumstances document many reflexive insights that hindsight affords about what came to pass. These discussions suggest that many initial reactions to Bruner’s thesis read his appeal to structure as the resurfacing of the ‘Herbartian interest in subjects as a fundamental organiser of curriculum... in contemporary, psychological language’ (p. 160). Overall, the effect on the field was a ‘decade in which the field appeared to expand... enrollments in curriculum courses continued to increase... funding for education generally and curriculum specifically increased’ (p. 159). Thus, much of this expansion was, according to Pinar et al., focussed on discipline-specific knowledge and the specifics of the relationship between curriculum and ‘nature of the knower and of the knowledge-getting process’ (Bruner, 1966, quoted in Pinar et al., 1995, p. 160). However, the principal responses to the process of education, that Pinar et al characterise as reactionary, surprised Bruner (1977) who, in his preface to his book’s second edition, reflects on how the first edition was caught up in educational debate. His reflective/reflexive views in the preface to the new edition include: discussion of pedagogy in the pages of this [first edition, are] almost unrealistically airy… learning depends on the need to achieve joint attention, to conduct enterprises jointly, to honor the social relationship that exists between learner and tutor, to generate possible worlds in which given propositions may be true or appropriate or even felicitous…while in
1960 a structuralist view of knowledge seemed out of the main current of American thought, particularly when related to educational matters, it no longer seems to be so. Indeed, functional and motivational considerations seem now to be taking a more central position in the revision of what have now almost become “establishment” views.

(pp. xiv-xv)

A twenty-first century reader might read some irony in Bruner’s second edition preface. As Marshall et al., (2000) observe, ‘Bruner’s ideas were far more complex than the manner in which they were employed’ (p. 57). This episode exemplifies for me the recurring dysfunction in the implementation of pedagogical theorising over recent decades. Whether it is Piaget, Bruner, Vygotsky or Freire, their appropriately generative ideas, synthesised from observation, intuition and experiments, are adopted, adapted and absorbed to suit policy imperatives of the time and become normalised as best-evidence-based practice. When the adapted-idea-cum-policy malfunctions, the idea is blamed not the adaptation and the wheel is again re-invented. How does this happen and why does it continue to happen? Here is a thought:

As an impressionable child growing up in 1950s Aotearoa New Zealand, I was conscious of the growing distance between the Dominion and its Monarch\(^{20}\). Even the visit of Queen Elizabeth II, which bestowed a potent cultural symbol – a royal blue ribboned gold medal – on every child, did little to assuage the growing desire for things American that the US servicemen had left behind in the mid 1940s, and continued to promote cinematically.

\(^{20}\) Dominion describes Aotearoa New Zealand’s status as a self-governing territory of the British Commonwealth obedient to the rule of the British Monarch.
In another autobiographical note, I reminisce on my teenage impressions to give a sense of the cultural confusion impacting on my identity and understandings of the world:

My memories of the late 1950s are culturally US-centric, driven by the movies. Images of characters, setting and situations from cartoons to comedies and westerns to musicals, most of the sights and sounds I received and rehearsed tasted of Coca-Cola and smelt of hamburger and fries. In the early 1960s this changed. Television arrived and with it came other sights and sounds, ones that struck up resonance with the embodied discourse of an earlier generation, bypassed, seemingly by my parents. This vocabulary and its articulation came from the other side of the world, and the opposite side of the Atlantic from North America. It came from a world that my grandparents still called ‘home’, but had fled, for several reasons, to start life anew in a new land. And it came from a world my father had gone to war for, a war he would never ever speak of.

I’m confused, technologically and culturally. I love the movies, they’re all and everything I ever want to have, to be and to become. But there’s a familiarly strange presence and immediacy about TV that excites me in ways that I can’t explain. Like the unforgettable evening when the continuity announcer delivers his close-down piece to camera, and as he says ‘good night’ he sucks on his tobacco pipe and blows smoke at the camera as the screen fades to black. How do I read this moment? All I can say now is there was a second or so when I suddenly
connected with this fellow in ways that had never struck me before. Somehow his speech, his action, and his look, had reached out through the screen and grabbed something in me that wanted to respond. I distinctly felt we were connected for the briefest of moments, I could sense he knew he was virtually touching me and I felt the potential to acknowledge that contact. Movies, on the other hand, were getting more spectacularly and aurally challenging as the screen ever-widened and sounds reproduced new dimensions that were located and moved about the theatre. There were other oddities. On the movie screen life appeared as bright and rosy as always, like a bowl of cherries and everything’s coming up smelling of roses, but on the TV screen the world seemed gritty, grainy and grey. On TV a nasty new war was in full force, racial riots and young people in rebellion against their elders. I remember one evening in 1962, my father arriving home from his after-work drink when bars closed at 6 pm. He sat me down and across the kitchen table informed me that my continued presence in the family home was now dependent on my adherence to certain rules, such as a well-kempt appearance—no long hair or beard—and abstention from the sort of behaviour that he and his drinking mates regarded as ‘rebellious’.

My reflections on these impressions, over four decades later, are that although my perceptions of recursive complexity and its significance for me were nascent at the time, overpowering cultural, technological, social and political forces were at work to teach me to ignore them. In other words, any sense of currere was consumed by curriculum. At that time (and even to this
time), generative possibilities are too often overpowered by the potent ideological forces of Establishment capitalism.

**Killing fields**

The core structured disciplinary disposition in curriculum was reinforced, in general, by the publication of *The Structure of Knowledge and the Curriculum* (Ford & Pugno, 1964, cited in Pinar et al., 1995, p. 160), which ‘attempted to “map” fundamental concepts and methods of inquiry for specific disciplines’ (pp. 160-161). And, in particular, by Joseph Schwab’s chapter *Structures of the disciplines: Meanings and significances* in Ford and Pugno (1964). However, in this chapter Schwab identified problems relating to the structures of the disciplines and he called for attending critically to such structures, so ‘that the student learns what substantive structures give rise to the chosen body of knowledge... and what some of the alternative structures are which give rise to alternative bodies of knowledge’ (p. 29). Schwab’s early cautions went unheeded as the escalating racial and generational tensions became social and political crises. So it took some time for all but a few to recognise ‘that military and nationalistic objectives were buried in erudite discussions’ (Pinar et al., 1995, p. 161), and for the literature to acknowledge that the underpinning ideology hidden in the 1960s curriculum reforms ‘was neither personal development nor social reform but national power. We were a warfare state seeking international supremacy in military-related scholarship’ (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 178). Although the paradoxical problems of 1960s curriculum disciplinarity struggling to structuralise socio-political relations seem to pale in the shade of twenty first century globalism’s knowledge society/economy and its lifelong learning curriculum, similar structural disciplinary issues still hold sway and similar consequences remain likely.
As the 1960s came to a close, the traditional curriculum field reflected the problematic irrelevancy and illegitimacy that were undermining the US “Establishment,” the military-industrial complex, patriarchal hierarchies, heterosexual orthodoxies, and conventional wisdom’ (Marshall et al., 2000, p. 92). Institutional legitimacy was breaking down under the stresses of a plethora of problems:

Too many large-scale curriculum projects had failed due to their global orientation, teacher proofing, discipline specificity, and more. Curriculum people themselves had so technicized the Tyler rationale that even the act of curriculum making had become an empirical science, ushering in an entire new field of study (evaluation) while placing teachers in a vulnerable new state of accountability (for student learning) without adaptability (in terms of what and how to teach). (p. 93)

As the US reeled from the onslaught of the Manson murders and the continuing mayhem of anti-war protest action, the death knell for the ‘traditional’ developmental model of curriculum began to sound. Schwab, who Marshall et al (2000) characterize as the Coroner for conventional curriculum (p. 94), is credited with sounding its demise loudest because ‘the structures of the disciplines, measurement and evaluation, curriculum knowledge and principles being generated from large, wholesale curriculum projects, and the seeming omniscience of behavioural objectives had all but killed the curriculum field Schwab believed in’ (p. 94). What Schwab (1969) wrote, and read to AERA colleagues, was an essay in which he set out three points for deliberatively reconstituting curriculum in a new generational field:

The first... the field of curriculum is moribund, unable by its present methods and principles to continue its work and desperately in search of new and more effective principles and
methods. The second... the curriculum field has reached this unhappy state by inveterate and unexamined reliance on theory in an area where theory is partly inappropriate in the first place and where the theories extant, even where appropriate, are inadequate to the tasks which the curriculum field sets them... The third... which constitutes my thesis: there will be a renaissance of the field of curriculum... only if the bulk of curriculum energies are diverted from the theoretic to the practical, to the quasi practical, and to the eclectic. By ‘eclectic’ I mean the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a body of problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to the problem in a different way. By the ‘practical’ I... mean... a complex discipline... concerned with choice and action... which is concerned with knowledge. Its methods lead to defensible decisions, where the methods of the theoretic lead to warranted conclusions, and differ radically from the methods and competences entailed in the theoretic.... (p. 1)

Pinar (1975a) remembers these times as painful, confusing and angry, with campus riots over continuance of the war, and action against racism, classism, and sexism: ‘all contributed to an extraordinary period’ (p. 357). So it is not surprising that Schwab’s ‘clarion call for renewal’ received a standing ovation (Marshall et al., 2000, p. 93).

The Curriculum 'Field': Don't fence me in
Why is curriculum a field? The primary definition for ‘field’ in The Oxford English dictionary (field, 1989) is:

Ground; a piece of ground… Open land as opposed to woodland; a stretch of open land; a plain… with reference to that which grows upon the surface… That part of the open country which is hunted over… The territory belonging to a city… Land or a piece of land
appropriated to pasture or tillage, usually parted off by hedges, fences, boundary stones’.

[The tertiary definition is:] An area or sphere of action, operation, or investigation; a (wider or narrower) range of opportunities, or of objects, for labour, study, or contemplation; a department or subject of activity or speculation.

Drawing on these definitions it is possible to see field having a proprietary character, which helps explain why curriculum is a field: to be defined, defended and protected. However the origins of its use in this manner remain speculative. Aristotle was called ‘the archetypical peripatetic teacher because he taught while walking up and down in the pedestrian area of the Lyceum known as the peripatos’ (Hamilton, 1990, p. 7), and his topics21, or common places, inspired us to look to fence fields of what we know. Whatever the explanation, English language maintains an agrarian tenor in imagining knowledge as branching from a tree, growing in a field or domain, and existing in/on an area or a sphere. Furthermore, Hamilton connects branching connects with curriculum.

The earliest recorded educational use of curriculum is attributed to Peter Ramus22, in what he called his 'Ramist map' (Hamilton, 1990, p. 26). Ramus claimed his map to be a ‘method’23 (Ong, 1958, p. 30) of mapping knowledge, which ‘comprised the clustering of related common places along the lines, quite literally, of a branching taxonomy… Moreover, the fact that

22 Whose surname is coincidentally the Latin word for the branch of a tree.
23 “‘Method” (methodus), Ramus’ term for orderly pedagogical presentation of any subject’ (Ong, 1958, p. 30).
Ramist maps also embodied directional route-plans explains Hardin Craig’s characterisation of Ramus as the “greatest master of the short-cut the world has ever known” (p. 30). Such innovative and entrepreneurial activities in the educational field suggest Ramus’s method would not be amiss in today’s knowledge economy. For example, Ong (1958) writes of Ramus’ methodological skeleton key: ‘Confident in the power of his key, he felt no hesitation – nor did many of his contemporaries, who had keys of their own cut to the Ramist or any other models – in teaching and organizing or “methodizing” curriculum subjects while he was in the process of learning them and in publishing the results in textbook form’ (p. 33). In his overview of curriculum history, Hamilton situates Ramus’ methodological course of learning at the commencement of a journey spanning Absolutism, the Enlightenment, Industrialism, Humanism, Progressivism, and the realisation that the user of the curriculum map – the learner – is also implicated in exploring the world of knowledge. Thus, as I see it, both the commencement of this journey and the era of modernity coincided.

Today, after moving through modernity and continuing arguably through postmodernity, when the curriculum field is surveyed, it is evident that although the field’s map has been through many revisions, the design remains modernist. The map still projects and frames analytical, rational, logical determinations of where knowledge is to be found, how it is to be used, and what it is to be used for. Knowledge, especially as Bloom (1956) taxonomised it for education,
Curriculum (re)viewing

continues to be fenced into paddocks of dichotomous definition, methodical demonstration, particular organisation, factual generalisation, and evidential evaluation. The neat and tidy boundaries, ensuring no pupils get lost on their way (to work), have proved indispensable to nineteenth and twentieth century school curricula. Despite concerted efforts on the part of some contemporary curriculum workers, formulaic, standardised learning remains a key strategic platform for the knowledge society on its twenty-first century track to a rhetorical future global prosperity.

However, while this modern curriculum is held neatly and tidily in place – much like a personal organiser with its hole-punched pages properly located and ring-bound between appropriately labelled dividers – its content, intended to be sensible and relevant to an increasingly fraught and complex worldview, and its delivery, are both becoming increasingly problematic. Not only is the personal organiser-like object so over-stuffed with content that it is bursting apart, it is also morphing into a personal digital assistant-like technological hybrid.
Consequently, individual subjective experience of the world itself is being paradigmatically turned on its ear. The notion of ‘post-’ has pierced the structural security of modern ‘reality’, making the modernist curricular cartographer’s map about as useful and reliable as the one Christopher Columbus set out with – when ‘ancient geographical knowledge had been well-preserved (and extended to China) by the Arabs, but almost totally lost among the Europeans, who imagined a flat Earth centred on Jerusalem’ (Sagan, 1981).

Future scanning of the ‘postmillennial curriculum field’ (Marshall et al. 2000, p. 211) may reveal another epochal turning – like the turning from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy presaging the era of modernity. Postmillennial curriculum scholars may remark on a modernistically perceived linear, sequential field becoming chaoplexically perturbed and different, thereby moving understandings of education beyond standardised prescriptions of what to fence in the field. Through postmillennial curriculum experiences embodying complex, multi-dimensional concepts, a fielding matrix (dealing with questions or problems) becomes more relevant. As Doll (1993) observes ‘[a] matrix… has no beginning or ending… So too, a curriculum modelled on a matrix is nonlinear and nonsequential but bounded and filled with intersecting foci and related webs of meaning’ (p. 162).

I have told here how the emergence of curriculum as an educational term, and an accompanying methodological scheme for its subjects, dawned in the modern era. Through successive centuries, the curriculum field has been well maintained with stout modern fences serving its industrious landlords capitally well. However, there is also discussion in the

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24 Chaoplex is a term used in special interest groups to conjointly refer to Chaos theory and Complexity theory.
literature of new paradigmatic complexions on the notion of field for postmillennial curricula (Doll, 1993). This newer field (or fielding process) resists fences in their modern form and reconceptualises the word *post* to embody altogether differing worldviews, which elaborate the diversity, complexity and recursivity of experiences.

Peter Cole and Pat O’Riley25 (2002), exemplify my notion of fielding in the following brief excerpt from their remarkable performance in Curriculum visions titled *Much rezadieux about (Dewey’s) goats in the curriculum: Looking back on tomorrow yesterday*. Both authors are co-implicated in their texting, yet ideas of difference are heard in different voices that speak – both and neither – poetry and prose:

we keep returning to the circle
sometimes to one perimeter sometimes concentric ones or spirals
the computer technology teacher is always talking
about ‘being on the leading edge’
in our culture the leading edge is every / where  not just in a terminal position
that’s very post-structural  she’d say  very post-colonial

we said  there is no post  when it comes to colonialism
the people who teach us up here in the hinterlands  the boonies  they come
from privilege and they’re stuck there  talking
with authority about people not in the mainstream

25 Peter Cole is a member of the In-SHUCK-ch/ N'Quatatqua (Stl'atl'imx) Nation of British Columbia and Pat O'Riley is of Irish / French / Mohawk heritage.
hey in case they haven’t noticed they’re the ones standing in front of the class
centre stage telling us about ourselves
we don’t need to learn about ourselves secondhand
or in ordinal manipulations above first
we’re in the margins yes to them but at least we got the aisle seats
in case the architecture doesn’t hold. (p. 147, extra word spacing in original)

I selected this excerpt for its relevance to the discussion that precedes it, but the whole performance embodies heavenly-levels of diversity and complexity exceed vision and puts me in mind of John Barth’s (1967) ironic allegory, Giles goat-boy or, the revised new syllabus. Barth’s complex novel, satirising technology and academia, is presented as a manuscript for publication derived from a dissertation by Mr Stoker Giles ‘prepared for the furtherment of the Gilesian curriculum’ (p. 35) ;)

Reconceptualising

Max van Manen (1978), in asking what reconceptualisation means, contextualises his question:

Periodically educators hear about the need for renewal and change in curriculum research and development efforts. But however well phrased the arguments for renewal may have been, thus far they have been unable to set in motion genuine alternative research movements. Yet, within the larger field of the social sciences, of which education and curriculum are a part, it is evident that a new epistemological infrastructure is being created that reflects a contemporary consciousness for the emergence of alternative forms of inquiry. Scientific research currently is seen less as an undivided and stable enterprise. Instead there is a growing sense that the very concept of research has become subjective and somewhat arbitrary and that the theories and concepts that guide it may be evanescent and unstable. True or not, this realization is deeply disturbing to many social science investigators. Those individuals who are in the vanguard of scientific renewal run the risk of incurring the wrath of their fellow scholars. Science only exists, the latter argue, where there is exactness and quantifiability. Readers may find their own reactions to the work of the reconceptualists as interesting or revealing as the nature of their work. Of this work, it may be said that it is here where the skeptic finds chaos and the committed further evidence that curriculum thinking has found its renaissance. (pp. 365-366)

Madeleine Grumet (1980) replies to the question by saying that ‘[l]iterally, reconceptualization means to conceive again, to turn back the conceptual structures that support our actions in order to reveal the rich and abundant experiences they conceal’ (p. 24).
Although reconceptualising sought to bring to notice links between emerging curriculum theory and political and cultural developments, after gaining attention (notoriety for some) it began to factionalise. The work eventually separated into two groups with one pursuing a more pragmatic approach to political interests and the other taking a more philosophical path aligned with cultural interests. Although I focus attention on the latter group, political interests are not ignored.

**Minding times**

In his paper to members of American Educational Research Association, Pinar (1975/1994) introduced the method of *currere* by proposing it as a way ‘to explore the complex relation between the temporal and the conceptual. In doing so we disclose their relation to the Self in its evolution and education’ (p. 19). Pinar’s proposal also discloses two important contextual relations concerning his thinking about worldly affairs and theorising: one involving political matters, the other cultural concerns, with both being implicated in the other. On the one hand, internal and international political matters in the United States of America during the 1960s and 1970s had chaotically shattered the nation’s conceptions of itself in relation to others: ‘By the mid-1960s deep social forces were producing an unforeseen turmoil in the American school’ (Bruner, 1977, p. xi). On the other hand, much of the initial rationale for the political actions of the time, and the consequences incurred, were grounded in a poverty of understandings of complex cultural concerns; a conceptual temporal state ‘where empiricism had long been the dominant voice and “learning theory” its amplifier’ (p. vii). However, from the chaos and turmoil a realisation of the complex embodiment of politics in culture in society began to emerge. This realisation was, in itself, due to a recursion of the political chaos and cultural complexity resonating with the French socio-politico-cultural revolution of *Mai 1968*, which
temporally brought to wider notice conceptually critical and post-critical theory perspectives concerning the world’s postmodern condition.

Pinar (1976b) explains that through *currere* he seeks to ‘understand the contribution my formal studies make to my biography’ (p. 51) and he continues to outline what this involves. Elaborating on his conceptualising of biography, Pinar notes that although he can see how life consequences have ensued from certain choices, upon reflection there is more than a simple linear causal relationship between actions and effects. He writes that although he can see his life ‘in a linear way [while] acknowledging its actual multidimensional character’ (pp. 51-52) and that he can plot events and decisions on a timeline, when he comes to describe his life reflections (bio-graphy), he sees that ‘there is a coherence. Not necessarily a logical one, but a lived one, a felt one. The moment of coherence is the biography as it is lived *The Lebenswelt* (p. 52). *Lebenswelt* derives from Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Edmund Husserl’s (1964) phenomenological notions of a world in which life is lived, and a world, which is in itself, living. Pinar’s use of *Lebenswelt* draws attention to a way of understanding self, experience and world that has no comparable description in English. Although the literal English translation of *Lebenswelt* – ‘life/living world’ – seems at first straightforward, the appearance of both words – life and living – presents an ambiguity for English readers. Understanding this ambiguity calls for another German expression – *gestalt* – which, in English refers to understanding a coherent whole, or form that is more than the sum of its parts. In other words *Lebens+welt* describes understandings of world where conceptual and temporal interrelationships between life and living are more complex than they appear or seem to be. In using *Lebenswelt* Pinar also reminds us that his thinking is being informed by a different
epistemology emerging in the so-called ‘continental philosophy’. A significant premise of this philosophy is to draw out understandings that contrast with those determined by the prevailing scientific analytical methods. So, taking water as an example, *Lebenswelt* refers to phenomenological understandings of how water is implicated in the life of the world and living in the world, rather than scientifically reducing it to the liquid H₂O.
(Re)viewing - Curriculum visions and currere

The following pages reiterate my first picturing currere performance (Sellers, 2003c) that was published as a hypertext document in the online journal International Journal of Education & the Arts. The original contained hyperlinked words (shown thus in the text) that opened the pictures in new windows when viewed on a computer. This iteration reworks the original, and locates thumbnails images of my pictures close to the underlined words instead. So it does not offer the reader either the image size or the interactive relationship that the online version does. Placing images in this way has also necessitated breaking the text in places where they would not usually occur. These are indicated by this symbol 📤. However, a folio of full size images is available in the appendix along with details for accessing the hypertext document.

The Internet home page of the International Journal of Education & the Arts (near right), and the index entry for my review in the journal (far right).
Curriculum visions


Review by Warren Sellers, Deakin University

Curriculum visions is an unusual book. Curriculum texts usually address the ways, means and goals of education, and they often do so in a synoptic, or analytic, or didactic manner. Bill Doll and Noel Gough have enacted a visionary exploration of curriculum that travels well beyond the usual bounds of the field. As Gough, quoting one of his favourite storytellers, puts it ‘I had been to Madidinou many times, of course, but this time the town looked altogether different, since I was on a journey beyond it’ (Le Guin, 1986, quoted in Doll & Gough, 2002, p. 18, italics added). The journey that Curriculum visions takes its reader on is not only one that ventures beyond the common notions of curriculum’s boundaries, but the reader gets to share in the conversations that have been enacted as the journey happened. Let me explain: During the evolution of the book, Doll and Gough were conscious of the conversations that constitute such projects; in this instance, the editors’ initial ideas for their introductory essays, subsequent essays by authors’ responding to the editors’ essays, editorial responses to each author’s essay in the form of an introductory ‘Problematic’, and then a ‘Perspective’ on each essay, written by an invited reader. Thus each chapter comprises an editorial ‘Problematic’, followed by the author’s essay, which is reviewed by a reader’s ‘Perspective’. The result is a textual gathering that embodies what Gough calls ‘emerging global theaters of academic practices’ (p. 10) and
Doll prefers to mark as ‘a period of “post” thought’ (p. 54) or, as I have come to envision it, a synthesis of Gough’s *chaotics* and Doll’s *complexities*. As a further indication of the unbounded eclecticism of this book, readers looking for a structural clue to its overall arrangement will only find an alphabetical answer, and, upon close inspection of the index, an entry under the letter S: ‘*sous rature* (under erasure), 1-303’ (p. 310).

Having sketched the editorial context for this work, I would now like to interweave my own perceptions. I am a picture thinker, and I take reading – words and pictures – to be a generative process that helps me to envision meaning from the many paths my learning takes me along. Therefore I see *Curriculum visions* (CV’s) more like a guidebook than a textbook. And, to explain how I interpret my reading journey, I need to show you my sketchbook that records some of my picturings of what I read.

One of my reflective sketchnotes reads, ‘CV’s has touched me in ways that are similar to, and reflect the fractal-like feelings I experienced when I first read of Pinar’s (1994b) *Currere* ‘method’ and Grumet’s (1988) *Bitter milk* – sweet-sour, heady-brisk, sensuous-sensitive, shades-tones’. Appended to this note is a quote from Gough, ‘you either “get it” right away or you don’t’ (p. 2). Gough’s quote, in turn, refers to Mary Elizabeth Moore’s use of ‘getting it’ in her essay *Curriculum: A journey through complexity, community, conversation, culmination*, and her re-visioning of Dolls ‘five C’s of curriculum...currere, complexity, cosmology, conversation, and community’ (p. 42). My reading of ‘getting it’ understands the paradoxical
complexity and simplicity\textsuperscript{26} of curriculum method reconceptualised as \textit{currere} process, or as Moore puts it, her ‘passion for education that contributes to the repair of the world (\textit{tikkum olam} in Hebrew)’ (p. 227). What my sketchnoting illustrates is the interconnected complexity of these ideas for re-generatively affecting being-in-the-world. With this in mind, I also need to explain that my readings of \textit{CV’s} are non-linear and non-hierarchical. They are readings that approach the book in a fashion that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) wrote of as a ‘\textit{rhizome}\textsuperscript{27} interweaving through \textit{A thousand plateaus}. Brian Massumi (1987) the translator, observes that Deleuze and Guattari’s recommendation for reading their book suggest that it be approached:

as you would listen to a record…When you buy a record there are always cuts that leave you cold. You skip them. You don’t approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You find yourself humming them under your breath as you go about your daily business (pp. ix; xiii-xiv).

Following this suggestion, I review \textit{CV’s} by interlinking the textual and pictorial responses of my personal reading experiences. If this concept is unclear, an example of my picturing of \textit{vision and mind} may be helpful.

\textsuperscript{26} Doll elaborates on this complexity/simplicity paradox by referring to Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart’s (1994) coining of the words ‘complicity’ and ‘simplexity’. Doll notes that: ‘Each is designed to show the embeddedness of simplicity within complexity and of complexity within simplicity. These two form a union, not a discrete difference’ (p. 45).

\textsuperscript{27} As the image linked to this word shows, a rhizome is a complex plant root structure that manoeuvres in a markedly different way to the centrally structured arborescent model. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) introduced the rhizome as an organising concept for their writing (pp. 3-25).
To help orient the reader to my approach I open with Niki Konstantinou’s cover illustration for CV’s, titled Eyeland 2. Here we see a chevron shape suggestive of an open book, over which stride Dorothy and her – supposedly dysfunctional – friends on their – hopefully remedial – journey to meet the Wizard of Oz, while beyond the horizon of the spread pages a sky of multiple eyes gazes back towards the viewer. My reading of this image conceives a rhizo-imaginary for the complex interactive conversations about remedial curriculum concepts available to the reader. Conversations between the editors, and with their author /reader friends – wending rhizomatically through and over a thousand plateaus; between the dimensional perspectives of the unseen viewer/reader and the refracting multiplicities of future visions.
In their respective introductory essays, Gough and Doll present visions that reflect the characterisations of chaos and complexity that I refer to earlier. As my sketchnote shows, Gough’s *Voicing curriculum visions*, and Doll’s *Ghosts in the curriculum* generate visual interpretations, which, respectively, chaotically *oralicise* texts and complexly *spectralise* visions. My vision of the two became further complexified in an image that reminded me of M. C. Escher’s (1975) ‘*Rippled surface*’, because of the visual-aural interrelationships that Escher’s graphic evokes. In short, Gough’s essay speaks to the chaotics of re-interpreting curriculum visions, and Doll’s essay re-envision images of curriculum in conversational complexities, and both echo and reflect each other.

A further reflection of the editors’ visionary interests is the ecological thread weaving through CV’s. Sometimes the thread is radically overt, like C. A. Bowers *Toward a cultural and ecological understanding of curriculum*, and sometimes it is allegorically covert, like Peter Cole and Patricia O’Riley’s *Much rezadieux about (Dewey’s) goats in the curriculum: Looking back on tomorrow yesterday*’ At other times, and in other places, the thread peeks through the texture of essays concerning the world’s curriculum, to remind us of the manifold visions ecology embodies.
In Bowers’ essay, for example, there is an explorative move toward contextualising cultural and ecological understandings. I initially see this as a spectrum with ‘humanity’ emitting phosphorescent interference between the atmospheric/geographic layers, to represent what I read as the confused intercourse between the mindedness of logicality and the embodiedness of generativity.
Following Bowers’ arguments, I go on to re-read the spectrum ‘chaoplexly’ in a more fractal-like fashion to think about as-yet unimagined dimensions of ecology. However, reading (backward to) the editors’ problematic Metaphor matters, which introduces both the chapter and the significance of how metaphors matter for understanding ‘in the literal sense that they have material effects’ (p. 73), I draw another image that registers the increasingly tenuous balance between the culture of technology and ecology of life. Then, reading (forward to) Ellen Wickersham’s Perspective on Bowers, which – critically – reviews the essay, another view emerges. Wickersham’s re-view invites me to re-consider Bowers’ cultural and ecological metaphors in the context of a technological world potentially inhabited by a ‘demiperson’, and a society questioning ‘whether the computer is becoming an appendage of us or whether we are merging with the computer’ (p. 88). The curriculum matter for Wickersham is how to make meaning in a world that challenges ‘our very concept of identity-making’ (p. 88).
Cole and O’Riley also find identity-making and curriculum, or ‘**krklm:** a neo-retro-paramorphopoeic radical originating in the future’ (p. 134), a matter of concern. The editors’ introductory problematic to this chapter is titled *A question of genre* and they stimulate me to think about ‘wordless representations of curriculum inquiry’ (p. 130). They also observe that Cole and O’Riley use words, although ‘Their chapter is and is not prose. That’s what we like about poets. We can’t make up their minds’ (p. 130).

I like to think of Cole and O’Riley’s words as ‘proemial’, which *The concise Oxford dictionary* (1999, p. 1141) describes as referring to ‘a preface or preamble to a book or speech’, and deriving from the Greek *pro* ‘before’ and *oime* ‘song’. Proemial suits the sonorous *textones* of Cole and O’Riley’s generatively chaotic and complex word-plays:

- what about hearing colour or feeling its subtle shades
- feeling timbre smelling silence seeing tonality
- what about tectonic movement in language?
- semiotectomy geographizing knowing
- putting the land back into the language (p. 133).

And, here is my *imagination* of their suggestive word-land.
Although Cole and O’Riley play an allegorical (Otis) Dewey (Esquire) as a tragic metaphor in their curriculum/krklm, other contributors follow Doll’s revelatory portrayal of John Dewey as a benign spectre hauntingly urging us to “practicalize” Dewey’s vision, to put in place the concept of curriculum he could not’ (p. 23). Doll follows this sentence with a clarification that this concept involves more than ‘mere mechanical adjustment; it is a reconceptualization of the very nature of curriculum’, which returns us to the gnarly crux of contemporary curriculum concepts – the incommensurable dys-junction of structural progress and poststructural process. CV’s wholistically declares its rhizomous journey to be poststructurally processual, and Doll sketches a map of generative potentiality with his ‘five C’s’ for interpreting curriculum (pp. 42-52), which I visualise and paraphrase thus:

**Currere** describing curriculum reconceptualized – turning the course of progressive education towards learning and teaching as coursing processes.

**Complexity** describing structure reconceptualized – embodying simplicity within complexity and complexity within simplicity, recursively.
Cosmology describing ontology reconceptualized – re-vising the study of a unique uni-verse towards studying pluri-verse ubiquity.

Conversation describing discourse reconceptualized – speaking to processes of learning for knowing by re-writing the method of structuring knowledge.

Community describing humanity reconceptualized – re-generating understandings of human experiences of being.

CV’s writings suggest to me a syn-alysis/ana-thesis – like Cohen and Stewart’s sim-plexity/com-plicity – revealing an ecosomic scale to curriculum journeys, which extends far beyond the economic track our present purposive prescriptions promote. Whether it is in Gough’s essay on globalisation’s effects on notions of otherness, or in Cleo Cherryholmes’ pragmatic concern for the artistic and aesthetic to help understand ‘what to do’, or in Molly Quinn’s Wholly vision-ing of currere symbolised through ‘the legacy of the chariot’ (p. 232), or in Donna Trueit’s summoning of the muses to partake in conversations for sensuous responses ‘to explore our multiple understandings and ignorances of self and other’ (p. 277), to mention but a few. Everywhere there are rhizomous paths and upshoots of ideas about ‘getting’ these visionary journeys. The editors’ stimulating introductions and the thirteen responsively enactive chapters in Curriculum visions are a substantial and important guide for everyone interested in such journeys.
Exegetic comments

Reviewing *Curriculum visions* was an opportunity for me to be generative in my own thinking about ways for approaching *currere* that were so immanent in the book. My readings on *currere* in Pinar, Grumet and others, up to that time, gave me an understanding of the *currere* ‘method’ as incorporating an interactive-reflective-enactive approach to contemplating a substantial curriculum-related text or artistic performance. In reporting on using *currere* Pinar had mainly focused on an autobiographic account of experiencing a work of literature, and Grumet on observing and reporting on her own and her students autobiographic accounting of experiencing a group theatre performance. I wanted to use my picturing as a different approach for autobiographically accounting for my experiencing of reviewing *Curriculum visions*. This approach seemed appropriate because much of the book’s content addressed different ideas about envisioning curriculum and this called for readers to form their own imaginative visualisations of what these might be-become. Picturing as a way of working with imaginative visualising struck me as not only a different way of representing but also a way of showing others that making pictures of thinking was not as difficult or demanding as it might seem.

Having theorised for sometime that ‘literacy’ is dominated by text because children are taught that competence in drawing images is a difficult and demanding skill that only a few will master. If modern literacy had taken a pictographic turn rather than a logographic one, I suggest the difficult-and-demanding-skill/mastery argument could just as well be made for text.

I was extended the privilege of reading drafts of some of the chapters of the book before it went to press. So I entered the book in a sense rhizomatically from the middle, that is, interstitially –
in theoretical spaces – between authors, editors, publishers and prospective readers. Negotiating these interstices gave me a poststructural view of the work. By accessing the writing before it was structured into chapters and compiled into a package, I had the opportunity to form my own thoughts about what I was experiencing as the book was coming together. Although my review of the book was subsequently presented in a form that followed the chapter-by-chapter structure, I began it very differently, drawing on my picturings that had been made at different times in a random order. As I explain early on in the review, I quickly found in the chapters resonances with my own thinking about seeing reading. In turn, these suggested potentials for not only making more of the chaos and complexity that the editor’s were interested in, but also in making those interests obvious and accessible to other readers. For me, this first attempt at picturing currere was illuminating and encouraging, and gave me confidence in continuing to work with it.

Currere comes to life in/through my thinking picturing and in so working currere recursively continues to open ways for picturing thinking coming to life. Recursion within a short to moderate temporal interval of several years is not difficult to appreciate and work with. Working with intervals of several decades is more problematic. However I have found that an eclectic approach to reading with currere in mind can reveal some interesting and helpful recursive connections. For example, Robert Rusk’s (1921) proposal for experimental education\(^{28}\) sets out principles that in retrospect seem both precient and familiar:

\(^{28}\) Rusk’s writing, dating from 1912, describes experimental education involving the application of experimental methods to understanding educational processes.
In the past Education has concerned itself with methods of teaching, for the suspicion has
dawned upon us that the pupil’s method of learning may not correspond with our methods
of teaching, that he [sic] may in fact be learning not because of, but in spite of, our methods
of teaching. In the future we shall consequently have to talk less of the teaching process and
more of the learning process, and for guidance in method we shall have to depend on the
psychology\(^{29}\) of learning instead of on “formal steps” and the logical analyses of
knowledge. (Rusk, 1921, p. 199)

\(^{29}\) Rusk remarks that psychology in experimental education ‘is best comparable with the science of geography…
The distinguishing feature of experimental education is its practice of approaching all problems from the
standpoint of the child’ (1921, p. 4).
Currere is a reflexive cycle in which thought bends back upon itself and thus recovers its volition. (Grumet, 1976b, pp. 130-131)

Admittedly, it is a grandiose ambition to imagine a research method that simultaneously and consistently will embrace both poles of the dialectic and not relinquish subjectivity to objectivity or vice versa. William Pinar’s approach is to scale the inquiry down to the experiential field of the individual. Currere, the root of the word curriculum, is Pinar’s term for educational experience; it describes the race not only in terms of the course, the readiness of the runner, but also seeks to know the experience of the running of one particular runner, on one particular track, on one particular day, in one particular wind. Thus to talk of education as the dialogue of person and world is not to break down this complex interaction into separate parts, subjecting each to a distinct, isolated analysis. Nor are we describing education as a magical transformation, a metamorphosis of self into forms of the world. Educational experience is a process that takes on the world without appropriating that world, that projects the self into the world without dismembering that self, a process of synthesis and totalization in which all the participants in the dialectic simultaneously maintain their identities and surpass themselves. (Grumet, 1992, p. 32)
What is this currere?

Genealogy in the literature:
Searches of online databases for scholarly literature using the term *currere* in an educational context show its steady and continuing appearance over the past thirty-three years. My detailed exploration of this intriguing and complex idea opens by chronologically listing and providing a brief synopsis of literature that includes significant discussion and/or contributions specifically addressing *currere*. Although the term appears more frequently than this list would suggest, many of the over one hundred references to *currere* I found, are not significant. These mainly note *currere*’s etymological association with curriculum and/or use the term to refer to thinking of curriculum as a verb as well as a noun, and therefore a process as well as a construct.

The generativity of *currere* caused me to look for a similar way to treat the literature. The synoptic text has long been associated with curriculum literature (Pinar, et al., 1995, p. 15) and is an approach that the curriculum reconceptualising literature has adapted and enhanced. *Synoptic* literally means ‘seeing together’. The historic usage refers to coinciding interpretations and depictions of complex concepts and/or events that work to improve understandings, for example, of large-scale meteorological and/or oceanographic conditions. The term *synoptic text* specifically applies this meaning to the first three Gospels of the Bible. I use it to mean multiplicity in interpreting analysing, synthesising and understanding the

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30 For example: *'currere'*...a word of Latin origin, derived from *currere*, meaning “to run, or hasten” (Boorstin, 1948, p. 123).
similarities and differences in situations and circumstances. How I see this working will be explained below in my discussion of Pinar’s (2004b) essay *The synoptic text today*.

In the following review of the *currere* literature I also adopt and adapt synoptic text, which then continues rhizomatically throughout the thesis. Pinar et al., (1995) in their important synoptic text cite Phenix (1964) to help explain meaning as a source for curriculum content and to emphasis the importance of its interdisciplinary organisation: ‘a philosophy of the curriculum requires a mapping of the realms of meaning, one in which the various possibilities of significant experience are charted and the various domains of meaning are distinguished and correlated’ (Phenix, 1964, quoted in Pinar et al., 1995, p. 170). Pinar et al., then note the realms as including symbolics, empirics, aesthetics, synoetics, ethics and, synoptics. The latter referring to the realm that, through subjects such as history, religion and philosophy, brings about integrative meaning.

The synoptic approach in the first part of this folio seeks to chart, look out for and integratively explain numerous multiple conceptions of *currere*. Pinar (2004b) elaborates on the synoptic approach as a way of understanding curriculum that brings interdisciplinary thinking to curricular content.

What I am proposing is that curriculum studies scholars research “throughlines” along which subjectivity, society and intellectual content in and across the academic disciplines run. Such “content”…becomes…a conceptual montage enabling teachers to complicate the conversations they themselves will lead in their own classrooms. Composing such synoptic
textbooks for teachers constitutes, I am suggesting, a new form of contemporary curriculum studies research. (p. 8).

*Throughline* is a theatrical term\(^{31}\) that refers to the spine or backbone of a play, which makes the story stand up and keep moving forward. As an example, the movie *The Terminator* involves a woman coming to terms with her fate as progenitor of someone who will save the world in the future. The throughline in this screenplay is the woman’s ‘transformation from timid, shy, lonely heart, to strong, brave lover and fighter. This level of the story is where themes come into play. Themes about faith, redemption, love, loss, betrayal. The things that make a movie watchable again and again’ (The Film Diva, 2006, ¶ 3).

Pinar’s (2004b) article on today’s synoptic text includes these helpful end-note quotes from Bernadette Baker responding to a draft of the article\(^{32}\):

1. “The new meaning of synoptic text also requires what I call ‘cross-readings’ or what you call juxtapositions and polysemy that deliberately forge the ‘inter’ in interdisciplinarity”

2. Baker locates in the notion of the “throughline” the “new meaning” of synoptic text, “keeping in motion complex conversations” and “preparing teachers to do curriculum work” (p. 19).

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\(^{31}\) The *through line*, was devised by Constantin Stanislavski to help actors think about characterisation by considering assumptions and actions that link their character’s objectives in moving through the narrative (See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Through_line).

\(^{32}\) These quotations are personal communications received by Pinar.
So Pinar’s (and Baker’s) use of throughline adapts this theatrical notion as a way of identifying and exploring the diverse and complex conversational interactions, or *conversactions*\(^{33}\), that contribute towards reconceptualising curriculum. In my adopt-aptation of synoptic text, I am also seeking the throughlines that work towards a ‘conceptual montage…to complicate the conversations’.

**William F. Pinar’s currere**

Pinar’s early commitment to conceptual critiques of curriculum are evident in his PhD dissertation (1972). This is from the abstract:

> The psychological impact of schooling is examined within the context of a new school of British psychoanalytic thought. It is concluded that schooling is maddening, in the sense used by Laing, Cooper, and others. A rationale for a sane humanities program is established consisting of two components: the nuclear and the cortical. The nuclear is the center of the program; the cortical refers to peripheral elements. The nuclear is the basic encounter or training group; the cortical component is music, dance, the fine arts—studies traditionally associated with the humanities. The study recommends that (1) this new humanities program should be tested throughout elementary and secondary schools, (2) teacher education programs should reflect the humanities program, (3) pilot humanities schools and colleges of education should study the dynamics of a genuinely humanizing, educative ambience.

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\(^{33}\) The theme/title of the 2003 Australian Curriculum Studies Association (ACSA) conference was ‘Convers/Actions’ and it was symbolised by the logo shown on this page. The peer-reviewed paper (Sellers, 2003) I presented to the conference is included and discussed later in this folio.
Here, Pinar makes clear his keen interest in three interrelated topics: the educational implications of (what has come to be regarded as) critical psychology; the significance of the humanities for teaching (particularly the performance arts); and approaches for reconceptualising pedagogy (with emphasis on personal learning experiences), all being aspects that will come together in what he will call *currere*.

The first appearance of *currere* as a distinct and different educational concept was Pinar’s (1974) coinage in a book chapter titled *Currere: toward reconceptualization*. The chapter comprises twenty-four numbered sections varying in length from two sentences to several paragraphs. After an epigraph with quotations from J. P. Sartre, R. D. Laing, James Carol and W. H Auden, it begins:

> The curriculum theory field has forgotten what existence is. It will remain moribund until it remembers.

The first reference to *currere* is in section two where the word is introduced in relation to what Pinar characterises as revisionist or reconceptualist curriculum scholarship that refutes Tyler’s rationale. Identifying the work of three revisionists, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene and James Macdonald as significant, Pinar suggests that an examination of the context of their work may be revealing for curriculum theorising and he calls this context *currere*. (p. 150).

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I include this reproduction of the actual text of Pinar’s chapter as a reminder of days, not so long ago, when the Yearbook it appeared in was 'mimeographed' using a physical stencil made on a typewriter. The more we lose sight of the physical world the easier it becomes to ‘forget what existence is’.

34 Endnotes to the chapter reference examples of publications by each author that Pinar considers qualifies his view of their work as revisionist.
In section eight, Pinar discusses the slipperiness of meaning for the word curriculum. Noting that Huebner, Greene and Macdonald’s use of ‘curriculum theorizing is apparently criticism’ (p. 153), Pinar proposes yet another meaning:

one rooted in its Latin root, *currere*. The distinction is this: current usages of the term [curriculum] appear to me to focus on the observable, the external, the public. The study of *currere*, as the Latin infinitive suggests, involves the investigation of the nature of the individual experience of the public: of artefacts, actors, operations, of the educational journey or pilgrimage[^35].

So understood, the field is not only an environment-producing discipline, involving the formulation of objectives, design, even criticism, as it is understood presently. It is [also] a knowledge-producing discipline, with its own method of inquiry, with its own area of investigation. *Currere*, historically rooted in the field of curriculum, in Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Psychoanalysis, is the study of educational experience. (p. 154)

The sections that follow this elaborate Pinar’s thinking about journeying toward reconceptualization; to bring social, cultural and political questions together with existentialist, phenomenological and psychoanalytic environments that embody the individual living in the world, or rather in *Lebenswelt*. And another, later section considers potential objections to *currere* and reflects on relationships of learning to teaching, which Pinar says involve understanding our own learning before teaching, that is to become ‘students of *currere*, which is to say students of ourselves’ (p. 167). Pinar also considers the future of *currere*, which he

[^35]: An endnote by Pinar acknowledges Huebner’s prior use of ‘pilgrimage’ in this context.
sees as likely involving ‘a shift in perspective, involving not only simply cognitive insight…but so-called affective insight as well. It beckons organismic change’ (p. 167). In my own synoptic texting of currere, diverse cross-readings show that ‘the kernel of a reconceived and revitalized curriculum theory field’ (p. 168) has continued to grow and bear fruit.

In his introduction to a retrospective collection of Essays in curriculum theory, Pinar (1994a) writes that as a student of autobiography he wanted the collection to cover his own history, ‘beginning in 1972 in a fascination with Jackson Pollock and trying to think about high-school teaching as “working from within”’ (p. 4). Pinar’s (1972b) original essay Working from within, expands on the reference to Pollock and introduces links to characteristics that emerge later in explanations of currere. Pollock opened up for Pinar a way of understanding how to engage with the notion of working in process, as an alternative to work in progress. That is, rather than always having a pre-planned lesson mapped out to rely on and progressively work through, a teacher could also extemporise in a learning situation and engage with students in a more generative and interactive way. Pinar (1994a) puts it this way:

I have knowledge of my discipline, some knowledge of my students, and some self-knowledge which I am willing to share on occasion. As well, I come ready to respond, not only as a student and teacher of literature, but as a person. In fact, I must be willing to disclose my thoughts and feelings if I am to hope for similar disclosures from students. I must be willing to explain, at times I intuit as “right,” how and why a certain literature piece affects me. I must be so willing if I am to hope that the discipline that is significant for me will also be significant for my students. So, although [like Pollock] I make no
preliminary sketch, that is, a lesson plan outlining material to be covered, I do have a general notion of what I’m about and what the results will be. (p. 9)

Pinar explains that what will ‘be’ in this situation is a direct affect or process, rather than an indirect effect or consequence. ‘I “be” with my students in a direct way; there is no lesson or sense of authority to make our conversing indirect; as a result, we often make cognitive and emotional contact. The class becomes more immediate; we tend to become immersed in the moment’ (p. 9). Returning to Pollock, and citing an interview with the artist, Pinar discusses the importance of drawing on what is within the self to negotiate learning and quotes from an interview with Pollock who says ‘…today painters do not have to go to a subject matter outside of themselves. Most modern painters work from a different source. They work from within,’ (William Wright, 1950, 1967, quoted in Pinar 1994a, p. 10). Pinar’s observation here is about complexity involving learners bringing themselves to learning rather than expecting learning to come to them. This process is not just another teaching tool; it involves a completely different understanding of teaching-learning relationships. It involves breaking down the hierarchical pedagogical structure and requires teachers to work on and with their own knowing, rather than relying on what they have been taught about how to teach what others know. In short, Pinar’s argument is about changing curriculum from the instruction mode to the inquiry mode.

Also in 1972, Pinar wrote an essay Sanity, madness and the school indicating a concern for psychosocial critique that underwrites and presages his later search for a method of self-awareness, recovery and renewal. Drawing on Freire’s banking metaphor for education with its
oppressive attitudes and practices, Pinar (1975a) identifies twelve resulting psychological/phenomenological effects:

1. hypertrophy or atrophy of fantasy life;
2. division or loss of self to others via modeling;
3. dependence and arrested development of autonomy;
4. criticism by others and the loss of self-love;
5. thwarting of affiliative needs;
6. estrangement from self and its effect upon the process of individuation;
7. self-direction becomes other-direction;
8. loss of self and internalization of externalized self;
9. internalization of the oppressor: development of a false-self system;
10. alienation from personal reality due to impersonality of schooling groups;
11. desiccation via disconfirmation; and
12. atrophy of capacity to perceive esthetically and sensually (pp. 362-380).

Describing the cumulative effect of these as ‘devastating’, he adds, ‘[w]e graduate, credentialed but crazed, erudite but fragmented shells of the human possibility’ (p. 381). This clearly indicates Pinar’s motives for the direction his work takes.

As mentioned above, currere first appeared as a chapter titled ‘Curre: Toward reconceptualization’36. The chapter also appeared in his (1975c) self-edited synopsis of the

work of the reconceptualist. And this same volume included another chapter Search for a method (Pinar, 1975b), in which Pinar discussed his thinking about ‘method’. In the first iteration of currere (1974) Pinar references Sartre’s (1963) Search for a method and writes about reading this work:

What sort of man would write like this? As I read I try to attend as loudly, closely and uncritically as I can to the print, to merge my minding, my attention, with that which is codified on the page. The degree of abstractness in Sartre, of hugeness, of globalness, is experienceable as expanding, of loosening what then feels like constraints of my mind’s structure, what Freire might in part mean by “limit situation”. Such sentences might constitute a very preliminary phenomenological or Experientialist account of one aspect of cognitive development, of what Piaget in part might mean by “decentering”. (pp. 161-162)

Pinar’s concern for conceiving of ways to engage with abstract, complex, qualitative phenomena and experiences are evident here. At around the same time, Pinar (1975d) also presented a paper titled The method of ‘currere’” to the annual meeting of the American Education Research Association in Washington D.C. The abstract for the paper records that: ‘the author paints a conceptual portrait of his evolving relationships to his formal studies and thereby describes a method by which educators can reconceptualize the meaning of curriculum’ (n.p.). The abstract describes a method involving existential experience as data source from which, using psychoanalytical free association, a multidimensional biography can be generated based on conceptual and preconceptual experiences. The method’s four steps – regressive, progressive, analytical, and synthetical – are explained as a way that ‘reduces the distance between the researcher and subject by making the researcher the subject and allows
for deeper and clearer understanding of the present by outlining the past, present, and future’ (n.p.). Of the four iterations of this paper, through which currere evolves, probably the most cited is the chapter in a book co-authored by Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (1976).

**Pinar and Grumet’s currere**

In *Toward a poor curriculum*, Pinar and Grumet (1976b) collect and connect a series of essays that introduced what they characterised as their ‘formulation of autobiographical study’ (p. 1). Pinar begins, and introduces notions of currere in the second chapter. Grumet follows with chapter three, introducing herself and discussing existential and phenomenological implications for currere. In chapter four, Pinar (1976b) details *The method* and includes a prefacing note that the method’s ‘complete exposition awaits the publication of Pinar’s *Life History and Educational Process*, now in progress’ (p. 51). In chapter five, *Toward a poor curriculum*, Grumet (1976b) explains how she sees currere’s theory and practice interconnecting by drawing on her theatre teaching and experience. Pinar returns in chapter six to ‘answer critics of currere and make clear the concept’s political as well as spiritual dimensions’ (p. 89), and Grumet follows with a detailed review of how psychoanalytic theory contributes generatively to currere as educational experience. So that:

attention to our students’ construction of their educational experience and to the revelation of the possibilities latent in their own structures need not be considered as a compensatory gesture extended to redress a pathological condition; it is a procedure of demystification that is essential to the development of human potential. (p. 141)

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37 Grumet was a doctoral student at Rochester University and Pinar was advisor for her dissertation.

38 Although that ‘complete exposition’ did not eventuate, a slightly revised version of the paper/chapter was republished in Pinar’s (1994b) *Autobiography, politics and sexuality: Essays in curriculum theory 1972 to 1992.*
Aside from some words unsuited to present poststructural thinking, this passage from Grumet is even more apposite in today’s problematic educational environment, where retention of disenchanted pupils and pathologies of learning deficit syndromes are features. Toward a poor curriculum reminds me of Philip K. Dick’s writing\textsuperscript{39}. Both portray a similar uncanny prescience of worlds to come.

In Qualitative evaluation: Concepts and cases in curriculum criticism (Willis, 1978), Grumet and Pinar further elaborated their respective ideas on currere. Grumet’s (1978) chapter, Songs and situations: The figure/ground relation in a case study of currere, brings Dewey’s aesthetics, Sartre’s existentialism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology together in a notion of ‘existential aesthetic’ (p. 284) that she uses to inform a case study of teaching and learning incorporating a theatre festival. Grumet uses the gestalt figure/ground notion to examine shifting relationships in the subject/object experience of teacher/student with content/learning of curriculum, which she observes are ‘eidetic, not grounded and contingent’ (p. 284). There is play (some movement)\textsuperscript{40} in the relationships that calls for the learner to actively engage in a ‘virtual-figure [understanding-curriculum]/ground [content of learning]/personal-subject [thinking-student]’ assemblage, in which the responding subject personally synthesizes their own knowing towards learning. In this notion, curriculum can never be a fixed, finite, object that structures the teaching of learning; rather, curriculum must be an assemblage that co-implicates teachers’ knowing and learners’ learning recursively. Grumet describes challenging

\textsuperscript{39} The three stigmata of Palmer Eldritch (Dick, 1964) for example, which brings psycho-social pathologies, distractive technologies, genetics and environmental catastrophe together in alternative world identities.

\textsuperscript{40} Here I follow Gough’s (1998).usage likening this to play in a machine, ‘a relative freedom of movement within limits’ (p. 119).
and ‘uncomfortable’ experiences that estrange the ordinary in the process of currere (p. 297).

She sees this as not only raising the students’ awareness of the importance of critical reflection, but also broadening their own perspectives on how and why students’ personal past and present educational experience influence future intentions (p. 296). Likening currere to a gift, Grumet (1978) concluded that some had returned it unopened, some had opened it but not used it, some had tried to use it but were unsuccessful, and some ‘made much more use of [it] than I had ever imagined possible’ (p. 312). She gives two examples of the latter that dramatically demonstrate currere’s generative outcomes for those participants: ‘Yes, plays must captivate. But there must be thinking, feeling willing author behind what finally occurs on stage… So goodnight ladies and gentlemen. A new phase, a new play is about to occur in my life, hopefully in the future…’ (Anonymous student quoted in Grumet, 1978, p. 312).

Pinar’s (1978) chapter Currere: A case study exemplifies his autobiographical approach by describing his own learning experiences of his immediate and reflective responses in reading Sartre’s Search for a Method. He explains that doing the reading is a recursively co-implicated process for generating meaning: ‘the course of study, the curriculum…becomes subsumed in the experiential curriculum of its student’ (p. 317). The currere case study is described in three parts that correspond to some extent with the regressive, progressive and analytical-synthetical movements of the process.

Part one recollects and reviews curriculum criticism scholarship and explores Pinar’s thinking on how this relates to his own approach. Part two describes the workings of the study, which involves the selection of relevant text passages and the recording of observations about them.
These observations are often very experiential and associative; much like a stream of consciousness narrative. He states how ‘I was dazed after reading it. It pulled and submerged me in its current and depth[…]I had the wind knocked out of me[…]What I saw in the water[…]that Sartre is convinced[…]this conviction is expressed noncognitively; it is in the weight of the words, and their movement’ (p. 331). Although this work may appear to be written ‘off the cuff’, and lacking any depth of thought, due to its seemingly unstructured form, this is far from the case. As most artists will affirm, an apparently spontaneous performance approach requires considerable commitment and effort. Such a generative approach engages with questions of difference about different ideas, or, as Deleuze puts it, different/ce in other ways of understanding researching-learning. Deleuze (1994) uses this arrangement to distinguish different from and difference in, as a complex notion that resists rationalising, in the same way that many find some contemporary art and musical performances inaccessibly irrational. A different idea thus involves questions of difference like the coming together of:

two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar ‘halves,’ the two halves of the Symbol, each dividing itself in two: an ideal half submerged in the virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the qualities actualising those relations and on the other by the parts actualising those singularities. Individuation ensures the embedding of the two dissimilar halves. (p. 279-280)

Part three (written some two and half years after the second part) discusses what has come about through the course of the preceding parts and what understandings and meanings have been generated in the process. Pinar writes of a realisation that ‘[t]he biographic issue that
absorbed me [two and half years ago] I view now as one of self-differentiation and integration’ (p. 338). He goes on to synthesise how that realisation relates to the original reading work, the thinking that work experientially generated and the reflective-explorative-interpretive understandings that have subsequently emerged. Again, this is a deeply effortful process. The timescale is particularly relevant because it emphasises the commitment required to sustain the work. This is not a once-over-lightly exercise that can be produced on demand. Like any process that works towards generativity, its needs to be carefully and attentively undertaken and sufficient time allowed for its working.

Broadening spaces for discourse

On the subject of timescale, this is an appropriate moment to observe the increasing flux of interests and activity around curriculum reconceptualising. Although 1978 may be seen as pivotal in it being the year that two conferences were held that clearly distinguished differing factions meeting under the banner of reconceptualising, and a decision was taken to start the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (JCT), the conception and birthdate of the movement and journal, are not clear in Pinar’s mind (2004a). As Craig Kridel (1999) reports, the odd portrayal of curriculum reconceptualising in the professional literature obscures and misrepresents the haphazard reality of complex discourse and events to synoptically determine and concretise a Reconceptualist Movement: ‘Instead…[b]y examining conference programs and assorted conference themes and by placing this information in juxtaposition with synoptic textbook descriptions, many interesting and somewhat unacknowledged dimensions emerge’ (p. 510). Kridel is referring, in part, to the ‘substantive work’ published between 1967 and 1972, prior to the first conference in 1973 (p. 512). A concerted attempt to deconstruct the emergence of
complex curriculum movements and concerns for reconceptualising are beyond my scope here, but to do so would be valuable work indeed and Pinar’s (1999) *Contemporary Curriculum Discourses: Twenty Years of JCT* is a most helpful introduction.

In the editorial statement for the first issue of *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, Pinar (1979/1999) refers to an alternative mode of thinking about curriculum in ‘what we have termed—not without controversy—the “reconceptualization.”’ (p. xxi). Significantly, Pinar draws attention to an inclusive editorial policy that is prepared to take risks:

> We reject the notion that only polished, finished scholarly products are worthy of publication. After all, our interest is education, including the process of formulating views, the process of articulating experience. Thus, some of the pieces will be rough and clearly unfinished, primarily calls for further work. We hardly eschew refinement, but we will not sacrifice our commitment to the experimental attitude—experimental extended to the forms of scholarship and theory themselves—for the sake of quick and wide acceptance. (p. xxii)

This position has characterised the identity of the journal from that time to the present. In the first issue the position on acceptance was amplified by William Reid’s (1979) article, *A curriculum journal and its field: A question of “genre”*, which reported an analysis of how articles were judged as acceptable for publication in the *Journal of Curriculum Studies* (JCS). Reid found that a preponderance of negative criteria for judgement indicated an editorial awareness of more ‘characteristics of papers that are not suitable for publication than of those that are’ (p. 13). Analysis also showed that acceptability mostly relied on something called ““overall impression”…applying as much to the author as to the paper…even when they are
totally unknown to us’ (p. 14). Impressions aside, Reid identifies ‘three propositions about the preferred “genre” of JCS’, namely, a loose definition of suitable content, importance of personal style, and ‘a demand for coherent, well-informed argumentation’ (p. 15).

The publication of Reid’s article was clearly a move intended to challenge the authority of a particular mode of academic publishing in the field. As Noel Gough (2002a), commenting on Reid’s article, wrote:

“the well argued essay” seemed to be the preferred genre of curriculum writing as published up to that time in the Journal of Curriculum Studies (of which [Reid] was then European Editor). But he warned that a preference for just one genre of curriculum journalism was inherently conservative if other possible forms were excluded without question: ‘Thoughts on curriculum can be pointed, substantive and coherent even if they are only a few lines long; they don’t have to run to 5,000 words… Nor need they be in prose, or even in words’. (Reid, 1979, quoted in Gough, 2002, p. 130)

There is no doubt that the Bergamo conference gatherings and JCT’s editorial philosophy has kept reconceptualising alive and well throughout the past three decades.

...extending Grumet’s currere
In the JCT’s second year, Madeleine Grumet (1980/1999) extended her views on Autobiography and reconceptualization. Although she omits the word currere from the article, she references earlier papers that do and she explains how autobiography is the method for reconceptualising curriculum. Grumet writes:
While there is initial anxiety, for students have little practice in finding and telling their own stories, there is usually a rush of fluency once the choices are made. It is rare that these pieces are burdened with poor writing. People make sense when they know what they are talking about. (p. 28)

The ‘rush of fluency’ Grumet refers to, is evidence that in this self-reflexive tactic of articulating their own experience, the learner discovers their own voice, their own way of interpreting, understanding and making meaning. ‘The method’ is more than autobiography, more than reconceptualising, it is currere – a gestalt that is more than the sum of its parts. Metaphorically, currere is to curriculum as the Taoist Taijitu (T’ai Chi, or yin yang symbol) is to a clock. Noel Gough (2002) writes of his ‘hope that a curriculum scholar with…embodied vision might one day produce a critique of the clockwork curriculum (timetables, times tables, time on task)’ (p. 3). In other words, Gough is calling for critique of a complicated, highly dependent arrangement of curriculum that can only exist as the sum of its parts. In response to Gough’s call I see the yin yang device, which is a graphic deriving from recording the cycles of the sun and symbolising limitless complexity in interdependent relations of all being.

Pinar v Tanner and Tanner, and currere
In collaboration with Henry A. Giroux and Anthony N. Penna, Pinar (1981) edited a volume titled *Curriculum and instruction: Alternatives in education* that, drawing mainly from published articles, documented a growing debate in the field between three perspectives, namely, traditionalists, conceptual empiricists, and reconceptualists. It is apparent from the content that the debate between each of the parties was becoming more heated and a distinct
rift was evident between traditionalists and reconceptualists. Much of the debate revolved around what the traditionalists critically saw as the reconceptualists’ overemphasis on theory and the ‘excessively personal character of autobiographical curriculum research’ (p. 139), at the expense of what the reconceptualists critically saw as the disciplinary effectiveness and command and control structures of curriculum for practicing instruction. The ‘debate’ eventually came to a head in a rather angry exchange of letters to the editor of Educational Researcher, which resulted from an article by Daniel and Laurel Tanner that was highly critical of another by Pinar. The Tanners (1979) set the tone by referring to ‘a small cadre of curricularists who call themselves “reconceptualists’” (p. 8) and proceeded to disparagingly criticise Pinar and his work. This altercation drove a wedge between factions in curricular studies that, for many theorists and practitioners, is still in place, and exemplified by the Tanners’ closing paragraph that resonates with today’s stocktake of curriculum41: ‘We see the AERA as dedicated to “the best available evidence” through scientific inquiry. Dogma, superstition, blind authority, mysticism, escapism, or even narrow empiricism, cannot stand up to “the best available evidence” which, after all, is the raison d’etre of the community of scholars in a free society’ (p. 7). The Tanners determination of scientific enquiry’s ‘best available evidence’ as standing up for the ‘raison d’etre…of scholars in a free society’ is problematic for me. My reading and research suggests that a free society of scholars has a more pluralistic worldview than the Tanners have. I find New Zealand’s curriculum stocktake problematic for similar raisons d’être.

41 The New Zealand Ministry of Education (2002) recently undertook such a stocktake in order to revise the New Zealand school curriculum.
In retrospect, it is possible to understand how this polarisation of perspectives reinforced the influence of the traditionalists – who acknowledged the theoretical role of the conceptual empiricists – and marginalised the reconceptualists. My own experience in a curriculum studies Masters programme between 1998 and 2000 is an example, in that the comprehensive synoptic text *Understanding curriculum: An introduction to the study of historical and contemporary curriculum discourses* (Pinar et al., 1995) was unknown to both teachers and students in the programme, and not available in the university library.

**Pinar elaborates...**
Also in *Curriculum and instruction: Alternatives in education*, Pinar (1981) connects his thinking about *currere* to the dilemma arising in the reconceptualising altercations presenting in the notion of *The abstract and the concrete in curriculum theorizing* (p. 431). Alluding to the theory vs. practice, humanist vs. Marxist, abstract vs. concrete dialectics he argues that the abstract idea can be privileged to the extent that it becomes more ‘real’ than the reality of that on which the idea depends: ‘As ideas become more “real” than human beings, the capacity to sacrifice the latter for sake of the former becomes more possible and likely’ (p. 434). He further argues that it is the interdependence of abstract AND concrete that matters, not the hierarchical dominance of one over the other. Portraying the dialectical relations as consciousness (abstract) and matter (concrete), he insists that the two ‘must be explicitly linked’ (p. 436) and points to his work as an example. ‘*Currere: A case study*’, he

42 Although I understand Pinar’s use of ‘concrete’, there is a tendency to focus on the solid structural reinforcing connotations of the product rather than recognising the ingredients and process that it involves, or the interdependence with abstract that *currere* anticipates. I prefer the word ‘actual’, which conveys the idea of ‘concrete’ but allows for practical active movement. I ask the reader to imagine that substitution where I have placed concrete under erasure in this paragraph. In the following paragraph I use the word actual.
notes, attempted to explore a concrete curriculum text (Search for a Method) through the abstract consciousness of a student (Pinar himself).

What Pinar is alerting us to, is the danger of the ideological abstractions of the curriculum overtaking the reality of the learner’s actual experience, that when abstract and actual are dichotomously set, the curriculum will dominate the learner.

**Picturing structures**

This ingenious picture, and its companion on the next page accompanies Gough’s (1986) article *Futures in curriculum*, Richard Mochelle (c 1986) illustrates the complex interdependence of the perceived abstract ideological abstractions and actual foundations dichotomy so well that I reproduce it here. However, what happens if this structure is overdetermined and possibly perturbed by unforeseen events? On the next page Mochelle explains how he sees such events, consequences and possible remedies and alternatives. It is
evident that the strategies are present on a continuum moving from rigidly dichotomous *fixes* towards more interdependent understandings.

In the second part of *The abstract and the concrete in curriculum theorizing* Pinar (1981) moves to further explicate the role of *currere* by discussing it as an example of the Freirean notion of ‘liberative work’. Proposing *currere* as ‘one strategy for conducting this work’ (p. 441), he describes such work thus:

-While carefully reading a particular text, one underlines or stars sentences and passages that in some way strike him, in some way “stand out” from the remainder of the text. This requires quiet, cautious reading of the text as well as constant attention to one’s response. The gestalt notion of figure-ground is useful here. The text becomes figure, that to which one is primarily attentive, and one’s response becomes ground. The ink on the page, the book as physical object occupy attention, yet the connection of the physical object to the physical body of the reader is not ignored. In this simple connection is suggested the relationship we hope to uncover. Just as there is a physical continuum between the text and the body of the reader, there is a lived continuum between the text, the reader’s immediate response to the text, and his biographic situation. (I am not interested in literacy criticism here. I am not attempting to portray phenomenologically the act of reading, insofar as that act involves an “empty” self, an unself-conscious reader giving himself to the voice become print on the page. Such reading is necessary when the motive is only clear comprehension of the text. To understand the relation of the text to the reader, to suggest in what sense reading can be a liberative activity, involves a subtle shift of focus from the text itself to the continuum that is the text, the reader’s immediate response, and his biographic situation.). (p. 441, italics added)
As my scribbled additions to the text above show, for some, the beginning of Pinar’s proposal for reading texts may seem irrelevant (students usually mark texts as they read), and other passages appear odd (‘gestalt’, ‘self-conscious’, ‘continuum’, ‘relation of text to reader’).

Working readers do mark text, but what is the *gestalt* figure-ground? The pictures at left show some examples of *gestalt* effect in perception,\(^{43}\) which demonstrate that what we *look at* and what we *see*, can be incongruous. They help to show that perception is more a matter of what we make of what we see, which is a much more complex affair. Pinar uses *gestalt* to point to this complexity in text. That our mind lets us see more of the words we look at, but that for our mind to do so is an enactive process requiring that we bring more awareness of ourselves in the world to the work of reading. And it is this enactive process that Pinar characterises as a physical continuum of text-body-reader.

An example of this how this text-body-reader continuum goes unrecognised is found in emerging research in the literacy field, which refers to problems of reading being a hidden ability that is invisible to others. (Block, 1992; Davidson-Toumu’a, 2005). This research suggests that, particularly at secondary and tertiary education levels, the importance of reading for learning is obscured because literacy competency is mostly assessed on the basis of writing. While most tertiary education institutions provide at least 100 level courses in academic writing, academic reading courses tend to be limited to offerings for non-native readers of English or others identified as needing support services. Academic reading proficiency is

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\(^{43}\) I acknowledge that there are criticisms of *gestalt* theory, such as (Bruce, Green, & Georgeson, 1996), but these do not upset Pinar’s reference to the theory (See also my discussion of *Lebenswelt* and *gestalt* on page 65).
presumed to be involuntarily acquired in and through post-primary education. In such a presumption not only do the complex interrelationships in a mind-body-reading-writing go unrecognised, so do considerations of diverse approaches (including my picturing) that comprise reading. *Visible* academic reading is also a critical issue for my thesis. That is, *currere* in reading goes to the heart of learning about understanding meaning and reading’s problematicity for learning will continue to prevail, most likely, invisibly.

Overcoming this problematicity for reading connects with Pinar’s ‘biographic situation’, which, as he explains, involves a different way of working needed for a text-body-reader continuum that works against the usual linear teleological step-wise approach where the text sits quite apart from the reader. A *currere* reading sequence is explained as moving from a first reading of the text, then to a second move where relevant passages are marked, looking for linking themes and the writing of short pieces integrating and describing text passages and themes, and then an irregular skip to a ‘fourth’ move, on to the reader. The second movement is described as being ‘away from the text toward the reader’…perhaps…midpoint between text and reader’ (Pinar, 1981, p. 442). That is, moving more towards the reader’s acceptance of the text’s instability at first reading. After this, the third move is ‘passed over’ to arrive at the reader’s place on the continuum. The reason for this, and what is involved, is explained in this way:

> Just as one cannot peer directly into the sun but can more easily examine the earth it lights, so one cannot peer easily into the self. We look also to the ground, to the lights and shadows created by the self’s “light” on material surface: the biographic situation. It is useful—in order to escape a taken-for-granted view—to attempt to describe this situation as
free associatively as possible, although an initial focus on items such as where one is living and with whom can be helpful. In describing the situation, one works to unself-consciously portray one’s experience. The focus is on lived experience, emphasizing concrete elements ordinarily taken for granted. There is a tendency, particularly among intellectuals, to immediately abstract from the concrete situation and begin analysis. One’s effort is always to return to “the things themselves,” to experience that which is “preconceptual.” The aspiration is to unearth material hitherto submerged in unconsciousness. (p. 442)

This passage explains that currere involves bringing oneself to the process, rather than it being a method that is brought to one.

Following the last currere reading move comes the return to the third and final (skipped) move, that is between the short descriptive pieces and the reader’s biographic work. Here analysis begins by bringing together those short descriptive text-thematic pieces and the biographic portrayal. In other words, there is continuing recursive movement that collects and connects reading and writing (there is further discussion of this is on pages 265)

Pinar’s explanation of currere reading is followed by an example of the method using passages from Virginia Woolf’s (1975) The Voyage Out. The example includes short quotations from Woolf within Pinar’s exposition of a descriptive piece, a biographic portrayal and an analysis. What becomes clear from reading these examples is a depth of context and contingency that the currere work reveals. Rather than a superficial surface reading of the text that produces a one-dimensional ‘take’ on the text, the reader’s unself-consciousness responses are re-read
through the text to bring about an embodied understanding that produces new dimensions of meaning. Through what Pinar later calls ‘complicated conversation’ a discourse with-in self is enabled that is much broader, deeper and far reaching than either one-to-one or one-to-many can be.

The vision for this currere work is its capability for bringing change to a weltanschauung (philosophy of life) through the participant’s enhanced dimensions of understanding and meaning of political and economic structures. Pinar (1981) sees such work as ‘redressing…imbalance in certain curriculum writing’ (p. 452) that privileges the (abstract/ideological) matter of politics and economics over (concrete/practical) consciousness of them. He observes that economic and political structures affect conceptions of ‘what is possible and legitimate [and]…oppressive economic and political structures are associated with oppressive, nonreflexive self-self relationships. By altering economic structures, one can provoke profound alteration of the weltanschauung and of self-self relations’ (p. 452). In short, through currere one obtains an enhanced personal philosophy of life that enables more involved and participatory relations with the world towards more harmonious understandings and meanings. Thus, currere of liberation, rather than a curriculum of privilege.

In conclusion, Pinar notes that the principles of the work he describes are not unique to currere, and that other forms, such as Freire’s dialogical encounter and Grumet’s journal

44 The expression appears in Pinar et al., (1995, p. 848), and was later adopted as the series title for curriculum studies books (currently 25 volumes) with Pinar as the series editor. Its most recent use is in Pinar’s scholarship and organisational efforts towards the internationalisation of curriculum research (Pinar, 2003).
keeping and teacher dialogue, work in similar ways. What matters is the focus on an individual’s learning experience, that ‘shifts from product of structure to producer of structures’, (p. 453) or, rather, in bringing a currere reading to it that shifts attention from the product of structured meaning to producing meanings.

**Currere and 20th century art**

Ronald Padgham (1988) brings art theory to the contemporary curriculum theory discourse by exploring ‘correspondences’ (p. 359) in twentieth century art and design, and curriculum theory. Firstly, he observes that phenomenology and existentialism are originating ideas in both contemporary art and curriculum theory: ‘In each of these fields an emphasis is placed on the present [which] is unveiled by looking to the past and of the future; each field places an emphasis on the individual as the source of reality and establishes the self as the beginning point’ (p. 359). Citing art historian Werner Haftman, Padgham argues for a from-Renaissance-to-modern shift in conceptions of reality, with modern reality characterised by more awareness of personal meaning-making experiences. The modern artist’s view ‘bring[s] forth into the world new visions or new perspectives which have never been seen before’ (p. 360). In so doing, the artist turns away from inert nouns, such as tree, flower, stream and instead towards ‘the dynamic verbs behind them: to grow, to flower, to flow.’ (Haftman, 1965, quoted in Padgham, 1988, p. 361, original italics). Padgham goes on to identify ways in which artist’s experiments correspond with reconceptualising ideas, for instance, Cubism and Maxine Greene’s ideas on dynamic change, and Huebner’s understandings about temporality.
Drawing on the writings of selected artists, art theorists and art educators from the early to the later twentieth century, Padgham elaborates on correspondences in art and curriculum that eventually bring his discussion to Pinar’s notion of currere. Referring particularly to artists Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko, Padgham notes their references to existentialism in how they work. Recognising the need for fresh vantage points for both teacher and learner, he quotes Rothko ‘The familiar identity of things has to be pulverised in order to destroy the finite associations with which our society increasingly shrouds every aspect of our environment’ (Rothko 1971, quoted in Padgham, 1988, p. 373). Padgham recognises congruences in currere’s method – regressive, progressive, analytical, synthetical – with the working methods of significant twentieth century artists. He writes that Pinar’s method is like the method ‘I have described…as developed by the Cubists and Futurist artists’ (p. 374).

Criticisms of Pinar’s work also attract Padgham’s attention. Padgham offers Pinar his support and, noting criticism on the emphasis of the individual over the political, and observing how significantly the artist affects the political through his individuality: ‘it is through enriching oneself that one can come to enrich others’ (p. 374). Also, Padgham notes the shift away from emphasis on the known towards the unknown, and he refers to Paul Klee’s method of working as ‘…the juxtaposition of the familiar with the unfamiliar to reveal the unknown…this is much like the process of currere whereby the individual juxtaposes his past (the familiar) with the
future (the unfamiliar) to reveal the unknown (the present)’ (p. 374, brackets in original). In this way the artist moves behind the familiar, beyond the unfamiliar, and within the present portrayal of the superficial concept of reality to reveal the contexts and contingencies of unknown realities.

In bringing his article to conclusion, Padgham signals the importance of personal performance in both curriculum and art work to observe multiple perspectives that unfocus the spectator, to help see the world differently. He quotes Picasso talking about painting ‘to show what I have found and not what I am looking for’ (Picasso, 1971, quoted in Padgham, 1988, p. 376), and uses this to emphasise that curriculum needs also to be more about finding than seeking, or happenings upon rather than setting out to look for things. Contrasting the traditional curriculum method of seeking what is known, with an alternative of finding new knowing, he quotes Paul Cezanne: ‘I wish I could be born again so that a green blurr [sic] in the distance was not a bush, but a green blurr [sic]’ (p. 376). Finally, Padgham refers to Huebner’s call for a curriculum field vocabulary that is congruent with its work. In the artists’ search for such a vocabulary, according to Padgham, it is necessary to find congruency between form and content. He states that in traditional curriculum theory, these are separate: content is the given and form is the means by which content is delivered. However, he adds, in the contemporary view both are inseparable, ‘The content in the new theory is the individual in the process of becoming that which has not yet been, but he [sic] is capable of becoming’ (p. 377).
Without diverging into details, it is important to note that there is extensive scholarship on interrelationships in art and curriculum\textsuperscript{45}, especially the work of Elliot Eisner and Kieran Egan. My attention to Padgham is due to his writing on \textit{currere}, but I have also found in Eisner and Egan empathetic resonances to themes in this thesis. Eisner’s \textit{Educational imagination}, for example, engages with the process and artistry of education. I have already referred to Egan’s ideas on curriculum, and his work in art, creativity, imagination and education continues through the Imaginative Education Research Group (2007).

\textbf{Curriculum reconceptualising – a paradigm?}

Criticisms of reconceptualising and \textit{currere}, such as Tanner and Tanners (1980), led Pinar to approach science historian Theodore Brown, who had studied under Thomas Kuhn, for a ‘disinterested’ opinion on whether curriculum reconceptualisation might be ‘tantamount to a “paradigm shift” in Kuhnian terms?’ (Pinar, 1988a, p. 16). Brown’s (1988) response was to review Kuhn’s paradigm shift and to consider its relevance to the curriculum field. He begins by problematising the notion of paradigm shift being used as a generalisation, and briefly discusses attempts to locate paradigm shifts in various fields, to conclude that it is helpful as a heuristic. Brown then proceeds to consider the use of the heuristic in the quest Pinar has proposed, namely an opinion on Tanner and Tanner’s (1980) disputing of Pinar’s claim of a paradigm shift in curriculum theory. Brown finds in favour of both parties. On the one hand, he finds, when the principle of a ‘paradigm shift’ is strictly applied, Kuhn’s cautions about careful use hold and, as the Tanners argue, the principle is not appropriate. On the other hand, when

\textsuperscript{45} I draw distinction here between: art curriculum – the learning and teaching of art; and art \textit{and} curriculum – the interrelationship of art with curriculum theory.
the principle is applied as a way to question the significance of upheavals within a field, Brown finds it has ‘considerable merit’ (p. 28) for use as Pinar claims. Elaborating this view, he comments on how paradigms succeed through despatching anomalies in preceding theories:

Oxygen theory replaced phlogiston theory in eighteenth century chemistry when it was realised that phlogiston theory required negative weight to explain the heating of metallic oxide. Are there examples of “negative weight” in traditional curriculum theory? Can their existence be demonstrated using the very techniques of the older generation? Does the newer generation have better solutions to these problems? These seem to me to be the salient questions’. (pp. 29-30)

**Curriculum fallacy and currere calx**

In researching phlogiston theory I found a précis on Wikipedia that helped me consider Brown’s question about curriculum theory having negative weight. I adapted the Wikipedia précis of phlogiston theory to help me read its interrelations with curriculum and *currere*, by inserting substitute words and phrases in brackets immediately following those I wanted to replace:

The theory [*traditional curriculum theory*] holds that all flammable [*curriculum*] materials contain phlogiston [*fallacy*], a substance without color, odor, taste, or weight that is liberated in burning [*teaching for learning*]. Once burned [*taught*], the "dephlogisticated" [*defallacified*] substance was held to be in its "true" form, the calx [*“true” knowledge*] which is a residual substance, sometimes in the form of a fine powder, that is left when a metal [*dictum*] or mineral [*trueism*] combusts or is calcinated due to heat. Calx, especially of a metal [*dictum*], is now known as an oxide [*a knowledge commodity*]. According to the
obsolete phlogiston theory [traditional curriculum theory] the calx was the
true elemental substance ["true" knowledge], having lost its phlogiston
[fallacy] in the process of combustion [teaching for learning]. (adapted
from Wikipedia, 2008c)

This brief ludic paralogy46 performance is only intended as a humourous way of
continuing to challenge the authority of a grand narrative that confuses
knowledge with absolute certainty. Can my imagined traditional curriculum
fallacy theory be upset? Probably yes, if it is agreed that fallacy, like weight,
cannot be ‘negative’ (negative false knowledge?). For it to be so would require
it to be a double negative resolving to a positive ("true" knowledge?).

This would appear to make ‘traditional curriculum theory’ problematic. It would therefore also
appear to make reconceptualising curriculum theory a possible succeeding candidate for the
curriculum paradigm shift. And what might this mean for ‘Calx’ knowledge?

Reconceptualising reconceptualists
With the continuing and growing interest in postpositivist approaches to curriculum inquiry,
mainly based in Canada and focused on phenomenology, there was some opportunity for a text
addressing these interests. Pinar and William Reynolds (1992) edited a volume containing
essays gathered under two parts titled Understanding curriculum as phenomenological text and
Understanding curriculum as deconstructed text – thereby allowing linkages to be made to

46 Following Lyotard, I use ludic paralogy to mean ironic, eclectic, generative wordplay.
The book was the forerunner of the major work *Understanding curriculum: An introduction to the study of historical and contemporary curriculum discourses* that followed in 1995.

*Understanding curriculum as phenomenological and deconstructed text* (1992) introduced a range of new voices to the reconceptualising discourse(s) that demonstrated a characterising breadth and diversity of heterologous and accordant ideas and interests. As the preface observes: ‘There is no homologous tension between phenomenologist and post-structuralists … Nor [do] post-structuralists in education represent the “discursive shift” from phenomenology and Marxism that it did in France twenty years ago’ (p. viii); rather, Pinar and Reynolds seek to introduce cross readings that are more about celebrating interdisciplinarity than countering disciplinarism.

There are only two references to *currere* in the book. One is in Grumet’s reiteration of her earlier (1976a) essay on existential and phenomenological aspects of autobiography. The other reference appears in the editors’ introduction and provides a new context and clarification for *currere*. Citing Merleau-Ponty, Pinar and Grumet link phenomenology to an epistemology of self and offering a meaning ‘not so much of encountering a new philosophy as of recognising what they had been waiting for’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, quoted in Pinar & Reynolds, 1992, p. 2). Thus phenomenology is seen as a way for embodying self-knowledge-knowing that, in turn, explains autobiography as an apposite approach to ‘reconceiv[ing] the relation of self to knowing, a relation at the center of curriculum understood as *currere*’ (p. 2). However, the
relations between autobiography and currere are clarified here. Referring to ‘earlier versions’, they note, ‘a tendency to dwell on the details of life history, to transfer the quantitative project of adding up bits of information to the qualitative project of understanding their meaning’ (p. 2). They describe this inclination as a characteristic of autobiographical literacy criticism, evident in some of Pinar’s work. But then add that if this emphasis on information was an error, it was ‘superficial, we believe, as we were always clear that the relation between the knower and the known’ was more essential than the concrete incidents and bits of information that express the themes of the “intentional arc”’ (p. 2). Not only is this volume valuable for its introduction to poststructural ideas for curriculum theory, the genealogy appendix is an invaluable record of authors and their work contributing to the emergence and presentation of the reconceptualising scholarship.

Pilgrim’s process
Robert (Roy) Graham’s (1992) article Currere and reconceptualism: The progress and the pilgrimage 1975–1990 is the most extensive published review of curriculum as currere to date. The notion of pilgrimage is drawn from Pinar’s (1975c) use to characterise currere as ‘an educational journey or pilgrimage’ (p. 400), and notes, in turn, Pinar’s adoption of Huebner’s (1974) earlier use, which spoke of ‘groups of people on a pilgrimage…reshaping their lives together and telling and retelling the stories of where they have been and where they seem to be going’ (p. 52).

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47 A reference to Pinar’s (1980) The voyage out: Curriculum as the relationship between the knower and the known.
Graham (1992) makes two key points about currere. One, the Deweyan influence of resistance to means-ends objectives in curriculum ‘leaves the way clear to conceive of [curriculum as currere] as a continuous process of construction and reconstruction, of active reflection on one’s own experience in the service of self-realization’ (p. 27). Two, that this conception of self is Husserlian rather than Freudian, in that it ‘would work like a Rorschach inkblot test, drawing out by means of association unconscious material regarding the nature of the individual’s experience’ (p. 29).

The article concisely reports currere’s developments and criticisms of it, along with Grumet’s more existentialist and contextual acceptance of life as continuous experience. As Graham puts it, ‘living always situated in the world and yet assuming responsibility for our actions in it’ (p. 35). Elaborating on this view, Graham notes Grumet’s awareness of the heritage of self-knowledge from Socratic times and her ironic references to dichotomising self-knowledge in ‘a culture that “estranges us from ourselves” and that has preserved “the products of its self-consciousness in museums and libraries”’ (p. 36). Consequently, teaching becomes focused on these products as objects and ignores how they have come to be known.

In his conclusion, Graham sets out what he sees as the reconceptualists interests ‘in concert with social reconstructionists and critical theorists of the Frankfurt school’ (p. 36). He sees these involving questions of school knowledge production and reproduction, how such school knowledge affects underprivileged students, and how teaching and learning might become more emancipatory. Currere is seen as a way of ‘intervening in this process’ (p. 36). Quoting Grumet, it ‘was a project of restitution, wresting experience from the anonymity and
generalisation that had dominated the social sciences…and returning it to the particular persons who lived it’ (Grumet, 1981, quoted in Graham, 1992, p. 36). In this view, *currere* is a way of intervening in the tension between submitting (learning as teaching to conform) and resisting (teaching as learning to emancipate). Graham summarises it this way:

> When cast in these terms [suspicion of ideologies] it is easier to see the threat that making the personal political represented and continues to represent for a variety of stakeholders in the curriculum: researchers, professors, teachers and parents whose conceptions of curriculum may be more oriented towards improving test scores and in maintaining clear standards of accountability than in shadowy concepts like “emancipation”. (p. 37)

The rhetoric of much of this sort of criticism harked back to the 1960s subversives, leading to comments on, and accusations of a generational conflict. In the late twentieth century generational conflict was easily dismissed as a tedious but short-lived nuisance. Electronic interconnectivity in the twenty-first century makes this conflict much more evidently problematic. The previous intergenerational physical and behavioural divide is now a virtual and cognitive chasm.

In his closing remarks, Graham refers to the appeal of *currere* as ‘critique and conscience regardless of the difficulties in its application or, despite the odds, in its local successes with teachers and students’ (p. 40). Further, he foresees the likelihood of a succeeding generation of reconceptualising scholars at work ‘keeping the human factor alive in education, especially at a time of widespread political retrenchment, a global movement whose impetus at present shows
few signs of exhaustion’ (p. 40). Fifteen years on, the situation is not so much unchanged as more securely re(en)trenched.

The interpreter
In the context of John Bunyan’s (1678/1984) allegory48, if curriculum is Christian and Pinar the evangelist, then William Doll (1993) is the interpreter, and *A Post Modern Perspective on Curriculum* is his diorama. The word vision features large in Doll’s work and his ability to envisage the enormous complexity of a changing world, envision ways in which complexity affects worlds of processes and to bring this together in an accessible and engaging way is no mean feat49. To my mind Doll is to curriculum theory as Dickens is to sociology. Although not as prolific as Dickens, Doll’s explication of postmodernity’s shifting scientific paradigms and their relevance to commonplace learning and teaching are equal to Dickens’ articulations of Victorian mores and their affects on commoners.

However *currere* appears only briefly in Doll’s book, although it does so in the introduction under the heading *Organization of the book*. This references the interpretation of curriculum as ‘a process of development, dialogue, inquiry, transformation…consistent with William Pinar’s…*currere*, to emphasize the person and process of “running” the course, the experience an individual undergoes in learning, in transforming and being transformed’ (p. 13). It is also clear from the arrangement of the book’s contents that *currere*’s principles of looking at the

48 David Hamilton, (1990), also writes of Pilgrim’s *Progress* and curriculum, and notes Bunyan’s self-assured resistance to orthodoxy (p. 34).
49 These feats of vision for complexity in curriculum continues in Doll, Fleener and St Julien’s (2005) edited book *Chaos, complexity, curriculum and culture.*
past, to the future, and coming to an analytic-synthetical working vision inhere: ‘I will speak of curricular possibilities in terms of a vision, not a model…[because] [t]here is no all-encompassing post-modern model…’ (p. 16).

For Doll the working vision is a “Curriculum Matrix” to emphasize both the constructive and nonlinear nature of a post-modern curriculum’ (p. 162), and his vision of the matrix saw it ‘filled with intersecting foci and related webs of meaning’ (p. 162). To explain, Doll recalls his own early experiences of being taught the three R’s and recounts how purposively linear and means–ends they were, and how focused this was on pre-set goals. To perturb this rigid organization, Doll proposes another way of regarding goals, a way to see them more as criteria to be used to understand performance, than as objectives to be met. This proposal shifts the rigidity of the three R’s to a more flexible arrangement of four R’s: ‘Richness, recursion, relations and rigour’. (p. 176). Doll’s four R’s are explained in this way: Richness refers to depth, diversity and dasein, as embodied characteristics of this curricular vision; recursion emphasises that learning and teaching is a dynamic continuously interactive process – recursion is not repetition; relations is linked with pedagogy and culture to signal how knowing and doing are interrelated, contextual and contingent, and the notion of curricular self-organisation is introduced; rigor, here, addresses issues of responsible

\[50\] Used in the sense of Heidegger’s (Heidegger, 1962) being-in-the-world.
interpretation for possibilities. Rather than determining reliability and validity subject to criticality, it concerns exploring defensible potentials for responsive critique.

**Essays 1973-1992**
Shirley Steinberg and Joe Kincheloe, series editors of Pinar’s (1994a) essay collection *Autobiography, politics and sexuality*, in introducing this volume perform a textual duet that pointedly applauds its contents:

Restoring the “living’ into the curriculum field, Bill taps a pulse so vital that technicists squirm in discomfort. “You’re too close, Bill, sometimes too close for your own good.” *Currere* was/is such a good idea. ([Kincheloe] p. viii)

*Reading this collection of essays has been like a “happening” for me. Listening to Bill develop his curriculum throughout the last twenty years of praxis.* ([Steinberg] p. viii, original italics)

Bill’s “voyage out” resonates at a variety of levels, his identity shakes out faith in the certainty—the groundedness and boundedness—of modernist identity. ([Kincheloe] p. viii)

*Thank you Bill for this book, for this dance.* ([Steinberg] p. x, original italics)

The iteration of *The method of currere* (Pinar, 1994b) in this volume is also the first reappearance of Pinar’s explication of *currere* since the chapter in *Toward a poor curriculum*, (Pinar, 1976b), long out of print. For many, this republication was their first opportunity to read a primary source on the subject.
**Currere within curriculum understandings**

Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman’s (1995) *Understanding Curriculum: An introduction to the study of historical and contemporary curriculum discourses* provides twenty-three page references for the word *currere*, which are cited most often in chapter ten, *Understanding curriculum as autobiographical/biographical text*. This chapter substantiates the significance of autobiography for curriculum discourse with sixty-seven citations from twenty-four authors. It commences by identifying ‘three streams of scholarship linked to autobiographical and biographical research’ (p. 516), namely autobiographical theory and practice, feminist autobiography and teachers’ auto-biographic knowledge, ‘including collaborative biography and autobiographical praxis, the “personal practical knowledge” of teachers, teacher lore, and biographical studies of teachers’ lives’ (pp. 516-517).

*Currere* is the sub-heading above discussion of autobiographical theory and practice (the first stream) and maps *currere’s* flowing from Pinar and Grumet (1974/1976), through the search for a method (Pinar, 1975b), on through further articulations (Pinar, 1978) and then brings the contribution of others to the discourse (Graham, 1991). The notion of collaboration is highlighted to offset criticism of *currere’s* exclusive and solitary (solipsistic) mode of work, for instance, in Nel Noddings’ (1984) focus on care and community, and Janet Miller’s study of collaborating teachers *Creating spaces and finding voices* (1990) through self-writing and others-reading. These emerging concepts of space and voice also signal a differently gendered aspect in the discourse that resonates with feminist understandings and work to disrupt more common masculine territorialisation and vocalisation.
Voice, is another tributary of the autobiographical theory and practice stream that is elaborated to include diverse and complex concepts and subjects of voices. Children, students and women teacher’s voices are included, for example, in the resistance encountered in having voices heard in places such as academic journals. Place, another tributary, explores geopolitical dislocation and displacement that alienates and ravages educational experience for many (Kincheloe, 1993).

Two other tributaries that join the currere stream are the autobiographical discursive self in poststructuralism, and the mythopoetic imaginary. The former, cites and quotes Jacques Daignault writing complexly on ‘traces’ and ‘places’ (Pinar et al., 1995, pp. 536-538) of poststructuralism, brings the philosophy of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard and Serres to the flow. The latter mythopoetic flow is characterised by Mary Aswell Doll’s sensitive scholarship. Both tributaries introduce fresh ideas to the discourse that have continued to enrich its further exploration and understandings.

Postmodern reconceptualising
Patrick Slattery (1995), contributing his views on Curriculum development in the postmodern era, devotes a chapter to reconceptualisation. He sees currere as a challenge to make broader interconnections based on personal experience, something he finds postmodern curriculum development is ‘attentive’ to (p. 58). Slattery also regards the temporal and historical attributes of reconceptualising as a ‘proleptic…confluence of past, present, and future…
Reconceptualization is an integral part of the emerging postmodern curriculum’ (p. 58). However, he emphasises that it is only one of several postmodern curriculum perspectives.
Slattery rehearses some of Doll’s (1993) exposition of currere, but also brings a more extensive historical treatment and personal perspective of his own that affirms currere’s principles.

Like Doll, Slattery also arrives at a personal curricular synthesis, and uses the kaleidoscope in contrast with the modernist telescope as a postmodern metaphor, the latter implying a narrow perspective in view and objective scrutiny of purpose (modern), compared with the diverse multiplicity of views and complexly fractalised imaginaries of the former (postmodern). Slattery’s vision of postmodern education as kaleidoscopic sensibilities is both creatively rendered and generatively articulated. He also describes five guiding principles for his vision:

- reconceptualising as a way of critiquing narrowness and exploring diversity;
- challenging deterministic practices by evoking presentations rather than imposing representations;
- reading closely to deconstruct obfuscating language and make meaning authentic;
- embodiment of currere as context and environment in which knowing and doing comes through inwardly understanding and negotiating the hazards of externalities; and
- cooperatively attending to contemporary emerging voices and visions. (pp. 252-255)

Slattery cautions to ‘avoid the temptation to construct a traditional metaphysics and epistemology to justify a postmodern view of curriculum development’ (p. 257) and concludes that postmodernity affords promise for curriculum’s future.
Skinning, reflecting-diffracting: identities and currere in hyperreality

In Pinar’s (Pinar, 1998) *Curriculum: Toward new identities*, the diversity of those identifying with curriculum in postmodernity becomes further evident with seventeen chapters from twenty-four authors covering topics from affichiste to Zen/Taoism. *Currere* features in this volume in three essays. The first, by Dennis Sumara and Brent Davis (1988), engages with notions of embodiment and enactivism that draw on ideas about chaos and complexity. Here, ‘currere’ embraces the unanticipated, the ambiguous, the complex, the strange, the queer, the incomprehensible. *Currere* compels us to focus on the moment—or, more accurately perhaps, on the weaving together of moments in lives’ (p. 84). In this view of *currere* Sumara and Davis perceive a ‘Hap’...what remains after method...beyond what we predict or strive to orchestrate...beyond our willing and doing’ (p. 84). The notion of Hap is seen as affirming *currere’s* processual movement by complexifying curriculum’s complicated componentry for ‘progress’: ‘the point is that components of curriculum cannot be known in themselves’ (p. 85).

The second essay in which *currere* features is Noel Gough’s (1998) *Reflections and diffractions: Function of fictions in curriculum*, which introduces a notion of ‘postmodernist *currere’ (p. 110). Gough is unable to justify *currere* referenced to existentialism and phenomenology, but sees autobiography in a postmodern literary and cultural context as a generative mode for ‘theoriz[ing] human agency, constructions of the self and problems of self-representation’ (p. 111). He writes of experimenting, ‘a better description might be *playing*...”

51 A serendipitous event. Borrowed from Weinsheimer who says ‘The Hap eludes the hegemony of method’ (see Davis and Sumara p. 84).
…using postmodernists texts and textual practices to diffract the storylines produced by autobiographical writing and personal narrative’ (p. 111, original italics). Further, he refers to this work as a ‘mutual interreferencing and deconstructive reading of personal and cultural texts—to read stories of personal experience within and against the manifold fictions of the world around us’ (p. 111, original italics). Gough identifies in postmodernist storytelling – ‘metafiction, graphic novels, cyberpunk SF, and feminist fabulation’ (p. 111) – characteristics that distinguish it from a modernist ‘epistemologically-oriented fiction’ (McHale, 1992, quoted in Gough, 1998, p. 112). From this view, Gough sees in the antecedents of currere method ‘an attempt to break with the modernist tradition of autobiography [and to] demonstrate strategies for exposing and criticizing the ways in which personal narratives can reproduce a politics of identity that maintains social hierarchies of class, gender, sexuality and race’ (p. 116). The prescience of this proposal for curricular cross-reading-writing of postmodernist fictions-personal narratives is more evident nearly a decade later in a virtual world of blogs, social networking media and Second Life.

The third by Joe Kincheloe (1998), links currere with hyperreality and ‘post-formal thinking’ (See Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1993) 53. This view of currere sees it as ‘post-formal intrapersonal thinking…to encourage analysis, an elastic proposal with ever-shifting boundaries’ (Kincheloe, 1998, p. 137). Kincheloe identifies five characteristics: meta-consciousness, transcendence of egocentrism, creation of integrated knowledge, recognition of

52 Gough (1998) footnotes this word and refers to its Derridean sense likening ‘the play of power across discursive fields to “play” in a machine…’ (p. 119).
53 Post-formal thinking challenges ‘formal thought [that] operates on the assumption that resolution must be found for all contradictions…[and] represents the highest level of human cognition’ (p. 297).
non-hierarchical difference and, developing self-reliance in the transcendence of authority dependence (pp. 137-140). Kincheloe concludes that ‘[t]he pedagogical, cultural, and political possibilities offered by currere have yet to be realized’ (p. 141). The interlinking of currere with post-formal thinking provides another affirmation of the continuing relevance of currere to thinking curriculum differently. In my mind, Kincheloe and Steinberg’s post-formal thinking is a proposal well-worth revisiting.

...emerging from shadowy word worlds\textsuperscript{54} into illuminating picturing

Twenty years ago...today

As a companion to Contemporary Curriculum Discourses (Pinar, 1988b), Contemporary Curriculum Discourses: Twenty Years of JCT (Pinar, 1999) adds to the wealth of diverse discourse engaging curriculum reconceptualising. With twenty-nine chapters of articles spanning twenty years and a comprehensive appendix providing useful historical information on the reconceptualising movement, its conferences and journal, it is a valuable resource. Currere appears here in Shigeru Asanuma’s (1998) essay on The autobiographical method in Japanese education. Asanuma draws parallels between currere and seikatsu tsuzurikata (commonly referred to as tsuzurikata) in not only method, but also reasoning and purposes for the use of the autobiographical process. Commenting on the complexity inhering in both currere and autobiographical processes, he presents various examples of implementations of tsuzurikata that demonstrate its diversity in practice. Perhaps of most significance is the affirmation of currere as a transnational concept, something Pinar takes up at later date. This

\textsuperscript{54} Borrowed from Grumet (1999, p. 233).
broadening of geophilosophical interests is suggestive of admixtures emerging in shifting perspectives towards deeper and far-reaching exploratory visions.

Visions, including ghosts, goats and globalisation

Although this book has been reviewed in the previous folio, I review it again in the context of this synoptic text of currere. William Doll and Noel Gough’s *Curriculum visions* (2002) re-imagines notions of seeing curriculum. Together, Doll and Gough’s eclectic interests in postmodernity, science, ecology, SF, transnational thinking, transcultural discourse – to name a few – bring about a rich tapestry of texts from thirty-three established and emerging curriculum scholars. A feature of the tapestry is the interweaving of problematical overtures and perspectival responses to all of the essays that I have already referred to.

Although *currere* features prominently throughout the book, with nineteen page references indexed, its appearance in Doll’s chapter is important for its inclusion in an alternative of his earlier ‘curriculum matrix’ incorporating four R’s, ‘richness, recursion, relations and rigour’ (see, Doll, 1993). The new vision sees five C’s, *currere*, complexity, cosmology, conversation and, community (p. 42). *Currere* in this context is linked to Dewey’s view of curriculum-child as a single process for transformation, which Doll believes leaves ‘no choice but to consider curriculum in its verb form, as *currere*...[and thereby] broadens the meaning of curriculum’ (p. 43).

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55 SF is used to represent a diverse range of writing with references to the letters S and F including, for example, studies of science, speculation, fiction, fantasy and futures.
Cleo Cherryholmes’ (2002) vision brings a pragmatist’s perspective to currere and challenges its use as a binary with curriculum that ‘temporarily mask[s] the complexity and implicit wholeness of the word race (noun and verb)’ (p. 119). Further, taking a Derridean turn, he puts curriculum/currere sous rature to emphasise the challenge of contextualising its use in both its appeal and its rejection. That is, rather than determining the use of either one or the other, to explore and critique both: ‘The way students choose to engage a course of a study can simultaneously be accepted by appealing to their interests and imagination and rejected by inquiring into, interpreting, and criticizing, the solipsistic, isolationist, and tribal impulses and interpretations that students sometimes bring with them’ (p. 120). Through this plurality of vision Cherryholmes anticipates ways of reading as ‘would-be artists in constructing, designing, organizing, and enacting beliefs and practices with an eye toward the production of beauty in our lives and the lives of those with whom we interact’ (p. 125).

In contrast to Cherryholmes’ pragmatism, Molly Quinn’s (2002) visionary, Holy vision, wholly vision-ing, links curriculum with currere to the legacy of the chariot through a critique of the “supremacy” of man’s [sic] mechanical mind; his reliance on contrivance. Mapping a forcefully symbolic genealogy, Quinn identifies a legacy that ‘sought to kill vision by finalizing it… Curriculum becomes a given, an objectified “thing,” gotten through by a well-defined procedure’ (p. 240). Characterising this view as ‘absolutizing’ Quinn finds that it ‘trivializes…and reduces the art of living to the science of purposive rationality, divorcing [human life] from its larger symbolic context, stripping it ultimately of meaning’ (p. 241). Against this ‘literalized’ singularity Quinn envisions a realm of ‘contemporary curriculum critiques—ecofeminist, postmodern, poststructural, multicultural—call[ing] into question this
very privileging of the mind, and reason, and work[ing] to rather de-center the human subject, problematize intentionality, and deconstruct our ideal of progress’ (p. 241). ‘The enigma of curriculum is that of vision itself: the predicament of concretizing, actualizing in some lived-out form its presentation—without losing vision, its living efficacy, the “beyondness” and “being toward” of it. It is the problem of substance finding expression in form: substance must articulate itself, yet the temptation is to give up substance for form or vice versa’ (pp. 241-242). The resonance of Quinn’s thinking with so much of what I have already presented reassures me that my own thinking is not as lonely as I have previously thought.

Trans-national inquiry for the twenty-first century

The turn of the millennium and an accompanying upsurge in rhetoric around the term globalisation saw Pinar (2003) turn attention to transnational curriculum research. This attention actively brought about a new organisation, the International Association for the advancement of Curriculum Studies and its online journal Transnational Curriculum Inquiry. Pinar’s interest and action also saw publication of the International handbook of curriculum research, which collects thirty-six essays on twenty-nine nations concerning curriculum research.

Although currere does not appear in this volume, two introductory essays, one by David Geoffrey Smith, the other by Noel Gough, address issues that also interest my research.

56 I picture this word as global[international]isation, which emphasises that the term has much to do with what goes on economically and politically between nations’ than what is needed ecologically and sociologically across nations’. For example, Gough (2003) uses ‘transnational’ in referring to agreements on climate change (p. 62). I see this as a way of perturbing the hegemony of globalisation; a view that my picture suggests.
A long-time critic of economic interests dominating education and a proponent of educational alternatives, (see Smith, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2006), here Smith (2003) writes on the challenges that curriculum and teaching face in globalisation. His essay outlines three globalisations to insist a plural view of the term that resists the grand narrative of centralisation and control that the term ‘globalization one’ (p. 37) valorises. ‘Globalization two’ (p. 41) characterises cultures of resistance emerging from concerns about the problematics of globalisation one and growing understandings of world’s complexities. ‘Globalization three’ (p. 44) discusses Smith’s vision forward towards ‘Curriculum and pedagogy as sharing horizons of understanding [and] Curriculum and pedagogy as being oriented to peace’. (pp. 46-49).

Gough (2003) thinks globally about internationalising curriculum in environmental education. Following a brief history of environmental education, Gough visits the onto-epistemological matters that I have raised in my first folio of this thesis. Therefore I see in his transnational vision resonances with Smith’s essay in that Gough anticipates from the problematics of ‘globalisation one’ and the growing awareness of ‘globalisation two’, an emergent scholarship of transnational environmental education that embodies horizons of shared understandings and orientations towards peace. What Gough can envision is ways to see and do curriculum differently, (by implication) through currere that brings very different thinking to the problematics that ‘globalisation one’ refuses to recognise let alone consider.

**A present nightmare for currere to waken us from**

Posing the question what is curriculum theory? Pinar (2004c) presents a five part response that (co)responds to the present, the regressive, the progressive, the analytic, and the synthetical
moments of his currere method. Describing the present as a ‘nightmare’, Pinar points to the public educational environment in America as ‘miseducation’ that has created a desperate need for ‘reconstructing the subjective and social spheres in curriculum and teaching’ (p. 15). Miseducation is characterized by the impoverishing of teacher education through the systemic ignorance of decades of important, generative “‘untimely” concepts’ (p. 18). Namely: ‘Too little intellect in matters of soul’ (p. 23), the valorisation of ‘The school as business’ (p. 27), and, the destruction of ‘The figure of the schoolteacher’ (p. 29) into some sort of corporate flunky. With its recursive, reflexive, reconceptualizing moves, currere’s autobiographical inquiry is an apposite approach for theorising and mitigating this nightmare.

Reiterating his call for curricular ‘complicated conversation’ (p. 9), Pinar’s plea is for educators to expose the dystopia of America’s obsessive and increasingly narcissistic presentism. His cry is to rest our eyes from ‘the hegemony of visuality [that] accompanies the ahistorical presentism and political passivity of the American culture of narcissism. Without the lived sense of temporality the method of currere encourages, we are consigned to the social surface, and what we see is what we get’ (p. 257). Thus currere enables not only an awakening from the presentistic nightmare that David Smith’s ‘globalisation one’ exemplifies, but also offers a renewed worldview to awaken to.

57 In the sense of disregarding useful past experiences and prioritising self-interest in exploiting the present, potentially to the detriment of a common-interest future (See for example Lasch, 1978; Lasch, 1984).
Landscapes of multiplicity

Ted Aoki’s abundantly nuanced work in curriculum studies is well respected in Canada but little known elsewhere. In *Curriculum in a new key* (Pinar & Irwin, 2005) Aoki’s collected works show interpretations and understandings of curricular complexities that resonate loudly and generatively with curriculum reconceptualising in ways that have significantly influenced a new generation of scholars – Brent Davis and Dennis Sumara, for example. As well as being a lead composer-player in the reconceptualising orchestra, Aoki brought Deleuzian readings to his curriculum scholarship ahead of the following they have since acquired.

Although Aoki makes only passing reference to *currere*, his recognition and acknowledgement of its significance is plain in his writing about moving between a ‘curriculum-as-plan’ and a ‘lived curriculum’ (pp. 202-203), thus enjoying what I think of as living *currere*. In explaining this movement he also refers to ‘landscapes’ (p. 204). I see the landscape metaphor being used contextually to allude to the detached instrumental singularity in merely planning an object to occupy a landscape and an engaged multiplicity of living in the landscape. Using the common North American teacher education construction of *curriculum and instruction* (C & I) that insists instruction is a binary with curriculum, Aoki reconstructs it as curriculum and instrumentalism so as to better represent the emerging triangulated curriculum and instruction/implementation/assessment arrangement.

In contrast to the C & I landscape, Aoki uses his own C & C landscape ‘embodying the curriculum-as-plan and curricula-as-lived’ (p. 207). However, C & C also suggests to me several interpretations for the second C in C & C including: curricula, contrast, continuum,
complex and *currere*. *Currere* seems well suited to Aoki’s earlier reference in his essay *Teaching as indwelling between two worlds*, where he writes of ‘movement from curriculum-as-plan to curriculum-as-lived-experience’ (p. 163, original italics).

Despite what appears to be his rejection of *currere* ‘We’ve tried curriculum as *currere*’ (p. 257), Aoki continues to seek a way of explaining the complexity of C & C and refers frequently to recursion, and multiplicity and the ‘*and...and...and*’ that Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 25) feature in their rhizome–lines-of-flight. Perhaps the loudest signal of *currere* being apposite for C & C is its inclusion in the final sentence of the book, where it appears as a query about the emergence of internationalising curriculum studies – now known as *transnational curriculum inquiry*. In what is called the book’s Postscript/rescript, Aoki comments on the significance of the location of the first conference of the International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies (IAACS): ‘Shanghai is situated on the Pacific Rim, on the borderline, in the space of “inter”—often midst vibrant ambivalent metonymic figurations. This Third Space provokes semiotic signs wherein linguistic and cultural signs in ludic play could generate newness and hope. *Currere* in recurring movement?’ (Aoki, 2005, p. 457). *Currere* is not so much a method, more a way for living.

**Moving and returning to synoptic text**

I have referred to the synoptic text (Pinar, 2006) above and written of my interpretations and use of it in this folio. I return to synoptic text here in the context of what Pinar calls the *return move* (p. 8) which he follows with an epigram quote: ‘*Currere* is a reflexive cycle in which
thought bends back upon itself and thus recovers volition’ (Grumet, 1976, quoted in Pinar, 2006, p. 8).

As I see it, synoptic text is to currere as instructional text is to curriculum. Synoptic text is a way of articulating ideas and knowing to generate understanding and does so, in part, by way of paraphrasing. That is, we distil and take understandings from an idea and we describe what we know about the idea that forms our understanding of it. In these terms synoptic text is an assemblage of paraphrasing in and through synopsis. However, the term paraphrase can suggest a simplistic and reductive abbreviation of a text passage that omits what may be more significant.

The etymology of paraphrase, from the Latin word paraphrasis shows the joining of para: beside, with phразеін: explain, and the common definition is given to mean another way of making meaning of a text. I find the following usage quotation from The Oxford English dictionary for the word paraphrasis helpful: ‘Our criteria is pleasure and enlightenment, not exegesis and paraphrasis.’ (paraphrasis, 2007). The contrasting of pleasure/enlightenment with exegesis/paraphrasis helps to draw out the subtle distinctions between exegetic interpretations and paraphrasistic deliberations and the importance of each for the other.

The significance of these readings of paraphrase for synoptic text is in the interacting processes that are implied and their affects on volition. For it is in the re-writing of the reading that further meaning-making emerges. Even omissions become contributions by pointing to what
needs to found in the idea that generates knowing that becomes understanding. Synoptic text is not an inactive medium it is an enactive process to volition.

Synoptic text works much like Grumet’s (1976b) explication of *currere*, ‘a reflexive cycle in which thought bends back upon itself and thus recovers its volition’ (p. 130-131). Such a reflexive cycle begins with a regressive relating of the idea to personal, existing experience and understanding – thinking back to one’s own earlier experiences and how that affects present experiences. It then moves to the progressive and potential – throwing the past-present understanding forward beyond the now and thinking about what could become of it. Then comes the analytical-synthetical recursion of the whole into thinking meaning differently, recursively bending and thus recovering volition that opens problematicity to insight and generativity, to understanding otherwise.

In contrast with synoptic text for *currere*, I see instructional text in curriculum as problematic because it derives in indifferent repetition and typifies the reductive-simplistic paraphrase – in learning texts in order to adequately reiterate and/or repeat what is read. Instruction text I curriculum mainly substantiates what is and therefore serves little, if any, generative purpose. Whereas synoptic text for *currere* is most generative, complex and recursively meaning-making in ways that volitively recover problematicity.

58 ‘Indifferent’ is used to distinguish repetition in this instance from repetition as contributing to difference (See Deleuze, 1994).
**Currere to the rescue?**

Problematics for twenty-first century teaching see Kanu and Glor (2006) proposing *currere* as a rescue. Kanu and Glor identify three ‘positives’ *currere* ‘allows’ educators:  
‘First…collaborative autobiography…Second…the capacity to gain voice, as individuals, within or even against the system…Third…understanding that they possess personal practical knowledge which guides their everyday work…Lastly…a connection of the public and private spaces of teachers’ (pp. 111-113).

Using *currere* invites reflection on three questions: ‘What do I understand teaching to be? How, through my experience and personal history did I come to understand teaching this way? How do I wish to become in my professional future? [thus] Autobiographical inquiry conveys how teachers knowledge is formed, held, and can be studied and understood transformatively’ (p. 116).

Kanu and Glor conclude that through *currere* ‘chains can be examined and a weak spot can be found to break the constraints on the engagement of teaching as *phronesis*’⁵⁹ (p. 119). Arguing for more attention to *phronesis*, they are critical of over-reliance on ‘remembering correctly, or having more questions than answers. The key is the path or journey one takes and what is discovered’ (p. 119). The *phronesis* that Kanu and Glor refer to I see as being exemplified today in ideas like enactivism and engaging minds found in the work of scholars such as Brent Davis and Dennis Sumara (see Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2008; Sumara & Davis, 1997). It is in continuing interests such as these that *currere* can be seen as immanent.

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⁵⁹ Practical knowing.
Re-locating currere
Coinciding with Pinar’s recent geographical and academic move from Louisiana to British Columbia, the following two articles acknowledge his new location and the continuing appearance of currere in the curriculum literature. I find some cultural resonances in these articles with Aotearoa New Zealand coinciding with growing cultural relations between indigenous peoples in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand that reflect some of the issues Smith and Gough have written in the Handbook of international curriculum research.

…to help, not advise
Terrance Carson’s (2006) Help without giving advice is, in effect, what is called in Aotearoa New Zealand a powhiri†, a celebratory welcoming of the unknown to bring about new meaning. Beginning by reciting Pinar’s whakapapa (genealogy), and then orating on the mana (peer esteem) and significance of the newcomer’s arrival, Carson refers to Pinar’s (2004) What is curriculum theory? Carson says: ‘[i]nstead of offering quick fixes this book asks that educators join in a longer-term project of currere to understand the historical present situation in hopes that this will ultimately lead to self-mobilization of teachers and social reconstruction’ (p. 188). Carson, pointing to a ‘fine line between advice and control’ celebrates the authenticity of Pinar’s help given without advice as ‘a genuine contribution’ (p. 188). Such sentiments are very resonant and commensurable with Māori pedagogical principles (ako) (see Lee, 2005).

† A Māori word for welcome: ‘Po can be translated as a venture into the "unknown" or a new experience, while Whiri is derived from the term Whiriwhiri meaning the act or experience of exchanging information and knowledge’ (http://www.newzealand.com/travel/about-nz/culture/powhiri/powhiri-introduction.cfm.)
...and a gift
Another Māori custom in Aotearoa New Zealand is that of making a gift (koha)\(^{61}\) for kindness shown or services provided. Bringing an historical perspective to currere, Douglas McKnight (McKnight, 2006) appraises Pinar and Grumet’s scholarship as an overlooked personal gift. Personal, through its *sui generis*\(^{62}\) character, and thus overlooked: ‘This singularity is their gift to curriculum. But, like all gifts, it comes with ambiguity, risks, and obligations’ (p. 172). Such a gift\(^{63}\) is regarded as worthless in a world focused on evidence-based research, technocratic cause and effect, and ‘behavioural outcomes (what used to be called learning) that can be observed, measured, and categorized on a normative scale’ (p. 172). In contrast, Pinar’s data reveals incommensurable idiosyncrasies, differences and singularities (p. 173). This awareness of incommensurability between the technocratic and the *phrœnetic* has McKnight explore further the antecedents of these attitudes and, drawing on his historical interests, he reports on Puritan influences in the North American curriculum that fit with the extant curriculum history literature (See for example Hamilton, 1990). Here currere is seen in the light of a tradition of curriculum thinking contrasting tension between methods—‘the self-reflexive orientation of curricula vitae and the more Ramist, technical approaches’ (p. 177). McKnight characterises his view of currere as concerning personal exploration and a narrative for articulation to bring an arrangement to chaos, ‘to provide the basic contours of a map, much like Calvin’s curriculum vitae, that is to be filled in, and even inscribed by each individual’

\(^{61}\) The principle of koha involves understandings of value that precede monetary exchange and where the worth of the gift is considered in relation to its value to the recipient, rather than a perceived market value. Regrettably, the custom has become subverted and money is now a common koha.

\(^{62}\) I like to read this as ‘own kindedness’.

\(^{63}\) Grumet (1978) also discusses the gift of currere in this way (p. 312).
(p. 178). Again there is a resonance here with Māori epistemology (tikanga) that insists on an individual’s recitation of their historical autobiography and ancestry (whakapapa) and the portrayal of historical persons, artefacts, places and events in carvings (whakairo), painted designs (kowhaiwhai) and woven wall panels (tukutuku). Tikanga Māori is especially sensitive to technocratic/phronetic incommensurability and works beyond this through immersion indigenous education or Kura Kaupapa Māori.

McKnight also recognises the difficulties of implementing currere due to its association with anti-establishment attitudes and fear of its radical intents. However, he concludes that ‘this is a wrong, over politicized, and superficial reading’ (p. 181, italics added), because currere is not – and never intended to be – quantifiably generalizable. McKnight has it that as it is policy that valorises the generalisability and accountability discourse, casting currere as far-fetched and radical ‘is a political, not an academic or scholarly move’ (p. 181).

My inclusion of references to Māori in my reading of these last two essays intends to show capabilities for cross-cultural qualitative generalisability of currere that I see transnational curriculum inquiry working towards.

…and…and…and…

What follows is an exercise and explication of my currere experience, in which currere refers to my experiences (Pinar & Grumet, 1976) – my recursive experiencing of my experiences. However, I also believe that its personal originality discloses potentials, through which others may generate personal interpretations for their own understandings. Pinar (1976a) says:
‘currere refers to my existential experiences of external structures. The method of currere is a strategy designed to disclose this experience, so that we may see more of it and see more clearly’ (p. vii). Thus currere is doubly embodied in oneself, once in what constitutes experiencing externalities (theory) and, once again, in how that constituency is experienced (method).

Pinar also says: ‘I find that by [in the present] entering the past and the future, by describing them and interpreting them, I can more closely differentiate the three from each other, and so I am better able to look at the present with less chance of superimposition of past and future’ (p. 62). Thus there is thirdness to currere, which reassures personal interpretations of experiences.

He wrote further: ‘I am able, and this image seems to fit, to descend deeper in what constitutes the present. I find that I am facing some issue, that is, that the present situation is meaningful, that some response is proper if I am to understand it, and move past it, and remain in it’ (p. 62, emphasis added). Thus currere becomes a four-folding: a doubling of currere as an experiential theory with a method of currere for understanding oneself experiencing the world and; a currere of thirdness for differentially understanding such experiencing and; fourth dimensional currere enfolding all three for understanding a transformative potential. That is, to ‘move past it, and remain in it’, or, to put it differently, always-already becoming. Moving from a reliance on words for discussing currere, to explicating my personal journey with/through currere, which involves my pictures picturing, drawings drawing, sketches sketching of ideas and words.
Here then, is my rendering of *currere*, in Pinar’s (1976b) terms, my personal ‘sketch…outline of what it is I am after’ (p. 51).

The sphere shows the three visually perceived dimensions distance, breadth and depth that resonate with regression (back), progression (across), analysis (into), and the wave shows a fourth temporal dimension resonant with synthetic and hinting at transconceptual that the painting suggests in polar and equatorial movements.
I am curious about how I feel. I have a query (?), an inquiry into a doubt. That doubt, in the main, concerns some thing, circumstance, condition, or such like, which is generally represented by visually encircling it. In other words, the inquiry object is isolated from its surroundings to show one apart from other. After confirming that the inquiry object is a discrete entity, I proceed to undertake its analysis. To do this I must adopt an epistemological position, which can recognise a theory about my inquiry and its concern, and a method of inquiry appropriate to the epistemology/theory. This form of analysis involves a narrowing of focus for my inquiry; by adopting a theory and then applying a method it engages a reductionist view that seeks to eliminate all that is not relevant to the object. Such an analysis is appropriate if the purpose of my inquiry is to determine the facts that will eliminate all doubts about my inquiry object. That is, to define what constitutes its true knowledge.

However, if my inquiry concerns how I might understand my experiences of one whilst also understanding my experiences of other, how do I proceed?

When I read: ‘currere refers to my existential experiences of external structures. The method of currere is a strategy designed to disclose this experience, so that we may see more of it and see more clearly’ (Pinar, 1976b, p. vii). I pictured that like this:
Rather than the inquiry being subject to the encircling of some thing, circumstance, condition, or such like, which encloses its object and aims to isolate it from its surroundings, to eliminate all extraneous matters and to determine what constitutes its ‘truth’, currere inquiry embodies all experiences. A currere inquiry reconceptualizes its object also as subject and thus becomes...
both method and theory that engages a generative view, which seeks to include its surroundings so that it may better understand becoming one with others. Such an inquiry, rather than looking inwards, looks outwards from within, and inwards from without to experience what is happening and bringing an inquiry to mind.

Thus currere is doubly embodied in oneself: once in what constitutes experiencing externalities (theory) and; once again, in how that constituency is experienced (method). In this way my experiencing currere doubly embodies me in generative existential experiences of complex external structures that disclose learning more expansively and more clearly. Although this doubling is helpful for interpreting and understanding embodied experiences, there is also a need to further interpret and understand how those experiences have been, are being, and will be affected by the complexities that embody them.

About this Pinar wrote: ‘I find that by entering the past and the future, by describing them and interpreting them, I can more closely differentiate the three from each other, and so I am better able to look at the present with less chance of superimposition of past and future’ (p. 62).

In my picturing, I see doubly embodied experience in the conceptual present and as a temporal contextual continuum, which recognises that the present is co-implicated in the past and the future. That is, past, and present, and future are all involved in thirdness with potential to differentiate each from other without separation or superimposition. In this way my experiencing currere opens me to thirdness for differentiating generativity through learning...
about complexity. Thirdness, therefore, helps me to explain Pinar’s notion of ‘the complex relationship between the temporal and the conceptual’ (p. 51).

My experiencing *currere* enfolds me in fourth dimensionality for understanding my transformative potential unfolding in always-already becoming. That is, understanding learning unfolding in generativity, through always-already becoming complexity. What is this *currere* for? It is a way for thinking differently about learning. It is a way towards becoming oneself in learning, rather than being ‘dreamt into existence by others’ (Pinar, 1994a, p. 235).

Learning is given to be a condition and outcome of education. To educate is to give instruct or train. This can be broad-based, and include intellectual, moral and social instruction, or subject specific. Learning, in this context, refers to both the content and acquisition of instructional or training information. This view of learning is presently rhetoricised in the seemingly tautological expression ‘learning to learn’, which implies that learning involves a cognitive externality that must be internalised in order to learn. But, in another view, learning is innate; it is a prerequisite for living. In this view learning is inseparably co-implicated in oneself, experientially embodied in living, and the externalisation of learning as a conditional, separated cause and effect becomes problematic (Varela et al., 1993, pp. 50-51).

Thus learning, I suggest, is the chicken/egg conundrum of education. When we speak of learning, which, and whose, learning are we speaking of: my innate learning, or the external learning to learn of others? The curriculum has no doubts; it requires me to learn what it sets out for others to teach me. But how can this be; why should this be? If learning is what I
always do in living, why do others lay claim to my needing their learning to learn, and how is this ‘other’ learning possible?

This, then, is currere’s quest: How am I understanding my learning? Importantly, this is not a question that requires an answer. Because to do so would mean privileging the separation and externality of learning as a cause and an effect, rather, it is a matter of concern for enquiry.

How can I demonstrate this schizophrenic notion of learning/learning to learn? One way is to ask myself what stands out; what memories do I associate with learning and learning to learn at school? Mostly, I remember bad experiences: exclusion, pain, humiliation, bullying, punishment, shame, assault, and criticism; there is strong sense of failure. These memories stand out as externalities, learning to learn experiences that I remember for what was done to me. My few good memories are mainly associated with art, something I was ‘good at’, and the experiences resonate with feelings of discovery, joy, revelation, generativity, and appreciation. These memories stand out as being embodied learning experiences that I mostly remember for what I made of me.

What of those who ‘taught’ me? Again, the few good memories are of empathetic artist-teachers – visual and musical – who stand out from the background of intolerant instructor-teachers. Take, for example, my experience at eight years old of being ‘strapped’ by the Headmaster for failing to learn my seven and nine times tables from the teacher who showed me how a figure eight could be drawn on to appear as a boat. What did I learn from this experience? On one hand, the teacher showed me how numbers were generative for
imaginative pictures, but, on the other hand, she taught me that numbers were connected with terror and pain. I learned to avoid learning involving numbers wherever possible.

Little wonder that, seven years later, I received five percent for mathematics and 90 percent for art in the national School Certificate examination, which I failed. The next year, after dropping maths for history, I barely passed. Subsequently, I received career advice and the advisor noted my success with art and proposed two career options: commercial art, including sign writing, advertising, and suchlike; or, learning to teach art. As I recall, the first option was presented in a rather disparaging tone of voice, and the second took on an uplifting lilt. My recollections of these, and other, learning associated experiences suggest to me that my embodied learning affected me more generatively than did learning to learn. Furthermore, although I was admitted to a university diploma course, I left school with a profound sense of academic failure accompanied by the conviction that I was incapable of scholarly work, which persists to this day.

For me, currere, as I have come to understand it, is a revelation for perturbation. It is a revelation because it has emerged from an accidental journey in postgraduate studies in curriculum that I was permitted to embark on in 1999. This journey was accidental in the sense that it had neither plan nor destination; all it had was learning intention. And, it is a perturbation because it shifted my path towards understanding thinking differently about learning, which co-implicates revelation in perturbation, which I have characterised elsewhere (Sellers, 2001) as a path laid in walking. Currere encourages me to explore my experiences in
ways that not only let me bring my interpretive and expressive capabilities to my inquiry, but in ways that also celebrate their generativity.

The following pages perform another picturing currere by revisiting my first significant currere work, a refereed paper presented to the Australian Curriculum Studies Association annual conference in 2003. Here I return to my earlier thinking, picturing, to recursively continue to re-work what I see, read, write, picture…

**Picturing currere: Envisioning-experiences within learning**

Although technology is becoming increasingly audio-visually oriented, it is also causing ever-greater volumes of text to be produced. Yet literacy skills are seriously declining, and education bears the blame. Here I explore complexities in interrelationships between words and pictures and sounds, learning and teaching and knowing, experiences and actions and outcomes, in ways that suggest the importance of other views of the world than those the conventional curriculum privileges. My ‘picturing’ is proposed as being complementary to the theory/method of currere to envision experiences within learning for emerging worlds of complexity.

**Glancing about the title**

Why ‘picturing’? Because picturing embodies an enactive sense reminding me that as a young learner I was encouraged to make and use pictures to express myself. I continue to work and play with picturing through my life, and I believe this enables me to interpret and understand my complex experiences in the world differently. For example, picturing opens me to seeing
ecology like a fractal, which does not become simpler when magnified or reduced and includes forms such as trees, riverbeds, arteries, and electrical discharges (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000). Another way of explaining picturing is to consider that if it was writing most adults would not be able to write, because most are convinced they never ‘learned’ to draw. Consider how experiences might be today if one could only read and never write. Yet this is how picturing becomes for many younger learners. Just as they begin to tacitly use picturing to express themselves and communicate with others, through drawings, paintings, and sculptings, they are taught that they must learn a system of communicating – that is to read and write using words – and their picturing capabilities are, mostly, forgotten. Rhoda Kellogg (1958), who undertook a comprehensive study of children’s pictures64, observed the effect of adult interventions in children’s picturing and concluded: ‘If art could longer remain untaught we might all retain more of childhood’s natural artistic ability’ (p. 57). In my own experience, as both learner and teacher of picturing, it is often inadvertently inappropriate teaching intervention that most disrupts learning and may convince an individual of their inability to ‘learn’ what they are supposedly being ‘taught’, without either party necessarily realising what has happened, or why.

_Currere_ draws on personal interpretations of past, present and future education experiences, to generate meaning for complexity in living. I have taken _currere_ to heart because it is empathetic with my picturing of it as a vital coursing of learning, in contrast to the objective teaching-to-learn course of the conventional curriculum concept. Picturing _currere_ is my way

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64 Kellogg (1958) studied 100,000 drawings made by some 8000 children (pp. 28-29).
of signifying a *gestalt*-like suite of meanings, which interconnect picturing with *currere*.

Meanings such as: envisaging *currere* – forming an exploratory ‘minds eye’ view; re-visioning *currere* – interpreting and understanding the conception as more complementary, than supplementary; and visualising *currere* – enactively performing these conceptions as ecological⁶⁵ experiences-processes for learning-teaching. These are meanings that are generative for my picturing *currere* as *envisioning-experiences* within learning. *Envisioning-experiences* is my way of referring to the complexity of learners’ authentic⁶⁶ personal experiences for knowing; the moments in spaces, and occasions within situations, which enable learners and teachers to intimately perceive, engage, and interact with each other’s knowing.

This experiential picture for learning and knowing – *currere* – contrasts with more common concepts of curriculum as the detached and complicated prescriptions that apprehend and qualify methods of learning, that is, of *being taught* knowledge. I believe that picturing helps to vivify, or bring life to, *currere*. I see this happening through the re-visioning of the predominantly textual structures of curriculum – the setting out of what comprises teaching of and to learners and how that is constituted – to reveal expanding vistas of learning and teaching experiences.

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⁶⁵ ‘Ecological’ is a term that has been appropriated and misappropriated to serve many causes. I deconstruct the term to refer to complex organism/environment/energy interrelationships reflected through being–living–learning in *eco* (dwelling place) and *logos* (knowing).

⁶⁶ I use ‘authentic’ to signify the availability of critical interpretations of modernist ‘experiences’. For example, a typical modernist experience generally privileges causal interpretations of outcomes, based on what can be directly observed – drought results from absence of rain. Alternatively, critical interpretations of such experiences are concerned for complexities, which interconnect processes with interpretations, within experiences – rain and drought are complexly interrelated in cycles of climatic experiences (See, for example, Kesson & Oliver, 2002).
Pictures in an exhibition
I am working to portray my ideas about picturing and learning and teaching, by bringing picturing together with words as complementary and generative expressions. Usually, academic writing is expected to conform to certain rules, which implies a structured linear and hierarchical arrangement of, mostly, words. Therefore, to help see my picturing as complementary to and generative for the words, I invite the reader to approach my ‘writing’ more like pictures exhibited in a cafe (or, for the musically minded, jazz on a summer’s day) than pages in a document. That is, to consider the contents as an assemblage, not necessarily bound in the order it appears for advancement to a conclusion, but gathered more interdependently and diversely for imaginative, generative interpretations.

The work I am exhibiting (or, performing) interprets three themes: text, as the dominant medium of communication and knowledge; pictures, for their complex capability to fulfil more than their usual supporting role; and enactivism, a comparatively recent theory for learning and teaching that enables a different way of acting.

Picturing
This picture, right, shows words printed on both sides of a paper strip, which has been made into a Möbius strip – a loop with a continuous surface formed by twisting the strip and joining the ends together. The words say ‘pictures to help us see thoughts our languages express to generate ideas.'
music represent...pictures to help’ and so on, forever, the phrase has no beginning or end. Since picturing this idea I can see redundant words so it will now read: picturing thinking language expresses generating ideas music represents picturing thinking...and so on...
‘picturing’ means any images, realistic or abstract, that people make/use in the course of attempting to express meaning in their lives. picturing is also a way of resisting the privilege many people attach to ‘art’, as in ‘I was never any good at art’.
‘language’ means any arrangement of sounds and/or visual symbols – phonetic, alphabetic, or numeric – that people use to communicate with each other.
‘generating’ means all that comes into being to continue to become. generating is well represented by thinking of children, with the gamut of thoughts that embodies: us generating children coming into being, their generative growing to become a generation, and then themselves generating another coming into being, and so on. generating is also involved in a complex interrelationship with ‘create’, as concepts that nest within each other like, chicken and egg, colony and ant, or complex and simple.
‘ideas’ expresses the notion of ‘thinking-thoughts’, that is, a making-meaning, process-production cycle within the complexity of world-body-mind interrelationships. ideas do not arise without this complexity.
‘music’ expresses the notion of abstract-actual-abstract complexity the whole statement embodies. music is the enactive embodiment of the aural-tactile-visual/temporal-spatial-

67 I choose not to capitalise these pictured words to affirm their involvement in a continuum.
68 The term ‘generative’ has been used in educational literature as a synonym for ‘constructivist’, in particular by science educators (See, for example, Osborne & Freyburg, 1985). Following Andy Begg’s (1999) review of enactivist theory, which critiques constructivism, I would call my use of generative ‘post-constructivist’.
dimensional experiences that pictures reflect and languages express towards generative ideas (such as in music).

Therefore, the complexity of the whole statement is reflected in the picture of a Möbius strip, which symbolises the infinitely recursive continuum of all concepts. There is no beginning, ending, or hierarchy – there is an inter-dependent, interrelated continuum of actual sayings, interpretive picturings, and generative abstractions, like music – [without a full stop]

**Txt**

**69-ing – the economic dominion of word-power?**

We live in a paradoxical age where, on the one hand, complaints abound about the demise of literacy, and on the other hand, where text is supplanting speech. As a consequence of technology, humans are generating ever-greater volumes of text, but of diminishing literary quality.

William Paulson (2001) writing about ‘literary culture’70, expresses concern for what he foresees as its degeneration, which he attributes to two problematics: a turning away from ‘print, literature, and the past so as to put our critical acumen in the service of studying audiovisual and electronic media, popular culture, and the present’ (p. ix); and ‘the tautology that the humanities have been centered in human practices, meanings, and relations: their

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69 ‘Txt’ is a reference to the irony of telephone technology being increasingly used to transmit text messages using an ‘economised’ language form (for example, pls txt me = please text me) in place of speaking, because of the cost-benefit to the caller.

70 Paulson notes that literary culture ‘is a nonstandard term, one that brings together the several related ways in which there is a culture associated with literature. If it is possible to speak of literary culture… this is because the works of literature…institutions…communities…ways of thinking and acting form an interdependent ensemble, a recognizable cluster of artifacts, interests, activities, and beliefs’ (p. 26).
relation to the nonhuman things of the world seems, by comparison, tenuous, problematic, and perhaps even nonexistent’ (pp. ix-x). Paulson states that his mission is to make the ‘strangeness and multiplicity of literary culture part of an always interdisciplinary or a-disciplinary education of world citizens—in all the worlds dimensions’ (p. xi).

I have drawn Paulson into my picture to rehearse that I am not anti-words, but I am critical of their assumed hierarchy for power and control – that the problems and concerns I am picturing are deeply seated, diversely situated and pervasive – to segue to another picture, which entertains an ironic literary diversion playing on ideas within words, to introduce my pictur-think-ing upon ‘strangeness, and multiplicity…of an always interdisciplinary or a-disciplinary education’ (p. xi).

**Therolinguistics – writing SF**

It was Professor Duby who, by pointing out the remote affiliation of the script with Low Greylag, made possible the first tentative glossary of Penguin. The analogies with Dolphin which had been employed up to that time never proved very useful, and were often misleading.

Indeed it seemed strange that a script written almost entirely in wings, neck, and air should prove the key to the poetry of short-necked, flipper-winged water-writers. But we should not have found it so strange if we had kept in mind the fact that penguins are, despite all evidence to the contrary, birds. (Le Guin, 1983, p. 6)
Imagining
As my picturing of Ursula Le Guin’s ironical ‘report’ depicts, human learning, thinking, and knowing appear embedded in such an elite textual domain that knowing and learning otherwise, seems practically unthinkable. Therefore, to disrupt what I consider the hegemony of the textual domain, I try to imagine language concepts otherwise—much as Le Guin (1983) has imagined…

that so late as the mid-twentieth century, most scientists, and many artists, did not believe that even Dolphin would ever be comprehensible to the human brain — or worth comprehending! Let another century pass, and we may seem equally laughable. ‘Do you realise,’ the phytolinguist will say to the aesthetic critic, ‘that they couldn’t even read Eggplant?’ (p. 11).

Words like these, help to make strange and disrupt thinking about the privileged system of words, in ways other than the conditioning of textual interpretation usually demands, towards more imaginative learning and thinking and knowing. My picturing is another way, although not for negating words, but for complexifying a currere\(^1\) — of learning and thinking and knowing.

However, the hegemony of words mostly confines pictures in the margins allowing them only a supporting role to illustrate and illuminate the dominance of words. Even the word

\[\text{\(^1\) Robert Graham’s (1992) review of currere and reconceptualism interprets ‘a method for giving voice to private experience within a public setting and [which] speaks to the developing structures of a student’s personality as it interacts with social and institutional forms and structures’ (pp. 35-36).}\]
‘illuminate’ reflects the historical subordination of pictures in its meaning, that is, to decorate the initial letter of a text or manuscript. Today, the hegemony continues through, for example, the re-imaging of ‘icons’ as symbols on the computer desktop for the supportive ‘mouse’ to click on, but only as an adjunct to the over-riding power of the alphanumeric keyboard.

**Logos/Logos**

I picture the expression ‘seeing is believing’ cloaking a paradoxical power relationship between picturing and using words. This is exemplified in the heading above, which points to different interpretations of the same word. On the one hand there is a modern interpretation that appeals to seeing/recognising in a picturing manner, and on the other hand, an ancient interpretation, which appeals to a reading (hearing)/believing, in the manner of words. The non-italicised word conveys the modern (plural) sense of emblematic designs that identify organisations, in a picturing manner – seeing McDonald’s golden arches produces a corresponding belief about the products available close by. Whereas, *Logos* conveys the ancient sense, which signifies the articulated principle of reason and judgement; the pronouncement of why something is believed to be so – through divine intervention (God’s Word), systematic logic (technique of reason), or empirical evidence (scientific ‘truth’). Therefore, I am proposing difference between the ancient and modern senses of the word is, perhaps, a matter of power-broking. That is, in the pervasion of powerful, modern logos throughout the world, an authority has been assigned to them similar to that of *Logos* and, thereby, they legitimate new rules. For example, Naomi Klein (2000) asserts that ‘[l]ogos, by the force of ubiquity, have become the closest thing we have to an international language, recognized and understood in many more places than English’ (p. xx). Klein goes on to explain
how logos valorise and validate global territories for their corporations; logos that are legal brands and marks notified by ©™® symbols and defended to the hilt by armies of lawyers. No longer merely stylised words, these imagineered brands/marks are legally defined by textual terms such as ‘swoosh’ for Nike, ‘curve’ for Coke, and ‘arches’ for McDonald’s, and they pinpoint channels, franchises and outlets that territorialise a new global regime.

Furthermore, these globalised logos appear to be increasingly complicit in a manipulative conflation of objective experience and its subjective interpretation; to have us believe something, which, more often than not, is at odds with our authentic experiences. For example, in the way that British Petroleum has reworded its identity to be read as ‘beyond petroleum’ and redesigned its logo from a shield to a sunburst/flower to ‘better’ reflect a view that scientific manipulation of the earth’s environment does not threaten its ecology. BP has, in recent years, unveiled a new ‘green’ brand image, in an attempt to win over environmentally aware consumers. The new green, white and yellow logo replaces the BP shield and is designed to show the company's commitment to the environment and solar power. The company is to revert to its old name of BP…and adopt a new slogan ‘Beyond Petroleum’…But environmentalists have yet to be convinced. ‘This is a triumph of style over substance. BP spent more on their logo this year than they did on renewable energy last year,’ the environmentalist group Greenpeace said. ‘BP doesn't stand for Beyond Petroleum. It stands for Burning the Planet,’ it added (BBC News, 2000).

Perhaps, if there is a difference between logos and Logos, it is that the former symbolises the power of the latter, and each recursively re-enforces the logic for so doing. To put it textually: Seeing the sign – recapitulates – believing the Word, and so on. Although logos are actual,
tangible objects, and *Logos* is an abstract, subjective concept, both appeal to us to see them and believe *in* their ‘truth’.

**It’s a dot.com.world**

To help resolve the problematic seeing (not what it seems) believing paradox, the logos/Logos regime has devised new comprehensive rules about thinking, learning, and knowing to cover spaces in virtual reality. Information and communication technologies (ICT) signify such spaces, and among examples of the new spaces/rules are the cellphone ‘txt’ lexicon, email ‘netiquette’, Microsoft ‘Word’, and the Google ‘search engine’, which are changing languages – ‘globally’. However, the Internet with its World Wide Web generally typifies the virtual effects of technology on words. The origins of the Internet can be traced to military research in the 1970’s and the need for a ‘communication, command, and control network that could survive nuclear attack by having no central control’ (Rheingold, 1994, p. 7) Bearing mind that ‘no central control’ means that control is not centrally located, rather than control not being centrally commanded. Although, over the intervening quarter-century, much has been made of the socially democratic potential of the Internet, the realities have tended to demonstrate the strengthening of its communication, command, and – de-centralised (globalised) – control attributes.

Most significantly, these features are reaching out to a particular audience – children. Writing about his recent study of childhood in a corporate world, Sumana Kasturi (2002) claims that a

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72 Exemplified by the United States of America’s Airforce One, a designation assigned to any aircraft carrying the US President who, as Commander in Chief of the forces, remains mobile on the network while in absolute central control.
characteristic of the Internet is its popularity with the young: ‘In general, children are considered to be early adopters of high-tech products. Stories of youngsters spending hours browsing the Net, and of running Web-based businesses, abound and are an indication of the ease with which the Internet has become a part of their lives’ (p. 40). Although there are those who would hold this up as exemplifying positive benefits of the technology, as Kasturi points out: ‘globalization, media concentration, and the ever-increasing access of children all over the world to both traditional and newer forms of the media have resulted in the universalization of a certain model of childhood as “natural” and “ideal” in a contemporary urban society’ (p. 40). Using textual analysis to review the Disney Corporation’s Web sites, Kasturi concluded that Disney is in the business of teaching people how to be good consumers, ‘by constructing and propagating a worldview compatible with its own corporate interests, one that erases problems of social and economic dimensions, to be replaced by a whitewashed version of homogeneity that is neither true nor democratic’ (p. 54). Once again the power of confusing and conflating symbols and words – symbolised words – becomes genealogically apparent through the exploitive expansionism of Walt Disney’s original ‘Disneyland, Disneyworld,’ colonisation ideology. For example, by appropriating classic children’s literature characters like *Winnie the Pooh* into the corporate ‘family’.

Joe Kincheloe (1997; 2001; 2002) has also written on the power that corporations wield over children. His observations, which focus on McDonald’s restaurants, point to a similarity
between the ideological ambitions of Walt Disney and those of McDonald’s founder Ray Kroc who, Kincheloe observes, ‘was obsessed with positioning his chain of restaurants in opposition to the social changes he saw occurring around him in the 1960’s’ (2002, p. 81). According to Kincheloe, Kroc’s priority was to protect traditional (American) values and to make McDonald’s a ‘family kind of place’ with advertising that deployed home and family as ‘paleosymbols—signifiers of our oldest and most basic belief structures’ to connect families to the ‘American way of life’ (p. 81). Furthermore, Kincheloe identifies McDonald’s family values theme as ‘one of the most successful campaigns in advertising history’ (p. 82).

Today, the ‘world ideals’ of Walt Disney’s ‘family’ – signified by his ‘hand-lettered’ signature – and Ray Kroc’s ‘family values’ – symbolised by his ‘Golden Arches’ – are intellectual properties of inestimable financial worth to the corporations that resolutely protect them. To paraphrase Kincheloe (2002), it is about selling social relations and ideology, not about selling hamburgers (p. 82).

What I have been writing here concerns how pervasively logos and images are commodified in the dot.com.world to hegemonically subvert picturing for overpowering ideological and selling social relations purposes, that is, pictures that sell. My fear is that in idolising logos and images as products and identities we are distracted from seeing the controlling power with which

73 Ray Kroc was the ‘founder’ of McDonald’s Corporation. Brothers Dick and ‘Mac’ McDonald opened their first McDonald’s restaurant in California in 1948. Kroc acquired franchise rights and formed the corporation in 1955, and bought out the McDonald brothers in 1961 (McDonald’s Corporation, 2003).

74 For example, McDonald’s in the UK spent several million dollars on a libel action against two unemployed activists (Vidal, 1997).
words are used – especially in subsuming and subverting images – to make us believe in an abstract world that is at odds with the one we actually experience. I believe my fear is intensified by my capability for ‘seeing-thinking-differently’ in ways other than those that my teachers instructed me to learn through their curriculum. I came to believe very early in my learning life that I was at odds with that concept of curriculum, and it has taken me many years to work towards other conceptions.

**Curriculum method and currere processes**

I interpret curriculum and *currere* as different concepts, typically, with curriculum signifying a methodical system for the management of education, and *currere* signifying experiential learning and teaching processes within, through, and beyond education. Curriculum, as an educational term, developed from an invention for organising knowledge as a ‘method’ (Hamilton, 1990). Its present and predominant formulation – complemented by my picture of *The curriculum organiser* – is the managing of that method by organising what knowledge is taught, how it is taught, and how the teaching of knowledge is measured as learning effects. A container, designed to methodically partition different projects, plans, subjects and content in a logical arrangement, but allowing for easy modifications to accommodate frequent organisational reforms.

Intersecting this construction of curriculum is *currere*, which is a (re)conception of curriculum towards personal learning experiences, or, a way of making the silences of educational experiences personally speak to broader perspectives of learning about increasingly diverse and
complex knowledge(s) (Doll, 1993; Graham, 1992; Pinar, 1975a, 1994b; Pinar & Grumet, 1976). My picture ‘Complexity as currere-learning-teaching’ is an early attempt to conceptualise currere through the synthetical phase of its method. That is, to answer Pinar’s (1994) question: ‘what conceptual gestalt is finally visible?’ (p. 27).

A way of projecting for ‘seeing’ how complexity might be represented as a gestalt like conception that, when illuminated in three different ways, reveals more than the whole displays. My design pictured here was inspired by Douglas Hofstadter’s (1980) ‘The “GEB” [Gödel Escher Bach] trip-let casting its three orthogonal shadows’ (p. 1). Hofstadter writes that what he intended as an essay concerning Gödel expanded like a sphere to touch Bach and Escher: ‘But finally I realized that to me Gödel and Escher and Bach were only shadows cast in different directions by some central solid essence[75]. I tried to reconstruct the central object and came up with this book’ (p. 28).

Similarly, curriculum and currere can also be seen as different conceptions representing differing worldviews, with curriculum characterising a modernist worldview and currere characterising postmodern views of, and attitudes towards, the world. Differences in these positions include: in curriculum, the empirically-based rational construction of knowledge and the objectivist structuring of teaching for individualistic, economically privileged learning outcomes (See, for example, Apple, 1995; Gabbard, 2000; Popkewitz, 2000); and with currere, phenomenologically and existentially conscious ecological processes of learning and teaching.

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75 Hofstader’s paradox ‘solid essence’ exemplifies complexity for me.
experiences for complexly collective generativity (See, for example, Doll, 1993; Grumet, 1988; Pinar, 1998). In other words, whereas curriculum signifies the effective course of teaching learning for earning achievement, currere concerns generative coursing concepts about learning and teaching in living experiences.

Thus my notion of picturing currere a-scribes76 to, and is generative for, an ecological idea of learning and teaching expressed as ‘coursing experiences’. Through this expression I mean to generate a metaphor for a ‘throb’77 (Kesson & Oliver, 2002) curricular ‘organocentricity’78 (Fleener, 2002), which I envision in a recursive organism/environment/energy circulatory continuum. For example, of picturing a biological circulatory system – food/body/blood – having similarities with a psychical circulatory system as environmental/organism/energetic complexes in my picture. My imaginative circulatory system also embodies ideas of reciprocity within organism/environmental complexes as dynamically interactive exchanges – ingestion, conversion, transformation, excretion – which invites a return to a genealogical view of the psychic and physic realms. In other words it is a way of picturing interrelationships within analogous complexities of psychical world~body~mind and physical world~body~blood.

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76 My added hyphen emphasises a deconstructive reading as ‘a’ – adding to, ‘scribes’ – writing.
77 Kathleen Kesson and Donald Oliver propose the need for: ‘Throb: A re-conceptualized theory of experience… – the flowing conversation/story of life in the ever-present, vibrating moment’ (p. 191).
78 M. Jayne Fleener (2002) writes, ‘[a]n organocentric curriculum as an organism/environment complex maintains Doll’s five characteristics of a postmodern curriculum as: currere, complexity, cosmology, conversation, and community’ (p. 160).
Re-minding79 thinking about learning

Proximate to the development of the curriculum ‘method’, attention was also being focused on
the idea of the human mind’s ability to ‘see’. Arnold Pacey (1999) quotes Alfred Crosby’s
claim that in the 15th and 16th centuries, a “shift to the visual” had the effect of “striking the
match” that set the scientific revolution ablaze’ (Crosby, 1997, quoted in Pacey, p. 53). Pacey
observes that visualisation caused objective and subjective experience to be distinguished as
the difference between what was seen and what was not, and, quoting Crosby again Pacey
says: ‘visualization, together with objective, quantified measurement, was used to “snap the
padlock on nature”…Even music, [Crosby] says, could be interpreted visually after musical
notation had evolved’ (p. 53).

Writing on the complexity of meaning in relation to technology, Pacey considers more recent
ideas around thinking visually, and comments on relationships between artists who have re-
envisioned world views and consequent scientific ‘discoveries’. As Pacey notes, artists have
historically shown alternative views of space, time, and light and, quoting Leonard Shlain
writes: ‘innovation in nineteenth-century painting may have prepared people’s minds for the
new insights offered by relativity and quantum mechanics, however abstract they may be’
(Shlain, 1991, quoted in Pacey, p. 54). However, views such as these also emphasise the
tension that continues to separate the aesthetic from the scientific, with the former pejoratively
characterised as ‘woolly ‘ or ‘fuzzy’, and the latter as ‘hard-edged’ or ‘narrow-minded’. Pacey
touches on the paradox in this tension by referring to the generativity of fractals that ‘makes

79 I have hyphenated ‘re-minding’ to signify my deconstructive interpretation of re – anew, afresh conceptions of
minding – caring mindfulness.
complex relationships accessible to the “intuition”’ (p. 55). He defines ‘intuition’ as ‘thinking…in which ideas emerge from visual experience without intermediate stages of verbal reasoning – ideas that can then be discussed verbally or tested using mathematics or experiment’ (p. 55).

Drawing his explorations of visual thinking together, Pacey writes: ‘Effective science has to clothe theory with words and mathematics, with constructs such as “causality,” and now we can say, with visual imagery’ (p. 56). This view of imagery echoes my thoughts on the hegemony of words (and their conflation with symbols) in my earlier discussion on logos and logos. Touching on gendered science, Pacey also comments on the inquiries of women researchers, such as Anne Roe (1953), Margaret Shotton (1989), and Sherry Turkle (1984) into the ‘masculinity’ of science, which include interpretations of scientific thought as ‘imageless thinking’ and the ‘masculine image’ of science (cited in Pacey 1999, p. 56). For Pacey, the peculiarity of ‘masculine science’ is not so much about non-visual thinking than ‘emotion-avoiding, object-centered thinking strategy’ (p. 56), a strategy that he suggests Douglas Adams caricatures. Although Adams (1982) is well-known for his aphorism on the answer to Life, the universe and everything being 42, Pacey notes that ‘in the context of chaos theory…[Adams] suggests that “the closest…human beings come to expressing our understanding of these natural complexities is in music”’ (Adams quoted in Pacey, 1999, p. 57).

These perceptive readings of meanings in technology continue to generate complexities-within-complexities. Thus the readings are not only a reminder of the male privilege that has historicised technology, but also a reminder to reflect on how complexly jazz musicians play
with a theme by improvising – jamming – with each other’s performances. These performances are not scored or rehearsed events, they are impromptu happenings and the experiential quality is sensed through a palate, which includes temporal, spatial, dimensional heuristics that are analogous with an artist’s palette.

The theme I am improvising with – by playing with other curricular thinker/worker performances – is that the conventional curriculum is, like masculine science and technology, no longer fitting the needs of learners, or teachers for that matter. Rather, there is an intuiting – in Pacey’s non-worded reasoning sense – that what they, as learners, are being taught to learn and what they, as teachers, are being instructed to teach is incommensurable with their authentic – currere – experiences as learners and teachers. To put it colloquially: curriculum and learning just ain’t jammin’.

**Acting differently**

Brent Davis (1996) writes of the term ‘complexification’ as a recent addition to the English language that appeals to him because it points ‘away from attempts to impose linear and causal models onto phenomena and toward embracing the difficulty and ambiguity of existence [Also,] it is a new word – a new pattern of acting’ (p. xvii). Davis adds that generating new words, or using words in new ways, interrupts ‘commonsense notions that frame our actions. We enable ourselves to act differently’ (p. xvii, original italics, bold added). I adopt this idea of enabling ourselves to act differently as a helpful heuristic for understanding the theory of

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80 For further discussion on jazz as an educational metaphor, see Jim Neyland’s (2003) *Re-visionsing curriculum: Shifting the metaphor from science to jazz.*
enactivism that is Davis’s interpretive framework. Although Davis’s book is subtitled *Toward a sound alternative* – and is principally about moving mathematics pedagogy away from being visually privileged (in Davis’s view) and towards more auditory awareness – his ideas and arguments are also helpful to my picturing proposals. His concerns are also about inter/dis/rupting structures that constrain learning. Furthermore, by drawing on Davis’s sonorous conceptions, I am also acknowledging the diverse complexity of perception experiences for cognition, and recognising picturing as another contributor to the whole complex of experiences. In a reciprocal manner, Davis also acknowledges the similarly complex role of imagery with his own picture on the book’s cover, above right, which is a complex image sounding out alternatives to ways of seeing teaching.

Davis’ picture exemplifies the complex instability and ambiguity of many patterns that are often (mis)taken to be concretely set, particularly in the modernist world. Susan Pirie (1996) in her foreword to Davis, uses the picture to introduce the importance of context for seeing differently, she says: ‘My first construal focused on the fetus curled at the heart of a recursively growing world, a new life connected to, developing from, and feeding on the richness of its past, but emerging from the many chambers of its history to display the art of teaching afresh’ (p. xi). Noting that her construal lacked the context of the book’s title, Pirie asks whether other viewers may see ‘An ear, alert to the whisperings of understanding filtered from the reverberating clamor that plays around the nautilus shell?’ (p. xi).
In another context, the ear/nautilus shell image/metaphor features as a symbol for the New Zealand education curriculum documentation. Both this picture and Davis’s are quite graphic, but their respective interpretations – the subtlety of Davis’s and the directness of the curriculum diagram – illustrate how differently context affects meaning making. Moreover, they picture an object that is easily conceived of in ‘the round’, and one that is often thought of as being held to make and hear sounds. It is through this visual/aural/tactile-generative/affective complex that I turn towards the idea of haptic experiences.

**Haptic tactics**

Although haptic and tactic have the sense of touch in common, their meanings are poles apart. ‘Haptic’ has an abstract connation that, as a related word such a haphazard suggests, involves an absence of the organisational structure and order that ‘tactic’ specifically denotes. In my mind, the term ‘haptic tactics’ offers a sort of paradoxical interplay, which the juxtaposition of both pictures helps to show. The near right picture represents *currere* as imaginatively haptic, spatially abstract, temporally fluxing and cognitively tentative (in the sense of feeling and trying). The far right picture represents curriculum as diagrammatically tactical, spatially structured, temporally divided and cognitively explicit. Although both images draw on the same metaphor, the purposes the metaphor is put to and the heuristics available from each image are quite different. On the one hand, Davis’ (1996) picture ‘echoes’ the irreducible complexity of diverse worlds of learning experiences, and complements his vision of *currere* as:

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**Currere workings**

Essential learning areas, or, the compartmentalisation of essential learning (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 1993, p. 8).
an acknowledgment of the relational basis of our knowing (and being) and a recognition of the happenstantial, constantly negotiated nature of our existence… One’s focus is thus set not on the path (because the course has not been predetermined) but on negotiating a path: on currere, running; on the instant of interpretation; on doing’ (pp. 90-91).

On the other hand, the New Zealand curriculum document picture employs the metaphor to reductively ‘frame’ subjects of knowledge into separate learning compartments in a way that graphically rhetoricises Thomas Popkewitz’s (1997) description of a tactical curriculum as: a disciplinary technology that directs how the individual is to act, feel, talk, and ‘see’ the world and ‘self’…Curriculum deploys power through the manner in which and the condition on which knowledge is selected, organized, and evaluated in schools.

(pp. 154-155)

I see these respective uses of the metaphor illustrating the differing worldviews of Davis and the New Zealand Ministry of Education, and thus each picture reflects the distinctive ethos its user brings to experiencing their knowing/knowledge concepts of their ‘world’. Whereas currereists embrace a haptically ecological worldview to enactively vivify knowing, curricularists deploy a tactical economic worldview to strategically exploit knowledge.

81 After communicating with David Wood the principal writer and Terence Taylor art editor of The New Zealand Curriculum Framework (Ministry of Education, 1993), which first featured the nautilus device, I learned that the nautilus resulted from Taylor’s suggested concept of a shell, which also reflected the Māori koru (spiral) design. The Wood’s impression was that the image also helped to overcome some misperceptions that the curriculum framework had adopted a lock-step approach (David Wood, 2 October 2002; and Terence Taylor, 17 March 2003, 17 April 2003, personal communications).

82 I thank Noel Gough for suggesting this coinage.
Returning to the notion of haptic, the word *hap* appears as the root for many common words like happen, happy, perhaps, happenstance, and mishap. *Hap*’s archaic meaning is of events coming about by chance, particularly, fortunate chance. Davis (1996) uses *hap* to refer to ‘the center-point of enactivist teaching…to the unexpected consequence, to the sudden insight, to the inexplicable interest that is conditioned or occasioned by the teacher’s actions’ (p. 257). In other words, enactivism inter/dis/rupts what Davis calls a ‘*hap*less curriculum, wherein the teacher is able to prescribe all learning and to foresee every possible contingency’ (p. 257). Thus I see enactivism encouraging *currere* to flourish in *happenings for learning*, which embodies *acting differently*. Acting differently can also picture the enacting of authentic experience through an altogether different view of curriculum, for example, a view made by members of cultures, from perspectives familiar with communicating complex ideas using non-verbal language.

**Painting the curriculum**

Noel Gough (2002a), introducing a chapter in *Curriculum visions*, quotes William Reid’s view that: ‘Thoughts on curriculum can be pointed, substantive and coherent even if they are only a few lines long; they don’t have to run to 5,000 words…nor need they be in prose, or even words’ (Reid, 1979, quoted in Gough, p.131). Gough comments that there have been few ‘wordless representations of curriculum to date’ (p. 131), however, he points to one interesting example in Kevin Keeffe’s (1991) article *Painting the curriculum: the view from Walungurru*, which records the story of four Australian Aboriginal student teachers from the Pintupi community picturing their curriculum vision.
Sarah Napangati Bruno, Paul Tjampitjinpa Bruno, Monica Nangala Robinson and Victor Tjungurraya Robinson made their painting, over a period of four days, in response to a question posed at the 1989 Australian Curriculum Studies Association national conference, which way for the Australian curriculum? Keeffe’s (1991) article describes and comments on the painting, drawing from the story the artists told to the conference delegates, and his personal discussions with them:

The painting is in five panels [a central diamond shape surrounded by four triangles, one in each corner]… This painting chronicles a Pintupi journey from the past, through the present and into the future, with special emphasis on schooling. The journey is represented by the tracks of feet moving from one panel of the painting to another. Each panel refers to a different period of time. From the top left, or northwest corner and moving clockwise, the four corner sections refer roughly to the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s. These decades approximate periods in which different policies of assimilation, self-management and self-determination have shaped the Pintupi educational experience… The central panel refers to the time before the Pintupi world was transformed by contact with non-Aboriginal society. (pp. 260-261)
Keeffe’s article also reviews the role of the painting as political critique in the context of Australian educational policy. He writes that:

A school curriculum is not a monolithic body of culturally loaded learnings that must always weigh oppressively on any student from another cultural background. The contemporary curriculum is riddled with contradictions and ambiguities, creating gaps and spaces into which local political action moves in order to create widespread change and eventual reformation…The painting is such an action and…provides a model of possibilities for the curriculum of the Walungurru school. (p. 265)

Keeffe makes a very significant observation in his conclusion by emphasising the importance of the artists’ use of their indigenous medium to express their message, and the effects it generates. He suggests that the medium disrupts the ability of ‘Europeans’ to respond in their culturally privileged terms: ‘A painting cannot be answered by a vague and polite Ministerial letter, filed and archived. It demands a response and sets terms based on Aboriginal values for any subsequent negotiations’ (p. 267). Furthermore, the medium helps to ‘make explicit values that are central to Aboriginal thinking but truly remote from non-Aboriginal thinking… These values are central to the work of the artists as teachers, as values that should permeate the curriculum’ (p. 267). Through this personal-collaborative, picturing expression, a different way of acting is generated. This way invites reciprocal responses for reflecting and generating from the values and experiences of acting differently.

Painting the curriculum is picturing currere. What Keeffe describes here is currere involving the participants in their respective and collective regressive, progressive, analytical, synthetical...
autobiographical understanding of educational experiences. In *picturing currere* these teachers brought their different thinking to a forum, which then required others to undertake a, contemplative reflective ‘reading’ of this work to be able to respond to its imagery. The *different thinking* in this instance came from teachers with a culture that dates back millennia and an onto-epistemology that is incommensurable with that of the settler government, which controls the education system they must operate within.

**...continua...**

I opened this performance by picturing a recursive interrelationship continuum as a Möbius strip. I will bring it to closure with some inter-connecting examples of complex ideas embodied throughout it, which I see as reflecting continua. For example, I see ‘Painting the curriculum’ helps to explain ideas about Aboriginal ‘songlines’ (Lawlor, 1991). And, I see enactivist concepts for learning and teaching resonating with a poem of Antonio Machado (1930) and a photograph my son took while we were walking together one day, which I see as a coda to the fractal-like ecological resonances of all these thoughts.

_Wanderer, the road is your footsteps, nothing else;_  
_wanderer, there is no pain,_  
_you lay down a path in_  
_walking._  
_In walking you lay down a_  
_path_
and when turning around
you see the road you'll
never step on again.
Wanderer, path there is none,
only tracks on ocean foam.

Anthony Machado 1930,
translated and quoted by
Francisco Varela (1987).
Re-viewing the exhibition/performance

Earlier, I invited the reader to approach my writing on these pages more like pictures exhibited in a cafe (or, for the musically minded, jazz on a summer’s day) than pages in a document. So, in currere manner, I now review my exhibition/performance:

On this journey I express my ideas about the importance of picturing for generating understandings of authentic experiences of the world. Although words appear to be the predominant means of communicating ideas, pictures and words are complexly interrelated. Words and pictures are embodied in each other, and de-scribe each other. How we think we see the world affects what we hear and say about it. What we call ‘the world’ is not just in mind, nor is it just out there; it is both within and without. Seeing in – insight – and seeing out – outlook – are equally important for complementary views and authentic understandings of our experiences.

There are, however, disturbing differences in views of ‘seeing’, and the ‘authenticity’ of experiences, which I believe are problematics of our concepts of curriculum. The conventional concept holds onto an anthropocentric view of the world, and uses The Curriculum to reify, prescribe and qualify objectives to that end. However, the theoretical foundations of this anthropocentric, objectivist worldview are under challenge from more recent research and theorising, which is informing more complex understandings of views of the world. These understandings have been the stimulus for reconceptualist curricular alternatives such as currere.
My concern is that the onto-epistemological tension involved in grasping (*being taught*) one worldview and feeling (experiencing) another, is causing us to lose sight of picturing as a way of thinking, which is complexified with and complementary to words. As a consequence, we are thinking more thoughtlessly because we are relying more on words and taking pictures for granted. Furthermore, as technology gains ever-greater strongholds over communication, our access to ‘real’ experiences, which are the ‘touchstones’ of authenticity, are being supplanted by simulated and ‘virtual’ experiences.

By interweaving pictures and words, I have tried to generate my impressions of the complex processes that happen as we are perceiving, interpreting, making meaning, and expressing our understandings of our experiences, and by doing this I am working to convey what enactive learning and teaching is for me.

If you have agreeable memories of enacting your own early learning experiences with pictures, think about how those experiences have languished, perhaps, to only make an occasional guest appearance at a party game. Think how differently you might be acting if picturing was more to you than a party game.

The term *postmodern*, as a generalisation, has long been problematic, but I find Patrick Slattery’s use of postmodern in combination with the words process and vision acceptable and helpful in the following quote:

A clear articulation of a postmodern process vision of curriculum development that includes the concept of *currere* is urgently needed, and this vision could be a prophetic
statement for a world in turmoil and denial. The fragmentation of society and individual persons, as reflected in the fragmentation of disciplines and departments in schools, is a central concern of the emerging postmodern era. The disciplinary structure of the curriculum is comfortable to students, faculty, and administrators not only because it is familiar but also because many have not experienced, or even considered, a postmodern alternative. Interdisciplinary, aesthetic, and multidimensional alternatives must be incorporated into schooling. This book has been an attempt to expose more educators to postmodern possibilities. Postmodern [process vision] voices are abundant in the arts, sciences, and humanities (Slattery, 2006, p. 287 & 1995, p. 249).

I am proposing that my picturing currere is working towards responding to Slattery’s call for a postmodern process vision of curriculum.

**Exegetic comments**

Hunkered down, lonely and struggling with feelings of utter despair over a perceived inability to deal with everything and nothing. Each morning I attempt to begin an attempt. There are moments…

**Where did the time go...why?**

I started with a hiss and a roar; produced a whiz-bang proposal and pumped out a raft of articles, reviews and conference papers, then crashed…I lost my way. I put it down to several ‘things’: the Black Dog, burn out, winter blues, support issues, to name a few. Funds were
becoming problematic. I needed to work. I took 18 months out. What I missed was that the ‘crash’ was alerting me to what I needed to explore, namely how I understood my work.

I often fail to appreciate the extensive depth of a piece of my work. I spend too much time trying to approve what I do, to make it ‘fit’ with what I think others think it needs to be. In doing this I lose sight of myself and the background thinking that I am bringing to expressing myself. My negotiating towards cura picture epitomises this. I could not accept that what had seemed so effortless to make could possibly be so crucial, so it has taken me a long time to accept that a picture I made in less than thirty minutes maps my thesis.

What saved me was dis-covering aporia and understanding that what I was experiencing is always-already what is. There is no poria (way) without aporia. One cannot find a way without not being able to find it. Without doubt, there is little of value; if all is certain, what is there to find?

I have read a mountain of literature and filled journals, notebooks, sketchbooks, and far too many files, with quotes, comments, observations, thoughts and sketches. What enabled me to do this was a mixture of my own lifelong devotion to eclecticism and the validation of this way of working I found in the scholarship of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and their philosophical adaptations of notions of rhizomatic and nomadic inquiry.

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83 *Aporia* is often used pejoratively to mean a disruptive moment of doubt in a teaching-learning situation. Following Burbules (2000), I draw on Kofman (1988) to explore other, more generative interpretations.
Although I could not see any way of making way with what I was doing I continued to persevere with doing it anyway. How did what I was doing work? A nomad is without a home-base; nomads travel without origin or destination. A rhizome is an underground stem growing horizontally without beginning or ending; rhizomes are always-already travelling, endlessly, and surfacing occasionally to express their presence. Thus, nomadic-rhizomatic inquiry. In practice this means taking the liberty of exploring disparate connections in reading and noting, and reflecting on how they work towards understanding differently. Burbules (2000) compares this to the experience of using hypertext links whilst browsing the Internet, which often bring serendipitous finding of apposite information that one was not looking for (p.181).

By way of an example, quoted below is a passage (that links from Burbules’ article), which is used to demonstrate a different sort of aporia: ‘Here, aporetic passages are no longer bad passages…They are radically ‘other’, and have more to do with the thought of the ‘way’ than with that of method’ (Kofman, 1988, p.41).

The worst thing was the harsh frightful cruelty of the light; I could neither look nor turn my eyes away; to see was horrible; not to see tore me apart, cut me from forehead to throat… Eventually I became convinced that I had come face to face with the madness of light; the truth was that the light was going mad, that the brightness had lost its reason; it assaulted me irrationally, bound by no rules, with no purpose. (Blanchot, Maurice, 1973, La Folie du jour, Montpellier, quoted in Kofman, 1988, pp., p.42).

…which links me back to the following piece that I wrote earlier in response to the image shown on the next page.
The concluding image in episode 18 of the final season of the television series *The Sopranos* has Tony Soprano, euphoric on the drug Peyote, standing in the desert outside Las Vegas, watching the sunrise, shouting ‘I get it!’ What is ‘it’ that Soprano gets? This image evokes a conundrum – understanding being [or/other than] becoming outsider: ‘it’ is a momentarily accessible realization, and then, only to the other, the outsider, the nomad.

The conundrum derives in the relentless challenge of virtually experiencing always-already middleness whilst being driven to actually determine ‘it’: black or white, left or right, zero or one, many or none.

There is no actual ‘it’, but there are virtual ‘its’ that interconnect subjects-objects. As Varela (1997) argues, although there has been a representationalist inside–outside ‘it’, another alternative mutually overlapping mind [and ‘its’] body orientation is also available.

Practically since its inception cognitive science has been committed to a very explicit set of key ideas and metaphors which can be called representationalism, for which the inside–outside distinction is the centre piece: an outside (a feature-full world) represented inside through the action of complex perceptual devices. In recent years there has been a slow but sure change towards an alternative orientation… This orientation differs from representationalism by treating mind and body as mutually overlapping, hence the qualifying terms embodied, situated or enactive cognitive science. (p. 354)

Varela’s orientation addresses the challenging conundrum that Tony Soprano’s revelation evokes: ‘This does not require us to consider a different world but rather to consider this
present one otherwise… The point is to turn the direction of the movement of thinking from its habitual content-oriented direction backwards towards the arising of thoughts themselves’ (p.344). This sort of linking is proposed by Burbules to demonstrate an alternate aporia, wherein the experience is of challenge to choose, rather than doubt over choice (p. 181). Through these linkings emerges a recursive reflectivity of reading and thinking and writing and reading and so on, that not only radical shifts attention about what is being explored, but also opens up the manifold complexity of the exploratory experience.

How does this fit with my topic? All my life I have lived as an outsider, finding great difficulty in fitting in. From earliest years at school, through secondary school and at university, I have been labelled as ‘not a team player’, ‘too independent’, ‘off in his own world’. Just writing these words brings on aporia…the self-doubt about what I am thinking. How can such a person ever be acknowledged as having anything relevant to say to others? Here is my recollection of attending my first colloquium of New Zealand-based PhD candidates (Deakin University Winter School in Wellington 2002). When it came to my turn to talk about my work I looked around and believed that I saw only confusion and disdain at what I was saying. I looked back at myself through my peers’ and superiors’ eyes and was convinced that I saw a dilettante.

So what did I say back then? The following text is from a coursework seminar from about the same time on writing a summary that I based my talk on, hence the [reviewers comments are included in square brackets]. A practice that I find helpful for a currere reading by recursively interpreting meanings:
Experiencing *Currere*: Towards generative [What is generative? Is it terms of generative grammar?] learning for complex being [I had to ask – what is the ‘being’?]

It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences… One reason for this phenomenon is obvious: experience has fallen in value.


My research concerns experiencing and education. To paraphrase John Dewey, education is reorganisation and reconstruction of experience; [I think this needs to be made clearer. I’m not sure how this research is to be conducted and on whom.] to add to meaning of experience to expand capabilities of subsequent experiences. [This bit does not have the flow. Did you want to emphasize the ‘educational experience’?] I follow Doll’s (1993/2002) view that Dewey intended ‘reorganisation and reconstruction’ to be interpreted as organistic and generative. [Were these 2 words to mean that the being as an organism had levels and would also enable it to evolve? Maybe it’s because I have not read Dewey’s theory]. Instead, the phrase has been misinterpreted to support and promote mechanistic and exploitative organisational management of experience for economic productivity. Subsequently, education has been managed by and for an exclusive ideological aspect of human experience—Capitalism—a hegemonic system exploiting social order. [I feel there is sudden leap back into the actual topic] Underpinning Capitalism is a controlling predicate—Curriculum—a prescription for
teaching economic productivity. This curriculum is said to derive its contemporary form from Herbert Spencer’s question ‘What knowledge is of most worth?’ The common answer, ‘Whatever is most profitable’, reinforces the narrow objectives of a fortunate few, ‘curricularly’ [Coining of a new word, possibly needs to be changed] imposed on the subjectivity of an unfortunate many.

In a world seemingly obsessed with ‘economic’ knowledge, I am concerned with other curricula relationships between knowledge, education and experience, and I address the question ‘Can generative experiences of curricula—currere— influence more complex experiences of being?’ Or, when education is not predicated on closed, mechanistic, and exploitative experiences of economic hegemonies is learning more towards opening experiences of being human in a generative and complexly interconnected world? [I got lost. Were you introducing another direction you would like to take in your research?]

In exploring this question I use arts-based research (A-b R) inquiry (Barone & Eisner, 1997; Eisner & Powell, 2002), which contrasts a hermeneutical with an analytic approach to research, to both reveal and re-vision structures and concepts influencing particular worldviews. Notions of ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ sites on continuum of worldviews are now generally acknowledged, and I theorise that such different worldview sites significantly effect and affect [What is the emphasis? I found it difficult to understand even with the following examples.] education experiences. For example, a ‘modern’ worldview effects experiences towards closure, whereas ‘postmodern’ worldviews affect opening experiences. Using A-b R, I ‘read’ from these differing worldviews, their [Whose?] knowledge bases and the educational approaches they involve, various ways
that ‘values’ of experiences emerge. Following Benjamin’s observation that ‘experience has fallen in value’, I go on to theorise that education is held accountable for both the promotion of and the fall of ‘values’. That is, Capitalism’s Curriculum has required education to promote values that for most people have impoverished their experiences and thus devalued those experiences.

I present evidence for this paradox of education’s accountability for values that have devalued experiences. I then discuss why and how this situation is opening to changes, before detailing my study of representative theories embodying opening experiences, or currere, which point towards my theory of generative learning in complex being. This theory traces rhizomatous (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) paths of interconnections, including ‘generativity’ as inter-generational insights linking through ‘creativity’ to ‘complexity’ as dynamical non-linear and non-objective experiences. [Can this be broken down to two sentences? It was a lot to take in.]

The significances of this research are as multiple as the paths it traces. However, the intentions are to respond significantly to Doll’s (2002) call for ‘…others in the [curriculum] field to lend their voices and thoughts to the development of a new curriculum paradigm’, and to Gough’s (2002) ‘…hope that a curriculum scholar might one day produce a critique of the clockwork curriculum’.

...
culture may want to offer not so much pronouncements from its perspective as gifts from its substance, explorations of how its stuff and its tools can enter networks and hybrids larger than itself.
(Paulson, 2001, p. 104)

Revisiting this piece a few years later, I can see how its verbosity and denseness would have made it difficult to listen to, let alone understand. However, the issue I wanted to address is there: Experiencing education as a generative process for living in complexity. My own critique of what I wrote is that I have allowed the critic and the oracle to overwhelm my sensibilities. In my defence, I see this as my outsider’s response to my attempts to unravel unconventional ideas; that is, my trying to initiate a solo dialectic by criticising problems and extolling revelations, rather than working on explicating the muddle of the middle. But what this writing shows is my early path towards aporia. This is significant because the pedagogical benefit of an aporia moment (be)comes through knowing how one got there (Burbules, 2000, p. 184).

Then, how does all this go with what I think I am doing?

There are two ways of walking through a wood. The first is to try one of several routes (so as to get out of the wood as fast as possible, say, or to reach the house of grandmother) . . . the second is to walk so as to discover what the wood is like and find out why some paths are accessible and others are not. (Umberto Eco, 1997, quoted in Burbules, 2000, p. 181)
Perhaps the most disruptive experience I encountered for working was not being able to see the wood for the trees.

Sitting, standing, pacing, amongst a forest of documents is not conducive to accessing a sense of philosophical geography, or *geophilosophy* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 85-113). Geophilosophy concerns complex geographical movement and direction affecting territorialisation and de/reterritorialisation of philosophical concepts, so ‘philosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory from Braudel’s point of view’ (p. 95). Braudel’s point of view attempts to synthesize human history, within the milieu of other social sciences, through the lens of geography. Deleuze and Guattari thus see geography as not just substantiating a form of history with presence and place, but also involving thinking and thoughts: ‘It is not merely physical and human but mental, like the landscape’ (p. 96).

The significance of geophilosophy for my work was not obvious until I began to think more about my negotiating towards *c u r e* picture. At the time of drawing the picture, I had only read the *Introduction: Rhizome* ‘plateau’ in Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 3-25), and rhizomes where included based on a very rudimentary philosophical understanding. As I continued to read I appreciated the growing resonances and relevance of these ideas to my own ways of thinking. However, the idea of drawing any sort of parallels seemed precocious to say the least. And, of course, the more I read of the primary and secondary Deleuze and Guattari literature, and solo Deleuze writing, the more intimidated I became by the intensity-extensivity of its depth and scope.
Perhaps the most insurmountable hurdle I faced in this work was that of trying to find some context.

I have before me A. S. Neill’s (1915) *A Dominie’s Log*, which begins, “‘No reflections or opinions of a general character are to be entered in the log-book.’—Thus the Scotch Code. I have resolved to keep a private log of my own… I shall write down my thoughts on education. I think they will be mostly original; there has been no real authority on education, and I do not know of any book from which I can crib’ (p. 11). Here, Neill is referring to the official school ‘log-book’, which he calls the ‘regulation volume [for] all the futile never-to-be-seen piffle’ (p. 11), a mandatory requirement of the Scottish school curriculum, or Scotch Code. As to his private log, which is the real interest, I take his claims to his prospective originality and the paucity of extant authority to refer to the contemporary situation he found himself in. No doubt he was aware of some of the pedagogical literature of the distant and recent past, yet painfully conscious of nothing of relevance to the experiences of a teacher and learners, there and then: ‘Tonight after my bairns had gone away, I sat down on a desk and thought. What does it all mean? What am I trying to do?’ (p. 11).

I doubt that I would be wrong in suggesting that many, many teachers would identify with Neill’s sentiments, here and now. So what do I see as context? What I have just written exemplifies a problematic; all is changing and nothing changes. What context can there be in constant flux? We speak of ‘change management’, yet this is surely paradoxic. Any attempt to manage change presumes prescience of what that change is. How can this be? The answer is, of
course, by science, which reconstructs pre-science as pre-diction. Without taking this rhetorical exercise any further, what I am alluding to is my critical concern for on-going learning and teaching ways. It is crucial to see this concern as complex rather than complicated. By complicated I mean the manner in which education and academic endeavours are formulated and managed mainly as a lever to control teaching of learning for economic/political ends. Many see this as naturally and justly so. By complex I mean engaging with new and different ontological understandings emerging in and through interdisciplinary inquiry that challenges and generatively differentiates traditional/conventional ontologies. Complicated and complex are often misused as synonyms, or, as antonyms. Deleuze (1994) proposes, instead, their co-implication and perplication:

It is as though everything has two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar ‘halves’, the two halves of the Symbol, each dividing itself in two: an ideal half submerged in the virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the qualities actualising those relations and on the other by parts actualising those singularities. (p. 350)

That is to say, the always-already implication of each in other is implicit.

What this tells me is that context is always-already contingent: One cannot ‘find’ context because it is inherent in what is happening. When someone says they have been ‘taken out of context’, they are referring to differences in whatever was said, being different from what was

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84 Deleuze (1994) introduces perplication as an alternate for complication, to open out mistaken synonymous relations and/or the dichotomy of complicated and complex.
repeated by others. This exemplifies what Gluckman and Hanson (2006) call a *mismatch* in what we think we are saying and how others hear what they think we said, which Gluckman and Hanson believe is a consequence of genetic constraints from our past affecting our capabilities for coping with the present. However, they also emphasise that those constraints are not singular: ‘While we might conventionally think of constraints separately, they are really intertwined like the strands of a rope’ (p. 125). Even this analogy is a problematic mismatch for those who see rope as a linear object with two ends, thus suggesting what Deleuze (1994) would call an un-actualised singularity, rather than seeing (actualising) some assemblage intertwining strands for interconnecting. In just the same way curriculum is seen as the unactualised rope that ties teaching to learning, rather than seeing *currere’s* complex intertwining of learning and teaching interconnecting understandings.

Gluckman and Hanson’s book *mismatch*, subtitled ‘Why our world no longer fits our bodies’, focuses on noticeable problematics of evolutionary biology and ecology for present-day humans. They propose that there is an increasing mismatch between the evolutionary biological design of humans and the environment that humans have been (re)making to suit them. They argue that our viable on-going evolution depends on its capability to engage with environmental information that enables us to ‘fine-tune’ our adaptation and implementation of genetic codes to ensure that our life-processes are a suitable match for the environment we live in. More simply put, the recent, rapid and radical change in the ecological balance of human-environment interaction has seen the onset of a mismatch in that balance, with increasingly complex and harmful affects. In the past, when a species/environment mismatch became problematic, the species could change the environment by migrating to one that was more
suitable. Today, the human species is not only so pervasive that there is nowhere left on the planet Earth to migrate to, humans have also built themselves into their own economic-environmental constraints that make migration an option for only a tiny economic elite.

**Aporetic pedagogy**

Quoting A. S. Neill:

One day when re-reading “A Dominie’s Log,” its author decided that a book is out of date five minutes after it is written. In other words, he was in doubt—terrible and perplexing doubt.

Do I really understand children? He asked himself. Are my ideas upon education right or wrong? He decided that he had not sufficiently studied the psychology of children and that, in consequence, he had been guilty of almost criminal neglect. In the same delightfully discursive and humorous manner the Dominie reveals himself, as attractive in his doubts as in his convictions. He does not repent his unconventions. On the contrary, he reproaches himself for having been a heretic, whereas he ought to have been an arch-heretic. (Neill, 1921, p. 1)

Homer Lane is the apostle of Release. He holds that Authority is fatal for the child; suppression is bad; the only way is to allow the child the freedom to express itself in the way it wants to…I believe Lane is right. I also believe that the schools will come to see that he was right…somewhere about the year 2500. (Neill, 1921, p. 112)
After several unsuccessful attempts to **weld** my results together into...a whole, I realized that I should never succeed... My thoughts were soon **crippled** if I tried to **force** them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. – And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation, for this **compels** us to travel over a very wide field of thought **criss-cross** in every direction.

(Wittgenstein, 1958, quoted in Burbules, 2000, p. 171, bold added)

The above epigraph opens an intriguing and insightful essay by Nicholas Burbules (1997; 2000)\(^85\) that discusses the concept of *aporia*. In its most familiar understanding, *aporia* derives in Plato’s dialogue, the Meno, where it represents an induced state of disruptive doubt in learning. Burbules considers that this traditional interpretation of *aporia* is no longer helpful

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\(^{85}\) The two dates refer to publication of the article as an html document on the World Wide Web in 1997, and in print by the journal Curriculum Inquiry in 2000. I use the 2000 publication for page references.
for learners and teachers in today’s complex knowledge society. Instead, drawing on critical philosophy, Burbules proposes a different interpretation of *aporia*, which sees it as a more generative ‘integral dimension of learning (and teaching)’ (2000, p. 171). Using the World Wide Web as a both a theoretical foil and a model for his presentation, he simulates hypertextual connections to navigate the reader through linking *words* (printed in bold underlined text) in a series of passages that both explain and demonstrate the alternative interpretation.

In the Meno, Socrates is educating a boy through a lesson that requires the boy to guess an answer. Working through the argument step-by-step the boy’s guess is shown to be incorrect. The boy’s moment of confusion and vulnerability arising in realising his error is what Socrates calls *aporia*. It is said to be a moment in which mis-conception is exposed and the way clears for the lesson’s steps to be rehearsed and the correct proof to be learned. Burbules, who has written frequently on troubling aspects of learning and teaching, goes on to observe that Socrates used bodily metaphors to refer to *aporia*, including ‘paralysed,’ ‘stung by a stingray,’ or ‘numb’, and he wonders why such ‘corporeal analogues?’ Plato does not explain this. What does it assume about learning to say that a learner must be exposed, stripped of misconceptions, before true learning can occur?’ (p. 172). Quoting Derrida calling *aporia* this ‘old, worn-out Greek term…this tired word of philosophy and of logic’ (p. 172), Burbules begins to explore the possibility of an alternative understanding by visiting the etymology. ‘A-poros means lacking a poros: a path, a passage, a way’ (p. 173).
On his journey towards an alternative aporia, Burbules links us through a series of separate critical philosophical ideas contained in connected passages. For example: Wittgenstein’s deconstruction of rules, ‘[i]ndeed “rule” sometimes means “line.”’ (p. 174), which links to; Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome in ‘thinking about ways of connecting, and regard[ing] points as the nodes of intersection where lines or links come together’ (p. 175), which links to; the deep complexities of translation as a ‘re-cognition’ of understandings, which links to; Lyotard’s concept of ‘differend: “the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be.”’ (p. 179), which links to; ‘vicious’ circles and recursive ‘hermeneutic’ loops ‘like a Möbius strip’ (p. 180), and so forth. These passages contrast singularity and plurality in aporia. On one hand the closed ‘epistemic emptiness’ (p. 179) of a Meno aporia – no way! On another hand, an aporia of open confusion and loss of way in experiencing too many choices – which way? On yet another hand, an aporia where the path goes unrecognised – what way? On a further hand, an aporia where the path is recognised but ignored ‘(perhaps because the destination is unknown, perhaps because it is known and unpleasant)’ (p. 179) – not that way.

Returning to the World Wide Web experience, Burbules discusses how well this fits with the plurality view of aporia. He notes the common serendipitous experience of finding something other than what one was looking for. Without being open to getting lost, the possibility for finding anything is closed: ‘One is “lost” only relative to one purpose or need; sometimes being lost is an occasion for rethinking how “necessary” that imagined purpose or need actually is’ (p. 181). Through this moment of rethinking, ‘by being returned to the same point again and again; with each return, each repetition, comes a new recognition, a changing
understanding’ (p. 182), and with it deeper understanding of complexity and uncertainty – ‘a
deeper kind of aporia: a **doubt** that never goes entirely away’ (p. 182). This ‘deeper’
doubt/aporia contrasts with Meno’s more shallow doubt that is sited between two conditions of
certainty described as ‘strongly held misconceptions and…true knowledge…the empty pause,
the frozen, paralysed instant, between two kinds of complacency’, a way of ‘(“tethering” our
ideas to reality so that they stay fixed and cannot run away, [Plato] says)’ (p. 182). The
‘deeper’ sense of doubt/aporia works to break free from ‘tethering’ and turns attention away
from how to think and towards what to do. Although this aporia still results in ‘a cessation of
movement’, it arises from ‘too many choices’ (p. 183) that obscure passage-ways. However,
contained within this deeper aporia is ‘educational potential’ arising from opportunities to raise
generative questions, ‘to see within doubt the **questions** that make a new understanding
possible’ (p. 183).

Socrates’ questions, Burbules says, are inauthentic because they are purposive and designed to
ensure a certain line of development. He criticises this use of Socratic questioning as being a
style of teaching that is authoritarian and manipulative. It is ‘the “conversion” model: inducing
the learner to abandon a corrupt set of beliefs, to experience the crisis of aporia, and then, with
the force of revelatory discovery, to be moved into the light of truth’ (p. 183). In place of the
Socratic narrow line of questioning Burbules presents a range of questions:

- There are questions one knows how to answer.
- There are questions one does not know how to answer.
- There are questions one does not know how to ask.
- There are questions that cannot be answered. (p. 183)
Such questions mediate between what is known and what is not known ‘resid[ing] in the space between knowledge and ignorance’ (p. 184) and continue moving towards questions yet to come.

What are the pedagogical implications of this other deeper aporia? Burbules returns to his discussion of ‘translation’ as a deeply complex endeavor…a kind of relation in which the elements it comprises are transformed’ (p. 178). This notion of translation, which Burbules presents in contrast to the ‘conversion’ model of teaching, introduces a way for ‘making sufficient associations between the familiar and the foreign to allow the learner to make further associations, to find other paths, and eventually to become a translator, a pathmaker, on their own’ (p. 184). Here, Burbules emphasises Wittgenstein’s point that ‘the way in which one arrives at a point of aporia itself influences whether and how one can pass through it’ (p. 184). Burbules elaborates by quoting Wittgenstein, ‘Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about’ (Wittgenstein, 1958 quoted in Burbules, 2000, p. 180), and continues, ‘This is a matter of recognizing where you are (and who you are) and how you got there’ (p. 184).

These questions are the nexus around which aporias turn, successfully or otherwise; particularly ‘the right sorts of questions. Learning how to ask a good question is in one sense the central educational task, yet one that is almost never taught explicitly, and rarely taught at all’ (p. 184). In this way it is apparent that a successful, generative aporia involves complicit learning and teaching endeavours – ‘the roles of teacher and learner blur: aporia becomes a

These terms – right, good – are up for grabs, or is the jury out? I agree with [Burbles] sentiments but think his terminology is in question. Perhaps the statement is illustrative of the ‘on-going condition’ that generates (more) questions and therefore (more) problem(atics) that move us to seek understandings through/towards different ways of thinking. (Marg Sellers, personal communication, January, 2008).
potentially shared state… Aporia, in this sense, is not a brief interstitial moment, but an ongoing condition that generates the questions and problems that move us to seek new understandings’ (p. 184).

Poros refers only to a sea-route or a route down a river, to a passage opened up across a chaotic expanse which it transforms into an ordered, qualified space by introducing differentiated routes, making visible the various directions of space, by giving directions to an expanse which was initially devoid of all contours, of all landmarks.

To say that a poros is a way to be found across an expanse of liquid is to stress that a poros is never traced in advance, that it can always be obliterated, that it must always be traced [mapped] anew, in unprecedented fashion. One speaks of a poros when it is a matter of blazing a trail where no trail exists, of crossing and impassable expanse of territory, an unknown, hostile and boundless world, an aperion [the boundless, the infinite, the indeterminate] which it is impossible to cross from end to end; the watery depths, the pontos is the ultimate aperion (paron because aperion); the sea is the endless realm of pure movement, the most mobile, changeable and polymorphous of all spaces a space where any way that has been traced is immediately obliterated, which transforms any journey into a voyage of exploration which is always unprecedented, dangerous and uncertain. (Kofman, 1988, p.10)

The next folio puts aporia away and opens towards such a journey of exploration.
So how are your Thousand Plateaus arranged?... It’s like a set of split rings. You can fit any one of them into any other. Each ring, or each plateau, ought to have its own climate, its own tone or timbre. (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 25)

Intellectual life should not be construed as two cultures of science and humanities at war, or even at variance. Human culture arose from the material substance of a complex brain; and science and art meld in continuity. (Gould & Purcell, 2000, p. 82)

In most cases, educational theory and practice has borrowed from the sciences of psychology, sociology and, to a lesser extent, anthropology. What is totally lacking in modern educational theory is a comprehensive and integrated perspective that has in the past been identified as cosmology. Thus, contemporary educational theory and practice carry with it the same blinders that have plagued modern scientific specialization coming out of the post-Newtonian period...

Nothing is completely itself without everything else.

(O’Sullivan, 1999, pp. 3 & 215)
cura

*cura* is my invention: imaginary, no-thing, smooth becoming, more than idea and less than concept, fractal-like in exceeding conventions. Now a few opening words about style. The letter *c* is uncapitalised because capitalism is eschewed. Italics reflect the Latin meaning – care – and spaced letters are used to challenge ordinary reading. Other-than-ordinary reading sees poststructural assemblage of rhizomatic letters with porous interstices opening to lines of flight and reminds of a call for *performing*-thinking in different and diverse ways. By different, I mean thinking ludically and deconstructively, or play-fully-working-out meanings. By diverse I mean exploring genealogy, heritage and potential, and how that affects what meaning becomes when considered nomadically, rather than empirically.

Imaginary is usually taken to mean existing only in the mind. It is also a mathematical term symbolised by an italicised letter ‘*i*’ for an imaginary concept required to produce and work with complex numbers, which I have discussed elsewhere in regard to notions of simplicity and complexity (see Sellers, 2004, p. 118). However, its use as an abstract noun in philosophy is found in Sartre's (1940) use of *l’imaginaire*, which concerns the ability of consciousness to imagine objects both as they are and as they are not. In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory ‘Imaginary’ is one of three registers86 of being which ‘is found wherever we are deceived into believing that the word has become identical with what it represents’ (Clark, 2004, ¶ 2).

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86 The other two being ‘real’ and ‘symbolic’.
Imaginary in a poststructural sense articulates understanding involving complex subject-object relations that are conceptually various, intangible, and temporally and spatially, multiple. Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is such an example of imaginary. It is imaginary, rather than a metaphor, because it is not possible to seize rhizome as an entity, and any attempt to represent it as such fails as soon as it is tried. Deleuze and Guattari quote Kafka to help explain rhizome as imaginary in thinking about ‘those things which occur to me, occur to me not from the root up but rather only from somewhere about their middle. Let someone attempt to seize them…attempt to seize a blade of grass and hold fast to it when it begins to grow only from the middle’ (Kafka, 1965, quoted in Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 23). They go on to say: ‘It's not easy to perceive things from the middle, neither from top to bottom or the reverse, nor from left to right or the reverse: try and you will see that everything changes’ (p. 23). In other words, imaginary as rhizome helps to reveal notions for understanding that are not otherwise conceivable. However, imaginary remains an abstract noun in that it is not something to be used to represent something else. It is rather like a homeopathic remedy, which through its impossibly minute degree of likeness to affects of an ailment, is believed to be incredibly potent. In other words, rather than holding that an event must comprise a definite effect it is to suggest that it may have a curious affect.

Curious also comes to English from the Latin *cura*, through *curiosus* meaning careful. Just as careful is taken more often than not as a caution, so too is curious. A more generative reading recognises a sense of care-full-ness in curious, or being full of care for living and learning, rather than regarding it as a warning. Thus I also prefer to consider care generatively to mean generosity of attention and concern for living and learning.
Thus imaginary helps me to move a little more towards what cura might come to mean, as I continue.

Curriculum towards cura

cura explores ways for turning educational thinking about curriculum away from its focus on teaching learning and towards learning about learning: curriculum is about what to teach and how to teach it; cura is living-learning.

Curriculum is an instrument for defining and managing educational procedures that are imposed upon learners through instruction for assessment. The expected consequences of exposure to curriculum, instruction and assessment are learning outcomes. Learning outcomes are the products that an education system designs and manages; they are the ends of means. Curriculum learning, as part of a procedure, also involves a temporal construct lifelong learning, and a spatial construct learning objects. These constructs work to situate learning as a consumable commodity, products that can be ‘valued’ as a cost against earnings. Without a curriculum, an education system would have no economic basis: nothing to cost, nothing to account for, nothing to profit from.

cura refers to continuous–various–diverse–learning experiences that are always-already occurring. Its state is dynamic, not systematic; therefore there are no designs to manage or means to (an) end. Its operation is processual so it has no method to follow, no constructs to conform to and no products to commodify. cura obviates any necessity for an economic
purview of education. A move towards c u r a would be a move towards an utterly different way of thinking of education.

However, critics would argue that such an idea is nonsensical. What would be the point of education without curriculum? Without a curriculum to specify what to teach, and how to teach it, there would be nothing to teach, therefore nothing to learn, nothing to assess, nothing to grade and nothing to certify. Without the prospect of educational qualifications, there would be nothing to aspire to or compete for. Neither would there be any method by which to evaluate what education was doing, costing or achieving, in order to formulate policy and guidelines for its governance.

I agree, such an idea is nonsensical – within an economic purview of education. But such a purview is only one way of regarding education. Moreover it is a way that has been developed in the course of just over a century and it is way that has accompanied (some say has been instrumental in inducing)\(^{87}\) an increasingly problematic existence for most human beings. Proponents of the so-called knowledge society/economy, point to the enormous growth in financial wealth and technological benefits that ensue from entrepreneurial investments and innovation and counter such an assertion (Drucker, 1993; Foray & Lundvall, 1996; Neef, Siesfeld, & Cefola, 1998; Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development, 1996). I respond to this by observing that the growth in such wealth is vested in a fractional minority of the population and the benefits of technology are promoted in ways that ignore or mask deficits

\(^{87}\) For example: (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Hargreaves, 2003; O’Sullivan, 1999; Smith, 2006)
(for example: hearing loss from use of in-ear music players; pollution from disposal of rapidly superceded hardware; lack of genuinely accessible support for computers in homes). Such ‘debate’ is an incommensurable dua/ellist argument that is irresolvable. Furthermore the basis for the ground on which economically-oriented education operates is elitist; those without ‘it’ are not ‘with it’. This is also the ground of evidence-based best practice, which draws on empirical studies of what is considered to be the ‘best’ of what practice is, in order to prove that this contributes to what must continue and identifies what must be corrected. Any attempt to critique this argument is, of course, only allowable if it conforms to the same ground-rules. Thus we reach a stalemate, because economic knowledge is the king. But, then, this is a game where the incumbent player not only unable to recognise checkmate, they would also be unlikely to understand that what presents as chess may also be Go.

**Go is to learning as chess is to education.**

Go is a game in motion – chess is a game of moves: ‘a game of State…Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 352). Go pieces are uncoded; they have nothing intrinsic that identifies their role or intent, ‘and have only an anonymous, collective, or third person function: “It” makes a move. “It” could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant’ (pp. 352-353). Chess pieces function in structured rule-bound relationships to one another and to their adversary pieces. Go pieces enjoy dynamic, generative relations with others and the environment: ‘a Go piece has only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebula or constellations, according to which it fulfils functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, shattering’ (p. 353). Furthermore these functions are generative
not destructive: like the sperm’s insertion into the ovum; land bordering the ocean; bees encircling a source of nectar; the hatchling’s shattering of its shell. That is, Go seeks to generate on-going interactions in the playing environment that further growth, unlike chess strategies that work only to eliminate opponents.

Therefore the space(s) in (on) which the game is played are also understood very differently. Go pieces move about and hold in open space, chess pieces occupy and take closed spaces. For chess ‘it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces’ (p. 353) whereas for Go, ‘it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival’ (p. 353). In this way the structural intensity of chess can be compared with the poststructural diversity of Go.

Education is a high-stakes game that structurally codes and decodes players and the ground they occupy, or colonise. Learning is a no-stakes game in which uncoded players negotiate and territorialise by moving into spaces, and deterritorialise by moving on.

The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing it (make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory; deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by
going elsewhere…). Another justice, another movement, another space-time. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 352-3)

Thus education colonises, whereas learning negotiates.

**Approaching the messiness of my**

For me Deleuze and Guattari’s *What is philosophy* ‘feels’ good: respected, relevant, resonant, generative.

It’s a way of organising…away from ‘arborized paradigms’ towards ‘rhizomatic figures’ on readings of their text (as paper). The book’s cover illustration, below, seemingly drawn in coloured chalk on a blackboard, shows me students in a lecture.

![Book Cover and detail of Michaux, 1938, L'Arene, Musée National d'Art Moderne, Paris.](image1)

My earliest currere picture.
I also remember my earliest *currere* picture.

A growing course, earth below, sky above, always running in the midst of living, bracketed (inside) itself, pointing beyond finishing...

for too long I have been fighting writing: not seeing what I’m doing; nothing makes sense.

Is there any *writing* at all?

There are many st-utterings, but none seem coherent; it’s like losing a dream on waking, or being interrupted in the middle…

Is there a story? If there is, it concerns curriculum and chaos, because curriculum stands for all that represents order and effect, and chaos connotes the antithesis of everything curriculum stands for, or that is how it seems.

**Curriculum** – a course, with many guises. A course of studies, the contents of the course, the plan for experiencing the course, the experiences of learning within the course, the outcomes determined for the course, the implementation plan of the course.

**Chaos** – utter disorder and confusion, reigning in many realms: matters exceeding any common sense, pre-existent forms of matter, extremely indeterminable behaviours, macro effects of micro affects.
Curriculum is in chaos: that is to mean both are in each other, Curriculum is in chaos and Chaos is in curriculum. It is not the one or the other it is always-already both one another. My concern is not to add to confusion; rather it is to understand confusion as chaos-reconceived, through complexity.

To be useful my story should explain curriculum and chaos coexisting, however, an explanation of coexistence is problematic because it calls for dynamic ways to discourse. The usual approach is to begin with a subject and identify its object. But, how to do this when both are each other? It is not that curriculum is in chaos, nor is it that curriculum is in chaos: it is that in curriculum is chaos.

This has been a continuing block to rendering my writing. How to begin when there is no distinguishable subject, object, time or place to begin with

...Deleuze...delusion...

Although Deleuze and Guattari resisted the ‘postmodern’ label, much of their writing concerns the condition Lyotard characterised as such. Foucault (1977) remarked that the twentieth century will perhaps be known as ‘Deleuzian’ (p. 165). To which Deleuze (1995a) responded in a Letter to a harsh critic:

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88 While Deleuze has little to say about postmodernism, Guattari felt very strongly that it was ‘nothing but the last gasp of modernism; nothing, that is, but a reaction to and, in a certain way, a mirror of the formalist abuses and reductions of modernism from which, in the end, it is no different’ (Guattari, 1996, The Postmodern Impasse. In G. Genosko, ed., The Guattari Reader Oxford: Blackwell). Guattari also observed that ‘[r]ather than indulging in the disillusioned indulgences of postmodernism, we might instead try to find a way out of the dilemma of having to choose between unyielding refusal or cynical acceptance of this situation’ (Felix Guattari, ‘Regimes, Pathways, Subjects’ in Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (eds.) Incorporations Zone, New York, 1992, p. 16).
I like and admire Foucault. I wrote an article about him. And he wrote one about me, from which you quote the remark… Your version of this is that we’re trading complements. It doesn’t seem to cross your mind that I might really admire Foucault, or that his little remark’s a joke meant to make people who like us laugh, and make everyone else livid. (p. 4)

With that generative response in mind, I want to suggest that the twenty-first century is likely to be more deserving of being recognised as Deleuzian.

On a recent a radio broadcast I heard, in succession, an interview with linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky (Laidlaw, 2007a) and a group discussion with a panel of information technology pundits (Laidlaw, 2007b). What struck me most about what I heard was the overwhelming evidence of the effects of capitalism and schizophrenia. From Chomsky I heard: that much of the present political chaos in the middle east could be overcome by a functioning democracy in the United States of America; that the majority of the population of the USA and its Middle Eastern enemies were actually in accord on how to resolve their civil differences; and, that the hawkish political regimes were maintaining divisive tactics to serve their sponsors commercial interests. From the technology panel discussion I heard and observed: that much of the technological chaos pervading the telecommunications and broadcasting environments is a consequence of ill-matched policy and vested commercial interests; that those who criticise and resist the policy/commercial interest dilemma are branded techno-tards; and that representatives of the factions are not only utterly at odds with each other, but also talk past each other on crucial issues. Such are typical delusions that are symptomatic of the effects of
capitalism and schizophrenia, which Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987) elaborate in their two-volume work with that title.

The etymology of the word delude shows that it descends from the Latin ludere – to play, through deludere – to mock, or, to distort the meaning of playing. Delusion is also a principal characteristic of schizophrenia, a mental state in which perceptions become distorted and chaotic. And capitalism is an economic system that promotes private enterprise for personal profit; it is often contrasted with communism, which promotes public enterprise for communal benefit.

Jeffery Bell’s (2006) reading of Deleuze’s work as Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos appeals to Heidegger’s thinking of difference in beings (things human) and Being (beyond things or ‘nothing’), which is helpful in understanding the interactions of capitalism and schizophrenia through technology. Although Deleuze was at odds with Heidegger’s stance on difference, Bell argues that a closer look at Heidegger’s text is revealing: ‘The more we get caught up in beings, in the everyday superficies of life, the less we attend to what is essential, to Being (the nothing)...[thus] the dominance of capitalism and technological expansion and control in Western cultures represents for Heidegger a frenzied attempt to make up for the lack of what is essential by excessively controlling and arranging the everyday world of beings’ (p. 136). In other words, the individual being’s self-ish pursuits distract from Being human, and this condition is compounded by a vicious cycle of capital-technology investment-divestment designed to avoid Being becoming a distraction. Bell quotes Heidegger:
The consumption of all materials, including the raw material ‘man,’ for the unconditioned possibility of the production of everything is determined in a concealed way by the complete emptiness in which beings, the materials of what is real, are suspended. This emptiness has to be filled up. But since the emptiness of Being can never be filled up by the fullness of beings, especially when this emptiness can never be experienced as such, the only way to escape it is incessantly to arrange beings in the constant possibility of being ordered as the form of guaranteeing aimless activity… (Heidegger, 1973, quoted in Bell, 2006, p. 136)

This points to the schizoid delusion beings have of technology, or as Bell puts it, ‘technology drives the earth beyond the developed sphere of its possibility into such things which are no longer a possibility and are thus the impossible’ (p. 137), and he returns to quoting Heidegger: It is one thing just to use the earth, another to receive the blessing of the earth and to become at home in the law of this reception in order to shepherd the mystery of Being and watch over the inviolability of the possible’ (Heidegger, 1973, quoted in Bell, 2006, p. 137).

However, Bell also contrasts Heidegger’s criticism of Capitalism’s transgressive control over the ‘mystery of Being’ and ‘inviolability of the possible’ with Deleuze’s criticism of ‘the capitalist appropriation of difference for the sake of producing the same – that is, the same consumers coming back again and again’ (p. 139). With this contrast another, paradoxical, sense of difference comes into Being, a way of thinking so differently about difference that it calls for other ontologic-epistemologic understandings.
In their two co-written volumes, Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987) comprehensively critique and explicate the *capitalism and schizophrenia* of the subtitle that applies to both books. *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume, is an anthro-philosophical investigation, ‘a genealogical account of how the psyche comes to form part of the body politic’ (Due, 2007, p. 4). The second volume, *A thousand plateaus*, is a geophilosophical exploration that ‘refines and complicates this method’ (p. 4). Here is method that turns Petrus Ramus’ method – which introduced curriculum to education – on its ear. Deleuzoguattarian method approximates, for me, what I have playfully called *Copernicanity* that reconceptualised an aspect of Being from geocentricity to heliocentricity. Separately and together, like both cooking an omelette without either breaking eggs, Deleuze explains how they see themselves:

Félix [Guattari] sees writing as a schizoid flow drawing in all sorts of things. I’m [Deleuze] interested in the way a page of writing flies off in all directions and at the same time closes right up on itself like an egg… And what we were both looking for was a discourse that was at once political and psychiatric, without reducing either dimension to the other.

(Deleuze, 1995, p. 15)

And their translator tells the reader that:

For Deleuze and Guattari, “meaning is use,” and *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* may be seen as a crash course in Deleuzoguattarian (“another language within the French language”) that “begins in the middle” rather than with an elementary grammar and lexicon. (Joughin, 1995, p. 184)
How is this at all significant? In the edgy chaos of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical explorations I see ways for engaging with a problematic curriculum discourse that, for example, valorises capitalism and pathologises schizophrenia. In Deleuzoguattarian approaches dynamic ways emerge to deconstruct modernist clichés and critique totalising concepts. Thinking in these approaches embraces conceptual chaos, geophilosophical complexity and genealogical generativity that I refer to above. I see this work resonating with my attempts to articulate cura through picturing currere.

Capitalism and schizophrenia, currere and cura, simplicity and complexity
In responding to an invitation to review Floyd Merrell’s (1998) Simplicity and complexity: Pondering literature, science and painting I found in this book an ‘exploration of simplicity and complexity through interdisciplinary contemplation. I discovered in Merrell’s text and images a notion of co-implicity (co-implicity of each in the other) within simplicity’s complexity and complexity’s simplicity that is generative for perceiving and thinking differently about things and matters simple and complex’ (Sellers, 2004, p. 117). Accordingly I produced a series of generative picturings about this work to explore my thinking. In drawing my thoughts together I wrote: ‘The significance of these matters for education’s theory, practice, and research concern what I earlier called “seeing–feeling–thinking differently.” That is, through seeing with feeling in thinking differently, Merrell’s ponderings upon literature, science, and painting generate other possibilities to meanings for simplicity and complexity’ (p. 122). I also see this thinking rhizomatically interconnecting the delusions of Capitalism and schizophrenia with the challenge of What is philosophy? The pictures show my ‘lines of flight’ in thinking through these ideas.
In pondering the two pictures above, it is important to understand that I am interconnecting Merrell’s text and diagrams with my thinking by both literally and metaphorically drawing on them. In the above left picture my pencil line draws on Merrell’s printed line, in the above right picture my pencil draws and writes about further interconnections in thinking, philosophically.
What is philosophy?

*What* is philosophy? what is philosophy? what is *philosophy*? Who else but Deleuze and Guattari would think of such a question let alone write a book with that as its title?

The thought that came to mind for me, as I contemplated this simply complex question, was *hyperdoxy* as in thinking more than *and* further than *and* over *and* above *and* beyond *paradoxy*. I used this thought in the review article referred to above, in which I discussed *hyperdoxy* as a ‘neologism for acknowledging paradoxity beyond simple contrariety. To my mind, hyperdoxy generatively expresses simplicity–complexity’s manifold productive conundrums, whereas paradox denotes a troubled aspect looking to divest a problematic part’ (Sellers, 2004, p. 118). I now say that hyperdoxy expresses the curious interrelatedness of simplicity’s complexity and complexity’s simplicity for thinking outside a square and is a much simpler way of putting words to the complexity of the concepts I attempt to picture.

The following pages show my efforts to bring hyperdoxy to reading Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition on the question ‘what is philosophy?’ As these are my picturings of Deleuze and Guattari’s words, the pages should be read as if viewing a performance in anticipation of being generatively stimulated towards diverse meanings, in contrast to reading in expectation of obtaining somewhat certain meanings from a text. So I ask you, the reader, to let your thinking go where your eyes wander and seek your own resonances in what you see and read.

First, I will briefly explain what I am showing and doing here. The following twenty-three pages display work I made when reading Deleuze and Guattari’s *What is Philosophy*. The first
page shows my opening thoughts in the typed text and beneath it is a diagram in which I attempted to bring as many ideas as I could into arrangement. I then drew over this the seeing–feeling–thinking responses the work continued to generate for me.

The subsequent pages are selections from the seventeen pages of working document, comprising portions of Deleuze and Guattari’s text that I selected as I read, and later retyped. I printed these selections and then drew in blue pencil on the text. My drawings become currere-like by letting the pictures be regressive, reflective, inflective, rhizomatic lines of flight about the pages. When I reviewed the work I found I needed to grow further rhizomes to discover more about the imagery that Deleuze and Guattari referenced, thereby sprouting pictures and words from Henri Michaux and Simon Hantai.

As a kindly reminder to think differently about the following pages, I draw on Brian Massumi’s (1987) translator’s foreword to A thousand plateaus:

The best way to approach the book is to read it as a challenge: to pry open the vacant spaces that would enable you to build your life and those of the people around you into a plateau of intensity that would leave afterimages of its dynamism that could be reinjected into still other lives, creating a fabric of heightened states between which any number, the greatest number, of connecting routes would exist. Some might call that promiscuous. Deleuze and Guattari call it revolution. (p. xv)
What is philosophy? For:

"I know what I believe, but I don’t believe what I know." (ace)

I believe I know, but I question what I believe...

Ontology and epistemology

The study of the existence of believing and the science of knowledge

What be(ing)comes? Then, how?

Mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, abstract concepts are largely metaphorical (Lucoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 3).

Perhaps, colour is a concept of embodiment?

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concept - function - sensation -
art - philosophy - science -

plane of composition

percepts & affects

varieties

plane of reference

variables

What is philosophy? I declare in Cura

rivalry

Art (cura)

Philosophy (cura

Science (curriculum)

love

function

prospects

sensation

secure

wisdom

concept
What defines thought in its three great forms—art, science, and philosophy—is always confronting chaos, laying out a plane, throwing a plane over chaos. But philosophy wants to save the infinite by giving it consistency; it lays out a plane of immanence that, through the action of conceptual personae, takes events or consistent concepts to infinity. Science on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference; it lays out a plane of simply undefined coordinates that each time, through the action of partial observers, defines states of affairs, functions, or referential propositions. Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite; it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations (p. 197).

The text above stimulated me to work on the diagram and picturing that follows.
This page, and the next two, are very resonant with my personal *currere* and the picturing suggests how that affects me.

"Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts...That's what it was, but I don't know if I really said it, or if I was convincing enough." (p. 2).

Philosophy, as in a love of wisdom, characterizes inquiring conversations between friends. But: "The idea of a Western democratic conversation between friends has never produced a single concept." (p. 6).

"Friend, lover, claimant, rival are transcendental determinations that do not for that reason lose their intense and animated existence, in one persona or in several (p. 4). Therefore - philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products... philosophy... involves creating concepts' (p. 5). "...Hitherto one has generally trusted one’s concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland," (Nietzsche, p. 5). We can at last see what philosophy is not: it is not contemplation, reflection, or communication." (p. 6).

"The first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be explained" (p. 7). "First, concepts are and remain signed: Aristotle's substance, Descartes's cogito, Leibniz's monad, Kant's condition, Schelling's power, Bergson's duration [dura]. But also, some concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary everyday word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms; it is through with almost crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a specifically philosophical athleticism" (pp. 7-8).

"The exclusive right of concept creation secures a function for philosophy, but it does not give it any pre-eminence or privilege since there are other ways of thinking and creating, other modes of ideation that, like scientific thought, do not have to pass through concepts. We always come back to the question of the use of this activity of creating concepts, in its difference from "scientific or artistic activity" (p. 8)."
Closer to our own time, philosophy has encountered many new rivals. To start with, the human sciences, and especially sociology, wanted to replace it....Then it was the turn of epistemology, of linguistics, or even of psychoanalysis and logical analysis....Finally, the most shameful moment came when computer science, marketing, design and advertising, all disciplines of communication, seized hold of the word concept itself and said: "this is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! We are the friends of the concept, we put it in our computers." Information and creativity, concept and enterprise: there is already an abundant bibliography. Marketing has preserved the idea of a certain relationship between the concept and the event. But here the concept has become the set of product displays (historical, scientific, artistic, sexual, pragmatic), and the event has become the exhibition that sets up various displays and the "exchange of ideas" it is supposed to promote. The only events are exhibitions and the only concepts are products that can be sold. Philosophy has not remained unaffected by the general movement that replaced Critique with sales promotion. The simulacrum, the simulation of a packet of noodles, has become the true concept; and the one who packages the product, commodity, or work of art has become the philosopher, conceptual persona, or artist. How could philosophy, an old person compete against young executives in a race for the universals of communication for determining the marketable form of the concept of Merz?...coined by the artist Kurt Schwitters to refer to
the aesthetic combination of any kind of material, and the equal value of these different materials, in his collages and assemblages. The term itself came from a fragment of a word in one of his assemblages, the whole phrase being "Kommterz und Privatbank."... But the concept is not a given; it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself—it is a self-positing. Creation and self-positing mutually imply each other because what is truly created, from the living being to the work of art, thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself, or and autopoietic characteristic by which it is recognized. The concept posits itself to the same extent that it is created. What depends on free creative activity is also that which, independently and necessarily, posits itself in itself: the most subjective will be the most objective. The post-Kantians... are the philosophers who paid most attention to the concept as philosophical reality in this sense.... The post-Kantians concentrated on a universal encyclopedia of the concept that attributed concept creation to a pure subjectivity rather than taking on the more modest task of a pedagogy of the concept, which would have to analyze the conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments. If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third—an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoints of universal capitalism' (pp. 10-12).
What is a concept?

There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. It therefore has a combination [chiffre] [a singularity representing several e.g. "the combination of a safe, or an opus number"]. It is a multiplicity, although not every multiplicity is conceptual. There is no concept with only one component... Every concept is at least double or triple, etc. Neither is there a concept possessing every component, since this would be chaos pure and simple... Every concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components, which is why, from Plato to Bergson, we find the idea of the concept being a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting. The concept is a whole because it totalises its components, but it is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it. (pp. 15-16).

The drawing on this page is my attempt at working with the original diagram shown in the inset image (Reproduced from Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 25).
The plane of immanence

Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All, an "Omnitudo" that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane. It is a table, a plateau, or a slice; it is a plane of consistency or, more accurately, the plane of immanence of concepts, the phenomenon... The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts... Concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them... Concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame, a spinal column rather than a skull, whereas the plane is the breath that suffuses the separate parts... The plane is like a desert that concepts populate without dividing up. The only regions of the plane are concepts themselves, but the plane is all that holds them together. The plane has no other regions than the tribes that populate and moving around on it. It is the plane that secures conceptual linkages with ever increasing connections, and it is concepts that secure the populating of the plane on an always renewed and variable curve.

The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearings in thought. It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts (pp. 35-37).
The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve. In fact, chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish. This is not a movement from one determination to the other but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection between them, since one does not appear without the other already disappeared, and one appears as disappearance when the other disappears as outline. Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence) ...[this] is very different from the problem of science which seeks to provide chaos with reference point, on condition of renouncing infinite movements and speeds (p. 42).

Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance....Science approaches chaos in a completely different, almost opposite way: it relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualise the virtual. By retaining the infinite, philosophy gives consistency to the virtual through concepts; by relinquishing the infinite science gives a reference to the virtual, which actualises it through functions. Philosophy proceeds with a plane of immanence or consistency; science with a plane of reference. In the case of science it is like a freeze-frame. It is a fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualised. A function is a Slow-motion (p.118).
The text on the preceding page also generated the picturing below. The picture on the left sees the plane of immanence like a hyperbolic paraboloid – ‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events’ (p. 36) – a plane that includes more than its conceptual boundaries contain. This suggested the picture on the right – ‘like a sieve stretched over the chaos’ (p 43). The reference to ‘Erisophosy’ comes from a footnote about Eris ‘the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia’ (p. 43). My note ‘(see also p38-39)’ refers to the following text: ‘It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept…in the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity (variable curvature of the plane)’ (pp. 38-39).

Hyperbolic paraboloid.

Sieve for chaos.
The picture below is from a rhizomatic excursion to look for the imagery that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) refer to without specifying any particular work. I find this painting very suitable for thinking about the following words: ‘To think is always to follow the witch’s flight...Michaux’s plane of immanence, for example, with its infinite wild movements, and speeds’ (p. 41).

Percept, affect, and concept

Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.

Harmonies are affects. Consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone and color, are affects of music or painting. The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest difficulty is to make it stand up on its own.... Standing up alone does not mean having a top and a bottom or being upright (for even houses are drunk and askew; it is only the act by which the compound of created sensation is preserved in itself—a monument, but one that may be contained in a few marks or a few lines, like a poem by Emily Dickinson. Of the sketch of an old, worn out ass, “How marvellous! It’s done with two strokes, but set on immutable bases,” where the sensation bears witness all the more to years of “persistent, tenacious, disdainful work.” (pp. 164-165).

We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, and write sensations. As percepts, sensations are not perceptions referring to an object (reference); if they resemble something it is with the resemblance produced with their own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely with, colors, lines, shadow and, light.... Sensation is not realized in the material without the material passing completely into the sensation, into the percept or affect. All the material becomes expressive. It is the affect that is metallic, crystalline, stony, and so on; and the sensation is not colored but, as Cézanne said, coloring. ... And, however strong and artist’s interest in science, a compound of sensations will never be mistaken for the “mixtures” of material that science determines in states of affairs, as is clearly shown by the “optical mixture” of the impressionists.

By means of the material, the aim is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and states of perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. A method is needed, and this varies with every artist and forms part of the work: (pp. 166-167).
This is Cézanne’s enigma, which has often been commented upon: “Man absent from but entirely within the landscape.”... Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts—including the town—are nonhuman landscapes of nature.... We are not in the world, we become with the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We become universes. Becoming animal, plant, molecular, becoming zero (p. 169).

The artist is always adding new varieties to the world. Beings of sensation are varieties, just as the concept’s beings are variations, and the function’s beings are variables (p. 175).

Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that take the place of language.... A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that
embody the event: the constant renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle (p. 176-177).

The clinch of forces as percepts and becomings as affects are completely complimentary.... Animal, plant, and molecular becomings correspond to cosmic or cosmogenetic forces: to the point that the body disappears into the plain color or becomes part of the wall or, conversely, the plain color buckles and whirls around in the body's zone of indiscernibility. In short, the being of sensation is not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man's nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, makes them whirl around like winds....In Kandinsky, houses are sources of abstraction that consist less in geometrical figures than in dynamic trajectories and errant lines, "paths that go for a walk" in the surroundings (pp. 182-183).

Art begins not with flesh but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts....That is why it can be defined by the "frame," by an interlocking of differently oriented frames, which will be imposed on other arts, from painting to the cinema....Interlocking these frames or joining up all these planes—wall section, window section, floor section, slope section—is a composite system rich in points and counterpoints. The frames and their joins hold the compounds of sensations, hold up figures, and intermingle with their upholding with their own appearance. These are the faces of a dice of sensation. Frames or sections are not coordinates; they belong to compounds of sensations whose faces, whose interface, they constitute. But however extendable this system may be, it still needs a vast plane of composition that carries out a kind of deframing following lines of flight that pass through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe, that go from house-territory to town-cosmos, and that now dissolve the identity of the palce through variations of the earth, a town having not so much a place as vectors folding the abstract line of relief....The planes must
now be taken apart in order to relate them to their intervals rather than to one another and in order to create new affects. We have seen that painting pursued the same movement. The frame or the picture’s edge is, in the first place, the external envelope of a series of frames or sections that join up by carrying out counterpoints of lines and colors, by determining compounds of sensations. But the pictures is also traversed by a deframing power that opens it onto a plane of composition or an infinite field of forces...The painter’s action never stays within the frame; it leaves the frame and does not begin with it (pp. 186-188).

With Hantai, foldings hide from the painter’s sight what once unfolded, they give up to the spectator’s eye....painting is thought: vision through thought, and the eye thinks, even more than it listens (p. 195).

What defines thought in its three great forms—art, science, and philosophy—is always confronting chaos, laying out a plane, throwing a plane over chaos. But philosophy wants to save the infinite by giving it consistency: it lays out a plane of immanence that, through the action of conceptual personae, takes events or consistent concepts to infinity. Science on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference: it lays out a plane of simply undefined coordinates that each time, through the action of partial observers, defines states of affairs, functions, or referential propositions. Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations (p. 197).
The references to Simon Hantai on the preceding page sent me in search of what these foldings unfolded might be like:

With Hantai, foldings hide from the painter’s sight what once unfolded, they give up to the spectator’s eye... painting is thought: vision through thought, and the eye thinks, even more than it listens.


...dell’Orto Mariale. Simon Hantai, 1962. (Musée d’Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris).

even though I have omitted several pages about here, the words and picturing still

are linked together according to a minimum of constant rules....This is all that we ask for in order to make an opinion for ourselves, like a sort of “umbrella,” which protects us from chaos (p. 201-202).

...people are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through the rent—Wordsworth’s spring, or Cézanne’s apple, the silhouettes of Macbeth or Ahab. Then come the crowd of imitators who repair the umbrella with something vaguely resembling the vision, and the crowd of commentators who patch over the rent with opinions: communication. Other artists are always needed to make other slits, to carry out necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions, thereby restoring to their predecessors the
incommunicable novelty that we could no longer see. This is to say that artists struggle less against chaos (that, in a certain manner, all their wishes summon forth) than against the “clichés” of opinion. The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with preexisting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of fresh air from the chaos that brings us the vision…. Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates for an instant, a sensation…. Because the picture starts out covered with clichés, the painter must confront the chaos and hasten the destructions so as to produce a sensation that defies every opinion and cliché (how many times?). Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation, so that it constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaomos, a composed cosmos—neither foreseen nor preconceived. Art transforms chaotic variability into chaoid variety,…. struggles with chaos but it does so in order to render it sensory, even through the most charming character, the most enchanted landscape (Watteau) (pp. 203-205).

We will speak of the brain as Cézanne spoke of the landscape: man absent from, but completely within the brain. Philosophy, art, and science are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three aspects under which the brain becomes subject. Thought brain. They are the three planes, the rafts on which the brain plunges into and confronts the chaos (p. 210).

The brain is the mind itself. At the same time that the brain becomes subject—or rather “superject,” as Whitehead puts it—the concept becomes object as created, as event or...
creation itself; and philosophy becomes the plane of immanence that supports the concepts and that the brain lays out....

It is the brain that says I; but I is an other. It is not the same brain as the brain of connections and secondary integrations, although there is no transcendence here. And this is I is not only the “I conceive” of the brain as philosophy, it is also the “I feel” of the brain as art. Sensation is no less brain than the concept (p. 211).

Sensation is pure contemplation, for it is through contemplation that one contracts, contemplating oneself to the extent that one contemplates the elements from which one originates. Contemplating is creating, the mystery of passive creation, sensation. Sensation fills out the plane of composition and is filled with itself by filling itself with what it contemplates; it is “enjoyment” and “self-enjoyment.” It is a subject, or rather an inject. Plotinus defined all things as contemplations, not only people and animals, but plants, the earth, and rocks. These are not Ideas that we contemplate through concepts but the elements of matter that we contemplate through sensation. The plant contemplates by contracting the elements from which it originates—light, carbon, and the salts—and it fills itself with colors and odors that in each case qualify its variety, its composition; it is sensation in itself. It is as if flowers smell themselves by smelling what composes them, first attempts of vision or of sense of smell, before being perceived or even smelled by an agent with a nervous system and a brain.

Of course, plants and rocks do not possess a nervous system. But, if nerve connections and cerebral integrations presuppose a brain-force as faculty of feeling coexistent with the tissues, it is reasonable to suppose also a faculty of feeling that coexists with embryonic tissues and that appears in the Species as a collective brain; or with the vegetal
tissues in the “small species.”...Not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things (pp. 212-213).

Knowledge is neither a form nor a force but a function (p. 215).

The brain does not cease to constitute limits that determine functions of variables in particularly extended areas; relations between these variables (connections) manifest all the more an uncertain and hazardous characteristic, not only in electrical synapses, which show a statistical chaos, but in chemical synapses, which refer to a deterministic chaos.

Arborized paradigms give way to rhizomatic figures, ascented systems, networks of infinite automatons, chaoid states. No doubt this chaos is hidden by the reinforcement of opinion generating facilitating paths, through the action of habits or models of recognition; but it will become much more noticeable if, on the contrary, we consider creative processes and the bifurcations they imply...
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The three planes, along with their elements, are irreducible: plane of immanence of philosophy, plane of composition of art, plane of reference or coordination of science; form of concept, force of sensation, function of knowledge; concepts and conceptual personae, sensations and aesthetic figures, figures and partial observers. Analogous problems are posed for each plane: in what sense and how is the plane, in each case, one or multiple—what unity, what multiplicity? But what to us seem more important now are the problems of interference between the planes that join up in the brain (p. 216-217).

The following page shows the cover of Michaux’s *Miserable Miracles*. I find the artwork, by Michaux, visually suggestive of rhizomatic chaoid states of the brain.
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It is not just a question of saying that art must form those of us who are not artists, that it must awaken us and teach us to feel, and that philosophy must teach us to conceive, or that science must teach us to know. Such pedagogies are only possible if each of the disciplines is, on its own behalf, in an essential relationship with the No that concerns it. The plane of philosophy is prephilosophical insofar as we consider it in itself independently of the concepts that come to occupy it, but nonphilosophy is found where the plane confronts chaos. Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience. They do not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which they would be called on to disappear by being realized, but at every moment of their becoming or their development. Now if the three Noses are still distinct in relation to the cerebral plane, they are no longer distinct in relation to the chaos into which the brain plunges. In this submersion it seems that there is extracted from
Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience. They do not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which they would be called on to disappear by being realized, but at every moment of their becoming or their development. Now if the three NOS are still distinct in relation to the cerebral plane, they are no longer distinct in relation to the chaos into which the brain plunges. In this submersion it seems that there is extracted from chaos the shadow of the “people to come” in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth: mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people—nonthinking thought that lodges in the three, like Klee’s nonconceptual concept or Kandinsky’s internal silence. It is here that concepts, sensations, and functions become undecided, at the same time as philosophy, art, and science become indiscernible, as if they shared the same shadow that extends itself across their different nature and constantly accompanies them (p. 218).
Although I found working on the preceding pages artistically and exploratively exhilarating, I also needed some feedback on how others reacted to my approach. Perhaps the most telling comment was ‘I was scared to say to you I didn’t get it, therefore I didn’t want you to think it was no good’ (Marg Sellers, personal communication). This opened Marg and I to a conversation about the how conditioning to teaching/learning situations often raises fears that block opportunities and potentials. On one hand is the fear of being embarrassed, even ridiculed, for presenting unusual ideas, and on the other hand is the fear of being embarrassed/ridiculed for responding to unusual ideas. It is this fear that affords the power and imposes the subservience that characterises what I think of as a corrosive curriculum, borrowing the sense of corrosion that Richard Sennett (1998) uses to critique the way personal and social character is under attack. Narrating his protagonist’s dilemma he says, ‘his deepest worry is that he cannot offer the substance of his work life as an example to his children of how they should conduct themselves ethically’ (p. 22). Sennett’s argument is that new capitalism brings character and experience into conflict. The extreme pressures of highly competitive and usually temporary employment situations are corrupting actual living experiences for individuals and families and forcing them into increasingly fractured future relationships amongst themselves and with their community. What I find intolerable about this situation is that it continues unabated with the overt complicity of the education system. The rhetoric of ‘no child left behind’ is inextricably connected to the threat of ‘you’re either with us or you’re against us’. There is no room for negotiation, let alone exploration of opportunities and potentials. I acknowledge this is polemic, but it is here as context to give some sense of how I feel about what I have been reading in the preceding pages.
If I were asked to nominate one significant idea from all others in the work I have undertaken in recent years, I would choose the principle of generativity in responding to the work of others. I am pleased to say that this has been my personal experience in the supervision of this thesis. Furthermore it is a principle that I was encouraged to practice that resulted in several publications (Gough, Lee, Moss, Sellers, Sellers, & Sousa, 2004; Sellers, 2006; Sellers & Sellers, in press) and brought peer recognition, which is discussed further in the following folio. These works exemplify the early sense of *cura*, which I began to recognise as a way towards understanding the rhizomatic lines of flight that *currere* had stimulated for me.

The impossibility of making any sense of my working began to turn towards incompossibility…

*Detail.*

negotiating towards *cura* (Detail).
Fold(ing)

Incompossibility: The paradoxical coexistence of impossibilities.
Deleuze provides a summary of the three serial elements of the world that inscribe the Leibnizian monad on the margins of incompossibility: one that determines the world by convergence, another that determines perfect individuals in this world, and finally another that determines incomplete or rather ambiguous elements common to many worlds and to many corresponding individuals. Deleuze is interested in how these elements fail to converge while still not negating or rendering each other impossible. Rather than either converging or remaining impossible for each other, rather than being either included or excluded, they stand in paradoxical relation to one another as divergent and coexistent: as “incompossible.” (Murray, 2000)

For me, incompossibility speaks to the complexity of continua, by deconstructing development. Development has taken on a very structural tone that reflects ideas of construction for advancement and improvement in distinct or discrete stages. Yet the word’s French antecedents reveal its association with unfolding and unfurling. As the above quotation from Timothy Murray suggests, Deleuze uses the notion of incompossibility, linking to Leibniz’s Baroque fold as a way of reconceptualising the ancien régime that folds matter in monadology, unfolds space in nomadology, and refolds time in lines of flight. In this way, a sense of living in the world as continua rather than (structural) development gathers meaning “[l]ike the shift of the opposition of organic and inorganic matter into tonal flow and flux, the movement from an order of ethereal and private space over a teeming public world (or “fishbowl”) indicates how geophilosophy will operate” (Conley, 1993, p. xv). This is a world where living is a
continuing re-enactment of an ‘embryonic…play of folds (endo-, meso-, and ectoderm) rather than as a battleground pitting the self against the world’ (p. xvii). It is also a world where rhizomes flourish in Baroque forms that perturb polar principles ‘one [pole] toward which all principles are folding themselves together, the other [pole] toward which they are all unfolding, in the opposite way’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 58).
Pleated matter and soul-full folding
The first chapter in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Deleuze, 1993), *The pleats of matter*, distinguishes Baroque as an ‘operative function…trait…fold[ing] unfurls all the way to infinity’ (p. 3). Baroque is labyrinthine, curvilinear, a spatial plurality of multiple minor openings that pass sensory phenomena into a resonating cavity that smooths their angular striations – to soothe the soul. Deleuze sees ‘The Baroque House (an allegory) [where] common rooms, with “several small openings:” the five senses [sited beneath a] closed room decorated with a “drapery diversified by folds”’ (p. 5). I see Jackson Pollock paintings: ‘Matter…infinitely porous, spongy, or cavernous texture without emptiness, caverns endlessly contained in other caverns…surrounded and penetrated by an increasingly vaporous fluid, the totality of the universe resembling a “pond of matter in which there exist different flows and waves.”’ (p. 5). Where pleats are formed of double or more folds that make more substance of many – coherence if you like of unfolding folds, enfolded in folding: ‘A fold is always folded within a fold…Unfolding is thus not the contrary of folding, but follows the fold up to the following fold’ (p. 6). Thus folding and unfolding are unceasing reciprocal movements in continua where pleats of matter enfold sensory perceptions folding in meanings to unfold understandings for the soul. Soul, in this sense, is akin to soul music, with its harmonious movement and energy resonating with depths of understandings. Such musical movement sometimes involves tonal inflection, a word that also means flexing curvature between concave and convex, and the changing grammatical form of words. Across all of these meanings, there is a sense of subtle change that concerns mood, feeling, tone, pitch, tense, person, case. Thus inflection concerns continuous and infinite movement that ‘is the ideal genetic element of the
variable curve or fold...the authentic atom, the elastic point...the active spontaneous line’ (p. 14).

In the following sequence of picturings I continue to perform reading~picturing *currere*. In this instance I draw in pencil on photocopied pages to play with interactions between Deleuze’s *The Folds in the Soul* that show my readings of these ideas alongside my thinking about curriculum, *currere* and *cura*.

On this image, my pencil notations underscore, circle and point to the printed line figures that Deleuze references to Paul Klee. Alongside which I have added my handwritten comments.

In doing this I am rhizomatically working to interconnect ideas in the text and my own thinking about how such ideas generatively fold and unfold more interconnections.
On this larger image, my comments indicate my thinking about movement from curriculum, a method for teaching that succeeds from the folds of learning, to currere’s rhizomatic line of flight enfolding complexity, and on towards cura’s clouds unfolding generativity. These are not stages of development or evolving progressions, rather ‘each’ indicates moments in movement and movements in moment.
Here, movement moments trace scansion in the early patterns of gothic linearity that enabled architecture to rise to new heights enfolding a ‘morphology of living matter’ (p. 16) and for Baroque mathematics to reveal ‘more than a line less than a surface…fractal…irrational… nondimension, an interdimension’ (p. 16). Then I see figurations of spatial dimensions mapping curvilinearity of Euclidean area, showing conic sections and generating fractals.
At this moment in Deleuze’s text there are several opportunities for differing lines of flight. I chose to follow one that seemed more resonant with my picturing. Although both images drew my attention on this page, the intriguing obscurity of the picture at the top of the left page fascinated me.
‘[A]namorphosis’ is a clue here to reconceptualising the point of view, which needs to be non-Euclidean that is, not just a shift in perspective but also a twist in space – shifting the subject (superject) and repositioning the object (objectile). As I continued to explore this strange drawing I continued to unfold further twists and resemblances that I show here.
Viewed anamorphically Deleuze’s subject/object becomes superject–objectile and the relationship can be seen as a plurality of inflection: ‘There are as many points of view – whose distance in each case is indivisible – as inflections in inflection, whose length increases’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 20).
Because the world is in the monad, each monad includes every series of the states of the world; but, because the monad is for the world, no one clearly contains the “reason” of the series of which they are all a result, and which remains outside of them, just like the principle of their accord. (Deleuze p. 26)

Monad and world are one and the same and move between each other through the folds of the umbilicus until such time as they evert and break free. Free monads become objectile, taking lines of flight, like motes in a shaft of light. Deleuze quotes Leibniz: ‘Monads “have no windows by which anything could come in or go out”…neither “openings nor doorways”’ (p. 27) and invites us to think of the windowless darkened cinema where, nevertheless, an image appears. The projected image pauses in curvilinear space, but continues to dance about before our eyes: superject eyes objectile.

Mutation, Yoishiro Kawaguchi (1992) A 3D computer animation ‘meditation on the endless repetition of “biocosmic” ideas in action. Kawaguchi uses growth algorithms and elaborate, multilayered textures to visualize the fluidity of changing, artificial, biomorphic shapes and creatures that exist at the interstices of microbiology and computer code’ (Kafala, 2000).
The next work is a version of an invited book chapter. It is another articulation of picturing *currere* towards *cura*. Its use of conversation emphasises the benefits of working in co-implicated, complex and generative ways.

**Currere and cloud-sculpting: conversing with Noel Gough**

*Noel writes (November 2004)*

My engagement with arts-informed inquiry draws for the most part on narrative and poststructuralist theorising, which I perform through narrative experiments that follow (more-or-less) a process that I summarise elsewhere as: ‘Read intertextually, write an essay, make a rhizome’ (Gough, 2004a). The ‘materials’ from which I produce my narrative experiments include genres of literary fiction and popular media, including crime fiction (e.g. Gough, 2002b), science fiction (e.g. Gough, 2004b), and particular fictional works (e.g. Gough, 1996).

Pictures rather than words are Warren’s first language (see, e.g., Sellers, 2003b). Although our respective preferences for representing and performing curriculum inquiry in prose (Noel) and pictures (Warren) have never produced anything resembling a ‘language barrier’, our different dispositions nevertheless produced occasional problems of ‘translation’.

We focus here on what some might call an ‘epiphany of process’. Early in Warren’s PhD candidature he produced a variety of poetic musings on, and picturings of, the objects of his inquiry: *currere*, generativity, learning, complexity, etc. (see the following page).
I did not always ‘understand’ Warren’s musings and picturings (I would have had a hard time telling someone else what he ‘meant’ in my words) but I found them pleasingly puzzling. To support and guide Warren’s creativity, I did not try to persuade him to represent his conceptual refinements and inventions in ‘academic’ prose, but encouraged him to perform them in ways that made their effects and consequences interpretable to his audience(s).
We elaborate [here] on an episode that illustrates how our respective modes of ‘scholartistry’ meshed in generative ways. It began with an email in which I responded to one of Warren’s draft chapters – and which also demonstrates my disposition to read academic texts for their intertextual relations with many (any) other texts: ‘Some of what you wrote reminded me of J.G. Ballard’s surreal short stories from collections such as Vermilion Sands, e.g. “The cloud-sculptors of Coral D”… maybe I see you doing some cloud-sculpting…’ Warren’s response follows.

*Warren writes (March 2003)*

I have since read Ballard’s (1973) story and formed the following impressions of both it and your comment.

The story concerns a pilot (grounded by injury), who has retired to a surrealistically dangerous desert resort. The pilot adjusts to this environment by engaging with flying craft – kites, then gliders – tethered by cables from the ground. Others join the pilot to launch an enterprise which evolves from the remark of one which ‘contained a complete understanding of my motives. He pointed to the coral towers rising above us into the evening sky. “With silver iodide we could carve the clouds.”’ (p. 12). Practically, this involves spraying iodide crystals at the clouds carving away ‘the flock-like tissue’ and forming it into ‘drops of condensing spray’ (p. 14). Drama for the story emerges through the narcissistic desires of the *femme fatale*, who challenges the sculptors to render her from the ‘storm-nimbus that swirled over our heads. “For clouds like these I need a Michelangelo of the sky… What about Nolan? Is he too frightened as
well?" (p. 26). The challenge is accepted: One sculptor is devoured and destroyed, but Nolan rides the whirlwind with fatal consequences for the femme.

My reading of Ballard’s story recognises the intertwining of his skeptical commentary on manipulating illusory reality with his visionary allegories for emergent creative potential. The pilot represents the disrupting reality of the emasculate modern world: Conventional consciousness, damaged and shoved aside by more ambitious worlds of ideological reality. Nevertheless, awareness of potentials beyond the rose-tinted virtual horizons sustains challenges. Flying remains a very male domain and, perhaps, it signifies the quintessential challenge towards reconceptualising control as other than the egoistic pursuit of omnipotence. That is, to recognise ‘control’ with the world not of it, in the sense that William Doll (2002) writes of it as ‘within, not lying outside or imposed on, situations, as arising naturally and complexly from rather simple interactions’ (p. 54).

My interpretation of your musing on ‘doing some cloud-sculpting’ interacts with this reconception of control through our interactions with each other, and the idea, and this writing, and so on… I will explain this by using Ballard’s story: I am the pilot, with a past in a technical medium. I have retired from the modernistic controls of the commercial world to the vermilion sands of the academy. Within the academy I have been able to review how: ‘Many paths of change are potentially possible, and which one is selected is an expression of the particular kind of structural coherence the unit has, in a continuous tinkering’ (Varela, 1987, p. 61). This notion of ‘tinkering’ and its ‘coherence’ is, I believe, reflected in the metaphor of cloud-sculpting. However, like the pilot, I am nervously cautious about cutting loose the tethers and
flying free to re-vision and sculpt the clouds. I therefore cast you in the *femme fatale* role, to challenge me to the call for a ‘Michelangelo of the sky’, and to remind me of the intrinsic difficulties involved in responding. Your (and Doll’s) curriculum visions pertain to the realm of clouds – they have presently used the metaphor of Ghosts – but both are conceptually nebulous. Thus a significant challenge condensing before emerging curricularists is about generating conceptual forms within nebulous nuances, such as reconceptualising ‘control.’ Cloud-sculpting is a useful and pertinent analogy for a prospective approach to this ‘control’ imaginary, because it elaborates the complexity embodied in conceiving ‘controlling’ – not as a force, but as ‘spirit’ in the vivifying sense. Clouds are analogous with spirit in this sense too, by representing energies not otherwise able to be recognised. In short, ‘doing some cloud-sculpting’ is a way (among many) for continually expressing reconceptualising control, or, as Doll (2002) suggests ‘another, new, livelier spirit of control’ (p. 28).

Noel and Warren write (November 2004)
This episode seems to be rich in possibilities for understanding some of the ways in which ‘scholartists’ can be supported in what are still somewhat risky endeavors. Borrowing from Joni Mitchell, we’ve looked at cloud-sculpting from both sides now, and see that Warren could have chosen much less demanding paths to explore and more obvious and explicit questions to investigate (and we suspect that some supervisors might have encouraged him to take such lines of less resistance). We conclude with Warren’s more recent musings on cloud-sculpting as an invitation to interpretive, recursive and enactive processing of embodied curriculum inquiry.
Warren writes (November 2004):

Cloud – sculpting…currere

When reading I often think visually; it’s like having a picture dictionary/thesaurus always running in my mind. I contextualise a word or words in a pictorial phrase that exemplifies the meanings I make through thinking. I read/see these pictures not as static literal objects, but dynamically, in an almost dreamlike way that opens to complex generativity. For example, consider this brief passage by Jacques Daignault (1992):

The history of arts and the history of sciences are a struggle against prejudices and clichés of an age, while it seems the history of education is an irreducible struggle to find the best prejudices and clichés.... Curriculum, I believe, is the excluded middle in the debates between art and science (p. 209).

As I read Daignault’s words – arts, sciences, struggle, prejudices, clichés – the concepts associated with chaos and complexity come to mind and begin to generate a picture, in this instance Maurits Escher’s (1950) Order and Chaos. In recollecting this picture the words resonate with a complex concept of curriculum, or, rather its reconceptualising, which William Pinar (1994) called the ‘method of currere’. I sense Escher’s image as a trope for curriculum/currere, although I am not able to recall why until I revisit the picture, with its paradoxical central element pointing to the fragility and reflecting the intangibility of objects surrounding the infinity of complexity.
However, this picture is not a composition of objects from which I make a literal meaning. Instead, I experience it as a complex space opening to meaningful generativity. I don’t search for meaning in the symbols, but allow the complexity of the imagery to shift my thinking beyond what I think I know. My thinking and reading is not methodically determining the making of meaning, rather it’s methodologically (thinking-reading-thinking) exploring meaning-making.
Writing about doctoral research as writing Alison Lee (1998) calls for ‘a way of theorizing the research/writing nexus that destabilises the naturalised distinction between the two terms and allows for a more dynamic and iterative relationship between them’ (p. 125). Lee cites David Murray’s (1980) writing process model, which delineates relationships between information/text, and writing/reading and collecting/connecting:

Reading Murray’s model impels me to deconstruct its linear geometry. The Euclidean geometric structures suggesting a crystalline formation is anathema to my reading--thinking about a text that writes of ‘the bringing together of text and information, or animating information into text’. Where Murray saw a crystal, I see clouds...
My collecting-reading thinking connecting-writing envisions a state in which, like Escher’s picture, constructs turn about and open different complex spaces, interacting notions, and other dimensions for research-writing generativity – and in turn inspires this painting...
Here I draw on meteorology to turn the literal relations of sun, earth, heat, moisture, condensation, towards the dynamic complexity of what is happening. Rather than trying to make things make sense, I am sensing what is happening by playing with (performing) reconceptualising. This is something that many visual artists always-already do, so I am not making a unique claim for any grand theory here. But through performing this visualising-
contextualising-thinking-synthesising process I am adopting a poststructuralist approach towards challenging what Lee (1998) termed the ‘naturalised distinction’ that inheres in writing and reading as separate skilled constructs for making and communicating meaning. Furthermore, I consider this approach to be not only effective for cognition, but also for learning, because both processes are complexly co-implicated in each other’s generativity.

**Why Exegesis?**

If a performative curriculum is regarded as being more than presentational, then there is need to seek other ways of thinking about how we express what we are learning.

If a thesis or dissertation presents the author’s report on research in the form of a long essay that follows particular conventions, then an exegesis is another way of thinking about expressing research reporting:

- in any discipline, the thesis presents the outcome - the results - of an independently undertaken research project. In the case of a creative thesis, the outcome of the independent research is a body of creative work. The role of the exegesis is to present the research framework: the key questions, the theories, the disciplinary and wider contexts, of the project. These things are not necessarily evident - to the examiner or viewer - in the creative work itself. The exegesis here serves to flesh these out, to make them explicit. The exegesis, which elaborates, elucidates and contextualises the resulting body of creative work, may be more or less theoretical and analytical, depending on the nature of the research question and the researcher. Finally, in this model, the researcher is enabled to produce an exegesis that, in outlining and describing the studio-based project, can articulate
the research in the language of the discipline: visual and practice based, with art practice at the centre of the research task. (Fletcher & Mann, 2004, p. 6)

Although Fletcher and Mann’s argument is focused more on studio-based creative activity, it holds as well for any creative endeavour. As a graduate of a school of art and design practice, and having practiced creatively for most of my life, an exegesis is more relevant to the expression of my research work than a thesis alone.

Performing in this way reminds me of flying. There is a strange sense of simultaneous freedom to move through space while confined within space. There is also an appreciation that moving through space involves understanding immanence in ways beyond immediate reason and logic. In the past, flyers flew ‘by the seat of their pants’, using a tacit sense of where they were in space and time. Today aircraft captains ‘fly by wire’. Writing of aesthetics and knowing as ephemeral principles for a groundless theory Lorri Neilsen (2004) performs her thinking in ways that I find reassuringly resonant. Narrating a flight and playing on the lyrics of a Joni Mitchell song she tells me that recalling cloud illusions needs more than one side of a story:

We make our way in the world — whether we are carpenters or researchers — according to the stories we tell each other. We could call them illusions. And in the academic world we call the discussion of these stories theoretical debates. This, this is how the world works, how we must think about human behaviour: the story of aloneness, or of people in community, the story of power, of being many in the one, one in the many. Each story offers both description and prescription. Each story causes us, the frenetic fleshy creatures, to adjust our movement, our sense of wonder, to its forms and its demands. We honour
these stories by giving them space in our thoughts, our days, our bodies. And the stories, like us, flourish for a time, then are gone.

Above us the clouds form, reform, trail, sweep, gather, disappear and reappear, as they have — for this is another story we share — for millions of years… *It's cloud illusions I recall.* (p. 45, original italics)

**Closing–opening?**

At the opening of this folio I wrote of my invention *cura* calling for *performing-thinking* in different and diverse ways. I offered no definition of *cura* because I characterised it as generative, always-already interpreted and re-interpreted *imaginary*. I elaborated on imaginary, in different and diverse ways to avoid leaving any totalised major construct in mind.

I trust that some impressions about *cura* are opening in this closing moment, and will continue to be generative and affecting in ways that resonate with some of the following thoughts:

*cura* is for *currere* as *currere* is for curriculum…

Never a revision, progression, development or displacement of another, all are *continua*…

*cura* is chaotic, curriculum is in chaos: *cura* thrives, curriculum strives…
cura rides in the folds of the soul, direct reflections hiding inflections…

cura is imaginary, and, like currere, works in process toward ways for performing…

cura is art to currere's philosophy to curriculum's science, all are energy in complicity…

cura is geophilosophical, currere is genealogical, curriculum is historical…

cura pictures as well as writes and numerates…

cura is caring working, it turns impossibility towards incompossibility…

cura is always-already in motion, no stakes to hold or take, it readily negotiates…

cura is cloud-sculpting…
Afterwording

Now I a fourfold vision see
And a fourfold vision is given to me
Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
And threefold in soft Beaulah’s night
And twofold Always May God us keep
From Single Vision & Newton’s sleep!

(Blake, 1980, p. 46)

If pictures are like sensory openings or perceptual structures, then looking at them is like putting on a new pair of spectacles or (more precisely) like opening your eyes. In other words, Blake’s style, like that of any great artist, affects our vision: we start seeing vortices and arches and wave forms everywhere, in and out of Blake’s pictures, just as we learn to see dark interiors from Rembrandt and storms from Turner.

(Mitchell, 1978, p. 68)
All too often, in debates about education, the basic questions are ignored in favour of mere technical issues. We should always begin by asking, ‘What are we educating for? What sort of people are we expecting to produce? What kind of society do we envisage?’

(Harber, 1994, p. 84)

I call this folio ‘afterwording’ because, as this is as far as my journey goes for now, some following words are due. I said in my journey’s Opening words to expect no finite conclusion, but to anticipate instead gifts for continuing questioning. The epigraphs above, which quote William Blake’s poem in his letter to Thomas Butts, William Mitchell’s observations on Blake’s composite art89 and Clive Harber’s questions about educating, introduce my afterwording and allude to the aforementioned gifts. Although these gifts have been proffered throughout my folios, I bring gifts to attention here by using the notion of poor.

I appeal to Blake because of what Mitchell calls composite art – Ut pictura poesis (as is painting, so is poetry) – that resonates with my thinking about picturing reading and picturing currere. In Blake’s poem I hear and see emergings and immanence that my picturing reflects and wording echoes, reminding me that my story is also his-story and like, for example, the symbols I picture over each folio title, there are many and diverse ways for showing and telling about seeing visions. This is why I also quote Mitchell telling about pictures as sensory openings for our eyes, affecting our vision. Mitchell is emphasising how complexly interdependent sight and vision are in bringing us understandings, much like the interdependent

89 Mitchell (1978) footnotes the genealogy of ‘composite art’ and attributes its coinage to Jean Hagstrum (p. 3).
complexities that *c u r a* brings to experiencing learning thereby giving rise to inquiries like Harber’s (1994) about educational intentions.

To most educational leaders and policy makers, questions like Harber’s seem trite. This is because the answers are, for their intents and purposes, historically inculcated as givens: in twenty-first century terms, we are educating for the knowledge economy; we are producing scientifically, technologically and culturally literate information-driven professionals, entrepreneurs, managers, and workers; and we envisage a society in which knowledge shall be the major creative and economic force. These objectives constitute the catechism of twenty-first century education, so to question them is tantamount to heresy. However, such ideological dedication is problematic not only because its adherents resist views other than their own, but also because they avoid debate on terms other than their own. Thus Harber’s questions are considered trite. But these are questions to be asked and their concern is more about working towards understanding the questions than it is in getting answers.

These questions – what are we educating for? what sort of people are we expecting to produce? what kind of society do we envisage? – are not as undemanding as they appear when they are read more closely. Who are ‘we’? who are ‘people’? what does ‘produce’ mean? what is ‘society’? what is ‘educating’? how? why? Unpacking these questions meaningfully expects a very different turn, which my suggesting of a transpiring neo-Copernican moment foreshadows. A worldview founded on one ideological premise, new economy capitalism for
example, once the rhetorical packaging is undone, is exposed as hegemonically self-interested and the diversity and generativity it subverts and conceals is revealed\textsuperscript{90}.

My concern that these deep questions continue to be raised after centuries of inquiry and voluminous research has stimulated my scholarly inquiries over the past decade. My Masters of Education studies and research explored and articulated understandings of tensions between economic and ecological views of educating for a knowledge society. In this work I uncovered opportunities to discuss ways of seeing other visions of understandings and these have generated the expanding work explicated in this thesis.

The thematic nub of my work is reconceptualising learning and teaching for seeing visions of living differently. My proposal does not look to work against any extant worldview, rather it seeks to promote and encourage acknowledgements and explorations of diverse and generative viewings-of-worlds. To offer an analogy, human beings widely subscribe to a planetary-cultural (Earth-human) view of superiority in the universe. Thus human speculation of sentient social beings existing in other worlds presumes an alien intelligence and physical form commensurate with that of humans. However such a view precludes the possibility of experiencing beings that fall outside these criteria.

Over the course of my research I have noted a rising interest in the effects of complexity science on educational research and much of this interest has been stimulated by the prolific

\textsuperscript{90} See, for example, Richard Sennett’s (2006) \textit{The culture of the new capitalism}.
work of Davis and Sumara (Davis, 2003; Davis & Sumara, 1997, 2005; 2006; Davis et al., 2008). However, as they caution: ‘In terms of conceptual influence, education is a net importer of theory and research. Indeed the domain has a rather startling trade deficit… The situation is unlikely to change any time soon, in part because description oriented and phenomenon specific disciplines may not have the means to embrace the transphenomenal and pragmatic character of educational inquiry’ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 165, italics added).

I concur with this cautionary view because my local observations of educationists interested in complexity have seen many grasping, mistakenly, for some demonstrable developmental effect on teaching practice and outcomes; such pursuits show scant interest in or understanding of complexity’s generative affects for learning praxis. Davis and Sumara also say that ‘educationists…must be more attuned to their complicity in the academic world’ (p. 166). Again I concur, however in this instance I question how readers interpret the term complicity. I read complicity as affectively co-involving learning and teaching in generativity, however my observations see, more often than not, academic complicity as effecting teaching as learning delivery for gain. This mismatch in understanding complexity exemplifies a problematic that pervasively curbs generative potential for learning and teaching.

If asked to intimate a consistent emphasis in my thesis I would say it is my concern to perturb these structuralising means that continue to capture and exploit generative work. It has been a source of continuing frustration throughout my life to see countless metaphorical `drowned in and tossed out with bathwater polluted by deterministic greed.
My thesis has articulated a rhizomatic currere journey – regressing and critiquing curriculum as being unhelpful for diverse and generative viewings of worlds – progressing and sketching c u r a for continuing learning and teaching generativity – analysing and reviewing currere as a relatively recent approach for reconceptualising curriculum towards being more inclusive of alternative understandings – and synthesising by picturing currere towards c u r a. I have explained the importance of recursivity for currere in movements turning back, forth, around and about meanings, learning, teaching and understandings. I will now recurse to discuss toward a poor curriculum[^91], its connection to towards a poor theatre and currere and c u r a…

**Toward a poor curriculum**

Pinar (1976a) introduces poor curriculum by asking:

What is a poor curriculum? What is currere?

A poor curriculum is one stripped of its distractions. Stripped of video tape, audio tape, fancy books and buildings, values clarification and individualized instruction. Stripped of all the clothing we drape around ourselves to keep us from seeing.

What am I naked?

I am experience. With each breath. Experience. Experience of a Masters program in education, experience of a love affair I’m in the midst of, experience of the collective

[^91]: Although poor appears in Pinar’s (1976a) preface, it also appears in the title to Grumet’s (1976c) chapter that is also the authors’ book title. Grumet acknowledges her use of ‘poor’ is drawn from Jerzy Grotowski’s (1968) book, *Towards a poor theatre.*
curriculum that is the historical present. Regardless of context, I am running a course. 

*Currere* is to run.

It is active. And it is not. The track around which I run may be inalterably forced, but the rate at which I run, the quality of my running, my sensual-intellectual-emotional experience of moving bodily through space and time: all these are my creations; they are my responsibilities.

The Regents may tell me what course to run, but whether the course is instructive or not, interesting or not, pleasurable or not, liberative or not, ultimately and immediately is my responsibility, and that of my fellow runners. (p. vii)

Pinar makes no bones here: *poor* is selflessly plain; *currere* is oneself running. Grumet (1976c), in her chapter, adds that,

> in a poor curriculum we turn our focus from the artefacts themselves, the Bunsen burner, Silas Marner, Greenwich time, nongrading, Deans Lists, modular scheduling, ITS, SRA, each one teach one, to the ways in which the individual student confronts them. Within his [sic] responses to the curriculum the student is continually experiencing himself [sic], and it is to that experience of self that *currere* turns. (p. 71)

For Grumet, poor is not the removal of artefacts, it is shifting from a view of them figuring in the foreground as features. Artefacts do not *constitute* learning, learners *experience* artefacts in learning, which contributes to *currere*. 
Thus, for me, poor is not a binary of rich; it is a lacking that rich disdains. To be rich, in the socio-economic sense of that term, is to have the economic wealth to wield power in the world and to assert hegemony, whereas to be socio-economically poor is to have sufficient resources to be generous to the world. Experience breathes experience. Like Pinar, I experienced a Masters programme in education, I am in love and I am caught up in the collective curriculum of historical present. I am running a course – experiencing currere. I too can read the Regents’ curricular rhetoric, but I also know that what I make, take and use of learning is up to me and those I share my experiences with. This has been my currere experience, myself using my learning to help me understand that which I share.

In the previous folios I have attended to the concepts curriculum and currere and discussed the problematic complications and generative complexities of their simultaneously separated and plural complexions. In the manner that I outlined as currere reading, I have revisited the past, envisaged the future, reflected on both and pictured myself in the world. I have given you, the reader-viewer, an in-sight into my seeing difference differently. This is not to show that I am somehow different from someone else, but to emphasise Deleuzian different/ce that complexifies dualisms – ‘two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar “halves” [that are] distinct–obscure, [rather than] clear-and-distinct’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 279).

92 I mean generosity here in an ecological rather than economic sense. The argument that those with extreme wealth are philanthropic is challenged on the basis of the ethical soundness of the source of funds, motives and intentions for that philanthropy.
Perhaps the most overused, least understood and utterly worthless dualism in the world today is rich vs poor. It is the binary of rich against poor that corrupts the sense of both to valorise and despise each other. Poor is this afterwording’s rhizomatic because understanding poor, as Grumet and Pinar saw it, is a nexus interconnecting curriculum - currere - c u r a

**Poor pauper – rich power**

A brief etymology of poor:

The word “poor” came via Old French from Latin *pauper*, and the word “poverty” came via Old French from Latin *pauperitas*. Latin *pauper* came from *pau-* = “small” and *pario* = “I give birth to” and originally would have referred to unproductive farmland or female livestock which failed to breed as much as wanted. (Wikipedia, 2008b)

The etymological reading above, from the Wikipedia entry on child poverty, is quoted because the context of children and poverty also suits my contextual reading of poor. As the Wikipedia article puts it: ‘Most agree that education is part of the solution [to child poverty]. If people waited until they could afford to have children, child poverty would be greatly reduced’ (Wikipedia, 2008a, ¶ 5). I challenge the expression ‘child poverty’ because by attaching poverty to child, it obscures the actuality that poverty is a construct. It is a ‘condition’ not of the child but of adults responsible for the child. Poverty is a constructed condition of adults that children are forced to endure. But, however it is looked at, the problematic is founded on a construct that defines and maintains poor as synonymous with poverty, and as binary to wealthy.
Poorn as plenitude
Continuing an etymological reading, plenitude historically meant fullness or completeness, more in the sense of ample sufficiency than of more than enough. I choose to follow the idea of sufficiency here because that fits with my understandings of complete and full more as qualities than as quantities. Even so, seeing poor as plenitude calls for an onto-epistemology that is commensurable with different/ces I have been discussing, and that perturbs the incommensurability that traditions of separate ontology and epistemology hold to.
But, why bother with exploring and proposing poor in this way? Mainly because education’s rich power-base continues to be increasingly problematic for the poor in their learning. Not only is the binary rhetoric of rich getting richer as poor get poorer still firmly in place, but the metaphorical gap between poor and rich is ever widening. Other ways of comprehending rich - power - control - poor - wealth – care are needed to understand these terms as contributing to complex continua discourses, rather than being discursive binaries. According to my reviews of the literature this has been a significant ambition of currere.

Poor in learning
I was curious to know more about poor and learning, aside from the obvious and well-researched adverse effects of poverty on learning outcomes (See, for example, Molteno, Ogadhoh, Cain, & Crumpton, 2000). A Google search using the term ‘poor learning’ finds about 4,770,000 results: the first ten include discussion of learning and poor health, fiscal policy, poor and good behaviour, rich and poor students in school together and empowerment of the poor. A Google search with the term ‘rich learning’ produces about 9,220,000 results: the first ten of these show five results for learning as technology-rich, two for creativity-rich, one for media-rich, one for a rich-learning consultant, and one for rich as an expensive
environment. Accepting the limitations of Google’s Search Engine Optimisation Rules, this very crude survey at least suggests that interest in rich learning exceeds concern for poor learning and that the term rich is positioned as progressively superior in contrast with poor, as detrimentally inferior.

So far, education and schooling hold fast to a structured system that ensures everything remains in order until time or circumstance arrives where change is deemed necessary and acceptable. Such change must be thoroughly researched and peer reviewed, before being authorised and approved. Otherwise, so we are told, the order of our world would descend into chaos. This is despite a now generally accepted epistemology that understands chaos as immanent, self-organising, always-already in the world.

**Poor curriculum, poor theatre and currere toward cura**

Jerzy Grotowski’s (1968) *Towards a poor theatre* resonates with Pinar’s (1976b) method of *currere* and Grumet’s (1976b) contributory articulation of it. Grotowski reiterated his ideas in a series of articles published between 1965 and 1968 and, like *currere*, poor theatre concerns personal, transgressive radical reconceptualisation of theory and practice in the field. Grotowski was concerned about the predominant, rich, synthetic theatre being incommensurable with the live actor-spectator communion and saw the need for reconceptualising his field towards poor experiential theatre (p. 19). Grumet was similarly concerned about the incommensurability of artefactual curriculum with learner-teacher communion. These resonances influenced Grumet’s work with Grotowski’s ideas to reconceptualise commensurability in curriculum, learning and teaching through *currere*. As I see it, Grotowski and Grumet were both working towards a
nexus for shifting blockages that made the problematics in their respective fields invisible. Poor is the contextual concept for the nexus, within which Grumet saw *currere* working to unblock problematic incommensurable conceptions of curriculum for learning and teaching.

However, *currere* remains problematic because it continues to be cited/sited against curriculum. Despite extensive explication of *currere*’s complex, dynamic, non-hierarchical activity, the notion of it as a *method* holds fast, and in so doing reinforces curriculum’s hegemony. To perturb the structural dualism of *currere*/method against curriculum/instruction hegemony, I look to a move that passes through the gravity holding binaries together in opposition.

Although I have yet to understand that move I see possibilities for it involving *cura* and here is my picturing of it in my journal notes, thinking about *currere*’s capability for perturbing curriculum. This picture invites interpretation towards my painting on page 294.
The previous picture also reflects this photo (at right), said to be one of the most widely distributed in human history, marking a turning moment for a worldview by changing forever the way people historically saw the world and providing a new way for people to see the world today. It was taken by an Apollo 17 crewmember, looking back at the earth while coasting towards the moon and is usually referred to as the ‘blue marble’ picture because of its likeness to a child’s marble. Picturing the Earth from space as an affect for changing human perceptions of the world is attributed to several individuals including American designer-engineer-architect Richard Buckminster Fuller and *Whole Earth Catalogue* publisher Stewart Brand who organised a campaign in 1966 and distributed buttons printed with the question, ‘Why haven’t we seen a photograph of the whole Earth yet?’ Brand’s campaign/ question sought to stimulate wider support for everyone to see the whole Earth as holistic, as he imagined it. British astronomer Fred Hoyle is the earliest cited reference to the idea that Brand’s question raises. Hoyle commented: ‘Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from outside is available – once the sheer isolation of the Earth becomes known – a new idea as powerful as any in history will be let loose’ (Hoyle, 1950, quoted in Okushi & Dudley-Flores, 2007, p. 3). Okushi and Dudley-Flores, also quote Frank White to elaborate on what they call an *astrosociological perspective* of planetary consciousness:

> A complex and profound meta-experience that astronauts and cosmonauts have reported that runs the gamut from a type of spiritual experience to a realization that we humans, as separated as we are by all manner of boundaries, are, in the final analysis, the progeny of one precious world with a thin veneer of atmosphere. (White, 1987, quoted in Okushi & Dudley-Flores, 2007, p. 4)
Commenting that only 400 human beings have experienced this unique perspective, they say ‘as such, a problem currently exists. The global public has never seen “the big picture.”’ (p. 4). My motives for referring to this intriguing notion of astrosociology, which broaches technological, commercial and sociological implications of space-based information transfer systems, are twofold. One is to remind that seeing visions about ideas, like my picturing currere perturbing curriculum, is a personal process that resists explanatory reasoning and invites generative interpretation. The other is to show that work concerning socio-perceptual impacts on worldviews, such as discussions about poor curriculum and currere, is not social/science fantasy. I see such work affirming that my own concerns and questions are more timely than futuristic.

**Poor theatre, currere and a provocation for closing**

The nub of Grotowski’s thinking about poor theatre is via negativa – a way to look more at what it is not than what it is. Reading Grotowski (1968), it is easy to see how well it suited Grumet’s ideas about currere, in philosophy, theory and practice.

In philosophy, theory or practice, bringing work towards some sense of closing is difficult. When the work has no closing and works against that very notion, such circumstance is as Grotowski puts it ‘not a condition but a process in which what is dark in us slowly becomes transparent. In this struggle with one’s own truth, this effort to peel off the life-mask, the theatre, with its full-fleshed perceptivity, has always seemed to me a place of provocation’ (p. 21). Here then is my provocation for closing without closing – an interplay – reading Grotowski alongside picturing currere...
We do not want to teach the actor a predetermined set of skills or give him [sic] a “bag of tricks.” Ours is not a deductive method of collecting skills. Here everything is concentrated on the “ripening” of the actor which is expressed by a tension towards the extreme, by a complete stripping down, by the laying bare of one’s own intimity… The actor makes a total gift of himself [sic]. (p. 16)

Not a ‘bag of tricks’, a ‘ripening’ gift as the actor brings aspects of an inner world to their outer performances of it.

The education of an actor in our theatre is not a matter of teaching him [sic] something; we attempt to eliminate his organism’s resistance to the psychic process [of teaching someone something]. (p. 16)

Not education as ‘teaching [someone] something’, understanding instead dark clouds of ‘resistance’ to it by facilitating experiences and expressions of inner worlds.
The result is freedom from the time-lapse between inner impulse and outer reaction in such a way that the impulse is already an outer reaction. Impulse and action concurrent: the body vanishes, burns, and the spectator sees only a series of visible impulses.
(p. 16)

‘Impulse and action are concurrent: the body vanishes, burns, [revealing] only a series of visible impulses.’ The viewer is left wondering did I see that? Did it happen? Did the actor act it? Did I only think I saw it? All of the above...

Ours then is a via negativa – not a collection of skills but an eradication of blocks. (p. 17, bold in original)

via negativa - not... skills but an eradication of blocks' of actor, of action, of audience, of experiencing... voiding hurdles blocking narrowly marked paths.
The requisite state of mind is a passive readiness to realize an active role, a state in which one does not “want to do that” but rather “resigns from not doing it.” (p. 17, bold in original)

The forms of common “natural” behaviour obscure the truth; we compose a role as a system of signs… At a moment of psychic shock… of mortal danger or tremendous joy, a man [sic] does not behave “naturally” [s/he] uses rhythmically articulated signs, begins to dance, to sing. (pp. 17-18)

“natural” behaviour obscures truth… elevated spiritual state [sees] rhythmically articulated signs, dancing, singing.
Another technique which illuminates the hidden structure of signs is **contradiction** (between gesture and voice, voice and word, word and thought, will and action, etc.). (p. 18)

**Contradiction** reveals hidden signs. A war on terror to bring democracy to a dictatorship.

I realized that the production led to awareness rather than being the product of awareness. (p. 18)

... a generative process for bringing awareness into vision rather than a product that results from being aware.
What is the theatre? What is unique about it? What can it do that film and television cannot? Two concrete conceptions crystallized: the poor theatre, and performance as an act of transgression. (p. 19)

[Theatre] cannot exist without the actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, “live” communion. This an ancient theoretical truth, of course, but when rigorously tested in practice it undermines most of our usual ideas about theatre. (p. 19)

... the interdependent actor-spectator relationship; perceptual, direct, “live” communion.
It challenges the notion of theatre as a synthesis of disparate creative disciplines – literature, sculpture, painting, architecture, lighting, acting (under the direction of a metteur-en-scene\textsuperscript{93}). This “synthetic theatre” is the contemporary theatre, which we call the “Rich Theatre” – rich in flaws. (p. 19)


This provocation, like all my \textit{picturing} is a mindful expressive effort, which anticipates reciprocal interpretive efforts for bringing significance to mind – in \textit{currere} towards \textit{cura}.

This is as far as my journey goes for now. I said in my \textit{Opening words} folio and repeated in the opening words to this folio, expect no finite conclusion, anticipate instead gifts for continuing questioning. What you are asked to read and view is challenging not only because it breaks usual academic conventions for a doctoral thesis but because it also resists applications of conventions for assessment. My view of assessment parts company with conventional practice too. I prefer to see instead the kinds of practices that I have been proposing in this thesis. Namely: reading for thinking about work differently, and reading and responding to work

\textsuperscript{93} The \textit{auteur’s} style of production, or creative vision, which characteristically synthesises elements into a distinctive presentation. Grotowski is alluding to this as theatre totalised, or a theatric \textit{grand narrative} that obscures and precludes experiencing the actor-spectator relationship.
generatively and generously. This view differs from the more usual academic peer review practice of constructive critique that involves the reviewer’s interpretation being made alongside certain criteria to qualitatively appraise the work and make recommendations as necessary.

**via cura**

In a forthcoming article discussing the problematic of oppositional criticism to scholarly discourse, David Greenwood (2008) cites me and my partner, Marg Sellers (Sellers & Sellers, in press), in our reviewing of an article (Sameshima & Irwin, in press) submitted for publication. Greenwood writes:

A response [to Pauline Sameshima and Rita Irwin’s article] will soon be published alongside of the original work […] The coming response […] is remarkable because of how much it differs from the typical academic disagreements journals sometimes publish, and how much it contrasts with Bowers’ record of encouraging others to “avoid embracing” a wide range of generative ideas. In Pauline’s case, the responding authors chose to respond “to an invitation to make opportunistic interconnections,” and to “join with [the authors] in elaborating their ideas.” The responding authors continue:

For some readers this may seem a strange way to review, but our poststructural reading of reviewing calls on us to be excessive, rather than intercessive, and to contribute more than critique. That is, we choose to be both celebratory with and salutary to our colleagues.

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94 Greenwood also explains how one of the article’s authors, Pauline Sameshima, drew his attention to our review.
Always there is a range of possible responses. How we respond says much about ourselves. How we respond is how we make our world. (pp. 336-337)

In responding we show and tell of our thinking for complexly interconnecting all we hear and see, which is how performing living~learning through currere towards c u r a happens. Reflecting on responding to Pauline Sameshima and Rita Irwin, it is possible I may have been stimulated by Doll and Gough’s (2002) presentation of fore and aft problematics and perspectives surrounding each chapter in their book. If so, it affirms a continuing currere towards c u r a passing through Bill Doll and Noel Gough and Pauline Sameshina and David Greenwood and his collegial affirmation of ways for working that I am privileged to share.

Conceptualising c u r a as rhizo-imaginary for curriculum is more picturing anomaly than constructive theory, it contributes towards encouraging different thinking and that enables me to pause now, with consciousness of currere’s immanence in c u r a, for others to reflect on…


References


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References


Reid, John (Director), & Sellers, Warren (Camera) (1967). Something of Course [16mm monochrome film]: New Zealand Film Archive Reference No F16194.


Sellers, Toby (Artist). (2003a). *Laying down a path in walking* [Photograph].


Appendix: Curriculum visions review pictures

The following pictures are those that appear in my (Sellers, 2003) review of Doll and Gough’s (2002) *Curriculum visions*, as explained on page 73 of my thesis. The online version of the review can also be experienced at this url: http://www.ije.org/v4r1/index.html or by opening the file named Curriculum Visions Review.html on the enclosed CD rom.
Sketchnotes

CV’s has touched me in ways that are similar to, and reflect the fractal-like feelings I experienced when I read Piranesi’s engraving method & Gombrich’s bitter milk.

Sweetness, heady, sick, seasoned, sensitive, shaded, dense.

Complicity

Grown up with “get it”... if you don’t.

Many times with Ambrose Bierce’s education in bad passion for the young of the world (Akonam Dhan-Akhan).

Simplicity
Rhizome (see also end note 2)
Vision-mind
Reading
Rippled surface
Intercourse

[Handwritten text: IDEOLOGICAL NALOGICAL GENERATIVE]
Chaoplexly
Fractal-like
Demiperson
Imagining
Appendix

Currere
Cosmology
Conversation
Community