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THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ANALYSIS AND INSIGHT
IN
MĀDIYAMĪKA BUDDHISM
| A LOGICO PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL |

COLIN LESLIE DEAN B.Sc (Science, Deakin)
B.A (Social science Deakin)
B.LITT (Hon) (Humanities Deakin)

THESIS SUBMITTED IN TOTAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASTER DEGREE OF ARTS

JANUARY 1993
FACULTY OF ARTS
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL INQUIRY
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I would like to thank Dr. P Fenner and Dr. P Bilimoria for their kind assistance, most helpful suggestions and scholarly supervision. Also I would like to thank Deakin's Off campus library service without whose most valued and dedicated service this thesis could not have been accomplished. I would also like to thank Jenny Lewis who once again performed the much valued service of photocopying material, purchasing books and acting as general person Friday. Similarly I would like to thank Lyn Smith for her most helpful editing. Last but not least I would like thank Diahane Van Rooyen and Hilary Smurthwaite who put up with what must have been a very annoying dialogue and who thus in some degree contributed to the crystallizing of ideas and clarification of certain troublesome points.
SUMMARY

This thesis investigates the relationship between analysis and insight in Prāsāṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhism. More specifically it asks whether analysis is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. The thesis is divided into six chapters which include an introduction, an appendix which outlines Prāsāṅgika and Svātāntrika views regarding the syllogism (svatantra) and a conclusion. The remaining chapters seek to demonstrate that analysis for the Prāsāṅgika and the Tibetan Geluk-ba school is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the arising of insight.

Chapter one is an investigation of certain Western psychological theories which deal with the effects on the mind of cogitating upon contradictions. Though the psychological theories are only suggestive, this chapter will lend support to the claim a) of the Prāsāṅgika, that analysis generates an altered state of consciousness; and b) that analysis may be a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of insight.

Chapter two seeks to construct a logico-psychological model of how insight is generated. In this model it is argued that insight is a conceptual and intuitive experience: i.e. non-inferential, and that all thought comes via the intuition. This model argues that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the generation of insight.

In chapter three an investigation of the writings of Žong-ka-ba (Tsong-Kha-pa) is undertaken in order to ascertain how the Tibetan Geluk-ba (dGe lugs pa) school regard the relationship between analysis and insight. The model of chapter two will be compared with the Tibetan Geluk-ba accounts to gauge its explanatory power and correspondence with the Geluk-ba views.

Chapter four is an investigation of the writings of certain Western scholars. This investigation seeks to ascertain how these scholars may have regarded the relationship between analysis and insight. The chapter then compares these views with the model developed in chapter two.
TECHNICAL NOTE
The names of Tibetan schools and scholars will be given in "easy phonetics". This will help with pronunciation. For a discussion of the system see technical note at the beginning of the book Meditation on Emptiness (1983) by J. Hopkins
"The sun is not accessible to blind people, Heaven is not accessible to wicked people, the real, and the ideal to be realized is not accessible to logicians (tarkika). How can one take blindness for authority when examining a precious jewel?"


1 Introduction

Dr. Peter Fenner, in his book *The Ontology Of The Middle Way* (1990), makes the point that, based upon Madhyamika texts, it can be claimed that analysis has a very considerable bearing upon the generation of insight. Fenner argues that analysis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. According to Fenner, analysis generates insight by deconstructing conceptuality. In an unpublished paper Fenner puts forward quite an elaborate schema for the generation via conceptual deconstruction of a graduated, or progressive, path to insight. Fenner’s justification for his model is built upon a logico-psychological foundation.

Fenner asks the questions: what is the relationship between analysis and insight and whether analysis is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the generation of insight? It appears from looking at the writings of Western scholars that this question has not been addressed, or looked at in these terms: i.e is analysis a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the generation of insight? Similarly it does not appear that the Madhyamika themselves have considered the question. I will investigate and expand on what precisely is understood, or to be understood by the terms ‘insight’ and ‘analysis’ in the context of the debate, as well as their exact relationship.

This thesis therefore critically investigates the relationship between analysis and insight in the Prasangika Madhyamika. To be more specific, it tries to ascertain whether analysis is a only a necessary condition for the generation of insight, or a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the generation of insight. As was said above, this question was not asked by the Madhyamika, nor has it been asked by Western scholars, with the exception of Fenner. To answer this question, a logico-psychological model will be developed in chapter two which describes the mechanics and dynamics of insight generation.

11 Chapter outline

Summary

This thesis is divided into five chapters: an introductory chapter, conclusion, and three chapters of investigation. Chapter one of this thesis puts forward a psychological model based on extrapolating from
the Western psychological theories. This chapter investigates what certain Western psychological theories suggest might be the effect upon the mind of cogitating on contradictions. To be more specific, this investigation is undertaken in order to try to ascertain what they might say about the mental consequences of undertaking a Prasangika analytical meditation. From these theories an extrapolation is made about the possible relationship between analysis and insight. This investigation will lay the foundations for the logico-psychological cognitive stress model outlined in chapter two.

Chapter two will build upon chapter one and construct a logico-psychological model which can account for the generation of both a conceptual and an intuitive, i.e. non-inferential insight. Chapter three is an investigation of Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba's accounts of the nature of insight. This chapter uses the model developed in chapter two to see: a) how compatible it is with the Geluk-ba account; b) how it can increase the understanding of what happens to a Geluk-ba yogi who is generating insight; and, c) to give greater clarity to how insight may arise and from whence it comes. This chapter will show that for the Tibetan Geluk-ba school, as expounded by Dzong-ka-ba, analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the arising of both a conceptual and intuitive insight into emptiness (śūnyatā).

This examination focuses upon the Tibetan Geluk-ba school. This focus is undertaken because: 1) the role that analysis plays in generating insight is clearly discussed in the Geluk-ba tradition and 2) the role of analysis in generating insight in the works of Nagarjuna is a moot point amongst Western scholars. Consequently this chapter highlights, in conjunction with chapter four the problems of a) drawing universal conclusions about the Mādhyamika from the focusing upon limited traditions, and b) differing interpretations of the same tradition or text/s by different scholars. It further emphasizes that the conclusions drawn in this examination are only applicable to the Tibetan Geluk-ba school and may not apply to the views of Nagarjuna, and Candrakīrti.
The fourth chapter of the thesis, after the text, is an investigation of the writings of certain Western scholars. This investigation is undertaken in order to ascertain how these scholars may have regarded the relationship; i.e. is analysis a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the generation of insight for the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, and consequently how they may have regarded the Prasangika's answer. This thesis will demonstrate that there is a wide variation in how Western scholars see the relationship between analysis and insight within the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika. This variation, it will be seen, is due to the interpretations being based upon a) different Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika i.e. Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Ďong-ka-Đæ; and b) different interpretations of the same texts by different scholars. This chapter will try to ascertain how the views of the Western scholars fit with and are explained by, the logico-psychological model developed in chapter two.

III Chapter outline

1) Induce an altered state of consciousness, and
2) be a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the arising of insight.

The investigation will show that analysis could induce an altered state of consciousness and that there is evidence that analysis could be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the generation of an altered state of consciousness. This examination is important since the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika believe that it is possible to arrive at an altered state of consciousness by generating contradictions through analytical meditation. This psychological investigation will thus examine what Western psychology says are
the effects upon consciousness of the simultaneous copresence of mutually negating theses. It will be shown that the majority of these contradictions can be linked with the generation of altered states of consciousness. The Western psychological theories dealing with the effects of contradiction on the mind which we will examine are:

a) Cognitive dissonance developed by Festinger;
b) The theory of the double bind and paradoxical communication; and
c) Piaget's theory of equilibration.

The investigation of certain Western theories regarding the relationship between analysis and insight will lend support to the idea that, for Prāśāṅgika Mādhyamika, analysis in the form of consequential analysis (prasaṅga) could prepare the ground for both conceptual and intuitive insights to arise. When this happens, extrapolating from the Western theories it could be argued that analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for this arising. The arguments of this chapter will give some support for the Prāśāṅgika claim that analysis via consequential analysis (prasaṅga) brings about a change in consciousness.

The mechanics for this transformation of consciousness are derived from extrapolating from what the Western theories seem to indicate would take place within the mind of one experiencing a Prāśāṅgika Mādhyamika analysis. It appears that the mind is subjected to a great deal of stress when it cogitates upon contradictions. From these theories it was seen that there is a possibility that a change in consciousness could result from the mind trying to alleviate the stress which results when it cogitates upon contradictions. If this is possible, then this could explain the arising of both a conceptual and intuitive insight into emptiness (śūnyatā). In this model the mind avoids the stress by the cogitating of new inferences, which dissolves the illogicality of the contradictions and thus breaks the circular reasoning of illogicality.
Chapter two sets out to create a logico-psychological model which explains how and from where insight is generated. This model is the heart of the thesis; the rest of the thesis is viewed in terms of this model.

This model, in my humble view, is a completely original contribution to Mādhyamika scholarship. The model allows for a greater understanding of the psychological processes which may be in operation during the generation of insight. This model allows for greater understanding and clarity when it comes to inquiring into the relationship between analysis and insight. It also allows for a comparison to be made between the different schools within the Mādhyamika in terms of agreement and disagreement over the relationship between analysis and insight— as chapter three will demonstrate.

The model maintains that when analysis creates stress in the mind, the mind tries to avoid this stress by generating an inference, which breaks the illogicality of the paradoxes generated by analysis. This inference, it is maintained, is the conceptual realization of emptiness (śūnyatā). When the analysis is continued after the inferential realization and the mind is still subjected to cognitive (thinking) stress, the mind avoids this stress by eradicating conceptuality. When this happens, the inferential realization of emptiness (śūnyatā) is eradicated and the intuitive source for this inference is directed to consciousness where it is experienced as an uninferrable realization [like the intuition of duration] with a powerful force. This then is the intuitive realization of emptiness (śūnyatā). In the possible case of a non-analysis realization the model is basically the same. Where it differs is that some inferential process other than analysis creates both the inferential realization and the stress. It is maintained that the source for both the conceptual and intuitive realizations is the conceptual field. This field, it is argued, is made up of given concepts and possibly innate ideas. It is maintained that the expected experiences associated with the realization of emptiness (śūnyatā) and the concept of emptiness (śūnyatā) either enter the conceptual field either via the traditional Buddhist praxis, or are there in the
innate propensities. Because these ideas have never been conscious, the intuition finds appropriate conceptual approximations for the realization in the given conceptual field which then are given to consciousness as metaphorical awareness.

In this model, the realization of both the conceptual and intuitive realizations of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) is dependent upon the presence of a number of pre-conditions before they arise. This demonstrates that analysis, if used for the generation of insight, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the arising of both the inferential and non-inferential realization. The arising of the realization will not take place unless these conditions are present. Thus insight will not arise when one experiences a fit, is in dreamless sleep, or while just meditating, since without the presence of cognitive stress, an non-inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) via the intuition will not arise. This arising will not happen so long as one condition is absent. Thus when analysis, or some other inferential process, helps to generate insight it is only as a necessary, not as a sufficient condition.

The model presented in this chapter rests upon the idea that all thought has its source in the intuition; that is, via a non-inferential process. In other words any idea or concept is thrown up via the intuition by some non-inferential process into consciousness. This idea, it will be seen, allows for both the conceptual, i.e an inference of emptiness (śūnyatā) and intuitive insight -when conceptuality is eradicated by cognitive stress - of the Tibetan Geluk-ba school as well the idea that there is only an intuitive insight. This flexibility of the model, it is argued, is one of the strengths of the model; a strength which upon slight variations allows for and can account for the views of Inada, Murti, Fenner, Hopkins, Thurman, and Napper, as is shown in chapter five.

This model also sets out why the intuitive experience is different from the conceptual. In other words, it explains the nature of both the intuitive and conceptual experience. It is maintained that the conceptual experience is different from the intuitive because in
conceptual experience there is a residual belief in intrinsic existence. This residual belief is due to the belief in the absolute or intrinsic existence of logic. Logic via consequential analysis generates the inference of non-intrinsic existence. This inference is believed in, or held to be absolutely true, by believing in the intrinsic existence of logic itself. It is this belief in the intrinsic nature of logic - i.e that it possesses an essence (āvabhāva), is not dependent upon other things for its characteristics, is absolute and non-relative - which makes the conceptual experience different from the intuitive. It may be argued that logic is not an existent, since it is in the background of what gives form to a belief and thus that it is not part of the belief. If this point of view is argued, then it is still a fact that it is the belief in the absolute and truth generating nature of logic which allows one to believe in the truth of any inference. The belief in the intrinsic nature of logic justifies the inference or belief it generates; thus it is part of the belief. That is believing in the intrinsic nature of logic causes one to believe in the beliefs it generates.

The construction of this logico-psychological cognitive stress model has a number of important consequences for Mādhyamika scholarship :-

1) It allows us to be aware of the psychological processes happening in the mind of a yogi when generating insight. This awareness has interest to both Western psychology and to the Mādhyamika scholar interested in both Western and Buddhist models of the mind. Consequently, this thesis claims to be an original contribution to Prasangika scholarship as it investigates an entirely new question and offers a new way of looking at the material on the Prāsangika.

2) It explains how analysis may generate insight.

3) If analysis generates insight, it shows how this may be achieved.

4) It shows a) the psychological processes which bring about insight; b) what effect insight generation has upon the mind; c) where insight comes from; d) how cognition works; and e) the nature of intuition and conceptualization.
5) The model may help clarify, as well as offer a better interpretation of, Mādhyamika texts and certain ideas such as: a) the nature of the ultimate (paramārtha) i.e. if analysis generates insight what does this say about the transcendence of the ultimate (paramārtha)? b) the nature of the distinction between the two truths i.e. how can an ineffable, completely transcendent state be generated by something that belongs to the conventional (samurtti)? c) 'dependent origination' (pratītya-samutpāda) -i.e. if analysis is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the generation of insight is this compatible with 'dependent origination' (pratītya-samutpāda)? If it is not compatible then what does this say about the relationship, or 'dependent origination' (pratītya-samutpāda)? d) the causal nexus i.e. how can what is considered to be unconditioned (the ultimate (paramārtha) be produced by analysis?

6) The model can further throw light upon the nature, function and distinction between the Svātantrika's syllogism (svatantra) and the Prāsaṅgika's consequential analysis (prasaṅga) i.e. a) is there any difference in the insight generated by the syllogism (svatantra) and consequential analysis (prasaṅga)? b) what function does the syllogism (svatantra) and consequential analysis (prasaṅga) have in the generation of insight?

It should be pointed out that the model presented in this thesis is within the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika belief system. This model will lend support to one of the central tenets of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika: namely, that all views are self-contradictory. As Murti succinctly notes "... the Mādhyamika rejects all views... he shows the self-contradictory character [of all views]." This means that this model is not consistent and is self-negating. It is thus irrational by the standards of rationality, it contains contradictions and is basically flawed. It is maintained that a close examination of this model will uncover innate and irreconcilable contradictions. This claim thus places this model well within the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika belief system. It admits the validity of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika arguments as well as accepting that this model will contain elements, points of view and assumptions which are self-contradictory. With this point in mind, it is maintained that this model itself will not
be immune to the Mādhyaṃkaka reductio ad absurdum critique. This admission, firmly embeds the model within the Mādhyaṃkaka system and admits that it cannot escape from criticism and be free of contradiction. This is not to argue that flaws are a merit but only that the utility of the model will hopefully be in its pragmatic usefulness ie though it will have contradiction within it it will hopefully have some pragmatic truth in that it can account for the generation of insight. Thus though truth is something which is not contradictable, which this thesis cannot be if we accept Murti's claim, it nevertheless may have some pragmatic truth ie in explaining insight generation.

Chapter three is an investigation of the views of Dzong-ka-ba and the writing of E.Napper. In this investigation it will be shown that, for the Geluk-ba, analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the generation of a conceptual and intuitive insight. In terms of the arguments of chapter four the Tibetan Geluk-ba school's account of insight generation will be compared with the cognitive stress model. This chapter will test the model's applicability and explanatory power in terms of a Prāsaṅgika tradition. From this investigation it will be ascertained how the Tibetan Geluk-ba school may view the relationship between analysis and insight. Though the Prāsaṅgika, in the form of the Geluk-ba, argue analysis is essential for insight generation they have not apparently considered whether analysis is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for insight. Chapter four is an investigation, after the text, of the writings of certain Western scholars. This investigation will be undertaken in order to ascertain how the Prāsaṅgika in the view of these scholars a) may have considered the question of the relationship between analysis and insight; and b) consequently, how they may have considered what the Prāsaṅgika's answer may have been to the question. Also, the Western scholars' accounts will be compared with the logico-psychological model to explore how their views fare in terms of the model.
The above investigation does three things which are of importance and contribute to Mādhyamika scholarship:

1) it allows us to see after the text how, in terms of Western scholarship, Nāgarjūna (Mādhyamika), Candrakīrti (Prāsaṅgika) and Ḍzong-ka-ba (Tibetan Geluk-ba school) may have regarded the relationship; and thus seeing where they may agree and disagree. This will hopefully allow for a greater insight into the views of the Prasangika.

Chapter four will critically investigate the writings of some Western scholars in order to ascertain how they may have regarded the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika views about the relationship between consequential analysis (prasaṅga) and insight. The views to be discussed in this chapter range from those that only consider the views of Nāgārjuna (Inada, Murti and Streng) to those that only consider the views of Candrakīrti (Fenner), and to those that only consider the views of the Prāsaṅgika Geluk-ba (Hopkins, Thurman and Napper). It will be seen that there are four main categories into which the views regarding the relationship between analysis and insight are divided:

1) Consequential analysis (prasaṅga) has nothing to do with the generation of insight and is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the arising of insight (Inada, Murti). It will be shown that these views are compatible with the logico-psychological model.

2) There is a weak relationship between consequential analysis (prasaṅga) and insight. That is, consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is only a preparatory stage preparing the ground for an intuitive apprehension of ultimate truth (paramārtha). In this model, consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is only a necessary condition (Murti, Streng and Gangadean). This weak relationship, it will be shown, is like the above views compatible with and explained by the logico-psychological model.
3) The relationship is a strong one, namely the relationship is one in which consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is seen as a direct cause for producing a non-conceptual realization of insight. Likewise, consequential analysis is regarded as being a necessary and sufficient condition for producing a non-conceptual insight (Fenner). This strong view will be shown to be compatible with the logico-psychological model in regard to the idea of a non-conceptual insight.

4) The relationship is a very strong one: in which consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is seen as a direct and efficient cause for producing both a conceptual and a non-conceptual i.e. intuitive insight. Consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is regarded as a necessary and a sufficient condition for the arising of both a conceptual and a non-conceptual insight (Hopkins, Thurman and Napper). It will be shown that the nature of the insight, that is, intuitive and conceptual, is compatible with the logico-psychological model, but the strong position is not.

The main difference between the strong view and the very strong view is that the strong view only considers analysis as a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of a non-conceptual insight. While the very strong view considers that analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of both a conceptual and non-conceptual i.e. an intuitive insight. Thus Fenner can be placed before Hopkins, Napper and Thurman.

It is seen from this examination that there is a theoretical progression from no relationship towards a strong one where analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for a conceptual insight, this is not so for an intuitive realization from weak through to a very strong one where analysis is considered to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of an intuitive insight. As well, this examination demonstrates that a lot of the disagreement between scholars as to the relationship between analysis and insight in the Prāśāṅgika is due to the scholars working within or dealing with different subschools within the Mādhyamika traditions. This examination highlights the problem of drawing universal conclusions
about the Prasangika from the investigation of only one tradition. Consequently, this thesis will only focus on the Prasangika Geluk-ba tradition of Dzong-ka-"ba- this focus will involve looking at those parts of Dzong-ka-"ba's work which specially deals with insight and it's generation. In doing this, and highlighting the reasons for the divergent interpretations, a greater insight into the relationship between analysis and insight is gained. The views of Inada, Murti, de Jong, Fenner, Hopkins, Thurman and Napper will examined to see how they are compatible with and explained by the logico-psychological cognitive stress model. It will be seen that the model can account for all these views by slightly altering certain parameters. This flexibility, it is argued, is a strength of the model.

The appendix is an examination of the Prasangika and Svatantrika views regarding the syllogism (svatantra). It will be shown that they disagree over the epistemological justifications for the use of the syllogism (svatantra). This disagreement, it will be shown, is based upon their differing views regarding the two truths. The appendix clarifies and gives background to certain points made in chapter two regarding the nature of the insight generated by the syllogism and consequential analysis (prasaṅga).

At this stage it is important to outline what is meant by a number of terms. These terms are of importance such that an understanding of the basic arguments can be followed. The terms are: 'analysis' 'insight' and a necessary and a sufficient condition.

IV Analysis
Analysis (vicāra) is a technical term used in all schools of Buddhism and means, as Fenner notes, "... a close scrutiny, examination, investigation, inspection or analysis of some meditative entity."¹⁰ For the Mādhyamika, analysis "... specifically means a rational or ratiocinative investigation, a conceptual analysis... Candrakīrti links it to reversing conceptuality".¹¹ Now in terms of the Mādhyamika it is necessary to distinguish within analysis (vicāra) between what could be called consequential analysis (prasaṅga) and the syllogistic analysis (svatantra).
V Consequential Analysis (Prasanga)

Bugault, Gangadean and Fenner argue that, in consequential analysis (prasaṅga), the logical axioms of the laws of thought - i.e. the Aristotelian law of contradiction, excluded middle and the law of identity - are used to discover logical inconsistencies within philosophical arguments. It should be pointed out that some Madhyamika scholars argue that the Madhyamika do not accept the law of the excluded middle, notably Bugault.¹²

The contradictions are generated in order to negate their adversaries' ontic, epistemological, or metaphysical claims by demonstrating the insubstantiality or emptiness (śūnyatā) of the arguments.¹³ This method of generating internal contradictions to a thesis is also called consequential (prasaṅga) analysis. Though some scholars¹⁴ would disagree, Fenner argues that consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is meant not to perpetuate or proliferate itself but rather to dissolve itself by reversing the conceptual process and thus bringing about the complete attrition of conceptuality itself.¹⁵ On this point P.Blimoria would point out why is not this a further step in the prasaṅga; a logical not a consequential move.¹⁶

My understanding of consequential analysis is that consequential analysis (Prasanga) was meant to have a cathartic effect upon the mind. It was meant to purge the mind of conceptualization and dissolve the process of reification by demonstrating the emptiness (śūnyatā) of the things signified by the concepts. Through consequential analysis (prasaṅga), the practitioner stripped back the layers of the conceptualization process to lay the ground for the direct experience, or yogic vision, of the ultimate (paramārtha). The soteriological function of consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is seen clearly in the words of Candrakīrti, from his Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvītāra):

When things are [conceived to intrinsically] exist, then conceptuality (kalpanā) is produced. But a thorough analysis shows how things are [in fact] not [intrinsically] existent. [When it is realized] there are no [intrinsically] existent things. The conceptualizations do not arise, just as for example, there is no fire without fuel.¹⁷
Ordinary people are bound by their concepts, but non-conceptualizing yogins [who realize the nature of things (dharmata)] become liberated. The learned have said the result of analysis (viśara) is the reversal of conceptualizations.\(^{18}\)

V1 **Necessary and Sufficient Conditions**

To say that something is a necessary condition for an effect is to say it at the very least has to present in order for the effect to take place. In other words "this is a necessary condition for that iff that cannot be without this"\(^{19}\). On the other hand to say that a thing is a sufficient condition for an effect means that this thing by itself is enough for the effect to arise. In other words "this is a sufficient condition for that iff this is by itself enough to guarantee that".\(^{20}\) Thus to say that analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the arising of insight means that analysis has to be present along with other conditions for insight to arise. If analysis was a sufficient condition this would mean that only analysis is required for the arising of insight. We will argue that analysis for both traditions of the Mādhyamika, the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for insight.

V11 **Focus**

It is important to outline why I only look at the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, as expounded by the Tibetan Geluk-ba school in chapter three, is undertaken. This outlining is important because the views of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are down played. Firstly, in the Tibetan tradition the Geluk-ba order is the dominant tradition.\(^{21}\) Secondly, in the works of Ązung-ka-ba are to be found "... the central issues and most intricate points of the Prasangika school with a precision and style unmatched in Buddhist literature".\(^{22}\) Ązung-ka-ba worked from a wider body of Mādhyamika texts and sources than is available to the modern scholar.\(^{23}\) As Napper states "... the body of texts relied upon by [Āzung-ka-ba] goes far beyond that worked on by any single contemporary scholar...simply because there is so much ground that has not yet been covered in the field of Buddhist studies".\(^{24}\) One reason for focusing on Ązung-ka-ba at the expense of Nāgārjuna is the difficulties associated with Nagarjuna’s texts.
Napper points out "... Mādhyamika philosophy is difficult to understand, especially because the works of the founder of the system, Nāgārjuna, are exceedingly terse and subject to a variety of interpretations. Thus there has always been debate among those who claim to uphold the Mādhyamika system as to what it is". It is argued that the cryptic and terse writing was in fact a conscious rejection of systemization. Thus because of the ongoing debates as to the quality of Mādhyamika translation the works of the Indian Mādhyamika will be used quite sparingly so that one avoids the problem of differing interpretations and ideas regarding the right translation.

The majority of scholars, according to Napper, in commenting upon the works of Nāgārjuna, argue that they base their interpretations of the Mādhyamika upon this Buddhist. Also, a number study Candrakīrti and even fewer study Bhāvaviveka. Thus it can be seen that Dzong-ka-ba is an ideal source to study in order to ascertain the views of the Indian Mādhyamika. Napper notes that Dzong-ka-ba would have considered the views of many Western Mādhyamika scholars to be incorrect interpretations of the Mādhyamika tradition. This claim of Dzong-ka-ba cannot be taken lightly in view of his access to more prodigious sources. Thus by moving beyond a sole reliance upon Candrakīrti and Nagarjuna we have an opportunity in the works of Dzong-ka-ba penetrate perhaps to a greater interpretative depth the Indian Mādhyamika. The problem of solely relying upon the Indian Mādhyamika is succinctly captured by Napper when she states:

Thus, those who think that a correct understanding of Mādhyamika must be sought from the writings of Nāgārjuna may not accept [Dzong-ka-ba's] basic approach. However, such an attitude seems unnecessarily limited first because, to borrow a point from Alex Wayman, it must be pointed out that Western interpreters who, in seeking to understand Mādhyamika, would disallow interpretations of Nāgārjuna by latter Mādhyamika authors being too late, too far removed from the subject, too likely to introduce their own opinions, and so forth, might just as well rule
out themselves, since they are even later. Of course, it is important to distinguish between what was actually said by Nāgārjuna and what is later commentary; nonetheless to refuse the assistance of trained scholars close to Nāgārjuna and steeped in the same intellectual and cultural milieu seems both arrogant and short sighted to say nothing of unlikely to succeed. Further-more, Mādhyamika is not Nāgārjuna, even though he was the founder of the system, but is the tradition that evolved and matured based on his writings which includes those of [which Dzong-ka-ba had access to].

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Thus in using Dzong-ka-ba I will rely heavily upon the interpretations of E. Napper rather than directly upon her translation.

One central problem which plagues the hermeneutical enterprise is the ever-present spectre of subjectivity. This subjectivity to some
degree undermines Kant's, Husserl's and Peirce's claim for 'objectivity' when they insist that "... if truth means anything at all there must be some single, timeless 'objective' truth independent of particular perspectives or methods". Now if there is to be some validity in the subjective hermeneutical enterprise, there must be some mid-position between the objectivists' arguments and the complete relativism of Nietzsche, who maintained, as stated by R.C. Solomon, "... that there are only perspectives, only a variety of incommensurable truths that change through history and from culture to culture." The claims of Nietzsche cannot be easily dismissed. Kalupahana asserts that terms like samyrti, paramārtha and nirvikalpa are used in different ways by the Buddha, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. This opens up the possibility that the work of scholars is a culture-bound hermeneutic, particularly since the translation of language is a somewhat personal or subjective enterprise; Wayman notes on this point that "...specialists in Mādhyaṃka have uniformly mistranslated the verse XXIV. 18 [of the Madhyamaka-Kārikā], and accordingly have failed to put Nagarjuna's middle path in proper focus." Wayman goes on to note that the culture and paradigm bound nature of some Mādhyaṃka scholarship. Wayman points out that T.R.V. Murti's book The Central Philosophy of Buddhism was "... written from a Vedantic background". Likewise, Robinson's work Early Mādhyaṃka in India "... might ... be down graded for its vocabulary drawn from modern philosophy of language...". When it comes to Streng's book, Emptiness - A study in Religious meaning, Wayman notes that "... certain sources employed by Streng ... colored his work..." More recently A.P. Tuck, in his book Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship, On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna, argues that "every scholarly community - or what Stanley Fish calls an 'interpreters community' - will have its own 'symbolic generalizations, models, and exemplars' and every generation of scholars will have its own methodological trends, stylistic preferences, and lists of canonical texts and founding father. In
addition influencing any scholarly enterprise will be social, political and economic, religious and national loyalties and innumerable unconscious cultural determinants... A product of scholarly labor will at some level be a reflection of the author's psychology and personal history..." 39 Dr. B.Bilimoria succinctly summarizes Tuck's arguments when he says that according to Tuck each scholar interprets the texts in terms of the expected and accepted modes of practice and beliefs and commitments current within each scholar's scholarly community.40 Tuck calls this hermeneutics isogesis, a "reading into" the text that often reveals as much about the interpreter as dose the text being interpreted".41 As distinct from exegesis. "Isogesis is an unconscious phenomenon, whereas exegesis is simply conscious intent"42 . Tuck points out that the isogesitic hermeneutics of Nagarjuna's texts has ranged from the Kantianism of Stoberbatsky's and Murti's, the analytic or formal logic tradition to F.Staal's, B.K.Matilal and R.Robinson's through to that tradition influenced by L.Wittgenstein43 [e.g D.Daye, E.Conze, F.Staal, I.Walda and S.Ichimura]. These comments of Tuck indicate that there is an hermeneutical relativism associated with Madhyamika scholarship due to a degree of subjectivity associated with interpretation. While P.Feyerabend in discussing science argues as Tuck argues that methodology depends upon the scholar and his historical period Feyerabend like wise says of the scientific methodology " It is clear that, the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests upon too naive a view of man and his social surroundings"44; and his book Against Method sets out to show that there is no privileged methodology whatsoever that guarantees the discovery of 'truth'.

These comments regarding the subjectivity of investigation alert us to the biases present in any investigation. Even this investigation is bound to be biased, e.g. in the selection of translations and in the interpretive framework used. Thus the claims for subjectivity show us that a culture-bound subjectivity is a factor which may distort the understanding of the Madhyamika tenets. Even though it is pointed out that this thesis is not exempt from subjective bias and hermeneutical isogesis [to use Tuck's neologism] it is hoped that the salient Prasangika Madhyamika points of view are presented in
such away that they are not heavily contaminated by personal predispositions. These comments regarding the subjectivity of the enterprise may sound as if one is putting forward a self-disqualification to engage Buddhological scholarship. This is far from the truth, for all that the above is meant to point out is that though a scholar may have an understanding far more salient than the layman, nevertheless some of his understanding is due to his own subjectivity; a subjectivity which may distort the subject matter. Tuck states the issue clearly when he says "...however, as I have said, the suspicion that one's own investigations are neither objective nor timeless is no cause for panic. Recognition of the isotethical nature of interpretations neither invalidates work nor offers interpretative licence...Consequently the most we can hope for from our own interpretation is to provide, in Richard Rorty's words "the culminating reinterpretation of our predecessors reinterpretation of their predecessor's interpretation"." 45

The interpretation of texts requires an overriding paradigm that directs the enterprise and thus to some degree determines the language within which the interpretations are framed. There have been at least seven main hermeneutical approaches to the study of Madhyamika texts. The paradigmatic approaches that we can distinguish are 1) philosophical (de Jong, Wayman); 2) analytic (Robinson, Staal); 3) phenomenology of religion (Stengel); 4) comparative philosophy (Murty); 5) logical philosophy (Gangadean, Ichimura); 6) Western philosophy (Sprung); and 7) philosophical psychology (Renner). The hermeneutic adopted for this thesis is that of philosophical psychology.

VII Primary Sources and Translations

This thesis uses a number of Western writings and a number of Madhyamika texts as primary sources. The primary Western sources upon which a critical investigation is undertaken in order to investigate the question of the relationship between analysis and insight are ten in number. These Western sources, upon which the investigation is
undertaken, range from five dealing with Nāgārjuna, to two dealing with Candrakīrti and three dealing with the Geluk-ba. These sources are:


2) Candrakīrti a) P. Fenner *The Ontology Of The Middle Way* b) Th. Stcherbatsky *The Conception Of Nirvana*

3) Geluk-ba a) E.Napper *Dependent Co-arising and Emptiness* b) J.Hopkins *Meditation on Emptiness* c) R.Thurman *Tsong Khapa Speech Of Gold* In "The Essence Of True Eloquence". In chapter four two Tibetan sources - Geluk-ba Prasangika - shall be used Dzong-ka-ba's *Great exposition of the Stages of the Path* and his *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.

Having outlined above the problems of the available Indian Madhyamika translations of the Madhyamika corpus and the limited use I will make of them in this thesis to draw interpretations from, I nevertheless cannot get away from using some portion from a number of translations in making my claim that the question of the relationship between analysis and insight was not asked. Thus it is important to note which translations I have used, and the reason for deciding upon a particular translation. Now even though I do use some portion of these translations as primary sources in the thesis, the points made above on the problem with translation from the Indian Madhyamika must continually be borne in mind.

The primary Madhyamika sources used in this thesis, from which it is argued that the question of the relationship between analysis and insight was not considered, are: Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (Mūlamadhyamakārikās), Candrakīrti's the *Supplement to the Middle Way* (Madhyamakāvatara), and the *Clear words* (Prasannapadā) and Bhavavivoka's the *Blaze of Reasoning* (Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajñālā) and the *Precious lamp of the
Middle Way (Mādyamakaratnapradīpa). All of these works are available in English translations, and as such this study will be based upon these English language translations. Streng's translation of the Treatise of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamikakārikā) will be used, although some Buddhist scholars don't accept this translation and de Jong has reservations. Wayman notes that when it comes to Streng's book, Emptiness - A study in Religious meaning, Wayman notes that "... certain sources employed by Streng ... colored his work..." and Robinson would have rejected it. Streng's translation will be used since this is the translation referred to by scholars such as Hopkins and Lopez. Nevertheless it could be argued why does Hopkins's and Lopez's opinion carry more weight than de Jong and Robinson. The answer is that any selection of translations will be based upon the quality of the translation and as we see with the two opposing sets of ideas this is itself a matter of scholarly dispute. Consequently in adopting Hopkins's and Lopez's opinion I am persuaded by the fact that these are relatively modern scholars and that consequently their opinion are based upon a greater corpus of Mādhyamika scholarship as to the value of Streng's translation. Kalupahana has done a recent translation of this work but this translation will not be used as Kalupahana is biased towards the Pali canon and Napper notes that she herself has reservations about his translation as she states "...I have found many points of disagreement." This is not to say that Kalupahana's translation is not worth considering but that I am unable to judge -because I have no Pali-as to where the translation is biased. For the Refutation of Objections (Vigrahyaavartani) I will use Bhattacharya's translation of it and its auto commentary. Sprung's partial translation of the Clear words (Prasannapada), as well as Stcherbatsky's translation of this work in his book The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, since it contains material not present in Sprung's translation. Huntington has done a recent translation of the Madhyamakāvatārā (Supplement to the Middle Way) and Penner has also done a translation of the Introduction on the Middle Way (Supplement to the Middle Way) (Madhyamakāvatāra). When I come to use Condrakīrti's work I shall juxtapose both Huntington's and Penner's translations so as to try and ascertain the meaning of the passages based upon the consensus that exits between the translations. Iida's partial translation of the Blaze of Reasoning
(Madhyamakahrdayavyavrittitarkajñāna) is used as it is the only translation; Ichimura's partial translation of the Karatalaratna and Lindtner's partial [CD1] translation of the Precious Lamp for the Middle Way (Madhyamakaratnapradīpa) will be used as these are readily available.
NOTES

1 Bhavaviveka does not state whose these 'tarikas' are. Sir Monier Monier Williams in his A Sanskrit-English Dictionary Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, notes that the term 'tarika' is usually applied to the Nyaya system, though it is also applied to the other five Indian systems.


4 ibid., p. 150.

5 ibid., pp. 115-119.

6 ibid., pp. 118-122.

7 ibid., p. 100.

8 Iizutsu says Towards a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism, Prajna Press, Boulder Colorado, 1982, p. 168) that, in Rinzai Zen, meditating on contradictions (koans) is meant to make the mind go through a state of formidable inner tension [see material on cognitive dissonance, double bind and equilibration] a tension verging on a state of psychosis, and thus leading to a final breakthrough.


10 P. Fenner, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

11 ibid., p. 103.


13 ibid., p. 103.

14 P. Fenner, in personal conversation.

15 P. Fenner, op. cit., p. 103.

16 Personal correspondence.


18 ibid., p. 102.


20 ibid., p. 242.


22 ibid., p. 22.


24 ibid., p. 140.

25 ibid., p. 8

26 ibid., p. 148.

27 ibid., p. 68.
ibid., p. 68.

ibid., p. 73.

ibid., p. 139.

ibid., p. 139.


ibid., p. 168.


ibid., p. 141.

ibid., pp. 141-142.

ibid., p. 142.


ibid., p. 96.

P. Bilimoria, Review of A.P. Tuck, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* (U K) (Forthcoming)

A. P. Tuck *op. cit.*, p. 10.

ibid., p. 10.

ibid., p. 10


A. Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 142

P. Bilimoria, personal conversation.


P. Fenner, in personal conversation.


"In ultimate reality... Ah! you [the incomparable one] are indeed the one who illumines the reality most difficult to illumine."
1 Introduction

Peter Fenner, in his book *The Ontology Of The Middle Way*, argues that analysis plays a strong part in the generation of insight for the Madhyamika. As Fenner notes:

"...it is difficult not to infer - given the prominent and extensive utilization of analysis in Madhyamika texts and their placement of this in a genuine religious tradition - that analysis must have some bearing on at least some aspects of the Madhyamika's quest for spiritual liberation."¹

This claim of Fenner's appears to be supported by Candrakirti, who argues that [Fenner's translation] "...a thorough analysis shows how things are [in fact] not [intrinsic]ly existent. [When it is realized that] there are no [intrinsically] existent things, the conceptualizations do not arise..."² Huntington translates the same verse as "...upon critical investigation the entity as such proves to be nonexistent, and in the absence of an [intrinsically existent] entity, these reified concepts are inappropriate..."³. In Huntington's verse critical investigation is another term for what Huntington calls deconstructive analysis⁴. This deconstructive analysis is the Reductio ad absurdum⁵; thus it is the same as Fenner's analysis. Huntington calls vikalpa reified concepts⁶ and Fenner calls vikalpa conceptual bifurcation⁷. Thus the claim that conceptualization is eradicated by analysis [Fenner] and Huntington's claim that with critical analysis reified concepts are inappropriate appear to be synonymous if inappropriate means donot arise. Thus it appears that the same meanings can be obtained from both Fenner's and Huntington's translations.

That analysis plays a part in the achieving of liberation is supported by Gyatso. Gyaltsö notes in his *Heart of Wisdom* that liberation can only come about after the intuitive [nonconceptual] realisation of emptiness [sūnyatā]⁸, or in other words the eradication of conceptuality. Thus Fenner's claim that analysis plays
a part in the generation of insight is supported by the Tibetan
tradition and Candrakirti's comments; as translated by Fenner and
Huntington.

Fenner maintains that a Madhyamika analysis brings about insight by
deconstructing conceptuality.9 This deconstruction comes about by the
mind experiencing a stasis due to the Madhyamika analysis generating
two contradictory theses10. Fenner argues that when the mind is
subjected to two mutually contradictory theses it can either
backtrack to a pre-analysis situation, or it can deconstruct
conceptuality11. According to Fenner, analysis is a necessary and a
sufficient condition for the generation of insight.12 Fenner gains
some support for his theory from the philosophical writings of D.
Armstrong.13 Nevertheless, he does not mention what Western
psychological theory may say is the effect of contradiction on the
mind, or what part analysis may play in the generation of insight
from a Western psychological perspective.

This chapter attempts to discover what Western psychological
theorists may say are the effects upon the mind which experiences the
presence of contradictory ideas. This exegesis of certain Western
psychological theories will be undertaken to try and ascertain if
there is any Western support to the apparent Madhyamika claim that
analysis induces insight, or in other words an altered state of
consciousness. From these Western psychological theories an
extrapolation will be undertaken in order to create a possible
psychological model of what happens to the mind which experiences a
Madhyamika analysis. Also this exegesis will ascertain whether
analysis is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the
generation of insight.

In order to undertake this exegesis, it is important first to
understand exactly what insight [Prajñā] is and what a Madhyamika
analytical meditation does. In outlining the nature of the analytical
meditation, the relevance of looking at what Western psychology say
might be the effects on the mind of a person who cogitates on
contradictions will be appreciated.
2 Analytical Meditation and Insight

The aim of the Prasangika analytical meditation is to generate conceptual paradoxes. The generation of these paradoxes entails the simultaneous affirmation of a thesis and its antithesis. Analysis seeks to generate paradoxes, which the Prasangika believe are inherent in any belief and which are hidden from the non-analytical intellect.

With the simultaneous presence of two logical but negating theses, it is argued that the predicative nature of thought breaks down and that this then becomes the basis for the arising of non-conceptuality. Fenner argues that, with the copresence of contradictory theses, a tension is set up between the two which can be relieved by the student in one of two ways. Either the student back-steps to a non-critical position, or the student leaps into non-conceptuality. The leap into non-conceptuality, Fenner argues, comes about because it is a psychological impossibility for consciousness to contain simultaneously in a unity of consciousness logically paradoxical theses. The copresence of these negating theses dissolves the foundations of predication, with the consequence that there is a destructuring of conceptuality. This, Fenner maintains, can be interpreted as insight. It should be pointed out that a subject may not perceive that a contradiction exists between two theses, or that the subject may not believe that a contradiction exists when there is one. Thus the above must surely only apply when the subject is aware of the contradiction or believes that there is a contradiction even if there is not a contradiction.

The question to be asked is: What support do these ideas have from Western psychology? And what does Western psychology say are the effects upon a mind which experiences mutually contradictory ideas? In order to ascertain the possible answers, an exegesis of Western psychological theories will be undertaken. These theories are 'double blind', cognitive dissonance and equilibration theory. These theories deal with the effects of contradictions upon the mind. The data collected by these Western psychological paradigms suggest that:-

1) a stressful situation is generated when the mind is subjected to
contradictions.

2) cogitating on paradoxes may induce the mind into another mode. On this point P.Bilimoria claims that (A\textsuperscript{\neg}A) make very little if any neural cognitive changes in one’s brain (mind), no more than does (A \lor \textsuperscript{\neg}A), or even N(A \lor \textsuperscript{\neg}A) [or, N A. N - A]. Bilimoria argues that the anxiety is purely logical, and the way out is epistemological not psychological or mystical\textsuperscript{18}. My reply is that the anxiety is a psychological state, so the way out can only be psychological even if the anxiety is produced by logic.

**Insight**

Some scholars like Hopkins, Napper, and Thurman translate Prajñā as wisdom, while others like Fenner and Wayman translate it as insight. Lindtner notes that “Nagarjuna does not spend many words discussing Prajñā in the abstract but instead employs it in its current sense of analytical understanding or intellect conversant with general truths”\textsuperscript{19}. Now pra\textsuperscript{\text{\textae}} according to Lindtner [inregard to Nagarjuna’s use] “...is a critical faculty constantly engaged in analysing...”\textsuperscript{20} At a certain point “...the analytical understanding suddenly shifts into an intuitive jñāna which has ānyata as its object...”\textsuperscript{21} The culmination of Prajñā is the an intuitive realisation jñāna. According Wayman prajñā, is made up of three levels “insight consisting of hearing (srutamayi), consisting of pondering (cintamayi) and consisting of cultivation (bhāvanamayi).”\textsuperscript{22} Gyatso in his book Heart of Wisdom says that “inferential cognizers realizing emptiness have the nature of wisdom [chos rab], and can be of three types: wisdom arisen from hearing, wisdom arisen from contemplation and wisdom arisen from meditation... Having developed this [wisdom from hearing and contemplation], if we continue to meditate on emptiness we gain a special valid experience of emptiness through the power of meditation.”\textsuperscript{23} Gyatso and the other Tibetans use the word shes rab for the term Prajñā. Thus for Gyatso and the Tibetans Prajñā or chos rab refers to an inferential realisation of emptiness this is in agreement with Nagarjuna. Now the Tibetan term used for jñāna is yc_shes, which is translated as ‘exalted wisdom’. Now according to Gyatso ‘exalted wisdom’ is the wisdom of a superior being; a being who cognizes emptiness directly, or intuitively.\textsuperscript{24} Thus we see that insight (prajñā) is a conceptual realisation of emptiness and jñāna, yc_shes, or ‘exalted wisdom’ is an intuitive
realisation of emptiness. Now this thesis will examine both realizations ie Prajñā and ve she in regard to how analysis brings these states of conceptual and intuitive realization of emptiness [sūnyatā]. Thus through out this thesis insight will refer to both conceptual insight [prajñā] and intuitive insight [jñāna] and where necessary I will refer to conceptual insight as prajñā and intuitive insight as jñāna.

3 "Double Bind"

From its first formulation in 1956 the theory of the 'double bind' has been said to be the cause of a number of phenomena. These include: attributing the aetiology of schizophrenia25 to a 'double bind' situation; the generation of neurosis to the 'double binding' nature of living in society26. As well as these, such things as: religion, creativity, humour, poetry and delinquency have also been attributed to the 'double bind'. 27 In all cases it is assumed that the 'double bind' brings about a transformation in consciousness either pathogenically i.e mental illness, or therapeutically i.e creating creative mental states28. Sluzki and Ransom29 go so far as to say that "the 'double bind' is one of the revolutionary ideas of the twentieth century... it constitutes a new approach to psychopathology and leads to a radically different way of thinking and speaking about human behavior in general ... [it is ] a new epistemology which has enriched psychiatry, psychology, sociology, linguistics and other field within the vast domain of the behavioral sciences."30

The original formulation of the 'double bind' theory postulated the presence of five ingredients to bring about a 'double bind' situation.31 The first ingredient was that there had to be two or more people. The second ingredient was the repeated experience of the 'double bind'. The third ingredient was that there had to be primary injunction, with the threat of punishment if it was not obeyed. The fourth ingredient was that there had to be a second injunction conflicting with the first and also promising punishment for failure to comply. Finally the fifth ingredient involved a tertiary injunction prohibiting the person from leaving the environment. The
presence of contradictions is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the arising of an altered state of consciousness. It should be noted that through the presence of a contradiction is a necessary condition in this case for the alteration of consciousness, there may be other alternative causal chains leading to this state in which contradictions are not a necessary condition.

That the environment of the Prasangika yogi fits roughly into the environment of the 'double binded' person is easily seen when the pre-enlightenment parameters of the yogi are examined. As was pointed out above, the yogi must be committed to the validity of the thesis he/she is going to contradict. This commitment can be likened to the first injunction of the 'double bind'. It was also pointed out that the yogi must accept the validity of the law of contradiction, and identity; thus he is committed to believing the truth of the antithesis he/she generates. As was pointed out in the introduction, some argue that the Madhyamika rejects the law of the excluded middle, pointing out that if he accepts the law, his negation of proposition p ought to commit him logically to the truth of not-p, but the Prasangika also negates not-p as well. Nevertheless, the generated antithesis can therefore be likened to the second negative injunction which conflicts with the first. The condition that the person experiencing the 'double bind' is stopped from leaving the environment of the 'double bind' is paralleled in the yogi's case by the self-enforced restriction which prevents him/her from escaping from the paradox by back-tracking to a pre-analysis situation. Although there is no formal threat of punishment, the belief that without a successful insight into emptiness there will be a perpetuation of the subject's suffering could be seen as a form of punishment.

The result for someone experiencing a 'double bind' is a possible 'flip' into a state of schizophrenia, due to a breakdown in the person's ability to discriminate between logical types. Bilimoria makes the point that if the initiate had a background in Nyāya...
or Madhyamika, or Aristotelian logic there would be no incapacity since she/he would see past the 'double bind' and say N[ N (pv ¬P)\]. My reply is possibly, but this is like saying that because the Madhyamika knows that analysis negates analysis, then he must see past the prasangas' he creates in his meditations and debates and thus there would be no anxiety from an analytical mediation, but as Hopkins points out [see below] there is anxiety generated by the prasangas'. Now to continue, in terms of the idea that meditating on paradoxes induces an altered state of consciousness, it is of interest to note that Bateson et al, in the original article, likens the situation of the 'double bounded' to the pre-enlightenment situation of a Zen Buddhist. It is important to point out that schizophrenia is only one of a range of possible consequences of the 'double bind'. Bateson notes that "within the bind pattern itself there is nothing to determine whether the outcome will be schizophrenia, a humorist, or a poet." Regardless of Suzuki's and Ransom's eulogy, the theory of the 'double bind' has met with opposition from its first formulation. Some critics argue that the theory is too abstract and not amenable to experimental verification. Others maintain that the theory is so slippery that it can support a number of alternative interpretations. Bateson, one of the original formulators, concedes that the theory is not easily amenable to experimental verification and is so abstract that it tends to be self-validating. It is argued that much of the literature debates just what the 'double bind' is. Evidence in support of the 'double bind' theory is meager and does not come from an accepted experimental framework. Though the above would seem to discredit the theory of the 'double bind', the situation is in fact not so cut and dry. The negative results of the experiments may possibly have more to do with experimental methodology, than with the validity of the theory. Aheles captures the situation when he notes that "hard data [about the 'double bind' causing schizophrenia] from controlled experimentation has largely been negative, but there are such basic problems with these studies that the matter cannot so simply be laid
to rest. Basic assumptions about the nature of the concept and its essential features are involved, as are assumptions underlying our strategies of research. In other words, there have been problems with the negative experiments such that a definite unequivocal assessment of the theory has not been achieved. Consequently the question of the theory's validity is a moot point.

The philosophical theory which underpins 'double bind' theory is Russell's theory of logical types. Russell's theory argues that "...a class cannot be a member of itself, nor can a member of the class be the class: classes and members are of different logical types." Russell devised the theory to resolve the vicious circle of reasoning involved in self reflexive paradoxes of the Epimenides type: that is Epimenides the Cretan says 'that Cretans are always liars'. Russell argued that some statements were neither true nor false but meaningless; the Epimenides paradox was one of these meaningless statements because it violated the theory of logical types, in that the statement of Epimenides refers to itself. Anthony Flew argues that Russell's theory of logical types has proved unsatisfactory though his solution of the paradox is to some degree accepted.

Russell proposed that the way to resolve the paradox was to go to a higher level of abstraction. The resolution of the Epimenides paradox lay in treating the remark as being of a different logical order by saying it belonged to a metalanguage. This method of paradox resolution has met with agreement in regard to the type typified by the Epimenides paradox.

Thus in terms of Russell and Bateson et.al the 'double bind' [paradox] places the person in a vicious circle of reasoning. The person is entrapped within a self perpetuating 'double bind', an oscillation between alternative logical contradictions. The only way the person can extricate himself/herself from the 'double bind' is by breaking through into an altered state of consciousness, either pathogenic or mind-expanding.
The idea that paradoxes have the effect of bringing about a breakthrough into an altered state of consciousness is validated in Zen Buddhism, where Izutsu says that, in Rinzai Zen, meditating on paradoxes (koans) is meant to make "the mind [goes] through a state of formidable inner tension verging on the state of psychosis, thus leading the way to a final breakthrough" into enlightenment. J. Hopkins in regard to the Geluk-ba also says that stress is experienced when doing an analytical meditation. As he states "...the reformulation of ideas [is] a harrowing process [under] analytical meditation...". This stress results from the mind trying to regain intelligibility. On this point Rinzai Zen likewise argues that "...our mind is so firmly habituated to work at the level of intellectual understanding and never stand still until it finds a meaning in any verbal utterance or statement...". As well as contributing to insight generation in Prasangika, as outlined by Hopkins, mental stress is a major element in what was the precursor to Zen namely Chinesse Ch' an Buddhism. R.E.Buswell notes that the technique of k'an-hua as fostered by Ta-hui placed the practitioner in a state of mental stress which then had the effect of flipping the practitioner into an altered state of consciousness, i.e. enlightenment as Buswell notes "...mental stress and existential quandary were exactly the states that Ta-hui sought to foster through k'an-hau [to generate insight]". Now these formidable inner tensions and psychotic symptoms of a 'double bind' situation are in fact validated by experimental research.

There was an experiment performed by Dush and Brodsky in 1981 which was based upon an experiment which Abeles cited as an exception to those possessing methodological problems. This experiment demonstrated that a 'double bind' situation increases the level of anxiety in normal subjects, and that these subjects' performances on certain tests where similar to those observed in schizophrenics. The anxiety in these cases of 'double binding' could indicate that the mind is experiencing inner tensions, or cognitive stress. Similarly, the schizophrenic symptoms experienced by the normal subjects may indicate that the mind is experiencing some sort of transformation of consciousness.
There is little evidence to support the theory that the 'double bind' causes schizophrenia. On the other hand, what 'double bind' theory does imply is that there may be only one way to respond to a 'double bind' situation. As Abeles notes "the point was not that the pattern of the 'double bind' interaction causes schizophrenia, but that the nature of the interaction is such that responses within the pattern are necessarily schizophrenic; that there is not any other way to respond within the pattern". If Abeles is correct then the symptoms reported by Dush and Brodsky would indicate that some sort of alteration in consciousness was taking place under the stress induced by cogitating on paradoxes.

Consequently, from a psychological perspective, there is justification for arguing that 'Double Bind' situations [paradoxes] have the potential to bring about a change in consciousness. This change in consciousness could range from schizophrenia, the creativity impulse seen in some artists, to a higher level of abstraction or in the case of Rinzai Zen and Praśāṅgika meditators, a breakthrough into enlightenment. Exactly which alteration in consciousness is brought about the theory has no means of predicting. What is possible to ascertain, though, is that cogitating upon paradoxes has the effect of inducing stress and psychotic symptoms.

Though none of the results in the western tradition are any thing like the non-conceptual altered state of the Praśāṅgika yogi, the point is that there is some justification to propose that, under the right conditions, paradoxes have the ability to bring about alterations in consciousness. The difference in the effects upon a Westerner and Praśāṅgika in being subjected to paradoxes ['double bind's] could be due to the fact that in the Praśāṅgika yogi is enveloped in a much more sophisticated and prolonged concentration upon paradoxes. As we saw above, the yogi develops special meditative skills in order to enhance the act of analytical meditation. Thus a way of testing the 'double bind' theory would be to examine the meditative techniques of the Rinzai Zen and the Praśāṅgika and see if symptoms manifest which are similar to those seen in western subjects experiencing 'double binds'.
3 Cognitive Dissonance

Another theory which postulates that the cognizing of inconsistent information results in stress and a consequent alteration of consciousness is cognitive dissonance theory. The basic thrust of cognitive dissonance theory is that people experience mental or cognitive dissonance when ever they are subjected to contradictory information. Cognitive dissonance theory postulates that the inconsistency forces the subject to alter his cognitive system in such a way that he arrives at a more consistent cognitive system. Thus cognitive dissonance theory is an independent psychological theory postulating similar effects to those put forward in 'double bind' theory. In doing so it gives independent additional support to the idea that paradoxes generate altered states of consciousness.

Since its original formulation in 1957 by L. Festinger, cognitive dissonance theory has gone through a number of reformulations. From being primarily a consistency theory (i.e. about subjects trying to regain consistency in their beliefs when they experience inconsistencies or contradictions in some beliefs), it has now evolved into behavioral theory. As with 'double bind' theory there is considerable debate about what the experimental data show and about the validity of the original formulation. Nevertheless, Baron and Byrne in 1987 noted that social psychologists have given cognitive dissonance theory considerable attention. R. Joul in 1986 argued that, although there has been a decline in interest in cognitive theory since 1976, no one would deny that the impact of Festinger's theory on social psychology is considerable. Joul likewise makes the comment that "... it may be possible to view Festinger's conception of cognitive functioning as a window on new directions in social psychology".

Festinger's basic paradigm "... is simply that inconsistency motivates people to alter their cognitive system in such a way that it will become more consistent". According to this theory, the inconsistencies create, consciously or unconsciously, tensions within the mind of the subject. The subject can either deny the inconsistencies or can modify them. The modification of the
inconsistencies, it is argued, is to relieve the tensions or cognitive dissonance.\textsuperscript{64} Fazio and Cooper point out that Festinger did not state exactly what he meant by inconsistency.\textsuperscript{65}

An assumption of dissonance theory is, as Holcomb points out, "...that as rational beings, we do strive to think logically and that threat of commitment to inconsistency is experienced by us as a threat to the rational unity of our cognitions".\textsuperscript{66} This assumption has support from Rinzai Zen, where Izutsu points out that it is likewise maintained that the mind strives for rational meaning.\textsuperscript{67} The tensions which are aroused in cognitive dissonance are of anxiety or discomfort\textsuperscript{68} and there is experimental evidence which leads to the view that these symptoms are signs of a psychological arousal due to the threat to rationality.\textsuperscript{69}

According to cognitive dissonance theory, there are three mechanisms by which cognitive dissonance [and hence anxiety] can be relieved. The first way to accomplish this is by altering one's attitudes or beliefs so as to make them more consistent. The second way is to reduce dissonance by getting new information specifically to support the original attitude. The third way to reduce dissonance is to minimize the importance of the conflict.\textsuperscript{70}

The degree to which a person experiences dissonance depends upon the importance attributed to the inconsistency.\textsuperscript{71} The three approaches mentioned above seek to reduce dissonance try either reducing the inconsistency or the inconsistencies importance. As Baron and Byrne point out, although the three methods of reducing dissonance are viable, social psychologists have been primarily concerned with dissonance as a way of altering attitudes.\textsuperscript{72}

Baron and Byrne point out that cognitive dissonance has been one of the most intensively studied areas in the field of social psychology.\textsuperscript{73} They attribute this to the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory in changing people's attitudes or beliefs.\textsuperscript{74} These authors liken the technique of changing people's attitudes by brain washing to those used in cognitive dissonance theory applications.\textsuperscript{75}
It is important to realize that there is a fair degree of dissonance in cognitive dissonance theory. This dissonance centers around two slightly dissimilar dissonance models. The first model defines dissonance regardless of behavior; the second defines it in terms of behavior. In the original formulation, Festinger did not regard behavior as being important in cognitive dissonance. Nowhere does he make reference to behavior in regard to cognitive dissonance. Festinger instead defines the situation in terms of obverse elements. He states "...two elements are in a dissonant relation if considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other." In 1962, Brehm and Cohen similarly argued that a dissonant relationship exists between two cognitive elements when a person possesses one which follows from the obverse of another that he possesses." In 1976 Wicklund and Brehm argued that dissonance was unrelated to behavior; they state "...dissonance reduction is organized around the cognition that is most resistant to change, whether or not that cognition has its basis in behavioral commitment." Cooper and Fazio argue that the experimental data had made the situation such that "it was possible to pretend that Festinger's original formulation of dissonance was correct, except for a long list of parameters that had to be in place." According to Cooper and Fazio, cognitive dissonance has a behavioral component and, regardless of the presence of inconsistent cognitions, they argue that dissonance does not arise unless the people "a) behave inconsistently without decision freedom... b) behave inconsistently but produce no aversive consequences... c) are not committed to their behavior or think they can take back the consequences." Joul makes the observation that Festinger's theory can only make predictions when a behavioral or conduct aspect is considered. Also, Joul argues that, though a reduction in the overall global dissonance can take place, there may be an accompanying increase in dissonance between elements in the cognitive universe. In other words, cognitive dissonance reduction does not always bring about greater consistency in the cognitions of the subject.
Baron and Byrne argue that cognitive dissonance is generated either from inconsistencies in a person's beliefs, or from inconsistencies between a person's actions and beliefs. In the latter case they agree with Cooper and Fazio that a number of behavioral factors contribute to dissonance arousal, but also point out that other factors are likely to be discovered.

Thus the alteration of attitudes or beliefs in order to alleviate cognitive dissonance generated by inconsistent or contradictory beliefs could be seen as an alteration in consciousness. In this regard, there seems to be independent experimental and theoretical support for the claims of 'double bind' theory. Both theories argue that stress or tension is felt by subjects experiencing inconsistencies or paradoxes in their belief systems. Also, both theories maintain that, in order to reduce these levels of discomfiture, the subject can move into an altered mode of consciousness. Where 'double bind' theory indicated that the presence of contradictions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the arising of insight, cognitive dissonance seems to imply that contradictions are a necessary and sufficient condition for the alteration of consciousness.

IV Equilibration

Another contemporary theory which puts forward the idea that contradictions cause the mind to alter its consciousness and thus constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for the alteration of consciousness, is Piaget's theory regarding the equilibration of cognitive structures. Piaget devised this theory to account for the development of thought in human beings. The central idea of this theory is that "...knowledge proceeds neither solely from the experience of the subject nor from an innate programming performed in the subject but from successive constructions, the result of the constant development of new structures". What Piaget means by construction is the view that new ideas/s can result from a disruption i.e. contradiction to a previous idea/s. These constructions are part of an ongoing process whereby the person forms new systems of belief i.e. structures.
Equilibration, according to Piaget, is the process whereby equilibrium is reestablished in a cognitive system which has been disrupted by a disturbance such as new information and/or contradictions. Piaget points out that the act of equilibration can return the system to its previous state of equilibrium or "... on the contrary, in the formation not only of new equilibriums but also in general of better equilibriums".\textsuperscript{87} The non-balance brought about the disruption is the driving force for the cognitive development of the subject, a cognitive development which is based upon the achieving of a higher equilibrium state.\textsuperscript{88}

According to Piaget the cognitive system is made up of a hierarchy of subsystems. The equilibriums of the cognitive system are in fact due to the conservative actions "...which the subsystems exert upon one another...".\textsuperscript{89} In other words, a disturbance of a subsystem brings about its interaction with other subsystems to achieve an overall modification of the whole cognitive system, by generating a new equilibrium of the total system.\textsuperscript{90} Piaget argues that the laws which govern the whole cognitive system override the changing characteristics of the subsystems.\textsuperscript{91} In other words as Piaget notes "... the whole system plays the role of regulator for the subsystems, for it imposes on them an extremely restrained standard: to submit themselves to the conservation of the whole...".\textsuperscript{92} Though Piaget does not go into any detail as to what these standards are, he does argue that the disturbances set up a conflict, due to the attempt at integrating the disturbance into the cognitive system.\textsuperscript{93} According to Piaget, this conflict is activated by "... the search for coherence ... [which logic expresses normatively] ...".\textsuperscript{94} Consequently Piaget is arguing, like the theorists of cognitive dissonance and 'double bind' theory, that the mind strives for logicality.

When the subject experiences contradictions the subject has at least two methods of alleviating them. According to Piaget, the subject can discover "...[new] observables that until now had escaped notice due to an all too summary investigation..."\textsuperscript{95} In this regard Piaget's
solution is similar to the acquiring of new information in cognitive dissonance theory. The second option the subject has is to bring about "...a new conceptualization of the previously recorded observables [information] which leads to new coordination [inferences]...". This new conceptualization alters the state of the subject's consciousness. As Piaget notes '[with contradictions] there is a non-balance and a reequilibration which necessitates passing from a state n to a state n + 1...".

Though Piaget says a lot about the equilibration process, he is very reticent about the nature of the conflict that results from a disruption to the cognitive equilibrium of the cognitive system. Piaget talks in terms of 'potential energy', 'least action' and 'least effort' in regard to the relations between the disturbance and the minds compensating reactions. These terms Piaget does not translate in terms of psychological arousal to the disturbance. Consequently there is no way of knowing how Piaget viewed the psychological effects on the mind experiencing a disturbance through contradictions. The validity or invalidity of Piaget's ideas is itself a question for contemporary experimental psychology to assess. With regard to this thesis we are producing some suggestive extrapolations on psychological theories in question. In doing so this points towards some areas that could be explored through psychological experimentation.

V Extrapolation
It can be seen from the above outline of Western psychological theories that there are a number of differing views about the effect of contradictions and the mechanism of contradiction resolution. Consequently, it is important to condense these accounts and bring out the salient points upon which there may be agreement.

What the above theories demonstrate is that the rational mind strives to maintain logicality or consistency between cognitive elements, or beliefs. These theories argue that the experience of contradictions results in the symptoms of increased levels of stress, or anxiety. On this point Rinzai Zen likewise argues that "... our mind is so firmly habituated to work at the level of intellectual understanding
and never stand still until it finds a meaning in any verbal utterance or statement...". Rinzai Zen and J. Hopkins respectively go on to say that under analysis there is stress. Rinzai Zen say that the rationalizing minds confrontation with paradox [koan] is a violent and dramatic psychological shock and Hopkins in regard to the Geluk-ba "...the reformulation of ideas [is] a harrowing process [under] analytical meditation...". Though the Western theories postulate the mind altering its consciousness when experiencing cognitive stress, they don't tell us what the effect would be if there was a failure to reduce this stress. In other words they do not tell us what the effect on the mind would be if it could not escapable from illogicality.

Holcomb argues that failure to reduce cognitive dissonance results in the subject losing all integration between cognitive states, with the result that the subject becomes a divided self with diminished rationality. An alternative mechanism could be that the failure to reduce the illogicality throws the mind into such a stressful state that it automatically stops conceptualizing in order to avoid the threat to rationality. This interpretation makes some sense when we point out that according to Prāṇaṅgika the yogin generated contradictions to all the elements within his conceptual world. Consequently with all the yogin's beliefs being contradictory it is impossible to alleviate the minds attempt to regain rationality. If the mind will alter its mode of consciousness by going to a different conceptualization, then it is possible that the mechanism which brings this about, will also alter the consciousness from conceptuality to non-conceptuality, when it is impossible to reduce the threat to logicality, conceptually.

VI Review
These are clearly tentative ideas and have no support in terms of Western experimental data. The systems are only extrapolations from the assumptions and findings of the above theories. Nevertheless, three possible consequences do arise out of these Western theories: 1) For 'double bind' theorists, contradictions are a necessary element for the arising of an altered state of consciousness, while for cognitive dissonance and equilibration theorists they are also a sufficient condition.
2) It seems possible that a change in conceptual consciousness could result from the mind trying to alleviate the stress due to cogitating contradictions, or paradoxes. This could explain the arising of a conceptual realization of the ultimate truth (paramārtha). In this regard the change is achieved by the discovery of: a) new information; or b) the cogitating of new inferences which dissolves the illogicality of the contradictions and thus breaks the circular reasoning of illogicality.

3) The possibility of the mind flipping into a non-conceptual mode, due to the mind finding it impossible to conceptually escape from the cognitive stress, could explain the arising of the non-conceptual or intuitive apprehension of the ultimate truth (paramārtha). In this regard the change to a non-conceptual consciousness is brought about by the mind finding it impossible to escape from a circular reasoning of illogicality, conceptually i.e. the mind escapes from the stress generated to a non-conceptual state.

For the Prasangika insight arises when the mind is flipped into a state of non-conceptuality. In this non-conceptual state the pre-structured and determined experience of insight evaporates up from the pre-linguistic, sub-thinking realm of mind\textsuperscript{103} and is then experienced as an intuition. This experience is not that of a merging or melting into something bigger; there is no union with God or pantheistic absorption. The experience is a noetic apprehension of the ultimate truth: an apprehension which was pre-formed, pre-structured and created in the life history and premeditative instructional stages of the Buddhist monk. In this regard it is the subject who creates the insight; as Nagarjuna indeed says, of the incomparable one, "In ultimate reality... Ah! you are indeed the one who illumines the reality most difficult to illumine" \textsuperscript{104}.

It is my contention that Fenner is right in claiming that the copresence of contradictory theses creates tensions, and has the effect of destructuring conceptuality. In extrapolating from the above theories, what analytical meditation does is set up tensions within the mind with the result that the mind flips into another
state. That tensions are set up in the student's mind can be clearly seen when an examination of the formal criteria which the student brings into the analytical meditation is made.

Venner maintains that one of the requirements for the generation of paradoxical theses is that the student has a commitment to the thesis from which he/she is going to generate contradictions.105 Also the student must have a commitment to the validity of the principles of the excluded middle, identity and non-contradiction.106 Thurman likewise argues that there is a concomitance to binary logic and the law of the excluded middle.107 Thus, when the student generates negating theses, he/she is under pressure from three areas; i.e the principles of the excluded middle, non-contradiction and identity.

In making a commitment to the thesis [i.e the student has some energy invested in believing it to be true] the student has contradicted, the student is thus forced to try to regain meaningfulness in his/her world view. The principle of the excluded middle forces him into accepting only one of the two contradicting theses, but this he/she cannot do, without also accepting the contradictory thesis. The mind is thus placed under stress due to the student fighting to salvage meaning and order.

This tension, it is postulated, is relieved by the mind escaping from the stressful situation by flipping into another mode of consciousness. This is perhaps the only recourse the mind has of escaping from the stress generated by concentrating on paradoxes. The yogi's mind is enveloped in a vicious circle of reasoning. The yogi oscillates between logical but negating theses. There is a perpetual alteration between one contradictory idea and another contradictory one. The mind of the yogi, in the act of trying to salvage intelligibility from this inescapable circle of self-perpetuating logical illogicality, is placed under a large amount of stress. The mind of the yogi responds to this stressful situation by shifting to a state of consciousness that transcends logic. From this altered state the conscious mind emerges reshaped, with either an intuitive [jnana] or new conceptual apprehension of the ultimate, an apprehension which reestablishes mental harmony and equilibrium of thought.
Thus it is argued that cognitive stress induces the mind to alter its state of consciousness. Now just what this altered state may be it is difficult to answer, because it involves a value judgment as to what constitutes an altered state. The point at issue for this thesis is whether the altered state is a state of liberation, or insight. As is known the koan and analytically meditation are used to generate insight or liberation and all that is argued in this thesis is that cognitive stress may play a role in the generation of these altered state of consciousness. Nevertheless the question to be asked is "is this cognitive stress a necessary and/or sufficient condition?"

According to the Prāśāṅgika, ultimate truth (paramārtha) is unconditioned, as Nāgārjuna states in Chapter eighteen verse 9 of the _Treatise on the Middle Way_ (Mālamadhyamikākāra) "[the ultimate] is not caused by something else...". Thus the problem with the cognitive stress model is that the ultimate is unconditioned (asamskṛta), thus it is difficult to see how the experience of the ultimate (paramārtha), insight, can then be conditioned. The answer to this is supplied when we realize that, at the conventional level (samyakti) it is impossible to conceive of an 'unconditioned'? Strong points out that according to Nāgārjuna everything has a cause, but that a cause cannot be logically related to an effect. Consequently talk of the unconditioned ultimate (paramārtha) must only apply in an ultimate sense. In other words, at the conventional level (samykti), insight can be said to be caused, but ultimately the experience of the ultimate (paramārtha) insight is unconditioned.

That insight must be caused by something convention seems to hold, since if ultimate truth (paramārtha) were not produced, then the Prasangika's religious praxis would be in vain. The solution to the problem seems to be the idea of 'dependent origination' (pratītya-samutpāda).
According to Nagarjuna "...there is no thing whatever on which something doesn't depend".\textsuperscript{111} Similarly Nagarjuna argues that "...there is no dharma whatever originating independently...".\textsuperscript{112} Nagarjuna argues that the true reality is "not caused by something else peaceful not elaborated by discursive thought...".\textsuperscript{113} Now to be consistent with the idea of 'dependent origination' (\textit{pratītya-samutpāda}) this unconditioned ultimate truth (\textit{paramārtha}) must only apply in terms of ultimate truth; since 'dependent origination' (\textit{pratītya-samutpāda}) is true at the conventional level. Consequently then, a matrix of conditions is involved in the generation of insight at the conventional level. This seems to fit Nagarjuna's idea of \textit{pratītya-samutpāda} - dependent origination - "every thing is conditional, relative, dependent".\textsuperscript{114} In this regard insight is not caused by analysis, but is dependent upon a matrix of factors [because every thing is interconnected and interdependent] for its arising. As Streng notes "(\textit{pratītya-samutpāda})...denies a "first cause". "Cause" should not be regarded through the imagery of a chain of reactions leading back to an original source, but as an orderly set of circumstances, or conditions - which themselves are conditioned".\textsuperscript{115}

What this means is that the arising of insight is dependent upon a matrix of conditions which are themselves dependent upon a further matrix of conditions; not one condition predominates and one single antecedent condition, or cause cannot be logically related to the arising of insight. That antecedent one cause, let alone cognitive stress, cannot be logically related to the generation of insight is because a matrix of conditions contribute towards the arising of the experience.

Thus, from the above account, analysis must be a necessary condition but not as Fenner argues a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. The idea that a cause cannot be logically related to an effect means that it cannot be demonstrated that analysis alone generates insight. In regard to the Mādhyamika's critique of causation, nothing could ever be a sufficient condition for anything. Nevertheless the Buddhists often insist that while there is no logical necessity involved ie logically sufficient condition there can
be a causally sufficient condition for an event. In this regard analysis could be causally sufficient but not logically sufficient for insight generation. It should be borne in mind that throughout this thesis I am talking not of causally sufficient conditions but logically sufficient conditions. The idea that a matrix of conditions goes into generating insight means that it cannot be maintained that analysis alone will produce insight. The equation is not that analysis will induce insight, but instead that it may.

What analysis does, it is argued, is to set up certain psychological conditions i.e cognitive stress which allows for insight to arise.

V11 Conclusion

In this chapter it was shown that, in terms of Western scholarship, it is argued that analysis may play a role in generating insight. The question was asked: Is there any support from Western psychology for this claim? An exegesis was undertaken on certain Western psychological theories to try to ascertain what they might say are the effects upon the mind of contradictions, or in other words what effect a Prāsaṅgika analytical meditation might have upon the mind. The theories examined seemed to support the idea that cogitating upon contradiction could alter the state of consciousness. These theories indicated that cogitating upon contradictions generated anxiety in the person experiencing the contradictions. From this observation it was extrapolated that under prolonged exposure to contradictions, a stressful situation was induced in the mind of a person. It was extrapolated from the Western theories that the mind, in order to avoid this stress, could alter its state of consciousness. This alteration could involve generating a new conceptual inference which broke the stress or, if the mind could not generate a new conceptual inference, it could move into a non-conceptual, or intuitive state.
The 'double bind' theorists argued that other conditions had to be present before a change in consciousness could happen. The cognitive dissonance and equilibration theorists argued that the presence of contradictions was a necessary and a sufficient condition for the alteration of consciousness. In extrapolating from these Western psychological models it was argued that analysis could be a necessary and a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. This situation was tested against what could possibly be derived from Prāsaṅgika views regarding the ultimate (paramārtha), 'dependent origination' (pratītya-samutpāda) and the causal nexus. From these ideas it was put forward that a matrix of conditions went into generating insight. Though everything has a cause, it was maintained that a cause cannot be logically related to an effect. Consequently it could not be demonstrated that analysis or cognitive stress, singly, caused insight. Insight generation involved a matrix of conditions where one condition did not predominate over any other. Thus it was claimed that analysis must be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the generation of insight.

The question that follows from this cognitive stress theory is this: What takes place in the mind of a person experiencing a Prāsaṅgika analytical meditation such that insight arises as an intuition, or conceptual experience? This question will be examined and presented in chapter two where a more detailed explanatory model will be presented. This model will be mechanistic and deterministic. It will explain certain points left out of the cognitive stress model: where insight comes from; why the conceptual experience of insight [prajñā] is different from the intuitive [jñāna]; and the possible experiential difference in the conceptual [prajñā] as against the intuitive experience [jñāna]. This model will use the cognitive stress model as the mechanism whereby both the conceptual [prajñā] and intuitive insights [jñāna] are generated. The cognitive stress model presented in chapter two will, in other words, build upon and extend upon the ideas outlined in this chapter. Chapter two will, using this chapter as an infrastructure, go beyond the ideas presented in this chapter to generate a more encompassing and explanatory model of how analysis may produce both a conceptual [prajñā] and an intuitive insight [jñāna] into the ultimate (paramārtha).
What the cognitive stress model generated in this chapter did not consider was that insight takes place within a meditative activity which is itself situated within a traditional preparatory framework. In other words, the analytical meditation [analysis], which prepares the ground for insight to arise by generating cognitive stress, is itself preceded by a preparatory program of praxis. Consequently in order to appreciate the psychological conditions which are in operation at the time of insight (i.e. cognitive stress), it is important to be aware of the interdependent elements which prepare the conditions for the arising of insight. The extension of the cognitive stress model in chapter one takes this into consideration and lends support to the idea that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the generation of insight.

Chapter two will show that the traditional praxis prepares the ground for the arising of insight by setting up the prerequisite conditions. In other words, the beliefs, concepts, and ideological views which are imparted to the monk, through his teaching, or praxis, as well as the entire history of the monk help to determine the insight which arises. This traditional praxis, undergone before insight arises, would indicate that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. The model in chapter three explains how this could be the case.
NOTES


4 *ibid.*, p. 245, note 142.

5 *ibid.*, p. 282.

6 *ibid.*, p. 286.


10 *ibid.*, p. 118.

11 *ibid.*, p. 118.

12 *ibid.*, p. 150.

13 *ibid.*, p. 119.


15 *ibid.*, p. 118.

16 *ibid.*, p. 122.

17 *ibid.*, p. 122.

18 In a personal correspondence.


20 *ibid.*, p. 269.

21 *ibid.*, p. 270.

22 A. Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, p. 47.

24 ibid., pp. 87, 117.


28 ibid., p. 122.

29 It should be pointed out that the heavy reliance on these authors book is because it is the only one known to me which covers the topic.


32 ibid., p. 254.

33 Personal correspondence.

34 G. Bateson, et.al, op.cit., p.254.


36 ibid., p. 114.

37 ibid., p. 114.

38 ibid., p. 114.

39 ibid., p. 114.

40 ibid., p. 114.

41 ibid., p. 114.

42 G. Abeles, op.cit., p. 117.

43 ibid., p. 117.


46 G. Abeles, op.cit., p. 118.

47 A. Bullock, et. al, p. 455.

48 ibid., p. 455.


59 J. Copper et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 524-527.


62 *ibid.*, p. 75.

63 *ibid.*, p. 66.


66 *ibid.*, p. 416.


68 R. Baron & D. Byrne, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133.


70 R. Baron & D. Byrne, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-137.


72 *ibid.*, p. 137.
73 ibid., p. 138.
74 ibid., p. 138.
75 ibid., p. 139.
76 R. Joul, op.cit., p. 70.
77 J. Cooper and R. H. Fazio point out that Festinger did not state what he meant by obverse (op.cit., p. 523)
78 L. Festinger, op.cit., p. 13.
81 J. Cooper and H. Fazio, op.cit., p. 523.
82 ibid., pp. 522-523.
83 ibid., p. 73.
84 ibid., p. 132.
87 ibid., p. 4.
88 ibid., p. 13.
89 ibid., p. 5.
90 ibid., p. 5.
91 ibid., p. 23.
92 ibid., p. 23.
93 ibid., p. 14.
94 ibid., p. 15.
95 ibid., p. 58.
96 ibid., p. 58.
97 ibid., pp. 58-59.
98 ibid., p. 73.
100 T. Izutsu, ibid., p. 169 and J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, Wisdom Publications,


102 In talking of the *Geluk-ba Prasangika* E. Napper, *in Dependent Arising and Emptiness*, Wisdom Publications, London, 1989, p. 135, notes that "... though emptiness is realized in terms of a specific phenomenon, that realization is a realization of the emptiness of all phenomena". This comment indicates that the emptiness of one concept implies the emptiness of all concepts within the range of the practitioner’s conceptual world.

103 The pre-structured experience is formed in that place in the mind where the words or language we use is formed. All language use has to be initially a pre-conceptual, or pre-linguistic process i.e there must be a pre-linguistic, intuitive realm which some how knows what and how we want to state ideas before we conceptually do. This realm must then pass on the intuition to a process which processes or structures the words we use into a meaningful form before we say them. This pre-structuring, pre-linguistic, since it is non-conceptual, must be an intuitive realm. This realm of the mind is the place where the intuitive awareness of insight is formed.


106 *ibid.*, p. 113.


108 See below for a fuller explanation.


110 *ibid.*, pp. 58-61.


113 *ibid.*, p. 204, verse. 18.9.


CHAPTER TWO

COGNITIVE STRESS MODEL:

FOR INSIGHT

"... the Mādhyamika rejects all views... by drawing out... [their] self-contradictory character."¹
Introduction

In chapter one it was pointed out, after looking at certain Western psychological theories, that analysis may have some bearing upon the generation of insight. Though the psychological theories only hinted at what effect analysis might have, chapter one argued by extrapolating from the Western psychological theories that analysis could possibly generate an altered state of consciousness by creating cognitive stress. It was maintained that cognitive stress could possibly be eradicated by the mind altering its state of consciousness. This alteration, it was postulated, could be brought about by the mind either producing new inferences or by it eradicating conceptuality altogether and moving into an intuitive state of consciousness.

This chapter presents a model of insight generation based upon the idea that analysis does generate insight, and that it does this by creating cognitive stress. This model tries to explain and account for the idea that the alleviation of cognitive stress can be achieved either by generating new inferences or by going to a state of non-conceptuality. The former method could account for a conceptual realization (prajñā) of emptiness (śūnyatā), the latter for an intuitive insight (jñāna). It is maintained that the model has interpretive power to explain and account for the generation of insight within the Prāsaṅgika. It is further maintained that the model explains, in logico-psychological terms, the possible relationship between analysis and insight.

The model assumes that all knowledge, intuitive (i.e. non-inferred) and that derived from conceptualization (i.e. inferential), is derived from concepts. Knowledge is either inferred via conceptualization or uninferred via intuition. Intuitive knowledge may not be conceptual, but it is maintained in this model that it is knowledge acquired via a concept or concepts. The idea that intuitive knowledge is knowledge via a concept is arrived at by asking not, how the insight is generated, but where it comes from.

Connecting these ideas is the hypothesis that analysis produces stress within the mind, and that the mind seeks to avoid this either
by generating a new inference, which breaks the vicious circle of illogicality, or by eradicating conceptualization, thus allowing for an intuitive insight [jñāna] to manifest itself in consciousness. This stress model is derived from the analysis of psychological theories in chapter one.

11 Model

That analysis may produce insight is clearly seen in the writings of Candrakīrti. In three verses of Candrakīrti one from his Clear words (prasannapāda) and the two from his Supplement to the middle way (Mādhyamakāvatāra); the soteriological function of analysis can be seen firstly from the Prasannapāda [Huntington translation):

...liberation follows from the destruction of both karmic action and the afflictions. Karmic action and the afflictions arise from reified notions (kalpāna) [of real and unreal things], and these are produced from conceptual diffusion. Conceptual diffusion, however, ceases in emptiness...".²

Now from the Supplement to the Middle Way (Mādhyamakāvatāra) [Fenner's translation]:

Ordinary people are bound by their concepts, but non-conceptualizing yogins [who realize the nature of things] (dharmata) become liberated. The learned have said that the result of analysis (vicāra) is the reversal of conceptualization.³

The same text and verse but Huntington's translation:

"Common people are tightly bound by these reified concepts while the meditator who does not produce such ideas obtains liberations. Wise men have declared that analysis results in the termination of reified concepts".⁴
Again Fenner's translation:

"...upon critical investigation the entity as such proves to be nonexistent, and in the absence of an [intrinsically existent] entity, these reified concepts are inappropriate..."6.

Since the last two verses from Candrakīrti where discussed in the last chapter I will reiterate what was said there. In Huntington's verse critical investigation is another term for what Huntington calls deconstructive analysis7. This deconstructive analysis is the Reductio ad absurdum8; thus it is the same as Fenner's analysis. Huntington calls vikalpa reified concepts9 and Fenner calls vikalpa conceptual bifurcation10. Thus the claim that conceptualization is eradicated by analysis [Fenner] and Huntington's claim that with critical analysis reified concepts are inappropriate appear to be synonymous if inappropriate means donot arise. Thus it appears that the same meanings can be obtained from both Fenner's and Huntington's translations.

That analysis plays a part in the achieving of liberation is supported by Gyatso. Gyatso notes in his Heart of wisdom that liberation can only come about after the intuitive [nonconceptual] realization (śūnyatā) of emptiness (śūnyatā)11, or in other words the eradication of conceptuality. Thus Fenner's claim that analysis plays a part in the generation of insight is supported by the Tibetan tradition and Candrakīrti's comments; as translated by Fenner and Huntington.
It should be pointed out that translating kalpanā as conceptuality by Fenner may be misleading. This may give the impression that with the eradicating of conceptuality there is no thought. The idea that there is no thought in the intuitive realization (jñāna) of emptiness is strongly denied by the Mādhyamika. This very point was what made Kāmalasāla attack Mo-ho-yen's argument that insight involved no thought. Rather Huntington's translation of kalpanā as reified notions gives a better idea that what is involved is that the yogin is not free of thought but rather free of reified conceptualization because of the insight that there are no intrinsically existent entities for our concepts to correspond to. Thus eradicating conceptuality is the eradicating not of thought but of reified concepts.

In these verses it can be seen that insight arises when analysis reverses conceptuality by showing how things do not intrinsically exist. In other words, they indicate that insight arises by analysis generating the idea of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyata). That analysis does produce insight by eradicating conceptuality is argued by Fenner who similarly points out "... [the] dissipation of conceptuality is concomitant with the onset of insight into reality. This model takes these views of Candrakīrti and builds a logico-psychological model around them. To be more specific, it argues that insight is the realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā), both for the conceptual (prajñā) and intuitive insight (jñāna). The model maintains that this realization could follow from the eradication of cognitive stress.

The model for the idea of cognitive stress is derived by extrapolating from the Western psychological theories as discussed in chapter one. From these theories it was seen that a change in consciousness might result from the mind trying to alleviate the stress imparted to it due to cogitating upon contradictions, or paradoxes. If this is possible, then it could explain the arising of the conceptual, or inferential, realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)). In this model, the mind avoids such stress by the generation of new inferences which dissolve the illogicality of the contradictions, thus breaking the circular reasoning of illogicality.
To illustrate what a contradiction and paradox may look like, two examples from the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*Supplement To the Middle Way*) will be used. Candrakīrti generates a consequence (*prāsāṅga*) in regard to the idea of generation from self:

A) A cause is a cause only if it produces a product. If an effect is not produced then in the absence [of any production] there can be no cause. And likewise, effects can only be produced if there are causes. Therefore, one must say that whatever comes from something is temporally preceded by it.\(^{14}\)

B) If the cause [that you posit] produces an effect due to contact (*pratyaya*) [between the two] then at the time [of contact] they would be a single potential (*sakyastra*) and therefore the producer would not be different from the effect.\(^{15}\)

Thus we have from B) birth from self, and B) contradicts A) that is producer and product are simultaneous. An example of a paradox could be:

C) If self-production were to be asserted then product, producer, object and agent alike would be identical. As they are not identical, do not assert self-production because of the objectional consequences extensively explained [in Nāgārjuna's work].\(^{16}\)

Consequently there must be production from other, but this contradicts B) where production from other indicated production from self. Thus a paradox between B) AND C). This paradox may be alleviated by a) drawing the inference that Nagarjuna might be wrong; or b) that a cause and effect might be simultaneous; or c) there might be a causeless effect.

Nevertheless, the model maintains that analysis produces cognitive stress. The mind can alleviate this stress by generating a conceptual
realization of non-intrinsic existence emptiness (śūnyatā), but if the stress is not eradicated, due to further analysis, then the mind eventually eradicates all conceptualization - i.e. those of intrinsic and non-intrinsic existence - such that an intuition of non-intrinsic existence, emptiness (śūnyatā), arises. In summary, the characteristics of the relationship between analysis and insight which the model will explain are:

1) how analysis can a) be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition; b) play no part in the generation of insight.

2) how insight can be a conceptual [prajñā] as well as an intuitive experience [jñāna].

3) how the intuitive insight [jñāna] arises when conceptuality is eradicated.

The model to be presented is a mechanical and deterministic schema of how thinking operates. It comprises a number of elements, each of which performs a function in the thinking processes. It is important to present this model of thinking as it gives clarity and sense to how an intuitive [jñāna] and/or conceptual experience [prajñā] of emptiness (śūnyatā) arises when either analysis or some other unspecified condition/s bring it about. Before the model is outlined it is important to define the terms and elements used within the model.

Before introducing the cognitive stress model it is important to define those terms upon which the model is based. This is important so that it is clear as to what the terms signify. This clarification will thus avoid the problem of the reader assuming a different definition from that of the writer. Also the clarification will thus attempt to make the model, at least in terms of the definition, internally coherent. The terms upon which the model hinges are: conceptual or linguistic field, innate propensities, consciousness, thinking, knowledge, intuition, conceptualization. The way these definitions relate to each other is as follows. Consciousness is the awareness of meaning. Through consciousness we acquire knowledge.
This knowledge is generated from the thinking process which is made up of the intuition and the conceptualization. The concepts which the thinking process supplies to consciousness as knowledge is retrieved from the conceptual field by the thinking process, see. Fig. 1 for a diagramatic of these processes.

III CONCEPTUAL, OR LINGUISTIC FIELD. The area in which the concepts reside. These concepts are given to the conceptual field via the socialization process. If there are innate propensities, it is from the conceptual field that concepts are given to explain or describe the innate propensities.

It is informative to outline just how concepts, ideas and ideologies may enter the conceptual field. This outline will help us better explain where insight comes from. Just how does the realization of non-intrinsic existence enter the conceptual field? It may do so via the traditional Buddhist meditational praxis.

The traditional praxis or methodology of the Hindu and Buddhist yogi consisted, according to Fenner, in the tripartite schema of hearing, thinking and meditation. After the potential yogi entered a monastery and received his monk's ordination he embarked upon the first preparatory stage.

The first stage of preparation consisted of the monk practicing good conduct (āśa) or morality. This good conduct involved obeying the rules which were to induce wholesome attitudes and actions. The reason for the inducing of these wholesome deeds and actions is, as Fenner notes, "... to free the monk's mind from emotional entanglements that would act as hindrances to their study and meditation". This freeing of the mind was a crucial stage for setting up a situation such that the teachings were assimilated. As Fenner notes "...[wholesome thoughts and acts] would make the monks fit vessels or receptacles for accommodating and assimilating the knowledge that their teachers imparted".
After cultivating good conduct, the monk then entered into a relationship with one or more teachers. While under the tutelage of these teachers the monk started memorizing and reciting the main texts that comprised his/her course of study. Fenner points out that it is uncertain exactly what these texts were in the early period of Buddhism, but in the Mahāyāna monasteries of Northern India they may have covered "...all aspects of the universal vehicle thought: Mādhyamika, Yogāchāra, Abhidharma, epistemology and logic".21 It is most likely that the works of Nagarjuna were studied; particularly his ideas regarding the soteriological relevance of emptiness.22 At this hearing stage the monk was expected to reach a competence in phonetics, grammar and syntax and to achieve a non-distorted apprehension of the written and spoken word.23 All these achievements were designed to ready the monk for the second preparatory stage.

This second stage is to induce in the monk a conceptual understanding of the text studied. The achieving of this understanding was facilitated by listening to oral commentaries to the main text. The monk then engaged in exploring the meanings in these texts by such techniques as logical analysis, linguistic analysis and debate.24 To enhance and facilitate the process of understanding the monk would engage in meditation with the desire to experience in some form the truths of the texts.25 These meditations would involve the practice of mental integration and serenity. The practice of tranquility, Fenner maintains "...removed effective and unwanted conceptual concomitants and was viewed as the basis for achieving concentration or collection or focus of mental attention".26 Thurman notes that, in the stage of eliciting the definitive meaning of the texts, the student combined an intellectual understanding with one-pointed concentration such that "one must go on cultivating this knowledge until it permeates the person's deeper layers of consciousness".27

The next and final stage involved achieving a non-conceptual understanding of the truths of the texts. This non-conceptual comprehending was achieved in a meditative state. Just as there were two preparatory stages leading up to the meditative experience of insight, this third stage itself comprised three stages.
Fenner notes that, in the Tibetan tradition, there are two stages prior to the final stage of apprehending the ultimate. The first meditative stage involves the yogi going over the entire range of his previous teachings in order to become completely familiar with them. The second stage is an analytical meditation where the yogi seeks to investigate the texts and produce logical and experiential consequences of the kind that validate the teachings of the texts.28

In the third stage the yogi, through a development of mental integration and serenity and the practice of a special discernment meditation, breaks through to the ultimate non-conceptual truth of reality. In the meditation on texts the yogi repeatedly focuses his concentration upon the inferentially based conclusions so as to transform these conceptual conclusions into non-conceptual realizations.29 In this non-conceptual state, Fenner notes that it "...is purportedly non-indexical or rather self-indexing, for meanings become known without having to make reference to any symbol or symbol system".30

Thus it can be seen that the initial realization or concept/s enter the conceptual field via the beliefs, concepts, and ideological views which are imparted to the monk, through his learning as well as his/her entire life history. This is not to say that these imprints structure or determine the very nature of the experience of insight, as S.T. Katz would maintain,31 but only that they make it possible for the yogi to know that he/she has had an experience of insight. Neither is it saying that all mystical experiences are the same and that differences are only due to a cultural system interpreting the universal experience through the blinkers of its own conceptual system. All that the idea of the conceptual field does is to explain where the concepts which are used to explain or describe the experience come from. It says nothing about the universality or possible structuring of the experience. Without a conceptual field the yogi would not know that what has been experienced is insight, unless he/she is cognizant of the concept/s which make it known, or intelligible. There are, nevertheless, only two alternatives in
regard to the describing of the experience: either the concept is a
direct expression of the experience, or it is only a metaphor for the
experience. It is this alternative which we will now examine. This
following examination will attempt to elucidate the etiology of
insight as we will see is put forward by Murti in chapter four.
Chapter four shows that according to Murti's schema, the experience
of insight is an a priori, or innate, characteristic of the mind, a
characteristic which according to Murti's analysis eventually
uncovers and allows to become conscious. In either case it is seen
that a number of conditions have to be in place before the insight
can arise. Consequently, even when some unknown inferential process
is present for the generation of insight it is only a necessary, but
not a sufficient condition for this arising.

IV INNATE PROPENSITIES. These are propensities, i.e. dispositions,
inclination that are a priori elements of the psychic makeup of the
human mind. They are preconscious, inborn and unconscious elements of
the structure of the psyche. In this way the psyche of the new born
child is not an empty vessel, it is structured both by the instincts
and the innate propensities. The innate propensities are knowledge,
experiences, the principles of human language, or the laws of logic.
Innate propensities are in the mind prior to and independent of sense
experience they structure. The innate propensities are propensities,
i.e. dispositions or inclinations that under certain circumstances
may be activated such that they then structure the sense experience
etc which activates them.

The innate propensities arise from the deepest foundation of the
mind. They may arise due to sensory data - i.e. the empirical
material of the phenomenal world - or due to purely cognitive
activity. The innate propensities can thus arise out of the
subjective, or by means of the objective; but in both cases they
arise from the deepest foundations of the psyche. In the former case,
the analogy would be the sense of self - an innate propensity - we
experience when we try to become conscious of our consciousness; the
latter would be the numinous experience - an innate propensity -
which is activated by an external object.
The experience we call love is a manifestation of an innate propensity. An object stimulated the psyche in such a way that the experience arose from within it. This experience is innate propensity belonging to all humans which can activated by certain stimuli. It is present in the psyche independent of any sensory experience. Similarly, the experience and/or gnosis of emptiness (śūnyatā) may exist as an innate propensity within the psyche or it may not; and the right concept may be learned or cultivated.

If the innate propensities exist, they don't refer to anything that has been conscious. They are propensities that can only be expressed through the concepts of the conceptual field i.e. we may experience a feeling which a concept calls "love". This experience exists without the concept "love" but we use this concept- from our conceptual field- to describe the feeling. In this way their conscious conceptual manifestations are initially signifiers or referential markers. In other words the concepts which are used to express the innate propensities are only approximations to what the propensities represent. In this regard, the manifestation of innate propensities is peculiar to each individual's store of concepts within the conceptual field.

If the experience of insight is derived from an innate propensity, and this propensity is to be known or expressible to consciousness, then this expressibility or knowability must rely upon concepts which come from the conceptual field. Consequently, if the experience of insight derives from an innate propensity then it can only be an object of knowledge if it is associated with concepts. The only concepts which are available are those from the conceptual field, thus when intuition has found those concepts which come closest to expressing the experience these concepts are only metaphors for the experience.

V CONSCIOUSNESS. Definition: The awareness of meaning, in the sense of making a judgment or interpreting. Meaning can be semantic meaning, meaning as value i.e. moral value, or meaning as a discriminating process that sets thing apart. Thus, ultimately meaning is a process that distinguishes and sets things apart as
different, i.e., semantically, morally, or through the senses. These
differences may be due to semantic acquisition; but may also have no
semantic acquisition as in the case of a baby's non-semantic awareness
of meaning in things are discriminated differently such as milk,
teat, etc in its environment. Meaning can be derived solely from the
innate propensities, from intuition, or solely from
conceptualization. Consciousness is defined in opposition to non-
consciousness. Consciousness must be the awareness of meaning, as
non-consciousness is the lack of meaning. Though consciousness is the
awareness of meaning, it is maintained that it, like the intuitive
process, ultimately cannot be rendered completely comprehensible.

VI THINKING. The mental process whereby knowledge may be acquired.
Some forms of thinking, such as reflexive thinking lead to no
knowledge. This knowledge can be intuitive, i.e. non-inferred, or
conceptual, i.e. inferred. The material, or concepts of knowledge,
come from the conceptual or linguistic field. Thinking is the process
which coordinates the sub-processes of intuition and
conceptualization.

VI1 KNOWLEDGE. That which is known. Though knowledge needs data to
work on, knowledge of the datum is always based upon a concept or
concepts, either those derived from intuition or conceptualization.
If knowledge was not based upon concepts we could give no meaning to
our conscious experiences, either objective or subjective.

VI11 INTUITION. An un inferred knowledge. Intuition is that process
whereby we generate the thoughts we supply to consciousness. It is
that process whereby:

1) we correctly apply concepts without consciously knowing the rules
of application - in the case of sentences, the correct grammatical
rules.

2) we derive the concepts we associate with objects or data.

3) we gain awareness of such ineffable objects of consciousness as
the duration of time.
4) the mind knows how we want to state ideas before we conceptually do so. In this regard intuition is a mysterious process, because paradoxically we must know the concept we want to use before we consciously do.

Through the process of intuition, the whole material of consciousness is supplied. The constituents of intuitions are concepts. Intuitions without concepts are vague, ineffable feelings. Intuitions are thus made intelligible through concepts. There are two forms of intuition: that which relates concepts to the objective world, and that which relates concepts to the subjective world. In both forms, the four aspects of intuition mentioned above apply. In these two forms, an object and datum is required to which the intuition then supplies the concept/s. In regard to the subjective world, this object or datum can take one of two forms. In the first case the object can be an experience to which the intuition then supplies the concept. In the second case, the object can be the concept from which the mind then generates the appropriate experience.

In the case of love, hate, fear, or any other subjective experience, it appears that the mind produces the very experience or datum of which we are conscious. In other words, the mind generates a subjective experience or datum at the same time that we apprehend it. This can take place in one of three ways. First, there can be an external object stimulating the emotion, for which the mind then supplies the corresponding concept. Second, there may be no objects or datum which stimulate the emotion to which the mind nevertheless supplies the concept. In terms of the above two possibilities, if we take love, regardless of whether or not there is an external object stimulating the emotion, the experience of love becomes the object of intuition, such that intuition supplies the concept 'love' to the experience, or datum. This situation is like the objective world where the datum is prior to the concept. Finally, in the case of the subjective world it is possible that the intuition supplies a concept prior to the experiential datum. This means that the generation of the concept via intuition produces the corresponding subjective
experience. This creates a paradox. The intuition generates the very concept which it used to generate the concept. Thus the concept has become the datum for itself.

This paradoxical situation must remain a mysterious aspect of the intuitive process. What is important in the present chapter is that:

1) all thought has its source in the intuition. This idea gains support from the the idea of pratibhā in the works of the Indian philosopher of language Bhartrihari. Pratibhā is the "spontaneous intuition of verbal meaning". According to Apler "pratibhā is the function of the mind which while developing without and special cause is able to lead on to real knowledge, to an insight into transcendental truth and reality".

2) intuition is made up of four aspects;

3) the object of the intuition can be the very concept it uses to generate the concept. In this case the mind, via the concept, generates the subjective experience corresponding to the concept.

IX CONCEPTUALIZATION. Inferred knowledge. This knowledge is derived from the process of logic and is based upon concepts. These concepts come from the conceptual or linguistic field. The reversal or eradication of conceptualization refers to the stopping of the inferential process only. This eradication leaves intact the intuitive. In this regard, a non-conceptualizing person, if acquiring knowledge, must do so by intuition via a concept.

The keystone upon which this model rests is the idea that it is solely through the process of intuition that the content of consciousness is supplied. In other words, the concepts which are generated by and used by conceptualization are themselves supplied via the intuition. Every form of knowledge, un inferred or inferred, has to be generated initially via the intuitive process. If the intuitive realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) was not based upon concepts, then it would be unknowable. In other words, if the ultimate truth were not the object of some type of intellectual understanding, it would be unknowable, and it would therefore follow
that all religious practice aiming at the realization of the ultimate would be in vain.

This model maintains that the act of analysis produces stress within the mind of the yogi. The mind tries to avoid this stress by generating an inference or by eradicating the reasoning process - i.e. conceptualization. In the case of the inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā), the realization is thrown up by the intuition in response to the need to give meaning and sense to logic. The generation of contradictions creates a vicious circle of illogicality. In order to regain logicality, the intuition supplies the appropriate logical concept. In other words, the mind's requirement for logicality forces the intuition to generate, or supply the correct concept which satisfies the mind's demand for logicality. This generation by the intuition is the same sort of generation whereby words or ideas are supplied in order to meet the rules of language (i.e. syntax and grammar). In the case of the inferential realization the rules which intuition is trying to meet are the rules of logic. This it is argued is because rules of logic are themselves rules of thought. This is not to say that Aristotelian logic is the rule of thought for everyone; only that some logic, no matter what form it takes, is a rule of thought for homo sapiens. This flexibility in what the logical rules of thought may be allows for the possibility that another inferential process, apart from analysis, may generate insight. This possibility is discussed below.

In the inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā), a distinction between subject (cogitator) and object (inference) is maintained. The cogitator is conscious of his/her separation from the object of the cogitations. In other words, the cogitator is conscious of his mental operations - i.e. that thinking is taking place. This awareness generates a separation between the cogitator and the act of thinking. In this regard, then, a distinction between subject and object is discerned in the consciousness of the cogitator.

As has been said, analysis creates cognitive stress in the mind of a cogitator. Now it is argued that, when this stress is relieved by the
generation a new inference - which breaks the illogicality - in this case that of non-intrinsic existence (śūnya), the cogitator experiences relief. This relief can be generated in two ways:

1) With the dissipation of the cognitive stress, the relief generated is experienced in a profound manner. This is because the mind relaxes itself and moves back to its pre-analysis situation. In other words the act of restoring cognitive stasis or equilibrium generates a subjective experiential experience of profound import. The relief generated by the eradication of cognitive stress and the accompanying profound experience can possibly be complemented, or enhanced, by a secondary profound experience. Whether this secondary experience is in fact generated the model does not say. All that the model argues is that this secondary experience is a possibility, given the characteristics or aspects of intuition.

2) In outlining the four aspects of intuition, it was pointed out that in the subjective realm, the intuition could throw up a concept before there was a corresponding experiential object. If this is so, then it is possible that after the intuition generates the inference of non-intrinsic existence (śūnya), the mind then creates an experience to correspond to the concept. The mind could find the parameters for this experience from the conceptual. As was pointed out, it is from the Buddhist praxis that the concepts enter the conceptual field. From this praxis, an outline of the expected experience of emptiness (śūnya) could have been outlined. It is maintained that if the mind does generate the experience of emptiness (śūnya) after it has generated the concept, this experience is modelled on the expectations internalized into the conceptual field from the Buddhist praxis.

If analysis is maintained after the new inference of non-intrinsic existence has broken the circle of illogicality, cognitive stress is regonorated. If a new inference cannot break the new circle of illogicality, the cognitive stress forces the mind to eradicate conceptuality altogether. When this happens, the mind alters its state of consciousness, such that the intuitive concepts which were
feeding the conceptualization process are then directly fed into consciousness via intuition. That the intuitive realization (jñāna) is a concept surely follows from the fact that if the ultimate truth (paramārtha) were not the object of an intellectual understanding - which must be derived from concepts - then it would be unknowable, and then the whole Mādhyamika praxis would be for nothing.

A major hindrance to this process is that the Mādhyamika texts specifically argue that the intuitive experience (jñāna) is not based upon concepts. This is no hindrance if we note that the difference between concepts derived from conceptualization and from intuitive concepts is that the latter are non-inferential. It is maintained that the non-inferential nature of the intuitive concept makes it a form of knowing markedly different from that experienced via inference (anumāna). In other words, the knowing which comes about through the intuitive conceptual realization of emptiness (śūnyatā), though due to concepts, is markedly different from the knowing via inferential knowledge (anumāna). In terms of this model, then, we qualify the Mādhyamika claim that the intuitive experience (jñāna) of insight is non-conceptual to mean non-inferential conceptual. It is only thus that the Mādhyamika praxis acquires meaning, since then intuitive experience (jñāna) can be a knowing experience - i.e. based upon concepts - and thus have an intellectual liberating import.

The experience of realization derived via the conceptualization (vikalpa) process, it was pointed out, was a dual experience. The cogitator discerned a distinction between subject and object due to the presence of the conceptualization process - that is, the awareness of the logic process. The intuitive experience (jñāna) of non-intrinsic existence, however, is a non-dual experience. The distinction between cogitator and object of cogitation, i.e. the realization, is eradicated. This is because, in the intuitive experience (jñāna), there is no awareness of thinking to create a separation between the act of thinking and the subject. Consequently the realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) is the sole content of consciousness. This means that the realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) permeates the whole of consciousness.
i.e. it is the sole thing upon which consciousness is focused. The subject becomes the realization, because that is all his consciousness is. His consciousness is merged with the realization such that they are indistinguishable. With this merging of consciousness with the realization, all objective and subjective phenomena vanish such that they don’t exist. To the cogitator they don’t exist at all. In other words, with the intuitive realization (jñāna) of emptiness (śūnyatā), the distinction between object and subject vanish, like water being poured into water.

With the realization of non-intrinsic existence via the conceptualization process, it was argued, there was a corresponding experience of relief due to the eradication of cognitive stress. Similarly, with the sole intuitive experience (jñāna) of non-intrinsic existence, there is also an experience of relief. But, unlike the former relief, the relief generated through the eradication of conceptuality is much more intense and profound. This increase in intensity of the experience is due to the non-dual experience itself. Because the realization occupies the whole of consciousness, there is nothing to mute the experience. The act of conceptualization takes up or occupies a part of consciousness. With its eradication, consciousness is completely focused upon the experience of relief such that this focusing makes the experience one of profound intensity.

The possibility of a secondary input to this experience in the case of the conceptualization process also exists in this case. As in the above case, in the intuitive state there can be a component derived from the mind generating, after the concept, an experience which corresponds to the concept. In other words, there can be an experience derived from the eradication of cognitive stress as well as one derived from the mind itself generating an experience to correspond to the concept. Which of these alternatives is correct this model cannot ascertain. All that the model demonstrates is that if this realization of emptiness (śūnyatā) is an object of knowledge, this knowledge must be based upon a concept, either as a direct isomorphic correspondence or as a metaphor approximating an innate idea. The model says nothing about what activates the intuition into its realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)).
It was pointed out, in the discussion of the conceptual field, that the concepts, ideas, ideologies and beliefs are imparted to it through a socialization process. Thus analysis cannot cause insight unless the appropriate concepts have been given to the mind. In other words, when analysis generates the inference of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)), this generation only comes about if other conditions are in place - i.e. the concepts etc. Consequently, it is seen that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. If analysis was a necessary and a sufficient condition for the generation of insight then there would be no need of the Buddhist praxis, since then any one who used analysis would generate insight: this seems to run counter to the whole Buddhist approach.

The question that remains to be answered in this model is that of why the conceptual experience (prajña) is different from intuitive insight (jñāna). We have already noted that intuitive insight is a much more powerful or intense experience; now the question is: why is this so? The answer is that the conceptualization, or logic process mutes the experience, because there is a residual belief in the intrinsic existence of logic. The answer as to just how this happens is arrived at by noting the characteristics of the conceptual and intuitive experience.

The conceptual experience (prajña) of emptiness (śūnyatā) is an inferred realization. By using consequential analysis (prasaṅga) an inferred realization of emptiness (śūnyatā) occurs. Consequential analysis (prāsaṅga) demonstrates a reductio ad absurdum to the belief in intrinsic existence. At the point where all we have is the reductio ad absurdum, the question asked is: what does the reductio ad absurdum mean? And the inferred answer is emptiness (śūnyatā). Thus, using consequential analysis (prasaṅga), the inferred emptiness (śūnyatā) to all phenomena can be realized. There is, however, always one phenomenon which remains exempt from this demonstration (for the demonstration cannot occur without it), and this is the belief in the intrinsic existence of logic. If reality can be shown to be empty (śūnyatā) by the process of consequential analysis (prasaṅga), which means by logic, then there must be an implicit belief in the absolute
and intrinsic existence of logic. The one thing that is not shown to be empty (śūnyatā) is logic itself. There thus remains a residual belief in the intrinsic existence of logic. This residual belief mutes the experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) and makes it different to or less profound than the intuitive experience [jñāna]. In the intuitive process, on the other hand, there is no act of logical thinking, so that, when the intuitive realization [jñāna] of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) is thrown up from the intuition there is no residual belief in intrinsic existence, because there is no act of logical thinking. The intuitive process is unknown: it has no defining characteristics and thus no intrinsic existence. Thus the intuitive realization [jñāna] of emptiness (śūnyatā) is a total realization of emptiness (śūnyatā), one that contains no residual belief in intrinsic existence.

In the appendix it is shown that the Svātantrika used both consequential analysis (prasaṅga) and the syllogism (svatantra). In this appendix it is pointed out that there is no clear evidence to show whether the Svātantrika used the syllogism (svatantra) or consequential analysis to generate a conceptual and intuitive insight. Nevertheless, what can be argued is that, like the Geluk-ka's conceptual insight (prajñā), the Svātantrika's conceptual insight (prajñā) also contains a residual belief in intrinsic existence. If the syllogism is used to generate the conceptual insight (prajñā) then, like the use of consequential analysis (prasaṅga) by the Geluk-ka, the syllogism is a process of logic, and in order for it to produce the conceptual realization of emptiness (śūnyatā), a belief that it has an intrinsic nature or absoluteness is required. It is this residual belief which makes the Svātantrika's conceptual insight (prajñā) less profound, or different from their intuitive insight (jñāna). In this regard, the Geluk-ka's conceptual insight (prajñā) looks as if it is the same as the Svātantrika's, since they both result from a belief in the intrinsic nature of logic - the syllogism (svatantra) for the Svātantrika and consequential analysis (prasaṅga) for the Geluk-ka. From this argument it is possible to conjecture how the Pārśāṅgika might view this conceptual experience (prajñā) of the Geluk-ka and Svātantrika. A possible opinion is that they view both as belonging to conventional reality (samyūti). For a diagrammatic representation of this, see Fig 5 in the Appendix.
This model has put forward a mechanism for insight generation based upon the idea that analysis plays a part in this generation. It is possible that some other mechanism may also generate insight. This model also takes into account the possibility that insight may arise by means other than via analysis. The strength of the model is that a realization of non-intrinsic existence by means other than by analysis is accounted for. In other words, the model allows for the possibility that the inferential realization [prajñā] of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) could occur without analysis - i.e. by some other inferential generating process. Also, while it is possible that the inference of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) may result from an inferential process other than analysis, it is also possible that the realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) comes, not from conceptualization, but directly from the intuition.

The mechanisms for this non-analysis realization are exactly the same as for the realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) with analysis; i.e. via conceptualization, or intuition. It is obvious that this non-analysis realization of non-intrinsic existence is a random affair. The non-analysis realization could occur at any time and while one is engaged in any conceptualization. All that is required is that the realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) is thrown up from the conceptual field. In allowing for this non-analysis mode of generating insight, the model caters for Inada's and Murti's claims that analysis does not cause insight. This allowance of the model is one of its strengths, as it indicates its interpretive range and flexibility.

To reiterate, the keystone of this model is that all thought has as its source the intuition. If we keep this in mind and combine with it certain extrapolations from contemporary psychological theory - i.e. that cogitating on contradictions may bring about an alteration in consciousness - then we have the infrastructure to the model.

In putting forward this model, it is assumed that it is nevertheless consistent with Madhyamika tenets, in the sense that it will not be consistent or, in other words, free of self-contradiction or
criticism. Murti points out that "...the Madhyamika rejects all views...by drawing out the implications of any thesis he shows its self-contradictory character...in a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments...". With this point in mind, it is maintained that this model itself will not be immune to the Madhyamika reductio ad absurdum critique. This admission, firmly embeds the model within the Madhyamika system and admits that it cannot escape from criticism and be free of contradiction. Nevertheless the utility of the model will hopefully be in its capacity to account for the generation of insight. Thus though truth is something which is not contradictable which this thesis cannot be if we accept Murti's claim it nevertheless may have some pragmatic truth in explaining insight generation.

X SUMMARY

The model presented rests upon three main theses:

1) All thought has its source in the intuition.

2) There can be both a conceptual (prajñā) and an intuitive realization (jñāna) of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā).

3) Extrapolating from the findings of contemporary psychology, it is argued that analysis creates stress in the mind which the mind may avoid by eradicating conceptualization.

The model maintains that, when analysis creates stress in the mind, the mind eradicates conceptuality. When this happens, the inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) is eradicated and the intuitive source for this inference is directed to consciousness, where it is experienced as an uninferred realization with powerful force. In the possible case of a non-analytic realization, the model is the same, except that some inferential process other than analysis creates both the inferential realization and the stress. The source for the realization is the conceptual field, and this field is made up of given concepts and possibly innate ideas. Now the realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) enters the conceptual field, it is maintained,
is either via the traditional Buddhist praxis, or it is there in the innate ideas. Because these ideas have never been conscious, the intuition finds appropriate conceptual approximation for the realization in the given conceptual field which then is given to consciousness as metaphorical awareness.

It can be seen that the realization of non-intrinsic existence is dependent upon the presence of a number of conditions before it arises. This demonstrates that analysis, if present for the generation of insight, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the arising of both the inferential [prajñā] and non-inferential realization [jñāna]. The arising of the realization will not take place unless these conditions are present. Thus insight will not arise when one experiences a fit, is in dreamless sleep or just meditating, since without the presence of cognitive stress, an uninferential realization [jñāna] of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) via the intuition will not arise. This arising will not happen so long as one condition is absent. Thus, whether analysis or some other inferential process helps to generate insight, it is only as a necessary, but not as a sufficient condition.

It was pointed out that the conceptual realization [prajñā] of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) was a dual experience of profound experiential import. This dual experience, it was argued, resulted from the fact that the act of thinking created a separation between cogitator and what is cogitated; i.e. non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā). This dual experience, it was argued, involved an experience of intense import. This experience resulted from the alleviation of the cognitive stress. It was maintained that this experience could be complemented by a corresponding experience generated by the mind to correspond to the expected experience associated with the concept of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā).

It was argued that the intuitive realization [jñāna] of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) was a non-dual experience, an experience which is more powerful or intense than that associated with the conceptual. This non-dual experience resulted from the fact, that with the eradi-
...cation of conceptualization, the act of thinking didn't exist. Consequently the realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) completely permeated consciousness, such that the experience of subject object dissolved to leave only the realization itself.

After outlining the cognitive stress model, it was shown how and why the conceptual insight could differ from the intuitive. It was maintained that, so long as we use logic, we can not help but regard it as an absolute, or as having intrinsic existence. This belief resulted in or from a residual belief in intrinsic existence. This residual belief, a consequence of thinking, muted the force of the experience of the ultimate (paramārtha) and made it different from the intuitive insight (jñāna).

Thus the model attempts to explain the generation of a conceptual (prajñā) and intuitive insight (jñāna). Obviously these ideas are only theoretical, or hypothetical. To ascertain the merits of this model, the model will be used against a Prāsaṅgika tradition. In chapter five, an account of insight in the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika will be compared with the cognitive stress model. This comparison will try to find points of agreement. In other words, the Geluk-ba account will be used to test the validity of the model. Chapter four will test the explanatory power of the model against what western scholars say may be the relationship between analysis in different Prāsaṅgika traditions.

It is very important to point out that this cognitive stress model is a model derived from what can be extrapolated from Western psychology. In other words this model is a possible Western explanation of how insight is generated in terms of: cognitive dissonance; 'double bind' and equilibration theory. This cognitive stress model is thus derived from Western sources and as a consequence is not based upon the phenomenology i.e. the experiences of the yogi during meditation, as expounded by the Geluk-ba. P. Fenner points out, that a description of the phenomenology of Geluk-ba meditation is not at the present moment available in the literature. As a consequence a model of insight generation can not be made based upon meditative phenomenology and all that can be obtained is a model based upon extrapolating from Western psychology. Nevertheless a comparison of the cognitive stress model can be made with the Geluk-ba's meditative praxis i.e. stages of meditation.
content stages. This comparison is left for chapter three, where it will be shown that there is a fair amount of agreement between the model and the meditative praxis of the Geluk-ba.
FIG. 1
MODEL FOR INSIGHT GENERATION
NOTES


7 *ibid.*, p. 245, note 142.

8 *ibid.*, p. 282.

9 *ibid.*, p. 286.


14 *ibid.*, p. 268.

15 *ibid.*, p. 268.

16 *ibid.*, p. 226.

17 This possibility is consistent with Inada's and Murti's claim, as shown in chapter five, that analysis does not cause insight. This in fact means that analysis may not be a necessary condition for the generation of insight.

18 *ibid.*, p. 20.

19 *ibid.*, p. 21.

20 *ibid.*, p. 21.

21 *ibid.*, p. 22.

22 *ibid.*, p. 22.

23 *ibid.*, p. 22.
NOTES


7 *ibid.*, p. 243, note 142.

8 *ibid.*, p. 282.

9 *ibid.*, p. 286.


14 *ibid.*, p. 268.

15 *ibid.*, p. 268.

16 *ibid.*, p. 226.

17 This possibility is consistent with Inada’s and Murti’s claim, as shown in chapter five, that analysis does not cause insight. This in fact means that analysis may not be a necessary condition for the generation of insight.

18 *ibid.*, p. 20.

19 *ibid.*, p. 21.

20 *ibid.*, p. 21.

21 *ibid.*, p. 22.

22 *ibid.*, p. 22.

23 *ibid.*, p. 22.
24 ibid., p. 23.

25 ibid., p. 23.

26 ibid., p. 24.


28 ibid., p. 24.

29 ibid., p. 35.

30 ibid., p. 25.


33 S. Katz op.cit., p. 381

34 T. V. R. Murti, op.cit., p. 131.

35 Personal conversation.
There are two kinds of rational cognition the non-conceptual intuition of the holy equipoise, without conceptual thought and the rational cognition that encounters Thatness depending on reason, with conceptual thought...
1 Introduction

In chapter two we outlined a logico-psychological model which we called a cognitive stress model. This model was based upon extrapolating from the findings, of Western psychology, in chapter one. The model was constructed in order to ascertain how, in a psychological sense, insight might be generated, and the nature of this insight. This model was not based upon any Prasangika account of insight, but rather deductively, upon the findings of chapter one. In constructing this model, certain terms were defined. From these terms and the extrapolations of chapter two the model was constructed. As this model is wholly theoretical, and not based upon any Prasangika accounts, this chapter seeks to compare the cognitive stress model with a living Prasangika tradition. The tradition chosen is the Tibetan Geluk-ba school. The cognitive model will be compared with the Geluk-ba's non-meditational account of insight [those views which deal with points other than meditational specificities] in order to see if the cognitive stress model has explanatory power in accounting for the Geluk-ba's views regarding the nature and generation of insight. The point in choosing the Geluk-ba are: 1) the role analysis plays in generating insight is clearly discussed within the Geluk-ba tradition and 2) the role analysis plays in generating insight in the works of Nāgārjuna is a moot point amongst Western scholars.

This chapter will not compare the cognitive stress model with the meditational praxis - i.e. meditative methodology, stages of meditation and meditation procedures of the Geluk-ba. Instead, the cognitive stress model will be compared with a non-meditational account in regard to the nature and generation of insight. In other words the cognitive stress model will not be compared against the meditative praxis. The comparing of the meditational praxis and the cognitive stress model is left, for reasons of methodology, to chapter five; where Western ideas regarding the relationship between analysis and insight are examined. After reading this chapter the reader may go straight to the section on Hopkins in chapter five to see this comparison, which will demonstrate that the cognitive stress model is in strong agreement with the meditational praxis of the Geluk-ba.
The main sources for the Tibetan Geluk-ba Schools' account of insight come from: 1) E. Napper's critique of the views of the Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and 2) an exegesis of the views of Dzong-ka-ba and some of the findings of M. Sweet. 3) Dzong-ka-ba's *The Middle Transcendence Insight* chapter of his work *Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment*. E. Napper's critique of Dzong-ka-ba is used because, in translating portions of Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, she also bases her comments upon four additional unpublished commentaries on *The Great Exposition of the Path*, as well as sections of Dzong-ka-ba's other major works on the Madhyamika. This background thus makes Napper an ideal scholar upon whose work to base an exegesis. It should be noted the chapters translated of *Essence of Good Explanations*, and two partial translations ie *Ocean of Reasoning* and *Illumination of the Thought* do not deal with insight or its generation. Thus the reason for using the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and the "Middle Transcendence Insight" chapter of Dzong-ka-ba's work *Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* is that apart from one untranslated work, these two books are the main source for Dzong-ka-ba's views on Madhyamika.

11 Geluk-ba

The first question that has to be asked is what is the role of analysis for the Geluk-ba? In chapter two it was pointed out that analysis may play a part in the generation of insight. On this point, Dzong-ka-ba would agree. Dzong-ka-ba in his *The Middle Transcendence Insight* chapter of his work *Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* points out that "... insight is the analysis of ultimate reality". Similarly, Dzong-ka-ba indicates that analysis plays a part in the generation of insight when he says "... analytic meditation is necessary, since without practicing analytic meditation which cultivates the discriminating wisdom analysis of the import of selflessness, meditative realization will not emerge... one seeks the understanding of selflessness repeatedly analyzing its meaning...". Napper likewise points out that Dzong-ka-ba argues that non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (*śūnyatā*)) must initially be realized through analysis.
It is thus seen that analysis plays a part in the generation of insight. The question is what is the nature of this insight? The cognitive stress model argued that insight could be both a conceptual (prajña) and an intuitive realization (jñāna). In this model the conceptual (prajña) preceded the intuitive (jñāna) and was a milder experience than the intuitive (jñāna). In regard to the nature of insight, for the Tibetan Geluk-ba school insight can be both a conceptual (prajña) and intuitive insight (jñāna); in agreement with the cognitive stress model. Dzong-ka-ba in his chapter The Middle Transcendence Insight of his work Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment, points this out when he argues that:

There are two kinds of rational cognitions the non-conceptual intuition of the holy equipoise, without conceptual thought and the rational cognition that encounters Thatness depending on reason, with conceptual thought... the objective emptiness according to the non-conceptual rational cognition is the actual ultimate... while according to the conceptual rational cognition... is not the actual ultimate...yet it is not said in general not to be the actual ultimate reality.⁷

In this regard, it can be seen that there is a conceptual (prajña) and a non-conceptual insight. It is argued that when Dzong-ka-ba talks about a rational cognition he means logical, or inferential. On this point Napper lends support when she points out that, according to Dzong-ka-ba, prior to a non-conceptual [intuitive (jñāna) realization] of emptiness "...one initially generates an inferential cognition of emptiness."⁸ Thus, in regard to the idea that there is a conceptual (prajña) and intuitive insight (jñāna) the cognitive stress model agrees with the Geluk-ba. The cognitive stress model and the Geluk-ba also agree in regard to the view that the conceptual (prajña) realization of insight is an inferential realization.

The question to be asked is how does Dzong-ka-ba sees the intrinsic difference between the intuitive (jñāna) and the conceptual (prajña). In the cognitive stress model it was maintained that the insight generated by conceptualization was a rational, or logical, inference. To answer this question an examination of some comments of Chandrakirti will be undertaken.
In two verses of Chandrakirti, both from his Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatāra), the nature of insight is pointed out. Insight, it is argued, is a non-conceptualizing state attained when the non-intrinsic nature of things is realized. As Chandrakirti states:

Ordinary people are bound by their concepts, but non-conceptualizing yogins [who realize the nature of things (dharmatā) become liberated. The learned have said that the result of analysis (vicāra) is the reversal of conceptualization.\(^9\)

Now from Huntington's translation:

"Common people are tightly bound by these reified concepts while the meditator who does not produce such ideas obtains liberations. Wise men have declared that analysis results in the termination of reified concepts.\(^10\)"

From Fenner's translation:

"When things are [conceived to intrinsically] exist, then conceptuality (kalpāna) is produced. But a thorough analysis shows how things are [in fact] not [intrinsically] existent. [When it is realized that] there are no [intrinsically] existent things, the conceptualizations do not arise, just as for example there is no fire without fuel.\(^11\)"

From Huntington's translation:

"...upon critical investigation the entity as such proves to be nonexistent, and in the absence of an [intrinsically existent] entity, these reified concepts are inappropriate..."\(^12\).

As these verses have been discussion as to there correspondance in meaning in chapters one and two no further discussion will be undertaken. Except to say that there appears to be agreement between the translators on there meaning.
In these verses it can be seen that insight arises when analysis reverses conceptuality by showing how things don't intrinsically exist. On this point, Fenner similarly points out "... [the] dissipation of conceptuality is concomitant with the onset of insight into reality."  

It is undeniable that Candrakīrti is rejecting conceptuality, but just what constitutes conceptuality is a matter of debate within the Mādhyamika. The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakīrti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions." Napper points out that Dzong-ka-ba finds support for his claim in a passage in which Candrakīrti comments upon a passage of Aryadeva i.e "conceptuality sees [and] one is bound; it is to be stopped here" [Candrakīrti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct." Similarly, Dzong-ka-ba argues that "...you should not be satisfied with a mere calm abiding that possesses the features of non-conceptuality that is the mind staying in accordance with your wish on the single object of meditation ... otherwise since such mere meditative stabilization is shared even with Forders, no matter how much you cultivate that mere [meditative stabilization] you will not be released from mundane existence..." Dzong-ka-ba also uses Kamalashila as an authority for this point when he quotes the lines "having thus made mind steady with respect to an object of observation one should analyze with wisdom." In this regard it is clear that non-conceptuality for Dzong-ka-ba is not the eradication of all conceptuality. Fenner would seem to be in agreement with Dzong-ka-ba as Fenner argues that the conceptuality Candrakīrti talks about may not mean all thought, but only that thought in which there is "some cognitive substratum that is responsible for ontologizing types of conceptions."  

According to Napper, Dzong-ka-ba maintains that, though he places the non-conceptual experience above the conceptual, "this does not mean that non-conceptuality is per se better, for some objects such
In these verses it can be seen that insight arises when analysis reverses conceptuality by showing how things don't intrinsically exist. On this point, Fenner similarly points out "... the dissipation of conceptuality is concomitant with the onset of insight into reality."\textsuperscript{13}

It is undeniable that \textsc{Candrakīrti} is rejecting conceptuality, but just what constitutes conceptuality is a matter of debate within the Mādhyamika. The Geluk-\textipa{}\textipa{Dzong}-ka-\textipa{ba} argues that the conceptuality spoken of by \textsc{Candrakīrti} has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".\textsuperscript{14} Napper points out that Dzong-ka-ba finds support for his claim in a passage in which \textsc{Candrakīrti} comments upon a passage of Āryadeva i.e ""conceptuality sees (and) one is bound; it is to be stopped here" [\textsc{Candrakīrti} glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct"].\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Dzong-ka-ba argues that "...you should not be satisfied with a mere calm abiding that possesses the features of non-conceptuality that is the mind staying in accordance with your wish on the single object of meditation ... otherwise since such mere meditative stabilization is shared even with \\textsc{P}dard\textsc{pa}, no matter how much you cultivate that mere [meditative stabilization] you will not be released from mundane existence...".\textsuperscript{16} Dzong-ka-ba also uses Kamalashīla as an authority for this point when he quotes the lines "having thus made mind steady with respect to an object of observation one should analyze with wisdom".\textsuperscript{17} In this regard it is clear that non-conceptuality for Dzong-ka-ba is not the eradication of all conceptuality. Fenner would seem to be in agreement with Dzong-ka-ba as Fenner argues that the conceptuality \textsc{Candrakīrti} talks about may not mean all thought, but only that thought in which there is "some cognitive substratum that is responsible for ontologizing types of conceptions."\textsuperscript{18}

According to Napper, Dzong-ka-ba maintains that, though he places the non-conceptual experience above the conceptual, "this does not mean that non-conceptuality is per se better, for some objects such
as emptiness could never be known without prior conceptual realization." It is clear from the above comments that Dzong-ka-ba sees the conceptuality that is eradicated as being conceptuality of intrinsic existence.

Thus Dzong-ka-ba argues that non-conceptual only means conceptuality of intrinsic existence. In this regard, the non-conceptual state of Dzong-ka-ba contains the concept of non-intrinsic existence. The cognitive stress model, it will be remembered, argued that the inference generated by conceptualization was an inferential concept of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā). Thus so far the cognitive stress model agrees with the Geluk-ba account of insight: i.e., insight is both conceptual (prajñā) and intuitive (ñāna), and the conceptual (prajñā) contains the inferential concept of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā). In other words, both the cognitive stress model and the Geluk-ba argue that there is a conceptual (prajñā) realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā) in the non-intuitive (prajñā) realization of insight.

In the cognitive stress model it was argued 1) that the inferential insight was a dual experience i.e the distinction between subject and object was maintained; and 2) that the intuitive experience (ñāna) was a non-dual one: i.e the distinction between subject and object was eradicated. On these points Dzong-ka-ba is in agreement as he maintains that there is both a dual and non-dual experience of insight.

Dzong-ka-ba argues that it is incorrect to maintain that insight is free from all distinctions of a dualistic appearance. In his The Middle Transcendence Insight chapter of his tract Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment, Dzong-ka-ba points out that:

Therefore, except that it [conceptual (prajñā) realization of emptiness (śūnyatā)] is free of all fabrications of dualism according to a certain type of cognition, it is not possible for that truth-emptiness to be free of all fabrications of appearance, and therefore it is not the meaning of the treatises that for it to be ultimate
reality it must be free of all fabrications of dualistic appearance.20

Thus we see that, in regard to the dualistic conceptual [prajñā], or inferential realization, the cognitive stress model and the Geluk-ba agree. In regard to the intuitive realization [jñāna], Dzong-ka-ba argues, AS DOES the cognitive stress model, that the intuitive realization [jñāna] is a non-dual experience. On this point Napper points out that, according to Dzong-ka-ba "... at a time of direct realization of emptiness, all conventional phenomena vanish, such that one might erroneously come to think that they did not exist at all...".21 Napper likewise maintains that "the heart of the system lies in non-verbal, non-dualistic meditative experiences...".22

Napper argues that, according to Dzong-ka-ba, reasoning is used to develop an inferential consciousness23. "Inference is necessarily conceptual, but can with repeated mediation familiarization be brought to a level of non-conceptual direct experience."24 Napper maintains that, for Dzong-ka-ba the content of both realizations is the same.25 Although the content is the same, however, the potency of the experience is different.26 According to Napper, Dzong-ka-ba maintains that of the two realizations, "... direct perception [intuitive] [is] tremendously more powerful".27 In other words, the non-dual intuitive experience [jñāna] is of more profound experiential import than the dualistic inferential realization. These claims of Dzong-ka-ba are in agreement with the cognitive stress model which likewise argued that the intuitive experience [jñāna] was more powerful than the inferential. This agreement thus lends support for the interpretive power of the cognitive model.

The cognitive stress model argued some points that are not raised in the Geluk-ba account. In the cognitive stress model it was argued that the experience of insight could be made up of two components: that derived from the alleviation of cognitive stress; and that derived from a possible component whereby the experience of insight was itself generated after generating the concept of emptiness (śunyatā), the cogitator then created an experience which
corresponded to the concept. These ideas are not broached by the Geluk-ba. Nevertheless, these ideas may offer an explanation regarding the generation of the experience of insight. This possible explanation, though theoretical, may be of use in understanding how the experience of insight is generated - this understanding will be an explanation and not a description, in that it will show how insight is generated by the psychological phenomena of cognitive stress. This possibility thus becomes a strength, at least theoretically, of the cognitive stress model, as it extends the explanatory range of the model by offering a psychological explanation for the arising of the experiential experience which is not accounted for in the Geluk-ba account. As will be eventually seen this explanation is compatible with the views of Dzong-ka-ba in that Dzong-ka-ba's views are are accounted for by the model itself. In other words, Dzong-ka-ba's view on the nature of insight ie conceptual insight [prajña] and intuitive insight [jñāna] and their generation by analysis are explained as a product of cognitive stress.

Dzong-ka-ba's qualification of non-conceptuality and the idea that there can be a dual experience of insight, as well as his characterizing of insight as being both conceptual [prajñā] and intuitive [jñāna], may appear to be inconsistent with the notion of the transcendent ineffable ultimate (paramārtha). How and why the ultimate (paramārtha) can be an object of conceptual knowledge is partially explained by the way the Svaatantrika interpret the two truths - an explanation with which Dzong-ka-ba agreed. In order to understand how this conceptual knowledge of the ultimate is possible, an examination of the dispute over the two truths between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika will be outlined. An awareness of the Svātantrika's argument will to some degree give an epistemological foundation to the cognitive stress model, a foundation which was not put forward in constructing the model. In other words this outline will demonstrate a possible epistemological framework upon which the cognitive stress model may find support.
The central issue of contention between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika over the nature of the insight is in regard to the nature of the relation between the relative conventional truth (sāmyāti), the ultimate (paramārtha) and the status of the conventional (sāmyāti). For the Prāsaṅgika, though the conventional (sāmyāti) and the ultimate (paramārtha) are not intrinsically distinct, ultimately they are non-continuous or separate and distinct aspects in a conventional or nominal sense. This incommensurability derives from the complete inability of anything of a conventional nature to be valid as a means to describe or articulate the ultimate. For the Svātantrika, on the other hand, there is a continuity between the relative (sāmyāti) and the ultimate (paramārtha), such that a conceptual experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) is possible. The Svātantrika, by propounding this continuity, have the problem of explaining how there can be a continuity between the conceptual [prajñā] experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) and the non-conceptual [prajñā] insight. A conceptual [prajñā] and a non-conceptual experience [[jñāna] would seem to imply a hiatus or break in the continuum. Bhāvaviveka in fact constructs logical arguments which seek to demonstrate this continuity or commensurability. The commensurability derives from the svātantrika claim that the ultimate can be expressed in terms of the conventional.

The textual support that the Svātantrika rely on for their claim of continuity and commensurability comes from Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* (Vighrahavyāvartani) (verse xxxviii) which states:

"The transcendent truth is not taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa] is not attained without having recourse to the transcendent truth...".

The Svātantrika interpret this verse to mean that the ultimate (paramārtha) cannot be expressed without the help of the conventional (sāmyāti). Both Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka claim that the ultimate is beyond speech, but Bhāvaviveka, in order to argue for a continuity between the two truths, inserts a third category between the ultimate (paramārtha) and the conventional (sāmyāti). Bhāvaviveka divides the ultimate (paramārtha) up into aparyaya - the paramārtha...
of the Prāsaṅgika i.e that which cannot be reached by the conventional (samvyāti) and the paryaya i.e that which can be reached, cognized and inferred. As Bhāvaviveka states in the Blaze of Reasoning (Madhyamakahrdayavṛttiarkajāvalī) (verse 96, 27, 4-8):

"paramartha is of two kinds. One is without volition, supramandane devoid of [mental] impurity and beyond conceptual differentiation [aparyaya]. The other, [paryaya] is the paramartha with volition, with correct worldly knowledge, conforming to moral and intellectual equipment and conceptions."

In this bifurcation the non-conceptual (aparyaya) is equivalent to the ultimate paramārtha of the Prāsaṅgika. It should be emphasized that, as Lopez points out, "a conceptual, or dualistic reasoning consciousness is not able to understand emptiness in a way in which a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness sees emptiness." Thus through the category of the conceptual (paryaya), Bhāvaviveka sought to detranscendentalize the ultimate (paramārtha) and bring it into the realm of logic and linguistics. In creating this bifurcation Bhāvaviveka turns logic into a means for knowing the ultimate. This is so because, in allowing an inferential reasoning consciousness to cognize the ultimate, logic must thus become an absolute; as Ebeck notes Bhāvaviveka "... engaged in a subtle absolutizing process in which conventional truths are again established in their own right."

Napper points out that some Western scholars maintain that Bhāvaviveka departed from Nāgārjuna in significant ways in laying out his etymologies i.e bifurcation of the ultimate (paramārtha) On this point Napper maintains that Özong-ka-ba does not agree, since he fully accept Bhāvaviveka's bifurcation.

In the literature the Geluk-ba are referred to as being Prāsaṅgika both by Western scholars and the Geluk-ba themself. Santina, in his Madhyamaka Schools in India, makes the point that there are two ways the Geluk-ba have characterized the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. One way is the epistemological one ie the way they demonstrate the ultimate, the Svatantra for the Svātantrika and the prasaṅga for the
Prasangika. Santina notes that this way was adopted by bSod-nams Seng-ge. The other the ontological was adopted by Dzong-ka-ba is the existence of entities by virtue of their own marks. In other words the existence of entities possessing a svabhāva conventionally. Now from an examination of the work of Jang-gya, his 'Presentation of Šenets', these two separate characterizations are to simplistic. The truth of the matter is that a number of features characterized the Svaṭantrika. From Jang-gya's account of the features of the Svātantrika it will be seen that the Geluk-ba follow some of these.

Jang-gya in his 'Presentation of Šenets' divides his Svātantrika section into three parts 1) definition of a svātantrika ie one who uses an autonomous syllogism, 2) divisions ie Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, and 3) assertions. This article will deal with the assertions. In the assertions section Jang-gya divides it up into four sections 1) identification of the object of reasoned negation, 2) the reasoning which refutes that 3) the two truths and 4) a brief presentation of the paths and fruits. This article deals with 1 and 3 ie ontological and epistemological assertions. It will be seen that these concerns are mutually dependent upon each other for their justification.

111 THE TWO TRUTHS (SATYADVAYA)-ONTOLOGY

Jang-gya in the section "The Meaning of the Ultimate" notes that in Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system the ultimate is bifurcated up into two parts. Jang-gya notes that according to Bhāvaviveka:

"Ultimate...[consciousness's] are of two types. One is a supramundane non-contaminated [meditative equipoise] free from elaborations which operates without [conceptual] activity. The second, possessing conceptual elaborations, is called mundane wisdom".

This claim of Jang-gya is supported by Bhāvaviveka. As we saw above in Blaze of Reasoning (Madhyamakahrdayavṛttiarkajñālā) (verse 96, 27, 4-8):

Jang-gya calls the second ultimate a concordant ultimate ie existing for an inferential consciousness. Dzong-ka-ba in his 'Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment' like wise accepts Bhāvaviveka's
bifurcation with the qualification the bifurcation does not describe 
the ultimate but instead the subjectivity's or consciousness that 
apprehends it. Dzong-ka-ba states:

"There are two kinds of rational cognitions the non-conceptual 
intuition of the holy equipoise without conceptual thought and the 
rational cognition that encounters Thatness depending on reason, with 
conceptual thought... Bhāvaviveka's explanation in 'Blaze of Reason' 
of ultimate as both non-conceptual intuition and as wisdom that 
corresponds to that and Kamalashila's [A Svātāntrika] explanation in 
the 'Illumination' of the two realities have the same intention. 
Therefore, the meaning of these treaties is not a differentiation of 
the objective ultimate only without differentiating the 
subjectivity's (involved)."\(^{40}\)

Jāng-gya goes onto state what all this means in an ontological sense 
for the Svātāntrika. He states that "Thus both the ultimate in which 
the reasoning consciousness is referred to as the ultimate 
[concordant ultimate] and something which is established for that 
[ultimate consciousness, such as emptiness] exists, but neither the 
ultimate of the latter mode of interpretation nor something existing 
in that way exists".\(^{41}\)

Dzong-Ka-Ba like wise accepts that there is an object which 
corresponds to "śūnyatā" for a reasoning consciousness In Dzong-ka-
ba's chapter 'The Nature of the Ultimate Reality Actual Meaning' in 
his *Middle Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* Dzong-ka-ba tries to 
demonstrate, using the arguments of Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna, that 
emptiness [śūnyatā] really exists for a reasoning consciousness.\(^{42}\) 
Dzong-ka-ba quotes Candrakīrti to give support to the argument of the 
objective status of sunyata. As he quotes "Candrakīrti further 
explains in the commentary that "the ultimate as the very object of 
the special intuition of those of authentic perception is discovered 
as the intrinsic actuality of the self but it (itself) is not 
established by its own intrinsic nature [svabhava]; it is a single 
actuality" Thus he states that while it is discovered by the 
uncontaminated intuition that encounters Thatness it has no 
intrinsically objective status."\(^{43}\) Now though Dzong-ka-ba states,
quoting Candrakīrti, "Thus he asserts that both objectivity and supremacy constitute the "ultimate reality" he goes onto say though that "...this ultimate reality is merely presented as existent in terms of social convention." In his own words Dzong-ka-ba clearly sees that... it is said that ultimate reality is only mentioned in terms of social convention. Therefore all things represented as existent are presented in terms of social convention." Mapper notes that in the section on those who don't negate enough in Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition Dzong-ka-ba "...focuses most of his attention on the proof that emptiness exists, although it does not inherently exist. Mapper points out that this assertion of the existence of emptiness is rejected, not only by most Western scholars but also by others in the Tibetan tradition, as a belief of the Prasangika.

Thus it can be seen that from the characterisation of the Svātantrika by Jang-gya the Geluk-ba, as represented by their founder Dzong-ka-ba, subscribes to many of the Svātantrika's ontological beliefs. In passing it should be brought out the closeness between the Geluk-ba and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika ontology's. According Jang-gya the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika are characterised by their belief that "...the observed-object-conditions of sense consciousness are external objects which are composites of particles." Or in other words "...in their system is the conventional existence of own character, that is, establishment by way of the [objects] own conventionality". It is seen that this own-nature ie svabhava is very close to the 'intrinsic actuality'[ established by a reasoning consciousness ie a conventionality] as expounded by Candrakīrti. And as Mapper points out "Dzong-ka-ba's case that emptiness exists [for a reasoning consciousness] is based on his equating a number of terms-emptiness (stong pa nyid, sunyata), ultimate truth (dom dam bden pa paramarthasatya), [final] nature (rang bzhin, svabhava) and suchness (de nyid or kho na nyid, tattva)."

IV THE TWO TRUTHS (SATYADVAYA)-EPISTEMOLOGY

Jang-gya in his section 'The Two Truths' lays out the Svātantrika's arguments for a conceptual or logical understanding of paramārtha ie
the concordant reality. Similarly as we have seen above Dzong-ka-ba also lays out arguments for a rational, or conceptual elaboration of the ultimate.

The controversy between the two schools over their understanding of the two truths has centred around their respective interpretations of a central verse in the insight chapter of Santideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra which states:

The conventional (samṛthi) and the ultimate these are accepted as the two truths. Reality (tattvam) is beyond the sphere of the intellect; intellect is called concealing (samṛthi).

Sweet argues that the Geluk-ka interpretation of Santideva is heavily influenced by the Svātantrika bifurcation of paramartha. The principle passage upon which the Geluk-ka base their understanding of the two truths is contained, according to Sweet, in the Sīkṣa samuccaya which states "this is what is to be known, the conventional and the ultimate. Since the blessed one sees and knows and experiences these as emptiness he is called the omniscient".

Sweet points out that the Tibetan Geluk-ka have argued that the last part of Shantideva’s assertion should not be taken literally. For the Svātantrika there is a continuity between the relative (samṛtti) and the ultimate (paramārtha), such that a conceptual experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) is possible. The Svātantrika, by propounding this continuity, have the problem of explaining how there can be a continuity between the conceptual experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) and the non-conceptual insight. A conceptual and a non-conceptual experience would seem to imply a hiatus or break in the continuum. Bhāvaviveka in fact constructs logical arguments which seek to demonstrate this continuity or commensurability. The commensurability derives from the Svātantrika claim that the ultimate can be expressed in terms of the conventional.

The textual support that the Svātantrika rely on for their claim of continuity and commensurability comes from Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of
Objections (Vigrahavyāvartani) (verse XXXV11) which states:

"The transcendent truth is not taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa is not attained without having recourse to the transcendent truth."59

The Svaśāntrika interpret this verse to mean that the ultimate (paramārtha) cannot be expressed without the help of the conventional (samvṛti). Both Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka claim that the ultimate is beyond speech, but Bhāvaviveka, in order to argue for a continuity between the two truths, inserts a third category between the ultimate (paramārtha) and the conventional (samvṛti). Bhāvaviveka divides the ultimate (paramārtha) up into aparaya - the paramārtha of the Prāsaṅgika i.e. that which cannot be reached by the conventional (samvṛti) - and the paryaya i.e. that which can be reached, cognised and inferred as we have seen above from his Blaze of Reasoning (Madhyamakahrdayavṛttiārkaśvāla) (verse 96, 27, 4-8)60

In this bifurcation the non-conceptual (aparaya) is equivalent to the ultimate paramārtha of the Prāsaṅgika. It should be emphasised that, as Lopez points out, "a conceptual, or dualistic reasoning consciousness is not able to understand emptiness in a way in which a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness sees emptiness."61 Thus through the category of the conceptual (paryaya), Bhāvaviveka sought to detranscendentalize the ultimate (paramārtha) and bring it into the realm of logic and linguistics. In creating this bifurcation Bhāvaviveka turns logic into a means for knowing the ultimate. This is so because, in allowing an inferential reasoning consciousness to cognize the ultimate, logic must thus become an absolute; as Eckel notes Bhāvaviveka "... engaged in a subtle absolutizing process in which conventional truths are again established in their own right."62

Thus when Dzong-ka-ṭa state that "There are two kinds of rational cognition's the non-conceptual intuition of the holy equipoise, without conceptual thought and the rational cognition that encounters Thatness depending on reason, with conceptual thought."63 In this regard, it can be seen that there is a conceptual and a non-conceptual insight. It is argued that when Dzong-ka-ṭa talks about a
rational cognition he means logical, or inferential. On this point Napper lends support when she points out that, according to Dzong-ka-ba, prior to a non-conceptual [intuitive] realisation of emptiness "...one initially generates an inferential cognition of emptiness." Thus it can be seen like the Svātantrika Dzong-ka-ba is arguing that logic can give access to the ultimate. This is in contradistinction to the Prāsaṅgika who in general terms claim that the ultimate (paramārtha) truth could not be the object of an intellectual understanding, because it is beyond the intellect.

In conclusion it can be seen that the Geluk-ba hold a number of views which Jang-gya states are what characterise the Svatantrika. These views are both ontological and epistemological in the nature of the ultimate and the possibility of knowing the ultimate. Also as we have seen the Svatantrika's ontology in regard to the conventionally existent is similar to the Geluk-ba so is their use of the svatantra. Hopkins points out in his book Meditation on Emptiness that the Prāsaṅgika [ie the Geluk-ba] themselves used the syllogism. According to Hopkins the Prāsaṅgika [geluk-ba] considered that "...once the view of emptiness is about to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena are appropriate: however when debating with those who are not yet about to generate the view in their continuum consequences may be used." Similarly Hopkins notes that "the case is the same in meditation consequences are stated in order to break down one's own adherence to the wrong view: then, syllogisms may be stated if necessary." Thus the situation as can be seen is more complicated than this for to make this characterisation it is required to derive accounts of what constitute the beliefs of the Prāsaṅgika from non-Geluk-ba sources ie Indian, Chinese, non-Geluk-ba Tibetans etc.

With this bifurcation of the ultimate (paramārtha), the question that arises is what part analysis plays in generating insight. In the cognitive stress model it was argued that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. Analysis was one of a matrix of interconnected and interdependent conditions which generated insight. In this model, the Buddhist praxis plays a part in the generation of insight. On these points the Geluk-ba's
views regarding the relationship between analysis and insight are almost the same.

For the Geluk-ба the relationship between analysis and insight is one of a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Dzong-ka-ба himself indicates that analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for insight. Dzong-ka-ба argues that the realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (śūnyatā)) is "... only fully realized through prolonged religious practice and meditation (and analysis)". This indicates that analysis is one of a number of conditions for the generation of insight. This is clearly seen when we note that Dzong-ka-ба claims that:

If you do not discover the view of selflessness no matter what method of meditation you practice, your meditation will not abide on the import of thatness...if you don't remember the view when you meditate on Thatness and focus your meditation upon that you will have no meditation on reality...if you practice analytic meditation by itself, the quiescence you previously generated will decline, so you should practice analytic meditation mounted on the horse of quiescence, now and then blending in periods of focused meditation.69

It is obvious that analysis for Dzong-ka-ба is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the arising of a conceptual (prajna) and intuitive insight (śānta). In other words, it is dependent upon certain preconditions being set up. This idea of preconditions being needed before insight arises is in agreement with the Madhyamika idea of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). On this point Napper indicates that Dzong-ka-ба agreed with the idea of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) when she says in her book, dealing with the views of Dzong-ka-ба, that dependent arising [origination] (pratītya-samutpāda) "... indicates the interrelatedness of the universe... nothing stands alone, autonomous and isolated, but instead exists only in a web of interconnections".70. Dzong-ka-ба, according to Napper, argues that "... the key to proper understanding of Madhyamika [is a] proper understanding of the compatibility of dependent arising and emptiness, [as well as] of conventional truths and ultimate truths".71
In the cognitive stress model it was argued that a matrix of interrelated and interdependent conditions goes into generating insight. It was argued that any one condition cannot, by itself, logically be related to the arising of insight. Thus we see that this claim of the cognitive stress model both explains the arising of insight for the Geluk-ba and is in agreement with the Geluk-ba’s own account of the arising of insight.

V Summary

This chapter has shown that, for the Geluk-ba, analysis is used to generate insight. This insight is both a conceptual (prajña) and an intuitive experience (jñāna). The conceptual (prajña), as distinct from the intuitive (jñāna), was the cradication of all conceptuality except that of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā). The conceptual experience was a dualistic experience where the intuitive (jñāna) was completely non-dualistic. In the non-dualistic experience, the experience was of a more profound or powerful import than the conceptual (prajña). As Napper argues, according to Đzong-ka-ba, “the direct [intuitive] perception [of emptiness is] tremendously more powerful [than the one based on reasoning].”72. The relationship between analysis and insight in the Geluk-ba is one of a necessary, but not sufficient condition.

These characteristics of the Geluk-ba account, it was found, are in agreement with the cognitive stress model. When it came to accounting for and explaining the differences in the experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) between the conceptual (prajña) and intuitive realization (jñāna), the cognitive stress model was found to expand upon and account for these differences. This explanatory range was found to be a strength of the model, as it covered an area which is left silent in the Geluk-ba. The model also explained and accounted for the generation of the conceptual (prajña) and intuitive insight (jñāna)s. It was also in agreement with the Geluk-ba’s claim that the conceptual (prajña) experience was an inferential one of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyatā).
Thus it was seen that the cognitive stress model did have support for some of its claims. This indicates the possibility that the model does have explanatory power in regard to accounting for the generation of insight. The model was not tested against the Geluk-ba's meditative praxis. This comparison is left for chapter five, where the Geluk-ba's meditative praxis, as expounded by Hopkins, is compared against the model. This comparison will show that the cognitive stress model is in strong agreement with the Geluk-ba's meditational praxis.

VI Cautions

Hopkins, in his book *Meditation on Emptiness*, makes the point that the "inferential realization is thus not a mulling over of concepts but a conclusion reached through perceiving a sign in a subject, realizing its concomitance with a predicate, and then realizing that the subject has a predicate".73 Hopkins account is seen to be in agreement with the cognitive stress model when it says that there can be an inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence which breaks the illogicality of contradictions. It is in regard to the effect of contradictions that a cautionary comment must be mentioned.

Hopkins states that "in Geluk-ba, there is a decided movement away from only smashing two conceptual poles [contradictions] against each other and thereby forcing movement to another level of consciousness in the resulting conceptual hiatus. Rather, a complete conceptual map is laid out with the moves neatly delineated ".74 It would seem from this comment of Hopkins that a flipping of consciousness to a non-conceptual [intuitive] state, due to possible cognitive stress, is ruled out. On the other hand, there is still scope for the cognitive stress theory in Hopkins' account, as he goes onto say: "Still, in order to follow the map [conceptual], one must undergo the battering and smashing of misbegotten conceptuality, gain the appropriate conceptual [prajña] realization and then, through becoming accustomed to it, eventually arrive at non-conceptual realization".75 In this second elaboration of Hopkins the 'appropriate conceptual realization' is obviously the new inferential realization which
breaks through the bind of the contradictions, an idea which completely agrees with the cognitive stress model. It is obvious that the phrase 'through becoming accustomed to it' does not really explain how the shift to non-conceptuality comes about. In stating 'through becoming accustomed to it' only describes what happens it should explain how this becoming accustomed comes about i.e. by what process does it happen. While Hopkins' account does not rule out the idea of a shift in consciousness due to cognitive stress, it is important to point out that Hopkins himself notes that analytical meditation places the yogi under a great amount of acute mental and emotional distress, as he notes "...[the] re-formulation of ideas in a harrowing process of analytical meditation - involving one's feelings in the most intimate sense - is of central importance".76

Thus it can be seen that, while Hopkins' initial remarks seem to leave out the possibility of cognitive stress flipping the mind into a non-conceptual state, his further elaborations seem to leave the possibility open. The point that the above arguments of Hopkins caution us to do is not to forget that the cognitive stress model is a possible model extrapolated from what Western psychological theory may say is the genesis of insight; and is not a model derived from the phenomenology of meditation. In other words, the cognitive stress model is a possible Western interpretation of what might take place in the generation of insight as seen from the perspective of cognitive dissonance, 'double bind' and equilibration theory. Obviously the cognitive stress model may not account for the generation of insight from the view point of the phenomenology of meditation, but until there are phenomenological accounts available a strict comparison cannot be made.

A further caution to be borne in mind is that emptiness (śūnyatā) can be generated without analytical meditation. In tantra, emptiness (śūnyatā) can be generated in the completion stage of highest tantra (Anuttarayoga) without the activity of analysis. Lama Yeshe makes the point that it would be dangerous to engage in anaylitical thought during the advanced stage of Highest Tantra yoga as this activity
could induce the painful condition called in Tibetan, lung - meaning frustrated energy at the heart (chakra). Hopkins notes that in the completion stage of Highest Tantra "when the winds have fully entered, remained, and dissolved in the indestructible drop in the center of the heart, emptiness is directly cognized by the very subtle mind of clear light." Hopkins goes on to state that "during the stage of completion in Highest Yoga Tantra the emphasis is not on meditation analyzing emptiness by way of reasoning but on stabilizing meditation for the sake of gathering the winds in order to manifest a subtle consciousness cognizing emptiness." Hopkins makes the important point, though, that "...these stabilizing concentrations cannot be effective unless they are built on firm ascertainment of emptiness attained through analytical reasoning, undertaken during the stage of generation and before." Gyatso points out that

"... with the arisal of the all empty clear light you should meditate [not analytical meditation] single-pointedly upon emptiness for a prolonged period of time. By doing such meditation again and again this all empty clear light will eventually realize emptiness intuitively...".

The state of clear light is one of: a non-conceptual; non-dual; and blissful experience. Gyatso points out that "when the winds are in the central channel, however they will not support such conceptual thoughts. All conceptualization are pacified and thus all interruptions are removed." When this non-dual, blissful state of clear light is conjoined with unintuitive realization (jñāna) of emptiness (śūnyatā) the state of mahamudra is reached. Thus we can see that in the state of mahamudra conceptuality is eradicated and the intuition of emptiness (śūnyatā) is realized. This thus follows the cognitive stress model to a fair degree. Where the state of mahamudra diverges from the cognitive stress model is in the fact that cognitive stress is not present instead there is a state of bliss preceding the intuitive realization [jñāna] of emptiness (śūnyatā).
It is important to place what has been said above in context of Mahayana Buddhism. Mahayana Buddhism is divided into two vehicles: perfection or sutra; and mantra or tantra.\textsuperscript{84} In both vehicles Buddhahood is the end result. In the perfection vehicle Buddhahood takes three countless aeons\textsuperscript{85} and in mantra Buddhahood can be achieved in one lifetime\textsuperscript{86} by practicing mahamudra\textsuperscript{87}. Hopkins notes that in the perfection vehicle the obstructions to liberation are eradicated and thus the intuition of emptiness (śūnyatā) is achieved. According to Hopkins in this vehicle the obstructions to omniscience i.e the simultaneous direct cognition of phenomena and their emptiness (śūnyatā) [Buddhahood] are not eradicated and one must go onto the mantra vehicle for this to be achieved.\textsuperscript{88} Consequently the cognitive stress model is directly relevant to the generation of insight in the perfection vehicle of Mahayana Buddhism. It applicability to the mantra, or tantra vehicle is a moot point.

Consequently, the above arguments point out that emptiness (śūnyatā) can be generated by means not involving analysis and cognitive stress. Nevertheless, in such cases Hopkins points indicate that the analytical generation of emptiness (śūnyatā) is a precursor to the non-analytical generation of emptiness (śūnyatā). These cautionary comments thus indicate that the generation of emptiness (śūnyatā) is a mechanism involving complexities and subtilities.

Obviously testing the model against only one Prāśāṅgika tradition limits its applicability for the rest of the Śvātāntrika Madhyamika. However in order to increase the scope of the cognitive stress model in chapter four we will tests its claims against the accounts of Western scholars. These accounts will deal with the views of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti and three views in regard to the Geluk-ba i.e those of Hopkins, Thurman and Napper. These accounts are used to test the model as an explanatory tool to account for the arising of insight. In other words the point of testing the model against the views of Western scholar is to see if the model can be used to give a similar explanation as that outlined by the Western scholars'. If the Western scholars' views are consistent with the model this naturally adds to it's explanatory power. In other words if the different explanation of insight generation also come out of the model this
must surely show the models explanatory power ie under certain conditions the model will give the same explanation of insight generation as that put forward by a Western scholar. It should be noted that this explanation while explaining how insight is generated ie cognitive stress and how we get a conceptual insight [prajñā] and intuitive insight [jñāna] ie conceptual thought coming via the intuition does not, and is not meant to, explain why the different scholars hold their views; except to say that their views where developed to explain to them the relationship between analysis and insight.
NOTES


3. The translation of these works are only partial and do not deal with the material that is of interest for this discussion namely insight generation.


5. Tsong Khapa, op. cit., p. 110.

6. Ibid., p. 114.


8. Ibid., p. 24.


11. Ibid., p. 254.


13. Ibid., p. 102.


15. Ibid., p. 104.


17. Ibid., p. 153.


22. Ibid., p. 144.

23. Ibid., p. 126.

24. Ibid., p. 126.

25. Ibid., p. 126.

26. Ibid., p. 126.

27. Ibid., p. 126.


29. Ibid., p. 256.

31 Bhāvaviveka, 'Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the 'Heart of the Middle Way', in S. Iida op. cit., p. 87.

32 D. S. Lopez, A Study of Śvātāntrika, Snow Lion, Ithica, 1987, p. 139.


34 E. Napper, op. cit., p. 132.

35 ibid., pp. 132-133.

36 ibid., p. 133.

37 P. D. Santina, Mādhyamika Schools in India, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1986, pp. xix-xx.

38 D. Lopez, op. cit., p. 315

39 ibid., p. 315.

40 R. Thurman, op. cit., p. 168.

41 D. Lopez, op. cit., p. 320.


43 ibid., p. 158.

44 ibid., p. 258.

45 ibid., p. 158.

46 ibid., p. 160.


48 ibid., p. 217.

49 D. Lopez, op. cit., p. 295.

50 ibid., p. 295.

51 E. Napper, op. cit., p. 217.

52 D. Lopez, op. cit., pp. 325-338.

53 see note 6

54 M. Sweet, op. cit., p. 79.

55 ibid., p. 82.

56 ibid., p. 82.

57 N. Katz, op. cit., p. 255.

58 ibid., p. 256.


60 Bhāvaviveka, op. cit., p. 87

61 D. S. Lopez, A Study of Śvātāntrika, Snow Lion, Ithica, 1987, p. 139.

62 M. Eckel, 'Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language', Philosophy East and


64 *ibid.*, p. 24.

65 *ibid.*, p. 79.


68 *ibid.*, p. 144.

69 R. Thurman, *op. cit.*, p. 177

70 E. Napper, *op. cit.*, p. 3

71 *ibid.*, p. 41.

72 *ibid.*, p. 126.


74 *ibid.*, note 773, p. 886.

75 *ibid.*, note 723, p. 886.

76 *ibid.*, note 723, p. 886.


78 J. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 114

79 *ibid.*, p. 115.

80 *ibid.*, p. 115.


82 *ibid.*, pp. 24-30.

83 *ibid.*, p. 30.


85 Lama Yeshe, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

86 *ibid.*, p. 166.

87 G. Gyatso *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9, 17.

"... the thinking has gradually gained ground that thinking, understanding and reasoning cannot be regarded as independent processes subject only to the eternal laws of logic, but that they are psychic functions coordinated with the personality... today we are convinced that in all fields of knowledge psychological premises exist which exert a decisive influence upon the choice of material, the method of investigation, the nature of the conclusions and the formulation of hypotheses and theories."¹
1. The Debates

Dr. Peter Fenner, in his book *The Ontology Of The Middle Way*, outlines Western opinions regarding the relationship between analysis and insight. Fenner notes that:

The problem at issue is essentially one of the strength of the relationship between analysis and insight, for it is difficult not to infer - given the prominent and extensive utilization of analysis in Mādhyamika texts and their placement of this in a genuine religious tradition - that analysis must have some bearing on at least some aspects of the Mādhyamikas' quest for spiritual liberation.²

Fenner points out that there is a linear progression from attributing a weak relationship i.e Inada and de Jong through to a progressively stronger relationship as espoused by Murti, Streng, Sprung and Gangadean to the strongest as expressed by himself.³ This chapter explores these claims of Fenner to attempt to ascertain if those scholars regarded analysis as being a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. It must be pointed out that only Fenner has looked at the question of the relationship between analysis and insight in this way. In this regard the question itself is completely new.

With the exception of Inada, and perhaps Murti, those scholars who have dealt with the Prāsaṅgika agree by and large, that analysis has some bearing upon the attainment of insight. Where these scholars diverge in is in regard to the centrality that the analysis has in the relationship. More specifically, the issue is the degree to which consequential analysis (prāsaṅga) influences the structuring of thought in such a way that insight is achieved.

11 Analysis does not cause insight

*It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for insight* (Inada, Murti?)

Inada and Murti argue that analysis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. This point of view
is in disagreement with the general trend of contemporary scholarship. This view claims that there is no causal relationship between analysis and insight. Although the view is in disagreement with the views of contemporary scholars, it will be seen that it does nevertheless gain support from Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti.

Inada, in his book *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakārikā*, represents the most extreme position regarding the lack of centrality of analysis in regard to its relationship with the generation of insight. Inada argues that logic or dialectics "at best only depict the play or function of reason and not in terms of 'awakening' reason to a wondrous realm of existence ... [and the] Buddhist truth, if forthcoming at all, is not the result of logic or dialectics." Though Inada argues this he acknowledges that "whether the prasaṅga is really a method for educing truth or only a method of criticism is a moot question. Perhaps it is neither...[it ] might be to tax reason... [to] render clear...the absurdity ...[of] objectified elements".

In arguing along these lines, Inada is claiming that consequential analysis (prasaṅga), does not play an antecedent role in the generation of insight. Although Inada is correct in arguing that consequential analysis (prasaṅga) does not induce insight, it is nevertheless true, at least for Chandrakīrti, that the consequential analysis (prasaṅga) does have a function in the generation of insight. This function, we will see, is to prepare the conditions in the mind such that insight may arise.

It is obviously putting words into Inada's mouth to say that he meant that while consequential analysis (prasaṅga) does not cause insight, it has a preparatory function in the arising of insight. Nevertheless, it is true that though there is no logically demonstrable causal relationship between consequential analysis (prasaṅga) and insight, consequential analysis (prasaṅga) does have a function to play in the arising of insight. Thus, though Inada's comments are true, it is equally true that Inada did not see the
centrality of consequential analysis (prasaṅga) in preparing the ground for the arising of insight.

We similarly categorize T.R.V Murti as a preparatory theorists. On many points, Murti's ideas are the same as Inada's. Like Inada, he denies that analysis brings about insight. On the other hand he claims that analysis prepares the ground for insight to arise. In this regard Murti argues that analysis is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight. Also, apart from Fenner and Gangadean, Murti is the only theorist who puts forward a model that attempts to describe the mental activity of the practitioner leading up to insight.

In his book, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Murti argues that "the dialectic does not bring intuition [of the ultimate truth i.e. insight] into existence de novo; it only removes the obstructions and limitations which have been obscuring it". In denying that the dialectic plays a part in the arising of insight, Murti agrees with the views of Inada. On the other hand in arguing that the dialectic removes the obstructions to insight, Murti is saying the dialectic prepares the ground for insight to arise. This part of Murti's argument for a preparatory function of the dialectic would account for Streng arguing that Murti is a preparatory theorist. In this regard it could be said that, for Murti, consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight. To see these differing perspectives clearly it is important to look at Murti's claims in some detail.

According to Murti, the dialectic does not bring the intuition of the ultimate (paramārtha) into existence, since "the dialectic is not an avenue for the acquisition of information". Also, intuition "... does not depend on contingent factors as a special faculty, favorable circumstances or previous information". Yet at this point Murti seems to be unclear on the function of the dialectic since he contradicts himself by also saying that the dialectic does lay down the conditions for intuition to arise.
According to Murti, the dialectic has a cathartic effect on the mind, much as it purifies the intellect. Murti writes that "... the intellect becomes so pure (amala) and transparent (bhaavara) that no distinction can possibly exist between the real and the intellect apprehending it."\textsuperscript{12} Although Murti argues that there is no progressive acquisition of insight (prajña),\textsuperscript{13} it is nevertheless "possible to conceive of the progressive falling away\textsuperscript{14} of the hindrances that obstruct [the] vision of the real."\textsuperscript{15} In saying this, Murti is obviously contradicting his claim that insight is not dependent on prior conditions.

To understand Murti's claim that the dialectic removes the hindrances to insight, it is important to explain how Murti regards the nature of insight (prajña) and its generation. According to Murti "Prajña [i.e. insight or intuition] is not a transitory state, [it instead] being the very nature of all things\textsuperscript{16}. Murti goes on to say that "...though realized in its pristine form in the highest ecstatic states, it is not a special faculty with a limited scope; it is the prius of all things - (prakṛtir ṣārmanam). Intuition must be viewed as that generic and invariable form of knowledge of which all modes of apprehension are a species."\textsuperscript{17} The intuition (prajña) is supra-rational, ineffable, infinite. It is not an instinct and cannot be identified with any biotic force.\textsuperscript{18}

It seems from the above that Murti sees the state of intuition (prajña) as being present in all people as some innate, inborn content of the mind. It is a pre-existing content which can be realized through the dialectic. This interpretation of Murti seems sound, as he acknowledges that at the moment of intuition, ".\textellipsis\textquotedblright there is neither order nor addition in the content of our knowledge of the real."\textsuperscript{19} This implies that the ultimate (paramārtha) is already there. It seems that the dialectic for Murti allows the natural, innate inborn content of the ultimate truth to manifest itself. In other words, it would appear that Murti thinks that we all have present in us an innate inborn capacity to become aware of the ultimate (paramārtha). This inborn content is a universal feature, a common mental content of a suprapersonal nature which is present in all of us and not specific to each individual. This inborn content
seems to be something like an a priori category of the mind, perhaps like R. Otto's a priori category of the numinous.20

The arguments of Murti regarding the removal of the hindrances to intuition by the dialectic are similar to the arguments of the preparatory theorists, insofar as he claims that the dialectic prepares the ground for insight. However there is an important difference between Murti and the preparatory theorists. Murti is arguing that the dialectic does not produce insight, i.e. there is no causal relationship between the two. On this point I think the preparatory theorists would agree, since in my reading of them, they would argue that there is a causal relationship between the two; though it must be admitted that these theorists make no explicit statement about a causal relationship. Consequently it is somewhat unclear as to whether Murti should be classed with the preparatory theorists.

III Summary
In terms of the model developed in chapter three it is clear that the parameters of the model have to be altered to accommodate the views of Inada and Murti. As was stated in chapter three a strength of the model is that it can account for the views of Inada and Murti. Inada and Murti argue that analysis does not cause insight. To be in accord with the model, all that is required is that some other mechanism apart from analysis generates cognitive stress. When this cognitive stress is generated, the process of insight generation is the same as for the case of cognitive stress being generated by analysis. What generates this non-analysis cognitive stress the model does not say. The cognitive stress could be any cognitive process, thinking which places the person in a state of cognitive stress. This unknown process could generate cognitive stress in some but not in others. It would be an entirely person, individualistic experience. Obviously, if some other factor/s generate cognitive stress, then analysis is not a necessary condition for insight generation. This could be a conclusion drawn from the views of Inada, but not from Murti.
Murti argues that analysis prepares the ground for insight to arise. This claim is in agreement with the model, wherein analysis had to be present with a constellation of other elements. Similarly Murti's claim that insight is innate to all humans is accommodated by the model by the category of the innate propensities. Consequently it is seen that the model can accommodate the views of both Inada and Murti if the parameters of the model are slightly altered. As was already said, this is a strength of the model, since it can account for quite a large range of alternative etiologies for insight generation.

IV Analysis prepares the ground for insight to arise Preparatory

(Stcherbatsky, Schayer, de Jong, Streng, Murti, Gangadean)

A point of view which differs from the above is that position which ascribes a preparatory function to analysis in the generation of insight. This point of view is put forward by Stcherbatsky, Schayer, de Jong, Streng and Gangadean. Although Stcherbatsky, Schayer, De Jong, Streng and Gangadean all ascribe a preparatory function to analysis, they do not indicate whether analysis is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the arising of insight. Nevertheless, as in the case of Murti, it would appear that they would consider analysis as being at least a necessary condition for insight to arise.

This preparatory view is propounded by such scholars as de Jong, Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Streng and perhaps Murti, given our previous reservations. De Jong, in his 1972 article 'Emptiness, acknowledges that Stcherbatsky in his 1927 book The Conception of Nirvāṇa was the first to put forward the preparatory theory. Stcherbatsky argues that "in the Madhyamika system, where logic was denied altogether, the preparation consisted in a course of negative dialectic, after which the intuition of the transcendental truth springs up as an inward conviction." Following Stcherbatsky, Schayer likewise put forward the theory in 1931. De Jong also notes that, along with these scholars, Murti also sees "... the Madhyamika dialectic as only a preparatory for the intuition of the reality behind the illusory phenomena [insight or intuition]."

In regard to the relationship between analysis and insight, de Jong himself is reluctant to be very specific noting that his ideas are
no more than an impression based upon his study of only a few Mādhyamika texts. He goes on to conclude that "in the Mādhyamika system the ultimate truth can only be apprehended by prajna in the act of concentration." Consequently "the negative dialectic does not lead to an understanding of the ultimate truth, but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained through concentration." 

In arguing along these lines de Jong is saying two important things. On the one hand he is claiming that the dialectic has the function of preparing the ground for the arising of insight. On the other hand, de Jong is arguing that an awareness of the ultimate (paramārtha) truth is not arrived at as an intellectualization, or cognition, from the dialectic. This second point of De Jong is a flat denial of Streng's claim that, for Nāgārjuna, the Mādhyamika ultimate (paramārtha) is an intellectual apprehension manifested through the dialectic.

Strong, in *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, formulates his own conclusions on the relationship between analysis and insight based upon his understanding of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Streng attributes to these two Buddhist two differing positions about the function of analysis in relation to the arising of insight. This could lead to the conclusion that Candrakīrti's philosophy is different to that of Nāgārjuna's.

Based upon his understanding of Nāgārjuna, Streng maintains that Nāgārjuna believed that the ultimate (paramārtha) truth may "manifest itself through logical reasoning as well as intuition." This statement must mean that, for him, insight is both a conceptual and a non-conceptual experience. Similarly, in regard to logical reasoning, Strong maintains that for Nāgārjuna "the dialectic is itself a means of knowing." Also Streng maintains that in "Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing the ultimate truth." Streng makes his meaning clear when he says, "... [discursive reason] can be revelatory if used in a critical dialectic to indicate the non absolute quality of any
assertion." Streng seems to be saying that an understanding of the ultimate (parāmārtha) is both an intellectual or conceptual experience manifested through reason and a non-conceptual experience. Although Streng has developed his position from a close study of Nāgarjuna, I intend to demonstrate that his claim is not true for the Prāsaṅgika, since they (1) deny a causal link between analysis and insight and; (2) indicate that insight is an intuition. Nevertheless while Streng's position may not represent the Prāsaṅgika, he does describe a view in which insight can be both a conceptual experience as well as a non-conceptual experience.

Streng maintains that Candrakīrti, in opposition to Nāgarjuna, believes that mystical intuition is "the only way of apprehending the ultimate truth." According to Streng this is because Candrakīrti "... did not recognize the logician's order of understanding as having any validity at all when referring to Ultimate truth ... [since] for this group, Nāgarjuna's critical dialectic served to reduce the logical procedure to absurdity when it attempted to express the Ultimate truth." In this regard Streng is implying that Candrakīrti was in disagreement with Nāgarjuna's idea that the ultimate (parāmārtha) truth could be known through the power of reason.

In arguing for the intuitive model of Nagarjuna and Candrakīrti, Streng maintains that "mental activity, using concepts and symbols is regarded as preparatory to the real mode of knowing the Unconditioned: namely through intuition." In this regard, Streng is obviously saying that the dialectic has a preparatory function in the arising of the intuition. This interpretation does not necessarily accord with Nāgarjuna's point of view, but it may accords with Candrakīrti's, as we shall see.

A theory which is similar to that of the preparatory theorists and has a psychological model associated with it is the logico-philosophical theory of Gangadean. Fenner maintains that Gangadean is likewise an advocate of the strong theory, but as we shall see Gangadean's theory is a slight variation of the preparatory theory.
Gangadean argues that Nagarjuna, in his *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Mulasāṃghikakārikās*), puts forward an exemplar form of what Gangadean calls transformational dialectic [T D].\(^{37}\) Gangadean maintains that T D "... can bring about the radical transformation to sūnyā consciousness only by seeing through the formal structures which condition any view of the world or experience."\(^{38}\) Gangadean says that the "... prerelational, prelinguistic, preontological consciousness which can never be objectified, never constituted in any way, never referred to or described is called sūnyā."\(^{39}\) According to Gangadean, this "... radical transformation is affected through analytical meditation in which the formal conditions of all discourse or any possible world are themselves shown to be conditioned and not independent, absolute, or self existent."\(^{40}\) The T D does this by making the practitioner of T D aware that everything is unintelligible and paradoxical.\(^{41}\) It is important to point out that T D is only a preparatory stage in the acquiring of this sūnyā consciousness. This is clearly seen when one examines Gangadean's psychological model of sūnyā generation.

Under T D, Gangadean argues, "... the student's world begins to collapse and dissolve and static consciousness begins to be dislodged ... [With] the collapse of predictive structure, the world becomes an unintelligible flux: without categorical structure or form ... rationality and judgment becomes silenced and paralyzed. This is the level of unintelligibility and meaninglessness."\(^{42}\) It is important to realize that this unintelligibility is not sūnyā consciousness, but a preparatory stage to sūnyā consciousness. It is by practicing T D that the student lays the ground for sūnyā consciousness not to arrive but to be implanted into the now empty mind by the subjects instructor. Gangadean argues that "with the collapse of the predictive structure the descriptive mode of discourse, hence of any possible world, the instructor shows the student how worldly consciousness arises and depends upon preontological, prepredictive, preformal, prerational consciousness, sūnyā consciousness."\(^{43}\)

Thus, from the above, sūnyā consciousness is really an implanted consciousness, rather than a naturally arising awareness. This model
of Gangadean clearly places him in the preparatory class of theorists
with the modification, that for him, analysis prepares the ground
for insight: it has no causal function, since the means to insight -
i.e the ideas are implanted by the subject's instructor; something
like brain washing implantations.

VI Summary
The preparatory theories of the above theorists are in accord with
the cognitive stress model. These theorists argue that analysis lays
the foundations such that insight can arise. This is consistent with
the cognitive stress model which argues that analysis, as well as a
further constellation of conditions, have to be present to allow
insight to arise. In this regard, analysis can be seen as preparatory
if the other conditions are in place prior to the analysis. Analysis
is seen to be a necessary condition for the generation of insight.

Streng's claim that insight can be both conceptual [prajña]
and intuitive [jñāna] insight is also consistent with the cognitive
stress model. Though Streng does not argue that there is a conceptual
insight [prajñā] prior to the intuitive insight [jñāna], he
nevertheless maintains that both are possible, though from the
cognitive stress model it would be argued that the intuitive insight
[jñāna] he talks about is preceded by a conceptual realization
[prajñā]. On this point, though, it appears that Streng would regard
the two forms of insight as being independent of each other.
Similarly those theorists who argue that insight is solely intuitive
[jñāna] would seem to disallow a preceding conceptual realization
[prajñā]. Thus it would appear that these theories cannot be
accommodated or explained by the cognitive stress model. Nevertheless
if we alter some of the parameters of this model, this accommodation
can be made. If under analysis the realization of non-intrinsic
existence is not realized, prior to the generation of cognitive
stress conceptually, but is nevertheless brought up via the
intuition; then with the collapse of conceptuality this realization
could be directed to consciousness solely via the intuition. Insight
then would only be realized intuitively, in agreement with the above theorists. Consequently the above views can be explained by the cognitive stress model, thus indicating its strength and hence versatility.

Another category of scholars are those who claim that analysis is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. This categorization is based upon what these scholars say is the case, or what can be directly inferred to be their intention. These scholars differ from the above preparatorists in: 1) their claim for a stronger relationship between analysis and insight, 2) their attention on other traditions other than that of Nāgārjuna. Of these scholars Fenner deals with the views of the Prāṣāṅgika Candrakīrti and Hopkins, Thurman and Napper with the views of the Geluk-ba Prāṣāṅgika as exposed, in the case of the last two scholars, by Dzong-ka-ba.

VI **Analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of an intuition of insight [śīla] (FENNER)**

According to Fenner "... the relationship between analysis and insight is strong."44 By 'strong', Fenner means that analysis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for insight to arise.45 Fenner argues that "... analysis is meant to be a direct and efficient cause for producing the insight into emptiness."46 In this insight, according to Fenner, there is an absence of conceptuality.47 In denying that the experience of insight is a conceptual act, Fenner is disagreeing with Streng's claim that it can be conceptual [prajñā]. Fenner also accords to the dialectic the function of preparing the conditions for the deconceptualizing to occur. He states, the dialectic brings about "... the sufficient and a necessary condition for the destructuring of a concept and hence... for insight into the emptiness of the concept."48 Fenner maintains that this deconstruction of conceptuality is the realization of emptiness (śūnyata) or insight. Consequently this sufficient and necessary49 condition must be seen as a preparatory for the arising of what also must be [since there is no conceptuality] an intuition of the ultimate (paramārtha)
truth. In other words, the conceptual activity of analysis must set up the conditions for the arising of the non-conceptual experience [śāna]. In this regard Fenner could be called a preparatory theorist. The preparatory function of the dialectic in Fenner's model can be seen more clearly when we examine the psychological model he puts forward as an etiology for the arising of insight.

Fenner argues that the "... co-spatial and co-temporal alignment of logical opposites constitutes the sufficient and necessary condition for the destructuring of a concept and hence ... for an insight into the emptiness of the concept."50 The dialectic, according to Fenner, creates logical opposites by bringing into alignment a thesis and a contrapositive thesis.51 It is the cotemporal alignment of these two opposites which "... necessitates the destructuring of the concept."52 The dissolution of conceptuality by the destructuring dialectic brings about a vacuity of the concept being analyzed, according to Fenner. Fenner consequently argues that this "... vacuity of reference amounts to ... an insight into the emptiness of the concept being analyzed...".53 In this regard, it can be seen that analysis sets up the situation, or prepares the ground, for this vacuity to occur

This theory of Fenner's is underpinned by a psychological theory regarding the state of the mind that experiences logical contradictions. Using an interpretation of Ludvik Buss, Fenner suggests as an interesting idea that the reductio ad absurdum creates a conflict between neural levels in the brain.54 Fenner suggests that "... this would involve a tendency for one neural structure to be formed or activated into two mutually exclusive states, a tendency which could be responded to by assuming one state and relinquishing the other... or by a destructuring of the neural state due to it being formed into an impossible condition."55 Fenner maintains that the latter is the case due to the assumption that it is a psychological impossibility to maintain logically contradictory concepts simultaneously in a unity of consciousness.56
Fenner's talk about neural states and unity of consciousness is a materialistic abstraction at the least and, at the worst, a reification; much like the idea that there is a thing called intelligence which can be empirically measured. In my model there is no need to add a new materialistic structure of the mind to account for the arising of insight. My model argues that the continued and prolonged activity of thinking about contradictory ideas creates stresses and strains within the brain which cause it to flip into a state where the experience is interpreted\textsuperscript{57} as that of insight.\textsuperscript{58}

VII Summary

Fenner's claim that insight is an intuitive experience [\textit{\textit{\textit{jñāna}}}] is accommodated by the cognitive stress model in the manner as outlined above. The only part of the arguments that is not accommodated is the idea that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of insight. The cognitive stress model explicitly argues that analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for insight generation. Thus it would appear that Fenner's claims on this point are out of agreement with both the model and the Buddhist idea of 'dependent origination' (\textit{pratīyā-\textit{samutpāda}}).

VII. Analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for producing an intuitive [\textit{\textit{jñāna}}] and conceptual insight [\textit{prajñā}]

\textsc{(Hopkins, Thutman, Napper)}

A model which seems to put forward a strong argument for the relationship between analysis and insight is the Geluk-ba model as described by J. Hopkins. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there is some confusion as to exactly what Hopkins' views are regarding the strong relationship between analysis and insight. From Hopkins' model it can be concluded that analysis is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the arising of insight, since Hopkins describes three stages which must be achieved before the arising of the intuitive insight [\textit{jñāna}]. On the other hand, from Hopkins' delineation of analytical meditation - i.e. the final stage - it can be concluded that analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of insight.
According to Hopkins, there are four stages in the generation of insight. In the first stage, a conceptual [prajñā] understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā) is obtained through inference by means of analysis.\(^{60}\) In the second stage he cultivates calm abiding, defined as a stabilization which arises from meditation conjoined with special pliancy.\(^{61}\) In the third stage, he cultivates special insight which is defined as "... a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis."\(^{62}\) The fourth and final stage is a direct cognition [intuition] of emptiness (śūnyatā) [insight]\(^{63}\)

According to Hopkins, there are nine stages in the achievement of calm abiding, and "calm abiding is attained when the ninth state is conjoined with a fully qualified pliancy...".\(^{64}\) Now this "... ninth state is a meditative stabilization devoid of the activity of thought... during the ninth state one can effortlessly abide in meditative stabilization...[but] this is only a similitude of calm abiding. To attain actual calm abiding, special joy and bliss of physical and mental pliancy must be developed through again and again familiarizing with meditative stabilization."\(^{65}\) Further this state of calm abiding is a prerequisite for directly cognizing emptiness.\(^{66}\) To induce this calm abiding "analysis and stabilization [no mental activity] are alternated for the sake of inducing calm abiding...".\(^{67}\) Hopkins states that "when analytical meditation itself induces the eighth [this must be a mistake for the ninth] state a yogi attains a similitude of calm abiding and a similitude of meditative equipoise."\(^{68}\)

In the third stage, leading to the direct cognition of emptiness (śūnyatā) in the fourth stage, special insight is cultivated on the basis of calm abiding. Special insight is achieved in the initial part of this phase when "... stabilizing meditation and analytical meditation are harmonized by alternating from one to another...".\(^{69}\) Towards the end of the phase, according to Hopkins', there is "a union of special insight and calm abiding; [where] within stabilization one is capable of strong analysis, which in turn induces even greater stabilization".\(^{70}\) In other words analytical
meditation induces meditative stabilization. As Hopkins notes:

...special insight ...must be conjoined with calm abiding induced by analytical meditation; calm abiding and analysis were like two ends of a scale, the one becoming slightly non-manifest when the other becomes manifest. Now, however, one has wisdom that has arisen from meditation, as contrasted to wisdom arisen from thinking which was the attainment of emptiness by inferential valid cognition attained during the first stage.\textsuperscript{71}

According to Hopkins "the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object prepares a yogi for his initial direct cognition of emptiness."\textsuperscript{72} Thus it can be seen that Hopkins account fits the cognitive stress model i.e the direct cognition (intuition) of emptiness (śūnyata) comes about within the meditative stabilization [no mental activity] which is induced by analytical meditation. In terms of the cognitive stress model the stress generated by the analytical meditation induces the intuitive, or meditative stabilization state. As Hopkins stated, calm abiding is achieved at the ninth stage when there is no mental activity, in making this comment Hopkins' model seems paradoxical.

Hopkins states that this union of special insight and calm abiding takes place within stabilization [i.e as he has said where there is no mental activity] as he describes "hence this union of special insight and calm abiding; within stabilization one is capable of strong analysis which in turn induces even greater stabilization."\textsuperscript{73} This assertion of Hopkins' is paradoxical. If, as he says stabilization or calm abiding is a state where there is no mental activity, then to say there is analysis (i.e mental activity) in a state with no mental activity is contradictory. It could be consistent to say that analytical meditation induces stabilization, but it is nonsensical to say that within this state of no mental activity there is mental activity which regenerates the state of no mental activity.

Hopkins maintains that "upon the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special insight ... the path of preparation is
attained." This path of preparation "... prepares the yogi for his
direct cognition of emptiness." According to Hopkins "on the path of
preparation the conceptual aspect of the realization of suchness
[emptiness] is gradually removed in the four periods", and that in
this state of 'supreme mundane qualities' "the conceptual aspect of
the realization of suchness [emptiness] is gradually removed." It
appears that the stages leading to the conceptual [prajñā] experience
are a preparatory stage preparing the ground for the intuitive
[jhāna] insight.

Thus it appears that although Hopkins argues that analysis brings
about a direct cognition of insight, his model seems to indicate that
the intuitive insight [jhāna] is achieved via a conceptual [prajñā]
realization which itself involved a preparatory path. Consequently
Hopkins can be placed in the same class as Streng. Hopkins' account
of the stages leading up to insight indicates that analysis is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for the generation of
insight. Nevertheless when Hopkins argues that, in the final stage
of the path to insight, analysis does cause insight it could be
argued that he is advocating a strong position - i.e. that analysis is
a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of insight.

A position in agreement with that of Hopkins is that put forward by
R. Thurman and E. Napper. These scholars, like Hopkins, maintain that
for the Geluk-ka analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the arising of both a non-conceptual [intuitive and conceptual
insight i.e [jhāna]] and [prajñā]].

Thurman regards insight as being a conceptual [prajñā] cognition
and, like Streng also an intuition. In arriving at this viewpoint,
Thurman has used a work of the founder of the Geluk-ka Prāsaṅgika,
Dzong-ka-ba (whom Sweet maintains exemplified the Svātantrika view
that the ultimate (paramārtha) truth can be an object of conceptual
[prajñā] cognition).
Thurman argues that insight is achieved by alternating between 'one-pointed quiescence meditation' - i.e. calm abiding (samatha) - and 'discursive analytical meditation' - i.e. special insight (vipasyana). Thurman maintains that "without a precise conceptual [prajña] treatment of distorting views at the beginning, no amount of concentration will liberate us from instinctual misknowledge." Thurman, while maintaining that the ultimate (paramārtha) is an intuitive [jñāna] non-conceptual experience, also maintains that the ultimate (paramārtha) is a conceptual or intellectual experience. According to Thurman, in analytical meditation the yogi "comes to a rigorous understanding of reality... and also without "the conclusions philosophy [analysis] aims for, the 'complete clarity' wherein all perplexities are resolved..." concentration on its own cannot bring about the transforming insight." Thurman argues that the ultimate (paramārtha) is not hidden from reason and that one "should [not] throw away reason as hopelessly inadequate to some ineffable absolute." According to Thurman "...reason [can reach] to its conclusive insight into the nature of reality... [also] the true nature of reality can be proven compellingly, albeit the proof is not itself a substitute for the actuality of the absolute...[thus] reason can prove what is most necessary to prove and that understanding - wisdom ultimately become intuitive - can realize what is most essential to realize." 

Thus it can be seen that Thurman maintains:

1) that there can be a proof of emptiness (śūnyatā)

2) that there can be a conceptual [prajña] cognition of emptiness;

and

3) that "...there is no dichotomy between intellect and experience, the rational and mystical and so forth."

According to Thurman, "enlightenment as wisdom is perfected as the culmination of the most refined rational inquiry, not at the cost of reason". In this regard "...reason is pushed to its utmost and held there by the cultivated power of concentration." These arguments indicate that analysis is a necessary and possibly a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. Though Thurman does not use
these words in arguing that insight can be achieved directly by reason, he is, to my mind implying it. Thurman also asks the question: what does it mean to have a cognition of emptiness (śūnyatā) if it is maintained that the ultimate (paramārtha) is transcendent?92 Thurman's answer is that "the perception of objective non-existence of things... is achieved in transcendent experience, in the holy equipoise intuition, where subject and object merge like water poured into water, and everything disappears under emptiness-seeking critical analysis, supercharged in combination with one-pointed concentration."93 In this respect it can be seen that Thurman argues that there is both a conceptual (prajñā) apprehension of the ultimate (paramārtha) and an intuitive apprehension (jnāna), and that the conceptual insight (prajñā) brings about the intuitive insight (jñāna). Now it will be shown that, like Streng and Hopkins, Thurman's characterization fits the views of the Svātantrika rather than those of the Prāsaṅgika. In this regard Thurman's argument regarding the cognizing of the ultimate (paramārtha) will be seen to be similar to the intermediate conceptual (prajñā) state of (paraya-paramārtha) of the Svātantrika and the intuitive state of Thurman to be similar to the intuitive (aparaya-paramārtha) of the Svātantrika. That Thurman's characterization is like the Svātantrika can be seen when he argues that a proof of emptiness (śūnyatā) can be made.

A characterization which is almost exactly the same as Hopkins and Thurman's is that of Napper. This similarity in point of view lies in the fact that, like Hopkins and Thurman, Napper bases her arguments on the Geluk-ba Mādhyamika sources. Napper argues that Dzong-ka-ba writings are Prāsaṅgika through and through.94 Nevertheless, she also points out that Dzong-ka-ba relied heavily upon the writings of the founder of the Svātantrika, Bhāvaciveka.95

Napper, in citing Fenner's view that analysis is a direct and efficient cause for generating insight, argues that on this point the Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba would agree.96 Though Napper argues that she would agree with Fenner's strong claims she nevertheless states that "Fenner sees more imputation of strength than [she does]."97 Napper argues that insight is achieved when there is a union of analytical and stabilizing meditation. In discussing these two forms of
meditation, Napper follows Hopkins' arguments regarding special insight and calm abiding. Consequently, from the above views of Napper and her adoption of Hopkins' characterization of the stages to insight it could be claimed, that like Hopkins, her delineation of the stages indicate that analysis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for insight. Nevertheless, though, her characterization that "reasoning can be included within analytical meditation" indicates that analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for insight just like Hopkins. Also like Hopkins and Thurman, Napper argues that there is both a conceptual insight (prajñā) and intuitive insight (jñāna).

Napper maintains that "...although the supreme realization of emptiness is non-conceptual and non-dualistic in nature, prior to the attainment of such a level emptiness must be realized in a dualistic fashion by a conceptual consciousness." Napper points out that these views of Dzong-ka-ṭa are heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti, Dignāga and Kamalaśīla; Napper also cites the Svātāntrika philosopher Kamalaśīla to substantiate her claim that the "...conceptual realization is developed to a level of non-conceptual realization...".

According to Napper, "the content of the two types of realization - conceptual and non-conceptual - is the same, for the object, emptiness is the same; also both can be called [a] "reasoning consciousness". Although both apprehensions are of emptiness (śūnyatā), the "...direct [non-conceptual] is tremendously more powerful." It is important to bear in mind that, for Dzong-ka-ṭa there is no partial realization of emptiness since "when emptiness is realized it is realized fully, even by a conceptual consciousness...".

IX Summary

The claims of Hopkins, Napper and Thurman that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for insight are, as mentioned above, not accommodated by the cognitive stress model. Nevertheless their claims that insight is both conceptual insight (prajñā) and
intuitive insight (jñāna) are in complete agreement with the model. This was already shown to be the case when the model was compared with the Geluk-ba accounts of insight generation and the nature of insight itself in chapter four. In terms of Hopkins account, of the stages through which the yogi passes on the way to the direct cognition of emptiness (śūnyatā), the intuitive (jñāna) experience of emptiness (śūnyatā) comes about when analytical meditation induces meditative stabilization. In other words cognitive stress is generated by analytical meditation which then induces the state of meditative stabilization: the state in which the intuition of emptiness (śūnyatā) then arises. It is interesting that Hopkins account of insight generation is fully in accord with the cognitive stress model account. This agreement must lend support to both the correctness of the model and its explanatory power.

X Review

The above investigation of the views of certain Western scholars has shown that there is some agreement between their views and the cognitive stress model of insight generation. In the case of Inada and Murti, a slight alteration of some of the parameters of the model allowed their views to be explained by the model. Similarly, in regard to the views of Streng, de Jong et al, an alteration of the parameters allowed their views to be accommodated by the model. Where the model did not have explanatory power was in regard to the views of Fenner and Hopkins on the idea that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for insight generation. Nevertheless, their claim that insight is an intuitive (jñāna) experience was accommodated by the model by following the procedure as outlined for Streng, de Jong et al. Further it was found that the views of Thurman and Napper were explained by the model apart from their claim, like Fenner and Hopkins, that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for insight generation. The ability of the cognitive stress model to explain such a wide range of opinions it was argued, is a strength of the model.

X1 Geluk-ba, Svetāntrika

Since there is some agreement on certain points between the Geluk-ba and Svetāntrika, it is important at this stage to examine what the
Geluk-با themselves say is their relationship to the Svātantrika [for further detail consult chapter three pp. 114–17 and the appendix]. D. S. Lopez notes that the most detailed presentation of the Geluk-با's ideas regarding what constitutes a Svātantrika is in the doxographies of the Geluk-با scholars Jam-yang-shay-با (Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa) and Jang-gya (LoCang-skya). Lopez points out that the terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika were coined in the eleventh or twelfth centuries in Tibet. Jam-yang-shay-با (1648–1721) and Jang-gya (1717–1786) wrote their doxographies a thousand years after the authors whose works they were delineating. Lopez points out that in the Indian tradition the Svātantrika school was not as coherent, or monolithic, as the above authors suggest.

The definitive explanation of what defines a Svātantrika was made by Jang-gya. According to this definition, a Svātantrika is one who:

1) uses autonomous syllogisms [svatantra] to generate a correctly inferring consciousness in an opponent, in contrast to the Prāsaṅgika's use of consequences (prasaṅga).

2) Believes a sense perception can be valid cognition in contrast to the Prasangika's denial that sense direct perceivers are valid cognizers.

3) Asserts that phenomena exist and are established by way of their own character conventionally, in contrast to the Prāsaṅgika's denial of this.

Although there are other points upon which Jang-gya says the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika differ, the above three points are as Jang-gya points out, those which define a Mādhyaamika as a Svātantrika. Thus it can be seen that although the Geluk-با argue for a conceptual (prajña) insight into emptiness (śūnyata), they do not consider this and their claims of a proof of śūnyata to make them Svātantrika, since a Svātantrika, according to the Geluk-با adopts and is defined by the above three tenets.
Lopez makes an important point when he says that the person whom the Geluk-ba consider as espousing and delineating the orthodox exposition of the structure of the path to enlightenment, Haribhadra [though a Jain] is regarded as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika by the Geluk-ba. In regard to the path and structure to enlightenment, Lopez notes that the Geluk-ba considered these ideas to be separate topics unto themselves. Lopez notes that in his translation of Jang-gya’s Svātantrika chapter of his Great Exposition of Tenets the material on the path and structure are very brief. Consequently to ascertain how similar the Geluk-ba considered their views on these matters to those of the Svātantrika is not clear from this work, and as a definitive answer Lopez notes "...[what they are] must await further studies for their full exposition."

**Summary**

What we have done in this chapter is to show how Western scholars view the relationship between analysis and insight. This chapter has shown that the debate on how the Prāsaṅgika regard the relationship between analysis and insight, as delineated by the above scholars, centers around four viewpoints - namely:

1) Analysis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the arising of insight, as there is no causal relationship between analysis and insight. (Inada, Murti?). These views are explained by the cognitive stress model by altering certain parameters of the model.

2) Analysis is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight, as it prepares the ground for an intuitive insight [jñāna]. Thus there is a weak relationship between analysis and insight - i.e., analysis is only a preparatory stage for an intuitive [jñāna] apprehension of ultimate (paramārtha) truth (de Jong, Murti?, Schayer, Stcherbatsky, Streeck and Gangadevan). The preparatory nature of analysis is in agreement with the cognitive stress model. The idea that insight is intuitive [jñāna] is accommodated by the model by altering certain parameters.

3) Analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of an intuitive insight [jñāna]. There is a strong relationship - i.e.
analysis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition the arising of insight (Penne, Gangadean, Geluk-ba [Hopkins]). The view that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for insight generation is not explained by the model. Nevertheless, the idea that insight is intuitive (jñāna) is accommodated by altering certain parameters.

4) Analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of a conceptual (prajna) and intuitive realization (jñāna) of the ultimate (paramārtha) (Geluk-ba [Thurman and Napper]). Apart from the idea that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for insight generation these views are in complete agreement with the cognitive stress model.
NOTES


5. *ibid.*, p. 34, no. 23.

6. It is obviously a very fine line to draw, which on one hand says that there is no casual relationship between the prasanga and insight, and the claim that the prasanga prepares the ground for insight to arise. It could be argued that if it prepares the ground, then it has a casual role in the generation of insight. This criticism is true and because it is true there appears to be some hidden process in the generation of insight. To make sense of the problem to our minds enveloped in the belief of causality it is claimed that some process is intermediary between analysis and insight, and this hidden process is what the prepared ground is. See the explanation of Murti below, an explanation that in form agrees with my explanation of some intermediate process, but with which I disagree in regard to the role the removal of obstructions plays in the arising of insight.


11. This is the very contradiction that arises from on the one hand denying the law of causality and simultaneously claiming that the dialectic play some part in the arising of insight; as was mentioned above in terms of my model.


14. In my model the dialectic create stresses and strains within the mind which then flip the mind into a state such that the experience of insight takes place or arises. See section the 'psychological etiology of insight'.


22 See below for a discussion of the mysterious arising of intuition in the Prāśāṅgika system.


24 *ibid.*, p. 117.

25 *ibid.*, p. 11.


29 *ibid.*, pp. 94, 147.


31 *ibid.*, p. 149.

32 *ibid.*, p. 94.

33 *ibid.*, p. 97.

34 *ibid.*, p. 97.

35 *ibid.*, p. 122.

36 *ibid.*, p. 100.


38 *ibid.*, p. 24.

39 *ibid.*, p. 22.

40 *ibid.*, p. 37.

41 *ibid.*, p. 39.

42 *ibid.*, p. 39.

43 *ibid.*, p. 39.

44 P. Penner, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

45 *ibid.*, p. 150.

46 *ibid.*, p. 99.

47 *ibid.*, pp. 101-102
It will be argued later that analysis is a necessary condition but, in disagreement with Fenner, not a sufficient condition.

This means, following S. Katz (1978, pp. 22-27, 33, 36), that the experience is culturally dependent. The experience is conditioned by the preformed framework of ideas and beliefs, these preformed ideas which the mystic is socialized into structure and determine the way the mystic has and interprets the experience.

When I refer to Hopkins it should be understood that I mean Hopkins description of the Prāśāntikā as put forward by Dzong-ka-ba, Jam-yang-chay-ba and the Gomang college of Dre-bung Monastery in Hla-sa Tibet.

74 ibid., p. 93.
75 ibid., p. 94.
76 ibid., p. 94.
77 ibid., p. 94.
80 ibid., p. 135.
81 ibid., pp. 126, 168.
82 ibid., p. 134.
83 ibid., p. 135.
84 ibid., p. 135.
85 ibid., p. 167.
86 ibid., p. 168.
87 ibid., p. 168.
88 ibid., p. 168
89 ibid., p. 168.
90 ibid., p. 116.
91 ibid., p. 126.
92 ibid., p. 168.
93 ibid., p. 168.
95 ibid., p. 9.
96 Ibid., p. 7.
97 ibid., p. 124.
98 ibid., p. 655, note 28.
99 ibid., p. 124.
100 ibid., p. 125.
101 *ibid.*, p. 125.

102 *ibid.*, p. 126.

103 *ibid.*, p. 126.

104 *ibid.*, p. 135.


107 *ibid.*, p. 28.

108 *ibid.*, p. 32.

109 *ibid.*, pp. 59-81.

110 *ibid.*, p. 240.

111 *ibid.*, p. 218.

112 *ibid.*, p. 218.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION
This thesis has been an investigation into the relationship between analysis and insight within the Mādhyamika. This investigation involved:

1) An exegesis of what Western psychology says are the effects on the mind of contradictions (Chapter One);
2) the creation of a logico-psychological model to explain insight generation and the nature of this insight (Chapter Two);
3) comparing this model with the Geluk-ba account of the process (Chapter Three), and
4) an after text exegesis of the writings of Western Mādhyamika scholars (Chapter Four).

The most succinct expression which describes the relationship between analysis and insight for the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika is that analysis is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for insight. This description is derived from an after text examination in Chapter Four of how the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika might understand the relationship. This investigation involved an after text exegesis of E. Napper's characterization of the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika, as espoused by བློང་པོ་ད་པ་. From this examination it was possible to construct an explanation of how they might regard the relationship between analysis and insight.

In Chapter one certain Western psychological theories which deal with the effects upon the mind of contradictions were examined. These theories maintained that a change of consciousness could take place when a mind cogitated upon contradictions. From the double bind theory it was argued that other factors as well as contradictions had to be present before the mind underwent a change of consciousness. On the other hand, cognitive dissonance and equilibration theorists argued that a change of consciousness could take place solely by cogitating upon contradictions. Consequently, an extrapolation from these theories pointed out that, based upon the double bind analysis might be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the
generation of insight. On the other hand, based upon cognitive dissonance and equilibration theory, it could be argued that analysis was a necessary and a sufficient condition for the arising of insight. See Fig 2 for a diagrammatic summary of these theories.

The mechanism whereby the mind changed consciousness, it was argued, is cognitive stress. This stress was generated when the mind failed to reduce the illogicality of the contradictions. Cogitating on contradictions it was argued, extrapolating from the above theories, throws the mind into such a stressful state that it automatically stops conceptualizing in order to avoid the threat to rationality. This interpretation makes some sense when we point out that, according to Praśāṅgika's the yogin generated contradictions to all the elements within his conceptual world. Consequently with all the yogin's beliefs being contradictory it is impossible to alleviate the mind's attempt to regain rationality. If the mind will alter its mode of consciousness by going to a different conceptualization, then it is possible that the mechanism which brings this about will also alter the consciousness from conceptuality to non-conceptuality when it is impossible to reduce the threat to logicality conceptually. This interpretation makes sense when it is recalled that Hopkins argued that the state of no mental activity [non-conceptuality] is in fact induced by the analytical (conceptual) meditation.

These are clearly tentative suggestions which have no support in terms of Western experimental data. These suggestions are only extrapolations from the assumptions and findings of the above theories. Nevertheless, two possible consequences do arise out of these western theories:

1) Firstly, it seems possible that a change in conceptual consciousness could result from the mind trying to alleviate the stress due to cogitating on contradictions, or paradoxes. This could explain the arising of a conceptual realization of the ultimate truth (paramārtha. In this regard the change is achieved by the discovery of: a) new information; or b) the cogitating of new inferences which dissolves the illogicality of the contradictions and thus breaks the circular reasoning of illogicality.
2) The possibility of the mind flipping into a non-conceptual mode, due to the mind finding it impossible to conceptually escape from the stress generated by cogitating on contradictions, or paradoxes, could explain the arising of the non-conceptual, or intuitive apprehension of the ultimate truth (paramārtha). In this regard, the change to a non-conceptual consciousness is brought about by the mind finding it impossible to escape from a circular reasoning of illogicality conceptually: i.e. the mind escapes from the stress generated to a non-conceptual state.

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FIG 2
In Chapter Two, the extrapolations of Chapter one were used in order to construct a logico-psychological cognitive stress model which could account for the generation of insight. The cognitive stress model presented rested upon four main theses:

1) All thought has its source in the intuition.
2) Analysis does not eradicate all conceptuality, but only conceptuality of intrinsic existence.
3) Extrapolating from the findings of contemporary psychology analysis, it is argued, creates so much stress in the mind that the mind may avoid this stress by eradicating conceptualization.
4) The cogitating upon contradictions creates a vicious circle of reasoning. No matter what the cogitator does he cannot escape from this vicious circle of illogicality. This inescapable circle puts the mind into a state of profound stress.

The model maintains that, when analysis creates stress in the mind, the mind eradicates conceptuality. When this happens the inferential realization of non-intrinsic existence (emptiness (ānyatā)) is eradicated, and the intuitive source for this inference is directed to consciousness where it is experienced as an uninferred realization with powerful force.

After outlining the way a conceptual insight (prajñā) and an intuitive insight (jñāna) arise the question asked was why these two realizations are different. The answer put forward was that in the conceptual experience, there is a residual belief in intrinsic existence. This residual belief it was argued mutes the experience of insight such that it loses much of its profound nature. The residual belief was the belief in the intrinsic nature of logic itself. Consequential analysis generates a reductio ad absurdum to the belief of intrinsic existence. This demonstration only has force so long as logic is viewed as an absolute, or possessing intrinsic nature. It is this residual belief of intrinsic existence which attenuates the conceptual experience. A paradox is set up: namely, in order to demonstrate non-intrinsic existence, the intrinsic existence of logic is believed in. It was shown that this residual
belief in intrinsic existence could explain why the Svatantrika's conceptual experience of insight was different from the Prasangika's intuitive. Regardless of whether the Svatantrika used the syllogism or consequential analysis (prasaṅga) to generate the conceptual insight, the use of the syllogism and/or consequential analysis (prasaṅga) involved a belief in the intrinsic nature of logic in order for a true belief in its generated inference to be maintained. It is this belief which makes the conceptual experience different from the intuitive.

In Chapter three the ideas of the Geluk-ba were compared with the cognitive stress model to ascertain the explanatory power of the model. It was found that the model could explain both the generation of insight and the nature of this insight as viewed by the Geluk-ba. It was found that as did the model the Geluk-ba regarded analysis as being a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. Also where the model argues that there is both a conceptual and intuitive insight it was pointed out that the Geluk-ba similarly maintain this [see fig 3]. With these points of agreement it was argued that the model does have some explanatory power in outlining the nature and generation of insight.

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FIG 3
After outlining the cognitive stress model in Chapter Two and comparing it with the Geluk-ba's account of insight generation in chapter Three, the model's explanatory power was compared against the views of certain Western scholars in Chapter Four. In regard to whether analysis is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the arising of insight, an after text exegesis of some Western scholars' opinions in Chapter Four showed that there is a diversity of opinion amongst Western scholars about the relationship between analysis and insight.

It could be concluded from the writings of Inada and Murti that they regard analysis as neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for the arising of insight. From the work of Stcherbatsky, Schayer, de Jong, Streng, and perhaps, the ambivalent Murti, it could be concluded that analysis is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight. When it comes to the scholars Fenner, Gangadean, Hopkins, Thurman and Napper it could be concluded that analysis is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the arising of insight.

The views of Western scholarship regarding the function of analysis are quite varied. Western scholars such as Schayer, Stcherbatsky, de Jong and possibly Streng, Murti and Fenner, it could be argued maintain that analysis has the function of preparing the ground, or conditions such that insight may arise. Inada and Murti argue that intuitive insight is not caused by analysis. Stcherbatsky, Schayer and de Jong argue that insight is an intuition and comes about by analysis preparing the ground. Streng argues that analysis prepares the ground for a conceptual insight. On the other hand, Fenner and the Geluk-ba [as described by Thurman, Hopkins and Napper] argue, in opposition to Nāgarjuna and Candrakīrti, that intuitive insight is directly caused by analysis; though it could also be said that Fenner advocates a preparatory model.

As there are divergences of opinion regarding: 1) the relationship between analysis and insight; and 2) whether analysis prepares the ground for insight to arise or is a direct cause of insight. There
is also disagreement over the nature of the insight for the Madhyamika. Fenner argues that in the case of the Prasangika as represented by Candrakirti, insight is non-conceptual, or intuitive. Napper, Thurman and Hopkins maintain that in the case of the Geluk-\-ba, insight is both conceptual and intuitive. Inada, Murti and Streng argue that in the case of the Madhyamika as represented by Nagarjuna, insight is intuitive. These divergences of opinion, it was argued, caution us against making universalist claim for the Madhyamika based upon the exegesis of one tradition or a limited number of Madhyamika texts.

A summary of my interpretation of how the western scholars view the relationship between analysis and insight is given in Fig 4. It must be emphasized that many of these scholars did not consider the question of the relationship between analysis and insight. Consequently this table is only an interpretation based upon an exegesis of their writings.

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**KEY**

Y: YES N: NO
* F: Candrakirti, #: Geluk-\-ba, &: Nagarjuna

**FIG 4**
It was found that the views of Inada and Murti could be accommodated to the cognitive stress model if certain parameters of the model were altered. If we assume that some process other than analysis eradicates conceptuality, then it could be argued in terms of the model that analysis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the generation of insight. Similarly, if insight is solely intuitive then this could be accounted for by assuming that the realization of non-intrinsic existence (śūnyātā), which was generated by the intuition does not enter the conceptualization process before conceptualization is eradicated. If this took place, the realization would be directed to consciousness as a purely intuitive realization. Thus, by altering these parameters the views of Inada and Murti can be explained by the model. This gives the model a considerable explanatory power and contributes to its strength.

It was found that the views of Streng and dc Jong could also be accommodated to the model by following the procedure as outlined above for the generation of an intuitive insight (jñāna). Their views regarding the preparatory nature of analysis were completely in accord with the cognitive model. Similarly the views of Fenner and Hopkins regarding the intuitive nature of insight could be accommodated by following the same procedure. Nevertheless, the views of Fenner that analysis is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of insight could not be explained by the model. Nor could the views of Hopkins, Thurman and Napper be explained. Nevertheless, Hopkins', Thurman's and Napper's views that insight is both a conceptual and an intuitive realization are prajñā and jñāna is completely explained by the model. It was pointed out that Hopkins account of insight generation is almost in complete accord with the cognitive stress model. This agreement it was argued gives support to the explanatory power of the model and the correctness of the model's arguments.

These points of agreement between the model and the views of the Geluk-ha and certain Western scholars demonstrate the explanatory power of the model. Also, the model's flexibility to accommodate some views is seen as being one of the model's strengths. Overall, then the
cognitive stress model does appear to have power in explaining a large variety of etiologies of insight generation as well as a large range of opinion regarding the nature of insight.

In summary, this thesis has looked at the modern question of what the relationship between analysis and insight is. As was pointed out in the introduction this question was not considered by early Western scholars and was not articulated by the Pāṇaṅgika themselves. Consequently, an exegesis of what Western scholars have written was undertaken, and it was discovered that views on the relationship between analysis and insight ranged from very weak, in the case of Murā and Inada, to very strong in the case of the contemporary scholar P. Penner. Western psychology supplied some evidence that a Pāṇaṅgika analytical meditation could induce a change of consciousness where the presence of contradiction in the mind could possibly be a necessary and a sufficient condition for the generation of an altered consciousness. In terms of the Geluk-ba Pāṇaṅgika it was seen that the relationship between analysis and the soteriological end point - i.e insight is made up of two elements (1) is analysis a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the arising of insight? and (2) does analysis prepare the ground for insight, or does it directly bring about a conceptual/ non-conceptual experience i.e praṇā and jñāna of the ultimate truth (paramārtha). In terms of these two elements the relationship between analysis and insight was shown to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the generation of insight and that insight can be both conceptual and non-conceptual. What this thesis has shown is that there is a danger of drawing universal conclusions about the Pāṇaṅgika from a too heavy reliance upon one tradition or one text. This shows that a careful study of all of the traditions and texts must be undertaken before universal conclusions are espoused. A concentration on one tradition or a limited number of Mādhyamika texts generates a limited and perhaps distorted exegesis of the Mādhyamika as a whole.
NOTES

1. In talking of the Gelukha Prasangika, E. Napper, [in Dependent Arising and Emptiness, Wisdom Publications, London, 1989, p.135], notes that "... though emptiness is realized in terms of a specific phenomena, that realization is a realization of the emptiness of all phenomenon". This comment indicates that the emptiness of one concept implies the emptiness of all concepts within the range of the practitioner's conceptual world.
Non-Prāsaṅgika [Śvātantrika] also use consequences to break down the vibrance or pointedness of the opponent's adherence to his own view. However they do not accept that a consequence alone can generate in the opponent a consciousness inferring the implied thesis. Prāsaṅgika assert that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient, provided the opponent is intelligent and ready.
1 Introduction
This appendix is an outline of the points of dispute between the Prāśāṅgika and Svātantrika over the issue of role of consequential analysis (prāṣāṅga) and the syllogism (svatantra) in demonstrating emptiness (śūnyatā). This outline is intended to complement the argument made in chapter three regarding the presence of a residual belief in intrinsic existence when an inference is formed regarding non-intrinsic existence. It will be seen that both the syllogism (svatantra) and consequential analysis (prāṣāṅga) generate inferences. It is important to realize, so that the arguments of chapter three can be followed, the major difference between the two.

11 Preamble
With the writing of his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise On The Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), i.e the Buddhapalita Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavyāvalī), Buddhapalita laid the foundations for the Prasangika system. In this commentary Buddhapalita used mainly consequences (prāṣāṅga) rather than syllogism (svatantra) to establish emptiness (śūnyatā). On the other hand Bhavaviveka used mainly syllogism (svatantra) to establish emptiness (śūnyatā). Bhavaviveka is considered to be the founder of the Svātantrika and although Buddhapalita laid the foundations for the Prasangika system, Candrakīrti is considered to be its founder. With the foundation of the Prāśāṅgika system, Candrakīrti rejected the syllogism (svatantra) and thus established themselves as a different school from the Svātantrika.

The issue is not that the Prāśāṅgika do not use syllogisms (svatantras) but rather the issue is what is the best way of generating the view of non-intrinsic existence. Candrakīrti argues that "... if the opponent will not accept consequences stemming from his own views there is no point in proceeding to state syllogism to him." Consequences (prāṣāṅga) use a person's own position or arguments against himself. Neither subject, predicate nor reason need to be accepted by an opponent; rather he is forced to accept the consequences of his own position. This is not the case with the following syllogistic example:
The subject, a pot is an impermanent thing because of being arisen from exertion - just as for example speech [is arisen from exertion and is impermanent].

In this case the "...stater of the syllogism must accept the reason's presence in the subject - that a pot is arisen from exertion. He must accept the pervasion -that all things arisen from exertion are impermanent - and the counter pervasion - that all permanent things are not arisen from exertion."¹⁰

111 Svātantra

It is certain that the Svātantrika used analysis to induce insight. Kamalashila argues that "... without correct analysis there is no means of attaining liberation [insight]...".¹¹ Nevertheless though analysis is used to induce the conceptual and non-conceptual realizations of emptiness (ṣūnyatā) it is not sure whether the Svātantrika used consequential analysis (prāsaṅga) and/or the autonomous syllogism to induce insight. It would appear from certain verses of Bhāvaviveka that consequential analysis (prāsaṅga) did play an important part. Bhāvaviveka states:

"while analyzing (vicārya) with [his] intelligence [he ponders] How is this [possible] from the ultimate point of view."¹²

"After a yogin generates concentration of intelligence, he should investigate (vicārya) with his insight those natures, i.e. solidity, wetness, heat, etc..."¹³

P. Fennor maintains that "vicara is a technical term in all schools of Buddhism... in the Maññyamika "vicara" means a rational or ratiocinative investigation a conceptual analysis... [it is a type of analysis which] result[s] in the complete attrition of conceptuality prasāṅga..."¹⁴ and more importantly, "analysis employs the prasāṅga..."¹⁵
Consequently, from Bhāvaviveka and Penner’s account of analysis (vicara), it could be argued that consequential analysis (prasaṅga) played an important part in the arising of insight. Nevertheless, this claim must be viewed with caution, since the information from the Svātantrika is very uncertain. As it is not clear whether the syllogism (svatantra) or consequential analysis (prasaṅga) is used by the Svātantrika, it is important to outline the features of the syllogistic argument of the Svātantrika.

Lopez points out that both the Svātantrika and Prasangika used syllogisms and consequences (prasaṅga) to break down an opponent’s arguments.\(^6\) The Svātantrika argued that consequences (prasaṅga) are not enough to demonstrate a proof of emptiness (śūnyatā). They insist upon the ultimate necessity of using the syllogism to demonstrate a proof.\(^7\) Ruegg notes that Bhāvaviveka considered consequential analysis (prasaṅga) to be the lack of a logical reason and example for a valid inference, and he therefore argued that it cannot exclude the opposite thesis in order to acquire full probative force.\(^8\) Bhāvaviveka argued that consequential analysis (prasaṅga), by negating without adding a qualification or restriction, conflicts with the doctrine of dependent origination. Consequently Bhāvaviveka introduced the qualified restriction “in reality” to the syllogism.\(^9\) Katz likewise points out that Bhāvaviveka modified the basic syllogistic form to include an adverbial qualifier ‘from the stand point of ultimate reality’ which he placed in all of his syllogisms;\(^10\) such that the typical Svātantrika syllogism takes the form following:

Hypothesis: Earth etc (is) own-being from the stand point of ultimate reality
Reason: (because) earth, etc (is)
   (a) manufacture-possessing
   (b) cause-possessing
Example: (like) knowledge\(^21\)

In the area of debate, two forms of logical argument are used: the syllogistic and consequential analysis (prasaṅga). The syllogistic
method is adopted by the Svetantrika and is modeled, according to Katz, on that form put forward by Dignāga. A syllogism is composed of a thesis [hypothesis], a reason [sign] and an example. In the syllogism, the sign or reason is one component of the syllogism and the probandum [thesis] - the thing being proved - is another. The probandum is in turn made up of two parts: the thesis, or the thing about which something is to be known or is known; and the predicate. An example of this is:

Hypothesis: the mountain is on fire
Reason: (because) that mountain (is) smoke-possessing
Examples: (a) (as in) kitchen
(b) (unlike) lake

An autonomous syllogism, according to Lopez "is one which generates an inference realizing the probandum [thesis] without taking the lead from the opponent's assertions." Based on this syllogism, an inference is produced in the mind of one's opponent regarding the validity of the thesis. Consequently, if a syllogism has as its thesis a claim denying intrinsic existence and the qualifying phrase 'from the viewpoint of ultimate reality' it can be seen how the Svetantrika can give a proof of emptiness (śūnyatā).

Bhāvaviveka supports his use of autonomous syllogisms by claiming that no less a personage than Nagarjuna himself used the method in the thirteenth chapter of his Treatise of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāstra). In his Lamp for Nagarjuna's Wisdom (Prajñāprādipamulamadhyamakavṛtti) Bhāvaviveka claims:

The thirteenth chapter was composed for the purposes of setting forth the lack of entityness of conditioned phenomena in terms of another aspect through the force of answers to refutations [by opponents] own-powered inferences.
As will be shown, where the Prāśāṅgika demonstrate the internal inconsistency of an opponent's arguments without offering a counter-thesis, the Svātantrika, as shown above, offer a counter-thesis when they claim 'from the standpoint of the ultimate' truth. Katz notes that Kajiyama argues that the Prāśāṅgika miss the point of the contradictions by restricting their criticisms to internal consistencies. According to Kajiyama, the real nature of the criticism lies in the relationship between conventional reality (samvytī) and the ultimate (paramārtha). He notes:

When we argue the transcendental contradiction arises not from logic itself but from the disparity between absoluteness and the ground of logic... the contradiction is not merely illogicality but the unique method which can reduce to the absolute reality our world which is human logicalization... for Bhāvaviveka to use the logic of contradiction in the place where samvytī and paramārtha meet together is methodological completion of the absolute negation of the Mādhyamika philosophy.

As Lopez notes, the consequence (prasāṅga), "like a syllogism, is used to bring about an inferential understanding in the opponent in a debate. Unlike the consequences (prasāṅga), the syllogism does not use the opponent's own assertions against him so the opponent is unable to respond". This can be shown clearly by the use of an example. It will readily be seen that this example is compared and contrasted with the example of Candrakīrti's demonstration of the selflessness of phenomena in chapter one. In his Karakalāratnā, Bhāvaviveka attempts to prove the selflessness of phenomena by the use of the following syllogism:

**Thesis:** Phenomenal elements are devoid of own being from the standpoint of absolute truth

**Reason:** Because their arising depends upon causes and conditions

**Instantiation:** Just like magically created beings
It is important to note the reasons why the Svatantrika used the autonomous syllogism. According to Dzong-ka-ba, "the reason why they [Svatantrika] assert autonomous signs...in their system is this conventional existence of own-character, that is established by way of [the object's] own entity conventionally."\textsuperscript{34} This belief in own-character means that both the subject and predicate of a syllogism are endowed with own-character. What this means, in the realm of debate, is that both the challenger and the Svātantrika agree on the own existence of the subject of the debate. Lopez points out that this is essential for the Svātantrika, as it gives the proofs an autonomous status which is accepted by both parties.\textsuperscript{35} Lopez notes "... when a form appears to exist by way of its own character to the valid cognizers of both parties and they assert to that appearance; it appears commonly."\textsuperscript{36} Thus by agreeing on the ontological status of a subject the proof offered must be accepted by the opponent, since both parties agree upon a subject's ontological status, thus this proof acquires an autonomous status.

On these points the Prāsaṅgika disagrees. Hopkins points out that the "...Prāsaṅgika sees the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion and the counter-pervasion as existing imputedly or nominally without inherent existence."\textsuperscript{37} The controversy over these ideas stems from different views regarding whether phenomena can appear correctly "... to a non-defective sense consciousness."\textsuperscript{38} The Prāsaṅgika argue that ordinary beings misconceive the nature of phenomena and also that phenomena appear to them mistakenly - i.e. they see phenomena as having an intrinsic nature.\textsuperscript{39} On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka argues that "... phenomena appear correctly in terms of their inherent existence to non-defective sense consciousness."\textsuperscript{40} Because of this he maintains that it is possible to state a syllogism (svatantra), since the subject and reason can thus appear similarly to both parties in a debate\textsuperscript{41}

1V (Prasanga)
Hopkins points out in his book \textit{Meditation on Emptiness} that the Prāsaṅgika themselves used the syllogism. According to Hopkins the Prāsaṅgika considered that "... once the view of emptiness is about to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena are
appropriate: however when debating with those who are not yet about
to generate the view in their continuum consequences may be used."42
Similarly Hopkins notes that "the case is the same in meditation
consequences are stated in order to break down one's own adherence to
the wrong view: then, syllogisms may be stated if necessary."43

In consequential analysis (prasaṅga), the Prasangika use a necessary
consequence (prasaṅga) to deduce a refutation or negation of an
adversary's thesis. Using consequences (prasaṅga) the Prasangika,
bring out a contradiction or logical absurdity in an opponent's
thesis.

The method of argumentation can be best seen when some examples are
used. The examples which will be used in this demonstration are
Dzong-ka-ba's demonstration of the absurd consequences existing in
the idea that a sprout has a self identity and Candrakirti's
similar demonstration.

In outlining the absurd consequences inherent in the belief that a
sprout has a self identity, Dzong-ka-ba points out an unwanted
consequence in the opponent's argument in order to refute the
position and forcing the person to adopt the position that there is
no self identity.44

Dzong-ka-ba argues that:
It follows that a sprout would not arise in dependence upon a seed
because of existing by way of its own entity.45

Also it is obvious that this consequence implies the opposite,
namely:
A sprout does not exist by its own entity because of arising in
dependence upon a seed.46
In these examples Dzong-ka-ba is trying to demonstrate that the idea of intrinsic existence leads to absurd consequences. In doing this Dzong-ka-ba is trying to eradicate the view of intrinsic existence.

In a similar manner, the selflessness of phenomena (dharma) is argued by Candrakīrti using consequential analysis (prasaṅga). Candrakīrti in his Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara), offers a typical Prasangika consequential (prasaṅga) argument for the selflessness of phenomena in verse 6.21:

"If a producer is a cause (hetu) producing another, then the product is counted as an existent, or a non-existent, both, or neither. If [the product] exists then what need is there of a producer. Then what has the [producer] done if [the product] is non-existent. What was done if it is both or if it was neither."47

Thus we have seen that both the syllogism and consequential analysis generate inference in the mind of the cogitator about the emptiness (śūnyatā) of things. Hopkins point out that "... cognition through inference is a prerequisite for direct cognition [of emptiness]."48 Consequences (prasaṅga) and syllogisms (svatantras) are used in meditation as means of familiarising one with emptiness.49 Hopkins argues that once the view of emptiness (śūnyatā) is about to be entered "... syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena are appropriate...".50 But when debating with those who have not generated the view of emptiness (śūnyatā) then consequences (prasaṅga) are mainly used.51

At this point, after outlining the Prasangika and Svātantrika's ideas regarding the importance of the syllogism and consequential analysis (prasaṅga), it is important to ascertain how they see the nature of insight. Is the insight the same or different for these two schools? If they are different, in what way are they different?
IS THE SVATANTRIKA AND PRĀSĀNGIKA INSIGHT THE SAME? YES FOR THE SVATANTRIKA, NO FOR THE PRĀSĀNGIKA

EVIDENCE: FROM THE SVATANTRIKA:-

Lopez maintains that "the Indian masters of the Svātantrika school did not perceive themselves as different from Buddhapaśita and Candrakīrti [Prāsāngika]." This must mean that they did not disagree on the nature of insight i.e they must have thought that it was the same insight as the Prāsāngika's.

EVIDENCE: FROM THE PRĀSĀNGIKA:-

The Svātantrika maintain that intrinsic existence exists conventionally to a valid perceiver and, as Lopez notes, "Bhāvaviveka holds that at the conclusion of searching for the object designated among parts, one finds something which is objectively established [conventionally i.e by conventional means]." Although objects exist by way of intrinsic existence conventionally, they do not exist by way of their own nature ultimately. The Svātantrika ground their belief in the conventional existence of own nature in their idea of a valid perceiver, which means as Lopez notes "the awareness which posits the object may be conceptual or non-conceptual as long as it is non-defective, for its function is to posit the inherently existent object that appears to it." The Prāsāngika while agreeing with the Svātantrika that ultimately own nature does not exist, argue that it does not exist even conventionally. The Prāsāngika maintain that because the idea of own nature cannot with stand analysis it does not even exist conventionally. The Svātantrika likewise maintain that analysis negates own being. As Lopez notes, "Bhāvaviveka emphasizes that the analysis of reality is to be undertaken by ordinary beings and that reasoning and analysis yield an understanding of the fact that things do not exist in and of themselves, but in fact are empty of ultimate existence." Although analysis negates own being, own being is established conventionally by a valid perceiver. The Prāsāngika maintain that own being does appear to exist as Lopez notes "the Prāsāngika concur that phenomena do indeed appear to exist in and of themselves, but argue that this is a false appearance, unfindable under analysis" [a point with which
**SVĀTANTRIKA'S INSIGHT AS CHARACTERIZED BY THE PRĀŚĀNGIKA**

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NOTES


6. *ibid.*, p. 449


17. *ibid.*, p. 66.


26. D. S. Lopez, *op.cit.*, p. 75
27 ibid., p. 63.
28 ibid., p. 73.
30 ibid., p. 261.
31 ibid., p. 261.
32 D. S. Lopez, op.cit., p. 64.
34 D. S. Lopez, op.cit., p. 295.
35 ibid., p. 74.
36 ibid., p. 75.
37 J. Hopkins, op.cit., p. 450.
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