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JAPANESE INVESTMENT ON THE GOLD COAST:

The Interface of Globalization and Locality

By

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M.A. Dip.Ed.

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

July, 2000
I certify that the thesis entitled: *Japanese Investment on the Gold Coast: The Interface of Globalization and Locality* submitted for the degree of: Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract:

This study explored the interface between the forces of globalization and a given place, at a given time, the Gold Coast during the 1980s. The global economic boom of the 1980s was one in which the role of Japan was particularly important. In less than half a decade capital flows from Japan surged to make it the world’s largest investor. Locations in the Pacific Basin were favoured destinations for Japanese investment, one of the most significant was the Gold Coast. Japanese capital and tourism helped transform its urban area from a national resort to an international tourist destination and resort centre. The surge of capital arriving to the Gold Coast was a function of economic conditions in Japan, as was its steep reduction after November 1989. Thus the Gold Coast became integrated into global capital flows and so dependent on decisions made in Tokyo, one of the main financial centres of the world. However this study has also sought to explore a more complex reality: namely, that this place also became the interface of complex cultural forces and perceptions. The wealth of the Japanese investors on the Gold Coast enabled them to realize their dream of developing projects in the most fashionable global styles. These styles were essentially Western, and it was onto these that their Japanese owners ascribed their own meanings; meanings that reflected the cultural baggage that they had brought from Japan, and through which were filtered the economic and environmental realities of the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast as locality also included residents. Hence it became an interface between two different groups of people, the Japanese and the strongly Anglo-Celtic local community. Some in the local community perceived the Japanese presence as a threat to their perception of the Gold Coast, in fact, a threat to their perception of Australia’s national identity. A campaign based on the politics of memory of the Japanese developed on the Gold Coast. Within weeks it became a national debate in which isolationalist, if not xenophobic traditionalists, concentrated on the Gold Coast challenged the economic rationalism and multicultural tolerance of the self-interested and ideologically convinced advocates of globalization. Governments at all levels sought to arbitrate, to legitimize standpoints, but more often than not were seen to move into positions of ineffectual flexibility. The forces of globalization on the Gold Coast were catalysts for change that in turn provoked local opposition which rapidly became a debate about national identity and direction. It is in the exploration of the complex and contradictory economic, cultural and political forces engendered by globalization that this study has sought to make a distinctive contribution.
This thesis is my original work and contains no material that has been submitted
for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my
knowledge it contains no material previously published or written by another
person, except where due reference is made in the text of this thesis.

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The Deakin University Ethics Committee at its meeting on 22 May 1995 approved
the field research of this thesis (EC6/95), subject to the names of the participants
not being published. Thus the identity of individuals has only been stated when
the facts or opinions they uttered were already in the public domain. In other
cases interviewees are quoted in such a way that their identity does not become
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I would like to mention my wife Judy who has also been engaged in a similar scholastic endeavour. Her perseverance with her work helped to stiffen my spine to stay at the computer and finish this thesis.

Finally, there was my mother Eta Gombos. She was an enthusiastic Gold Coast resident for twenty years, and being there with her provided the initial impetus for this whole project. Sadly she is not here to see its completion.
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Introduction

The second half of the 1980s saw a transformation of Queensland’s Gold Coast on the northeast coast of the Australian continent 80 kms south of Brisbane. The why and the how of this transformation is the subject of this thesis. It changed from being an exclusively national tourist resort based on visitors and capital flows from southeastern Australia to one onto which flows of people and capital from Japan were superimposed. This occurred with dramatic suddenness. From negligible beginnings in 1985, by the end of 1988 the total value of Japanese real estate holdings and projects in Australia was estimated at $10.1 billion, of this 40 per cent, or about $4 billion was located on the Gold Coast (Gold Coast Bulletin, 20 October 1988). A subsequent estimate of this Gold Coast investment was put at $4.7 billion (GCB, 28 March 1990).

Such economic change was matched by an equally dramatic cultural impact on the Gold Coast urban region. Japanese visitors in small and large groups became a feature of the streets, shops, cafes, restaurants, hotels and theme parks of its central precincts. The proliferation of Japanese language signs in the shop windows of central Surfers Paradise stirred feelings of alienation among some of the locals. They felt that their city centre was slipping from their grasp, that their community was being taken over by strangers, people whose behaviour was shrouded in mystery and worse, what some did know about them, was associated with frightening memories. These changes seemed to sharpen the visual and social differentiation between the central tourist precinct and the suburban housing areas, with their strip shops, holiday flats and motels. It appeared that the central wedge of the Gold Coast from Broadbeach through Surfers Paradise to Main Beach and the Spit was functioning increasingly according to different rhythms and dynamics to that of the rest of the city.

Such increasing differentiation of signs, space and images became even more apparent through the reconstruction of many parts of the Gold Coast built environment that this Japanese capital was causing. McRobbie (1988: 579-98), a local journalist, spoke of a ‘Sayonara to the Old Surfers’ as five-star hotels, stylish
shopping complexes, luxurious high-rise apartments and golf course resorts replaced the walk-up holiday flats, family motels, corner-shops, as well as the sand dunes, coastal swamps and river flats of an earlier era. Much of Australia just watched in incomprehension, if not amazement, as Japanese capital took the lead in ‘moulding the Gold Coast into a showpiece of coastal development’ (Spearitt, 1989:26).

Rationale for this Study

Such general puzzlement about Gold Coast changes reflected a widespread lack of understanding of fundamental economic, political and cultural processes which by the mid-1980s had developed an inexorable momentum and were well on the way to remoulding Australia. These changes emanated from the progressive deregulation of capital flows between nations and the revolutionary developments in communications between places. These enabled the instantaneous transmission of instructions, information and capital. The arrival of capital from distant locations or control centres had the effect of integrating ever more regions into the global economy, as well as redividing and grading global space on the basis of the perception of its advantages had by the investor at the ‘home base’. Thus the attractions of southeast Queensland, the Gold Coast in particular, were perceived by the investor from Tokyo in relation to Hawaii and southern California, rather than within an Australian context.

The Japanese investors’ perception of the advantages of the Gold Coast as a location for property, tourist, and resort investment gives credence to Soja’s point about the centrality of space to the world of capital. He wrote that (1989: 192) ‘space provides the most revealing tactical and theoretical insights to major world issues’, and this particularly now at a time, when capitalism has expanded to ‘occupy space, fragment it into parcels, homogenize it into discrete commodities, organize it into locations of control and extend it to a global scale’.

Investments are made by people, therefore these places are not only the locations of investment, but also the settings for human interaction and cultural contact.
The result is that an interface is created between the foreign investor and local residents. It is in the study of a place that has become the interface between the interests, assets, values and perceptions of the new arrivals and those of the local community that the complexity of global processes becomes apparent. It is here that the rationale for this study lies.

**Major Research Questions**

This study is both thematic and spatial. It is based on the theme of globalization, but focuses on its impact at a specific place. As a result, there are number of research questions that permeate the whole thesis and constitute its integrative structure.

**Integrative Research Questions:**

There are two research questions that integrate the whole study and others that are corollaries of them. The two questions are as follows. What happens at a chosen place when global capital discovers it as a favoured site for investment? For the place so affected becomes an interface between the newly-arrived extraneous forces and values and those that had long characterized it. These reverberations of globalization on the place and its people then lead to the reverse question: What do the impacts of globalization at a place reveal about the nature and ramifications of the globalization process itself and the reactions it provokes? The fundamental issues contained within these two questions can be approached through the elucidation of a series of specific sub-questions contained within them.

**The Sequence of Specific Research Questions:**

The specific research questions have an economic, spatial-environmental, cultural and political dimension. In general terms that is the sequence in which this thesis seeks to address them.
Chapter Three considers the economic dimension of the topic. The initial questions here are- What new integrative characteristics did global capital possess in the 1980s? How did it connect with the local economy and what was the effect of its interlockage on that economy? Did the arrival of global capital affect the sectoral and cyclic characteristics of the local economy? Subsidiary research questions follow logically. The type of investment being studied is that into property, hence it becomes also relevant to ask- Are there distinctive features of property investment that need to be identified and related to the investment process and its local outcomes? Also, is there a chronological dimension to property investment? If so, does this reveal significant details of the investment process and the nature and diversity of the global investors? Also, does the chronology of property investment expand and shrink according to prevailing economic conditions at the source of capital and/or the investment locale? Furthermore, if the investment flows expand and shrink, do the projects they finance shrink as well? Does this then mean that economic and financial globalization accelerates and slows according to prevailing economic conditions? Can this study provide indicators of this as far as the property market is concerned?

Chapter Four considers the spatial-environmental dimension of the research topic. Here the basic question becomes- Is there a distinct spatial dynamic in the pattern of overseas investment in the Gold Coast urban area? If so, what locational and environmental features of the Gold Coast affected this pattern? How was this seen in the pattern of their Gold Coast investments? Was there any relationship between the characteristics of the investor and the type and location of the investment made?

Was the investment process also embedded in a socio-cultural context? Were expectations, cultural baggage important? Chapter Five is devoted to the global investors’ images of the Gold Coast. How did the Japanese arrive at their images of the Gold Coast? Were these in any way a reflection of the environment and culture from which they had come? Is it possible to theorize that there was a connection between their perception of ‘home’ and that of the Gold Coast? If so,
how did this influence their purchases and projects there? Was the Gold Coast seen as a subset of the holistic image they had of Australia? Was the Gold Coast as a place to invest and as place to live also seen in a global context in relation to other such destinations? Was the scope and were the designs of their developments more a reflection of their image of the Gold Coast, or were they just as much influenced by the trends of contemporary global design and architectural fashion? Such questions are as much cultural as environmental.

Chapter Six considers culture as a set of skills, styles, images and the professionals who were the intermediaries/gatekeepers in the investment process. The research questions that emanate from these concerns relate to the culture of the professional service providers, the cultural intermediaries between the global investor and the place of investment and the gatekeepers. The key question here becomes-What is the role of local gatekeepers in the conversion of investment capital into desirable real estate or a functioning tourist amenity? Do they have a role in channeling global investment capital to specific locations at the place of investment? More precisely, who are they- local professionals who have sought to derive material benefits from the arrival of global capital by connecting into global networks of skills, styles and images? Or, are they perhaps professional service-providers who have themselves worked at global centres of cultural creativity? In other words, do the people move or only the skills and imagery of the global culture? To what extent do the owners of capital bring their own intermediaries and experts from their home-base, in this case from Japan? Does global capital inevitably connect with the relevant aspects of global culture?

Chapter Seven deals with the issues of culture as world-view. What happens when the forces of globalization impact on a place with a distinct historic-cultural identity? It is reasonable to expect that different groups within the local population would have partially, or completely different value systems, memories, aspirations and fears. In turn, the foreign investors would bring their own cultural baggage with them. Thus questions arise, such as- What meanings did the local population place on the arrival of the global investors and their capital? Did these meanings vary? If so, were these variations a function of the socio-economic
position of individuals or groups in relation to the investors? Which groups felt that their world views were reinforced by the new presence on the Gold Coast and who felt threatened by the Japanese and their capital? Where do such fears come from? Past images? Memories? Did this lead to conflict? Conflict about what-world views? Control over space? Power?

At a semiotic level such a conflict may be about signification, that is, a conflict about meanings ascribed to actions and behaviours. The basic research question arising from this is - Did different individuals and groups among the Gold Coast population ascribe different meanings to the Japanese presence in their midst? Does this in turn reveal significant cultural indicators about the nature of the Gold Coast population? Did the different responses to the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast signify a fundamental difference towards the forces of globalization— one receptive, the other fearful and hostile? In what way does the Gold Coast experience exemplify a possible global-local dichotomy described by social theorists?

Finally the role of government needs to be revealed. This occurs in Chapter Eight. Its position is at once pivotal and marginal, definite and opaque. For on the one hand government is the omnipotent symbol and agent of the modern, sovereign state, but hasn’t globalization marginalized it in the face of uncontrolled flows of capital, ideas and images into the space over which it has jurisdiction? How relevant does government remain when confronted by globalization? Government has legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens by symbolizing the ‘national interest’. Does it seek to identify the national interest with globalization? If so, to what extent is this possible? If it is not, does government veer towards the views of those who perceive globalization as a threat, or does it find itself oscillating between the two world views? Does this then mean that the role of government in such global-local disputes is becoming increasingly peripheral? Perhaps the power of global finance and global cultural processes has become so great that in disputes such as the one over Japanese investment, the government is acting out a charade of concern so as not to loose its legitimacy? Do the large investors have to be seen to enter discourse with government to increase their local legitimacy?
Does the evolution of the conflict depicted in this study help provide some answers to these questions?

Did the structure and ideology of government influence its attitude towards Japanese capital? Did the proximity or otherwise of politicians to the Gold Coast affect their position on the issue of Japanese investment? Finally, were there any differences between a governing party versus a party in opposition?

To conclude, this study hypothesizes that the process of globalization is a complex phenomenon. It is revealed at different scales and has connotations that are much more comprehensive than either a purely economic perspective or a purely cultural perspective can reveal. Therefore a study at the interface of these perspectives is needed to identify the complexities and subtle nuances of this process. Not only does such a study need a sophisticated epistemology, but the scale of its focus also becomes an important consideration. For the different layers of meaning and the permutations of economic forces, cultural clashes and their transformation of space, as well as the impact which the environment has on them, can be revealed most clearly at the scale of a specific locality. Thus this thesis has chosen one locality at a particular time, and it is in this way that it hopes to make a distinctive contribution to the field of knowledge. However before this study can commence a detailed evaluation of the relevant theoretical literature and the position of the study in relation to it has to be undertaken.
Literature Review

The purpose of a literature review is to ground the thesis in an appropriate theoretical framework and, more specifically, to indicate how the research seeks to contribute to the development of theoretical debate in the field of study. As indicated in the Introduction, the research questions being addressed in this study are complex and diverse so the literature review has to be developed accordingly.

Initially the literature review will focus on the complex phenomenon of globalization. Then it will explore the impact that globalization has had on local populations. As an understanding of the interaction between the people who have arrived from outside and the local community is based on assumptions of group behaviour, different concepts of group behaviour formation need to be discussed. In this case the outside group who entered the local community were the Japanese. Their cultural identity has produced a rich body of literature. This needs to be analysed, particularly that which addresses their particular relationship to the forces of globalization.

This thesis is also about place. Thus reference has to be made to the theories of globalization and spatiality. A specific aspect of this are the linkages established between global forces and the local economy; theories of specific economic processes, at both a global and local scale need to be analysed. Therefore the literature review needs to encompass social, economic, urban and spatial theory, themes drawn from cultural studies, and from the margins of ethnography. Its integrative concept is globalization.
Globalization: Layers of Meaning

Social and political theorists in the last two decades have increasingly sought to address globalization, if not to place their work within its ontological parameters. Economists and economic geographers have found globalization easiest to define. This is because their definition is focused on: commodities, finance and capital. Hence Martin (1994a: 255-256) defined globalization as:

movement beyond a system based on inter-national financial transactions between nations.... It refers to the emergence of truly transnational banks and finance companies that integrate their activities and transactions across different national markets. And above all it refers to the increasing freedom of movement, transfer and tradability of monies and finance capital across the globe, in effect integrating national markets into a new supranational system.

However social scientists have not been satisfied with such a narrow definition. They have sought to discover its impact on human action and experience. In the process of doing that they have found that globalization is a complex, multilayered concept. Part of the difficulty of definition is that globalization is both a process and an outcome. Kofman and Youngs (1996: 1) noted that ‘globalization relates as much to a way of thinking about the world as it does to a description of the dynamics of political and economic relations within it.’ The political scientist, Julian Saurin (1995: 257) referred to it as ‘the multiplication and intensification of exchanges or relationships between those similarly constituted units (called states).’ Featherstone (1995: 5) also defined it in terms of the power-struggle between states becoming globalized ‘as more parts of the world were drawn into the competing figuration of interdependence and power balances.’ Robertson (1990: 26-27) argued that this process of globalization was a stage in a process of spatial-historical evolution and as such, was no different in substance from trends identifiable over the last four hundred years if not earlier.
In other words, globalization is a process by which a greater integration and interconnectedness between states and localities is occurring. Such processes reflect a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections in which events, decisions and activities in one part of the globe can come to have significant consequences in places quite distant from these actions. To quote Giddens (1991: 64), 'globalization can be defined as the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.' Again one can say that this is nothing fundamentally different from a process of change which began in the Renaissance.

Saurin and Robertson, more concerned with the political dimension of globalization, reformulated their thoughts to argue a case for globalization being a fundamental paradigm shift of the world political order. Saurin (1995: 258) made this point when suggesting that international relations needs to shift from its traditional focus of studying the relations between states; according to him, there are now significant social and economic processes which state authorities have been singularly unable either to comprehend or contain. Whereas Robertson (1992: 8) wrote of globalization as 'the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.' In other words, contemporary globalization is a continuation of a process which has historical antecedents and spatial precursors, but it is also a phenomenon which is new in its parameters, scale and intensity.

Globalization and the State:

A number of theorists argued that the present phase of globalization requires a reformulation of assumptions on the relationship between states. Hudson (1997) addressed this and spoke of our need to redefine sovereignty by 'unbundling' its traditional definition. He argued that we have traditionally seen sovereignty as having, inter alia, both economic and political connotations. In the 1990s these must be separated. National sovereignty still includes what Hudson called 'political place',
but it is no longer able to encompass the ‘economic space’ within which major economic processes affecting the lives of citizens of separate states occur. This has resulted in the separation of economic from political space. Thus in this sense globalization means the slippage of private economic forces from the spatial bounds of the state and the creation of structures, flows and networks over areas involving numerous distinct national political jurisdictions. Institutionally it means the creation of integrated frameworks and hierarchies without reference to state boundaries which enable this inter-national spatial framework to be developed.

For Morley and Robins (1995: 32) this was the essence of globalization. They referred to it as ‘very much a function of corporate integration.’ It is a process driven by imperatives of capital and its ever larger spatial integration to achieve productive efficiency. These specific economic imperatives are its driving force, and it is these imperatives which define it in the eyes of the lay community and which have set its course in relation to the state. Most simply defined it means that ‘globalization is an economic theory which holds that economic efficiency will be most powerfully advanced if all restraints are removed from the movement of capital and technology throughout the world, so they can freely move to exploit the cheapest labour costs’ (Santamaria, 1995: 24). Soja (1989: 105) and Wallerstein (1990:37) saw globalization as an integral feature of capitalism whose arrival, given certain technological developments, was an inevitability. Thus globalization becomes a condition of increasing interregional, inter-national interlockage, if not domination and dependence, in which the people and economies of various ‘sovereign’ states may be ultimately manipulated by decision-makers in faraway financial and technological centres (Williams, 1993: 2-3).

Thus the social theorists argue that globalization is a long historical process, but its features have evolved in the last few decades, so that one can speak of a new form of globalization. Mohamedan Ould-Mey (1997:24-25) defined the earlier type of international linkage as ‘shallow integration’ of states and the present globalization as
'deep integration'. If the first was evidence of interconnection, then the latter
globalization is a loss of control by the state and so signals fundamental change in the
nature of the world order.

**Cultural Globalization:**

However the processes which have resulted in an economic definition of globalization
have also facilitated a cultural globalization. Until recently cultural globalization
would have been equated with Westernization. As non-Western, traditional cultures
acquired and were absorbed by Western Modernity, they were deemed to have joined
the global system. However more recent perspectives and experience have defined
globalization of culture as a much more complex, contradictory and subjective
process. Wallerstein (1991: 166) wrote of the ‘contradictions’, ‘ambiguities’, and
‘complexities of the socio-political realities’ of the present culture of globalization.
The example of cultures such as that of Japan, the first non-Western country to
consciously seek to absorb Western technological modernity, shows that the result of
this process is not a carbon copy of a Western culture. Hence a cultural definition of
globalization cannot be equated with Westernization and homogenization.

Nevertheless clearly the processes which have resulted in globalization as an
economic phenomenon have also produced culturally integrative processes. This
form of globalization relied on a well developed infrastructure permitting social
communication to proceed relatively unhindered. Modern technology, mass travel,
the spread of a world language such as English, and the immediacy and ideological
sharpness of television contribute to this (Williams, 1993: 3). So if economic
globalization penetrated new spaces, so did cultural globalization. However it is
incorrect to define cultural globalization as a process of global harmonization. The
arrival of global images, services and styles interacted with, and was the catalyst for
diverse cultural responses which rarely lead to an integration or even harmonization
in the overt manner in which economic globalization was often seen to do (Appadurai
1996; Jameson 1991; Wallerstein 1991; Williams 1993). Given this, Farrands (1996: 179) concluded that globalization in a cultural sense is really just 'some form of reconstitution of difference'.

Therefore, globalization can be seen as being a diverse, if not diffuse, concept. In an economic sense it means not just an extension of contacts and flows across national borders, but more importantly it is qualitatively different. It implies a degree of purposive functional integration among geographically dispersed locations with major decisions made at a distant place impacting on economic activities and development processes in regions which appear to have little commonality with the location from which the economic impulses emanate. In a cultural sense, it leads to infusion, and juxtaposition of global forces with those at the locality so affected, but not harmonization or integration with them. Therefore the interface between the globalizing process and the local culture becomes a phenomenon unique to each place. ‘Globalization, thus conceived, is a constant interactive process breaking down the unique, the particular and the traditional, and reconstructing it in the form of a local response to a general set of systematic stimuli’ (Williams, 1993: 3). The result, according to Robertson (1990: 18) is that the world becomes ‘united, but by no means integrated’. The nature of the actual economic, spatial, and cultural processes inherent in globalization needs more detailed explanation.

Globalization as an Economic Phenomenon:

The economic and technological processes of globalization define one level of the study which follows. Without them there would have been no Japanese financial or physical presence on the Gold Coast.

King (1996: 36) writing in the tradition of Marxist social theorists, argued that spatial expansion is inherent to capitalism. The continual desire for profit comes up against the barrier of fixed consumption. So the task is to push the barrier ever outwards. So
he argued that one way is to seek sources of profit in new locations. The economic dimension of globalization is the contemporary result of this process, and this is seen in the rapid rise of international trade, investment and finance. However it is in the degree of interlockage between these economic phenomena that the essence of contemporary globalization is evident. Stillwell (1996: 4) expressed it as a ‘simultaneity of internationalisation in trade, investment and finance’.

At one level the economic system is becoming ever more integrated, but at another, it is becoming geographically more dispersed, that is, exposed to an ever more diverse range of local conditions (Sassen, 1996: 36). The integrative element in this dichotomy is money, the fragmentary one is the great diversity of local economic, cultural and environmental situations into which the capital is inserted. The flow of capital and its placement at specific locations is increasingly the focus of study to help explain this contradiction.

Henderson and Castells (1987: 7) argued that the corollary of the above is that the dynamics of a place become increasingly a function of decisions that emanate from centres which may be in another country, if not on another continent. The potential investors assess the relative profitability of a location in relation to other locations in different states, on different continents. A similarity of attributes appropriate to the type of investment to be made is sought, with the final decision being made in terms of the one which gives the marginal advantage to the investor. Kojima (1990: 75) developed this argument one step further: prior to the large investment having been made the sites which were considered would have had similar investment attributes. However with the transfer of capital and perhaps technology, amenity, global image and style to the favoured site, it gains a competitive advantage. This advantage then enables that place to develop an economic advantage within a global network. The restructuring of the Gold Coast as a tourist resort by Japanese capital will be examined as a case study of this situation.
However Sassen-Koob (Henderson & Castells, 1987: 61) cautioned that such international capital flows can be very volatile, so that the relative attractiveness of a location can change dramatically, depending on developments at competitive locations, changes in ‘fashion’, the economic fortunes of potential investors, as well as changing cost structures. The very speed with which an investment decision can be implemented and information transferred about alternative locations can also mean the abrupt transmission of decisions to cease investment, abandon development proposals, cut any losses and withdraw. Thus, argued Friedman (1993: 311) there is a systematic integration of capitalism in the world today into a global economy controlled by an identifiable number of global companies, banks and financiers. These are based in a small number of key decision-making centres, appropriately called ‘world cities’ and there they conduct their locational investment calculations.

At this point it is important to note that a number of politico-economic theorists have cautioned against the view that globalization has made the state disappear, or at least completely irrelevant. Brown (1995: 56) in his essay ‘Globalization and the end of the national project’ argued that ‘the state is a key element within the processes of globalization rather than something opposed to them’. His thesis is that the state has not vanished, but been transformed. It still has much residual prestige and considerable regulatory power and the challenge of contemporary international political economy is, in broad terms, the coexistence of a territorially based political system with an economic system that is now increasingly global in scope.

States are in competition to attract investment capital and so pursue policies to maximize this opportunity. Underhill (1994: 56) suggested that this process has led to the ‘internationalizing of the state’. The state seeks to adjust its national economic policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy. In contrast, Watson, Le Herron and Rimmer (1997: 281-282) saw the state as still playing a pivotal role in intervening to mediate and directing the effects of globalization at a national, regional or local level. They argued that regulatory mechanisms, the use of its traditional
authority to extract concessions, or political procrastination and investigative procedures are used by the state to persuade the global economic forces to modify capital placement decisions that are perceived by significant groups to be economically, politically or culturally threatening. This supposition will be tested in Chapter Eight in relation to the role of government in the Japanese investment conflict.

Globalization and Spatiality:

The ability of capital flows to affect places is considerable. At this stage a point of definition that has occupied many social theorists warrants a brief mention; that is, the distinction between ‘place’ and ‘space’. If ‘place’ refers to the areal context of events, objects and actions, then ‘space’ is one of the factors that determines what processes occur (Entrikin, 1991: 6-7). Against this, Merrifield (1993: 103) argued that such a duality misses the point. For both are, according to him, ‘the embodiment of material properties’. Rather than a fundamental difference, there is a dialectical process between them—‘Space is commanded and appropriated by capital and represents the realm of a rootless, fluid reality consisting of flows of capital, commodities, money and information that may take on a global dimension’. But then at some point capital ‘becomes grounded in a specific territory in order to fulfill exigencies of production, addition of surplus value’. It thus stops and enters a ‘place’. So Merrifield saw ‘place’ as ‘one specific moment in the dialectics of space’. That moment when capital engages with the physical environment and cultural processes to achieve its profit aims. Here a ‘place emerges through social struggle and imposes itself as a potential barrier for capital to overcome’. Its success is a function of its ability to achieve this and to restructure place according to its dictates.

Soja’s (1989:158) writings also focused on the relationship between capital flows and space. He argued that the realization that there is an important connection between the dynamics of capitalism and the formation and reformation of places ‘has been the
most important discovery arising from the encounter between Western Marxism and Modern Geography’. Capital enters a space and structures it according to its own productive imperatives, or restructures it from the spatial structures created by earlier flows of capital investment. He distinguished between ‘physical space’ and ‘social space’. The former he considered as merely the ‘physical or geometrical container of action’. It is social space which was the focus of his concern and is pertinent to the meaning of globalization. Social space, according to Soja (1989: 92) is a product of historical and political elements and is filled with meanings and ideologies. He referred to it as ‘socially produced space’, which in developed countries is frequently urban space. It is in this socially produced space that economic production occurs. He argued that there is an increasing potential for conflict here as the ability of global capital to transform, if not restructure this space, is enormous:

Advancing capitalism has occupied space, fragmented it into parcels, homogenized it into discrete commodities, organized it into locations of control and extended to a global scale (Soja, 1989: 92).

The meaning inherent in Soja’s argument is that capital in its pursuit of the maximum profit location restructures the economy and spatial pattern of the place it enters. Chapter Four seeks to investigate the applicability of this proposition.

So at one level globalization has meant that ‘geography no longer matters’ as ease of movement, transmission of information and capital has compressed the time-distance equation. However, as Kofman and Youngs (1996: 7) argued, at another level, it still does matter because global processes are articulated and concretized in particular places and a decision in such a place can transform other places that are far away from it. They call these ‘global cities’, and these act as the sites of control and management for the increased dispersal of capital flows and economic activities. So they conclude, whereas previously a place may have related exclusively to closer, national centres of power, now it may relate to centres on another continent, thousands of kilometres
from it. For example Tokyo as a financial centre developed a relationship with the Gold Coast.

Jameson (1991: xix) referred to such examples of spatial realignment and greater global integration of economic processes as 'late capitalism'. He saw its manifestations in the instant transmission of information, data, decisions, and images, the emergence of spatially ever more integrated networks of control and decision-making, and an increased flux in the ebb and flow of capital between given locations. The result is that global forces, represented by capital, people, products, images, skills and conceptual frameworks are inserted ever more potently into local environments. Their presence can result in the spatial and environmental restructuring of such places which their inhabitants may take as a form of cultural provocation. Gessner and Schade (1990: 258) in turn focused on the theories of cultural conflict studies that have arisen between the outsider, foreigner, and the long resident community members in the places so affected. Here, they argued, 'intercultural misunderstandings, and hence possible conflict, occur when two individuals coming from different cultures give a different expression to or differently interpret the same symbolic action. In an intercultural context, then, there is more to conflict than merely divergent interests'. Out of such interaction, if not confrontation, has arisen the idea of their being a global-local interface.

The Interface of the Global-Local Dichotomy

The result of the global flows of capital to given places is a series of local economic events which are to be explained in terms of the nesting and interplay of both locally specific and more general national and international forces, perceptions and structures. Martin (1994b: 41-42) made an important generalization from this: economic events are necessarily contextual, that is, they are embedded in local structures, preconceptions and power-relationships. Wilson (1991: 412) in his analysis of uneven development pointed to the role of locally prominent individuals,
such as politicians, planners and business people, in negotiating investment from outside the region. Thus development has to be seen as ‘defined in form by interconnections between micro- and macro scales’. This meant to Martin, that a study of place must be conducted both at the level of the relevant global forces which are impinging on it, or restructuring it, and through a consideration of the local economy, population and environmental ecology.

Such a multilayered approach becomes even more pertinent when the focus is turned onto cultural mores and processes. Here the analyses of Featherstone and Giddens are particularly helpful. Featherstone’s (1995: 6) argument was that globalization has resulted in ‘a compression of cultures. Things formerly held apart were now brought into contact and juxtaposition. Cultures piled on top of each other in heaps without obvious organizing principles’. Often it was the global which was piled on top of the local. Giddens (1991: 64) commented more perspicaciously, there is a ‘new ordering of social life across time and space...(which results in)..... complex relations between local involvements and interaction across distance’. The result was that any place was formed not just by the local environment, culture of its population, and the practices and institutions which they have created, but ‘is shot through with much more distant influences’ (Giddens, 1991: 109).

Clifford (Gregory and Ley, 1988: 116) wrote of:

An older topography of experience (being) exploded. One no longer leaves home confident of finding something radically new, another time or space. Difference is encountered in the adjoining neighbourhood, the familiar turns up at the ends of the earth.

The experiences of residents of a place can be said to be double-layered, or ambivalent; there is still the local, or familiar and reassuring, but at the same time there is an increasing realization that what is familiar is increasingly affected by
distant influences and events. A more precise discussion of global cultural flows and the human receptivity to them to be conducted. Here the theories of the anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai are helpful.

Global Cultural Flows:

Appadurai’s thesis was introduced in a contribution to the book edited by Featherstone in 1990 and then developed in his own volume titled *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (1996). Appadurai saw cultural flows as being a complex, multifaceted phenomenon and categorized them into five types: ethnoscape (people), mediascape (TV, film, images, etc.) ideoscape (ideas, ideologies, politics), technoscape (technology and control), and financescape (capital).

Fragmentation and conflict in many places in the contemporary world arise, according to Appadurai, because there is a disjuncture among the above five dimensions of cultural flows. ‘Money, commodities, and persons are involved in ceaselessly chasing each other around the world’, but all five dimensions of cultural flow of which the above are a part, do not impact equally at a given location, nor is receptivity to them uniform within any community. The latter is a function of local/national cultural tradition and practice. This is exacerbated by the fact that mediascapes and ideoscapes are sometimes created for the deterritorialized populations (for example, cosmopolites, migrants, tourists and multinational company itinerants.), with which the established local population cannot or does not want to identify (Appadurai, 1996: 32-38). He argued that issues of national identity versus ethnic tolerance, national development versus economic rationalism should be seen in this context. The argument subsumes there being different degrees of receptivity to global cultural influences. This issue was conceptualized in greater detail by Massey and Featherstone.

The impacts and responses to external cultural flows were, according to Massey, complex (1993: 61-2). This is because different individuals and groups were placed
in very distinct ways in relation to these flows. There was a group which 'controls' them, for example, owing, or transmitting investments, films, journals and commercials. Some partook in them (migrants, tourists, business travellers), others were receptive to them (professionals, academics, business people); whereas some were unaffected, not receptive or hostile (some pensioners, small business people, less-well informed groups). In fact, Massey argued that some in the last group saw the forces of cultural globalization as a power-play over their lives and homes which they feared greatly.

Featherstone (1995: 98) dealt with the issue of receptivity to globalization in a similar way, but categorized responses more in terms of the people-locale relationship. He postulated four response types to the arrival of globalist forces. Firstly, those who resist and advocate the erection of barriers to such cultural flows. Then, there are those who seek ‘refurbishment of the local imagined community through the rediscovery of ethnicity and regional cultures’. There are also those who have a weak local affiliation, but have geographical mobility, as well as those with a professional culture which is receptive to cosmopolitan influences. The responses of the last groups may result in the creation of a 'third culture' whose adherents are happy to move between a variety of local cultures with which they develop a practical, working relationship and the bridging third culture which enables them to communicate with like persons from around the world. The final group were the cosmopolitan intellectuals and cultural intermediaries who are content to interpret foreign cultures to others and who are able to live within the third cultures themselves.

This shows that the relationship of numerous individuals and groups on the Gold Coast to the Japanese and their capital needs to be considered within the framework of such a socio-cultural spectrum.
The Nature of the Global-Local Interface:

Thus the interface of the global and local is opaque, if not kaleidoscopic. Social theorists argue that it triggers various combinations of forces, reactions, contradictions and incompatibilities, such as increased homogenization and fragmentation, globalization and localization, universalism and particularism. This global-local interface has not been adequately researched, even though it is one of the defining fulcrums of the contemporary world. For example, Hale in his analysis of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (1998: 48) pointed to the fact that ‘(international) bankers failed to understand the magnitude of the cultural gap between the global financial order and the local one’.

A dimension of particular relevance to this research project is the dialectic which globalization has opened between two contesting concepts of culture: the pluralism of the globalist whose ontological framework is based on supposed universal premises, such as the free flows of capital or universal human rights; in contrast to the adherents of the notion of cultures as territorially bounded and based on ethno-historical evolutionary processes. According to Buell (1994: 325) the latter paradigm was very commonly a centred ‘we’ as against the ‘other’, whereas according to the globalist view, the world has become decentred, and ‘we’ ourselves are an ‘other’ among ‘others’.

These two ontologies of reality are in fact Janus-faced. At its most obvious, Ehlers (1996: 343-344) argued that one sharpens the other, that is, ever increasing contact and macro-scale spatial integration will provoke its very opposite, the quest for a revival of deeply rooted local cultural identity often based on the resurrection of an ‘imagined’ past. Featherstone developed this thesis by quoting the 1980s global experience (1995: 92-3). He argued that at that time increasing flows of people, capital and ideas did not necessarily lead to greater tolerance or cosmopolitanism; there was evidence to show that an increasing familiarity with the ‘other’ may equally
lead to a disturbing sense of engulfment and immersion. This resulted, in some cases, in a retreat to traditionalism, racism and fundamentalism. The form which such a local reaction to global forces takes is influenced by the society and culture of the given place. The philosophical and psychological roots of such a revived localism on the Gold Coast are one of the foci of this study, and so its exploration may lead to further insights into this local-global dialectic. This will occur in Chapter Seven.

As local reaction to global forces is seen as some form of revival of past traditions and values, the role of time in this phenomenon warrants brief consideration. Boyarin (1994: 2) in his book *Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time Space* developed the theme of time and its role in present reality by pointing to a contradiction of logic regarding time:

> On the one hand, we pragmatically assume that time is a one-dimensional and irreversible phenomenon. On the other hand, our commitment to the past and its representations implies that the past affects the present in much more complex ways than the model of points on a straight line permits us to imagine.

He argued for the time factor to be incorporated into our perception of places at the present time. To achieve this we must develop a more complex view of the relationship between the past and present, of time and space. Locality, according to Boyarin, is a three-dimensional concept, where time and space combine to give it its meaning and produce the 'localist culture'. Giddens (1991: 105) addressed the issue of past and present, of time, through a consideration of the concept of tradition. According to him localism has a strong component of tradition, which he defined as:

> a distinct mode of structuring temporality....through the logic of repetition.....the past as a means of organising the future....past time is incorporated into present practices, such that the horizon of the future curves
back to intersect with what went before. Tradition is routine, but it is routine which is intrinsically meaningful, rather than merely empty habit for habit’s sake.

The summative point on the nature of localism was best put by Featherstone (1995: 107) when he said that it has the elements of the boundedness of a stable, homogeneous and integrated cultural identity anchored in tradition and place.

However Arnason (1990: 209) argued that there was a larger group dimension of ‘localism’, namely, the nation-state. Though it is incorrect to reduce the difference between the local and national to just the factor of scale, for the sake of this point, such a simplification is adequate. He saw the nation-state as ‘a specifically modern form of collective identity... (and)... it presupposes the image of the nation as a manifest, latent or desired form of collective identity’. It is a collective identity on a larger scale than the localism previously discussed. There have been numerous instances where the localist response to outside forces has manifested itself at the national scale. This has occurred in the use of nationalist rhetoric, symbolism and rituals in conflicts with globalist forces. An issue of relevance to the study which follows is the dichotomy between the nineteenth century concept of the nation-state as representing only one clearly identifiable set of traditions, mores, or as Featherstone (1995: 88) expressed it, ‘a single history’. According to him the localist-globalist conflict frequently occurs around the paradigm of a single, centred national history versus the perception of the nation as having a plural history decentred from its previous ethno-nationalist focus (Featherstone, 1995: 89). So the conflict becomes one between two groups having different concepts of nation and national space, with each group accusing the other of fundamentalism or betrayal. Chapter Seven of this study seeks to investigate the applicability of this thesis.

According to Appadurai (1996: 170) globalization has sharpened, if not produced such conflicts, through the creation of what he calls ‘postnational loyalties’. This has been a result of the rise of multinational companies, organizations such as Greenpeace
and Amnesty International, not mention the multitude of international professional
and business organizations. Agnew and Duncan (1989: 3) claimed that the result of
such forces, particularly the rise of the global economy, has been the ‘fatal
compromise of the power of the state’ in its ability to control the economy.

Individual Consciousness and Group Behaviour

As major sections of this thesis are based on assumptions regarding group perceptions
and behaviour, a closer examination of this issue is pertinent. Any discussion which
assumes that a group is just a number of collectivized individuals leaves itself open to
charges of oversimplification. Two theorists who have introduced concepts of
relevance here are Emile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu.

Both Durkheim, and more recently, Bourdieu have dealt with this logical gap between
individualized meanings and collective consciousness. How can one seek generalized
categories of attitudes from individualized meanings, or is it legitimate to deduce
individualized meanings from general categories?

Durkheim introduced the concept of ‘Binde-Gewebe’ (social bonds) to explain the
situation of the individual within sociocultural groups. According to him there are
socio-psychological webs binding individuals into specific group(s). These can be
based on a multiplicity of past and present strands of experience, proximity, frequency
of interaction, psychological predisposition and self interest. Factors such as
territorial belonging, shared experience, ethnic origin, social instincts and political
affiliations all help to define the existence and nature of these social bonds.
Durkheim argued that these bonds interlace society, if not helping to define it, and can
unite diverse groups within it. He deduced from this that individuals who see
themselves within a social group are not just structural agents of the unifying group
ethos and functions, but as individuals are in constant interaction with other
individuals within the group through the exchange of information, symbols, signs, and
rituals. This collection of interacting individuals then forms an entirely new psychological construct, which he called the ‘collective consciousness’ of the group. This group consciousness formed through such interaction of individuals gravitates around a set of core meanings, or if action is required, a directing force. This process in turn may solidify the group into an association or even institution (Durkheim, 1978: 102-108).

Bourdieu and the concept of Habitus:

Bourdieu, writing much later, was equally wary of agreement with either of the two ontological extremes of individualistic phenomenology on the one hand, and deterministic structuralism on the other. He sought to overcome their individual-agent/structure dichotomy through the introduction of the concept of ‘habitus’. He defined habitus as a system of durable, transposable dispositions to act in a predictable way (Bourdieu, 1993: 5). Writing in 1996, Appadurai (1996: 44) gave considerable weight to the importance of this concept and in turn defined it as being ‘a tacit realm of reproducible practices and dispositions’.

Bourdieu explained the functioning of habitus as follows. Given the predisposition to act (habitus) of a certain cultural group does not mean that each individual associated with that group is sociologically or psychologically made to act or react in specific situations in a certain way. This is because, according to Bourdieu, the mode of action of an individual in this situation is not an outcome of obedience to any set of rules, but more the result of a ‘practical sense’ (sens pratique) that inclines agents to act and react in specific situations in a certain way. Therefore the application of the concept of habitus enables the researcher to make a prediction about human response, human action in a given situation, but this prediction does not have the determinism inherent in the structuralist’s epistemology. The flexibility inherent in the habitus concept also means that only the broad outlines of behaviour and action become the subject of prediction, while the specificity of behaviour can be explained by the
characteristics of the individual and the nature of the specific stimulus or situation at the time being observed. Harvey (1989: 263) endorsed the habitus concept and saw it as ‘a durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations which produces practices that in turn tend to reproduce the objective conditions which produced the generative principle of habitus in the first place’. Both Bourdieu and Harvey, the interpreter, saw structure, predictability, yet flexibility in the habitus concept.

Bourdieu (1993: 6) then developed his theses by explaining the underlying motivations and development of habitus. He argued that this is the result of a long process of inculcation, beginning in early childhood followed by a series of reinforcing experiences. At some stage in the individual’s development it becomes a ‘second sense’, or second nature in behaviour.

At this point it is valuable to relate the habitus concept to the globalization process. Appadurai (1996: 55-56) drew attention to this when he said that globalization meant that habitus is now no longer just acquired through upbringing and personal experience, but can be ‘always skidding and taking off, powered by the imagined vistas of mass-mediated master narratives..(thus)..now habitus has to be painstakingly reinforced in the face of life worlds that are frequently in flux’. In other words, the habitus can now be influenced by fads, fashions, images and opinions which emanate from far away. Hence it is not necessarily exclusively related to local evolutionary experiences. A habitus, once acquired, is durable, it may last throughout an individual’s lifetime. It is ‘transposable’ in that it generates practices and attitudes in multiple and diverse fields of activity and may resurface in situations which at first glance to the outsider, may not be a stimulus for it to do so (Bourdieu, 1993:6). However the individual or group with the given habitus will interpret the new situation as being similar to the one in which these predispositions were first activated and will respond in the same way. This study will seek to ask whether this process is sometimes apparent in the subtext of a global-local conflict.
Some political scientists have used the habitus concept in work on 'the politics of memory'. Boyarin (1994: 2) for instance, analysed the politics of memory as a case of 'rhetoric about the past mobilized for political purposes'. If at a subsequent time a set of events occurs which are perceived by some groups to echo a much earlier experience of great import, then their habitus will predispose them to respond to it in a similar way. Thus the cultural geography of a place may be identifiable through the diversity, the mix of cultural groups, each finding its group identity through the social bonds formed by shared memories, rituals, hopes and fears, as well as their own distinctive response to the environment in which they find themselves. Outsiders may perceive the views of any of these cultural groups as being partial or selective, but they form, or help constitute the character of place. Recent work by such cultural geographers as, for example, Anderson and Gale (1992) and Duncan & Ley (1993) was conducted on the basis of such a paradigm and has revealed fascinating new perspectives for cultural geography which this thesis will seek to augment.

In any but the smallest community there are likely to be numerous socio-cultural groups. Bourdieu used this to develop his conceptual framework by arguing that each group has its own 'cultural field' (champ). This he defines as the distinctive set of views, values and relationships and the laws of their functioning that determines the nature and workings of the given group. The cultural field of a group can be, for example, essentially economic, educational, political, or military. Each is a separate social universe, having its own intangible principles of status and action, or to quote Bourdieu (1993: 164) directly:

...each field is neither a vague social background nor even a milieu artistique.....it is a veritable social universe where, in accordance with its particular laws, there accumulates a particular form of capital (i.e., status, knowledge, influence, money) and where relations of force of a particular type are exerted.
A corollary of this is that if outside individuals, or members of another group wish to influence the group members they must use the language of its cultural field and enter into an ideological discourse on the basis of the laws of the field to which their audience subscribes (Bourdieu, 1993:96). The difficulties of a discourse in contemporary society between environmentalists and economic rationalists would be a sharp example of this point. Another point made by Bourdieu (1993: 162-164) is that the cultural field of a group functions like a prism which refracts every external fact of relevance (political, economic, social). It reinterprets these facts according to the specific logic of the field and so affects the dynamic relationships within the field. As this study contains an important intercultural group dimension, Bourdieu's epistemology can be used.

**Group Values as a Struggle for Power:**

Finally, it is important to mention Bourdieu’s (1994: 50-65) point that the cultural fields of each group arise from a process of conflict. For he argued that what is at stake in the field of cultural production is a struggle to impose the dominant definition of values, feelings and rewards; which in effect are conflicts between rival principles of legitimacy. For example, the field of economic production, or political and social action is in each case an attempt to achieve philosophical legitimacy in society. The struggle by lifestyle and personal identity groups, such as feminists and gays, is about having their world views recognized. Such struggles between cultural groups are frequently called ‘cultural contestation’.

One more point about such cultural contestation has to be made. Unwin quoted Foucault (Unwin, 1992: 28) to argue that the discourses in society about cultural truths are linked to systems of power. At any one time power is held by coalitions of dominant cultural groups whose views are the prevailing orthodoxy. For the views of new groups to become established, they have to successfully challenge this
established orthodoxy. In the same vein, Soja (1989: 130) referred to 'a competitive arena for struggles over social production and reproduction... aimed at the maintenance and reinforcement of existing spatiality or its significant restructuring and/or radical transformation'. In the context of globalization the struggle may be between well-resourced individuals or groups seeking economic advantages at a given place through restructuring its economy and refocusing its culture and a long-resident local population which feels itself overpowered by such ‘intruders’. One of the research questions in this study arises from this point.

Such struggles between groups should not be seen in the classical Marxist Left versus Right sense, rather through the existence of shifting balances among ideological positions. Bourdieu's work emphasized the role of shifting alliances formed through negotiation, compromise, and marginalization of the opponent. The achievement of such alliances may be facilitated by the established dominant group incorporating some opposing ideas and interests in an effort to win over the group(s) which have sought to challenge it. However, having done this, it may find that the debate has shifted ground, so any equilibrium in the cultural struggle is often just temporary. An example of research that has shown this is that by Ley (1987) of the changing culture of central Vancouver as it experienced gentrification. The application of such a paradigm will develop this point to detail the contestation about what should be the dominant features of Australian culture that was triggered by the appearance of the Japanese on the Gold Coast in the 1980s.

Globalization and the City

If this research seeks to draw on the conceptual framework of globalization and its economic and cultural manifestations, then it is also about ‘place’. For it is at specific places that the manifestations of globalization are revealed most sharply and the interface of its economic and cultural dimensions occurs in its kaleidoscopic, multilayered manner. Place as far as this research is concerned is the ‘city’, and so it
is to the literature relevant to the city and globalization that this literature review will now turn. First, the concept of the city in the age of globalization needs definition; secondly, the processes of capitalism that have created it will be elucidated and finally, an interpretation of the flows of capital into its fabric is introduced.

The Harvard psychologist Philip Stone (1995) proposed that in the age of globalization the assembly of capital in volumes large enough for a single investor to fund large cities has become feasible. Given this, cities, he argues, become nothing more than commodities to be evaluated on the basis of quality and price. Harvey’s (1990: 3) perception was more multidimensional. Using a Marxist ontology, he initially referred to the city as an ‘automated system of mass production and consumption’, but then saw the one dimensional nature of such a definition, adding that cities are also ‘about the production of signs and images’. The significance of this addendum will be left for the moment, and what follows will concentrate on the economics of the city in the globalizing world as seen by Harvey.

Harvey (1989: 158) defined the city, or urban region as ‘a kind of competitive collective unit within the global dynamics of capitalism’. The dynamics of the city and the entrepreneur are equated, each being driven by their locational advantages, skills and resources, and each being exposed to the competitive threat of being outmaneuvered by rivals. Thus ‘urban regions can be left behind, stagnate, decay, or drift into bankruptcy, while others surge ahead’. This process is a function of capital investment or disinvestment; in other words, the ebb and flow of money. Such flows of capital have the power to occupy and restructure urban space, fragment it into parcels, and, in the era of globalization, create intercontinental systems of control (Soja, 1989: 92).

The form that such investment takes needs to be elucidated. Here Harvey’s (1989: 191) concept of cycles of capital becomes a relevant theory. He argued that in the post-industrial economy, in which most developed countries now find themselves, the
primary circuit of capital (investment in manufacturing) has been largely replaced by a secondary circuit of capital. This is capital that flows into fixed assets like real estate and services. Such capital requires a sophisticated financial and credit mechanism to enable investment to occur in advance of actual income being forthcoming from the investment. In this form of investment Harvey referred to the crucial role of interest rates and the length of credit to link this investment-income-profit cycle and so enable it to function. Harvey explained this cycle through the concept of capital turnover time, which in the secondary circuit of capital, manifests itself in constant pressure to shorten turnover time so that the borrowing-investment-income-profit cycle can be brought into balance as quickly as possible. As much of such investment in the secondary circuit of capital enters land and property, Harvey (1989: 191) argued that:

 pressure then arises to accelerate the turnover time of the fixed capital at an accelerating rate (no matter what its physical lifetime), and even replace it before its economic lifetime is out. Machinery, buildings, and even whole urban infrastructure and life-styles are made prematurely obsolescent; 'creative destruction' becomes necessary to the survival of the system.

When sources of capital become as spatially and institutionally diverse as globalization has made them, the management of the above cycle becomes particularly complex, if not impossible. This thesis examines the process in which money borrowed in Tokyo on the basis of Japanese economic relativities is then transferred to the Gold Coast property and tourism market with its own attributes. As this aspect of the study is one in which the nature of the property cycle is important, this cycle needs more detailed consideration.
The Nature of the Property Cycle:

Considerable research has been conducted into the role of the secondary capital circuit in property. The earliest writings are those of Conrad, Mangoldt, Spiethoff and Reich at the turn of the 20th Century in Germany (Gottlieb, 1976: 1). Their empirical research was conducted into property trends in Freiburg, Göttingen, Bonn, and Berlin respectively. This led to a model of property investment. In this model, land values and all associated real estate activity were postulated to rise by a process of wavelike terracing in which upward surges were followed by step-laddered plateaus and ended, more often than not, in absolute declines. Later this concept of cycles was adopted by theorists such as Schumpeter (1939), and so entered general economic theory. In the 1970s, Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) and Gottlieb (1976) showed that property investment cycles were a function of the interaction of given agents and generally conformed to the intermediate length movements of the general business cycle.

There is considerable literature on the reasons for the cyclic nature of the property market. As mentioned already, Harvey (1989: 191) pointed to the role of credit in the investment process, whereas those in the industry refer to the 'imperfections in market intelligence' (BKF, 1993: 11); in other words, misunderstanding the supply-demand relationship (Barras: 1979a: 2). The result of this process may be that there comes a point when demand is overestimated, completed projects become unprofitable and the investor and bank or financial institution that leant the capital may have to suffer losses, dispose of the property and write-off their debts (Harvey, 1981: 105-106).

With the above situation in mind, Barras (1979b: 3) proposed a detailed chronology of the property cycle. He argued that this cycle proceeds through seven stages. The first is characterized by an acceleration of demand for property which translates into increased prices and rents. This in turn increases the profit potential of any new investment. The second phase sees an inflow of investment capital into property. A first wave of developers/investors initiate new projects, but these come onto the
market only two to four years later. The third phase is characterized by continuing high demand, which in turn encourages a second wave of developers to enter the market. During the fourth phase, the first wave of developments come onto the market and are seen to be very profitable. The cycle starts to turn in the fifth phase, more and more projects are completed resulting in the first signs of oversupply. The sixth phase is one in which the second wave of projects come onto the market which results in increased levels of oversupply and a sharp dive in the profitability of these new projects. Finally a seventh phase arrives in which most capital investment ceases. Here the ability of the investor to carry the now frequently not performing, if not loss-making investment, is related to their capital base, level of liabilities and, in the case of companies, the policy priorities they set.

Hajdu (1993: 43-44) found that a further dimension needs to be inserted into such a chronological model: property investment has two motivations, at one level it is a response to demand for given types of property, but it is also in competition for investment funds with other investment opportunities. Hence dangerous volatility on the stock exchange may encourage capital to move into property and so heighten cyclic behaviour on the property market by partially decoupling its dynamic from actual demand, and so making the subsequent downturn in the cycle sharper. Globalization has made this cycle more complex and less transparent. This is because conditions, and perceptions of economic conditions in the desired market are viewed from the perspective of other countries with other investment reflexes. Thus the scope for investment volatility has increased. It has also led to an increase in demand for transnational property information flows to which the theorists in the industry have sought to respond.

**Property Investment and Globalization:**

Even those theorists who have studied property investment in isolation point to the important role which globalization has had on it. Writers, such as Elsom, Pridham,
Hill, and Seek, have researched the changes to property cycles caused by the forces of globalization. Elsom (1995) argued that the internationalization of property markets has in fact been one of the driving forces of globalization. This is seen in the increasingly international nature of capital flows into property, as well as the internationalization of the services which facilitates this process. Pridham (1995) pointed to the role of global capital flows in exaggerating the peaks and troughs of the property cycle in given locations. He argued that the ebb and flow of investment capital into property is a function of comparative interest rates, rates of return on investment capital, and levels of capital growth and rentals found at different locations. As evidence for the last point, Hill (1995) and Seek (1994) developed a global model in which there are a number of national and macroregional property cycles whose phases lack synchronization. Seek argued in one national or regional economy the property cycle may be in phase two, whereas in another, it is already in phase five or six. This led him to theorize on the likely capital flows which this will trigger. Seek saw participation by the investor in property cycles in a number of countries as a highly desirable risk reduction strategy, a strategy which he argued an increasing number of investors are beginning to follow.

Thus the threads of globalization are being woven ever more tightly around the property industry. This has had the intellectual corollary that the theorists researching this industry need to develop ever more complex economic models which encompass integrated international spatio-temporal dimensions. Theorists such as Parkes and Thrift (1980: 408) were among the first to engage with this aspect of globalization theory and move towards a new conceptual structure.

**The City as a Result of Global Capital Flows:**

An outcome of the dynamics just described is the literature that defines the city produced by the global property investment process.
Soja, whose work detailed the nature of globalization, as well as developing urban theories which take it as given, wrote of advancing capital as occupying space and reorganizing it into commodified entities that will maximize profitability. His assumption was that elected leaders, planners and city officials, had lost their preeminent power to form the city. The city has become the creation of the investor, and their priorities determine townscapes and spatial patterns of the built environment and the socio-economic fault lines within the community. Such fault lines are increasingly defined in relation to individual's or groups' relation to global capital. Thus, if capital was an important determining element ever present in modern cities, then globalization has, according to Soja, only heightened its impact even further. This is because it has facilitated capital flows, so that sources of capital in any given city have been made much more diverse and the speed of investment decisions has been increased. The result can be seen in the tumultuous changes in the built environment (Soja, 1989: 92). King (1990: 400) encapsulated this issue in the following way:

The spectre of capital combing the world looking for profitable sites for investment and, if necessary, tearing down existing environments to achieve it, if not the major feature of the 1980s, has nevertheless been a striking characteristic of urban development in that decade.

The result of the above process, according to Harvey, is the ‘creative destruction’ of the urban environment.

In a later work Harvey dealt with the social dimension of the creative destruction. In 1994 Harvey wrote that creative destruction in the city wasn’t just a physical and economic process, but also led to the destruction of certain kinds of life. These lifestyles had their own spatio-temporal rhythms and disappeared ‘while creating new modes of life in which the new notions of spatio-temporality are embedded’ (1994: 131). Thus for Harvey the destruction of familiar places, the changes in the
appearance of the hometown, and the disappearance of the lifestyles and values which went with them and their replacement by new structures, new aesthetics, and new economic dynamics, built by and for social groups who were previously not found there, can become a new source of suspicion if not fear among the local population. If this process of creative destruction and its socio-cultural corollary are perceived to be synonymous with globalization, then an important causation for the appearance of a countervailing exclusivist localism becomes evident. It is in this theoretical context that the latter chapters of this thesis are to be placed.

To conclude, social theorists such as Harvey, Soja, Short, and King, have defined the city as being produced in the era of global capital. It is characterized by spasmodic bursts of capital flows and their equally sudden cessation, a process which has sharpened the intrinsically cyclical nature of investment in the built environment. The physical landscape of the city is therefore the product of cycles of investment. With time the structures financed by the earlier cycles are likely to become non-profitable. As new flows of capital arrive, the older buildings will be demolished to create sites for new structures, and so the new investment cycle creates a new townscape. So at any point in time the products of past investment cycles are juxtaposed with those which have been the outcome of recent capital inflows. Their different spatial dynamics and aesthetic discordance define the character of the urban area to such an extent that since the late 1970s many social theorists have postulated that such cities are a mirror of a new global epoch.

This epoch has been called postmodernism. Lyon (1994: 84-85) echoed this when he asserted the postmodern epoch to be a valuable ‘problematic’ because it alerts us to key questions concerning contemporary socio-economic change. Dear (1994:3) defined postmodernism as having three dimensions: firstly, it is an epoch, but he also considered it in its attack on rationalist modernist thought as a method, and thirdly, he saw it as a style or aesthetic. In its aesthetic the change refers to a reappraisal, if not complete rejection of the formalism and austerity of the modernism which went
before it (Lyon, 1994: 84-85). Postmodernism as an epoch or method is less directly relevant to the research which follows, but postmodernism as an aesthetic is often illustrated in the structures of the built-environment created by global capital. Whether the Gold Coast provides evidence for this is to be investigated by this study.

The Postmodern Aesthetic and the City

A number of social theorists have identified links between the postmodern aesthetic and globalization. The writings of Jameson focused on the globalization-culture nexus. Basing his work on the theories of Ernest Mandel, Jameson (1991: 36) argued that globalization has not just been a spatially integrative process, but also one which has been characterized by 'a prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas'. This has been particularly the case in the area of advertising, media, architecture, design, leisure and recreation. Time-space compression has enabled companies, if not individuals with specialized skills, to globalize their operations so that the centres of creativity and control can be far from the actual project for which the creative work is intended.

At one level then McLuhan’s ‘global village’ is being facilitated, but on the other, the countervailing processes of localism have forced the creative professional and investor to make allusions to local traditions, historicism, and popular vernacular which the consumer desires. It is the ‘product’ of this globalizing service sector investing and designing for diverse groups of consumers at specific locations which, according to Jameson (1991: 64) has been instrumental in the appearance of the postmodern aesthetic. Although Jameson (1984: 56) saw the postmodern aesthetic as the ‘cultural dominant’ of the globalizing epoch, it is not characterized by ‘massive homogeneity...but is a conception which allows for the presence and coexistence of a range of subordinate features’. Jencks (1992: 6) accounted for this by suggesting that the postmodernists recognize the contradictory pressures in having to cater to diverse groups of consumers ranging from global elites, migratory tourists, to local
conservatives. It is out of this that they have created the postmodern style, an aesthetic which is both traditionalist and futurist, paying homage to both and subverting them at the same time.

Architects and the Postmodern Aesthetic:

Jameson and Jencks have seen the architects and designers as the pioneers and driving force behind this postmodern aesthetic. It is architects who have produced the visions of urban change and Jameson (1984: 54) referred to architecture as the 'aesthetic production ..(whose works).are the most dramatically visible...and whose theoretical problems have been most centrally raised and articulated'. It is also the creative activity which has a virtually unmediated relationship to the investor, land values, yields and rents; this is according to Zukin (1988: 435), because the most important clients of architects are companies. Market criteria are therefore imposed on them. More and more of such clients are international investors, so urban architecture can be seen 'as a direct expression of globalizing international capitalism'. The consequences of this are, according to Zukin, that new architecture and urban forms are produced under nearly the same social organization as consumer products and business services. Specific markets, or market niches are identified, and a product of the appropriate aesthetic created to fill it. However this process has to be concealed behind superficial accoutrements of distinctiveness 'while individual buildings become standardized, their designers claim more distinction for their clients' (Zukin, 1988: 437). Kaplan in the Los Angeles Times (6 August 1989) quoted architect John Lautner as saying that the reason clients of buildings want such distinction is to give them a status symbol, for what else has architecture become but a 'bottom-line business?'.

Finally, such commodification and individualization of architecture was seen by the postmodern theorists, Jameson (1991) Turner(1996) and Ellin (1996), as having made architecture a particularly apt symbol of the postmodern world view; a world view
which denies the existence of an encompassing meta-narrative in favour of an infinite number of group perceptions, texts and ideologies. They see architecture as being double-coded, that is, it juxtaposes elements of different styles and it 'speaks' on the one hand to members of the architecture profession, and also 'speaks' probably with a different message, to its consumers.

Therefore the key to understanding the postmodern aesthetic is to understand postmodern architecture. Its pioneers and practitioners have ranged from Venturi, Jencks, Johnson, Graves, and Moore in the United States, to Krier, Rossi, Stirling and Hollein in Europe, and Isozaki in Japan. Its main characteristics have been described and debated in detail by, inter alia, Jenks, Jameson, Klotz, Turner and Ellin. All these writers referred to its emphasis on historicism, contextualism and eclecticism. Jencks (1991: 105) explained these characteristics by saying that postmodern architecture has to appeal to the middle class urbanite, who in the age of globalization 'is bound to have a well-stocked, indeed over-stocked 'image-bank’ that is continually refilled by travel and magazines. His musee imaginaire may mirror the pot-pouri of producers, but it is nonetheless natural to his way of life’.

So the use of, for example, discordant Classical or Romanesque references in the design of a building may in fact reflect the palimpsest of the consumers’ mental images. If one can live at one location, but also enjoy the memory of another, why not do so (Jencks, 1991: 19). The fact that such architectural references may occur in incongruous combinations, or may be completely out of context, is according to Jencks, irrelevant, for isn’t the derivation of the word ‘eclectic’ the Old Greek, ‘I select?’

Ellin saw the features of postmodern architecture much more in a cultural and psychological framework. For instance, its penchant for Neo-classical allusions was interpreted by her as a symbol of the quest for ‘timeless’ design features. Thus Neo-classicism equals permanence in a fast-changing, globalizing world. It is revealing
that permanence is to be achieved through a stylistic symbol of Western culture, even according to the perception of some non-Westerners. The other meaning which it embodies is the desire for monumentality, especially by social groups who want reassurance that they are *arrive* (Ellin, 1996: 23-25). Peter Ward (1997) an architectural journalist, saw the popularity of Neo-classicism in postmodern architecture in Australia 'as the taste of the newer rich for the respectability of an older style. Something which makes them look as if they've been rolling in lucre for ages and have the proper taste of gentry'.

Klotz (1992: 235-239) was critical of writers who regarded the historicism of postmodern architecture as 'regressive'. He explained the use of historical allusions and decontextualized cultural references in a building as giving the building meaning for the consumer rather than fellow members of the profession. A general historicism also implied that the building sought to draw attention to itself through means other than just its functional qualities. However he did admit that 'superficial decorative historicism' can be just seen as 'pastiche', or quest for nostalgic kitsch.

The postmodern characteristic of contextuality, it is argued by Turner (1996: 109-115) and Jameson (1991: 39-40), is that which determines the visual relationship between the new development and those around it. Jameson was critical of postmodernist projects that disregarded the problem of contextuality by turning inwards; a feature he noted is increasingly frequent with hotel-resort type developments. On occasions contextuality is synonymous with historicism, that is, the stylistic references in the new project are to adjacent pre-existing structures, though the desire by the architect or developer for such references may be to those with no special local meaning, but only a broad regional or national significance. In these instances the postmodern aesthetic of the new project has poor contextuality and may even be viewed by some critics as a case of a city as 'Theme Park' (Sorkin, 1992: xi-xv).
However, according to the semiotist, Roland Barthes (1982) different people attach distinctly different signifiers to the same architecturally structure. This is frequently the case with the Japanese. As the Japanese are the pivotal group in thesis, is to the cultural constructs of and about the Japan and the Japanese that this literature review turns.

Japanese Culture and the Postmodern Aesthetic

Generalizations about ‘a people’ and ‘their culture’ have to approached with great caution, for they can lend themselves to exactly the types of descriptive superficiality many social theorists have warned against. Clarity of conceptual formulation appears essential.

King (1991: 1-2) in his essay ‘Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge’ admitted that definitions of culture are now more difficult than ever, for in recent social theory they have undergone many transformations of meaning. Nevertheless he still ventured to give one. His definition had two components; on the one hand a set of characteristics which distinguish a group of people from another, but on the other, it is a process of constructing a way of life, set of values and beliefs, which in turn feed back into peoples’ lives to create frameworks and points of reference for their actions and responses. Anderson and Gale (1992: 2) referred to culture as the frames of mind and action which people inhabit. Cosgrove and Jackson (Mitchell, 1995: 102) summed up culture as ‘the medium through which people transform the mundane phenomenon of the material world into a world of significant symbols to which they give meaning and attach value’.

Akami (1997: 16), writing about the nature of contemporary Japan, assumed the importance of the concept of culture, but then made the point that what one saw in a culture depended on where one viewed it from. For example, Japan viewed from ‘outside’ appears substantially different when compared with Japan viewed from
'inside'. Barthes (1982: 6) specified the situational nature of cultural meanings more specifically in the following way:

> to understand the text of another culture requires us to undo our own 'reality' under the effect of other formulations, other syntaxes; to discover certain unsuspected positions of the subject....in a word, to descend into the untranslatable.

He then commenced to deconstruct Japanese culture without further questioning whether there was a single unified phenomenon to which that name could be applied.

**Japan: A Culture of Uniqueness?**

Writing of 'national cultures' assumes that a given country has a coherent, monolithic culture whose salient characteristics can be ascribed to all, or most of the people living in it. This is a problematic assertion, for as Said (1978: 54) commented, human beings have an intrinsic desire to demarcate their group from the 'other' group and then look for cultural attributes to justify having done so. The result of this can be that 'truth becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself.' (Said, 1978: 67). In this way Europeans have frequently overgeneralized and exoticized Asian cultures.

There has been a wealth of literature based on the existence of a unique Japanese national identity. Jansen (1965: 37) argued that the origin of the extensive school of thought based on the existence of a unique, Japanese national culture had its origins in the view of social theorists of the nature of modern Japanese history, more specifically its experience of technological modernization. The importation of Western technology, it was argued, hid 'a human experience that really did not coincide with the theory of modernization' (Masao Miyoshi & H. D. Harootunian, 1989: 6). Analyses of Japan’s process of modernization and the resultant cultural
changes were made from a Western perspective and were inevitably found to be especially perplexing because it did not conform to the Western model. Thus, it was argued, there must be some factor of Japanese national uniqueness to explain the otherwise inexplicable.

The 1980s, the period considered by this thesis, was according to Akami (1997: 12) one of the high-points of this belief in Japanese uniqueness. Thus Japan’s economic and technological successes in the 1980s were ascribed to unique features supposedly inherent in their culture. It was even perceived by many in the United States as the start of a cultural conflict for world dominance. Newspaper headlines such as ‘The Success of the Japanese Model of Market Economics’, and ‘Tokyo’s version of capitalism exerts growing influence’ were increasingly common place. Writers such as Wolf, Vogel, Chalmers Johnson, Prestowitz, Drucker, Burstein, and van Wolferen all sought to explain the ‘Japanese challenge’ to US hegemony by reference to the existence of unique Japanese cultural characteristics. The issue even entered the realms of popular literature through novels such as Rising Sun by Michael Crichton (1992). At the academic level a number of social theorists also subscribed to this Zeitgeist. Arnason (1987: 59) in his essay, ‘The Modern Constellation and the Japanese Enigma’ wrote of Japan having:

a nationalist background consensus incomparably more solid than in other countries...(this truth)...takes the indestructibility of nationality and the existence of the nation as the subject of economic action for granted and thus assumes continuity where a different historical experience would raise fears of a rupture.

Robert Smith (1985: 16 & 110) discussed the concept of ‘kokutai’ (Japanese uniqueness) at length. Though he admitted that it was largely constructed by the Japanese themselves to explain their distinctive process of modernization and overcome their fear of being swamped by Western culture, his work Japanese
*Society: Tradition, Self, and the Social Order* is based on a premise of Japanese uniqueness. He commented that books and essays on Japan-ism and Japanese-ism have in recent years assumed the status of a thriving cottage industry. Many Western historians, anthropologists and sociologists writing in the 1980s about Japan also based their theories on this paradigm (Barthes, 1982; Condon & Kurata, 1987; Jacques, 1992). The case for Japanese uniqueness reached its zenith in the comment by Yoshimoto (1989: 25) that some exponents of the paradigm of Japanese uniqueness went so far as to claim 'that Japanese reality is too unique to be analysed by theory that originated in the West'.

The topic of this thesis spans a period in which the behaviour, attitudes and actions of Japanese, singly or collectively, were seen and explained in terms of their supposedly distinctive national traits; traits moulded by their historical experience, if not a unique bio-psychological character. (It should be noted that since the late 1980s this nation-centred, contingent view of Japanese behaviour has abated; subsequent events have strengthened the perspective that the nature of the global economic boom of the period, and general role of human agency in moulding it, and being moulded by it, were equally important in all countries of the world; and so factors of Japanese national uniqueness have since been given a lesser significance).

However during the 1980s arrival of the Japanese in Western countries, their activities and impact, were seen and evaluated very much in terms of them being a people with unitary, integrated, modes of action and playing the role of the ‘Other’ in relation to the foreign communities in which they appeared. This is the rationale for using and interpreting data about the Japanese in the context of a belief in their national uniqueness.
Japanese Receptivity to the Postmodern Aesthetic:

Given the period covered by this research topic, it is Japanese receptivity to, and discourse with the postmodern aesthetic that is of immediate relevance. This is an issue which has been addressed by both foreign and Japanese social theorists. Yoshimoto on the one hand, and Yoshida, Mitsukumi, Tanaka, & Sesoko on the other, argue that from the beginning the nature of Japan’s contact with Western modernism revealed what they now identify as post-modern characteristics. Yoshimoto (1989: 9) wrote that the Japanese desired to retain something of their own culture in the face of Western modernist universalism. This had to take it beyond modernism. Thus, according to Yoshimoto, from the 19th Century onwards, Japanese culture ‘could not help but contain some postmodern moments’. Yoshida et al (1984: 110) made this point in the global-local context when they said that ‘since the latter half of the nineteenth century Japan has struggled to create an original new culture that combines both universality and particularity’. Thus the local vernacular has remained in spite of the onrush of universalist modernism.

However it is with the next point that scholars of Japanese culture introduced the link between Japanese culture and postmodernism. Japan, they argued has always approached Western culture as a matter of forms, not as something having a different spirit. Singer (1973: 98-100) made the same case when describing the Japanese propensity to mimic Western forms. He argued that Western models were selected by the Japanese and scrupulously copied in every detail without the spirit behind them ever being understood or appropriated. Kazuo Shinohara (1984: 48) a Japanese writer on architecture, said much the same when he referred to Japan’s tendency of taking a Western architectural concept to use solely for decorative purposes.

Semioticists such as Roland Barthes (1982) explained this phenomenon by saying that Japanese culture is decentred, that is, the centre can be fractured into a ‘signified’ and an irreducible play of floating ‘signifiers’. The result is that an object, a ritual, a
landscape, a building, does not retain an exclusive meaning, vantage point, or symbolism. Each individual can read their meaning into it. His book on Japan, *Empire of Signs* published in 1982, described the nature of Japanese urban landscapes, gardens, food, packaging and poetry, in this manner. Social theorists and scholars of Japanese culture argued that such semiotic decentring is particularly appropriate to what has entered Japan from the West. Every object, or idea which enters Japan is adapted or signified as something neither intended nor appreciated by its originators abroad (Singer, 1973: 100). This is very much a case of the ‘multivoices’ of contemporary postmodern social theory. It is such free-floating signifiers, the ability of each group of people to read their own meaning into objects and experiences that forms an important dimension of the postmodern aesthetic.

On the other hand, some Japanese social theorists note that the postmodern aesthetic appeared in Japan as a manifestation of the same forces of economic and cultural globalization that produced it in the West. It burst forth in the late 1980s as part of what the Japanese refer to as their ‘bubble economy’, a time of ‘hyper-yuppiness, snobbery, and materialism’ (Akami, 1997: 14). This was the time when the Japanese perception of themselves was at its most inflated and when their view of their unique national attributes was at its strongest (Hashizume, 1997: 7). However, according to the social theorist Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, (1989: 13), this only served to highlight a penchant for the postmodern aesthetic, a penchant, which he argued, has always been in Japanese culture.

One aspect of this has been the prevalence of a commodification of styles, structures, and their integration into mass culture. This often takes the form of the creation of simulacra of Western ‘experiences’. According to Yoshimoto, Tokyo Disneyland epitomizes the postmodern logic of Japan. Not only that, but the use of replicas of the Statue of Liberty as the rooftop logo of the love hotel in a number of Japanese cities gives the postmodern aesthetic and its semiotic deconstruction kaleidoscopic possibilities. Yoshimoto (1989: 21) also developed the example of the manga or
comic form as a commodified form of simulacra for history and economics. He explained it by saying that the more historical and economic issues are exploited as themes of the comic form, the more they are transformed into the archtypical narratives of mass images, a basic form of the postmodern aesthetic. Ivy (1989: 35) generalized from this through her description of the plethora of colourful printed matter and television images produced in Japan. She argued that material which blurs the distinction between information and advertising and makes the Japanese reader and viewer a 'literary grazer'.

Creation and Perception of Architecture in Japan:

This leads to a consideration of architecture in Japan, its creation and perception. For, as mentioned earlier, architecture has been seen as the 'favoured aesthetic' of the postmodern social theorists. It is also relevant because one of the research questions is the Japanese investors' relationship to the design and architecture of the developments their capital made possible.

The postmodern architectural aesthetic in the city cannot be regarded as part of any urban whole (Ellin, 1996). It is disconnected and eclectic. It has a strong visual resonance in Japanese cities. As Popham (1985: 119) commented, 'one thing anyone who has looked hard at Japan realizes is that integration in the classical sense is a quality the Japanese are happy to get along without'. In fact, the city is decentred and perceived differently by each individual, thus 'visual inconsistencies', if any, are in the eye of the beholder. If the beholder is a Westerner, like Popham, there are plenty. His description of what met his eye on his first arrival in Tokyo is a very good example of seeing this Japanese metropolis with 'foreign eyes':

I saw blocks of flats, factories, a horse-racing track, a sewerage farm, a black-tiled temple hemmed in about by graves, a rusting scrapyard, a warehouse hung with company names -SANYO, SONY, NEC- high office blocks of
crude concrete rammed right up against wooden houses packed together as tight as they could go. It was a mess of highly assertive and wildly incongruous elements, all abutting each other without a hint of compromise or deference, and with no trace of organization. Everything seemed in flux: little old pitched-roof wooden structures were smothered by huge modern rectilinear facades, rooftops sprouted annexes of corrugated PVC, a monorail track popped out of what looked like a lump of solid building (Popham, 1985: 37).

The Westerner's perception of Tokyo is based on concepts of integrative visual harmony, but to the Japanese this is not the point. Condon and Kurata (1987: 100-109; 129) maintained that the Japanese have always had an ability to see selectively and to create their own images. A visual inconsistency in the streetscape in the eyes of a Western modernist may be seen by a Japanese as two isolated aesthetic experiences, each one enjoyed on its own terms and with no connection between them. The old and the new juxtaposed to each other are equally valued and should be judged on their own terms. In other words, they argue, a Japanese can 'see selectively' at any one moment. The result can be, what a Western social theorist would call a postmodern eclecticism speaking in a multitude of aesthetic, architectural and cultural voices.

Postmodern historicism and eclecticism are also a feature of the Japanese in their receptivity to, and use of, Western architectural styles. Yoshida, Tanaka & Sesoko (1984: 112) argued that from the Meiji period onwards Western style was 'translated' by Japanese architects and designers in accordance with their perception of what urban public spaces in Western cities are like. At the same time they retained an attachment to Japanese-style private spaces. Thus they had a floating, decentred aesthetic.
In general the Japanese relationship to contemporary architecture is ‘intricate, complex’ (Boyd, 1968: 7). Hesselberger (1984: 29) a German scholar of Japanese architecture, wrote of the Japanese architect’s tendency to incorporate a range of styles in the one building, not with any aim of synthesis, but to ‘run parallel’. On the one hand Western elements are mimicked, but on the other they are clearly kept separate from that which is perceived to be ‘traditionally Japanese’. Thus different observers can glimpse different features in the same building. The existence of such floating signifiers is further heightened by a sense of the aesthetic being opaque and flowing.

Since the beginning of the 1980s Japan has seen the spread of postmodern eclecticism that shows such floating signifiers. A few examples will make this point more vivid. The Hotel Kawakya(1997), in Wakayama, was built of English brick, Italian tiles and French stone. It has French Renaissance turrets, a Hanseatic, high-gabled, serrated roof line and Gothic gargoyles. The Ibaraki City Library (1992), built in the form of a circular reading hall (which quotes Boullee, the designer of the British Museum), but is also surrounded by a covered walkway, that refers to the cloister of a Medieval monastery. Finally, a particularly colourful example of postmodern eclecticism with floating signifiers. It is the ‘Restore Station’(1991), in Hiroshima. This is a series of single-storey shopfronts separated by screen walls on which are projected scenes from 1950s Hollywood films. This building has within it a cafe, a restaurant, the sales office of a local company, and a public toilet.

To conclude, there is considerable literature on Japan which argues that Japan entered, contributed to, and helped structure the 1980s process of globalization, but it did this with its own cultural baggage. This ‘baggage’ had some aesthetic, perceptual and philosophical features which postmodernism had no difficulty quoting. This will be one of the themes that will be considered in the Chapters Four and Five.
Summary

This literature review has been concerned with the identification of relevant concepts, paradigms and perspectives of the globalization process, and the identification and characteristics of a phenomenon of localism it has engendered. It is the interface of the global and local, the economic and cultural, and how it can be revealed, which has guided the selection of literature. For this the appropriate theoretical framework has to be sought through a great range of social theory. This includes the literature on globalization as an economic phenomenon, most particularly the flow of capital, especially into property. Here the function of theoretical literature is to provide a conceptual and structural framework for analysing the ebb and flow of capital at a time of increased globalization. As well, theories on the changing role of the state as a residual, or mediating force, in the face of globalization have to be grasped. The literature also reveals that the very processes of time-space compression which facilitated economic globalization were also evident in the transmission of images, the interchange of information and the rise of global professional networks, and the flow of people. Hence globalization also developed a culture with global characteristics. The result has been, according to theorists, the creation of a global culture, juxtaposed with, superimposed upon, and threaded through, the long established cultures of individual places.

Since the interface of the economic and cultural, the global and local, occurs at a place, so this study is also a study of a place. Hence the nature of place in relation to these forces is another dimension whose literature had to be considered. This requires an understanding of the changing locational relativities of places in the face of global flows and spatial restructuring. Places, as competitive, collective phenomena creatively destroyed by cycles of investment; places that have been reformed, repackaged by new styles and images flowing from global centres of creativity. The cultural reformulation of the place in this study occurred during the appearance of what theorists have called the postmodern aesthetic. The postmodern in architecture
and design has become the most visible manifestation of manifestation of the economic globalization forces to be studied. There is an another reason for the emphasis on architecture: the relevant literature argues that architecture has the most unmediated relationship to capital. Architecture is also double coded, thus making it of great interest to semioticists, cultural studies theorists and those writing on postmodern theory. The semioticist reveals the concept of free-floating signifiers, and this has cross-cultural applicability.

Social theorists have also shown that these economic and cultural flows are carried by, mediated through, and impact upon human groups. Therefore the literature of cultural group theory becomes important. It argues that economic forces should be seen as contextual, because they become embedded into local structures, assumptions, and power relationships at the place which they have entered. This means that the specific interface of the globalist economic and cultural forces is also an interface between people who bring them and the long-resident local population. The position of people in relation to their receptivity to globalization varies greatly. A series of groups at this locational interface can be identified according to whether they are ‘carriers’ of globalizing forces, receptive to them, ignorant of them, or resistant/hostile to them. The last named have been counterposed to the groups called ‘globalists’, and given the name of ‘localists’. Localism is ‘relational’ to the place at which it can be identified and is a function of group dynamics, values and memories. Explanations of this require recourse to theories of group behaviour. Social theorists have based their work on group behaviour on paradigms postulated by theorists such as Durkheim and Bourdieu. The conceptual framework postulated by Bourdieu enables a study of group behaviour to be made without having to accept the individualistic extremities of phenomenology or the positivistic rigidities of structuralism. It also makes possible the introduction and application of the concept of cultural contestation and quest for hegemony, a feature of the opaque and kaleidoscopic interface at a given place and time.
Finally, the agents of globalization and the local population at the interface assume positions that relative to each other. However they also have unique cultural characteristics which, it is argued, affect their perception, receptivity, and use of the 'global', or the 'local'. It thus requires a specific cultural study of the relevant group, people, professional interest nexus, and political lobby, to reveal the exact nature of the cultural conflict which is occurring at the specific interface. If group happens to be the Japanese, then one enters the field of a cultural/national research literature of great richness and academic diversity. For the study of the Japanese as a people, as a society, as a culture, a situational geopolitical entity, a psychological construct, is extensive. In social theory and cultural studies, the existence of a 'nation' as a group with highly developed integrated characteristics is a controversial paradigm.

However, it is argued, in the case of the Japanese this paradigm has been applied widely, but the rigour of its application has been related to the identity and perspective of the researcher and the Zeitgeist prevailing the work was carried out. This thesis researches a period when the belief in a unique Japanese identity was particularly strong. The Japanese were seen as one of the main riders of the wave of globalization, but riding it with cultural baggage perceived as unique, and resulting in the creation of cultural interfaces at numerous locations which produced dramatic physical changes and issues of cultural contestation of particular severity.

Hence this study takes the phenomenon of globalization as its conceptual core and seeks to address a number of its dimensions that appear to have been inadequately considered so far. Firstly, the impact of globalization on place. So far the focal point of globalization research appears to have been on theme and process. Relatively little has been written on the environmental and socio-cultural changes and flux that these processes may galvanize at the places so affected. Secondly, globalization may crystallize countervailing forces of opposition to its presence. The nature of such opposition produces a dialectic between the socio-cultural form of globalization at a specific place and the local culture; so far inadequate research has been conducted on this dialectic. An interface is created between the global and the local that requires a
comprehensive paradigm of research to reveal its true complexity. This is the third
collection that this thesis can make, namely, a study paradigm that considers both
the economic and cultural perspectives of the global-local interface at the chosen
study locale. Until now most literature has been economic or cultural, with very little
research on the interrelationships between them. Finally, though the impact of
globalization on the state has been conceptualized in a thematic manner, the position
of government at a specific interface between globalizing forces and local reactions
has not been adequately researched. It is also here that this thesis seeks to make a
contribution. To conclude, this thesis is a study of place, a place chosen because it
has become the interface between the economic and cultural forces of globalization
and the local reaction to it. It thus seeks to explore the spatially situated dimension of
globalization and so reveal a new perspective on its nature.
Research Design and Methodology

The genesis of this study lies in the series of annual visits paid to the Gold Coast since 1979. Though initially not motivated by research aims, from the mid-1980s they became progressively more research-oriented. From 1987 onwards casual empirical observation was followed by the informal formulation of research questions, as well as local media research and the first series of interviews. These focused on the question: what impact were Japanese buyers and project developers having on the development of the Gold Coast? A number of publications have been the result (Hajdu, 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999). Concurrent with the research on the Japanese on the Gold Coast came increased engagement with Japan. Two private visits in 1982 and 1987 were followed by teaching-research visits in 1990, 1995, 1997 and 1999. Also, from 1993 onwards, the theoretical connections between the phenomena being observed on the Gold Coast started to be made. Such embedding of the Japanese-Gold Coast issue into a framework of social theory revealed new layers of meaning. This encouraged the reformulation of the key research questions, and led eventually to their articulation as set-out in the Introduction.

This study seeks to answer the question: What happens when globalization affects a specific place? This implies insights into the complexity of globalization and the reactions to it at the affected place.

However the research question also concerns the nature of place; a place with specific environmental characteristics and cultural dynamics to which the agents of globalization must adapt and respond. A series of questions were posed in the Introduction through which this thesis seeks to develop answers to the economic, environmental, cultural and political dimensions of the interface between globalization and a specific place. The research design and methodology has to reflect this.
Eclecticism of the Research Methodology

Such a complex set of research themes needs eclectic methodologies. Some social theorists argue that diverse paradigms of study are required to reveal the nature of conflicting global-local forces that are moulding the world. For example Soja (1987: 290) wrote of the 'challenge of making practical and theoretical sense of the perplexing present, the contemporary era of disruptive crises and far reaching restructuring,' and to comprehend this, 'demands a much more flexible, combinatorial, and cautiously eclectic specialization of thought and action, theory and practice'. The focus of this study, the location and nature of the interface between the globalizing processes and the local forces reacting to it, is characterized by layers and permutations of complexity, and hence in this instance Soja's point is especially apt.

There is also a philosophical argument for methodological eclecticism. This emanates from the denial by many of a metanarrative in postmodern human geography and the freedom which this gives for a study of uniqueness, localism, historical specificity, and the cultural, environmental and political differentiation of places. Curry (1991: 215) wrote of the need 'to be aware of the locality and flexibility of the differences among places,' and the importance of not restricting oneself to the straightjacket of a single, paradigm of study that seeks to encompass the totality of a research project. Instead, what is desirable is a 'post-modernist explanation which resists the hegemonic hold of any modernist theory, celebrates diversity engendered by theoretical relativism, and maintains the creative tensions, conflicts and contradictions between theories in the belief that accelerated insight is likely to be derived from different interpretations'. (Dear, 1988: 270-71). In effect, this means that it is desirable to use the approach which is most appropriate to the material being researched at each stage of the project.

However it is important to be aware that the use of an eclectic methodology may contain within it the danger of superficiality. Given the value of such individually chosen, diverse paradigms of study, how can this danger be avoided? The need to step back from the research theme and see how it is constructed is crucial.
Seglacek (1989: 14), argued that the purpose of such distancing facilitates the incorporation of different perspectives into the research project. Such an approach means the study of a topic in its totality- ‘die Ganzheitlichkeit der Forschung’.

This still begs the question of how the worth of a research project that has used an eclectic mix of methodologies can be judged. Gatrell (1997: 219) in a paper delivered to the Association of American Geographers argued that the quality of the research needs to be judged on the basis of two criteria: firstly, the nature of the research’s embeddedness in the appropriate theory; secondly, comes the need to evaluate the scholar’s richness of structure, clarity of data analysis, textual presentation and the nuances of meaning that have been revealed from it. Ultimately the ‘proof of research conducted by whatever means resides in the pudding of its outcomes’. (Peshkin, 1993: 23). It is on such criteria that the judgment of the study should rest.

The rest of this chapter aims to explain the nature and use of certain information sources and research methodologies of importance to the key research questions. It will then describe and explain the basic research design of the study.

Two Information Sources

Though the research methodology is eclectic, two of its specific aspects permeate most sections of the study and need a few pertinent generic comments to explain their importance. These are, the use of the interview and the documentation provided by contemporary texts of the print media.

The Use of Interviews:

Much data for this study was collected in the field. Initially this was casual observation. As knowledge and sensitivity towards the manifestations of the Japanese presence increased, the observation became more focused. The result were recorded and this helped crystallize the subsequent interviews. These
research methodologies are connected, for the interview is a means of gaining
access to facts, knowledge and understanding that cannot be directly observed.

Except for specific economic and cartographic facts of relevance, the research
questions of this thesis do not lend themselves to an assessment through
aggregates of standardized data. Substantive answers are more likely to be
revealed from the accumulation of texts that show diverse perspectives on major
issues contained within the research questions. A range of individual and group
realities, experiences and meanings need to be sought from persons in pivotal
positions at the Gold Coast interface of the global-local forces in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. This can be achieved through individualized, in-depth qualitative
interviewing techniques.

As Polkingstone (1983: 267) commented, in-depth interviews have the ability to
provide 'the richest data source for the human science researcher trying to
understand human structures of experience'. This means that the choice of
interviewee and the format of the interview have to be established with
considerable forethought. The aim of the researcher here is twofold: firstly, to
seek responses to specific questions pertinent to the research; secondly, to
encourage the respondent to reveal the outlines of their cultural and philosophical
world. The significance of the latter is that it provides some of the context within
which the specific opinions have been expressed and so facilitates the revelation
of meanings from it. Needless to say the interviewer's prior formulation of the
research questions, his cultural context and his procedure in the selection of
interviewees are all influences that contribute to the progress and outcome of the
interview.

To achieve this process, some interviewing became a two-stage process. An
initial interview that sought to gather statistical information and descriptive text
was followed at a later date by one through which the relevant tasks, values,
expectations and fears were probed. The period between the two interviews gave
the researcher the opportunity to better crystallize the less tangible issues that he
wished to draw out of the respondent. For example, stage one revealed details of
the location, size, value and timing of the intended Japanese investment, whereas the repeat interview sought to draw-out the interviewee on their Japanese background, perceptions of the Gold Coast, expectations of the project, attitudes towards the service providers used and fears about opposition to it.

The choice of interviewees and the decision regarding the length of the interviewing program to be followed are connected. The choice of interviewees was based on a number of criteria. Firstly, field observation and empirical data gathering on the Gold Coast gave an indication of which were the largest, stylistically most distinctive Japanese funded/owned projects. A typological classification was established and an interview was conducted with a person involved with a property in each category. Secondly, but interwoven with the first approach, was the identification of categories of individuals, professional and socio-cultural groups who appeared to be 'stakeholders' in the research question that had been formulated. The identification of these stakeholders arose partly from the third criteria of interviewee selection: recommendation by an earlier respondent. The interests or perceptions of many stakeholders in the research question were revealed to be interconnected, yet sufficiently distinct in perspective to either verify or cast doubt on the first story told, or to give another dimension on the issues being considered. As this can give multiple perspectives on the same issue, the evolution of an interview chain can become an important determinant of the interview process.

Thus the interview chain, empirical and contextual knowledge of the researcher, and background textual research led to the identification of the following stakeholders: the Japanese investor-large company, small company, family, individual; Japanese property purchaser/immigrant; real estate agent-large, small; property consultant-national, local; professional service provider- architect, planner/civil engineer, urban designer, surveyor, solicitor (Japanese and Australian), consultant, interpreter (Japanese and Australian), interior decorator; local government official; Japanese community organization office bearer; resident action leader; journalist and newspaper letter writer; academic.
As in all such qualitative interviewing, the outcomes are likely to be variable. They will reflect the extent to which the aims set for the interview are achieved and the sense, albeit diffuse, of the quality of the rapport achieved between interview and respondent. Here the researcher’s personality attributes and his embeddedness in Australian and Japanese socio-cultural contexts are significant variables. The latter point warrants further comment.

The physical, psychological and verbal signs of Australian and Japanese behaviour and attitudes show some significant differences that may impact on the progress of the interview. If the Australian values of casual friendliness and matter of factness require the interviewer to lead off in an open manner, with gestures of superficial cheerfulness leading to an explanation of the interview’s intent coupled with reassurances on privacy of information, then a Japanese respondent has to be approached with a somewhat different mix of signifiers. For example the face to face meeting should be preceded by written communication, with the Japanese respondent being given a list of questions. Apart from any problems of English comprehension, the Japanese tend to thoroughness and ponderousness of thought and a suspicion of, if not inability to respond in a spontaneous manner. If an interpreter has to be used in the interview, then the interpreter acts as a gatekeeper between the interviewer and respondent. One way of assessing whether any filtering of meanings occurs or not as a consequence is to rephrase the question and put it again. The texts of the two answers can be compared to identify any slippage of meaning.

There are also likely to be differences in the construction and nuances of the texts that are produced. The text of the Australian respondent is likely to have a higher degree of precision and make liberal use of the vernacular and colloquialisms. In this process information and opinions that could be interpreted to reflect negatively on the respondent may slip out. In fact the task of revealing latent meanings may relate to the decoding of vernacularisms. The text produced by a Japanese respondent will tend towards the use of philosophical generalizations and involve praise for places and people related to the issue being discussed. Any issues, events, people and problems that could be seen by them in a negative light
are touched upon lightly through the use of conciliatory phrases. In this case textual analysis may have to proceed in a systematic manner with decoding by the researcher seeking to reveal a new text parallel to the original.

Finally a brief comment on the problem of acknowledging interviews used in this study. As a general principle, all data and text is acknowledged. However, the Research Ethics Committee of Deakin University made approval of the interview program conditional on the names of the interviewees not being identifiable in the text of the completed study. This led to the following procedure. Where the information from the private interview quoted mirrors that in the public domain, such as in a newspaper, for the sake of convenience the newspaper source is used in preference to the private interview. Also, a distinction is made between a statement that makes a general observation, or expresses a widely-held perception in contrast to an opinion about an ethno-cultural group, a specific person, project or event. In the former case, especially when the respondent is active in public life with well-known views, then clear acknowledgment becomes an unproblematic course.

However with opinions that are about specific persons and projects or generally critical or negative in tone, a form of disguise has to be developed. This takes the form of describing the interviewee through an alphabetic letter, in occupation or ethnically generic terms. Here multiple references to information provided by the same interviewee is acknowledged in the text in a consistent manner. At the same time the names of the forty eight interviewees are listed in Appendix II, but in such a manner that their disguise cannot be uncovered.

The Use of Printed Media Text:

The print media that are contemporaneous with the period of study are an important source of information. They mirror events, perceptions and conflicts. Though most journalistic writing is not in essence reflective, it does have the value of immediacy and detail. As most newspapers are a business, their content has to maintain a close relationship with the activities, opinions, aspirations and fears of
its readers. In the late 1980s Japanese investment into property in Australia was covered by the press at the national, regional and local level. Use is made of all such references, however as this study is in one of its dimensions about place, the newspaper that chronicles that place is used most extensively. This is the *Gold Coast Bulletin*. As its local competitors are limited to two give-away tabloids of relatively small size, the Gold Coast Bulletin has a monopoly of comprehensive local news coverage. Hence its reportage is used extensively and when cited as an acknowledgment the acronym *GCB* is used. For all newspaper sources, where the article is unsigned or written by a staff journalist, the details of the newspaper are acknowledged in the text, where the reference used is by a guest writer it is under their name and is listed in the References in Appendix III.

A newspaper can inform in two ways: firstly, it can provide new data about relevant issues and developments from the articles written by its journalists, as well as providing access to the announcements and advertisements placed in its pages by others; secondly, it can provide another perspective on issues that have already become known from other sources. The inclusion or omission of an item in the newspaper may be significant, as can the frequency of its inclusion, detail given and the mode of its presentation.

**Research Design**

The approach taken to any study gives it its structure or research design. The research design is the outcome of the paradigms of study chosen.

The determinant of the structure of the research design draws on the ideas of Geertz and Soja, both social theorists whose writings have combined important insights into the nature of the human realm with original thoughts on questions of epistemology. Geertz, an ethnographer, saw his study material as being 'the text' and his research task was to reveal the meaning of the chosen text. However each text, according to Geertz (Cosgrove & Jackson, 1987: 96-7), has a multiple layer of meanings, each of which can be disclosed through a process of 'thick description'. Thick description is description of the actual text linked to analysis,
stating as explicitly as possible what knowledge thus attained demonstrates about the society and culture from which the text comes, if not about society as such. Soja (1989: 2), a human geographer, also referred to the layers of meaning in a text, only to him ‘text’ meant ‘map’. Maps depict places and Soja saw the study of place as axiomatic to contemporary social theory. The map of a place, or text, he argued is like a palimpsest or parchment from which layers of meaning can to be peeled off and then tied together by a spatial logic and the web of human perception, interaction and power dynamics. Such a focus on layers of meaning seeks to evoke a series of different levels of reality found in the topic being researched, with the aim of substituting a spatial, cultural, or thematic logic for the traditional chronological causation.

The layers of meaning concept with its consideration of a topic from various vantage points to reveal different meanings offers considerable flexibility in the choice of research paradigm. Hence it is chosen as the basis of the research design. The perspectives chosen are the: 1. Economic; 2. Spatial/Environmental; 3. Cultural; 4. Political. These perspectives give the structure of this study. Thus Chapter Three is economic, Chapter Four and to some extent Chapter Five are spatial/ environmental, Chapter Five is also cultural, as are Chapters Six and Seven, whereas Chapter Eight is political. As this structure provides the basic intellectual framework of the study, a more detailed explanation of it is warranted.

1. Economic:
The instigator of the issues inherent in the research questions is investment capital. Thus the economic has to be considered as one level of meaning. It is also the benchmark to which the major agents of the research topic relate and/or react. It is the tangible manifestation of the material world and so a very important level of reality to which diverse meanings are attached. Many social theorists, even semioticians, now concede that the material world is a reality and that it functions according to nonsemiotic processes (Gottdiener, 1994: 169). Gottdiener defined the essence of this material reality as economics and politics- money and power. A semiotic study of culture which ignores the reality of money and power can, according to Gottdiener, do little more than describe. Explanations often require
reference to the reality of the material world. This point is also picked up by Goldman and Papson (1994:249-50) in their criticism of the widely employed postmodern paradigm of research which they see as glossing over the dynamics of production and consumption. Meanings may now be ambiguous and open to individual interpretations, but capitalist hegemony is stronger than ever, and it is capital, labour, land and resources which create developments.

Thus the economic dimension of this makes use of the empirical, positivist paradigm. This is 'a specific way of gaining knowledge about the world which involves observation and the selection of observable phenomena for the purposes of empirical validation' (Smith, Booth & Zalewski, 1996: 14-15). Data used here is sometimes quantitative or statistical. The meanings that can be ascribed to such data revolve around two issues: firstly, questions of definitions; here the matter of what exactly is being presented in a quantified state has to established precisely; secondly, relationships which can be established by quantitative means are usually bivariate, but relationships at deeper levels of meaning involve many factors in a complex structure of mutual causation, and a bivariate relationship can only refute a bivariate assumption. Therefore it is important to show clearly what meanings are revealed by quantified data and what are not.

In this study observable and quantifiable data will be augmented by explanatory text. Nicholson (1996: 133) supported this point by writing that 'positivism should not be seen as an austere a doctrine'. Words have meanings and these have always been part of academic writing. The important point is to state overtly that such meanings are often derived from a priori concepts (for example, 'wealth', 'competitiveness', 'greed', 'status', 'fashion'), on whose basis judgments are made by the academic writer.

To conclude, the economic layer of meaning aims to use mainly quantitative measures to describe the globalist economic forces that were at work during the period of study. This will provide the context for the focus of the study: Japanese capital in Australia on the Gold Coast.
2. Spatial/Environmental:

As this thesis is also a study about a specific place, place uniqueness is an important subject of its analysis. As each place has different spatial, social and environmental characteristics, so the intersection and interaction of global and local forces takes different forms at whichever location is considered.

It is here that Harvey saw one of the most valuable attributes of the postmodern research paradigm in human geography: its emphasis on the local, unique place. However he cautioned against one of its features: a movement away from the consideration of the tangibles of place towards a reliance on textual deconstruction. This brings with it the danger of 'reducing knowledge and meaning to a rubble of signifiers' (Harvey, 1990: 350-1). Though Harvey agreed with Haug (1994: 68) that in the era of postmodernism, the skin, the packaging, the appearance of the object is in itself worthy of consideration and may have its own intrinsic meaning, the reality behind it should not be ignored. If this is accepted, then description becomes an important component of the study. The changes to the built-environment which have resulted from the globalist forces have to be recorded and described and this will provide the spatial template from which layers of meaning will be sought.

Description has sometimes been regarded in research as superficial, in other words, a level of engagement with the subject matter which does not reveal meanings of sufficient gravity. Peshkin (1993: 24) disagreed with this view, arguing that 'the soundness of the nondescriptive and the prescriptive aspects of research rests essentially on what has been provided by the accuracy, sensitivity and comprehension of its descriptive foundation'. The outcomes of description can give locations, dimensions, visual detail, settings, spatial relationships and systematic connections. All of these are primary realities to which other research methodologies can then be applied to reveal meanings beyond the physically tangible level. The important point at this descriptive stage of the study is to be aware of what can and needs to be described and the parameters of meaning which can justifiably be ascribed to it. For as Ledrut (1986: 120) warned, an understanding (verstehen) of place ultimately requires us to examine the field of
local experience. He discussed it in reference to the city and wrote of the importance of examining ‘the urban experience, the lived city’. To do this effectively this study has to be able to reveal another layer of meaning, namely the cultural.

3. Cultural:
This study of the interface between the global and local brings into contact different groups of people. This is a process through which a juxtapositioning, interweaving, and/or conflict of cultural values, perceptions and expectations can occur. The meanings that matter at this interface between different groups of people are situation dependent, and are an outcome of an interactive process between individuals and groups at a given time and place. Furthermore as Sedlacek noted (1989: 13), meanings are revealed in a progressive manner, with each one giving a glimpse of another meaning to follow. The sources of such meanings have to be identified and the methods through which such meanings are revealed described.

The text is the source from which meanings are derived. In the case of this study, the text takes a number of forms. One of these is the townscape, or those elements of it which relate to the research question. For as Wilson (1991: 411) argued, ‘townscapes are the templates of a sense of place out of which emerge material objects and landscapes permeated with symbolic qualities’. The research value of the townscape is derived from the fact that the meaning of such symbolic qualities can be identified from it and the nature of such symbolism revealed. Aspects of the semiotic methodology will be employed to achieve this aim. As well as symbolism, issues of scale, detail, perspective and distribution can be revealed by the townscape text.

Text can also take the written form. Here the researcher has to interrogate the text, take it apart and expose its underlying meanings, biases and preconceptions. It is also important to unravel any theories related to the text and attempt to reveal the author’s intentions inherent in the text. If the text takes the form of the spoken word, then its rhythm, sentence patterns, even silences, may help to reveal
intentions, attitudes and truths of significance in its deconstruction. In general, it is important to remember a point made by Gottdiener (1994: 198), 'texts always exist within systems of discourse, or discourse formations'. Therefore the context within which the text has been produced, its relationship to other texts (intertextuality), events, actions or tangible phenomena, becomes of crucial importance when the researcher engages with it.

The point of this epistemology is to allow the text to speak to us while at the same time recognizing that the context in which the text is located may be discovered from other sources. To quote Gadamer (1989: 301), 'they [texts], like everything else, need explication, i.e., to be understood not only in terms of what they say, but also in terms of what they bear witness to'. Livingstone (1992: 29) considered the issue of individual text and its cultural context. He wrote that we need to 'transcend the conventional distinction between text and context...what we need is a greater sense of how texts and contexts are constituted reciprocally. For defining what constitutes geography's intramural domain-the text- in part determines what composes the extramural domain- the context'. Thus in this study the cultural traits of the Japanese, as well as those of groups in the Gold Coast community with whom they interacted or who felt affected by their presence, have to be researched. For it is in the cultural contexts of these groups, the cultural baggage that they bring to the situation that the interviews, public statements, written comments being used as data are embedded and one cannot be analysed without a consideration of the other.

The semiotic paradigm is of value in this study. This is because textual deconstruction seeks to reveal different levels of meaning in a text, as well as the varied meanings that different individuals and groups attach to it. The separation of the object, idea or value, (called the 'signified'), from the meaning that can be attached to it (the 'signifier') enables such a multiperspectival approach to be implemented. The fact that Roland Barthes (1982) wrote an empirical study of the Japanese and Japanese culture through a semiotic perspective only heightens the relevance of this perspective. His book *Empire of Signs* drew the conclusion that the signifiers-signified linkage of one cultural group may be very different to the
signified to which another cultural group will link the same signifier. In other words, different people may attach different meanings to the same object or experience.

Such a semiotic epistemology can be applied to the city, and more specifically, to the architecture and design of its buildings. As Lefevbre (1996: 114) expressed it, ‘the city can be seen as a system of significations and meanings and therefore of values.’ The material objects of the urban environment are the vehicles of signification; they are the signifiers from which people read meanings. Buildings, facades, amenities, streets and vistas are the obvious examples of objects to be read; behind these lie the planning documents, design concepts, advertising material of the developers, planners, architects and real estate agents. It is important to examine these and to engage their producers to establish what they sought to signify through their work (Gottdiener & Lagopolous, 1986: 3).

Some insight into the signification of the architecture is also important to this study. This is because Japanese purchases and developments on the Gold Coast were not only a direct reflection of their financial strength, but were also influenced by their socio-cultural values. To reveal this a semiotic interpretation of architecture becomes useful. As Preziosi (1984: 182) argued, ‘architecture is a sign system for the communication of social/cultural/individual values.’ The conveying of such individual meanings through architecture and design is now increasingly seen as a marketing exercise. Harvey (1990: 287) wrote that new sign systems are frequently created through advertising to manipulate hidden desires and attach them to the product to be sold. In the case of buildings, such architectural packaging explains the frequent presence of superficial imagery and simulacra in contemporary postmodern architecture (Harvey, 1990: 289-90).

This approach gives an entry point to a consideration of the relationship between the Japanese who arrived on the Gold Coast, the mediating role of local service providers, and the projects in which they invested. It is thus an integral element of the cultural dimension of this study.
4. Political:
If written text is seen as a symbol of marginalization, or as a form of dialectic among different socio-cultural groups, then some social scientists also see it as an instrument of power. Warf (1993: 164) argued that ‘lurking behind those epistemological questions [of textual deconstruction]...is an important political one....every world view serves some political interest and not another.’ This assertion is in itself a world view and was first articulated by Michel Foucault (Young, 1970: 51) who claimed that discourses can be both an instrument and an effect of power, also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Thus in a study in which diverse groups, each with their distinctive cultural values, are central to the research question, issues of influence, power and conflict need investigation. This can be done through an analysis of relevant public statements, comments and policies. The oscillations of power inherent in the conflict seen through the texts to be studied here have to be revealed. It is hoped that this will give some indication of the place-specific power relations and the challenges (if any) to established power hegemonies that have resulted from the conflict.

In a sense this layer of meaning draws on some traditions of political geography. For even in the age of globalization that symbol of spatio-administrative cohesiveness - the government- cannot be ignored in relation to the economic forces and cultural contestation which occurs at the global-local interface. Democratic governments have their own politico-administrative culture and at the same time must respond to the needs, values and demands of groups over whom they have jurisdiction, and this in a way that minimizes conflict. This governmental imperative, this governmental agenda has to be revealed. Here there is also another aspect to the study of power, that of individuals pursuing their own agenda and individuals as agents of authorities, such as governments. For as Wilson (1991: 411) stated, ‘power is much less a reflection of impersonal universal laws, than it is of processes produced consciously by active agents. Powerful individuals are authors of their own worlds and not simply respondents to a predetermined world. Their actions, however are influenced by prevailing ideologies, roles and production relations.’ Thus pivotal individuals can be said to
have their own values and agendas. These are a product of discursive processes between themselves and others from whom they draw their legitimacy and/or justification for action, and whom they in turn seek to influence.

Therefore it is important in this study to examine the statements that were produced by various levels of government as well as the texts of individuals in pivotal positions in various economic and socio-cultural groups. The position of government and of pivotal individuals needs to be related to the research question asked. This is the final dimension of this study.
Summary

The research methodology which is used in this study aims to be reflective, multilayered and differentiated in its approach. There is a need to distance oneself from the narrative to gain some insight into how a given epistemology ‘works’ and what the principles are by which judgments have been or to be made. This is important because the actual multilayered and differentiated methodology according to which the study design has been developed is not the outcome of an inevitable, objective epistemology arising from the contours of the chosen research area, but is an outcome of a lengthy process of engagement with given issues out of which specific research questions have been formulated, which in turn led to the research design set out in this chapter. Thus the ‘fundamental questions’ did not arise in an a priori manner, but appropriate theoretical issues are an outcome of observation, data collection and preliminary analysis, as well as engagement with the texts of relevant academic social theory.

The progress of the actual study will lead to the continuous refinement and elaboration of the initial research questions, as well as the modification, reevaluation and development of theory relevant to it. This project sees itself in a social science culture in which research is a continuing activity, a search for the revelation of different levels and types of truths. This methodology leads to the appearance of one set of answers to the research questions, to be followed by a refinement of the original question, which in turn leads to the revelation of new answers of greater ontological depth, and so the process continues. For as Jackel (1994: 396) argued, such a process can lead to large conclusions being drawn from ‘densely textured, local facts’.

To conclude, there is one very important point of continuity within social science research which must be stated again: the need for logical coherence. The choice of a diverse, pragmatic research methodology for the reasons that this chapter has tried to explain, has to be developed in such a way that the logical coherence of the study is unimpaired. In fact, the very application of one approach has to be seen to be logically related to that of another. Thus epistemological and
methodological diversity within a research study gives great flexibility in the
collection of material and in the nature of its presentation, but its logical coherence
becomes as important as ever it was in the tradition of social research. This is the
fundamental methodological paradigm exemplified in this study.
Globalization and Capital: Japan and the Gold Coast

For reasons already discussed in the Literature Review, in the 1980s globalization accelerated and penetrated ever more groups in society, and sectors of the economy and integrated more and more regions and places into its networks, structures and cultural processes and images. One of the factors which facilitated globalization is that money is fungible, that is, one unit may be converted to another. With the deregulation of international financial transactions monetary fungibility was greatly facilitated. This was seen in the rapid rise of capital flows to most regions of the world from the centres of accumulated capital (Hanink, 1994: 203-43). An increasing proportion of this was speculative and the economist Susan Strange (1994: 57-59) went as far as saying that this had converted the world to a 'casino economy'. The role of the United States and Japan was pivotal in this process. The developments and decisions that happened in those countries created the macro-economic and political setting for such large financial flows and provided the economic if not cultural framework for the arrival of large amounts of Japanese investment capital on the Gold Coast.

The situation of Japan is most directly relevant. Leyshon (1994: 128-134) argued that two processes are important here as an explanation of the rise of Japanese capital flows in the second half of the 1980s. The first is the dramatic success of the financial system created by the Japanese after 1945. This harnessed domestic funds and channelled them into industrial production so as to achieve rapid production growth and technological modernization. By the early 1980s this had translated into a sustained export boom and rising trade surpluses, especially with the United States. At the same time as Japanese exporters were amassing rising wealth from the increasingly free flow of global commodity trade, Leyshon argued, they sought to insulate their financial system from global processes and manipulated the exchange rate of the yen to maintain it against the US dollar at levels much below that which their relative commercial success warranted. The second process is one which Leyshon called ‘the Geo-economic Offensive’ of the
United States Government against Japan in the first half of the 1980s. This led to the reduction in the role of structural regulation in Japanese financial markets and their greater integration into world financial systems, or in effect, their progressive globalization (Furuta, 1987: 53-5) This culminated in what economists and politicians have since referred to as the 'Plaza Accords' of September 1985. Under these accords the United States sought and achieved an agreed reduction of the value of the US dollar against the yen through governmental manipulation of global currency markets.

The impact of the Plaza Accords was spectacular: in July 1985 the exchange rate of the yen: US dollar was 242:1, by April 1986 it was 171:1 and by January 1988, 123:1 (Itoh, 1990: 176). Similar rises in the value of the yen against other deregulated currencies, such as the Australian dollar, were recorded during this period. These changes had significant effects on investment relativities within Japan as well as Japanese perceptions of their wealth and investment opportunities outside their country; this in turn led to large amounts of their capital entering economies very different from their own (Furuta, 1987: 53-55). It is to these issues and their concomitant outcomes that this chapter will now turn.

**Japan’s 1980s Economic Boom**

The forces within Japan which led to the spectacular economic boom have been chronicled by many economic texts produced both by writers within Japan (for example Inomata, 1987) and by those from other countries. The foreign observers tended to emphasize ‘longer-term, underlying trends’, whereas the Japanese and those foreigners there at the time, wrote of the unique, spectacular nature of the phenomenon and sought explanations in the peculiarity of values, resources and expectations which coalesced in Japan in the late 1980s. Thus David Clark (1988: 42) an Australian economist, wrote that the origins of the boom were to be found in the high Japanese saving rate, Japan’s huge trade and current account surpluses, and the fact that during this period both inflation and interest rates were considerably lower in Japan than in comparable Western economies. Leyshon (1994: 132) argued that an explanation should be sought in the deregulatory
measures of Japan’s financial market that led to a competitive reduction of bank lending rates as Japanese banks were forced to compete against each other and against the US banks who were now able to enter the Japanese market. The result was an explosion of credit which made ‘for a heady and potent brew’. Christopher Wood (1992: 2) the Tokyo correspondent at the time of the consistently pro-deregulation, pro-globalization journal. *The Economist*, in retrospect penned the following comment on this issue: ‘In the second half of the 1980s Japan was involved in the biggest financial mania of this century...a speculative boom fueled on cheap and supereasy credit’. Commenting in retrospect, Daly and Logan (1998: 123) observed that ‘Japanese banks lent wholly on the expectation that growth would cover everything’.

Japanese writers commented that ‘Land prices in Tokyo are soaring to stratospheric heights’ (Takeuchi, 1987: 36), far in excess of the growth rate of the ‘real economy’. Noguchi (1994: 291) wrote of ‘Japan’s extraordinary 1980s, the age of the bubble. The fluctuations of the Tokyo stock exchange were a good symbol of the bubble economy. On the 29 December 1989 the Nikkei share price index peaked at 40,000, before the bubble burst; by March 1990 it had fallen through the 30,000 barrier, and it kept falling until it bottomed at 14,000 (*The Australian* 2 December 1995). At the same time some foreign Japan scholars pointed to the contrast between the dramatic increase in wealth and investment in leisure amenities and the long working hours of the people. ‘The first paradox is that the massive increase in physical amenities (such as golf courses) is not accompanied by any increase in the time available for people to enjoy them’ (McCormack, 1991a: 122).

Statistics are an indicator of the economic truths behind this rise in Japanese wealth. Three indices of economic trends in Japan shown in Table 3.0 are: the value of Japan’s Gross domestic Product (GDP); the total value of shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the total residential land value in Tokyo.
A number of arithmetic calculations can be made from Table 3.0. Between 1981 and 1991 Japan's GDP increased by 75.1%, the value of shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased by 360.5%, and the value of Tokyo residential land rose by 293.8%. Note the date of the afore mentioned Plaza Accords of September 1985 in relation to a comparison of the percentage increases in 1984-85 and 1985-86: GDP - 6.2% and 4.3%; Share values - 22.4% and 36.1%; Land - 18.1% and 59.1%. Another statistic should also be considered in relation to the above: the Standard Lending Rate in Japan which between 1980 and 1988 fell in an uninterrupted manner from 7.50% in 1980 to 3.375% in 1988 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1992). This made borrowing increasingly cheaper as the decade progressed.

The significance of the boom in shares and land values arose out of their use as collateral in borrowing for overseas purchases and developments. As the value of this collateral in Japan rose, so did the ease with which banks would lend, as well as the amount that they were willing to advance for projects outside the country. So in effect a lot of money was being lent on theoretical values (The Nikkei Weekly, 25 March 1996). The relatively low and declining level of interest rates further encouraged borrowers to throw caution to the wind and borrow on the basis of very small equity in their given projects. As Douglass (1987: 33) in his

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**Table 3.0 Indices of the Japanese Economy (1981-91)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (¥ trillion)</th>
<th>Asset Shares (¥ trillion)</th>
<th>Value: Land (¥ trillion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

study of transnational capital and Japan commented, in the 1980s Japanese investors into land and property seemed to lose all sense of the relationship between the size of an investment and likely returns from it, both in the short or long term.

The Value placed on Land in Japan:

The value placed on land in Japan, and land as a form of investment in Japan needs more detailed elaboration. For the Japanese investors brought this cultural baggage with them to the locations outside Japan where they contemplated making an investment.

A number of writers have argued that the Japanese relationship to land is tinged with feudal characteristics, that is, land is not just an investment judged in economic terms, but is also seen as bestowing power and status, and is considered the ultimate security (Wood, 1992: 49; JETRO, 1998: 5). Such economic relativities are of course also produced by the fact that in Japan the population-land ratio has always been by Western standards, even in comparison with European countries such as Germany and France, unfavourable. McCormack (1991a: 121-34) in his essay ‘The Price of Affluence: The Political Economy of Japanese Leisure’, argued that Japan appeared to have a dual currency system, the yen on the one hand, and the ‘land currency’ or doka on the other. Thus the use of land as collateral for loans is widely used (compared with Australia where potential returns on assets are used).

Faith in this land-based system was strengthened by the uninterrupted land-price inflation experienced in Japan since 1960. The result has been very high land values in Japan, especially in the major urban agglomerations such as Tokyo. Flüchter and Wijers (1990: 203) in their study of land values in Tokyo found that the average price of residential land in the metropolitan region increased from DM3650 ($A3300) per square metre at the beginning of 1986 to DM6600 ($A6000) per square metre two years later. A recent article in the journal Japan Focus (JETRO, 2000: 4) quoted the rentals charged for space in the A-grade office
building Ark Mori Building in Tokyo as having risen from Y10,000 ($A145) per square metre per year in January 1986, to Y18,000 ($A265) per square metre per year in January 1989. The rise of Tokyo as a global financial centre made it an extreme case in Japan. However behind these figures were also the speculative excesses of the Japanese bubble economy that had inflated the basic pressure on land in Japan.

A research project conducted by the economists Peter Boone and Jeffrey Sachs (1989: 2) at Harvard University into the evolution of Tokyo land values compiled comparative statistics on the relationship between the size of the gross national product and total land value in a number of countries, including Australia, USA and Japan. They calculated the figure for Australia to be 0.56, for the USA- 0.98, and for Japan 2.88. An analysis of this bivariate relationship between land and gross national product shows that in the case of Australia the value of all land is little more than half that of the gross national product, in the USA the value of all land is about the same as the gross national product, whereas in the case of Japan, the value of its land is nearly three times that of its gross national product. Such relativities provide a clue as to Japanese perceptions of land values when they arrived in the USA or Australia.

For reasons already mentioned, the 1980s became a period of unprecedented affluence and increased leisure in Japan and this gave a specific dimension to the issue of the national land market and the spatial, economic and cultural meanings ascribed to it. Apart from general land speculation, this affluence and increased leisure was also transposed into the land market through the proliferation of resort projects, especially those based around a golf course. The Government in Tokyo facilitated this through the Comprehensive Resort Region Provision Law of 1987. McCormack (1996: 87-9) interpreted the intent of this ‘Resort Law’ to be as much about political patronage for well-connected developers as for the ostensible aim of furthering the development of peripheral regions of Japan and providing more diverse recreational facilities for the population. Quoting a range of Japanese Government reports and academic sources, McCormack estimated that by
September 1989, 19.2% of the entire land area of Japan was involved, 646 projects had reached the ‘works’ stage by then, and with a further 205 at the planning level.

In this process the cultural symbolism of golf in Japan needs to be examined. The game derived its status from being the exclusive preserve of the American occupation personnel in the late 1940s, and from here it was transposed to become a key sign of success in Japanese business culture. Golf club memberships were highly prized and in the Boom of the 80s were traded like shares on the stock exchange (Rimmer, 1992). In the exclusive clubs outside Tokyo and Osaka their value reached anything between half- to one million dollars per membership, and the number of courses in Japan increased from 1325 in 1980 to 1876 in 1990. ‘All anybody had to do was announce plans to start a golf club, sell memberships, use the money raised to buy land and build the club and then have the remaining money to speculate’ (The Nikkei Weekly, 20 May 1996). This speculation increasingly took the form of attempting to repeat the process of golf resort investment outside Japan. Thus the ownership or development of a golf course resort was seen as one of the images of investment success which an increasing number of Japanese companies had when they cast their eyes outside their own country. At the same time, the individual Japanese investors and tourists fancied themselves becoming consumers of the golf course resort as ‘cultural product’ in other countries to an extend most of them could not afford to do at home in Japan. The scale of this process is shown by the characteristics of Japanese foreign investment during this Boom.

Japanese Foreign Investment flows in the 1980s Boom

The revaluation of the yen in September 1985 against other currencies in the Developed World gave the Japanese a much greater sense of their relative wealth. This was quickly reflected in the increase in the flow of tourists to foreign destinations. Business interests at the potential destinations of Japanese tourists quickly saw this as a veritable income ‘honey pot’. The property report published by the estate agency of Max Christmas (1987: 17) on the Gold Coast included an ecstatic item in which it claimed that the 4 million Japanese traveling overseas in
1987 would rise to 15 million by 1995 and that Australia had the potential to receive 40% of these, 6 million. The average Japanese visitor spends $3,000, therefore Australia could earn $18 billion per annum. The Gold Coast on average gets 30% of Japanese visitors, so nearly $6 billion would flow there. In retrospect the euphoria was somewhat exaggerated, but the rise in the number of Japanese visitors to the Gold Coast during the late 80s was quite substantial: Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation statistics put it at 24,320 in 1986, rising to 135,572 in 1988 and 153,091 in 1989 (the year in which the ten-week pilots strike occurred). Another relevant point is that Japanese tourists have been seen as the best spenders of money: 1986 figures from the Queensland Tourism and Travel Corporation quoted by the Gold Coast Mayor, Dennis Pie show that daily spending on the Gold Coast, excluding that for accommodation, was $47, - for the Australian visitor, but $155, - per day for a Japanese (GCB, 13 February 1988).

Greater familiarity with foreign locations in turn reinforced the realization of the strength of their currency, and the relative cheapness of goods and assets in other countries. This led to high levels of tourist spending and encouraged the Japanese capitalist to consider investment in tourist facilities to provide increased amenities of a type they deemed their fellow Japanese nationals to want (Forsyth & Dwyer, 1992; Daly, Stimson & Geraghty, 1992). New circuits of capital linking Japan to major economic regions of the world developed, especially to points around the Pacific Basin. Locations previously only lightly touched by the forces of globalization were increasingly exposed to the dynamics determining capital flows in distant Japan. Statistics gathered by Matsui from Ministry of Finance sources in Tokyo attest to dramatic increase in these Japanese capital flows (Table 3.1). The statistics are of direct foreign investment and excludes portfolio investment from Japan.
Table 3.1 Japanese foreign investment to all overseas countries ($US million) (1951-93)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Investment ($US million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-79 (incl.)</td>
<td>31,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-</td>
<td>4,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-</td>
<td>8,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-</td>
<td>7,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-</td>
<td>8,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-</td>
<td>10,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-</td>
<td>12,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-</td>
<td>22,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-</td>
<td>33,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-</td>
<td>47,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-</td>
<td>67,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-</td>
<td>56,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-</td>
<td>41,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-</td>
<td>34,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-</td>
<td>36,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Matsui (1996) p.42

The total Japanese direct foreign investment for the whole 42 year period (1951-93) was $US422,555 million, of which more than half or 53.8% flowed out of Japan during the five years between 1986 and 1990. During this five-year period the United States received 45.9% of all Japanese direct foreign investment with the major concentrations of it in the states of Hawaii, New York and California (Warf, 1988; Howenstine, 1989; Sakai, 1989). Though Japanese investment into manufacturing in the United States was also significant, using statistics from 31 December 1987 (the middle of the boom cycle of Japanese investment), Howenstine (1989: 127) found that the Japanese were already the largest foreign owners of urban real estate in California and Hawaii and the second largest in New York State.
In this context it is significant that during the late 1980s the *Gold Coast Bulletin* provided a regular coverage of Japanese investment issues in Hawaii. An article on 18 May 1988 quoted estimates of Japanese investment flows to Hawaii since the beginning of 1986 as being $6.5 billion. This was followed by descriptions of three major hotel, golf course resort and commercial office projects which Japanese capital was developing. Subsequent headlines in three different issues referred to the fears that such a large Japanese financial presence apparently engendered in Hawaii- ‘A Promised Land?’, ‘A political hubbub in Hawaii over Japanese investment’, ‘Japanese Investment Alarms Residents’. The analogy between the Gold Coast and Hawaii was also perceived to exist in the national press. Paul Coombes writing in the business journal *Rydges* (1986: 6) commented, ‘Japanese developers are looking at the Coast to create a Japanese environment with the space to leave bonsai behind. A second Hawaii is not out of the question’.

The above point is an example of the strength of the forces of globalization: how the instant transfer of information and images can lead to the media exploiting potential interest, empathy and identification with the ‘distant’ place (in this case Hawaii). A similar development which becomes an issue at places locationally distant from each other can act as a means of changing local awareness to global consciousness and so create unified spaces of meaning over long distances. In this case, the Gold Coast community became aware of the fact that another place with similar environmental and economic attributes was experiencing a wave of foreign investment at a scale which made it a local community ‘issue’. It is interesting to speculate on the extent that instant transmission of information about an issue at one location in turn leads to the recreation of the same issue at another.

**Japanese Investment in Australian Real Estate:**

The definitive study of the earlier phases of Japanese investment in Australia is that by Edgington (1990). He considered the period 1957-85 and in a book of 294 pages devoted only two and a half pages to Japanese investment in urban real estate (pp.70-72). He cited the figure of $A 2,018 million as the sum total of
direct Japanese investment in Australia on the 30 June 1984, and showed that in
the preceding five years only 6.1% of this was invested in real estate (1990: 5 &
69). Another study, edited by Adrian in 1984, showed the Japanese investor
having a similarly minor role (1984: 182-83). Thus until the mid-1980s the role of
Japanese capital in Australian property was statistically quite insignificant.
Hajdu's (1994: 249-254) study discovered that this changed from then on. His
study of foreign owned real estate in the CBD of Sydney and Melbourne showed
the contrast between the early 1970s and the late 80s in the extent of Japanese­
owned quantifiable ‘bricks and mortar’ in these two city centres: in 1973 a search
of property titles identified one Japanese-owned building in both CBDs; the 1988
data used as comparison identified 33 in Sydney and 43 in Melbourne, though in
the latter city centre, one large Japanese -funded office-retail project encompassed
a whole city block and involved the amalgamation of 27 small property titles.

The impact of this rising flow of Japanese investment into city centre real estate
was becoming a factor in urban change. It is reflected in the annual statistics
published by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) of Treasury in
Canberra (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Total Investment associated with Proposals approved by the
Foreign Investment Review Board ($A million)( 1983 to 1993-4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total foreign investment</th>
<th>Total foreign investment in real estate (a)</th>
<th>Japan investment in real estate (b)</th>
<th>(b) as a % of (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>9,818</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>18,464</td>
<td>5,193</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>24,849</td>
<td>11,804</td>
<td>4,488</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>32,023</td>
<td>19,763</td>
<td>8,443</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>24,105</td>
<td>14,382</td>
<td>7,195</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>20,241</td>
<td>7,507</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>15,819</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>24,001</td>
<td>7,514</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>23,467</td>
<td>14,996</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of the Treasury: Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB),
Annual Reports.
The FIRB’s role is to investigate and advise the Australian Government on the purchase of Australian assets by foreigners or on development proposals. This it does according to the provisions of the Foreign Takeovers Act 1975-89. Hence its figures are restricted to proposals which have to be referred to it under this Act. In the case of commercial property and tourism assets, if the property was valued at under $2 million, then no referral was required. In the case of residential real estate the figure was $350,000. On 29 October 1985, these benchmarks for compulsory referral to the FIRB were increased to $5 million and $600,000 respectively (FIRB, Report 1993-94: 45). The deduction can be made from this that the statistics presented in Table 3.2 are likely to be conservative. At the same time a comment by Berry (1994: 145) should also be noted; in his study of Japanese property development in Australia he wrote that ‘most’ foreign capital flowing into the Australian real estate sector is earmarked for development rather than the acquisition of fully developed properties. Furthermore, even though Japanese (and New Zealander) purchases of existing houses and units at places such as the Gold Coast during the 1980s was quite extensive, the capital involved in this could be quickly counterbalanced by a small number of large commercial property takeovers and development projects, with the latter types appearing in FIRB data.

Quite irrespective of these caveats, a number of points become apparent from Table 3.2. The general surge of foreign investment into Australia during the late 1980s and early 90s was one in which the increase of investment into property and tourism projects played a considerable part. At the beginning of the period (1983-84) for which statistics have been presented, the role of property investment as a part of total foreign investment was about one-sixth; however if one looks at the three years which formed the peak of this cycle (1987-90), the proportion rises to nearly two-thirds. Within this surge of foreign capital into Australian property was contained the Japanese investor; not only is investment capital from Japan seen to be a very important component of the total, but its proportion was highest at the peak of the boom, and relatively speaking declined much more rapidly than the decrease in the total volume of capital flowing into property and tourism projects. This means that the wave of Japanese investment was more sudden in its
arrival, steeper in its growth, quicker in reaching its peak, and more precipitate in its decline than total foreign investment (column two), or even total investment in real estate from all foreign sources (column three). The tightening of credit by Japanese banks and the onset of recession are reflected in the spectacular ebb of capital flows from that source (1992-1994 statistics).

Thus the surge of Japanese property investment in the late 1980s can be interpreted as having made a substantial contribution to the sense of euphoria in Australia about the boom in general and awe, if not fear, about the scale of Japanese wealth and financial power in particular. ‘Australia: Japan South,’ (Time, 14 September 1987), ‘The New Asian Invasion,’ (Bulletin, 29 September 1987), ‘Japanese snap up Australian offering’, and ‘Japanese Takeaway’ (Business Review Weekly, 10 July 1987; 31 March 1988), were just three headlines at the time. The sense that the Japanese and their money were ‘everywhere’ could be read into it and so, such headlines responded to, and encouraged a mood of unease, if not suspicion that Australia was entering a new phase of its history in which it appeared to be increasingly woven into international networks, be the object of ‘foreign forces’ and so suffer from that ill-defined process, a national ‘loss of control’.

However when one actually read these articles, it became apparent that the presence of the Japanese investor was largely confined to specific locations: central Sydney and parts of the North Shore, the Gold Coast, Cairns, with some, but fewer of them in central Melbourne and Brisbane, as well as the Perth region. What the journalists headlines were depicting as an Australia-wide phenomenon was in fact quite location specific. This was also revealed by evaluations coming from the property industry and academic researchers (Pollock, 1990; Seek, 1990; Hajdu, 1993).

Therefore the very choice of the case study arose out of the location-specific nature of Japanese investment flows, and hence determined the formulation of the research questions. For it was the Gold Coast which was the important location of Japanese investment in Australia, and it was there that Japanese/globalizing
capital met the local community, fed the economy, and played an important role in restructuring the urban environment and impacted on the perceptual space of many of its people.

The Gold Coast Economy and the Meaning of Japanese Investment

If the national print media contributed to, and sought to reflect a certain Zeitgeist or contemporary mood regarding Australia and globalization during the late 80s Boom, then that process was particularly apparent as far as the Gold Coast was concerned.

Relatively restrained leaders such as ‘Foreign investors poised for buying spree’ (The Australian, 13 January 1990), ‘All set for growth on Coast as demand, prices hot up’ (The Australian, 14 January 1989), and ‘Foreign Led Recovery’ (HTW Property Report, May 1987), were matched by others that were more sensationalistic. For example, ‘Japanese Swoop’ (BRW, 27 March 1991), ‘The sun also rises on the Gold Coast’ (The Australian, 8 August 1987), ‘Japanese investment “crazy”’ (The Australian, 15 October 1988), ‘Japanese dictate Gold Coast destiny’ (The Australian, 1 December 1990), and “Hostage of Japan” (Australian Business, 13 February 1991). Another type dealt with more specific topics and read: ‘The Japanese buy a funpark- Surfers’ (The National Times on Sunday, 21 February 1988), ‘Resorts depend on foreign finance’ (The Australian, 2 December 1989), and ‘A Yen for Golf: Keepers of the green’ (The Age-Good Weekend, 25 November 1989).

A number of meanings can be deduced from such journalistic headlines. Firstly, the newspapers and magazines all have national or statewide circulations, text from the local Gold Coast press has been purposely excluded from the argument at this point. Hence, to have warranted coverage the issue of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast was deemed to have been of national interest and importance. Secondly, the terminology used portrayed feelings of uncontrolled frenzy on the part of the Japanese of a kind which the Australian reader was perceived to have
difficulty comprehending. The aura of some kind of ‘threat’ was possibly implied by this. Thirdly, words and phrases such as ‘hostage to Japan, ‘the sun also rises...’, ‘keepers of the green’ appeared to be deliberately phrased to imply more than just ‘buying’ something as being limited to a commercial transaction involving a specific asset at a specific location. The aura of ‘buying’ as meaning ‘national takeover’ ‘conquest’ ‘control’ appeared to be inherent in the language. Again perhaps the reader was being encouraged to have an image of some kind of new force entering Australia, a force of a kind not seen before and its presence, increasing control, having consequences new to the Australian experience. Even if one does not go as far as reading the idea of ‘conquest’ into these texts, at least the thought of ‘dependence on inscrutable outsider’ is definitely there.

These meanings were not being conveyed in a way as to imply that Australia was somehow being increasingly integrated into a globalized web, but very much in terms of a national ‘us’ versus ‘them’, with them coming to buy control of us. Any sense that globalization may be making the national unit less meaningful was completely absent from these journalistic texts. The national/tribal frameworks of thought and feeling appeared to be very much the benchmarks against which the issue of Japanese investment was being constructed. It is interesting to conjecture the role of the specific word ‘Japanese’. Would words such as ‘British, ‘American’ or even ‘Malaysian’ or ‘Indonesian’ have been couched in similar semantics to produce such headlines? Did World War Two still produce a given habitus, a given propensity to feel and respond in a certain way?

The meaning of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast may have been controversial and perceived to be fraught with many problems. This implies an unswerving faith in the accuracy of every statistic, but what exactly statistical measures of investment represent has to be considered. The response to this seems to be similarly perceptual, that is, it depends on who is asked and what is meant by the figures so revealed. Foreign investment statistics in Australia have only been compiled at the national and State level, more location-specific aggregates are not available from government sources. For Gold Coast totals reliance has to be placed on the real estate/property industry itself. Here a number
of totals within a reasonably small range can be collected to give a general sense of the volume of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast. In September 1987, the Gold Coast real estate firm PRD Realty was requested by the Australian office of *Time* ‘to put a figure on it’ and its response was, $3A billion (*Time*, 14 September 1987). A report quoted in October 1988 from Halifax KK, the Japanese affiliate of the property consultant Colliers International, estimated it at between $A4.0 and 4.2 billion (*The Gold Coast Mail*, 22 October 1988). Paul Randell, Queensland Managing-Director of the Baillieu Knight Frank (BKF) put a figure of $A4.7 billion Japanese investment on the Gold Coast. This was reported by both the local and national press in March 1990 (*GCB*, 28 March 1990; *The Australian*, 31 March 1990).

However one general point can be made immediately about the above figures: even in relation to Honolulu and Los Angeles, the Gold Coast totals show that it witnessed the arrival of a very large amount of Japanese capital over a short period of time. There is also a second point to note: they form a pattern; there is a chronology to them and the lowest figure is the earliest and the highest figures is the latest. Hence they reflected cursors in the continuous flow of Japanese capital to the Gold Coast during this period. The closing months of 1987 saw an acceleration in the surge of investment, only to peak about a year later and then start to ebb in an uneven, discontinuous manner (Table 3.2). As a general point though, it made the Gold Coast the recipient of about forty per cent of all Japanese investment into Australian real estate.

However the question needs to be asked: What did this investment signify? Because there are an array of gradations as to the timing and extent to which a sum purportedly invested at a given place actually has entered, or will enter the local capital circuit. Money used to purchase land or property is transferred at time of purchase or within a designated period of time. This period of time is usually quite short. The only variation on this is when the investor is given an option over a property in exchange for a bond or deposit. However this acts as a delaying-mechanism in the sale process and is therefore very rare during a boom period in the property market, that is, a period in which the vendor is in the advantageous
position. The granting of long-term options to buy was a rare occurrence with the purchases made by the Japanese on the Gold Coast. Thus the total Japanese capital inflow figures contained such a direct purchase component that can be said to be reasonably reliable.

There is however another component which is less reliable, that which consists of investment in projects to be built. Here there is a development sequence of market research, decision-making, planning, construction and sale. In large projects, the construction phase is frequently done in stages so that the response of the market to the project can be assessed on a continuing basis and the capital being invested adjusted to it. With both the Halifax KK and the BKF figure developments ‘planned’, ‘projected’, ‘committed,’ and ‘under construction’ are included. Hence at the time when the total investment figure was calculated, there is the full continuum of large sums of capital having already been spent, or being spent, to only a minor proportion of the total expenditure on a project having being spent. One example could be that only architects fees have actually been paid, within a general decision to spend, but with nothing having actually been spent on construction. BKF itemized a number of large projects proposed for Surfers Paradise, and viewed in retrospect, some of them did not get beyond the purchase of site stage (GCB, 28 March 1990).

However media publicity ensured that these total Gold Coast Japanese investment figures entered the public domain and so contributed to the perception of immense Japanese financial strength and ‘what it might do’ to the Gold Coast. For Japanese capital entered the local economy of the Gold Coast as a globalizing force and as Ries (1990) commented, ‘on the Gold Coast holiday apartment prices once were linked to the pocketbooks (or sump-sum super pay-outs) of upper middle class Australians, but now are linked to Japanese incomes, savings patterns and the propensity of Japanese banks to lend’. However these global forces were seen to impact upon a local economy with a its own dynamic, one traditionally forged by local and to a lesser extent national conditions.
The Gold Coast economy has been from the beginning a post-industrial one. The city evolved very much during the phase of increased car ownership, air travel, affluence and leisure (Hajdu, 1993: 41-42). In 1961 its population was 39,043, which by 1981 had quadrupled to 177,264 in the following decade it increased again by 70.1% to reach 301,559 at the 1991 Census. Its subtropical climate and long, sandy beaches have been its main resource and its urban morphology reflects this. The urban area could be characterized as being typical of a coastal resort city (Pigram, 1977: 525-41): a core commercial/tourist zone at Surfers Paradise elongated along the coastline, with residential areas of decreasing density with increasing distance from the coastline and punctuated by nodes of retailing and tourist accommodation at given locations north and south of its core. Its economy has been dominated by the provision of amenities and services for the visitor and the actual process of its continuing and rapid development as a centre of tourism as well as for retirees. This rapid rate of urban growth has given the construction and property industries a pivotal role.

The Gold Coast is very much a product of Harvey’s (1989:191) secondary circuit of capital in which credit is used to invest in the built environment. The physical fabric of the city is thus created, destroyed and recreated by chronological cycles of investment and disinvestment. Figure 3.0 shows the cyclic nature of the Gold Coast property market in sharp relief; sudden surges in sales and values form three-four year long periods of a ‘Boom’, which ends abruptly with a collapse, during which a third to two-thirds of boom time values can be wiped off property in two economic quarters; this is then followed by the six to eight year ‘Bust’ where values and sales oscillate at generally much lower levels. These cycles appear to substantiate Harvey’s view that instability is inherent to capitalism. Also, as discussed in Chapter One, property cycle theorists would analyse a graph such as Figure 3.0 in the following way: long lead times for large construction projects, very high profits at the beginning of the boom, the greed and inexperience of the new investor, ill-informed and badly-timed judgments by lending institutions, unrealistic expectations created by the property intermediaries, such as estate agents, the result: an eventual bust.
FIGURE 3.0  GOLD COAST CITY
NUMBER OF SALES AND AVERAGE PRICE
ALL SETTLED SALES 1967 TO 1994

NUMBER OF SALES ('000)  AVERAGE PRICE ($'000)

%CHANGE IN AVERAGE PRICE
1967 TO 1994 = +19.93% P.A.

PREPARED BY PRD REALTY RESEARCH SERVICES
SOURCE: GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
AS AT SEPTEMBER 1994
Interviews with, for example, Lyn Ginns of Max Christmas Pty. Ltd. (21 September 1988), Coleen Coyne of PRD Realty (1 October 1990) and Dan McVay (21 October 1994) of Richard Ellis International revealed that the property cycle with its extremities of sudden wealth followed by the prospect of bankruptcy is accepted with a general sense of fatalism—‘the Gold Coast has always been like this’, ‘there is a need to learn to ride the ups-and downs of the market here’, were some of the comments made. The quarterly reports of the large Gold Coast property consultant/land valuer, Rider Hunt, have a feature page which contains graphs of the cycle of building approvals and commencements with the appropriate comments on the stage of the cycle the city is at the time of publication. Rider Hunt’s competitor, Herron Todd White is quoted regularly in the Gold Coast Bulletin on the state of the property market in relation to the property graph template (for example, GCB 30 July 1993). To have ‘learnt to ride’ the property cycle on the Gold Coast seems to have enabled an individual to achieve a higher degree of ‘philosophical wisdom’. Alexander McRobbie (1988:256) a Gold Coast historian and journalist, commented in his book about the city’s development as follows:

Almost everyone who became involved in the development of Surfers Paradise experienced one or more financial disasters; I think it was Keith Williams (a 1950s/60s developer) who said that if you didn’t have one or more losing projects on your record in Surfers Paradise then you hadn’t given it a go.

This point is made about the Gold Coast even by the literary semioticist Ruth Barcan (1993:205): ‘...boom and bust ...is built into the region’s economic base and semiotic identity’. In other words, the very image of the Gold Coast signified the idea of the wildly-fluctuating economy. A newspaper interview with Geoff Burchill, Director of Burchill, Bate, Parker & Partners Pty. Ltd., developer and consulting engineer, featured a stylized version of the Gold Coast property cycle and set to explaining how to ‘ride’ it without ‘falling off’ (Fig.3.1). ‘It’s important for project initiators and lenders to get together and watch things closely. They can then put the brakes on if necessary’; then follows a comment about those
intangible, distant institutions, the banks, ‘but ultimately the banks are the people who strangle the market to an undersupply situation or open the floodgates so we have an oversupply’ (GCB, 18 December 1993).

The role ascribed to the Japanese investors by Burchill is revealing; the annotations on his graph show that he considered the arrival of the Japanese investors as having led to the late 80s Boom reaching the record heights which it did (Fig. 3.1).

Thus the assumption that the Gold Coast economy was prone to great cyclic fluctuations was a constant in the thinking of the members of the real estate industry (perhaps sustaining, if not justifying in their eyes a ‘get rich quick’ mentality). This was a mentality which was very different from that with which the Japanese arrived on the Gold Coast. As Sir Sydney Schubert the Australian Executive Director of the Daikyo Corporation, the largest Japanese investor on the Gold Coast commented in an interview (15 April 1994): ‘They (ie., Japanese) had no experience of property booms and busts when they came down here. They saw land as good as gold. I mean they thought it was cheap by their standards’.

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese investor came from an economy in which the value of land and property had experienced a steady rise for over a generation, reaching particularly high levels in the late 1980s. It was also an economy in which there was a great shortage of land, and so Japan had a land and property market of very high prices and limited access. As employee A of a Surfers Paradise property consulting firm commented (21 October 1994), the Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast had only one skill: buying in a rising market, that is, one in which time is the essence and the imperative is to buy quickly before the price goes up. In the same interview he said in a similar vein, ‘the Japanese are culturally incapable of handling their recession and are no help with ours’. These perceptions were exacerbated by the fact that Japanese business culture has no tradition of bargaining, whereas that of the Gold Coast property market is based on it. A number of examples were quoted in various interviews of projects which the Japanese investor had predicated on the premise of uninterrupted increases in
tourist flows, or capital gains, or levels of rent. When these did not eventuate the cost-income basis of their project did not add up, and as they had usually paid the initial price quoted to them for the site or building, the figures were, from their point of view, particularly ‘bad’.

So the Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast had no perception of an economic phenomenon like a property cycle, particularly one as pronounced as that on the Gold Coast. Furthermore, as the Chief Research Manager of the Gold Coast Regional Development Committee commented (12 April 1994), it was obviously not in the interest of many of the Gold Coast intermediaries to make them aware of it. A Japanese property management consultant with somewhat longer experience of the Gold Coast economy said that he had told a number of key investors to plan their investment with greater sensitivity to the local market. For example, he claimed to have cautioned them against the financial foolhardiness of insisting on the completion of all the luxurious facilities of a golf course and hotel, before the commencement of the residential component of the resort. For it is the latter which creates the quick cash flow during a property boom. Another instance mentioned, referred to the advisability of developing a proposed high-rise luxury residential project as two interconnected buildings so that they can be placed on the market in a staggered way in response to market demand. However this particular Japanese company president wanted one structure, so that he would have the tallest building on the Gold Coast.

The word ‘hubris’ was used in reference to the Japanese in the late 1980s by more than one person interviewed on the Gold Coast. Such comments were made in reference to the speed and headiness with which they made major decisions to buy. The Japanese felt that ‘whatever price they paid, they could not go wrong’. What is equally revealing is that at the time, many Australian observers seemed to subscribe to the appropriateness of the Japanese market behaviour and were in fact in awe of their commercial acumen and business culture. In 1993 Daly at the Institute of Australian Geographers Congress in Melbourne, attempted to conjure up the perception of Japanese commercial behaviour in Australia in the late 1980s. He described a view of the Japanese which was characterized by opinions such as
THE Gold Coast property cycle is running true to form, says consulting engineer Geoff Burchill. He says the cycle is on an upswing and has reached a point that is comparable with late 1986 or early 1987 in the previous seven-year cycle.

"The difference this time is that it's not the Japanese that are causing the upswing. "The activity is coming from a multitude of buyers, ranging from people from Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan through to a lot of southerners."

Mr Burchill, of Bundall-based Burchill Bate Parker and Partners, says the upswing should run to 1995 and says it is crucial the Gold Coast does not have a short, sharp boom.

"It's important for project initiators and lenders to get together and watch things closely. "They can then put the brakes on if necessary."

Mr Burchill says development on the Gold Coast has been 'steady' compared with Brisbane and the Sunshine Coast.

"In fact, we're undersupplied in developed stock compared with them. "We've got a severe catch-up period ahead."

Mr Burchill says a hiccup could lie ahead because the development of areas such as Helensvale and Robina is entering its later stages. "There'll be a very severe effect in the next two years because of the shortage of land. "The banks aren't helping. "They're pouring money into loans for bricks and mortar but it's hard to raise money to provide the land component."

"It's a crazy, short-sighted view."

Mr Burchill says he has been disappointed that the banks have not been included in forums relating to property.

"With RPAC (the Resource Planning Advisory Group that brought down the SEQ '2001 report) I don't know of any bank body that was part of the consultative process.

"But ultimately the banks are the people who strangle the market to an undersupply situation or open the floodgates so we have an oversupply."

---

**FIGURE 3.1**

Cycle running ‘true to form’

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**GOLD COAST BUSINESS CYCLES 1981-88; 1988-95**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stock Levels</th>
<th>Investment Wave</th>
<th>Equivalent Point in Cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981-88</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Start of</td>
<td>Equivalent Point in Cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Units and</td>
<td>Sanctuary Cove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-95</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**BURCHILL, BATE, PARKER & PARTNERS PTY LTD.**

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**Very High Stock Levels of Home Units and Housing Land at This Time**

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**Start of Japanese Major Investment Wave**

---

**Equivalent Point in Cycle to the Start of Sanctuary Cove**

---

**1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95**

---

**Start of Sanctuary Cove**

---

**Equivalent Point in Cycle to Japanese Investment Wave**
‘shrewd, financially astute...they bought at high prices, but had a long-term vision’. In retrospect, Daly argued they were just transferring their own culture of property, and especially experiences and expectations of the bubble economy, from Japan to Australia. In the late 80s the Japanese were not to know that within about five years, they were to experience the downside of a property cycle at home as sharp as any that had occurred on the Gold Coast (Arai, 1994; *The Nikkei Weekly*, 25 March 1996).
Summary

Thus the economic philosophy of both the Gold Coast elite and the Japanese investors was in a general sense capitalist, but came from cultures that were substantially different. The Gold Coast was a culture of unfettered capitalism in which the path to success was seen through hard work, but at the same time its large resources of land, rapid growth and post-Fordist culture had produced a belief in the high probability of riches also coming through luck, gambling and speculation. Entrepreneurs made their living producing advice and insights on the way to maximize one's chances in this business culture. Even the downside of this culture, seen in financial loss, if not ruin, was not only accepted in a fatalistic manner, but as a potential source of greater insight, if not wisdom.

In contrast the Japanese came from a business culture which emphasized long-term planning and national coordination. This was a culture very much honed by the imperatives of national scarce resources, especially that of land. In the late 1980s their wealth enabled them to enter areas of investment both at home and overseas with which they had little experience. In such property investment they displayed similar human frailties as all other investors, but also revealed an inability to read the economic signs of the places to which they sought to bring their capital. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the suddenness with which the deregulation of capital controls occurred in Japan and the realignment of the exchange rate that nearly doubled the value of the yen in relation to other major currencies. This gave the Japanese great financial power and encouraged them to overlook local business practices.

On the Gold Coast they came into contact with a business culture in which the property market played a pivotal role. Their misunderstanding of it, and their misinterpretation of it were crucial as an explanation of many of the outcomes which occurred. Thus in this particular case the nature of the interface between the global and the local showed the force of ignorance on the part of the bearers of outside capital, that led to the creation of projects based on values and expectations brought as cultural baggage. These projects were then developed in a
local economic culture very different from that which they brought with them from home. The outcomes were sometimes not those intended by the bearers of the globalized capital. On a macro-scale these capital flows resulted in a greater integration of this given local area into the dynamics of global capital, but at the micro-scale the processes at work were more diverse, eclectic and unforeseen. It is the consideration of the actual pattern of investments and to the nature of their instigators that is the subject of the next chapter.
The Gold Coast, Urban Space and the Japanese Presence

Advocates of nomothetism in the social sciences all too frequently regard 'place' as some kind of residual whose role was incidental to the identification of universally applicable patterns and theories. If cities per se were studied then they were regarded as functional constructs whose patterns reflected the spatio-economic needs of their economic and political hierarchy. Such a paradigm of study had difficulty explaining place uniqueness, not to mention the importance of cultural behaviour, the role of signification and the presence in urban areas of disconnected, contradictory spaces and processes.

The postmodern social theorists have countered this paradigm by urging the study of cities to be much more individualized, eclectic, and multi-perspectival. Hence the study of an essentially post-Fordist city such as the Gold Coast should take note of Zukin's (1991: 16) comment that urban environments are 'an ensemble of material and social practices and their symbolic representation' and these provide meanings differently to each individual. In a similar vein Fainstein and Gladstone (1996: 1) developed the theme that the outsider's interaction with a place becomes analogous to the viewer's relation to a painting or the reader's to a book and its meanings will arise out of the individual's interpretation of it. This approach is predicated on the premise that socio-cultural forces and institutions impose their own order onto a landscape and whose meanings become apparent when the individual enters into discourse with them.

This implies that the city cannot be just seen as an economic creation whose contours are obvious to everyone in the same way, as for example, in Pigram's model of urban form (Ch. Three). Rather, the city is seen as a manifestation of spatial networks, cultural values, social behaviour and economic power relationships. Ellin (1996: 256) encapsulated this when she wrote that cities are increasingly seen as a 'collection of meanings'. Such meanings can be revealed
not just from written text but also from visual and cartographic images. These meanings can be deduced from the patterns formed by the infrastructure and ensembles of buildings in the urban environment. The spatial logic that results from the analysis of such patterns will result in insights that have been all too infrequently sought. Soja (1989: 11) argued, in the past social scientists have generally limited their consideration to urban chronologies and neglected the role of the spatial dimension, Kant’s nach einander (one after the other) was emphasized at the expense of his neben einander (one beside the other). In this sense cities should be seen as visual and cartographic mosaics whose interpretation requires a consideration of the spatial patterns, networks and meanings inherent in them. In other words, the significance of ‘one beside the other’ taking precedence over the meanings inherent in ‘one after the other’. In the case of the Gold Coast during the period of study it is important to ask whether the insertion of Japanese capital set new accents in the spatial patterns of the city.

At the same time importance of one chronological process, the already discussed Gold Coast investment cycle, should not be overlooked. Here it is appropriate to revisit Harvey’s thesis (1989: 191) of cities being a reflection of the creative destruction of capitalism (Ch. One). For flows of investment capital result in the creation of a cultural and physical landscape that reflects the form which the investment has taken and expressed through the cultural and stylistic signifiers of the time. In a city such as the Gold Coast, whose development has been particularly prone to the vagaries of investment cycles, this is a particularly apt approach.

Thus to understand the meanings inherent in its urban tapestry, one has to examine the significance of Gold Coast investment booms of 1958-60, 1971-73, 1979-81 and 1986-89. The first, 1958-60, created the canal estates and the first retailing and gastronomic infrastructure for visitors used to the metropolitan lifestyle of Sydney and Melbourne. During 1971-73 capital flowed into the first generation of high-rise apartments in Surfers Paradise and motels offering different styles and levels of service, whereas 1979-81 saw the second wave of high-rise development (up to 46 storeys in height) in Surfers Paradise and their spread to key locations
along the whole coastal strip of the Gold Coast. The 1979-81 boom was also characterized by integrated residential projects being undertaken by large developers on the inland, western fringe of the urban area; the largest ‘Robina’, being also noteworthy as the first significant instance of foreign capital being invested on the Gold Coast.

The nature of the last Boom, that of 1986-89, cannot be explained without a consideration of the Japanese presence and it is to the patterns and flows of their investments, the characteristics of the investors, the fate of those investments, and their imprint on the Gold Coast, that this study will now turn. These phenomena form the spatio-environmental dimensions of the research questions of this project.

**Japanese Investment: Cartographic Mosaic**

The flow of Japanese investors to the Gold Coast quickly became mirrored in the flow of purchases and projects being developed. The spatial dynamics of these investments quickly became a new reality for the population, especially for the people in the urban districts into which this capital was being injected.

All property transactions in the State of Queensland have to be registered with the Department of Lands in Brisbane, hence the data is available to show the spatial manifestation of the Japanese investor presence on the Gold Coast. This can be portrayed as spatial slices through the urban mass of the city. The transaction totals which involved a Japanese national or a company registered in Japan were as follows: 1986-87=37 transactions; 1987-88= 122 transactions; 1988-89= 286 transactions; 1989-90=184 transactions (Dept. of Lands, Brisbane).

Here a point has to be made about the timing shown for these statistics: the dates quoted for these figures are of the time of lodgment with the Department, and their personnel said that there is usually a delay of between six to eight weeks between the completion of a sale and its lodgment in Brisbane. Therefore there is slight chronological slide in the above sequence of figures. It is important to make
another point: the data above gives no indication of the value of the transaction, and in its cartographic depiction (Figs. 4.0-4.3), values are presented only in generalized categories, with the consequence that a discussion of their magnitude will only be made in a later section of this chapter. In spite of this the reading of the resultant cartographic mosaic compiled through this data revealed a number of significant spatial realities about the Gold Coast Japanese presence.

Figure 4.0 in the first phase of the boom shows the pivotal role of the urban/tourist core of the Gold Coast as the site of Japanese capital. Investment is largely limited to Surfers Paradise and adjacent Broadbeach, with only isolated examples being found south towards Mermaid Beach and west in the office precinct of Bundall. Interviews indicated that on arrival most Japanese had at best only a generalized image of the Gold Coast and that was of sandy beaches fringed by a ribbon of high-rise apartments and hotels, rather like the Honolulu image with which many were much more familiar. Thus as far as the Japanese were concerned, Surfers Paradise equaled the Gold Coast and therefore their wish was to buy into it, or add to its development, so that they would share in its ostensible commercial success and derive prestige from being a part of its visually striking image. Such desires were facilitated by the relative cheapness of real estate by Japanese standards and the ease of credit lines available to them at the time from Japan.

Figure 4.1 shows the result of flows of Japanese capital dispersing to locations spread over a wider urban space. Surfers Paradise appears to be still a significant entry point with a tight cluster of dots, but Main Beach to its north is the location of many purchases. Field observation showed that this was the time when low-rise houses and cluster developments on Main Beach were beginning to give way to high-rise apartment buildings, some on sites bought by Japanese capital, others on sites being developed by Australian investors, and with some of the apartments in the completed buildings being bought by Japanese purchasers. The proximity of Main Beach to Surfers Paradise and its views over the Pacific shoreline and the Broadwater near Southport, were giving it the image of a prestigious residential
FIGURE 4.0: PURCHASES BY JAPANESE: 1986-1987

PRICE CATEGORIES:
1. Less than $250,000
2. $251,000 to $500,000
3. More than $500,000

Sanctuary Cove
Paradise Point
Runaway Bay
Southport
Carrara
Ashmore
Bundall
Surfers Paradise
Broadbeach
Mermaid Beach
Burleigh Heads
Palm Beach
Currumbin
Coolangatta

SCALE
0 2 4 KILOMETERS

PRICE CATEGORIES:
1. Less than $250 000
2. $251 000 to $500 000
3. More than $500 000
area, one to which the Japanese aspired. A residential district west of Broadbeach was now also being integrated into the spatial orbit of the Japanese investor. This area is the site of a number of canal estates with names that echo leisure and sophistication: ‘Miami Keys’, ‘Florida Gardens’, ‘Sorrento’ and ‘Broadbeach Waters’. They consist of well-established, spacious homes with canal frontages, many with boat mooring facilities. This is the type of residential property that hardly exists in Japan and is purchasable on the Gold Coast for prices which in Japanese eyes were remarkably low. Runaway Bay to the north was similar, except that here the development is of townhouses and apartments around a marina and hence prices here were even lower than for the large detached houses in the canal estates west of Broadbeach. Finally, there are now purchases by the Japanese visible around the peripheries of the Gold Coast urban area: from Coolangatta in the south to Palm Beach, on the western urban-rural fringe at Robina, Carrara and Ashmore to Sanctuary Cove at the northern extremity. As the number of Japanese buyers and developers increased so apparently did their confidence to venture forth and purchase in previously unknown parts of the urban area.

The spatial mosaic on Figure 4.2 is for the peak phase of the boom on the Gold Coast. Japanese-funded transactions are still at their highest in the urban core. This core location now means Main Beach as much as Surfers Paradise and the Isle of Capri and Cronin Island to its immediate west. As well as that a new canal estate to the west of Main Beach, called ‘Paradise Waters’, was attracting the Japanese buyer. Main Beach and Paradise Waters were being marketed as the most prestigious addresses on the Gold Coast for high-rise living and canal-estate living respectively. The Japanese preference for them was quickly established and commented upon by estate agents and an increasing number of people writing to the Gold Coast Bulletin. By mid-1990 comments such as ‘Japanese investors have targeted one of the Gold Coast’s most prestigious canal estate and splurged more than $30 million on almost 50 sites and luxury waterfront homes-some left vacant for up to 18 months...’ had even hit the national press (The Australian, 20 June 1990). The very interest of the Japanese in such expensive property quickly
FIGURE 4.2: PURCHASES BY JAPANESE: 1988-1989

PRICE CATEGORIES:
1. Less than $250 000
2. $251 000 to $500 000
3. More than $500 000
became a cumulative process; as real estate agents’ fees are usually connected to the sale prize, it was in their interest to channel the Japanese buyer towards residential properties in the Main Beach, Paradise Waters area.

The spatial orbit of the Japanese investor was now wide-open, and as Figure 4.2 shows, their purchases occurred in new canal estates to the southwest of Palm Beach and Currumbin, as well as in the north in the marina development at Runaway Bay; high-rise purchases also occurred at the southern extremity of the Gold Coast in Coolangatta. Coolangatta with its saleable image of having a northerly aspect and thus exposure to the sun for most of the day, was discovered by a number of Japanese (the Japanese had no tradition of ‘sun culture’ until they were introduced to it in Hawaii and southern California and grasped it as a symbol of both the successful holiday experience and holiday resort development). Other less extensive evidence of a Japanese presence were along the coast at Broadbeach, Burleigh Heads and Sanctuary Cove, as well as in the office precinct of Bundall and throughout the more conventional suburban estates of the hinterland at Robina, Carrarra and Ashmore. There were also the site purchases for golf course resorts on the northern and western fringes of the urban area.

The spatial mosaic of the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast at the end of the boom is shown on figure 4.3. The emphasis in this phase appeared to be the prestigious residential properties and development sites of Main Beach and a mix of canal estates and high-rise to its west. The core of Surfers Paradise had lost its preeminence, with a scatter of purchases along the coastline south towards Broadbeach still being noticeable. It is as if the Japanese investors had redefined and resubdivided the urban space of the core and were now redirecting their attention to other types of environments in the urban area. A sign of this was the pronounced Japanese presence in the north of the Gold Coast. Runaway Bay was still attractive, but a new canal estate-marina to its north at Paradise Point was now also deemed to be a prize worth purchasing; the resorts to the northwest of it at Sanctuary Cove and Hope Island were in fact being created by the Japanese and completed homes in them being bought by their fellow nationals. A scatter of purchases is evident throughout the interior fringe of the urban area and the newly
FIGURE 4.3: PURCHASES BY JAPANESE: 1989-1990

PRICE CATEGORIES:
1. Less than $250,000
2. $251,000 to $500,000
3. More than $500,000

SCALE
0 2 4 KM
developing canal estate west of Palm Beach andCurrumbin; as well as these, purchases in the high-rise clusters at Coolangatta are also evident.

The maps discussed above do not present a holistic picture of the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast. They are a spatial manifestation of diverse investors with differing capital resources and perceptions of what the Gold Coast was and what it could offer. However there are a number of themes revealed by these cartographic mosaics of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast.

One of these is the role of the urban core as the point of entry for the foreign investor. Surfers Paradise was the most highly developed district of the Gold Coast urban area. The new arrival saw it as the visual manifestation of what the Gold Coast meant: a vibrant tourist centre with a tight cluster of shops, cafes and clubs overwhelmed by a phalanx of high-rise buildings symbolizing growth, wealth and success. A Japanese investor, particularly one who had already experienced Honolulu and Los Angeles, would regard Surfers Paradise as another location in the global network of places providing them with capital growth and profits. Similarly the purchase of a luxurious apartment in a prestigious high-rise block or the acquisition of a large canal-side home gave the Japanese buyer access to properties of a size and quality that were very limited in number and prohibitively expensive back in Japan.

Equally important is the case of Japanese investment in one type of property which reflected a cultural symbol already part of their increasing degree of globalization: the golf course resort. Prior to their arrival on the Gold Coast many had acquired familiarity with golf course resorts as tourists or even investors in Hawaii, California and Arizona. So by the mid-1980s they were being regarded by them very much as signifiers of the new global culture of success, leisure and travel, not to mention their role as an extension of the well established role of golf in Japan as a symbol of corporate business life. As such resorts need large, flat sites, they could only be developed on the rural-urban fringe of the Gold Coast, and so through their development Japanese capital played a significant role in the spread of the urban area, especially towards the north and west.
The Spatial Restructuring of Central Surfers Paradise:

To understand the impact of Japanese capital on Surfers Paradise a number of its locational and morphological features need to be mentioned. The morphology of central Surfers Paradise is tightly defined through its physical geography. It has been created on the primary sand dune between the Pacific Ocean to its east and the low-lying estuary of the Nerang River to the west. It became accessible from the older settlement of Southport to the north and for visitors from Brisbane through the bridging of the Nerang River in 1925. It was in the same year that Jim Cavill, a local entrepreneur, sensed the change in cultural values in favour of mixed bathing and more active holidays, especially the rise in popularity of surfing. He opened the Surfers Paradise Hotel on the southeastern corner of Cavill Avenue and the Gold Coast Highway. This hotel became the social and entertainment centre of the area and has defined the spatial dynamics of Surfers Paradise ever since (McRobbie, 1988: 45-66). Being as close as possible to the surf beach of the Pacific Ocean has been the sina qua non of the Surfers property market and so has determined the nature of its development; this took the form of an elongated strip paralleling the coastline for about 3kms, but extending inland for only about 400-700m until the banks of the Nerang River are reached (Fig. 4.4).

Since 1925 the focal point of this commercial strip has been the Cavill Avenue-Gold Coast Highway intersection and the owner who controlled the Surfers Paradise site has been perceived to symbolically dominate the central Surfers Paradise property market. From 1925 to 1957 the property on that site was owned by Jim Cavill and his wife, that is, local, private capital; between 1957 and 1986 it was owned by Australian metropolitan capital represented largely by two property developers originally from Melbourne (Stanley Korman & Eddie Kornhauser), and in November 1986 it was bought by Kokusai Motorcars Pty. Ltd., the property arm of a Tokyo taxi and tour bus company. Thus if the genesis of central Surfers Paradise was local initiative and capital, then, since the middle of this century it
has been integrated into the national capital flows of Australia, and more recently, since the mid-1980s, it had become integrated into the global flows of capital. Japanese capital arrived in 1983. In that year Daikyo Kanko of Tokyo bought its first site in central Surfers Paradise; a site that is bounded by Staghorn & Ferny Avenues and the Gold Coast Highway. By the beginning of the next decade Japanese ownership dominance of central Surfers Paradise had been established (Fig. 4.4). To analyse this map is not only to reveal the pattern and extent of such ownership, but also to consider the dynamics of the place which led to this pattern.

The traditional retail/gastronomic hub have been the blocks bounded by Elkhorn Ave., the Esplanade, Hanlon St. (south of Cavill Ave.) and the Gold Coast Highway. By the mid-1980s this area had been divided into numerous small parcels of land, often with building blocks bored-through with arcades, to create the maximum number of shop frontages. Here clustered a large number of souvenir shops, cafes, restaurants, entertainment parlours, and varied retail outlets selling the ubiquitous Australian holiday attire of shorts, T-shirts, thongs and bathers. Properties were tightly held by major local owners, mainly Jim Raptis and Eddie Kornhauser, and Melbourne capital around the Rockman family. Thus the Japanese investor had to persuade one of these major interests to sell. As mentioned above, Eddie Kornhauser sold the prime Cavill Avenue-Gold Coast Highway site to Kokusai Motors Pty. Ltd. in 1986.

The sale of another pivotal site in central Surfers Paradise signified the boom psychology of the late 80s. This is the property bounded by the Esplanade and Cavill Avenue. It is a revealing examples of the values and expectations of the local business elite and the Japanese investors. The site was assembled and redeveloped by a major local property owner, Jim Raptis. He redeveloped it as a retail complex in the latest postmodern style. Its postmodern style was meant to convey the luxury and lavishness appropriate to one of the largest developers on the Gold Coast, as such the Raptis Corporation planned it as its property flagship. However, according to Partner B in a Surfers Paradise property consultancy (interview, 13 April 1994), who managed the transaction, the offer of $128 million made by the Japanese condominium and housing developer, Dia Kensetsu Co. Ltd. was more than Raptis ever imagined; so in 1990 it was sold.
Another pivotal site was that at the Cavill Avenue-Ferny Avenue intersection. Here numerous titles had to be amalgamated to create enough development land for a major project. It was difficult to achieve this, but a local real estate agency facilitated the assembly for a consortium consisting of the largest, most-prestigious Japanese companies: Nomura Securities, Japan Airlines and Toyo Real Estate. They paid $65 million for the site and were so keen to finalize unconditional control of it that they were willing to spend another $30 million to buy out the leases of the retailers on the street frontages.

Thus the competition among the Japanese investors to buy into Surfers Paradise was intense. They were flush with money, offered premium prices, often beyond anything local owners and real estate imagined possible, and the difficulty of assembling property was the main obstacle to them achieving a greater penetration of these retailing/gastronomic precincts. This forced them to turn to the sites to the north of Elkhorn Avenue.

In this precinct the difficulty of assembling sites large enough for the lavish, integrated projects the Japanese wished to develop was much less onerous. This part of central Surfer Paradise had been developed largely by local investors in the building booms of 1958-60 and 1971-73. It had a mix of low-rise motels, walk-up holiday flats, some high-rise apartment buildings let on a short-term basis, and diverse service activities catering to the tourist industry. Once some members of the local property industry had sensed the capital resources of the Japanese and their eagerness to invest on the Gold Coast, they used credit to buy up many of these small properties, assembled the titles, demolished the buildings, prepared them as cleared development sites, put them into their property portfolios, and offered them to the Japanese. Creative destruction is an apt description of this process.

As Figure 4.4 shows, by the end of the boom, five adjacent blocks north of Cypress Avenue between the Gold Coast Highway and Ferny Avenue were in Japanese possession as were a number of others to their east and west. At the
southern extremity of this urban area, a large L-shaped site on Elkhorn Avenue became the site of the Matsushita Electronic Corp-owned five-star ANA Hotel, the first hotel of such quality in Surfers Paradise. The Marriott followed in 1992 on the site at the northernmost edge of central Surfers Paradise. This was funded by the large Japanese developer, Town Development Co; immediately to its south is the Ocean Blue Resort, an example of an Osaka-based family company buying an existing business on the Gold Coast as a long-term investment. Finally, the series of L-shaped Japanese-owned sites between the Esplanade and the Gold Coast Highway attest to the difficulty in assembling the large integrated development sites which the Japanese investors wanted and were willing to buy at boom prices in the late 1980s.

There are some significant conclusions that can be drawn from these maps. By far the most important is the sheer extent of Japanese purchases in central Surfers Paradise: Figure 4.4 depicts a total of 36 urban blocks demarcated by streets or water frontages, by the end of the property boom, 21 of these were entirely or partially in Japanese ownership. It is obvious that such a statistic derived from a map does not reveal anything about the scale, nature and value of this Japanese property presence. It is not meant to. However when one considers that the urban area in question is the commercial, retail and entertainment core of the whole Gold Coast and as such has always had the most valuable pieces of property in the whole city, the map attests to a substantial Japanese presence.

Within central Surfers Paradise the processes which led to the Japanese purchase have spatially reconstructed the central area; by the end of the boom the northern section had been transformed from a lower value mixed-use zone to one which contained a number of lavish hotel/resort developments surrounded by empty sites awaiting the vital financial transfusions from Japan to revive their development plans. The integration with global finance was complete.

These maps point to the sheer volume of capital which flowed from Japan to the Gold Coast. However using contextual material another meaning can be revealed: the extent to which Japanese capital transformed central Surfers Paradise not just
in a spatio-quantitative sense, but also in a qualitative manner. For often what the 
Japanese had designed and built was of a style and lavishness that went beyond the 
area’s aspirations prior to their arrival. Central Surfers Paradise saw three five-
star hotels being built (not to mention five others owned by Japanese-investors at 
other locations on the Gold Coast), as well as a number of high-rise apartment 
buildings constructed, within which differing numbers of units were also 
purchased by individual Japanese owners.

The spatial dynamics of the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast revealed much 
about the interface between globalizing forces and the nature of the local 
environment. Thus central Surfers Paradise was the entry point for the Japanese 
investors and the urban area where they achieved rapid dominance of property 
ownership. As the flow of capital from Japan increased, the investors and 
developers radiated from the centre to purchase apartments and canal estate houses 
at increasing distances from central Surfers Paradise. At the height of the boom 
such residential purchases formed disconnected clusters at a number of favoured 
sites along the whole coastline where new high-rise apartment buildings were 
located and where canal estates existed. The golf course resorts, for which the 
Japanese investors bought sites on the northern and western fringes of the Gold 
Coast urban area, do not stand out sufficiently on such scatter maps.

Thus explanations of the patterns shown on Figures 4.0-4.3 could be sought in the 
value placed on the centrality of Surfers Paradise by the Japanese investors, the 
specific locations of prestigious high-rise apartment buildings along the coast, the 
presence of canal estates and the development of golf course resorts often initiated 
by the Japanese themselves.

However there is another perspective on Japanese investment that needs to be 
examined: the characteristics of the Japanese investor and the fate of their 
investments on the Gold Coast. For both of these issues reveal a dimension of the 
globalization processes which operated during the late 1980s, as well as the 
characteristics of the locality on which they sought to impact.
The Nature and Fate of the Japanese Investor on the Gold Coast

A tabular and statistical resume can be used as a pointer leading into a discussion about the nature of the Japanese investor on the Gold Coast (Appendix I). It is a classificatory exercise and as such is already the result of an interpretive and filtering exercise carried out by the researcher; in other words, it is the result of one individual’s compilation of the material, defined and punctuated by him according to his extratextual intellectual and cultural framework.

The identity of the Japanese investors on the Gold Coast and the classification of their investments provided another dimension to this research theme. In specific terms it could be used as an indicator of their qualitative impact on the city, and, within a chronological context, was a sharp manifestation of the workings of the property cycle during the period under study.

Queensland Department of Lands data on the number of property transactions involving Japanese nationals or Japanese companies shows that between 1986 and 1990, that is, the period of the property boom, totalled 629. The majority of these were private individuals who bought an individual apartment or house for their own use, or letting purposes. However there were also a range of individuals, groups and companies involved whose investments were more substantial and usually of a commercial nature. The sums of money involved here were larger (in some cases very much larger), and therefore their individual impact on the Gold Coast was considerable. It is some of these types of investments that have gained the publicity, attracted the awe and caused the controversy about the Japanese on the Gold Coast. Though individual projects have had detailed publicity, sometimes of a spectacular kind, there has been no attempt at a detailed compilation of all such commercial investments by the Japanese.

Between 1993 and 1997 the researcher compiled and tabulated a detailed list of the major Japanese investments. It required the use of a diversity of sources, such as government documents, the reports of relevant service providers, the local and the national press and personal communication. Much cross-referencing and
double-checking of specific information was required before the dossier of Japanese investment so compiled was sufficiently comprehensive and credible (Appendix I).

Using categories of business type and nature of ownership, the ninety Japanese investors detailed in Appendix I can be classified in the following way (Table 4.0)

Table 4.0 Categories of Japanese Investors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing, resort development company</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial or trading company</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building, civil engineering, property consultancy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel, transport or tourism company</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance/banking company</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private company of an individual or family</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ten classed as ‘Housing, resort development company’ had been active in this field of investment in Japan, some deriving considerable benefits from the Comprehensive Resort Region Provision Law of 1987. Many were identified with the bubble economy of the time; some had made general property and resort investments in Hawaii and California before their arrival on the Gold Coast. A number of them, such as Shinko Corp. and Daikyo Kanko, had earned large profits from golf course resort developments in Japan and sought to continue their success with this type of investment on the Gold Coast.

The nine classified as industrial/trading companies included such global multinationals as the Matsushita Corp., Mitsui, and C. Itoh. They had previously established their presence in Australia through their core business, but were caught up in the wave of property investment in the 1980s, and through their property arms aimed to enter this field of investment. On the Gold Coast they usually
sought to develop top-quality projects and, because of the considerable financial resources of the parent company, were able to sustain them through the recession that followed. The spectacular exception to this pattern was EIE, which used easy credit during the boom in Japan to amass a large property portfolio around the Pacific Basin on the basis of a modest trading turnover in electrical tapes in Japan. When the boom ended EIE crashed. The category 'Building, civil engineering, property consultancy' was varied. Some were multinationals, such as the construction company Kumagai Gumi, with property investment being the means to the end of developing civil engineering/construction projects, on completion they usually sold their projects; others were established development companies in Japan (for example, Towa Kohmuten Corp.). These can be contrasted with a companies, such as Pacific Atlas, which were the creation of entrepreneurial individuals who saw their chance for 'riches' through foreign property investment during the boom.

The eight classified as 'Travel, transport, tourism company' were owners who often invested in tourism-related property which they considered as an overseas expansion of their core business in Japan. Some of them invested in property of a type that would enable them to develop an international vertical integration of their transport and tourist operations. For example, Royal Airlines of Japan owns the Parkwood golf course resort on the Gold Coast; thus transport and destination venues can be coordinated so that both profit from the same tourist flow; HIS Investments Pty. Ltd. has a chain of travel agencies in Japan and has built a three-star hotel in Surfers Paradise into which the clients of its travel agencies can be booked. The three banks and finance companies represented on Table 4.0 had gone into partnerships with Japanese or Australian companies with more experience in the property industry. One of them 'fell into' Gold Coast projects through being the mortgagor of a developer who was forced to declare bankruptcy.

The twenty eight classified as private companies of individuals or of a family are the most numerous. This reveals the extent to which the 1980s boom in Japan encouraged individuals and small private companies to expand their business horizons. Individuals, who in most instances had no experience of foreign
investment, followed each other into overseas ventures. They are the most
difficult to analyse and classify. Looking at private individuals and companies,
information about many of them is hard to obtain and commonalities in their
characteristics difficult to identify. One type which became apparent was the
established company of an individual or family in Japan which sought to spread its
assets by buying Gold Coast property. They usually had relatively modest
amounts of investment capital with which they bought an office building or a
small hotel-resort, whereas others bought a development site on which they
planned to build a cluster housing project or apartment building. The latter type of
investment sometimes involved one member of the family or partnership moving
to the Gold Coast on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. An example is the
private company of Toshimasa Tamamiza and Minoru Tokita and their
Comfortable Housing Developments Pty. Ltd. The partners eventually moved to
the Gold Coast and have developed various small residential and office projects
there since then.

Another type of individual investor was the type who had acquired wealth (and
credit) suddenly during the boom in Japan and saw foreign investment via the
very-strong yen as the inevitable continuation of this quest for enrichment. A
spectacular example of such a process was Koshin Australia Ltd. This was a
development company established by Mitsuhiro Kotani, a Tokyo sharebroker. On
the basis of very profitable share dealings and commissions during the boom on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, he spent $90.3 million buying Gold Coast property
and development sites. His faith in the free flow of credit in Japan led him to
believe that he would be able to fund a hotel-resort in Surfers Paradise and a golf
course resort in Mudgeeraba on the western urban-rural fringe to the value of $600
million. There were also a few individual investors on the Gold Coast whose
occupations and sources of wealth appeared to have little connection with
productive (or speculative) business. They visited the Gold Coast in the late
1980s and were swept-up by the frenzy of investment in which their fellow-
nationals had been caught up. Such people included a prominent baseball player,
Sadao Hishiki, who sought to develop a golf course resort and Eikichi Yazawa, a
Japanese pop star, who established the Comestock Corporation as a vehicle for
funneling capital into Gold Coast property developments. His chief executive on the Gold Coast was the ex-tennis professional, Henry Kawada. The fever for foreign property investment seemed to extend to groups in Japanese society whose established modus operandi had no connection to property.

The category of ‘Other’ consisted of a wide range of Japanese companies who entered the Gold Coast property market via company diversification policies to make investments in what was perceived to be a particularly profitable economic sector in the 1980s boom. A significant example was the Senshukai Co. Ltd., a large retail mail order firm in Japan which went into partnership with the multinational trading company Nissho Iwai Corporation to establish a development company in Australia. They built a high-rise apartment building at Broadbeach, which was given the name ‘Belle Maison’. A case which, in terms of the relationship between core business and property investment was even more esoteric, was that of the Sundai Group. In Japan they owned and operated a chain of ‘jukus’, coaching colleges to which many parents send their children after school so that they will get better marks in the competitive examinations. They built a 267-room hotel at the southern edge of Surfers Paradise and let the management rights to Travelodge and have also invested in a golf-course at Robina. The entry of such an eclectic assortment of Japanese companies into the Gold Coast property market in the late 80s was an indicator of their aspirations for the Gold Coast as a place for investment at that time. It is now appropriate to see how far these aspirations were realized.

A Retrospective View of the Japanese Projects:

The right-hand column in Appendix I shows the fate of the individual Japanese investments at the end of 1996. Some generic sense of the nature of these investments and their fate is worth revealing. One way is to establish a categorization based on the relationship between original intent and outcome. For example, an approach to take is to compare the entries in the columns headed ‘Location of Property(ies)’ and ‘State of Investment End of 1996’ and grade them on the basis of the degree of symmetry between the aims had by the investor for
their project and the state of the investment a decade later. Some investors had a number of purchases and development projects and so the extent to which original aims were realized varied, Here an attempt is made to summarize the state of these individual projects at the end of 1996. Table 4.1 shows the result of this exercise.

Table 4.1. Fate of Japanese Property Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Still own the property purchased, or as a developer, completed the project according to the original plan</th>
<th>34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Still involved with property, but scaled down project, or developing it in slower stages</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Intended to develop property, still own it, but development not commenced</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Property on the market</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Property sold, or mortgagor's sale</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the culture of the property industry and the economic volatility of the decade in question, such a diversity of outcomes for such a large number of investments by such a range of investors was a reasonable expectation. However related to the expectations of the Japanese investors about Australia and the Gold Coast in particular at that time (a perspective to be considered in greater detail in Chapter Five), what this tabulation reveals can be interpreted as very surprising.

Thirty four out of ninety, or only a little more than one third of the original investments are seen to have proceeded as expected by their owners and/or initiators. The features of this group revealed a number of distinct patterns. There was the investor for whom purchase of the property was only a means of gaining a site for the conducting of a business not related to property and development as such, but one servicing the Gold Coast tourist industry (Ado Star (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.; Takao Haneda; Traveler Corporation). Here success in the achievement of
original aims appeared to be related much more to general trends in the tourist industry during this period than to the bust or otherwise of a bubble economy. Another pattern which is apparent, not unrelated to the first, yet also distinct, is one in which the Japanese investor showed a more acute sense of the locality; that is, they appeared less insistent on making investment and development decisions in the context of views about the Gold Coast that they brought with them and sought to relate their project to the nature of the local economy. This often took the form of allowing themselves to be influenced, if not guided by a local advisor or business partner. This usually resulted in their project being redefined, or restaged to be closer to the view of the Gold Coast economy given them by the Australian person or company. The projects of Nara Holdings, the Sundai Group, Big Arrow Enterprises Pty. Ltd, and Verde Australia showed this process at work. In a conceptual sense this perhaps shows the global-local interface at its most seamless.

Finally, the success of Gold Coast property developments by companies essentially for their own use had much more to do with the economic prosperity of the company per se at other locations than on the success of the particular Gold Coast investment (For example the company retreat built on the Gold Coast by the Nikko Building Co. Pty. Ltd.). This applied far less to investors whose prime activity was building and real estate. Their business was much more globally integrated, which meant that success in one country, or at one location flowed through to the other country, or other location to a much greater extent. In the same way company crises were also more likely to flow through the international web that such a company had created. Thus the dependence of a given Gold Coast project on infusions of capital from Japan meant that when the bubble burst in Japan and the capital flow stopped, the Gold Coast project was frozen. This type of interconnectivity can be discerned with numerous projects listed in Appendix I (For example, Daikyo Kanko, Daiwa House, Sanwa Home Inc.).

Type 2 identified on Table 4.1 is one in which economic and cultural pressures forced the Japanese investor to become responsive to the Gold Coast situation. The most important factor was the slide into economic recession in 1990. This
meant a readjustment of their perception of its potential, especially in terms of market size, its volatility, its absorption rate of new property and the perceptions which people had of the relationships between property characteristics and prices. In other words what they were willing and unwilling to pay. Both the MID Australia Pty. Ltd. and EIE International Corp. resorts suffered from their misjudgment of the Australian perception of resort condominiums (townhouses). What to a Japanese was the ultimate luxury living, suffered in the Australians’ perspective from inadequate space, and this combined with the effects of recession, meant a loss of attractiveness and sales. Given the dynamics of the Gold Coast property cycle, the timing of completion of a project was crucial. For example, the following three Japanese- funded, high-rise apartment buildings were completed at the times shown in brackets: ‘Silverpoint’ (Sept. 1990), ‘The Inlet’ (June 1991), ‘Belle Maison’ (June 1992). The recession started to be felt as 1990 progressed, so the degree and extent of apartment discounting in an increasingly recessed market was lowest at ‘Silverpoint’ and highest at the ‘Belle Maison’.

Another process at work with properties in category 2 was the ability to maintain flows of overseas capital during the full phase of development and sales activity. This was crucial to the timing of the project and the realization of the original concept. Those that were cut-off from the flow of credit from Japan faced ‘instant death’ or at least a humbling of the original concept. In November 1991 Maruko Pty. Ltd. was placed under the control of its creditor banks, but subsequently bought by Daiei, Japan’s second largest discount supermarket chain. The result was that its ‘Rivage Royal’ high-rise on the Gold Coast was completed according to the original luxurious concept, with units being sold more slowly than planned, but without any discounting. In contrast the golf course resort ‘Sapphire Lakes’ and ‘Hope Island’ had their funds from Japan cut in November 1990 and February 1991. Development of Sapphire Lakes was stopped immediately never to be resumed, while building at Hope Island ceased for over a year and then resumed on the basis of a reassessment of the size of the Gold Coast market and the nature of its popular taste. Being cut from the global network of capital meant being thrust into a much smaller local economic context, and so what is evolving at Hope Island is not according to the taste and purchasing power of global
cosmopolites, but a project that reflects local cultural horizons and economic constraints.

The third category in Table 4.1 consists of a smaller group of Japanese investments in which a development site was bought during the boom period, but before actual development commenced, funds from Japan were cut-off. Though more than half a decade has passed since then, development on these sites has not started, but nor have these investors liquidated their Gold Coast assets. The Jimna site in central Surfers Paradise is the most vivid manifestation of this situation. The owners are a group of the most prestigious of Japan’s companies- Nomura Securities, Japan Airlines and Toyo Real Estate. The cost of the site reflected the peak of the 1980s boom- $65 million was paid by them in March 1988. The original concept for its development was grand- a $480 million hotel, shopping and residential complex to be bigger than anything so far seen on the Gold Coast. The crash came and the miscalculation of the investors became impossible to rationalize. The proposed project was scaled down to one to the value of $200 million, with a more modest hotel and a more directly mass tourist-oriented retail and entertainment component. In spite of this reassessment, even a decade later nothing has happened; the site is now the venue for a periodic market.

One detailed face to face interview with the General Manager of Jimna Ltd., followed by another over the telephone (9 January 1995; 19 January 1995), gave some clues. As the investors saw themselves as the ‘creme de la creme’ of Japanese business, there was a determination to get into the Gold Coast, and not just in any way, but into its prime space and to develop a project that would reflect the wealth and status of the companies which had made it their own; hence the willingness to pay such a high purchase price. This was seen initially as not a problem because a project of appropriate quality would be put there. Then came the recession in Japan and Australia and a sense of the miscalculation which these rich, prestigious companies had made. The investors showed some willingness to take the changed circumstances into consideration and to take a closer look at the reality of what the Gold Coast is, a place with a more modest scale of up-market tourism and a smaller number of wealthy residents than they had first thought. So
they compromised and made some downward adjustment of the original
development concept. But there were limits to this, company prestige and perhaps
lack of a consensus among them has led to inaction, a situation which only owners
of such large blocks of capital can countenance. A small number of company
representatives have continued to enjoy living on the Gold Coast, but at the end of
1996 there were no signs of action on the development site.

The fourth category shown on Figure 4.1 is of properties owned by Japanese
investors who at the end of 1996 wished to sell. In many cases these are cleared
development sites on which their Japanese owners planned to construct diverse
projects. The process of selling has often been a lengthy one. This has been
because the boom time prices paid were difficult to match in the relatively
recession-affected 1990s. The result was tension between creditors in Japan
wanting to be paid and the investor on the Gold Coast waiting for price rises to
occur to minimize their on-sale losses. The situation with the sites owned by the
Anabuki Construction, Ashizawa Contracting Co. and Ocean Resort Development
was of this type. The time given by the creditor in Japan for the process of sale on
the Gold Coast to be completed varied from instance to instance and according to
the financial situation of the lending institution in Japan. For example, the Long
Term Credit Bank was the lender for the Gold Coast projects of the EIE
International Corp. and to TNN Gold Coast Pty. Ltd., the developer of the Surfers
Paradise Marriott Hotel. They did not foreclose on these two companies until July
1993 and February 1994 respectively, by which time the bank’s financial situation
in Japan was starting to become precarious. They were then forced to place the
Gold Coast properties on the market.

Thus the globalization of investment flows became a two-way process: during
periods of high liquidity capital from centres of capital accumulation flows to
favoured locations very quickly, but the process can be reversed just as quickly
when liquidity and profits at the key control centre become tight.

This reversal of capital flow is seen best by the Japanese investments that fell into
category 5. This is illustrated by companies such as Koshin Co. Ltd. and Pacific
Atlas, the creations of individuals who were products of the late 80s bubble economy in Japan. They had acquired sudden wealth through land and the stock exchange. Their horizon of future wealth seemed to become limitless, so using the inflated values of their shares or land, they borrowed extensively to make overseas property purchases. They saw the Gold Coast as a place of limitless opportunity; therefore an opportunity to invest there and was seen by them as the way to establish themselves in the ‘big league’ of Japanese business. In other words, the overseas location was perceived in terms of its ability to advance them within the Japanese business culture. After the bubble burst in Japan they had to liquidate their overseas assets, often being forced to sell at prices one-quarter to one-third of those they paid during the boom (Appendix I).

Other Japanese investors, such as Towa Kohmuten Corp., K.K. Alpha Corp., and Wacore and Cedric, were established property/development companies in Japan. However they also overextended during the boom, and when credit was tightened in Japan, and the property cycle turned down on the Gold Coast, they sold and left. Finally, another variation of this pattern was seen with Japanese companies well established in non-property sectors of the economy, which were drawn into property in the late 1980s in the belief that opportunities there were limitless. When the recession hit, they cut their losses, and withdrew to their core business. The Excellent Life Corporation an insurance company, the chemical company-Japanese Calsonic Corp., and the civil engineering/construction firm, Kumagai Gumi, were examples of this.

Thus the situation of the Japanese investors on the Gold Coast were at one level individual. At another level though, patterns of similarity in their individual and company backgrounds, types of investment and their experiences with those investment can be discerned. The fate of these investments a decade later was function of economic changes in both Japan and on the Gold Coast, investments that had connected the economies of these two locations.
Deconstructing the Gold Coast of Japanese Investment

Ellin (1996: 44) in her book *Postmodern Urbanism* argued that global flows of capital, people, images and journals, were increasingly moulding the nature of cities and thus contributing to their post-modern character. One manifestation of this is an increasing eclecticism of styles, juxtaposition of disconnected functions, building ensembles and lifestyles. The double-codedness of postmodern architecture is both a process which facilitates this, as well as being the response to the global-local forces which are reforming cities in these ways. Cities are being ‘turned inside out’ (Soja, 1993: 489). Then, by quoting Foucault, Ellin (1996: 183) developed her argument further: global capital, images and styles were also manifestations of power, and the spatial arrangements created by them in the city thus came to reflect power relationships between the global and local.

Soja (1989: 241), whose treatment of postmodernism was less cultural-aesthetic and much more politico-economic, wrote of ‘space and power as intrinsically interconnected’. In other words, the force of capital in a city and the power which this represents determines the nature of the developments that occur (and that don’t occur), the spatial relationships among them and the groups from whom they seek to benefit. Thus an ostensible fragmentation of the city is revealed to be only the manifestation of an integrative web of capital and control. Soja (1989: 223) then used such a paradigm to produce ‘a succession of fragmentary glimpses, a freed association of reflective field notes of Los Angeles’. The Gold Coast of Japanese capital in the early 1990s lends itself to such an analysis, with a series of perspectives a la Soja being possible.

Surfers Paradise is what gives the Gold Coast its image, the focal point of its interface with globalist forces. It is thus the opening of the funnel through which the flow of Japanese tourists and Japanese capital occurred. Orchid Avenue, Elkhorn Avenue and their web of arcades show a liberal sprinkling of the brandnames of international retail consumer culture- Hermes, Dunhill, Cartier, Louis Vuitton, Bally, Hunting World, Pierre Cardin, Celine, Gucci and Ken Donne. They are all there jostling to maintain their individuality, yet clustering
together to strengthen their collective aura of exclusivity. This place is very much what Mullins (1990: 37) called a 'consumption compound'. Largely Japanese faces can be seen peering at the shop windows and also meeting the glances of other Japanese who are inside. Duty free shops are scattered along the main shopping streets, a young Japanese on a working holiday on the Gold Coast is standing outside the ‘OK Gift Shop’ and bowing to his fellow nationals while muttering polite phrases trying to entice them in. The sign over the exclusive duty-free shop reads: Tokyo-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Sydney-Surfers Paradise. The Gold Coast has been connected to the global web of tourist merchandising. The Japanese-owned Raptis Plaza shopping-mall at the beach end of Cavill Avenue tries to overawe with its postmodern opulence. Its many square metres of marble, barrel-vaulted ceiling lead the visitor to Franco Cervietti’s $200,000, 6.7m tall copy of Michelangelo’s ‘David’. He stands there, on his pedestal, in the middle of the atrium, surrounded by the tables of the food court, and overshadowing groups of elderly Japanese tourists taking refreshments.

North of Elkhorn Avenue the scene changes dramatically. The creative destruction of the built-environment has wrecked havoc; gone are the walk-up flats of earlier Gold Coast property booms- The Dunes, Ten The Esplanade, Surfside Six, Southern Cross, and Sahara Court. Alan Midwood, a Gold Coast valuer and property consultant has estimated that nearly 3,000 apartment and motel units had disappeared since the mid-1980s in Surfers Paradise to make way for the projects planned by the Japanese investors on the sites which they purchased (interview, 14 April 1994). Now in many cases what is visible are just vacant lots used as car parks, the sites of mini-golf courses, or the occasional market. The odd relict building testifies to local entrepreneurship or just a stubborn refusal to sell. Other such sites are to be seen, a couple of kilometres away, at the southern end of Surfers Paradise, near the shores of the Nerang River. Only two or three years earlier plans for these sites were emblazoned across the headlines of the Gold Coast Bulletin. Two high-rises, rather like a pair of multi-tipped biros were to rise on the shores of the Nerang River, whereas the northern end of Surfers Paradise was to have, inter alia, a pair of hexagonal towers rising above a pre-packaged landscape of pools, spas and shady retreats along with the
tallest hotel on the Gold Coast, 48 storeys and costing $250 million. However in
the early 90s the only evidence of these projects were the vacant sites and plans in
offices gathering dust. Credit lines from Japan had been cut and that was that.
People were starting to refer to Surfers Paradise as having ‘the Beirut Look’. Gold
Coast City Council alderman, Gary Baildon said that he would try to bring
pressure on the Japanese owners to ‘do something to get their projects going’ (The
Australian, 20 January 1992). Does a local individual have sufficient clout to jolt
the forces of global recession into retreat? Hardly.

If one changed perspective, flew above these vacant sites and looked northwards
from central Surfers Paradise towards the horizon another pattern becomes visible:
a chain of Japanese-financed five-star hotels; the Ramada International Hotel, then
the ANA Hotel, the Gold Coast International Hotel, Marriott Surfers Paradise,
Sheraton Mirage, and right on the horizon, Hyatt Sanctuary Cove. Prior to
Japanese investment there was only one such hotel on the Gold Coast, now these
had become like pearls on the tourist chain of the local economy. All, except the
ANA Hotel, are managed by American chains, but the instigators of their
development or subsequent purchase, were the Japanese investors. Their wealth
and cultural baggage led them to go up-market to an extent that had never been
part of Gold Coast tourist culture. Now some of these hotels had completely
restructured the spaces to which they were pivotal: the ANA Hotel rises from a
podium of up-market shops, the Marriot is the centrepiece of an inward-oriented
British-Indian Colonial style resort and the Sheraton Mirage is part of a large retail
development on the other side of the road to which it was linked by a footbridge.
This centre, the ‘Marina Mirage’, is a network of exclusive shopping arcades and
uses a series of white sails as its trademark.

Whether these restructured spaces can be interpreted as ‘space of exclusion’ is a
moot point, but their style and image made them part of the international network
of hotels, resorts and shops whose consumers were the global travellers. For such
travellers the comparisons were made between the Gold Coast, Honolulu, Guam
or Vanuatu, rather than any other Australian locality.
Looking away from the chain of five-star hotels the observer could cast an eye
towards Main Beach and Paradise Island. Here again the Gold Coast of Japanese
investment becomes visible. The 80s boom had razed much 15-25 year old
housing to be replaced by high-rise apartment buildings. Some owner-occupiers
were made offers ‘too good to refuse’, this started the process of change which
then led to other owners becoming powerless to prevent their homes being
overshadowed by the high-rises appearing around them. They sold quickly. Main
Beach became the elite high-rise residential address. The Japanese made their
contribution to this as seen by the luxuriously appointed Main Beach Tower, The
Inlet, with its saw-tooth edges, Silverpoint, looking rather like a complex CD rack,
and on the western side of the Gold Coast Highway, the studied geometry of the
Art-Deco Grand Mariner facing the sinuous curves of Rivage Royale on the
northern shores of the Nerang River. Varying numbers of apartments in these
buildings were sold to Japanese buyers and their benchmarks of size and price
were drawn from Hawaii. Thus in this sense the dynamics of these projects were
essentially global, but the actual choice of the site came out of relationships to the
coastline, views, and the complexities of the local property market and the
positions of gatekeepers in relation to it. Thus the uniqueness of place played a
crucial part in determining locations and spatial relationships among them. In
contrast, what was built and the meanings that can be interpreted from the
appearance of these projects make more references to Hawaii, Miami, or
Acapulco. For it was in that spatio-cultural context that their appeal to the buyer
was meant to occur.

Casting one’s eye along the coastline few kilometres north of Main Beach one
sees a cluster of townhouses, villas and sporting facilities grouped around a
marina. If the whole complex evokes an instant sign of recognition, this is
intended. For its initiator, the Japanese construction firm Kumagai Gumi wanted
to make a reference to the Port Grimaud development on the French Riviera, a
project featured in many works on contemporary architecture. Other visual
manifestations of the Gold Coast of Japanese investment require a peripatetic gaze
sweeping over large expanses of the urban area. They range from the gated
mansions found in an arc around Surfers Paradise on the canal estates of Paradise
Waters, Isle of Capri, Chevron and Cronin Island, to the insertion of the sinuous curves of town houses around the canals at Merrimac by the Japanese ex-tennis pro, now developer, Henry Kawada. There is also the Nifsan suburban housing estate spreading across the barren countryside at Robina.; the styles, layout and name (‘Glenwood Park’), of the Nifsan project shows that this Japanese company sought local advice to get its symbolism ‘right’, so that those groups of Australian society seeking to locate there would feel reassured about what their move signifies and with what they have identified.

The gaze of the observer moves to the southern end of the urban area, to the hillside above the Gold Coast airport runway at Coolangatta. The grey hulk of a five-storey building looms up from the edge of low-rise suburbia. What the observer sees is an empty shell, the empty shell of the Tugun ‘Hospital of Excellence’. This was a joint venture between the Japanese trading company C. Itoh, the Moran Health Care Group, and AGC. The investors sought to create an image for it of a world class clinic- Australia’s answer to the Mayo Clinic in the US. Its purpose was to attract the rich and powerful from overseas to the Gold Coast. Thus it was not seen as a service to the local community, but as a symbol of the Gold Coast’s globalization. PR statements made mention of its ‘state of the art equipment’, such as $5 million scanning machine specially imported from the USA and 25,000 candle-power surgical theatre lights (GCB, 2 July 1990). As the recession hit, the whole project seized in a tangle of litigation among the investment partners, and in the early 1990s the completed building stood there, empty.

Golf, and what it signifies in the cultural baggage of the Japanese on the Gold Coast, seems to reappear again and again; no more dramatically than around the peripheries of the urban area. The unique qualities of the environmental ecology of this urban fringe consist of the estuarine mudflats and mangrove around its northern edge, and everywhere else, relict dairying and sugar cane country that is largely floodprone, except for small, old sand ridges interspersed throughout it. It is into this environment that Japanese capital entered and sought to transform parts of it into golf course resorts.
The developments were all initiated as package deals and what was planned exemplifies the processes which Ellin (1996: 153) ascribed as defining postmodern architecture, ‘form follows finance’. In this process a costing strategy is developed which is then transposed into a set of aesthetic signifiers of a type that are perceived to be the most marketable commodity at that time. The observer casting a glance over these Gold Coast environments would have seen earthworks reforming the previous environment into which landscapes prepackaged in the offices of architects and landscape designers were being inserted. These ranged from the most developed, most expensive EIE-owned Sanctuary Cove, with its nautical-themed ‘village centre’, semi-circular marina, 1920s Raffles-style hotel and golf links interspersed with curving ribbons of homes as close as possible, to the ultimate Japanese prestige symbol, golf. The whole resort being clearly delineated by fences and gates from the abandoned farmland with its relict Queensland-style houses outside its perimeters. The gated community had arrived from the United States and became a part of the package being marketed. The developers argued it signified social exclusivity and personal security. As Jones (1998: 446) commented, ‘in recent years fantastic “entry statements” to estates have become popular. They provide a structural frame for escape, marking a dividing point between the ordinary and extraordinary, a packaging mechanism to mark a special place’.

Arundel Hills, Gainsborough Greens, Sapphire Lakes, Palm Meadows, Royal Pines, Paradise Springs, Hope Island, and the Nikko Resort can all be seen to have unrolled variations on a similar prepackaged landscape. The only significant difference being the stage of development they had reached when the credit lines from Japan were cut in 1990-92. This meant that, a year or so later some, such as the clubhouse at Hope Island, could be seen sitting alone in front of its impeccably-groomed links flanked by flat floodplain awaiting development. Sapphire Lakes was never more than piles of earth in which monsoonal rains regularly set off mudslides. By the third quarter of 1990 Koshin in Tokyo was forced to cease the flow of funds and Sapphire Lakes on the Gold Coast was ‘mothballed’ (GCB, 12 November 1990). The others were luckier, and the
observer in the early 1990s found these resorts revealing themselves in varying stages of development.

Viewed through the prism of the global-local interface, the significance of these golf course resorts was far reaching. The investors had restructured the chosen space from low-lying, swampy pasture, or coastal mangrove to the pre-planned landscape of the golf course resort, with its salient features often transposed from overseas examples. In this sense then, at a macro-scale, Japanese capital furthered the integration of the Gold Coast into global networks of capital and cultural signifiers. But at the immediate, local scale its space was subdivided and fragmented in a very definitive manner to form spatial packages according to the cultural imagery of their financiers and the way they, and their consultants, were reading the market.

The patterns of the Gold Coast of Japanese investment were spatially incoherent, functionally manifold and contextually diverse. They bring to mind the paradigm of the postmodern city discussed by Rowe (1975: 65-91) the ‘city as collage’. Such collage cities are cities with many different cultural groups, values, lifestyles, all reflected in the diverse signifiers of the built environment they have created. In the case of the Gold Coast, the arrival of the Japanese inserted a powerful new element into this urban collage. However, the Japanese were not just a new cultural group disconnected from others there; their capital was also a unifying thread: the amount, the timing, the location where it was inserted into the space of the Gold Coast and the way it reformulated that space became a key to the reading of the landscape of that city.
Summary

This chapter has sought to reveal the spatio-environmental dimension of the global-local interface on the Gold Coast. The Japanese investor was the major vehicle through whom the forces of globalization arrived on the Gold Coast. Their capital was directed to diverse projects at disparate locations. As their purchases were made and their projects were created, these projects revealed themselves to be manifestations of what Japanese wanted in the Gold Coast; but their locations and patterns were outcomes of the uniqueness of the Gold Coast as a place having its distinct environment and spatio-economic features. The most important spatio-environmental feature was the coast itself along which an urban strip had developed centred on Surfers Paradise. Japanese capital reinforced this centrality. In turn this coastal strip was backed by floodplains and estuaries into and onto which Japanese capital had accelerated spread of the urban development.

If the spatial relationships among the Japanese projects at first glance appeared accidental, then a closer analysis of the cartographic evidence revealed that the unifying thread running through it was Japanese capital and its injection into given locations and its spatial restructuring of those locations. The way this spatial restructuring occurred has in turn to be considered in relation to the aims of individual investors, both as revealed on the Gold Coast, and also as derived from contemporary Japan; a very time-specific Japan, that of the bubble economy of the 1980s. For it was economic forces unleashed in Japan at that time, and the vision of limitless credit that this created in the eyes of many of their fellow nationals, which led to perception that they should leave their local environment and go out into the world and acquire property assets or develop the projects of their dreams. The results on the Gold Coast of this endeavour can be seen in the tabular and cartographic templates presented and interpreted in this chapter.
The Japanese on the Gold Coast: Culture and Projects

The previous chapter considered the spatial dimensions of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast, as well as providing an analysis of the characteristics of the major Japanese investors and the fate of their projects. Through the presence of the Japanese, the Gold Coast also became the interface between these ‘outsiders’ and the local environment and economy. Seen from a cultural perspective, the Gold Coast became the site of projects whose characteristics were determined as much by the cultural baggage brought by the Japanese as by the socio-economic features of the local environment. To seek to explain this, the features of the Japanese-funded developments need to be analysed within the general cultural framework of the Japanese investor. In other words, as discussed in the methodology chapter, such textual engagement involves both ‘text’ and ‘context’.

As introduced in the Literature Review, the existence of a unique Japanese national culture is a widely-perceived reality. Such a national text encompasses a world view, or an identifiable perspective through which meanings and values are placed on images and encounters with the world outside. The content of the national culture evolves in a specific context, that is, the historical experience which the group has had, the geographic characteristics of its home territory and its spatial relationship to the rest of the world (Nester, 1990: 125). Thus one can only start to understand what Australia and the Gold Coast meant to the Japanese when one places it into the context of the Japanese experience, the experience of space of a large group of people on limited land, the experience of living as a group with a high degree of cultural integration in an environment in which resources were scarce, and a group which in the 1980s acquired wealth and so was able to enter the global mainstream with dramatic suddenness (Burstein, 1988: 32-76).
The aspects of Japanese national culture that need investigation are those that help to explain their Gold Coast projects; more specifically, how the projects into which they invested their capital were defined by their image of the Gold Coast and, in turn, how the processes of investment in these projects and the symbolism they acquired could be read in relation to the culture from which they came.

It is a circular study paradigm which can be entered at different points and within which linear logic is replaced by a narrative that can be read in either direction. It can start with a consideration of the cultural baggage the Japanese brought with them to the Gold Coast and how the projects they developed reflected this; or, it can be entered through a study of the actual projects, with explanations for their main characteristics being sought in the cultural perceptions and priorities with which the Japanese arrived on the Gold Coast. Perhaps such a flexible narrative structure is appropriate for a study focused on the Japanese, for, as Wei-hsun Fu and Heine (1995: viii-x) argued, the Japanese have never favoured linear thought, but ways of thinking that could be entered at many points and that had a plurality of meanings according to who was reading it. As already mentioned in the literature review, this has led Western semioticists to engage with Japan and see it has a culture with decentred signs, that is, any sign can be fractured into a ‘signified’ and an irreducible play of floating signifiers so that it empties itself out and thus no longer has the centre, the ostensible perspective or vantage point (Wei-hsun Fu and Heine, 1995: 2).

Such a semiotic approach can be applied to the Japanese projects on the Gold Coast. Given the period under study, reference has to be made to the postmodernist paradigm which sees capital being combined with culture and commodified into a form of cultural production (Jameson, 1984; Ellin, 1996). Bourdieu (1984: 1) made a similar point when he wrote of an ‘economy of cultural goods’. In this, he saw culture as part of a process of production and consumption in which given cultural products circulate in a market. Zukin’s (1991: 259) comment that ‘architecture is crucial in the management and determination of cultural consumption’ specified this point in terms of one form of cultural
production. Thus the Japanese projects on the Gold Coast can be considered as cultural products and examined accordingly.

At this point the dual nature of buildings and the ensembles they form should be noted. On the one hand the built environment is functional, but on the other, as Eco (Knox, 1984: 12) pointed out, 'every usage is converted into a sign of itself'. This means that most buildings have a secondary function that is connotative, or symbolic of something. The signs of this are the main signifiers contained in their architectural style, layout and design. It is through a decoding of these that, according to Krampen (1979: 1) cultural meaning is extracted from the urban environment. This is possible because architecture/design is a particularly good sign system for the communication of social, cultural and individual values. In the architectural work, argued Preziosi (1984: 181-182) the signs of the producer, the consumer and the observer intersect. Hence its reality is very much an exercise of free-floating signifiers caught in individual ways by those engaging with it.

In this chapter it is the relationship between the Japanese and Western architecture and design that provides the theme through which the meanings of the Gold Coast projects will be revealed. In this, the Japanese sense of selective visibility, the use of Western signifiers to convey Japanese meanings and the use of such signifiers in eclectic combinations, are all relevant to the Japanese engagement with Western architecture (Popham, 1985; Yoshida, Tanaka & Sesoko, 1984; Hesselberger, 1984). In turn what certain aspects of Western architecture and the built environment signified to the Japanese can be related to their image of Australia, particularly the Gold Coast and their place in it.

Therefore this chapter will identify and explain the Japanese perception of Australia and more specifically the Gold Coast. This will provide the context for a consideration of the properties that the Japanese bought there and the projects they developed. The aim is to discover what their projects say about their Japanese owners and their relationship to the Gold Coast.
The Japanese Perception of Australia and the Gold Coast

At the top of a rack outside a large travel agency in Osaka the researcher saw the JAL (Japan Air Lines) travel brochure on the Gold Coast for the northern summer season of 1990. Apart from the smiling Japanese girl in a bathing suit, it featured small inset photographs of the Gold Coast coastline, and a few examples of coastal activities possible there and illustrations of the two hotels to which JAL was offering holiday packages. The next page showed a photograph in the centre around which the details of the various holiday packages were grouped. The large photograph had an oval logo in its top corner with a kangaroo and the words 'Aussie Style' in both Japanese and English. The actual coloured photograph showed a close-up of the section of a white chair in front of a bright blue swimming pool water surface transfused with light. On the chair was visible a section of a pink towel on which was casually draped a tube of sun screen, a pair of sneakers with shoe laces on which the words 'Coca Cola' could be read clearly and a paperback with the title: 'Understanding Hypertension: Causes and Treatments' by Timothy N. Caris, M.D. (Fig. 5.0).

Images aimed at tourists can sometimes be a valuable symbol of images about a given place or people. For example, the writing of Biles, Lloyd and Logan (1999) on Vietnam shows this. For the travel agency, tourist organization or airline has an obvious vested interest in evoking an active response for its travel commodity from its potential consumers. It must succeed in engaging the people to whom it is trying to appeal with its visual, or written texts. Market research is used to identify the signification which the potential consumers attach to a given place and the tourist text is then designed to reinforce its salient signifiers. If it is found that the distant tourist destination is largely unknown, then the text created about it seeks to crystallize hidden or not so hidden deficiencies or longings which the targeted local group is perceived to have in its everyday life at home. Thus the tourist destination may be portrayed as a 'fantasy' constructed through TV, film or magazine images (Urry: 1990: 3). Thus it becomes an 'other', an 'other' that is contrasted with the people's 'usual' cultural text. The result is that these texts
may be increasingly perceived in relation to each other and may even define themselves in relation to each other. A tourist text can be seen as a meaningful point of entry into discourses about perceptions and images of place.

What does the JAL brochure reveal about the Japanese image of the Gold Coast? How can it be analysed? What signifiers does it contain and what is signified by them about the meanings which the Japanese attach to the Gold Coast? The visual text is both an integral whole with a unifying signifier, as well the number of individual signifiers attached to its constituent parts that in turn help define its overarching meaning. The presence of the word ‘Coca Cola’ appears to be a signifier that the Gold Coast is in that ‘big-wide world’ outside Japan, part of a sophisticated global culture which a trip to the Gold Coast will enable a Japanese person to enter. (Perhaps the Coca Cola Corp. paid the advertizers for its name to be in the photograph to achieve this very perception). Sunshine, leisure and relaxation can be immediately decoded from the photograph on the brochure. The bright colours, the play of light on the water surface, the clean, white chair and fresh pink towel evoke the style of much Japanese advertizing; a style that no doubt has been tested for its effectiveness in bringing the product and the consumer together. The Japanese advertizing style places great emphasis on freshness, brightness, and cleanliness. In Japan these are often attached as signifiers to whatever product is being promoted and as Ivy (1989: 36) argued, the aim is to inform and reassure the potential consumer by creating advertizements which are ‘joyful artifacts’.

In this case it has been used to present the Gold Coast as having the attributes of a relaxing holiday destination within the framework of a set of signifiers that a potential Japanese tourist would interpret as being a sign of desirable human virtues. The paperback on hypertension is revealing. For its signification is a multilayered one: at the more obvious level, one can see it as reinforcing the image of the Gold Coast as a place of leisure and relaxation; at another level though, it appears to say something about the perceptions of the Japanese of life in their own country, a lifestyle within which tiredness, stress and tension are
omnipresent. Thus the discourse between the two texts helps define the meanings contained within each of them. Interview texts gathered on the Gold Coast appear to provide variations on the meanings revealed by the photograph in the tourist brochure just discussed.

The most detailed statement on the Japanese perception of the Gold Coast was provided by the Gold Coast Japanese translator and community worker Kimiko VanderWaal (Interview, Broadbeach, 12 October 1993). She described the reaction of the Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast in the 1986-90 period in the following way:

They saw the space, the beautiful climate, blue sky day-in, day-out. They thought about things back in Japan—hot, humid, rainy. Such a crowded place, people living and commuting in a packed train, everything so crowded. Living conditions are not really so good in Japan. They were just fascinated and wanted a part of it......They realized how many properties foreigners could buy at such a ridiculous price for the Japanese. They had excess money and they could borrow from the banks so easily......They thought they could live well here......the golf course is so close, in Japan they have to get on a train to get to the golf course and that takes a couple of hours. Here people who love boating can tie-up their boat in front of the house......Some came as business migrants or retired here, others bought a house, or more often a unit, as a second home or as an investment.

The clear refrain of her comment is space, beautiful climate, leisure, easy access to sporting amenities, especially golf, and all this, to be had with little effort and at low prices. The Etsuko Bishop of PRD Realty Pty. Ltd. (Surfers Paradise, 19 October 1994) summed up the appeal of the Gold Coast to the Japanese under four headings: space, sunshine, safety and the success of advertising; with the last point of course seeking the acceptance of the truth of the first three. Employee A of another real estate firm in Surfers Paradise commented (21 October 1994):

‘The Japanese are overawed by Australia’s broad spaces, they will buy land just to
own it’. Similarly, Mick Okawa, President of The Japanese Society of the Gold Coast said (Surfers Paradise, 27 June 1995), that he was drawn there by its environment, sunny climate and easy lifestyle. He also commented that most of the members of the Society had the same feelings about the Gold Coast. Even those whose investments and planned development projects were aborted by the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy and the downturn in the Gold Coast property market were happy to live there. As one so affected commented (Japanese Executive A, Surfers Paradise, 9 January 1995): ‘This is the best place to live in the world. I have my family here, my children go to school here. It’s just not much good for business.’

The opinions quoted above are similar to other research and writing into the Japanese and their perception of Australia. For example, Mizukami’s study (1993) of selected Japanese in Brisbane, the discussion in English of Suzuki’s book *Nihonjin No Oosutorariakan* (Australia through Japanese Eyes) by Yoshimitzu (1992: 39-46), and the essay published in 1990 by the sociologist Masatoshi Abe (1992: 85-88) *Oosutoraria Koosatu Kikoo* (Reflections on a Study Tour Around Australia) all identified space, sunshine, relaxation as the most important components of the Japanese image of Australia.

Many of the Japanese first saw the Gold Coast after they had already visited, if not invested in Hawaii. A comment made by Desmond Brooks (Southport, 28 June 1995), a Gold Coast architect/resort planner illustrates this view:

I think that Australia was a new sort of flavour for a lot of them and with our lots of land.....Hawaii has too big a Japanese population, that made some of them feel inhibited.....and we are more or less in the same time zone as Japan, that meant they could keep in touch with their business back in Tokyo....(in the 80s) we were starting to get the new flights into Brisbane and the Gold Coast, the airports were improved. They’ve (ie., the Japanese) changed the place for all time, the Gold Coast entered the real tourist market only in the 1980s.
Des Brooks had lived and worked in Hawaii, so he tended to think in comparative terms and ascribed a similar perspective to the Japanese. He interpreted their perspective as being a global one, in which Hawaii and the Gold Coast were perceived in relation to each other, and both were defined spatially, environmentally and economically in relation to the cultural baggage that the Japanese had brought with them. The result can be seen as a three-sided textual discourse of considerable complexity.

There is another type of text in which the Japanese view of the Gold Coast is contained. This is overtly commercial and makes a clear connection between the environmental desirability of the Gold Coast and the latent desires to buy property there. The Japanese-language, give-away monthly newspaper Nichigo Press had regular features on the beauty of the Gold Coast with written and visual graphics featuring beaches, sunshine and property. For example, the September 1992 issue contained a double-page spread laid-out with the advertisements for the Japanese-financed high-rise apartment projects Main Beach Tower, Grand Mariner, and Rivage Royale encircling a photograph of Surfers Paradise beach and skyline (Fig. 5.1). Next to these illustrations the following text was written (in translation):

The Gold Coast is a vast 40km long beach which runs north and south in an arc. It is a couple of times bigger than Hawaii’s beaches. You will be greatly refreshed if you walk barefoot over its white sand. Also, you can see the sparkling south Pacific from the balconies of the condominiums which are built along the beach. Some people will dream that they live there. We are happy to advise you if you wish to buy.....If you walk down the street....you’ll find a lot of colourful advertisements in the real estate shop windows....you’ll find most of them are much cheaper than in Japan... (Nichigo Press, 10 Sept., to 10 Oct., 1992: 14-15).

Again, meanings in this text are related to the perceptions of established holiday destinations with which the Japanese came to the Gold Coast. The emphasis on light, sunshine, cleanliness and the space of the Gold Coast environment, as well
ゴールドコーストでコンドミニアムを
取得は簡単、比較検討が大切

レオ不動産

MAIN BEACH

新築2ベッドルーム販売

$199,000より

特別販売価格

・ベガストンハイツの一貫購入を
ダブル購入の方法
・タウンハウス型では高齢者
向けの助成手当
・営業に3%の税金負担
・ホスピタルパークイニティブ
・新築25年保証

MA N I N B E A C H T O W E R
18 CROWN AVE NUE • MAIN BE A C H

ロケーション
セキュリティ
タトリティ

全てを乗り越えてほしいのは、
グランドマリナーだけです。
as the cheapness of property there says as much about their cultural baggage, as it
does about the Gold Coast. It is obviously in the interest of Nichigo Press and the
advertisers who enable it to be published, to establish a strong link between the
signifiers of environmental attractiveness and cheapness of property. This will,
the publishers hope, convince their readers that it is not only desirable, but also
quite possible for any Japanese to become part of what the Gold Coast signifies.
There is an obvious desire to identify with the image of the Gold Coast as a place
of sunshine, relaxation and leisure that the writers and advertisers in the Nichigo
Press believe their Japanese readers in Australia have brought with them. This
explains the nature of the verbal text and the photographs they created in this issue
of Nichigo Press.

The Japanese and their Response to Australian Values:

The Japanese perception of the Gold Coast was one of space, sunshine and sandy
beaches, environmental characteristics that were in short supply in their home
country. However the interviews revealed that there was another dimension which
they perceived as highly desirable on the Gold Coast, and that was not just
physical space, but also social space.

Again, to quote Mick Okawa, the President of The Japanese Society of the Gold
Coast:

The Japanese here like the friendliness and informality of Australians.....I
came here with my second wife and new family....I want my children to
grow up in the Gold Coast environment....I am educating them to be
bicultural.....it will be their choice whether they go back to Japan or not.
(Surfers Paradise, 27 June 1995)

This comment appears to reiterate the meaning placed on the physical
environment of the Gold Coast, but what is revealing is that it also points to
certain aspects of the cultural environment on which the speaker has placed a high
value- informality, friendliness, biculturalism. In other words, social flexibility
and individual difference were being experienced by the Japanese on the Gold Coast and they were putting a positive value on them.

Japanese resident A on the Gold Coast spelt out her feelings and those of her fellow Japanese about social space in Australia (Broadbeach, 3 July 1996). She spoke of how many Japanese living on the Gold Coast liked the privacy which they had there. The social obligations into which they were locked at home were seen by them as a burden. She spoke of their 'sense of freedom'. By contrast, in Japan there were 'unseen walls' in terms of social etiquette and personal behaviour and appearance. Even older women for example, enjoyed the fact that they felt free to wear brightly coloured clothes, something that would incur disapproval in Japan. So on the Gold Coast they felt in a sense 'liberated'.

Alexander McRobbie, a Gold Coast journalist with many contacts in the Japanese community put it this way:

The Japanese here are fascinated by the casual Australian lifestyle. What is more, it seems to be rubbing-off on them. They go around in casual clothes, develop overt mannerisms, show affection in public. It's quite incredible.

(Broadbeach, 23 September 1992)

So the Japanese on the Gold Coast were confronted with an environment and a culture very different from their own. As most of them had negative memories of many aspects of their physical environment in Japan, that of the Gold Coast was quickly seized on as the 'other' and strongly endorsed. What was more surprising was their desire to place a positive meaning on aspects of peoples’ attitudes and behaviour on the Gold Coast. For the conventional image of the Japanese has been that they take their socio-cultural baggage with them wherever they go and continue to behave in terms of its norms. However there is research that shows their positive response to the Gold Coast lifestyle was matched by the response of some Japanese to living in the United States (Paine, 1997).
Japanese Projects on the Gold Coast and Japanese Values

The affluence of the Japanese during the 1980s meant that they could realize many of their dreams of consumption and lifestyle. One manifestation of this was foreign travel and the possibilities opened up by it (Clammer, 1997: 139). Such dreams of the desirable lifestyle and its tangible manifestations were defined according to Western cultural models; a situation that is not surprising when one considers that very few Japanese had a traditional culture of affluence and leisure. This should also be considered in relation to the fact that since the beginning of the Meiji era the aim of the Japanese elite has been to emulate the West, even though the signifiers Westernization were often adopted in a fragmented, superficial way which removed them from their social and cultural context (Ellin, 1996: 139; Yoshimoto, 1989: 13). It is with this in mind that the characteristics and imagery of the Japanese-funded projects on the Gold Coast need to be considered and through this the visions of their owners deduced.

The material used here to reveal these visions is that gathered in relevant interviews, as well as in advertizing texts produced to publicize individual Japanese-financed projects and purchases. For, as Williamson noted (1978: 11), advertizing is one of the most important cultural forms moulding and reflecting our lives today. It is created for the obvious reason of selling products, and this is often done through the creation of structures that have meaning for the consumer. In other words, advertizing text has to have signifiers which will evoke certain values, desires in the people who read it, or as Williamson (1978: 19) continued, the text has to be able to embed the object (signifier) that is being advertized into a social or cultural ideology. For example an advertizing text has to be created for a certain Gold Coast resort which attempts to ensure that it signifies success, wealth, well-earned leisure, and sophistication.

The creation of such structures of meaning appears to be especially the case in Japan. Creighton (1994: 226) argued that in the Japanese advertizing culture, especially that which they create around foreign images and foreign places, the text created by advertizers tends not to emphasize information about the product,
but rather serves to create a series of 'intriguing image quotations' and 'the possibility of playful excursion into fantasy'. Miyoshi and Harootunian (1989: vii-xi) took this cultural trait further, they pointed to the prevalence of such a perspectival, decentred, flickering cultural text among the Japanese as a sign of it being an essentially postmodern culture. At the same time, from a generic perspective, all advertizing text, no matter its cultural origin, is an outcome of the discourse between the producer of a commodity and the potential consumer, mediated by the chosen advertizing agency. However the form the discourse takes and the nature of the text produced is strongly influenced by the perspectives and values just discussed.

Thus, in a consideration of the salient features of the projects that the Japanese bought or built on the Gold Coast, their own verbal text of them, the verbal text which others produced about the Japanese and their projects, as well as text produced by advertizers all become distinct yet connected discourses which can reveal a variety of meanings.

**Investments as Visions of Luxury and Prestige:**

Ron Burling of the Gold Coast architectural firm of Burling, Brown and Partners Pty. Ltd., referred to the Japanese projects on the Gold Coast in the following way, 'they have prestige, colour, gimmicks and luxury' (Southport, 30 June 1995).

Visions of success and luxury have always been interconnected; indeed, one is a precondition of the other, or the latter is perceived by its practitioners to be a manifestation of the former. Success is frequently valued in a competitive sense. Japanese culture is very group centred, and it is through the group that the competitive ethic is manifested (Kubota, 1994: 39-40). The dominant groups of relevance in Japan to property investment were the corporations and smaller companies. In the 1980s their competitive ethic was transposed, to among other things, the quest for status through foreign property ownership. One Japanese property consultant interviewed on the Gold Coast (Surfers Paradise, 19 October 1994) noted that very few Japanese companies investing on the Gold Coast did
their market research. They were motivated by the desire to gain or develop a more prestigious asset than the other Japanese companies; or, as Partner A in a large Gold Coast real estate agency put it: ‘There was a competitive quest among them (Japanese firms) for the best’. The three largest and architecturally most striking Japanese high-rise apartment buildings, Grand Mariner, Rivage Royale and Belle Maison, were frequently referred to as ‘ego trips’ for their company directors. Ownership of the Sanctuary Cove golf course resort became the focus of the competitive quest among a number of Japanese companies (Fig. 5.2). At its auction in September 1988 fierce bidding by Suntory Corp and EIE Corp. was considered by the property industry to have pushed up its price by 35-40 per cent to a record $341 million. Once EIE Corp. had bought it, it became the benchmark of luxurious golf resort development for other Japanese companies such as Shinko Corp., Narui Natin Co. and Koshin Co.

The advertizing text created for Sanctuary Cove provides some signs as to why the Japanese investors came to consider this resort as the symbol of luxury and prestige. Brochures led with ‘This is Sanctuary Cove....(dissolving into a series of coloured photographs of the golf course, showing the pastel ambience of display home interiors and reflections of yachts in the marina)....imagine the lifestyle’. The studied flamboyance of its Gold Coast developer, Mike Gore, ensured that Sanctuary Cove attracted a high level of publicity even before it was opened. The actual opening on 9 January 1988 was managed by John Singleton Advertizing in Sydney. It involved the insertion of a glossy, four page broadsheet into the Brisbane and Gold Coast press. It was headed Invitation and said:

Michael Gore, who built his dream at Sanctuary Cove, would be honoured if you and your family would join him for the opening of Sanctuary Cove Marine Village, where everything is special and nothing is second rate.

Around the above text was a large aerial photograph of the centre of the project, the Marine Village with its yacht club architecture, ribbon of white town houses around the semi-circular marina and just a glimpse of the golf course on the top edge of the photograph. Members of the social elites of Sydney and Melbourne
were invited to attend the opening and what they got was an open air concert focused on such icons of global culture as Frank Sinatra and Whitney Houston. Subsequently an Indian-Colonial style Hyatt Regency at Sanctuary Cove was opened as the focal point of the commercial facilities at the resort.

EIE Corporation was the creation of the Japanese bubble economy, and Sanctuary Cove was the symbol of the extravagance of the Gold Coast property boom of the 1980s. They were made for each other. The Executive President of EIE, Harunori Takahashi, declared of Sanctuary Cove: ‘This is a beautiful place and my favourite project in Australia’ (*The Courier-Mail*, 20 Sept. 1988). However his chief investment advisor, Dr. Bungo Ishizaki, spoke of the need to ‘pump sorely needed funds into the project’, and referred to some of the detail on the hotel as ‘looking cheap’ (*GCB*, 20 Sept. 1988). The confidence of the new Japanese ownership appeared infinite- they had paid a very high purchase price to knock out an established Japanese company from the bidding and now their words implied a continuing lavish flow of investment capital into it to embellish their ‘dream property’ according to what they perceived it should be.

Earlier in 1983, the decision to built the ‘Palm Meadows’ golf course resort in Carrara was the result of the president of Daikyo Kanko Corp. being convinced that the Gold Coast did not have a golf course of sufficiently high standard and his company was best placed to give it one. A prominent Gold Coast firm of planners and consulting engineers was commissioned to assemble a site and the Palm Meadows golf course opened in 1987. The luxurious club house incorporating elements of a south seas loggia and with Japanese roof lines, fringed by palm trees and sitting above an artificial lake became the icon of the whole development. The advertizing spoke of the Gold Coast being Australia’s most popular holiday destination and which now had ‘just 10 minutes drive from Surfers Paradise, Palm Meadows a world class public facility catering to holiday makers and local residents’ (in translation from: *Meatpie*, Japanese Tourist Magazine, 1992 Autumn-Winter: 2).
However a local facility was not enough for Shuji Yokoyama, the Daikyo Kanko Corp. president. He considered the Palm Meadows golf course as a global icon and so he decided to fund the 'Daikyo Palm Meadows Cup'. The first was held between 28-31 January 1988 and with $500,000 prize money attracted the 'who's who' of world golf. Full page advertisements appeared in the local and metropolitan press featuring Greg Norman, one of the chief symbols of international golf teeing-off in the foreground with the Palm Meadows club house and resort landscaping clearly visible behind him (Fig. 5.3). The desire to establish a link between local amenity and global status was obvious.

Not to be outdone, after EIB Corp. had purchased Sanctuary Cove it attracted another world-class golfer, Ian Baker-Finch, to settle at Sanctuary Cove and so made him a symbol of that golf course resort and used him in their publicity. Sanctuary Cove advertizing also highlighted a report from the Australian Golf Digest that within weeks of its opening the Sanctuary Cove golf course had been rated number 13 out of the top 100 courses in Australia, while Palm Meadows was number 29 (*The Spirit of Sanctuary Cove*, Spring 1989: 12). Shinko Corp’s response to this competitive quest for status among the Japanese companies was to commission Peter Thomson, the doyen of Australian golf and five times winner of the British Open, to design the golf course in their Hope Island development project. Opened in 1993, the March 1994 issue of the Australian Golf Digest rated it the number one course in Australia. From then on Hope Island Resort publicity was headed, ‘Live on Australia’s No 1 resort golf course’.

The desire to create an image of ‘global status’ for a local development project and so encourage both extra customers for the golf course as well as the sale of land-house packages overlooking it was their clear intent. However as Partner B in a Surfers Paradise property consultancy commented (13 April 1994), these Japanese companies in the late 80s had such a overwhelming belief in the lavishness of their capital resources and infinite lines of credit that their competitive urge with each other seemed to take precedence over what Gold Coast property consultants regarded as ‘normal’ economic practice, such as considerations of cash flow and
FIGURE 5.3: DAIKYO PALM MEADOW CUP

MASSIVE SHARK ATTACK ON THE GOLD COAST

On January 28th, the world's best will tee off at Palm Meadows with one thought in mind — stop Greg Norman, The Great White Shark, taking the $500,000 DAIKYO Palm Meadows Cup.

Marsh, Faldo, Woosnam, Askii, Otaki, Senior, Davis, Graham and other world class professionals are invited to challenge. And for four full days the magnificent Palm Meadows International Golf Course will sort out the victors from the victims.

Palm Meadows was designed by top Australian golfer Graham Marsh as a great course for all golfers, as well as a course to test all the skills of the greats. Join the gallery for the tournament and see how to play Australia's premier course.

WIN A TRIP TO HAWAII
You can win one of 15 seven day Hawaiian holidays for two including airfares and accommodation.

Tickets for the Cup are available by writing to: DAIKYO Palm Meadows Cup, P.O. Box 5945, Gold Coast Mail Centre, 4217.

Tickets are $15 per day or $50 for four days.

DAIKYO Palm Meadows Cup • January 28-31, 1988
$500,000 PRIZE MONEY
Palm Meadows International Golf Course, Carrara, Gold Coast. Telephone (07) 52 9800.
the timing of property being put on the market in relation to the property cycle. A Bundall consulting engineer specified this attitude as follows:

I think they primarily wanted a golf course....and the concept of the residential buildings, was more or less, from the Japanese point of view, an afterthought. It was something they’d do after they built the golf course, it wasn’t seen as a total project in itself, the golf course was the main issue and, strangely the cash flow was coming from the land development and that they left till last.

(Bundall, 25 October 1994)

The Role of Japanese Company Competitiveness:

The culture of the Japanese bubble economy of the 80s with its very strong yen and flushness of cheap credit, plus an ignorance of property cycles and a belief that the Gold Coast economy was just as large as that which sustained Hawaii and California, emboldened them to act according to their culture of group conformity and corporate competitive behaviour. These are values which Kubota (1994: 39-40) argued the Japanese believe to be the driving force of social progress. The fact that such behaviour was being acted out at a locality with an economic culture requiring different priorities, time scales and investment decisions was a perception which these Japanese companies at the time of their arrival did not have.

Company competitiveness and the quest for status among the Japanese investors also contributed to the perfectionalism, opulence and desire for eclectic distinctiveness in appearance of their projects. There was often a desire to achieve this through a theming of the project according to the Japanese investor’s image of what designates status and wealth according to the signifiers of Western culture. The Japanese property consultant A interviewed (Surfers Paradise, 19 October 1994), expressed the opinion that most of the large Japanese projects on the Gold Coast said more about the image desired by the company than about the realities
of the local environment and the nature of the real estate market. Numerous examples of this point can be quoted.

The Gold Coast Prince Hotel which is the visual focus of the Royal Pines Resort in Ashmore is triangular in shape (Fig. 5.4). The reason for this is that its developer and owner, the Matsushita Corporation of Osaka, uses the pine tree as its logo. The pine tree in turn is a signifier for the Company’s philosophy, that is expressed as a triangulation between human beings-buildings-nature. The roadways within the resort were all bordered by low hedges consisting of neatly arranged bushes constantly being shaped by gardeners to retain their sinuous rotundity. This gives a kaleidoscopic perspective depending on the angle from which it is viewed. Such floating visual images are a frequent component of Japanese garden imagery (Condon & Kurata, 1987: 48). However the visually dominant element of the landscaping is the pine tree, the Matsushita Corp. logo; about nine thousand of them were planted against the advice of Gold Coast garden landscapers who pointed to the unsuitability of the soils for that tree at the resort site.

In a similar way the Senshukai Corporation, a mail-order retailer, called its Broadbeach high-rise apartment block ‘Belle Maison’ after the title of its catalogue in Japan. Their retail marketing strategy was aimed at the young, working, unmarried woman and their choice of catalogue title shows that they had already sought to make the link between stylish shopping and France. They now sought to extend and transpose this signifier of stylishness in Western culture to their first venture into foreign property investment. As partner A in the architectural firm commissioned to design Belle Maison commented: ‘They decided to do something that would give it (the building) an iconic quality in the Gold Coast skyline’. (Southport, 4 July 1995). For apart from the French theme in the nomenclature and interior decor of the apartments, it was the penthouse that made the building visually striking. The architect in the same interview explained the genesis of the penthouse in the following way:
Let's design a two storey house and then put it on top of this thirty-two storey building....so we designed a two storey house with an outdoor pool, a little guest house on the side, you know that you walk across your yard to get to it. There was also a garden gazebo which sort of topped-off one of those vertical elements of the main house.....it wasn’t a French chateau, but it was inspired by one.

The architect’s description just quoted appears to be more subtle than that of the adverizers marketing Belle Maison. For their text refers to this 752sq. m penthouse as ‘The French Chateau in the Sky’ with a drawing of Belle Maison that places the observer in mid-air with the turrets and mansard roves of the penthouse drawn in such a way that they are seen as thrusting up towards them (Fig. 5.5 ). Judging by numerous comments made about the building, the Senshukai Corp. had achieved its intent of creating a very distinctive symbol for itself on the Gold Coast.

The Role of Cross-cultural Signification:

This raises the issue of cross-cultural signification. For at one level the Japanese companies sought to create signifiers that would be unique to their company, but in many instances such signification was drawn from opulent Western culture. They wanted to place their meanings onto Western cultural symbols. In this case, the designs and architectural styles they felt would show other Japanese, if not the world, that they had not just financially, but culturally arrived. The Senshukai Corp. vision above is one revelation of this process. Other variations are equally instructive.

Partner C in one of the firms of Gold Coast architects involved with three major Japanese development projects saw the discourse between his Japanese clients and Western architectural aesthetic in the following way:

They came to us wanting bright colours- yellow, greens, blues, and crimsons. It was all very disruptive. They saw themselves being freed
FIGURE 5.4: PRINCE HOTEL - ROYAL PINES RESORT
from the stringent Japanese aesthetic back home......I think their philosophy probably was to imagine and see what the Mediterranean was, some of those colours, and transplant a lot of those on to what they were doing here. A little bit of Florida stuff, a little bit of Hawaiian stuff, and a little bit of the Mediterranean, and mix them all up.

(Southport, 30 June 1995)

Thus the style of the projects which they financed was not Japanese, but can be seen as their interpretation of the style that they felt signified affluence and success in Western culture. Architect B on the Gold Coast described this cultural transposition in the following way:

(What they wanted here) was not their style. It’s their interpretation. You see they interpret a lot of things from Western magazines of architecture from all over the world. You are seeing this little influence or attachment from wherever.

(Southport, 28 June 1995)

As discussed in the literature review, there is a school of thought that argues that Japan has always approached Western culture as only a matter of ‘forms’ (Yoshida, Mitsukumi Tanaka & Sesoko, 1984: 110; Singer, 1973: 98-100). Shinohara (1984: 48-49) applied this point to architecture when he wrote of the tendency of Japanese architects to make references to this or that Western architectural style and then juxtapose them in an eclectic manner to achieve solely decorative aims.

In the 1980s such Japanese eclecticism and propensity for decoupling signifiers from the context of their cultural signifieds seemed to be just another variation on the postmodern aesthetic of the time. This postmodern aesthetic was inter alia, both a product of, and a localist reaction against globalization. For as Ellin (1996: 23-25; 56-58) argued, two frequent visual manifestations of the postmodern architecture can be shown to make this point. One is its references to Neoclassicism- that can be interpreted for the universal signifieds of permanence,
Now get it all...

Under the one roof

FROM $205,000

Belle Maison is more than just another apartment block. It's an entire lifestyle
and you'll find it all under one roof.

The magnificent beauty of Belle Maison is
the natural evolution of the beauty captured
by famous French artists. Many years ago,
these artists designed in this very
right. Belle Maison is setting new
standards of excellence for high rise living.

Choose one, two or three bedroom
apartments, none are overlooked with
eastern views, floor plans and luxurious finishes.

From just $205,000.

For terms, prices and the big
envelope of 8500 area with friends. Work out in the gym, or rewind yourself with
a refreshing swim in the pool, or perhaps a
sauna and a spa. Work on the terrace, in
the bar or garden. Whatever activity matches
your mood, you'll find it at Belle Maison.

Experience the Parisian lifestyle as you've never experienced it before.

For further information call Mr. John Freedman on
07/32 21 01 or fax 07/32 21 919.
solidity and tradition-, the other, is its reference to regional vernaculars which may mean a desire for symbolic identification with specific places and times. The wealth of the Japanese during the 1980s enabled them to engage with the signifiers of success and status of Western culture, and in architecture and design their expression at that time was largely postmodern. From this they sought to select what they deemed to be the appropriate cultural symbols to signify opulence and status for their major projects on the Gold Coast.

Chizuko Nakandakari, Managing Director of Maruko Aust. Pty. Ltd. (Southport, 10 April 1994) mentioned with pride that their high-rise apartment block 'Rivage Royale' had used about one and a half times as much marble as any other comparable high-rise on the Gold Coast. The advertising brochure for the project had covers that showed marble surfaces into which were engraved the words 'Rivage Royale' below a logo which signified the wave-like shape of the building (Fig. 5.6). Marble is unknown in traditional Japanese building, whereas it has had an important role in Western architecture. Marble has meant opulence, as well as solidity, durability and tradition. Similarly the Prince Hotel at the Royal Pines resort glistened with its surfaces of granite and glass, in this case echoing some of the trophy buildings of global corporate culture in the major cities of the world.

The architectural style of Rivage Royale was called 'Californian' by the managing director of the company. Thus Californian reveals itself as being the original symbol of opulence and stylishness according to the aspirations of the Rivage Royale developers. However an observer steeped in the history of Western architecture could read 'Californian' in a very different manner, that is, as an architectural style that is a transposition to California of Greco-Roman references from Spain via colonial Mexico. Once this style became a symbol of California, its Mediterranean qualities were embellished to project it more clearly to the rest of the United States. This is a case of the floating signifier, with the cultural direction from which a person approaches it, determining the meaning that they place on this architectural style.
The fact that even after the Japanese had succeeded in identifying the Californian style with the Royale Rivage project, it could still be read in different ways by different people was revealed through the interview with its managing director (Southport, 10 April 1994). She said that the building was originally designed and ‘packaged’ with the Japanese buyer in mind, but since the beginning of the Japanese recession in 1991, the number of purchasers from there have been fewer than anticipated, and so they have tried to appeal to Australian buyers. Here they have been faced with some resistance, because the older, affluent Anglo-Celtic Australians have sometimes not responded to the Californian design in the positive manner expected by the Company developing the project. ‘Some Australians still say that English design is the most stylish’ the Japanese managing director noted.

The Significance of Postmodern Commodification:

There is evidence of the widespread use of expensive postmodern eclecticism in other Gold Coast projects initiated by Japanese companies. The Venetian theme, with its connotations of stylistic lavishness, intimacy between buildings and water and an overripe urbanity verging on decadence, was chosen for projects by both the Alpha and Shinko Corporations.

The Alpha Corp. had bought a 12ha undeveloped island in the Broadwater off Paradise Point and commissioned the California-based architect Larry Sticker to design a maritime residential-tourist resort for them. This was based on the concept of the Venetian neighbourhood with a piazza in the centre of an artificially created embayment linked by arched bridges to the townhouses and low-rise luxury hotel enveloping it in the form of a horseshoe. The Australian development manager of Alpha Corp. commented proudly that: ‘This (Ephraim Island) resort will be different from anything else in Australia, not just architecturally, but in style and ambiance’ (The Australian, 9 November 1991). Not quite so.
For the Shinko Corporation’s resort project Hope Island, five kilometres to the northwest of Ephraim Is., was unveiled to the media on the 11th November 1988 by its president Shigeru Isutani. The model and development plan shown for Hope Island could be read unmistakeably as one with a Venetian theme. Its focal point was to be an ensemble of buildings located on promontories around a T-shaped water feature. Set on one shore was a low-slung golf clubhouse, which on completion made clear references to Neo-classicism. It was set in a formal garden with geometrically placed palm trees and a central fountain in whose contours one could sense an image of Spanish Granada via southern California. Located on the opposite shores of the water feature was to be a hotel and a series of three-storey townhouses and apartments, some of which made obvious references to Gothic fenestration, while others featured Romanesque arches and turrets. (Fig. 5.7). The club house was to be linked to the hotel and residences by two Venetian bridges. The Hope Island Resort called its newsletter ‘Renaissance’ and adopted the Rialto Bridge as its logo.

The use of different European, especially Mediterranean styles, was an overt choice according to the Australian Shinko Corp. Marketing Manager David Kozik (Broadbeach, 20 October 1994). He volunteered the observation that Neo-classical, Romanesque elements were intermingled in it in an eclectic postmodernist mix. So perhaps he was reading the aesthetic text of the project in ways different from that of his Japanese employer. He also ventured an observation on the Company’s perception of this design aesthetic: ‘Shinko was familiar with the Mediterranean theme from Hawaii and that is what up-market, five-star resorts nowadays seek to be’. He also added that the Japanese liked ‘themed resorts’ and especially here on the Gold Coast ‘theming’ was crucial to differentiate their product from the adjacent Sanctuary Cove. On hearing such a comment, Jameson’s thesis (1991: 64) on the axiomatic relationship between the postmodern aesthetic and this latest stage of capitalism appears to be exemplified. This philosophical perspective is also apparent when one considers the Shinko Corporation’s marketing strategy for Hope Island.
The Marketing Manager saw himself not so much selling a ‘home’, but a ‘package’. When asked what he meant, he said that the company was marketing a lifestyle consisting of a home with a certain cachet, recreational amenities, and personal security. The $13 million spent on the club house was a symbol of the exclusivity of this ‘package’ through which a certain lifestyle could be bought. ‘It had to be a promise, a dream’, he said. The Mediterranean references of the exterior of the club house were matched by an interior focused on a pair of facing semi-circular colonnaded cloisters behind which were recessed the various communal spaces of the club house. The exclusive packaging extended even to the toilets and changing rooms. Here marble partitions separated individual urinals, brass taps shone on the walls of both the Western style and Japanese style bathrooms and oak-paneled lockers lined the walls of the changing rooms.

Thus at Hope Island architectural styling combined design elements and expensive raw materials to create a lifestyle package which signified success, wealth, opulence, desired and financed by the Japanese investor, and furthermore, packaged in terms of the appropriate Western cultural signifiers. Two other Japanese-funded resort schemes on the Gold Coast are similarly postmodern and themed. However they show a greater sense of the traditional Queensland, if not Gold Coast vernacular architecture. Commodification of the project and product differentiation from other resorts is still evident, but instead of the use of Western cultural signifiers with global aesthetic and socio-economic connotations, the companies concerned chose to use the local aesthetic and historical tradition and make references to them in the creation of their projects. The two golf course residential resorts that reveal this are ‘Paradise Springs’ at Robina and ‘Arundel Hills’ to its north at Arundel.

Nara Australia Pty. Ltd. established a partnership with local businessman Peter Lawrence, who had developed the Seaworld themepark on the Spit at Main Beach, to build the 400 room Nara Hotel adjacent to it. The Japanese decision-makers of the Nara Corp. entered into a substantial, longer-term business relationship with pivotal local people and so appeared to develop a greater awareness of local traditions. After the purchase of the site for Paradise Springs, Tadanori Nara,
president of the company, made a point of ensuring that the old Queensland-style dairy farm house on the land was recorded and elements of its appearance were incorporated into the design of the Paradise Springs club house. It was opened in September 1992 and has the appearance of a large, rambling house from one of the traditionally affluent suburbs of Brisbane, such as Hamilton or Ascot. It is on stilts, and has the high-gabled roof with finials rising at strategic locations along its ridgeline and is covered in corrugated iron. Large verandahs ring it whose railings are decorated with white painted criss-cross shields and posts enhanced with post brackets and post moulds. Inside, in the public areas, is a featured collection of old photographs of the pioneers of the district, mounted and hung at pivotal locations on the walls. The advertising produced for Paradise Springs writes of ‘playing golf in a relaxed, traditional country-style atmosphere’ (GCB-Special Supplement, 14 August 1992).

Similarly Arundel Hills, with its formal staircase, wide front terrace and deep upstairs balcony and decorative window shutters makes numerous references to the Victorian mansion of Colonial Australia. The interior decor makes use of leather-covered chairs, a fireplace and features views of the Gold Coast in the first decades of this century. The carpet is a gold-dark green colour and features the logo of the Club, a gum leaf. As in the case of Paradise Springs, the directors of Okachu Aust. Pty. Ltd., the Japanese company which developed Arundel Hills, engaged with the local environment and commissioned local design professionals to create a visual package that would convey a sense of place by quoting the local/national vernacular aesthetic and making references to some signifiers of the environmental and cultural text of the community into which the project was inserted.

**Japanese Projects and Packaged Landscapes:**

The use of architectural/design themes to make specific references and so create a system of signification which can be read as conveying the aspirations had by the Japanese investors for their Gold Coast projects can also be read in another way:
as the desire to create an integrated, packaged, if not commodified, project landscape.

The landscape as a human creation has obviously appeared in all cultures that have developed the technical skills to transform the physical environment. In Japan with its high population density, the pressure to do so has been there for a long time. Semioticists argue that it is in this field that the Japanese have developed the most subtle tradition of detaching the signifiers from the signified. To be specific, they have ‘created’ landscapes which in terms of pattern, morphology and detail are replicas of those created by nature, but have been imbued with meanings which are substantially different to those they had in the physical environment. Barthes (1982: 108) sought to illustrate this point by deconstructing the Japanese garden to reveal its kaleidoscopic imagery.

Thus the creation of integrated landscapes was contained in the cultural baggage of the Japanese as they moved out of their home environment and invested in other places. However in the 1980s this image of landscape was joined to that from the American Sunbelt and Hawaii. Here there were many instances in which an unkempt arid or tropical environment was transformed into a luxury resort for desert or tropical living and recreation. Such a degree of integration of the residential and holiday lifestyle was not seen on the Gold Coast prior to the 1980s. The Gold Coast architect Ron Burling, who had worked for Japanese developers explained the change in this way:

> Australians tend to look to developers to meet needs in a more specific, limited way, especially for the provision of a home. Other lifestyle needs are organized much more individually. The Japanese saw a project as a much more all-inclusive amenity- home, sport, some shops, restaurants, etc. are all part of it.

(Southport, 30 June 1995)

This could be interpreted as being a signifier of a greater Australian individualism versus Japanese collectivism. Be that as it may, their cultural baggage in this
regard, combined with the cachet they attached to American-style residential/hotel/resort development meant the arrival of new, integrated concepts not previously seen on the Gold Coast. The features of the golf course residential resorts discussed earlier can be interpreted in this way, as can a number of the hotels and apartment buildings financed by Japanese capital on the Gold Coast.

Japanese partners Town Development and Showa Build funded the construction of the Surfers Paradise Marriott Hotel. According to a partner in the firm of Gold Coast consulting engineers, what the Japanese sought was a replica of the Halekulani Resort Hotel in Honolulu. Located on the main northbound thoroughfare of the central Gold Coast it was designed inwards with the interior design of the hotel opening to a completely integrated landscape of beach and lagoon, grotto, waterfalls, and a restaurant in a grass hut. These signifiers mean the ‘South Seas’ and completely exclude the immediate outside world of the Gold Coast around it. Similarly the Daikyo Kanko-funded Gold Coast International Hotel, a few hundred metres to the south-east of the Marriott, forms an L-around an in-ground swimming pool, whose geometry and ordered landscaped setting is an echo of the clear, modernist style of the building itself.

A number of the Japanese-funded high-rise apartment projects also created integrated landscapes which sought a definitive, gated separation from the world outside the perimeters of the property. The 43 storey ‘Grand Mariner’ at Paradise Waters was being marketed as a ‘Residential Resort’ and the advertising created for it wrote of the ‘Grand Mariner- Living in Australia’s First Residential Resort’ (The Australian, 17 June 1989). A series of advertisements encouraged the viewer to see the apartments as being in a world of their own arising out of its own landscape dominated by a 2000sqm swimming lagoon with stepping-stone rocks set into it rather like landscape features of a Zen Buddhist temple garden; on one of these rocks two contemplative guests are seen playing chess (Fig. 5.8).
"LOSE YOURSELF IN THE EXPERIENCE, not in the crowd"

Grand Mariner

Grand Mariner Apartments
from $350,000
Display Open Daily
10am to 5pm

VISIT OUR NEW DISPLAY APARTMENTS

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Paradise Waters, Gold Coast,
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Telephone: (07) 5532 9277
Fax: (07) 5532 5201
Toll Free: 1-800-074 214
Signifiers of Japanese landscaping were even stronger in the Rivage Royale where Chizuko Nakandakari the Managing Director explained the landscape created by Maruko Aust. Pty. Ltd. in the following way:

We have tried to put our building into its own landscape and we spent $5 million to do this. We built a pumping system and underground pipes to bring the water from the Nerang River frontage of the property to its highest point. From there it tumbles through a series of garden falls and indoor falls back down again. Separate landscapes have been created around each of the waterfalls and so people can walk around the garden and be surprised at every turn.

(Southport, 10 April 1994)

The reference to the image of the Japanese garden and the fluid, kaleidoscopic way it reveals itself is echoed quite clearly.

It should be noted that such packaged landscaping can be seen at its most lavish with the most up-market Japanese-funded projects, but that does not mean that it is absent in others which are more modest. For example, the 18-storey apartment building called ‘Solitaire Riverside’ financed by the Nakayama family at the western edge of Surfers Paradise was built on a very small site. This did not preclude the creation of an integrated landscape at its base. This was achieved by increasing the size of its site by building a platform over the adjacent Nerang River.

In this way a multi-terraced tropical landscape containing two swimming pools fringed by palm trees was created out of which the Solitaire Riverside rises upwards. The building acts as a distinct visual feature of the western edge of central Surfers Paradise.

Apart from its packaged landscape, there is another revealing aspect of the Solitaire Riverside that appears to reflect Japanese values: it is an eighteen storey building having only 18 apartments. This is because each apartment occupies the
whole floor. Its Japanese developers regarded the spaciousness so created as one of the building's most appealing features.

**Japanese Realization of Dreams of Space:**

The Japanese response of Australia was defined to a significant extent by what they perceived to be its lavish availability of space. In Japan space for a building project is either only physically available at a bare minimum, or its prohibitive cost forces the project into a tight spatial design corset. As a result of such cultural experience, Japanese coming to Australia perceived it to be a spatial nirvana. They saw the ease of availability of land and its relative cheapness as a sign of luxury of which at home in Japan they could only dream. A number of the wealthiest investors built homes, which even by the ostentatious, extrovert standards of the Gold Coast nouveau riche elite drew extensive comment. Shuji Yokoyama bought three adjacent properties on Cronin Island, had them demolished and built a 220sq.m house on them at a cost of $3.9million (GCB, 3 August 1991). This was topped by the mansion with golf course, built for Toshiaki Ogasawara at Nerang. This had a floor area of 182sq.m, but cost $4.1million (The Sunday Telegraph, 6 April 1997). Plans were also announced for a 650 sq.m. mansion to be built on Admirality Drive, Paradise Waters for Noritaka Tange, the architect son one of Japan's most prominent 20th Century architects, Kenzo Tange (GCB, 3 June 1991).

In their Gold Coast development projects the Japanese were able to relax the very tight relationship found in commercial buildings between space and cost, so that all the rooms in their hotels, such as the Marriott, Gold Coast International, The Prince, and Travelodge are spacious. The C. Itoh Corp. ensured that the design of its 'Silverpoint' apartment block was such that each floor would only have at most two apartments. Thus the advertising written for it highlights the point that 'all apartments are at least 24 squares'. Similarly, the Japanese-funded 'Inlet' features apartments where the smallest is 22squares and 'Main Beach Tower' developed by Yamashin Pty. Ltd. features 'only 2 units per floor'. At the Rivage Royale the smallest one-bedroom apartment is 149sq.m in area, the two-bedroom units range
up to 276sq. m in area and the standard penthouses were deemed to insufficient, below them on floors 21 to 26 were inserted 24 ‘Sub-Penthouses’ ranging in size from 358 to 720 sq.m in area.

The basic design guidelines for Sanctuary Cove had been established before the EIE Corp. bought it, but after it took possession of the golf course resort, EIE commissioned an architect in Japan to design 200 houses for the resort. These were subsequently constructed in clusters on ridges above the golf links and were to be marketed in Japan. The Japanese architect designed them to be between 280 and 495sq.m. in area and contained, from the Australian perspective, an inordinate number of rooms to reflect the Japanese concept of a more wedge-shaped house with a tight partitioning of domestic space. As such their design was very different from that of the open-plan, outdoor living which Australians buying property on the Gold Coast have always had. After mid-1990 when purchases by Japanese largely ceased, EIE had great difficulty finding Australian buyers for them until they organized ‘The Ultimate Minimum Bid Auction at Sanctuary Cove’ on 30th August 1992 where most were sold at prices 40-60 per cent below those originally sought by the Company. Thus the Sanctuary Cove experience illustrates divergent meanings of space and spatial organization.

Though the Japanese investing on the Gold Coast quickly learnt to place the same meaning on the quantity of space in their projects, their concept of its arrangement and degree of compartmentalization was one they brought with them from Japan and this was different from that which Australians favoured. Thus it provides a sharp symbol of the relationship of the Japanese and their cultural baggage with the projects they developed on the Gold Coast.
The Japanese brought cultural baggage with them and it is in this context that they took cognizance of the Gold Coast environment and culture. The aspects of the Gold Coast on which they placed greatest positive meaning were its space, climate and social informality. However such features of the Gold Coast environment and culture were only one dimension of the meanings that can be identified in their projects. There is also a more complex signification that can be revealed here.

The Japanese use of colour and space reflects their view of Australia, but other aspects of their projects show traits of the culture they brought from Japan. For example, there was a strong sense of group competitiveness signified by the rivalry between the companies for the ownership of the most luxurious and prestigious property assets overseas. Thus the large projects which Japanese companies sought to develop on the Gold Coast can be seen as signifiers of this Japanese company culture of status and competition. In a more specific sense there is contained within this the symbol of golf, a recreational and social activity that plays a pivotal role in Japanese company life and therefore helped define the form and function assumed by some of their largest Gold Coast projects.

If the Japanese investors arrived on the Gold Coast carrying their own cultural baggage, then it is equally revealing that in a sense they also wished to leave some of it behind. This was because they were acting in their tradition of entering into discourse with Western culture and seeking to appropriate those elements which they saw as being of value to them. They had sought to appropriate technology for over a century of contact with the West, but what was new was their desire to go beyond the technological and economic to encompass the symbols of success, status and luxury in Western culture. In other words, they sought signifiers beyond the plain economic that would show that they had arrived in the sense of global cultural equality, if not supremacy. The nature and styling of their foreign property investment projects can be interpreted as one attempt at conveying such a meaning. In the 1980s the signifier of global aesthetic supremacy was the postmodern style. Hence its widespread use in the major Japanese Gold Coast projects. Its multicodedness, with inter alia, Neo-classical references to signify
tradition, stability, as well as its references to various regional vernaculars are shown by many of their Gold Coast developments. In this way the Japanese investor was bringing the global architectural and design aesthetic to this particular location to an extent and with a lavishness which it had never experienced. To convert their visions into the reality of hotels, apartment buildings or resorts required the employment of the professional service providers. It is to a consideration of this group that this thesis will now turn.
Professional Elites, Cultural Intermediaries and Japanese Investment

The conversion of investment capital into property development is not an unmediated process. There are intermediaries and service providers whose professional skills are pivotal in facilitating the investment of capital into the bricks and mortar. In this process these service providers play a not inconsiderable role in moulding the appearance of the city and facilitating its spatial restructuring. The focus on this group can be said to echo the managerialist approach to urban research followed by Pahl (1975; 265-268; 270), with its concept of the 'gatekeeper' allocating resources among competing claimants in the city and distributing advantages to chosen locations and assets.

This process of mediation has become increasingly important with globalization. For it is the same forces that have enabled the globalization of capital to be accelerated, which have also facilitated the globalization of services, if not the mobility of their actual providers, to occur. The authors of generic geographical texts on services over the last decade or so are increasingly making service globalization the focal point of their writing (Daniels, 1985; Price & Blair, 1989; Dicken, 1992). In an economic sense the driving force is the provision of the service at a globally uniformly high standard so the patronage of business people and tourists wherever they are in the world is retained (Price & Blair, 1989: 163-164). Numerous Japanese companies in the 1980s joined this trend. These included the civil engineering/construction companies of Kumagai Gumi, Kajima Corp. and Obayashi Corp., the Dentsu advertising agency, the accounting firm Tomatsu Corp., and the Tokyu and Nara hotel chains (Rimmer, 1988; Business Review Weekly, 27 March 1987 & 16 February 1990). The professional services which they provide are increasingly important at the place where the owner of capital seeks to make an investment.
At the same time, communications developments and time-space compression have also facilitated the flow of professional information, skills, images, styles, and people with professional skills (Dicken, 1992). Therefore the local provider of a professional service can interact with the international, global culture of the given service activity. This means that the professional elite service providers at the place experiencing global investment may themselves be from an important global decision-making centre, or they may be entirely or partly local, but purveying the global professional skills of their service culture. Whichever is the case, their role is arguably particularly significant when the global investor is newly arrived and so has only a vague image and poorly defined perception of the place-specific investment context that they have just entered. This was the situation with the Japanese investors arriving to the Gold Coast in the 1980s.

The role of these pivotal mediating individuals or groups has been discussed in the writings of Wilson and Appadurai. Wilson (1991) was particularly concerned with the decision-making and allocation role of this group, such as politicians, planners, and local business people. They acted as ‘gatekeepers’ between the investor and the place of investment, and so were perceived by him as influences on the scope and location of the investment eventually made. In contrast, Appadurai (1996: 32-8) focused on the position of such groups in relation to the dissemination of prevailing styles, skills and images from the centres of global creativity. He saw such professional service providers as a ‘transmission belt’ for global cultural processes into the local arena. It can thus be proposed that such professional skill providers, interpreters and gatekeepers, by identifying with a range of global cultural activities, but at the same time seeking economic or political success in the local environment, become pivotal in mediating the local to the global investor. Some intermediaries have specialist professional skills, such as in architecture, design, law and property salesmanship. Thus their task in this discourse between investor and place is to make the investor aware of their specialized skills, and to show how it can be applied and adapted to the locality where the investor wishes to achieve success.
When considered more closely it becomes evident that the actual role of such mediators can vary considerably according to the origins of their own specific professional skills and the nature of their relationship with the global investor. Two variations of this scenario can be summed up in the following way: the first is the instance where the owners of capital bring their own global professionals and mediators. If this is the case, then the ability of such mediators to adapt or interpret the local environment of the place to which they have come is likely to be quite limited. This is in contrast with the instances where the global investor uses local intermediaries to provide him with the needed professional expertise and also gains their interpretation of the local scene and its culture. The extent to which the global investor uses such mediators, and the extent to which they take the advice given, will inevitably affect the extent that the investor become influenced by the culture of the locality and the intermediary’s interpretation of it.

The extent to which discourse takes place at the interface between the global and the local may vary in part according to the role of these intermediaries between them. It is in this cultural context that the nature, position and role of the intermediaries between the Japanese investors and the Gold Coast locale will be considered.

The first section will consider the role of intermediaries in actually attracting the Japanese investor to the Gold Coast and then in drawing their attention to specific sites for purchase and development. In other words, the role of such mediators in influencing both the macro- and micro-scale spatial pattern of investments. This section is followed by a consideration of the identity of the mediators and global professionals and their relationship to the Japanese investors. The issue of their position on the global/local interface will be treated as of special interest and will lead to a consideration of the extent these global professionals have or have not been part of a global culture of service provision. Finally, the role of these intermediaries/global professionals in the process of investment decision-making and the conversion of the images and preconceptions of the investor into the tangible realities of the built environment will be considered. This will raise the issue of the extent to which the investor was willing and able to take note of the
values and make use of the skills of the local intermediary and global professional to create an investment whose features were an outcome of such interaction.

Gold Coast Gatekeepers

Intermediaries and the Attraction of the Japanese Investor:

Until the arrival of the Japanese the only significant foreign investor on the Gold Coast was Robin Loh from Singapore. His major residential development ‘Robina’, was begun in 1979-80. In the process of starting his development he created a network of professional contacts on the Gold Coast including that with the firm of consulting engineers and planners, Burchill Bate Parker & Partners (G. Burchill, letter: 24 March 1994). Earlier, in 1972, Shoji Yokoyama, President of Daikyo Kanko Corp., a property developer and apartment builder in Japan, had visited the Gold Coast. He returned in 1983 and was surprised at the development that had occurred there. It reminded him of Honolulu in the 1960s. He bought a development site from the mortgagee of an Australian owner who had crashed at the end of the 1979-81 boom. The legal aspects of the transaction were conducted by a firm of Brisbane solicitors who were also the solicitors acting for Robin Loh and had had indirect contact with Geoff Burchill. Yokoyama was introduced to Burchill in the legal firm’s office and sought his advice for the design of the hotel he proposed to construct on the Surfers Paradise site he had bought. This led to a professional relationship that involved Burchill Bate Parker & Partners doing the concept plan for the Daikyo Kanko Corp. Palm Meadows golf course resort development. Yokoyama’s enthusiasm for Gold Coast investment culminated in March 1987 when he invited a Jumbo-Jet full of travel agents, developers and other company executives from Japan to attend the opening of Daikyo’s Gold Coast International Hotel.

According to the local journalist and historian Alexander McRobbie (Broadbeach, 23 September 1992), the other crucial intermediary in the initial attraction of Japanese investment to the Gold Coast was the business partnership of Richard Holt and Richard Graham. In the mid-1980s they saw the potential of Japanese
tourism and decided to invest in a five-star hotel in Surfers Paradise and made a conscious decision to attract the Japanese construction company Kumagai Gumi to build it. The construction of the hotel commenced in February 1984 and led, according to McRobbie, to the raising of the Gold Coast profile in the eyes of potential Japanese investors, not to mention construction contracts for Kumagai Gumi for five further Japanese-funded projects on the Gold Coast (Kumagai Australia Group, 1990: 11).

In the meantime, some service professionals from the established hotel/motel industry on the Gold Coast were also taking note of the rise of international tourism from Japan. In 1982 the Surfers Paradise ‘Quality Inn’ sent its marketing manager to Tokyo and Osaka to contact a series of major travel agencies. The increasing flow of visitors who started arriving encouraged the ‘Beachcomber’ to follow suit. The role of pivotal individuals had started the process of familiarizing the Japanese with the Gold Coast, and in turn key intermediaries started to facilitate the establishment of business relationships between the Japanese investor and the Gold Coast service professional. These individuals gave the Japanese advice about local conditions and provided them with specific services. As the success of these initiatives became apparent, the Gold Coast real estate agents also became increasingly important in attracting the Japanese investor to their home base.

Max Christmas, owner of one of the major Gold Coast real estate companies first visited Japan in 1985. He sensed the potential of Japan’s increasing wealth and the significance of their removal of exchange restrictions on the yen and felt that the Gold Coast could be beneficiary of this. However as he commented in an interview (Surfers Paradise, 11 April 1994), in their image of Australia the Gold Coast was a relatively meaningless blur- ‘They knew Queensland because of Toyota, the coal trade and the whole thing, but the Gold Coast, next to nothing’. He felt that now was the time to present them with a positive image of the Gold Coast through his eyes and of course, to offer his services as the intermediary through whom property business could be done there. His initial visit was pre-planned through the Queensland Government’s Agent General’s Office in Tokyo.
He was given help in the setting up of meetings with businessmen and bankers (‘I worked with the Queensland government people who introduced me to the right people to start with’). Max Christmas also commented that apart from anything else, the use of Queensland Government letterhead in the preparatory correspondence gave him extra status in the eyes of the hierarchical Japanese business culture. Between 1985 and 1990 he, or his senior staff, visited Japan five or six times a year and his company was instrumental in arranging the purchase by Japanese of numerous properties and development sites on the Gold Coast.

Other major real estate companies quickly sought to establish similar networks of contacts with potential Japanese investors. Interviews with representatives of three other Gold Coast real estate companies (Surfers Paradise, 26 February 1988; 13 April 1994; 19 October 1994), revealed a similar pattern of networking with Japan: regular visits there, often involving four or five different meetings per day, the running of property seminars to inform them of the Gold Coast market potential and then the presentation of the property portfolios in their books to encourage them to make a choice.

Networking also occurred at later stages of the decision-making process of the property purchase. Once a company representative had been sent to the Gold Coast, the real estate agent, with whom contact had already been established, would describe the Gold Coast environment and market to the Japanese investor in terms of his own agency’s property portfolio. As employee A of a large real estate agency commented (Surfers Paradise, 21 October 1994) about the orchestration of a particularly large deal with three Japanese company representatives who had arrived on the Gold Coast: ‘Once I glimpsed their interest in this large development site which our company was managing, I didn’t let them out of my sight for three days’.

If the representatives of the Japanese company sent to the Gold Coast were relatively junior, then the final decision to purchase could not be made until the owner/director of the Gold Coast real estate firm paid a visit to the company’s head office in Japan and presented details of the property under consideration to
its president. For the company’s junior representatives could draw the Gold Coast and its property market to the president’s attention, but the commitment by the company to purchase would only be made as a result of a decision between peers. Thus, bringing the Gold Coast into the perspective of the potential Japanese investor and then revealing details of its property market to them in the context of the intermediary’s own interest, that is, his agency’s property portfolio, was a complex process that required the establishment of networks between the Gold Coast and Japan. The success of such a process is reflected in some aspects of the pattern of Japanese property ownership described in Chapter Four.

**Gatekeepers and the Pattern of Purchases:**

Figures 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show clusters of Japanese-owned properties. As already discussed, many of these reflect the spatial and environmental features of the Gold Coast and the economics of its property market. This is especially so in reference to the meaning of Surfers Paradise in the image, property market and cultural reality of the Gold Coast and what this implied for the perception which the Japanese had of it. However there are other clusters of Japanese-owned property, for example, 70 Pacific Street Main Beach, 35 Bayview Street Runaway Bay, and St Kevins Avenue Benowa. Such clustering reflects the channeling of Japanese purchasers to given properties, usually a high-rise apartment block or canal estate development, by the estate agent acting as gatekeeper/intermediary in the purchase process.

The thoroughness with which key real estate agents on the Gold Coast sought to establish networks with potential Japanese purchasers facilitated this process and this was further enhanced by two features of the Japanese cultural situation: their command of English and their view of the estate agent’s role. Most Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast spoke relatively little English, and even if they did, in contrast with the Southeast Asian Chinese, they lacked the self-confidence to seek advice on their own about Gold Coast property from diverse sources. This reliance on one firm of estate agents was encouraged by the role of the estate agent in Japanese business culture. As a Japanese solicitor practicing in Brisbane and on
the Gold Coast revealed (Surfers Paradise, 20 October 1994), in Japan estate agents in a property deal are seen as arbitrators. They earn their commission from both the vendor and the purchaser and so are perceived as having a ‘neutral impartiality’. This would encourage the Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast to see them as a trustworthy authority on property and not as agents acting only for the vendor. The point therefore is that the agent as intermediary played a pivotal role in guiding the Japanese investor to specific sites. These were sites for whose vendors they were acting.

The choice of site of two large golf course resort projects illustrates this situation. As director D of a valuation firm described (Surfers Paradise, 14 April 1994), on an early visit to Japan Max Christmas, director of a large Surfers Paradise real estate agency, was made aware of the tentative interest which Tsuneo Sekine, president of the Matsushita Investment and Development Corp. (MID) had in the development of a golf course resort on the Gold Coast. Through his local network of business connections Christmas knew that the ANZ Bank had purchased a site along Ross St. in Ashmore from a dairy farmer to sell as development land. Christmas offered his services as the intermediary who could sell it to MID. The deal was completed in March 1987, MID purchased the 202.3 ha site and developed the Royal Pines Resort on it. This occurred even though parts of it were flood prone, thus necessitating expensive earthworks, and its location 6kms from the coast has until recently given its five-star hotel a very narrow market base, namely the convention trade.

Similarly in the case of the Shinko Corp. of Osaka, the role of the Gold Coast estate agent as intermediary was equally important in determining the site of their investment development project. Personal communication from director M of a civil engineering consultancy (Bundall, 11 April 1994) showed that after an initial contact with representatives of the Gold Coast property industry in Japan at which Shinko was shown data about the projected population growth of southeast Queensland between 1986-2001, they made the decision to invest. Shinko then commissioned PRD Reality of Surfers Paradise to find them a site for a golf course resort. PRD Reality had been offered a 368ha site at Hope Island that had
just been assembled from two relict dairy farms by Geoff Burchill the consulting engineer, Eddie Kornhauser, who in 1986 had sold his Paradise Centre in Cavill Avenue, Surfers Paradise to Kokusai Motorcars Pty. Ltd of Tokyo, and a private company associated with the National Party politician Russ Hinze. The site was partly a swamp, but it was adjacent to the trendsetting Sanctuary Cove golf course resort. PRD Realty led Shinko to it and it is here that the company is developing its Hope Island Resort.

In a similar way, Geoff Burchill, of Burchill Bate Parker & Partners, was instrumental in the choice of site for the development of the Palm Meadows golf course estate by Daikyo Kanko Corp. (G. Burchill, letter: 24 March 1994). In 1981-82 Burchill had already drawn up a plan for a resort for the farmer who owned a site along Springbrook Road in Carrara, but the problem was to find the venture capital in Australia for such a new type of scheme. So when Burchill was introduced to Shoji Yokoyama he was able to lead him instantly to the site which suited the latter’s investment intentions on the Gold Coast.

Another variation on the theme of the Gold Coast intermediary/service provider channeling the Japanese investor to a specific Gold Coast site was that of the Gold Coast business person/entrepreneur actually visiting Japan to seek a partner in a venture that they had already established on the Gold Coast. In other words, the local person or company was not just the intermediary/gatekeeper in a transaction that leads the investor to a specific site, but was already active at a Gold Coast site and wished to develop links with Japanese capital and its leisure/tourism industry. The best example of such a situation is the partnership between Nara Holdings and Seaworld Pty. Ltd. Peter Lawrence of Seaworld Pty. Ltd. visited Japan in late 1986 to seek a partner there to develop a hotel adjacent to his themepark. Nara Holdings was interested and agreed and built the 400 room Nara Hotel on the Spit at Main Beach. Now both projects support each other’s patronage, with about 15-18% of the Nara Hotel’s visitors in the early 1990s being Japanese honeymooners who also inevitably visit adjacent the Seaworld themepark (J. A. Wild, Group Commercial Manager, Nara Aust. Pty. Ltd, personal communication, Robina: 28 June 1995).
The early successes of a number of estate agents in leading Japanese investors to specific large development sites, encouraged a number of local and interstate individuals to establish companies to do only that. They assembled large development sites for sale to Japanese investors. Zim Sawachika, a Japanese property consultant working on the Gold Coast described the process in which during the 1987-89 a number of Australian companies, such the McMaster Group, Gordon Pacific and the Girvan Corp., had borrowed large sums from banks to assemble development sites for sale to Japanese investors. However when in October 1989 banks in Japan suddenly stopped lending for overseas property purchases, the Australian mediators could not on-sell to the Japanese and they crashed. In this case then, the intention of channeling investment to specific Gold Coast sites by local intermediaries was aborted (Interview, Surfers Paradise, 19 October 1994).

Cultural Intermediaries and Service Providers

If the group of real estate agents discussed in the previous section were gatekeepers who introduced the Japanese investors to the Gold Coast and channeled them to the purchase of properties at specific locations, then there was also another group that needs to be considered. These were advisors, consultants and the providers of skills who played diverse mediating roles after the visiting investor had purchased a specific property.

This group of people had varying locational and cultural origins. Their presence on the Golf Coast at this time, at this interface of global investment and this specific place, bore witness to the interplay of the different perspectives, needs and interests, such as that of the Japanese, that of the Gold Coast population, and the interests of the specialized service provider. As is to be expected, these interests were often divergent. However behind this observation is the theoretical perspective that globalization as a cultural force enters a specific place, reformulates its identity and image, and so affects the meanings it has for the local residents. In other words, the processes described here were changing the Gold Coast. If one assumes that external cultural providers and service professionals
are bearers of some of the forces of globalization then the revelation of their origins, role in the investment decisions and impact on place makes an important contribution to the explanation of this process of change.

The first issue to be considered is the personal and cultural relationship of this group to the Japanese investors who came to the Gold Coast. Were they also Japanese, did the investors arrive on the Gold Coast with their own network of professional service providers? If not at all, or not entirely, what was the position of this group of service providers in relation to the Japanese investor? What was the relationship between them, and how did this affect the investment process, if not outcome?

The assumption underlying the issue of the Japanese investors using, if not actually bringing their own intermediaries and service professional to the Gold Coast is that under these conditions they could conduct the process of property purchase, planning and development as much as possible in ways to which were accustomed in Japan. Given this, they could transpose their cultural baggage from Japan onto their Gold Coast investment activities and so their cognizance of, and adaptation to the Gold Coast economy and culture would be minimized. If, on the other hand they were completely, or largely reliant, on professional service providers with whom they engaged only after their arrival in Australia, then the process of investment/property development can be assumed to have occurred much more according to Gold Coast perceptions and realities. The previous section of this chapter already pointed to a considerable dependence on Gold Coast/Australian intermediaries, however a closer consideration of this issue reveals the situation to have been more complex. Here a brief consideration of the background and role of the lenders, agents, builders and consultants is enlightening.

**Lenders, Agents and Consultants:**

The representatives of three of the real estate companies on the Gold Coast interviewed (Surfers Paradise, 28 September 1990; 13 April 1994; 21 October
1994) spoke of, as one of them put it, 'the symbiotic relationship between the Japanese investors and their banks'. The banks in Japan had real estate specialists who saw their task as seeking out foreign property for their client who was considering making such an investment. Thus when the Gold Coast real estate agent appeared in Japan, on occasions his initial presentation was to the property specialists of the bank rather than the interested investor. One of the agents quoted above noted that he had the impression 'the bank's word was God'. If the bank advised them to buy, than they rarely questioned it. Subsequently this intimate business relationship had significant implications for the Gold Coast property market: when the recession hit after 1990, there was sense of collective shame, for the Japanese bank suffered as much a loss of face for having given bad advice, as did the investor. The corollary of this was that the bank had a sense of responsibility towards the client and was willing to carry the losses for periods much longer than is the case in similar circumstances with Australian banks. The Gold Coast estate agents saw this as the cause for the freeze in the market at locations such as central Surfers Paradise during 1990-93, with its visible expression seen in the hectares of vacant sites north of Elkhorn Avenue.

There was another stage in the investment process where evidence of the existence and role of Japanese intermediaries/service providers was revealed by the interviews: at the design and planning stage of the project. Both Maruko Aust. Pty. Ltd. and Daikyo Australia Pty. Ltd. engaged the services of architects in Japan to work on their Gold Coast projects. Shoji Yokoyama of Daikyo commissioned a firm of architects in Tokyo to produce drawings for the Gold Coast International Hotel on the site that he had bought in Surfers Paradise. However at a subsequent stage Yokoyama decided to give the commission to a Southport firm of architects. As architect B of this firm commented:

When we were called in, we looked at these plans from Tokyo. We found them so sterile. You know, they did not relate to the site at all.....We ended up not using their design at all.

(Southport, 28 June 1995)
This shows an instance of the Japanese investor having drawn back from the use of his own service professional from Japan in favour of engaging an architect in situ. In the case of Maruko Australia Pty. Ltd., the Company's Japanese architect worked on the project from beginning to end, but became one of a team with the Southport firm of Burling Brown and Partners. This team designed and supervised the construction of the Rivage Royale and in the eyes of Burling Brown and Partners was seen as the Company's representative and the conduit through whom information passed between Maruko and their Australian architects. 'He (the Japanese architect) didn't have the authority to make key decisions and so these had to be referred....the strain on him showed at times', commented one of the partners (Southport, 30 June 1995). The Australian architects developed a general perception that the decision-making of their Japanese clients was inordinately slow, with the low position of the Japanese architect in the decision-making hierarchy exacerbating this situation. Though in retrospect, two of the partners commented on the thoroughness of the Japanese, and that this had been the building of highest quality that they had designed and supervised since the establishment of their architectural office on the Gold Coast in 1972. Since then they had been using the Rivage Royale on the frontispiece of their firm's promotional brochure.

Instances of Japanese service providers at other stages of the development process can also be identified. Japanese civil engineering and construction companies were able to get contracts to construct some of the Japanese-funded projects. Major examples of this were the already mentioned construction of what became the ANA Hotel by Kumagai Gumi, and the Hazama Corporation's construction of the Nikko Securities Gold Coast Resort, the Gold Coast International Hotel and the Belle Maison apartment building. However the impression that there was a restricted network of Japanese capital investor-architect/designer-constructor should be minimized. For other construction companies, such as the Gold Coast-based McMaster Group of Companies and the British-owned, Brisbane-based Barclay Mowlems Construction, also featured prominently in the awarding of construction contracts by major Japanese investors (GCB, 2 February 1990 & 18 October 1991). Also, generally the role of Japanese architects/designers was
much less important that that of their local Gold Coast professional colleagues, a role which will be detailed in a later section of this chapter.

The most publicized and arguably the largest Japanese urban property investor in Australia was also the one who was perceived by the media to have made his investment decisions most definitely according to aims predetermined by him and his advisors in Japan. He was Harunori Takahashi of the EIE International Corporation. Press headlines such as, ‘On the Takahashi takeover trail’, ‘Takahashi sweeps through the Pacific Basin’ (*The Australian*, 27 September 1988), and ‘Japanese giant plans $2 billion spending spree’ (*The Weekend Australian*, 6-7 May 1989) painted a picture of an incredibly wealthy and powerful Japanese capitalist flying from country to country in his private Boeing 727 with his coterie of advisers picking up one property after the other. Purchases at locations such as Los Angeles, Sydney, Perth, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, Singapore, Fiji, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Saipan and even Ho Chi Minh City were listed. In a rare interview he gave to the Australian press he revealed his plans quite precisely:

> My ambition is to have an international operation of resorts and hotels, with bases in strategic locations throughout the world, but concentrating on the Pacific....Another plan is to have a type of businessmens’ club under which corporate members will be able to use my resorts in a number of countries, perhaps staying at several during one holiday or work trip.


This is as a clear a manifestation of globalist integration as can be found, and the position of the Gold Coast into it occurred through EIE’s purchase of the Sanctuary Cove golf course resort.

EIE International Corp.’s investment decisions appeared to be the outcome of a self-contained decision-making process based on easy access to credit from banks in Japan and the skills of Takahashi’s adviser, whose main role was to act as negotiator in non-Japanese situations in which Takahashi himself appeared to suffer from cultural inhibitions. The name of the adviser was Dr. Robert Bungo
Ishizaki. The Tokyo correspondent of *The Australian* described Ishizaki as an ‘urbane, American-educated economist with a good grasp of idiomatic English and a smooth American approach’ (*The Weekend Australian*, 17-18 July 1993). Partner B in a Surfers Paradise property consultancy (13 April 1994) referred to Ishizaki as the ‘front man’ for his boss. In his study of EIE International Corp., Rimmer (1993: 29) defined Ishizaki’s role as ‘to interpret the Group’s overseas leisure-investment strategy to host countries by emphasizing the advantages of its long-term infrastructural development and spin-offs in training as opposed to short-term or speculative investment’. Employee E of Sanctuary Cove interviewed (Sanctuary Cove, 18 October 1994) felt that due to his more typically reticent Japanese personality and poor command of English, Takahashi was ‘neither willing, nor able to strut the international business scene,’ and so Ishizaki was ‘his wheeler and dealer’. Thus Ishizaki became pivotal as a negotiator in the property deals of EIE International Corp. However he was more than just a negotiator, he quickly became seen by the media as a general cultural intermediary between the forces of globalizing capital, which Australians saw his company symbolizing, and the locality of their investment. A photograph that appeared in *The Weekend Australian* of 6-7 May 1989 provided the typical image of this point. On this photograph Bungo is seen smiling and wearing an Akubra hat while setting out the EIE Corporation’s investment strategy for Australia.

At the same time it is important to reveal that the complete identification of the service provider/intermediary with the company that person serves cannot be made. Service provider, mediators at the global/local interface assume that role because they have skills, can help project images which facilitate discourse, development and acceptance at the local level, but they also have their own agenda and a distinct perspective. The Melbourne director of a national property consultancy commented (4 November 1993) that a key reason why Bungo Ishizaki conducted his boss’ property negotiations with such enthusiasm and panache was that success ensured collection of a commission for himself from the vendor. At times this commission went to ‘about half a million dollars’. A few vendors baulked at this, so a number of deals fell through.
The opposite response to this need for special skills, discourse at the interface between the global investor and the local community was that which saw the investor rely on the skills, influence and knowledge of given local individuals. In other words, the Japanese investor relied on chosen Australians to act as professional mediators and so help ensure the success of their Gold Coast venture.

Thus Tobishima appointed Geoff Booth as the director of their Queensland investments, including their Gold Coast retail complex at Southport. He also saw his task as one of attracting Australian businesses into joint-venture projects in SE Asia through the use of Tobishima’s network of offices in that region (The Australian, 16 June 1993). Daikyo Australia Pty. Ltd. and Shinko Australia Pty. Ltd. both appointed Australian managing directors with experience at the politico-commercial interface of Queensland and Japan. In 1988 Shinko appointed J.R. Breaden, who had been Queensland Agent General in Tokyo, and in the same year Daikyo appointed Sir Sydney Schubert, recently retired as head of the Premiers Department in Brisbane and frequent Queensland Government representative in coal export negotiations in Tokyo. Other examples are that of Jim West, an experienced builder who was appointed deputy director of the Japanese-owned Big Arrow Enterprises Pty. Ltd., and the already mentioned partnership between Peter Lawrence of Seaworld Enterprises and Nara Holdings.

In all the instances quoted above the Australian appointed had an important role in sensitizing the Japanese company to relevant features of the Gold Coast economic and cultural situation. For example, Satoru Hashizume, president of Big Arrow Enterprises Pty. Ltd. confided (Southport, 27 June 1995) that it was Jim West who had convinced him that Australians in general much prefer low-rise residential developments to high-rise apartments (except perhaps along the coast). It was this advice that led to his company changing their original development concept from clusters of eight to ten storey apartment buildings to one of town houses and detached units. Hashizume credited this advice as having ensured the commercial success of his company’s Southport project. In a similar way, Peter Lawrence dissuaded Nara Holdings from their original plan for a five-star hotel on the Gold Coast.
Coast in favour of a three-star venture interconnected with the SeaWorld theme park and so tapping into the Gold Coast family tourism market.

An interview with Sir Sydney Schubert (Surfers Paradise, 15 April 1994) the Australian managing director of Daikyo, revealed that he saw his role as a two fold one; firstly, the use of his Australian, especially Queensland background, to formulate the best commercial decisions for his company; but secondly, there was also a broader cultural role, one of interpreting his company to the general Australian community. This second role he felt was particularly crucial in the late 1980s when Daikyo’s property/tourism investments in Cairns and on the Gold Coast were nearing $1 billion and were starting to attract opposition (especially in Cairns). Among other responses, Schubert made a point of appearing in print through a half-page article in the national daily *The Australian* (1990: 2) under the heading - ‘Long-term commitment benefits community’. After a detailed description of Daikyo’s investments in Queensland and a detailing of the benefits these will provide for Australia, he concluded:

> Just as Japanese traditionally have cherished ownership of their own real estate in Japan, they now realize that they are part of a global economy. While a Japanese company may be buying the Empire State Building in New York, a US investor is buying the big Associated International Underwriters Tower in the heart of Tokyo. We too, as Australians must recognise the global implications of foreign investment and of our future.

This statement was as clear an enunciation of globalist economics to the local community as it is possible to make and the specific meaning which Schubert wished to convey through it was: the Japanese have embraced globalization, it is time Australia also did.

**Intermediaries at the Cultural Interface:**

This task of interpreting the Japanese and their capital to Australians and vice versa was taken up by various intermediaries, both individually and as groups. On
the 13 February 1992 the Japanese business people on the Gold Coast established
the Japanese Business Association Inc. Its small staff consisted of people fluent in
both languages and being able to move with ease among both of the culture
groups. The first president, Hidehisa Vemto, enunciated the aims of the
association in the following way:

We are not yet well understood by Australian people....We formed this
Association to have mutual understanding and provide information and
advice on a range of business problems.


Research on the Gold Coast also revealed the presence of a number of Japanese
who provided specific professional services to their fellow nationals and in some
cases acted as cultural intermediaries between them and the Australian
community. One such was Kotaro Matsuda, a Japanese lawyer, accredited in
Queensland and employed by the Brisbane/Gold Coast firm of Feez Ruthning. He
had acted for many Japanese property purchasers on the Gold Coast. He
commented in an interview (Bundall, 20 October 1994) that one of his most
important roles had been the explanation of Australian legal culture and that of the
property industry to his Japanese clients. Another such person was Zim
Sawachika. He was an architect who had arrived on the Gold Coast in 1985, then
gained his experience of Australian business culture through designing, funding
and supervising the development of a residential project in Eady Avenue
Broadbeach. Later he decided to establish a property consultancy on the Gold
Coast. His interpretation of the bubble economy culture in the Japan of the 1980s
and its effect on the investors’ psychology gave the researcher many indications as
to why there was often such a lack of understanding of the Gold Coast property
market by Japanese investors.

Subsequently Sawachika was joined on the Gold Coast by a number of other
Japanese service professionals, among them was Hiroaki Furuno who established
Leo Estate Pty. Ltd. in October 1991. In 1985 he had been preceded by Yoshihiro
Hasagawa, the chairman of the architectural firm Interplan, who in that year
opened an office in Brisbane to expand his network from Tokyo and Orlando Florida, to another resort region of the southwest Pacific. Interplan soon gained clients on the Gold Coast, mainly for the design of residential complexes (The Courier-Mail, 26 July 1991). There was also the firm of Starts International. The latter was a Tokyo-based property consultancy which added an office in the icon Gold Coast building 50 Cavill Avenue to others it already had in Honolulu, Los Angeles, and Taipei. Starts International advertised in the Newsletter of the Japanese Society using the slogan: ‘We’ll help you market the real estate of your dreams with great reliability’ (In translation: Newsletter, July 1995: 12). This firm of global service professionals had apparently followed the flow of Japanese real estate investment around the Pacific Basin and so had now seen its commercial opportunity on the Gold Coast.

The perception that the Japanese investor on the Gold Coast needed special mediators to explain the nature of properties available and the ability to convey this information to them in Japanese led to the setting up of ‘Japanese Manager’, ‘Japanese Desk’ by the larger Gold Coast real estate firms, such as PRD Realty, Jones Lang Wootton and Raine & Horne. These positions were filled by Japanese persons who, it was hoped would be seen by the potential Japanese buyer has ‘the culturally familiar face’ of Gold Coast property business. These individuals were joined between 1987 and 1992 by Daikyo Real Estate, who employed both Japanese and Australian staff. The life cycle of this branch of Daikyo Australia Pty. Ltd’s establishment, expansion, shrinkage and liquidation became a mirror of the Gold Coast property market during this period (GCB, 12 April 1990; 10 April, 1992).

Finally, there was another group whose role can be seen as that of general cultural mediators between Australian and the Japanese coming here: selected academics. They entered the public debate on Japanese investment on the Gold Coast, and presented meanings and interpretations which were quite diverse. Alan Rix of the University of Queensland and Beverley Sparks of Griffith University sought to explain the Japanese presence in Australia in terms that aimed to soothe any fears which Australians may have had of some kind of ‘takeover’ (Business Review
However it was the conservative views of Geoffrey Blainey of Melbourne University and those of the left-leaning expatriate Japanese sociologist Yoshio Sugimoto from Latrobe University that gained the most publicity. Sugimoto gave a speech on the Gold Coast in which he articulated a view of contemporary Japanese culture in which ‘close ties link the political and economic elite with the development real estate/land mafia in a political economy that resembles the worst features of W.A and Queensland in the 1980s’ (GCR, 17 September 1990). Such a critical utterance about Japan was rare at that time. As discussed earlier, to be overawed by Japanese wealth and success, and to be convinced of their investment insightfulness was much more the norm. As Chapter Seven will discuss, even those fearful of Japan feared their moral fibre, determination, and hard work, to be shown such a picture of a corrupt culture was unusual.

To conclude this section, the identity of these cultural intermediaries, gatekeepers and cultural professionals varied greatly. Their features did form a pattern: some provided basic professional services needed in the property industry, others used the mutual ignorance of the Japanese investor and most in the Gold Coast community for their own commercial gain; such people were either Australians or Japanese; others, saw their role in a more disinterested, intellectual context, such individuals took part in the public debate on Japanese investment that had erupted, not just on the Gold Coast, but also at the national level. Their positions reflected the different cultural and intellectual directions from which they came and so produced diverse perspectives at this Japanese-Australian cultural interface.

Agents in the Investment Process

Having identified a range of cultural intermediaries and service professionals and revealed some details of their relationship with the Japanese investors, it becomes important to consider their impact on the actual nature of the investment decision. Research into this issue showed that it was at two distinct stages of the investment process that the role of the global professionals and cultural intermediaries appeared to be pivotal. These two stages were, firstly, the purchase negotiations,
and secondly, the stage where the investor’s mental image of his proposal was translated into the reality of the project to be built.

The Decision to Purchase:

In a legal sense the purchase of a property is an uncomplicated act signified by the signatures on given documents and the transfer of agreed sums of money. However if considered as a cultural phenomenon, it involves buyers, sellers, perhaps intermediaries and obviously the available properties. Each of these participants has their own set of needs and expectations regarding their own behaviour and that of the other parties involved in the process. There is a cultural discourse occurring among them. These participants also attach their own meanings to the properties being offered and considered in the transaction process.

The attitudes and behaviour of the potential Japanese buyers drew considerable comment from many of the Australian property consultants and estate agents interviewed on the Gold Coast. Partner B in a Surfers Paradise property consultancy, recalling his role in three multimillion transactions involving Japanese investors, saw their approach and values in the following way:

They are thorough and diligent, but this did not unearth the relevant information for them regarding the proposed purchase. The lateral thinking, flexibility, negotiating skills, which are part of buying property, they cannot do. They are narrow specialists. Task areas are apportioned among them and they cannot think laterally.

(Surfers Paradise, 13 April 1994)

Another local agent spoke of the Japanese coming to the Gold Coast as having been ‘naive’ and ‘ignorant of Australian business ways’. (Surfers Paradise, 21 October 1994). He also touched on the Japanese investor’s weakness at lateral thinking in terms of their inability to ‘weigh-up options’ and ‘stringing on the vendor’. Professional service providers not directly involved in the purchase process saw the culture of the Gold Coast property cycle as the issue around which
these different expectations surfaced. Partner A in a firm of consulting engineers said that he attempted to explain the vagaries of Gold Coast property values to his Japanese client, but generally this was not done. For:

I mean, you wouldn't expect real estate agents to do it. I mean that's not in their interest. That's not their role.

(Bundall, 25 October 1994)

A resort architect/designer made the same point, and added that some of the Japanese ‘were led astray by, you know, the estate agents’. The ability of some Gold Coast property service professionals to do this was undoubtedly facilitated by the perception which the Japanese brought with them from Japan that the real estate agent arbitrates between the vendor and the purchaser; very different from the Australian property culture in which they are exclusively the vendor’s agents.

This raises the question: To what extent were the Japanese service professionals consulted? Some Japanese purchasers and developers did consult them, but interviews with the Japanese service professionals revealed that many did not. Other Japanese investors did not take astute advice given to them, or advice given to them was inadequate or deceptive.

However behind this situation is a truth discussed in other chapters of this thesis. Most Japanese arriving on the Gold Coast during this period were so self-confident of their wealth, if not their overall cultural superiority, that any discourse they may have entered into with service professionals on the Gold Coast appeared not to dent their original beliefs and perceptions. This perception is endorsed by a comment made by Geoff Burchill, a planner/civil engineer of Burchill Bate Parker & Partners in a letter to the researcher:

These tools (of property market analysis), and the evidence of previous bad experiences in the Gold Coast market through booms followed by busts, were available to Japanese investors and we expressed concerns to our clients about the possibility of another boom/bust and the absolutely
critical nature of having a correct market position in project strategy. As could be expected, this advice was ignored and many projects were badly affected by the bust of 1989/90.


So the outcome of the divergent cultural perspectives and gatekeeping functions at the point of sale was the Gold Coast agents were able to maximize the selling price for their vendors much beyond the vendor’s and agent’s initial expectations. Two of the largest purchases by Japanese investors in central Surfers Paradise were quoted by three interviewees as cases of just this. This situation may also signify that some of the purchases would not have occurred at all if the Japanese investor had been willing and able to enter into more detailed and honest discussion with agents of the Gold Coast property industry.

Intermediaries and Project Development:

The realization stage of the project was another point at which the role of specific Gold Coast service providers engaged by the Japanese investors became important. They had the skills in valuing, planning, design, and construction which were needed to actually get the project off the ground. Their role also involved the making of basic judgments about the nature of the project to be developed and thus the giving of advice to a foreign investor. In most cases, the Japanese investor had far less familiarity with Gold Coast market conditions than they had, and initially the Japanese had no knowledge of Australian property culture. Hence the interaction between the Japanese investor and these Gold Coast service professionals gives an important perspective on the evolution of the development projects.

The extent to which consultation resulted in advice being accepted or rejected appeared to vary. Partner C in one firm of architects, who had been chief designers of three major Japanese-funded high-rise apartment projects, evaluated their discussions with their Japanese clients in this way:
We had a lot of meetings and a lot of recommendations were made, which were initially refuted or rejected. We went full circle and came back and they were later on accepted in another form. But initially no, probably initially no there was an adverse reaction. Because of a lack of understanding....

(Southport, 30 June 1995)

On the other hand, comments made by Director D of a firm of property valuers (Surfers Paradise, 14 April 1994) on the Gold Coast referred to the Japanese’ rigid preconceived notion of development they wanted to undertake on the Gold Coast. These preconceived notions were often based on their image or experiences in Hawaii or California. They saw the local valuers not as experts who could prepare feasibility studies for them and so identify project options, but only service providers who could facilitate the granting of building permits. Valuer G of another firm was asked to comment on the Japanese projects in hindsight:

They paid prices which were too high and because they paid so high prices, it is hard to see how they could ever have made the projects viable. They were investing in unproven market sectors on the Gold Coast- up-market apartments, five-star hotels, etc.

(Nerang, 14 April 1994)

The difference in perception between the mental images of lavishness which some large Japanese investors had of their projects and those conveyed to them by the planners, architects and engineers was a reoccurring theme in a number of interviews.

Partner A in a planning consultancy that was engaged by the companies at the initial stages of planning of the Hope Island and Palm Meadows golf course resort projects claimed in the interview that they had advised the Shinko Corp, and Daikyo Kanko to develop a fairly conventional sub-division, a land subdivision with waterways and a golf course, ‘a sort of pitch at the affordable, the top end of the affordable market in Australia.’ (Bundall, 11 April 1994). But he said that this
was rejected by the Japanese companies in favour of designs featuring more lavish public amenities and ostentatious landscaping designed by planners/architects using architectural themes making references to Hawaii and California. Thus in these cases the role of the Gold Coast service providers was marginal.

The interaction between the Japanese investors and service providers varied in degree and nature. Here research revealed cultural differences in priorities and perceptions. Partner C in the Gold Coast architectural partnership working for Maruko Australia Pty. Ltd. on their Rivage Royale project said that their Japanese clients had a strong sense of the desirability of panoramic views, but no sense of the significance of orientation. (Interview: Southport, 30 June 1995). This meant that the consultants saw it as one of their tasks to sensitize their clients to basic geographical facts, such as that in the southern hemisphere the sun is in the northern sky and that on the Gold Coast southeasterly winds are cool. This resulted in the rearrangement of certain internal spaces in the apartment plans as well as the re-siting of the main balcony. Another detail on which differences of perception appeared were the colour schemes. The Japanese clients had a perception that at a place like the Gold Coast bolder colours were most appropriate. Two local architects mentioned having flown to Japan to do a presentation to the company board on the colour schemes for their respective Gold Coast projects.

In general terms, the degree of consultation between the local architects/planners/designers and their Japanese clients varied considerably. This ranged from one extreme in which the client came with a precisely-formulated concept into which the Gold Coast service professional input was limited to matters of detail (Prince Hotel, Inlet, Silverpoint, Ephraim Island Resort), to instances where the basic concept was created substantially by the architect/designer. Examples of the latter are the Surfers Paradise Travelodge, the Gold Coast International Hotel and the Kooralbyn Valley Resort.
Gold Coast Professionals and the Establishment of International Networks

The Japanese investment process and the location and nature of the properties and projects which eventuated were influenced by the discourse between local intermediaries/service professionals and the Japanese capitalists. At the same time this had an impact on the local property culture and the position of the Gold Coast vis-a-vis the global centres of creativity. This occurred because the wealth of the Japanese and their desire to spend it to create lavish projects was in sharp contrast to the preexisting Gold Coast property industry culture, described by one established Gold Coast architect as being one of ‘tight budgets and quick returns’. The ability to design with less regard for costs and the general building boom of the 1980s drew service professionals from the global centres of resort design creativity to the Gold Coast. The Hulbert Group International, headquartered in Vancouver and having another office in Miami, established a Gold Coast office in 1986. They had designed resorts and hotels on both coasts of North America and became identified on the Gold Coast with three Japanese-owned projects—Sanctuary Cove, Belle Maison and the Grand Mariner. Des Brooks, an Australian-born architect, but working in Honolulu for eighteen years returned to Australia in 1985 and established his practice at Southport on the Gold Coast. He brought with him what was the prevailing fashion of the post-modern aesthetic. To quote his words:

I came back with the idea that architecture should be a bit of fun, you know, I think people believe architects design for architects.....Well I think it’s got to be a bit of fun.

(Southport, 28 June 1995)

Since his return Brooks has left his imprint on Brisbane and the Gold Coast through a number of substantial projects, including two which are Japanese-owned— the Sheraton Mirage and Marriott Hotel. He credits the wealth of the Japanese and their desire to have projects synonymous with the global avant-garde with getting the Gold Coast ‘to be more international in style’. At the same time some Gold Coast service professionals globalized their horizons, such as the
already mentioned Japan-Pacific Basin networking of the large Gold Coast real estate agents. To this can be added the globalization of the work of firms of architects/designers, such as McKerrell Lynch and Burling Brown and Partners. Work with their Japanese clients on the Gold Coast encouraged them in the early 1990s to seek contracts in Malaysia and Thailand. Also, in 1988 the consulting engineer/planner Burchill Bate Parker & Partner established Burchill Japan based in Tokyo, in a joint venture with an Australian expatriate and Japanese professional colleagues. This was Burchill’s first overseas office, with a representative office in Kuala Lumpur that followed three years later. During the same period the firm of Surfers Paradise valuers Herron Todd White started researching the nature of Hawaii tourism and the cycles of its property industry to find out what lessons can be drawn from it on the Gold Coast (GCB, 23 May 1989).

The arrival of the Japanese tourists, investors and service providers had produced a new awareness among the Gold Coast business elite about their interconnectedness with overseas locations, and so thrust their perception of challenges and opportunities into a globalized dimension. This was facilitated by some members of the Gold Coast service professional elite who saw the magnitude of Japanese investment capital, not just as an opportunity to gain commissions, but also reveal through their professional work the extent to which they had become synonymous with the global avant garde. This applied particularly to architects, designers and planners whose agenda was to use the lavish budgets that the large Japanese investors were allowing them to dispense, to show that they could design projects on the Gold Coast which reflected what were perceived to be the height of global fashion set by such centres of tourism and leisure culture as Hawaii and southern California. As was to be expected, the service professionals in the Gold Coast property selling industry had a very specific agenda: to maximize the price for the vendor and so earn the highest commission for themselves. This was a business culture about which most Japanese buyers were naive and ignorant.
Summary

One of the key questions raised at the beginning of this chapter was the extent to which the Japanese investors brought their own service professionals versus the extent to which they relied on those on the Gold Coast. Some Japanese companies arriving on the Gold Coast did bring architects and financial advisors with them from Japan and there are instances of projects that reflect this. The Japanese investor with the highest media profile at the time in Australia was in fact perceived as flying in from Japan at regular intervals with his self-contained team of service professionals on board his aircraft. During the 1980s there were also a number of Japanese service professionals who arrived on the Gold Coast independently and who interacted with the Japanese investors by giving them professional advice. However the Japanese had a high degree of dependence on the local service professionals. This was the case at both of the crucial stages of the investment process, the choice of site, the purchase negotiations, as well as the translation of the project from the investors initial mental image to the structures that arose as part of the built environment of the Gold Coast. Hence the Japanese investors may have had their own mental images of what they desired to buy and create on the Gold Coast, but they had to use mediators, service professionals and gatekeepers to realize their aims. To conclude, in a general sense, the service professionals and gatekeepers did have a role in attracting the Japanese investors to the Gold Coast and then funnelling them to specific sites and properties. Furthermore, given Japanese ignorance of the Gold Coast property culture, which it was not in their interest to change, the property service providers were able to facilitate the pushing up of prices, particularly at the top-end of the market. At the planning stage the designers and architects interacted with them to help crystallize their image of contemporary global chic, about which many Japanese already had some image from their familiarity with Hawaii and the US Sunbelt. This in turn influenced their images of the Gold Coast and what they wanted to create and enjoy in that environment and it facilitated the globalization of the professional service activities on the Gold Coast.
Japanese Capital and Conflict at the Global-Local Interface

If the Japanese arrived on the Gold Coast with their distinctive cultural baggage, then the community that they entered also had its own cultural baggage regarding them. They, as a manifestation of globalizing forces, were impacting upon local cultural groups with a suddenness and in ways previously not foreseen. As Antonio and Kellner (1994: 143) argued, globalization has resulted in culture groups, which previously rarely came into contact and had only the vaguest images of each other, contesting control of the same space. Featherstone (1995: 6) developed this point by saying that there has been an indiscriminate piling on top of each other of cultures and so the local, the familiar, becomes transfused with influences emanating from afar (Giddens, 1991: 109). The result may be not a fusion of cultures, but a juxtaposition of differences.

This may produce the potential for conflict between long-resident groups and those more recently arrived; a conflict over space, resources and images. The reasons for this lie in conflicts coloured by clashing economic and political interests, but behind it also lies, argued Bourdieu (1994: 50-65), a process of cultural contestation. This is a struggle for ‘legitimacy’ between definitions of values, feelings, and rewards. Such sets of cultural attributes can be encapsulated by a concept to which he gave the name of champs, or ‘cultural field.’ He defined the cultural field as the distinctive set of relationships, status, parameters of thought and modes of action, and it is within their cultural field that each group receives, absorbs and reflects upon, and retranslates stimuli, information, and images (Bourdieu, 1993: 162-4). Thus the public statements, responses and actions of an accountant or business person are likely to reflect a cultural field defined by economic values, the opinions of an army officer are likely to come from a cultural field in which the parameters of thought are based on the existence of a bellicose world and the primacy of territorial security.
Given this conceptual structure of culture group reality, it becomes pertinent to pose questions about the possible impact of the Japanese presence on the cultural field(s) of the Gold Coast community. What was the meaning which different groups in the Gold Coast population placed on the arrival of the Japanese? Did their presence contain a threat? What was it perceived to threaten— a way of life? Modes of behaviour? Perhaps even the control of the familiar place that had been imbued with a multitude of meanings and which gave the local cultural groups an important component of their very identity.

This interface between the newly arrived group, the bearers of the global forces, and the local population is not one-dimensional. It is not characterized by a unified perception and mode of response revealed by all the new arrivals on the one hand and all the local residents on the other. It is, as Massey (1993: 61-2) argued, much more kaleidoscopic, dependent on where an individual or group is placed in relation to the global processes that are impinging on the local community. In turn, it can be argued that this relationship of the group and the individuals in it to the new, to the global is a function of education, field of professional activity, personal or group interest, receptivity to outside influences, and nature of psychological predisposition to new stimuli, modes of thought and action. Thus some in the local community will embrace the new global forces; in fact they may seek to further their impact, whereas others may acquiesce to them, or see themselves unaffected by them, while yet others may become opposed to them, seeing them as ideologically undesirable or even as a personal threat. Such threats to the cultural values, if not the cultural field of a local group can give rise to a localism antithetical to the globalism that is seen to be impacting on the place in question.

Featherstone (1995: 97) argued that the existence, and meaning of any such localist perceptions can only be revealed in relation to their antitheses: the specific culture of globalization which appeared at that time and place. In other words, its meaning is essentially relational to the nature and dynamics of a specific instance of globalization. Robertson (1995: 26-7) encapsulated this symbiotic relationship between the localist and globalist forces by coining the word
'glocalization'. This means that one cannot be understood without the other. At a national level, an instance can be quoted from the writings of the social researcher Hugh MacKay (1994: 16). He argued that during the 1980s nothing sharpened the sense of tribal identity of some Australians more than the push to take them into Asia. Such a localist-globalist paradigm can provide a meaningful insight into the culture of a specific place in the contemporary world, or as Appadurai (1996: 184) enunciated it, can be 'the beginnings of a theoretical angle on the relationship between local and global realities'.

If the global perspective is large in scale, then that of the localists can vary according to each instance being considered. According to Featherstone (1995: 88) it is the perception of a cultural group that it has a single set of traditions, mores, or a single history that is the definitive point. Thus the group may be local, regional, or have a collective identity which its members feel is encompassed by the nation-state (Arnason, 1990: 209). Such a vision of a collective national identity can crystallize as the symbiotic counterpoint to a globalist one based on universal principles of spatio-economic organization and action.

As discussed in Chapter One, it is philosophically simplistic to premise globalist-localist arguments on group behaviour that regards each group as just a collection of individuals. As Durkheim (1978: 102-8) and more recently Bourdieu (1993: 5) have argued, ties bind members of a group together so that groups develop a collective consciousness which then has to be considered in relation to their behaviour. Bourdieu sought to reveal the logic and dynamics of group behaviour by establishing a relationship between the processes in the past that led to the formulation of its distinctive cultural field and the nature of its present behaviour. According to Bourdieu, the predisposition to certain modes of group behaviour are historical in their origins. He applied the term 'habitus' to such a predisposition by members of a given group to act in a predictable way (Bourdieu, 1993: 5). Boyarin's (1994: 2) research on the politics of memory is another perspective on this conceptual model of behaviour. In this case the rhetoric about the past has been mobilized for the political purposes of the present. It is through such a prism
that the statements produced in the globalist-localist conflict about Japanese investment on the Gold Coast will be considered.

This chapter seeks to reveal some of the formative influences on the values and behaviour patterns of the globalist and localist groups on the Gold Coast and what this place meant to them. This creates the context within which the views expressed and statements made by them on Japanese investment will be considered. The meanings contained in the utterances and structured statements will be analysed so that the socio-cultural values of each group and some individuals within it become apparent; in other words, their cultural field is explored. Most of the texts to be used are written or spoken. Much of it was taken from the public domain from newspapers and commentaries, but some is also drawn from interviews, especially two interviews with the self-appointed leader of the group that led the opposition to Japanese investment on the Gold Coast.

The Gold Coast as Culture

Elites and Globalist Views:

During this century the Gold Coast has experienced a number of phases of dramatic change (Hajdu, 1993: 41-42). The continuous stream of arrivals have placed the Gold Coast community in a high state of flux. Since the early 1950s the Gold Coast population has doubled every twelve to fifteen years. Social fluidity and materialism has been the norm and this is also seen in its elite. A description of its elite may reveal important traits of its culture.

The above comment is based on the premise that all communities, with the possible exception of the smallest, have an elite. An elite can be defined as being persons who have power and are located at strategic organizing positions in the community where their use of this power can affect many other people (Higley, Deacon & Smart, 1979: 1-7). Lowell Field and Higley (1980: 19) developed a corollary to this point when they wrote of the existence of a symbiotic relationship.
between elites and non-elites: the rest of the local population, or at least a
significant number of them, must share the values and aspirations of the elite. If
this is not the case, then the elite may lose its status and legitimacy.

The ethos of the Gold Coast elite has been development. Their cultural field can
be defined by entrepreneurial initiative, financial speculation, psychological
flexibility and lavish self-promotion. As the historian Michael Jones (1986: 122)
argued, ‘the Gold Coast development ethos creates the maximum profits for the
entrepreneur who is seen as a folk hero because he creates the jobs and brings
wealth to land regarded as useless sand dunes until fairly recently’. It is also a city
where the nature of the built-environment is defined by the developer in the least
constrained way of any major Australian city. Ron McMaster, a major Gold Coast
builder in the 1980s commented that, ‘Some people have said that Surfers
Paradise has an ugly skyline, but what’s happened here is the result of market
demand.’ (GCB, 7 May 1987). Therefore this explanation justifies it. Also, in a
general sense, (Jones 1986: 3) the Gold Coast has become the best example of the
positive and negative features of competitive private sector urban development.
Such an unconstrained, wide-open business culture has always attracted
entrepreneurs and capital that were keen for quick success. Jones in his book A
Sunny Place for Shady People: The Real Gold Coast Story drew a series of pen
portraits of Gold Coast developers and concluded with the comment that ‘the Gold
Coast is the refuge of the self-made man’ (1986: 124). As potential entrepreneurs
have arrived and prospered, they have joined an ever-changing Gold Coast elite. It
has also meant that in a psychological sense the elite has always had outside points
of reference, as the names given to new suburbs and canal estates attest.

This has been an elite of developers, property investors, estate agents, property
consultants, valuers, builders, civil engineers and designers, as well as those in the
tourist industry. They have set the cultural tone of the community, particularly
during the boom phases of the property cycle when they have drawn in wider
circles of other people who have sought to increase their wealth, improve their
status and lifestyle by entering the local market in expectation of upgrading their
domestic property asset.
The members of the Gold Coast business elite have been traditionally outward-looking. Since the late 1950s many of them have come from Melbourne or Sydney, and their capital inevitably also has. In the 1980s they embraced economic rationalism and globalization. For example, Lyn Ginns, Research Economist for Max Christmas Pty. Ltd., the largest real estate company on the Gold Coast was quoted in the *Gold Coast Bulletin* (16 November 1988) as saying: ‘We cannot afford to say that capital has nationality’. She then went on to say that she saw tourism and the investment which it needed as always having been the lifeblood of the Gold Coast, and then argued that restrictions on it would kill the place. Federal or State government policies which are seen as being an intervention in the global market are criticized. For example, the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) of the Australian Government, with its investigative and advisory functions, is the obvious focus for such criticism. Les Allen, Chairman, Goldco Developments, stated the following:

> Attracting investment funds is a very competitive business and all around the world countries are doing their best to try and attain funds. I can go to London, Japan, America and Canada and buy real estate as a foreigner. But in Australia foreigners are not easily permitted to buy....The Government has to really look at its policies in relation to the FIRB and attracting investment...it is really an opportunity for Australia because if somebody is going to take their money out of Japan, where do they go? Hawaii has been done to death, America poses security problems because there is recession building there. London has suffered the same as us and its cycle is six months behind ours.


In perceptions such as the above, the perspective is completely global, with Australia and within it the Gold Coast being locations that are jostling for comparative advantage within a global playing field of capital flows. The use of any powers by the Australian government to regulate, control, to demarcate its part of the global playing field were regarded by the Gold Coast elite as an inhibitor of the legitimate forces which they saw as determinants of global order. These
legitimate forces were supply and demand, the market, or economic efficiency. They saw the large inflow of Japanese capital in the late 1980s as evidence of the truth of their globalist perspective. It encouraged many of them to transpose their self-interest and philosophical convictions into a moral imperative through which they sought to strive for an Australia in which economic considerations had unfettered reign and that was ever more tightly integrated into the global economy. In its sociological dimension, this globalist view saw the nation as a focus of loyalty and reference point of action being gradually usurped by the supremacy of the individual, that is, the individual per se, not the individual as a member of any group. In the 1980s this cultural text came to be seen as a mirror of the increasingly culturally and racially diverse nature of Australian society in which a wide range of values and lifestyles were seen as being enshrined. Hence what was happening on the Gold Coast was seen by many of its elite as a manifestation of this trend.

However the Gold Coast was also a diverse community and some of its residents did not share this globalist, individualistic view of the world. In fact they felt provoked into articulating its antithesis: a localist text.

Localism on the Gold Coast:

Until the late 1980s the Gold Coast had developed essentially as a tourist and retirement centre. Mullins (1990: 37) in his extensive work on its social structure referred to it as a city which developed ‘for the consumption of pleasure’. It catered to visitors and a disproportionately large permanent population no longer in the work force. The 1986 statistics of occupational structure presented by Mullins showed a large representation of people in the wholesale and retail trade, construction, property and business services. The ‘Self-employed’ and ‘Employer’ groups were represented in the statistics at rates twice that found in Melbourne and Sydney (24.4% of the total in employment versus 13.0% and 12.8% in Melbourne and Sydney). The higher age groups were also prominent: in 1986 those aged 65 years and over accounted for 17.1% of the Gold Coast
population, compared with a range for the capital cities of 11.9% in Adelaide to 3.3% in Darwin (Mullins, 1990: 38).

An article in the *Gold Coast Bulletin* of 17 February 1995 headed ‘Budget motels are ideal for retirees’ shows the perceived link between the retirees and self-employed. ‘Southern retirees moving to the Gold Coast increasingly are on the look-out for budget motels to buy to give them a home, income and investment package, say property agents’. It then lists a number of motels of a type which would suit older people moving to the Gold Coast. Mullins in his 1993 essay saw another connection between the strong representation of the self-employed, the small business people, artisans on the one hand, and the dominance of the tourist industry on the other (1993: 404-409). This occurs through the types of job and business opportunities that the tourist industry on the Gold Coast has created. These are- family-run shops, cafes, small blocks of holiday flats, motels, service stations, and jobs in the building trades. Bechhofer and Elliott (1981: 183) regarded this social group as the core of the petite bourgeoisie. Petty productive property is the essence of their identity. It is property which they work themselves, often with the help of relatives, or, according to Mullins, with at most four paid employees. Mullins (1993: 405) argued that it is this group which is pivotal to an understanding of the Gold Coast society:

Since the Gold Coast is a strikingly different type of city, its class structure should also be markedly different...(data shows).....it to have a large petite bourgeoisie, defined here as forming the majority of the ‘classes of owners’, and a relatively small number in the middle classes (notably in the expert middle classes).

The small size of their businesses, limited capital and immediate exposure to economic cycles made them feel particularly vulnerable. Also, time-consuming work routines tend to bind people like this into limited social networks, so most of the petite bourgeoisie do not have the knowledge, experience and social confidence of the large entrepreneurial and professional classes. The leader of Heart of a Nation, the catalyst of opposition against Japanese investment on the
Gold Coast, happened to be a house painter and co-owner with his wife, of a secondhand clothes shop. From such a picture of this group culture Bechhofer and Elliott (1981: 186) deduced that although its members are instinctively conservative, they only give grudging support to the political forces representing the large capitalists. Laclau (1977: 91) in turn defined the petite-bourgeois as one of ‘status quo anti-capitalism’. Their response to perceived vulnerability is more likely to take the form of political populism (or even fascism).

Scholars of populism, such as Canovan, Laclau, Richards and Mullins, agree on many of its salient features: its anti-establishmentism, its nostalgia for a past of cultural harmony if not heroic endeavour, its inclination towards racism, its propensity to be anti-big business, and most importantly, the use of rhetoric about ‘the people’, ‘the little person’, ‘the underdog’ against the power of a self-serving elite. Canovan (1977: 59) wrote of populism as having a strong notion of the people as distinct from a collection of individuals or groups in positions of power, in other words, an elite. Laclau (1977: 196) developed this by making the point that populism inevitably involves a struggle between ‘the people’ and the hegemonic class and its distinct values. Richards (1981: 6) saw the cause of such a struggle as the desire of ‘the people’ (however vaguely defined) to seek the disbursal of power from the hands of an economic and political elite that had acquired it to an unwarranted extent. Finally, Mullins (1986: 142) defined the populism of the petite-bourgeoisie more according to Marxist paradigms. He wrote that:

Right populism emerges from initiatives of a subordinate-and frequently ascendant-section of the bourgeoisie, a section that is trying to negate the power of the dominant component of that class, a component which is also the centre of the power bloc.

The essay from which the above quotation is cited is about populism and politics in Queensland. In his subsequent research of the Gold Coast, Mullins established the existence of the sociological basis for populism there. He did this through his description and analysis of its social and occupational structure. All it needed was
the appearance of an issue, a flashpoint, to crystallize populist action when latent fears and images of past shocks were aroused. This process predisposed such groups to act in ways which echoed the formative years of their world views.

To be specific, what revealed the distinctive habitus of this group of the Gold Coast petite-bourgeoisie was the arrival of capital-rich Japanese. This was a group that was largely older and of Anglo-Celtic background. Many were also in the higher age groups and so had memories of the Pacific War. Therefore to understand the culture of many in the local Gold Coast population one has to situate it within the context of the attitudes and perceptions held by a significant proportion of Australians, especially the older generation, about the Japanese.

In 1991 Gavan McCormack (1991b: 13) the Japan scholar from the ANU in Canberra, appraised the past relationship between Australia and Japan in the following way:

‘The relationship has been marked by massive ignorance, hostility, and prejudice at times in the past, each at times perceiving the other to be utterly alien’. He then expanded this statement to reveal the key images and beliefs which have given it validity. On the Australian side, fears of racial and territorial threats from the North, culminating in Japan’s military aggression between 1941-45, as well as the nature of the captor-captive relationship which occurred between Australian POWs and the Japanese military personnel during that period (1991b: 13-31). Subsequently McCormack himself became the co-author of a book detailing one of the most vividly remembered Wartime Australian POW sagas (McCormack & Nelson, 1993). The experiences and impressions that Australians gained of the Japanese during that period became so formative that the historian Humphrey McQueen (1991: 263) was able to write that:

Australian attitudes to all of Asia are filtered through a prism of memories from the Pacific war: Coral Sea, Changi, the Thai-Burma railroad and the Kokoda trail became not merely place names but mythic sites. These inheritances still shape the choices that Australian governments can make in international relations.
Even though there have been some voices that have sought to portray the harsh treatment meted out to Australian POWs by the Japanese as having been exacerbated by the Australians' ignorance of Japanese psychology and culture (such as Clarke, 1984), these experiences created the ties for much group and generational solidarity in Australia after 1945, as well as being definitive to the cultural world of these groups. To use the Bourdieu terminology - this coloured their habitus. Organizations such as the Returned Servicemens League (RSL) were focal point of these groups. In the late 1980s when the wave of Japanese tourists and investors appeared on the Gold Coast, McRobbie a Gold Coast journalist and local historian wrote regular articles in the Gold Coast Bulletin, as well as publishing two books. In these he discussed the need for the Gold Coast population to be positive about the new Japanese presence in their midst. However even he commented in 1988 that:

It should be remembered that buried in the memory of many Australians is the ticking time bomb of bitterness towards all things Japanese, because of the atrocities of World War Two.

(McRobbie, 1988: 595).

It is noteworthy that during the period 1986-91, that is, the period with the large wave of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast, the Gold Coast Bulletin ran four feature articles that can be interpreted as playing on the memories of many of its older readers. These were titled: ‘A time to Remember: Changi hell-hole left a generation scarred,’ ‘POWs still suffer horrors inflicted by the Japanese’, ‘After Changi and years of rejecting things Japanese, it’s time to “Bury bitter memories”’, ‘Why Japan must pay the price for war atrocities’, (GCB: 17 Oct 1986; 6 Feb. 1989; 4 Oct. 1990; 17 Sept. 1991). It was not just the strength of these formative images and experiences of many Australians that provided the context of the Gold Coast debate that ensued over Japanese investment, but also the belief, if not annoyance, that the Japanese did not feel any sympathy, or even had little knowledge of what was embedded in Australians’ cultural attitudes regarding them. For instance, King (1997: 131) wrote of the annoyance of the
Australian government ‘over the contents of Japan’s notoriously vacuous, euphemistic and misleading school textbooks dealing with the war period’.

Thus the context of the debate on Japanese investment that occurred on the Gold Coast cannot be separated from the actual texts that it produced.

Conflict and Japanese Investment on the Gold Coast

This public controversy spanned about seven years, from 1986 to 1992. It was conducted by means which sought to engage widening circles of groups and was manifested in various aspects of local public life, with some echoes at the State and even national level. An important means of engagement between the chief exponents of diverse viewpoints were the pages of the Gold Coast Bulletin and to a lesser extent the state and national newspapers. There were also six public meetings, on 24 May and 4 July 1988, 7 February and 20 November 1989, 2 July 1990 and 11 June 1992. The local press gave estimates of the number of people attending each meeting. These were, 1500, 300, 400, 150, 300 and 32. At the first public meeting an organization called ‘Heart of a Nation’ was established. The Gold Coast Bulletin Postbag became a focal point of the debate. In an interview the editor estimated that during the three years 1987-90, about 280-300 letters relating to this issue were published by them. The peak months were May and June 1988 which saw 45 and 33 relevant letters appearing on their Postbag page. The controversy about the Japanese, their capital investment and property purchases featured as an issue in the 1990 Federal election, in the 1989 Queensland election, a state by-election campaign, and led to three public demonstrations in the centre of the Gold Coast at Surfers Paradise (Fig. 7.0), as well as extensive lobbying of state and federal parliamentarians. There was also considerable exposure of the conflict on local, regional and national radio and television.

Participants on each side in the conflict were determined to equate their opinions and attitudes with what was ‘desirable’ for the whole Australian population. Each set of values, interests, experiences, memories and world views were articulated as
BRUCE Whiteside leads the protest march . . . “our complaint is aimed at the politicians”.
the definitive ones for all ‘right-thinking’ people in the country. At their most
philosophical, their adherents sought to articulate them as the definition of
Australian identity. There was an element of logical and ideological predictability
in the views uttered, but at the same time the revelation of individual opinions,
images and feelings showed a range of interpretations, assumptions, logic and
sophistication of argument, not to mention vehemence of fears, that was
surprising.

It is to a selection of these texts from the exclusionary, localist perspective, as well
as from the spatially unbounded, economically rationalist globalist perspective,
that this chapter will now turn. The selection of texts will result in the issues
being seen through the prism of the researcher, as will the interpretations that are
put on them. The aim is to chart the progress of the Japanese investment debate
and sketch the cultural worlds of the main participants.

Meanings from the Localist Text

The localist text had at its core a critique of or opposition to Japanese investment
on the Gold Coast. However it was articulated from different positions and so
revealed a range of meanings within the framework of its basic philosophical
parameters. It painted a clear picture of the cultural world of its spokespeople.

Possession of Australia as a unique land:

The first of these was the identification of, and attachment to, Australia as a
unique land. The widely used slogan of many globalists that ‘Australia is a part of
Asia’ was seen as the catchcry that this group felt had to be contradicted as
forcefully as possible. Thus one letter writer to the Gold Coast Bulletin (4 August
1989) stated: ‘We are not part of anybody’s empire. We are an island continent,
wealthy in our own right. We must fight. We must fight for our right to remain
so’.
In an interview (17 October 1994), the Chairman of Heart of a Nation Bruce Whiteside saw a connection between the uniqueness of place and the uniqueness of its people: 'This land here is sacrosanct to Australians. It doesn’t belong to the Japanese. It doesn’t belong to the New Zealanders. It doesn’t belong to the Indians. It belongs to the Australians'.

This belief in, and attachment to, Australia can be interpreted as showing that there is a symbiotic relationship between the land of Australia and the people and an exclusivity towards outsiders. It also encompassed pleas from a romantic environmentalist living in the mountains near Murwillumbah in northern New South Wales for 'a residential place for everyone, and a chance for our grandkids to experience the joy of dinkum Aussie bush' (GCB, 3 August 1990). For, as put by a letter writer from Biggera Waters on the Gold Coast, 'if we don’t draw a line in the sand, (our) children might be living in central Australia while our coastline has been sold off to foreign landowners' (GCB, 7 June 1990).

This particular variation on the localist text reached its most eloquent and bitter manifestation in the rendering of a version of the Australian poetic icon, 'My Country' (the original by Dorothea MacKellar) with its echoes of the people being at one with the land:

I loved a sunburnt country,
A land of sweeping plains,
Before the pollies sold it
To all the As-ians
I loved her far horizons
I loved her jewelled sea,
Alas, my kids won’t see it-
A yellow land to be.


The use of the past tense shows that affection for Australia is for a country that is perceived to be vanishing rapidly. Another meaning is that this unique continent
has to be possessed completely by its established white inhabitants, or it will be
lost. Change and evolution are not part of this view of national identity. The
arrival of others, particularly of another race, will result in possession passing into
their hands. For land and its possession is seen as a birthright, ‘those who own
part of Australia must first of all be Australian and owe allegiance to no one else’
(GCB, 13 April 1988). Further, it is ‘the right of a sovereign people to voice their
concern about the sale of freehold land to any foreign power’ (GCB, 4 May 1988).

Peeling away layers of feeling and argument reveals some reasons for such
populist fundamentalism: ‘the soil is the soul of the nation’ (GCB, 4 June 1988).
As the manifesto of Heart of a Nation, written by its Chairman, Bruce Whiteside
(Fig. 7.1) said:

What riles Australians most of all and rightly so is the selling of their
country’s soil. This strikes at the heart of a sovereign people and I believe
the practice should be stopped immediately.

(What is Heart of a Nation?, May 1988).

Barnes, a cultural historian, argued that such a sense of territoriality, is basic to
Australian myth or legend. He wrote (1994: 41) that: ‘the essence of the
Australian legend is the struggle of man (read-European man) with the
land....(and)....the importance of legend is that the Australian (white man) has
earned the right to possess the land’.

At the same there is a hidden meaning within the text of this cultural iconography:
the claim to identify with, and enjoy possession of the Australian continent by
Europeans has overtones of fragility and insecurity. The writings of Nettie Palmer
in the 1930s discussed this in some detail. The seminal point of her discussion
was that:

three or four generations have not been enough to allow us to get thoroughly
rooted in the soil. Waves of uncertainty sweep over us. Is this
WE NEED YOUR HELP NOW!

MAY 24TH, 1988

Facing page 1: HEART OF A NATION

CHAIRMAN: Bruce R. Whiteside
VICE CHAIRMAN: Trevor R. Pettit M.L.A.

Ph. 356252

I wish to become a dinkum Aussie and join

HEART OF A NATION

I give financial support for its objectives and aims.

NAME:

ADDRESS:

PHONE:

NOTE: Donations over $100 will receive a copy of the Miami Great Hall Address.

FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS ON ITEMS FOR SALE

GOLD COAST BULLETIN, Saturday, June 4, 1988

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continent really our home, or are we just migrants from another
civilisation?

(Palmer, 1932: 25).

It is plausible to argue that it was these fears which coloured the trauma of World
War Two for Australians and made them vow never to allow ‘freeholding of
Crown Land to commercial developers, especially those of former enemy alien
origin’. (GCB, 12 August 1987). After 1945 many groups in Australia continued
to fear a resurgence of Japanese militarism (King, 1997: 126) and so, in the years
that followed, the psychological implications of Japan’s transformation from being
a ‘target for racial fear and contempt to becoming our major trading partner’ was
avoided (Rickard, 1988: 222).

The appearance of Japanese property buyers on the Gold Coast in the 1980s
reawakened the memories of the Second World War that the older petit-bourgeois
groups there had. It brought forth their predisposition to treat all Japanese as
potential military enemies. A sense of ‘letting the enemy into our castle,’ a sense
of ‘surrendering this great country’ was being revealed as an element that had
always been latent in their world view.

Defence of the country as a test of nationhood:

Inherent in the belief about a symbiotic relationship between the land of Australia
and its European inhabitants was a second meaning: the ability to defend your land
as the ultimate test of nationhood and national virility. This is a theme that writers
on Australian culture such as White (1981: 73) and Bennett (1994: 58-59) have
both identified. The Manifesto of Heart of a Nation enunciated this in
considerable detail:

We the sons and daughters of ANZAC are duty-bound to uphold the
principle and tradition that has been etched indelibly into Australian
culture. Men have laid their life on the line fighting to defend a country
and a way of life that they believe in. When this soil on which we stand
was under threat from invading forces, the demarcation lines of war were clearly defined. Many believe that in a more subtle way we are again facing a threat of invasion.

(What is Heart of a Nation?, May 1988).

People pivotal to this view were cited to substantiate the standpoints enunciated, or were encouraged to participate in the debate. The Gold Coast Bulletin of 1 September 1987 quoted the president of the Victorian branch of the RSL, Bruce Ruxton, as having warned all Japanese to stay clear of RSL clubs. However in the same article, the national leadership under Sir William Keys, took a more moderate line, ‘though we cannot forget the atrocities of wartime, but equally we cannot close our minds to the challenge of the future’. A year later the highly decorated Australian war heroine Nancy Wake’s address to the womens’ section of the Queensland National Party was reported in the Gold Coast Bulletin under the heading: ‘War heroine blasts ‘attack’ by the yen’. She was quoted as having said that ‘I personally am very worried about all the money they are investing, not only in this country, but throughout the world....If the Japs get a foothold here they will expand’ (GCB, 6 October 1988). Daniel Burstein (1988: 66-7; 243-4) the American author of Yen!, subtitled. ‘The Threat of Japan’s Financial Empire’ also entered the debate and reiterated passages from his book about the inroads the Japanese were making into Australia.

These prominent individuals provided the extra-textual frame of reference for the localist text in this conflict on the Gold Coast. For they were seen to echo and to add legitimacy to the text of the localist groups ‘fighting’ the global ‘invader’.

The culture of political populism became evident in the role the adherents of such views ascribed to government in this conflict. Anne Pascoe a letter writer to the Gold Coast Bulletin, revealed this clearly in the following letter to the editor which appeared on the 27 February 1989:

The ownership of this land is vested in its people. The governments are there merely for the housekeeping, and housekeepers who act contrary to
the wishes and instructions of the employer courts instant dismissal. This country’s governments, state and federal, are obviously ploughing their own furrows. Their activities are against the interests of the majority and continue to favour the moneyed classes for obvious reasons. When the interests of foreign countries take precedence over ours.....it is hardly surprising that the uproar is growing against those whose hands are out to grab the flowing wealth of other nations.

This sense of alienation, of abandonment of ‘the people’ by the political elite in what they perceived to be a fight against globalist aggression against their home territory was also present in their utterances about politicians who entered this debate. References to politicians who were willing to sell their homeland ‘for thirty pieces of silver’, alternated with criticisms of specific state and federal political leaders. Margaret Herron of Broadbeach Waters headed her letter to the editor, ‘The losers’ bloodless victory’ and then attacked the then Queensland Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen for ‘allowing our country to be sold to the Japanese....All Queenslanders should unite in stopping Joh Bjelke-Petersen selling more of our heritage, our precious Australian land to these people’ (GCB, 25 March 1987). Later on the 13th January 1989, when the conflict about Japanese investment was at its height, Prime Minister Bob Hawke visited the Daikyo-Kanko owned Palm Meadows golf course resort at Carrara on the Gold Coast. He made a speech in which he said Japanese investment in Australia was ‘unequivocally welcome’. The riposte from Bruce Whiteside, chairman of Heart of a Nation, was quoted in the Gold Coast Bulletin next to the PM’s speech. He said: ‘Mr. Hawke is selling out our childrens’ heritage for a few miserable yen. What Bob Hawke said was tantamount to a fifth columnist’ (GCB, 13 February 1989).

Investment as conquest by other means:

Such bellicose language revealed another meaning within this localist text: the perception that the purchase of property by the Japanese was territorial conquest by financial means. This showed that these groups of people on the Gold Coast
had a strong predisposition to seeing the Japanese as inherently aggressive and hostile towards the country of Australia and people living in it. Fears that the Japanese were staging a rerun of 1941-45 were echoed in the phrases used to describe their decisions to invest: they want to ‘Blitzkrieg us with money’, and on the Gold Coast, ‘they are bombing their way into huge investment wealth’. John Cumming, a retired businessman, wrote his memoirs (1993: 60) in which he claimed that on visits to Japan, foreign journalists told him that the Japanese regarded their defeat in World War Two as only a setback to their long-term plan for world power. However this time their power would be economic not military. This theme recurred in numerous pieces of correspondence to the Gold Coast Bulletin.

‘It was said when the War finished, if they didn’t get us by war, they would get us by peace’ (GCB, 18 March 1988).

‘The Japanese boasted that they would take Australia even if it took a hundred years to do so’ (GCB, 22 March 1988).

Phrases, such as ‘buying us out’, ‘selling the country to the enemy’, and ‘peaceful take over of our country’ (GCB, 25, 26 & 22 March 1988) were a frequent occurrence in this text.

The contextual perceptions revealed by this are worthy of enunciation. One of them is that of a Japan as a monolithic juggernaut that is bent on control and power by any means. Another is that of a Japan which is implacably, or even genetically, hostile to Australians, but irrevocably covetous of their country. The last point also appears to have another connotation: Australia in the eyes of the Japanese is such a desirable place to possess that they have mounted a campaign to ‘conquer’ it by whatever means appears to be most advantageous at any given time.
The nation/race as the ultimate focus of meaning:

Underlying these statements and their textual and contextual meanings is the perception that the 'nation', and 'national character,' are the basic points of human reference and provide the ultimate framework of human beliefs and modes of behaviour. Furthermore these, the characteristics of a nation and the behaviour of its members, produce individual and group behaviour that is immutable. Changes of time, place, experience and circumstances do not fundamentally alter the aims of given nationals.

Thus the behaviour of the Japanese is seen as a constant. Their war-time aggression and atrocities committed by them are but one manifestation of their fundamental national character. They are a: 'sadistic enemy ...well on the way to achieving their aim (to conquer Australia)...they lack compassion...they are the same people today as those who horrified the world with their barbarous atrocities against those they conquered,' wrote D.W. Barrett in the Gold Coast Bulletin of 15 April 1988. Whereas Derek Harris, managing director of the small property-owners group, Strata Apartment Management, (GCB, 11 September 1987) warned that, 'the Japanese are ruthless in business...they are commercially interested in the Gold Coast, not morally interested'.

Quite apart from the purported assumptions regarding the moral interest that non-Japanese business people are ascribed as having in the Gold Coast, the transposition of alleged past military behaviour by the Japanese to their present commercial behaviour, only illustrates the contextual meaning mentioned above. That is, the belief in the existence of immutable national behaviour as the ultimate framework or reference point in the reading of meaning into human action. In this case, it is the immutability of Japanese aims, values and behaviour, whether in 1941 or 1987.

The perception of the nation as the basic reference point of human behaviour and action was boosted by the role of Professor Geoffrey Blainey, a historian from Melbourne University. Through a series of public speeches, radio and television...
appearances, Blainey provoked a debate on the level of Asian migration into Australia that was occurring in the 1980s. His public utterances were collected and published in 1984, under the title, *All for Australia*. At the height of the Japanese investment controversy on the Gold Coast the M.H.R for the seat of McPherson, Peter White, invited Blainey to address a Liberal Party luncheon at Surfers Paradise. At this luncheon on the 21st April 1988 he spoke of Australia’s loss of ‘national cohesion’, the Australian nation was becoming fragmented into a ‘cluster of tribes’ (*GCB*, 22 April 1988). In this he revealed his personal view of Australian culture as having been formed at some stage in the past and that had remained the context within which he interpreted many events in the Australia of the 1980s. As with the texts in the Japanese investment debate mentioned above, a particular concept of ‘nation’ appeared to be fundamental to his views.

A final perspective of this rhetoric of ‘nation’ warrants some discussion, and that is the extent to which ‘nation’ and ‘race’ were seen as synonymous. Was the vehemence of the opposition to globalizing forces on the Gold Coast explicable by the fact that its most visible and important protagonists were ‘of another race’? White, in his work *Inventing Australia: Images and Reality* (1981: 70-71) noted that in the dominant utterances on culture in the first half of the 20th Century, culture was frequently seen as being connected to race with the distinction between ‘race’ and ‘nation’ was often not specified. Nation, race and culture were seen as an all-enclosing envelope that guaranteed stability, identity, emotional warmth and social cohesion. Walker’s study of Australian identity and its relationship with Asia prior to 1939 develops this theme in considerable detail; especially interesting is his treatment of the discussion on Australian national identity at the beginning of the 20th Century in relationship to Japan (1999: 85-97). It is easy to conjecture how older, Anglo-Celtic Australians seeking security and contentment through a world of familiar signifiers on the Gold Coast could counterpose such an idealized text of an Australian national past to the contemporary world of rapid change rushing in from the outside, particularly from Japan.
The desire to retain the immutability of the nation as the basic reference point in the formulation of cultural texts was also seen to take on some kind of psychological, if not biological imperative. Adrian Davies, a participant in the public debate spoke of his conviction that:

> by the law of nature we show a preference to our own family members and form groups based on kinfolk, thus becoming Australians, Japanese, or whatever. To go against nature is not just courting trouble, it is guaranteeing it (GCB, 5 May 1988).

In the same correspondence, he added that any policies based on the view of a globalist unity of humanity is ‘fit only for discussion among academic zombies with lemming-like tendencies...(for) we are not prepared to become guinea pigs in a genetic factory for the benefit of another international conspiratorial folly’.

Member S of the Heart of a Nation movement responded in an interview (Miami, 20 October 1994) to a public statement by the then Queensland Treasurer Keith De Lacy that Japanese ownership of land in Queensland was limited to a very small proportion of the state’s land area: ‘a few months ago he said it was only 1.5%. I say now it’s going up to over 5%. My argument is: when does a doctor say to a patient- “You’ve only got 5% cancer?”(Fig. 7.2).

This opinion appeared to have transposed the Blainey concept of desirable national identity as social cohesion with a concept of desirable national identity as a biological, or racial, imperative in which people and land are interconnected like the parts of some biological organism and into which the entry of foreigners is regarded as being analogous to some fatal disease.

A direct question on racism in the first interview (17 October 1994) to the chairman of Heart of a Nation evoked the following reply:

> Just mention ‘Japanese’ or ‘Aborigines’ and racism is thrown at you. It’s opposition to Japanese investment. Racism’s got nothing to do with it!
Japan puts its stamp on prestige real estate

By TONY WONKA

NO WORRIES!
THEY ONLY OWN 5% OF THE GOLD COAST - SO FAR.
Racism is a dislike of colour based on a natural prejudice. What I was talking about was nothing to do with it. It had more to do with economic security.

However a subsequent open-ended interview (19 October 1994) with him provided a more complex, veiled, but ultimately unmistakable set of feelings and views:

There are two aspects to that (land and property ownership by foreigners), from the point of view of aggression and non-aggression...in a sense of, there’s always been a friendly war going on between Australia and New Zealand, but we’re practically cousins...I also venture to say that the British owning land here, the Americans owning land here, there is not the same degree of concern as what there is with the Japanese.....The fact of the matter is you can’t change the mentality, you can educate people, but when it comes to an out and out stoush, people will revert to their natural inclinations.

And the meaning in the above text is that Australians by inclination, familiarity, and even biological make-up, will reveal their innate friendliness and support of people from other English-speaking countries, but are unable do this towards a people of another race, particularly a race that by definition is regarded as intrinsically aggressive.

Thus the above elements of racism are but another layer of meaning in the concept of nation that is revealed in the localist text on the Gold Coast. The presence of many older people there, with formative years in the Australia of the British empire, with memories of the Second World War, and with small likelihood of personal gain from the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast, predisposed them to generate such a set of views.
The Localist Text and the Meaning of Populism:

As discussed earlier in this chapter, political populism is usually characterized by the mobilization of groups of people who feel alienated from the economic and political elites within their society. There is more than a hint of betrayal and powerlessness in the views they articulate. The meanings that become apparent in populist texts often reflect a feeling that the contests for cultural acceptance and power in the society are not equal. Expressed more specifically, the perception that the elites ignore the views and values of 'the people' as they act on the basis of ill-considered or philosophically fashionable principles, if not straight self-interest. Thus some groups of people become alienated from the ascendant cultural text of society and feel increasingly politically impotent (Canovan, 1981: 291). The resultant attitudes of such groups to the elite are often characterized by ambivalence: on the one hand, they blame the elites for not having coopted them into the political process; on the other, they argue that they would not want to participate in the existing institutions and processes because they have lost contact with their democratic roots. Such meanings were both insinuated and overtly stated in the localist text of the Japanese investment debate on the Gold Coast.

In an unpublished manuscript titled *Yen for Australia* (1993), Bruce Whiteside, the chairman of Heart of a Nation, wrote of his entry into the campaign against Japanese investment on the Gold Coast in the following way: 'I went into this whole affair as an innocent child. There were no hidden agendas, no racist vendettas, no personal mileage for an ordinary Aussie battler like me.'

His perception of himself as the quintessential 'ordinary person' reflecting the views of mainstream Australia is also echoed in his comment given in an interview (*GCB*, 19 May 1989) on the reason for organizing the first protest meeting: 'This is a plaintive cry from the people of Australia'. The next sentence he uttered is equally revealing; 'I don't want political interference'.

Such views revealed a perception that the networks of global money and power were so persuasive that they had appropriated Australian politicians. The result
was that the issue of controlling Japanese land purchases was now seen as political
dynamite not to be touched by any public figure wanting to preserve their position
and influence. Such a perception was at times coloured by a sense of betrayal, as
the following letter by Anne Ruscoe of Paradise Point reveals:

(Hawke and Keating) like chameleons they changed to match their
environment. They have attained the highest pinnacle and now move
among the Gods of High Finance. They are a far cry from their humble
beginnings and the rest of the ordinary Australians battling against the
odds. When democracy is still spoken of around the country, it is in the
muted tones one uses in the presence of the dying. (GCB, 4 November
1988).

The sense that the Australian political elite was now serving the interests of global
capital, in this instance its Japanese manifestation, is very strong. At the same
time (Interview, 17 October 1994) the chairman of Heart of a Nation expressed
criticism of the ALP for not having used him as its candidate in the state by-
election for the seat of South Coast on the 20 August 1988. Whiteside maintained
that with ALP endorsement he could have won it (As an independent, and one of
ten candidates, he won 421, or 2.35% of the total vote). Here a sense of betrayal
and a wish to be noticed and coopted vie with each other for psychological
ascendancy.

Another dimension of populism in the cultural world of the Gold Coast localists
was the evocation of certain iconic values of popular Australian culture. One of
these was the concept of the ‘fair go’, that is, the willingness to play ‘the game of
life’, especially in the area of work and business, according to principles of
generally accepted decency so that the ‘little person’ gets an equal chance to
succeed. In a competitive economic sense the sheer volume of capital which the
Japanese had at their disposal for Gold Coast investment was perceived to make
this impossible. One participant in the Gold Coast dispute over the investment
issue argued that because the Japanese could borrow unlimited funds from banks
in Japan at interest rates a quarter to a third of those in Australia, the local
investors and home buyers there not have a chance against them. ‘The Aussie or Kiwi has proved he can handle a fight, but for God’s sake, let it be fair’ (GCB, 7 February 1989). This issue of a fair-go even led to comments by a local politician on the Gold Coast. Alderman Lester Hughes of the Gold Coast City Council. He stated that he was convinced that Australian developers were being priced out of the market by the large volumes of cheap money that was coming from Japan. ‘It is most unfair that every major piece of development land that borders the Gold Coast is being acquired by the Japanese’ (GCB, 23 September 1987).

Blainey re-entered the debate at a national level in an article published in The Australian on 22 October 1988. Under the headline, ‘It’s time to talk about Japan: We cringe in the face of such mighty power’. He developed the argument that Japan’s economic power was now so great that many people in Australia were just adopting a supine attitude towards the capital flooding in from there. He pleaded for a government-led public debate to help establish the conditions under which we would allow it to enter or not enter. In other words, a better balance, a fair-go, for Australia and Australians in what Blainey perceived to be at present a most unequal relationship. His view that governments in Australia were not addressing an issue of such fundamental importance to all Australians appears to echo the populist cry that governments had become divorced from the values and perceptions of many people.

Another iconic image of the localists on the Gold Coast that struck a populist chord was that of the ‘Little Aussie Battler’. This was the poor but honest and hardworking family man, who through no fault of his own was battling against rising prices of Gold Coast housing, the cyclic local economy, and the marginalization of small businesses through the arrival of large companies. If the company happened to be Japanese, then the headline, ‘Little battler crushed by big Japanese developer’ was seen as a direct stab to the heart (GCB, 31 January 1989). Public comment about this showed that, for example, there was a perception that the character of the retail heart of Surfers Paradise was being changed from one of small, independent shopkeepers to one being increasingly dominated by large foreign corporate investors and retail chains. In this way the small shopkeeper, the
proverbial Aussie battler, was being forced out to give way to a ‘city for what has been described as the financial elite’ (GCB, 25 July 1989). The Gold Coast Small Business Association accused the Gold Coast City Council of doing nothing to prevent this from happening (GCB, 2 November 1990).

Thus populist hallmarks of Australian culture, such as the fair-go and the Aussie battler, were projected into the dispute to show that the political and business elites had become misguided, if not self-serving, and so had lost touch with the values and needs of the ‘true Australians’. As a result, such people felt alienated and were forced to resort to populist action to fight the internationalist, the globalist agenda that they believed was being forced upon the whole country. It is this, the nature of this globalist text that now needs to be presented and the meanings contained within it analysed.

The Globalism and the Japanese Investment Debate

As could be expected, there were individuals and groups on the Gold Coast who sought to counter the views expressed by the local groups in the preceding section of this chapter. Comments abounded, such as:

There’s no such thing as a Japanese invasion. People talk of a takeover. I talk of development. And development with Japanese help.

(Max Christmas, The Australian, 8 August 1987)

People who are opposed to change reflect the drawbridge principle, which cannot exist in a developing community.

(A. Midwood, GCB, 1 July 1988)

An epidemic of xenophobia (which is sweeping Australia) could result in economic isolation endangering Australia’s tourism industry.

(Australian Property Journal, June 1989: 41)
The concern over foreign investment on the Gold Coast disguises the racism and bigotry of some Australians.

(L. Ginns, GCB, 16 November 1988)

Finally, Fiona Cameron a journalist writing in *The Australian* of 30 June 1990, expressed her criticism of the text of the opponents of Japanese investment in the following personalized manner:

The bottom line is probably the fact very few Australian individuals or companies have been known to knock back an offer from a foreigner for their land, especially when (as it usually is) the offer is generous. Anyone who claims to have an opinion on this matter should perhaps put that question to themselves. If a Japanese company wanted to buy your house for a figure well over market value, would you sell?

The views quoted above seek to identify not just alleged hypocrisies, prejudices and misreadings of human behaviour among the opponents of Japanese investment, but they seek to do more than that. They seek to articulate another world view and Australia's position in it.

Geoff Burchill, a Gold Coast civil engineer, planner and developer, articulated this particularly clearly in a conference paper he delivered in Japan in January 1991. He listed ten points that he thought would characterize the world during the 21st Century. Those of most relevance to this dispute on the Gold Coast were- global markets, free-market socialism, global lifestyles, rise of the Pacific Rim, and the triumph of the individual. He commented on them by saying that: 'These trends are so strongly based in technological change that they are unlikely to be frustrated by events such as the Middle East war or any other man generated crisis from time to time' (Burchill, 1991: 3).

The succinct characteristics of the above world view provide a framework within which the meanings of the globalist text in the Japanese investment debate can be analysed. For those individuals and groups on the Gold Coast who sought to
counter the criticisms their opponents were making of the Japanese presence, usually did this by converting any self-interest they may have had in this issue into a general world view. In this they were only conducting the debate at the same level as their local critics, who were also presenting a very clearly articulated view of Australia and Australians and their relationship to the world outside.

The globalist text will be analysed from three perspectives: Japanese capital inflows and the economic philosophy of globalization; the perception of Australia as a distinct entity in the context of the globalization of capital and culture, and globalization as an ontology of human values and behaviour.

The Economic Philosophy of Globalization:

An unconditional adherence to the economic perspective of the globalist viewpoint was most clearly seen in individuals, groups, and firms whose livelihood came from dealing in money and property. This perception was based on a belief in the dominance of global markets, with its corollary, the internationalization of the state. Here the state is restricted to being an agency for the adjustment of national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy (Cox: 1994: 49). A report published by the global property agency JonesLangWootton (1989: 7) at the height of the Gold Coast controversy writes of the irreversible nature of globalization of capital and then concludes that: ‘commonsense as well as logic suggests that if Australian investors can export capital overseas, then overseas investors should also be able to export capital to Australia’.

Local Gold Coast real estate agents reiterated variations of this point in all interviews and were just as eager to state it in the public debate. For example, R. Bean the Surfers Paradise director of the firm BaillieuKnightFrank, was quoted in the Gold Coast Bulletin of 13 August 1987 as saying: ‘The Gold Coast is now part of the rest of the world and everyone is competing in an open market’.
Thus the global economy with unhindered flows of capital was seen as the basic frame of reference. Here Australia as a distinct nation-state, a distinct culture, was assumed to be subsidiary to the forces of globalization. Here Soja’s (1985: 178-9) thesis of the spatially-differentiating results of capital flows can be seen as the ultimate geo-spatial reality. The national daily, *The Australian*, on 7 August 1990 entered this Japanese investment debate by publishing a long editorial with this as its theme. After describing some of the manifestations of opposition to Japanese investment in Queensland, the key image it sought to convey was that: ‘..in the modern international economy, capital flows easily wherever it will, seeking the greatest returns. Capital owes Australia no loyalty and can easily go elsewhere if it feels unrewarded’. In other words, locations in the world are graded by investors according to their relative economic attractiveness and their relative position on this hierarchy of investor attractiveness can change quickly. In the era of globalization this has become the most important spatial reality.

In such a world view, the sharpest image is of the ‘level playing field’ and any government decision, or government instrumentality, that seeks to filter, inhibit, or regulate the flows of capital from one location to the other, is perceived to be an artificial, unnatural barrier to that which the global market has ordained. Thus there were frequent criticisms by members of the Gold Coast property industry of the federal government’s Foreign Investment Review Board. Some referred to its individual decisions as being time wasting, unrealistic, but behind it was the denial of its very legitimacy. ‘Foreign investment review boards are an obsolete mechanism now internationally,’ Ray White of Ray White Real White Real Estate was quoted as saying (*GCB*, 28 November 1987):

> Criticisms of the localists on the issue of Australian loss of control of its land, if not its national destiny were countered by the argument that, ‘People sometimes forget that real estate, unlike cash and commodities, cannot be exported offshore’.

(Douglas, 1989: 1).
However it is revealing to see how such an acceptance of economic globalism is sometimes placed within a distinctly Australian context, or how a distinctly Australian variation of it is projected within the framework of the globalization philosophy.

The Placement of Australian Identity in Globalization Rhetoric:

The desire to relate Australia to the globalization world view appears to be a tacit admission that there is ignorance, unease and opposition to its beneficence for the country. Perhaps there was a feeling in the 1980s among the elites that an unedited globalist philosophy may have difficulty achieving dominance in the preexisting Australian culture. The result of this could be that it would be disputed by groups in society that were more broadly-based and numerous than the territorially exclusionary localists with their politics of memory on the Gold Coast. So elements of the opponents argument or cultural field had to be appropriated to make globalist views more broadly acceptable to the Australian public. To achieve this globalization had to be related to widely accepted elements of Australian culture.

As was done by the localists, wider acceptance of the argument was sought through a linkage with some icon of Australian identity and myth. Members of the business and political elite felt that this would make it more culturally and psychologically acceptable to the Gold Coast population, as well as ensuring that opposition to Japanese property investment did not take centre-stage at the national level.

One linkage that was made was between the arrival of foreign capital and national development. This was done through the postulation of a simple, populist equation: ‘capital inflow equals development’ and a developing Australia equals the ‘Good Life’. The quarterly market report of the largest Gold Coast real estate agency devoted a special section in its January 1989 issue to the foreign investment debate. In that the seminal statement was: ‘A strong correlation exists
between our periods of high development and rising living standards and high levels of foreign investment’ (Max Christmas Pty. Ltd., 1989: 69).

In other words, the Australia valued by its people has always been open and globalist, and they have valued it because of what the economic forces of globalism have made of it.

Statements by supporters of the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast also sought to encapsulate the capital inflow-prosperity linkage through slogans such as, ‘One Japanese is worth more than a few tonnes of coal,’ (GCB, 28 March 1989), ‘Each jumbo load of tourists could inject $100,000 into the Gold Coast’, ‘Foreign Investment will create the Australia of tomorrow’ (GCB, 30 April 1990). Peter Muller, a Gold Coast land owner and development consultant entered the debate on a number occasions. He projected an image of an Australia in which the Japanese investment yen would go on and on creating jobs and an ever more prosperous country. He called on the Heart of a Nation members to ‘get real’ and wake up to the true needs of Australia (GCB, 6 July 1988). The proposal to site the Multi-Function Polis on the Gold Coast was also argued on the basis of this capital inflow-development-prosperity equation (GCB, 31 January 1990).

Other variations of the globalist viewpoint sought to place Australia into it through a cultural, in some instances overtly moral text. In the latter case there was a desire to replace a territorially-exclusionary, anti-Japanese image of Australia with a common sense, forgiving, compassionate portrayal. One correspondent to the Gold Coast Bulletin asked the Japanese on the Gold Coast:

not to judge all Australians by the view expressed by a small minority. They may have reasons for their comments, but they don’t speak on behalf of all Aussies. Like a lot of others I served in the 1939-45 World War, but there is no way I can hold the grandchildren of our one-time enemy responsible for deeds committed by them.

(GCB, 6 April 1989).
The point that most Japanese coming to the Gold Coast now are another generation is made by most people putting this type of argument. They tend to say this in the context of universal Christian principles, namely that Australia as a Christian country has ‘a God who can see everything and is always ready to forgive our sins’ (*GCB*, 22 April 1987).

Another variation of Australia and the globalism text was based on the conviction that Australia had changed fundamentally from the country that was under threat in 1941-45.

As one resident commented, ‘Australia has successfully absorbed millions of people from overseas without serious racial disharmony’ (*GCB*, 24 January 1990). This meant that, ‘We are a cosmopolitan society now and our birthright is based on a mix of races and cultures,’ said Gold Coast international property consultant Richard Bean (*GCB*, 13 August 1987). This, therefore is an Australia whose cultural identity is based on a high level of global integration and that can absorb rising levels of Japanese investment and property ownership without any loss of national cohesion and identity. In fact, Australia’s national identity is portrayed here as being the outcome of this continuous process of outside influences that are then reformed to evolve into a distinctive Australian culture. Such a cultural text of Australia, under the label of multiculturalism, was the basic image of the country portrayed by progressive groups in public debates during the 1980s and 90s (Jupp, 1994: 81-84).

So even if one suspects that for many in the property/development/tourism industries on the Gold Coast it was essentially the economic aspects of the globalist view that gained their enthusiastic support, they were astute enough to realize that the benefits to be derived from it could not be maximized without an acceptance of its sociocultural connotations. An Australia open to a flow of money from Japan and the rest of Asia could not then erect barriers against ideas and people from the same region. Localist, populist cries to the contrary had to be disputed as strongly as possible.
There was also another perspective revealed on the place of Australia in relation to globalization in the Gold Coast debate. This perspective was a somewhat negative one. It was of a society that had become lethargic, unadventurous and obsessed with 'our sacred working conditions of long service leave, paid sickies and all those penalty rates' (GCB, 28 May 1988). As a Gold Coast property consultant and development planner commented in an interview (11 April 1994): 'We must have foreign investment from whatever source. The Australian investors, especially the banks, do not have the foresight to invest in tourist infrastructure. Our economy is just too immature for that'.

Added to this version of a shortsighted and immature business culture was that of a population that preferred spending to saving, and so by world standards, had such a low savings rate that it had always been forced to rely on overseas funds to finance development (Clark, 1988: 4; Editorial-The Australian, 27 January 1989). The meanings revealed here were clear: such a relatively small, conservative, shortsighted capitalist culture as that of Australia has to see itself as being interconnected with the rest of the world if it is to continue to enjoy the 'Good Life'. In turn, it is the ability to achieve the good life that has been such an important element of the Australian self-image. Those developing this argument for an Australia that is an integral part of globalized space, therefore claimed that key components of its traditional national identity depend on it to continue being so.

**Globalization as an Ontology of Human Values and Behaviour:**

There is a core meaning in globalist philosophy that is often not consciously articulated by its exponents; and that is, that it is the individual, irrespective of her or his location, group affiliations or culture who is the ultimate point of reference, source of meaning and unit of human existence. This then implies that any meaning, any legitimacy of any part of the globalist view is positioned in relation to the individual and the individuals' world of reality. The ontology contained within this world view can be contrasted with that in the localist text in the Gold Coast debate. In the latter, it is a tightly defined static concept of nation that is the
essence of their philosophical standpoint, whereas in the globalist Weltanschauung or world view everything can be included, everything can be accommodated, if it can be related to the acceptance of human individuality and the global principles of its mode of existence and behaviour.

Thus the cultural dimension of the globalist philosophy revealed in the debate had strong libertarian overtones. In this Australia was depicted as a free and open society in which respect for the rights of the individual was seen as a fundamental virtue. So, for example, a Gold Coast estate agent could argue that he had individual rights the same as everybody else in Australia and opponents of Japanese property purchases had no right to tell him how to choose his customers. He could sell the property on his books to anyone he liked. The general issue of the Japanese ownership of Australian land was not something with which had to concern himself (GCB, 11 July 1990).

The element of self-interest is often a thread between an individual or group and the cultural view they espouse. In the case of the Japanese investment dispute on the Gold Coast, the representatives of the property and accommodation industries, restaurateurs, coach lines and advertising agencies, were particularly fearful of the challenge to their globalist standpoint by a group that they labelled as narrow-minded, unforgiving and living in a time warp. The threat which their anti-Japanese views posed to business turnover was clearly the bottom line. The ability of these Gold Coast service professionals to spell out their interests as a philosophy of economic rationalism or civil libertarianism fixed the universality of the globalist text in the debate with their opponents.

The Japanese Viewpoint

Visits to the Gold Coast by journalists and TV crews from Japan, were signs that reports about the conflict that their property investment on the Gold Coast had provoked would appear back home. Japanese companies with established business interests in Australia also started to read this dispute as a warning that the goodwill they had built-up in Australia may be threatened. Though at a local Gold
Coast level, Japanese investors, visitors and residents appeared to have largely avoided participation in the debate. Perhaps inhibitions borne of language difficulties, as well as the ingrained predisposition towards public consensus of Japanese culture, were the context in which this has to be seen. Furthermore, would overt participation have given them reassurances about their presence on the Gold Coast that they no doubt desired?

A few however did comment. The views these Japanese individuals revealed about the debate of which they, and their money were the focus, varied according to the direction from which the individual came and the context within which they spoke. Public statements made by senior Japanese businessmen had to be contrasted with comments made on the occasion of a long, private interview in which a significant degree of confidence had been established between the interviewer and the Japanese respondent.

Published statements by prominent Japanese business people in Australia came from the context of the globalist text in the debate. For example, Jun-Ichi Toyama of the Bank of Tokyo Australia Ltd. was published as having said:

> It is unfortunate that there have been some negative reactions to the increasing presence of Japanese investors in Australia. In part, this is attributable to the lack of understanding and sensitivities of Japanese investors, but the prime cause can be traced to inadequate communication between people of different cultures.

(JonesLangWootton, 1989: 13)

In the same publication, Tatsuya Hoshino of Overseas Realty and Development, C. Itoh & Co. Ltd. was quoted as having said:

> The search for the right kind of development and asset acquisition opportunities is worldwide, not only for Japanese investors, but for those of most other developed nations seeking to diversify their real estate portfolios.
Both of the above statements echo the already discussed globalist philosophy. The first articulates a plea for tolerance and cross-cultural understanding within the global human family. The corollary contained within it is that if people of one culture understand those of another, then issues of land, ownership and control by the members of the other culture group are perceived in a much less threatening way. The second text is a clear exposition of the economic dimension of globalization, that is, the world is now one integrated economy and property investors see it as such and make their investment decisions entirely on the basis of financial considerations, not any national sensitivities that may appear. Political boundaries and peoples of different cultures have become basically irrelevant to such a global perspective. Public statements made by other Japanese business people during this period were generally variations of this economic rationalism (*The Age*, 23 November 1988; *The Australian*, 11 February 1989). In the statement quoted in *The Age*, the speaker addressing the Australian-Japan Business Cooperation Committee on the Gold Coast went as far as arguing that given the extent to which Australia and Japan are integrated through flows of commodity trade and tourism the degree of integration through capital investment is relatively low and should rise. Though as a postscript he urged his fellow nationals to be 'sensitive' when investing in Australian property.

Sensitivity is a word that came to the fore in private comments made by Japanese on their relationships with Australians and how they saw Australians’ perception of them on the Gold Coast.

A Japanese community worker on the Gold Coast stated in an interview (Broadbeach, 12 October 1993) that, ‘Japanese people do not feel there is any hostility towards them. They are very happy here’. It appeared that it was the relationships with Australians at an individual level that they found most reassuring. The same community worker spoke of the appreciation felt by many resident Japanese of the kind deeds done for them by their Australian neighbours. These feelings of personal happiness with life on the Gold Coast were echoed by
comments made by the president of the Japanese Society on the Gold Coast, as well as two Japanese investors resident there. Another Gold Coast resident, Japanese property consultant S was asked in an interview (Surfers Paradise, 19 October 1994) how his fellow nationals felt about the anti-Japanese investment campaign being run there. His answer was thoughtful and subtle: ‘The Japanese people here are not dissuaded by ‘Heart of a Nation’. They are concerned, but not unduly’. However it was the undertones he detected among his Australian business colleagues detected by him that gave him twinges of unease: ‘I felt that some of them had fears. They liked the good business (with the Japanese), but when drunk, confided that, “in my heart”, they were worried about the Japanese buying Australia’.

Though the public debate was about their presence, it appears that a combination of Japanese reticence and sensitivity made them largely avoid participation in it. Perhaps personal satisfaction with their life on the Gold Coast, as well as a lack of confidence in participation in public debate in another culture also played a part. The signs of awareness and unease were limited to those Japanese whose command of English was good and who had extensive networks among Australian colleagues among whom they perceived signs of unease about the long-term consequences of large Japanese property purchase on Australia.
Summary

The forces of globalization can produce a spatial overlay of people of one culture with another. This may result in a struggle for legitimacy between two sets of values, frameworks of thought and feeling, and cultural world views. The arrival of Japanese investors on the Gold Coast produced such a situation, in which the arrivals were seen as the outside, globalizing force that provoked a local reaction. One group of the local population saw the Japanese capital flowing into its region as a business opportunity of unlimited potential. This gave them the predisposition to embrace the globalist world view, not just in its economic, but also in its social and cultural dimensions. Others did not appear to have had an economic interest, but shared the cultural world of progressive thinkers of the 1980s about a multicultural Australia open to the world. However others in the Gold Coast population perceived the Japanese and their cultural baggage as a threat. Their predisposition to react this way was a function of their age and socioeconomic characteristics. Thus the Gold Coast was characterized by an economically ambitious, socially fluid, outward-looking property-development-tourism elite, that could be contrasted with a significant petite-bourgeois group of trades, and small business people and retirees. To many in the last group, past Japanese behaviour towards Australia had been a decisive formative influence in their self-image and that which they had of Australia. This predisposed them to read the same meanings into the arrival of the increasing number of Japanese property purchasers to the Gold Coast as they had into Japanese behaviour during the Second World War.

This crystallized into a struggle for cultural control over the public intellectual agenda on the Gold Coast. There were even signs that this debate would extend to the whole of the country. The globalists saw the Japanese presence as a vindication of their view of the future Australia, an Australia adhering to economic rationalism, globally-integrated, and basing its internal social-cohesion on tolerance and respect for universal human rights. The localists challenged this world view with one in which they saw the nation as the fundamental unit of human meaning; furthermore, the nation as defined in a clearly static, white,
historicist manner. This they felt the Gold Coast elite had betrayed and so lost its legitimacy in their eyes. Thus the campaign of such localists against Japanese ownership of land on the Gold Coast can be aptly described as a case of contemporary perceptions and actions based on experiences drawn from the distant past now revived by new realities interpreted to have the same meaning. In other words, the politics of memory.

A final observation is of significance. A close analysis of both sides of the debate shows that both localists and globalists tacitly conceded some legitimacy to their opponents beliefs. For the globalists, the need to link their world view with elements of Australian cultural images and myths shows that they were unable or unwilling to eliminate the meaning of nation in their ideal globalist text. This can be illustrated in the frequency with which the link between foreign capital flows and national development and prosperity was made in their statements. For they knew that one focal element of the Australian national self-image was that of the ‘Good Life’ that Australia can provide and for this, capital from whatever source is a necessity. On the other hand, the localists never actually argued for a prohibition on all Japanese capital entering the Australian property market. They never denied that money was needed to create wealth and the good life. So all they argued for was an Australia in which all foreigners, especially Japanese, would be restricted to leaseholds. Also in general terms, they wanted a much more dirigiste government policy to achieve this. This they feared was not the case during the late 1980s and early 90s. It is to the role of government in the issue of foreign investment in Australia that we must now turn.
Government and the Global/Local Interface

It is now beyond contention among social theorists that the processes of globalization have had a far-reaching effect on government, if not the role of the state. In theory, the role of the state remains, as it always has been, the defence of the 'national interest'. But, as Stubbs and Underhill (1994: 22) pointed out, this is far too glib. It begs the question of the definition of national interest and of how this could be or should be defended. Finally, if the philosophical basis of globalization is taken to its logical conclusion, then the ultimate sources of meaning become the individual on the one hand, and the values that have achieved global dominance and the organs created to implement them on the other. Here the national interest becomes a residual entity.

Underhill (1994: 22) argued that the socio-economic interests behind globalization are gradually converting the state into the facilitator of policies that will maximize the benefits of globalization on its territory. To be specific, socio-economic forces in one state extend across borders and develop interrelationships with similar forces in other states. Thus, for example, the government of one state has to respond to comparative interest rates and capital flows that occur globally, not just those which exist within its own territory. This may imply that the decision-making role of a national government is becoming increasingly peripheral to the forces that affect its population. Such a viewpoint is countered by other writers such as Brown, Watson, Le Heron and Rimmer. Brown (1995: 56) did not deny that the state has been affected by globalization, however instead of becoming peripheral, he argued that the state is a key element in the process. It has not only considerable residual prestige as a point of reference and as an arbiter, but also has considerable power as a regulator. As the most important vehicle for the democratic aspirations of its people, inter alia, government has to respond to those elements of globalization that are perceived by significant groups as being undesirable, extreme or threatening.
It is this point which is detailed by Watson, Le Herron and Rimmer (1997: 281-82). They argued that the state in the era of globalization is still pivotal as the mediator between the effects of globalization and the national, regional and local space. This can take the form of public statements as a form of pressure on key interests or participants in a dispute, it can use its traditional authority to extract concessions from key pressure groups, and it can initiate investigative procedures or introduce regulatory mechanisms. In these ways it can be a crucial actor at the interface of global and local processes. Here its role in conflict management is still regarded as very important. Cerny (1990: 237) saw this role of the state as being akin to a 'kind of national firm or cartel operating directly in the transnational environment'.

Needless to say, globalization is making the task of the state in attempting to control, guide, or even influence non-state actors progressively more difficult. Stubbs and Underhill described this dilemma in the following way:

..for most states dealing with domestic interests at the same time as attempting to develop an advantageous position for the state in the global economy has often been exceedingly difficult. When events in the international political economy lead to the mobilization of domestic interests, the institutional state invariably finds its autonomy or freedom of action reduced, and options that might otherwise have been open to it in dealing with domestic and international issues become foreclosed

(Stubbs & Underhill, 1994: 422).

If the phrase ‘events in the international economy’ is replaced by ‘the Japanese boom in the 1980s’, and the words ‘mobilization of domestic interests’ by ‘opposition to Japanese purchases of Australian property’, then the applicability of the above argument to this thesis becomes apparent. The result of such a scenario may be that state policies on the issue at hand are likely to become ambivalent, as the state becomes a socio-cultural entity caught in the web of pressures and constraints at the domestic and international level.
Therefore another perspective on the globalist-localist theme of the previous chapter becomes relevant in which the role of government in this conflict can be identified. In a federal state such as Australia, government means a hierarchy of national, state and local centres of decision-making. In such a hierarchy, issues of capital movement across national boundaries are obviously the prerogative of the national government. However political exigencies may force both regional and local levels of government to assume a position regarding the whole or a given aspect of this issue. This perspective needs exploration.

This chapter will firstly seek to describe the national context of the role of government on the issues of foreign investment and the ramifications of this for the Gold Coast dispute. This will also be used to show the different positions assumed towards the role of the national government by significant protagonists in the dispute. Secondly, a closer consideration of the position of the national centre of political decision-making will be undertaken to consider whether there were diverse perspectives apparent in national political circles in the late 1980s over the role of government in the issue of Japanese investment. Thirdly, the position(s) assumed by the regional level of government, the state of Queensland, will be introduced. This section of the chapter will engage with the statements of individual politicians and seek to assess them within the context of their political ideology and ability to exercise power or provide opposition at specific phases of the dispute. Finally, brief consideration will be given to the position of local government and the extent and nature of its involvement with the manifestations of Japanese investment in the space over which it has jurisdiction. So this chapter seeks to consider government and the controversy of Japanese investment through the prism of scale. This consideration will commence at the macro-scale of the nation-state, turn inwards to the region, and conclude at the micro-scale of the local place.
National Context of the Foreign Investment Debate

The Australian Government is strongly supportive of international measures to encourage flows of investment capital. Though we do resist investment in sensitive areas, such as residential dwellings. This is to prevent land banking and to discourage speculation. Though no such general restrictions apply to commercial real estate.


The ministerial statement above is significant for two reasons. Firstly, its acceptance of the globalist philosophy on the free flows of capital in the world, but at the same time the exclusion of specific sectors of the economy from the effects of this process. Secondly, the specific mention of investment in residential real estate as one of these excluded sectors.

The fact that such a policy was stated by the Treasurer of a Labor federal government is indicative of the extent to which its ideological baggage of socialism had been discarded. This is especially striking when seen in the context of the philosophies of national ownership and management of resources from which the Australian Labor Party’s policy on foreign capital investment emanated (Whitlam, 1985: 218-219). In 1975 the Whitlam government established the Foreign Investment Advisory Committee (FIAC) whose function was to implement this general philosophy. Whitlam in his account of the 1972-75 federal government that he led, makes special mention of the FIAC’s guidelines for foreign investment in Australian real estate. He wrote that:

Real estate acquisitions would be disallowed unless made for the purpose of employee residence, uses incidental to commercial ventures or for a specific time period, after which they would be resold to Australian interests.

(Whitlam, 1985: 220).
Whitlam saw the FIAC's brief being considerably weakened by his successor, Malcolm Fraser, the leader of a Liberal-Country Party Coalition government. In 1976 Fraser replaced the FIAC with the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) and gave it a membership dominated not by civil servants, but business people, so that, according to Whitlam (1985: 221) it would become a more sympathetic conduit between Canberra and the foreign investor. The guidelines given to the FIRB from 1976 onwards further revealed the increasingly favourable disposition towards foreign investment that Canberra had. Initially all proposed residential property purchases by foreigners had to be approved by the FIRB. However, as already mentioned in Chapter Three, the annual reports of the FIRB reveal that from the 8 June 1978 only those valued at more than $350,000 had to be subject to approval and from the 29 October 1985 this threshold was increased to $600,000. In the case of commercial and tourism properties, the relevant thresholds were $2 million and $5 million. This shows that from the late 1970s a period of progressive deregulation had set in. This indicated a government policy that would facilitate the workings of the economic forces of globalization.

The dramatic rise in the investment flow, largely from Japan, into Australian real estate that occurred in the second half of the decade could have been seen as a vindication of the success of this progressive deregulation of real estate investment controls. It was considered as such, by those with a globalist world view and/or those who benefited from this flood of capital.

However the negative local reaction to this surge of money from some groups was not long in forthcoming. The generally rising level of inflation and increase in property values in Australia, coupled with headline stories such as 'The New Asian Invasion: How Australian Property is being Sold Off,' (The Bulletin, 29 September 1987), led Canberra to change course unexpectedly. On the same day as the above issue of this journal hit the Australian newsstands, the federal government promulgated a new set of regulations for the FIRB. A set of regulations that were much more restrictive than any since 1976 and so appeared to apply a policy to foreign investment in the residential property sector that was
contrary to the whole thrust of the general economic policy of the federal government.

These regulations, restricted residential property purchases by foreigners to new dwellings, and in integrated projects such as new golf course resorts and high-rise apartment buildings only up to 50 percent of units could be sold to foreigners. Land for development purposes could still be purchased in an unrestricted manner, but subsequent decisions by the FIRB intimated that a condition of the permission to purchase was that work on the proposed project on the site had to commence within 12 months. In effect all proposed property transactions involving a foreign purchaser now had to be referred to the FIRB for approval, with only purchasers with an Australian residence permit, or those connected to a foreign company active in Australia having the possibility of gaining an exemption from these guidelines (Department of the Treasury, 1987, Corrigendum: 1-5). Chong (1987: 67) argued at the time that the Commonwealth Government introduced these regulations because it was becoming politically imperative for it to attempt to prevent an uncontrolled residential property boom in Sydney and the Gold Coast. Also, perhaps it had to counter the rise of suspicion about the extent of Japanese property purchases at a time when Canberra was persuading the public about the need to focus Australian foreign policy on Asia.

On the day after these regulations were announced, on the 30th September 1987, the *Gold Coast Bulletin* appeared with blazing headlines, 'Keating move rocks industry: Estate Market Shock'. Given such a sudden reversal of federal government policy from economic deregulation towards national exclusiveness, it is appropriate to pose the question: Why did opposition to Japanese property investment on the Gold Coast not subside after this dramatic policy announcement? Why wasn't Canberra successful in changing the negative public perceptions on this issue? In fact the first protest meeting against the Japanese investors occurred in the Miami Hall on the 24 May 1988, eight months after this policy announcement. A number of explanations can be offered.
One explanation could be seen in the relationship between the timing of the policy announcement by Canberra, the Gold Coast property cycle and its correlation with the surge in Japanese capital inflow. As discussed in Chapter Three, the property cycle on the Gold Coast had been rising steeply since mid-1986 and the surge of Japanese property investment gained momentum during the financial year 1985-86. In other words, Canberra reacted at the peak of the boom, two weeks before the Wall Street sharemarket crash. This can be seen as having meant that according to the extreme opponents of Japanese capital on the Gold Coast, the perceived economic, if not moral disaster had already occurred. The fact that new development land, up to half of the residential units built on it, and all commercial property could still be bought on freehold title meant in their eyes that the ‘selling-off of the farm’ would continue nearly as before. The application of the regulations by the FIRB was another dimension of the issue about which those concerned with Japanese investment were not unaware.

**Foreign Investment Review Board: Decisions and Perceptions:**

The annual reports of the FIRB present statistics of the total number of investment applications lodged with them for consideration. During the period 1983-84 to 1992-93, 16,962 applications for investment in Australian real estate were lodged with the Board, of these 16,608 were approved and 354 were rejected. The rejection rate ranged from a high of 10.57% (1983-84), to a low of 1.59% in 1986-87. The average for the ten year period was 2.09%. Though such statistics say nothing about the size, scope and location of the proposals rejected in relation to those approved, at the overt level statistical level they show that the decisions of the FIRB did not appear to have been a major obstacle to the flow of foreign capital into Australian real estate.

Sir Bede Callaghan, the Chairman of the FIRB from its inception in 1976 to 1992 gave an interview to *The Australian* towards the end of his tenure. His responses to questions on this point seem to substantiate the above impression. To quote the article:
Sir Bede would not respond directly to the question of whether the FIRB should be abolished to facilitate foreign investment in Australia, except in strategic sectors. ‘Let me answer the question this way. Very little has been rejected in recent times,’ he said....... He also said that foreign investment had done a lot of good in the Australian economy and there was no need to spell out in greater detail what the term ‘national interest’ meant in the foreign investment guidelines. 

(The Australian, 26 October 1991)

Such an acceptance of a general policy of minimum restrictions on foreign capital investment into Australia was also echoed by the Shadow Treasurer in the Queensland parliament during a debate provoked by the vocal opposition to Japanese capital on the Gold Coast. Keith De Lacy, the MLA for Cairns, did not hesitate to justify his federal Labor colleagues’ welcoming of foreign investment, though he did note the perception among some people on the Gold Coast that the boom in Japanese investment there had fueled the rise in property prices to which Canberra had responded with the new FIRB regulations of 29 September 1987. Even though, he commented, ‘to a certain extent that judgment was not fair, because (quite apart from the Japanese presence) a variety of reasons had caused the price of real estate to be pushed up,’ (Queensland Legislative Assembly Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 27 October 1988: 2122).

Two large land purchase applications for Gold Coast sites by Japanese company’s were rejected by the FIRB. These were for a 473ha site at Coomera sought by Hokojitsugyo Ltd. and a 151ha site at Currumbin wanted by the Co-You Corporation. The first of these decisions led to bold headlines in the Gold Coast Bulletin ‘FIRB Ruling Rocks Business,’ (GCB, 8 August 1990) and both cases were reported in detail over three issues of the paper. Apart from a general statement on the rejection of these applications to purchase because they were against the ‘national interest’, the FIRB was not obliged to specify reasons for its decisions. As the concept of ‘national interest’ was ill-defined, a situation that even the Chairman of the FIRB thought appropriate, perceptions rather than public statements determined the meanings that were read into it.
In both of these cases the local and regional press interpreted the rejections to have been caused by the applicants not being able to explain sufficiently clearly to the FIRB their development time table for the sites they wished to buy (GCB, 9 August 1990; The Courier-Mail, 21 September 1990). At all times federal government policy had regarded property purchase by foreigners as the first step towards development, with the flow-on of job creation in the community being the most important perceived benefit. If the latter did not appear to be a clear possibility, then the former was ostensibly treated with much more suspicion.

However the opponents of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast refused to make this connection between the purchase of land by a foreigner and the potential benefits of its development by the purchaser. They viewed federal government policy as exercised through FIRB decisions with suspicion, if not derision. Their ability to see FIRB decisions through the perspective of their anti-Japanese cultural filter was facilitated by the secrecy of the FIRB’s deliberation processes. A telephone discussion on the 10th February 1989 with Ivan Hardman, executive officer of the FIRB, revealed that the work of the FIRB is covered by the confidentiality laws that apply to the Taxation Department and are therefore exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. In the absence of a free flow of official information, conjecture, rumour, and preconceived perceptions and interests appeared to determine the positions taken by participants in the Japanese investment debate towards the FIRB decisions.

The convenor of Heart of a Nation, Bruce Whiteside, commented in an interview (17 October 1994) that ‘the FIRB is no deterrent to Japanese investment, nor to ownership, as its pathetic record in this regard attests to’. This comment was made about seven and a half years after the new more restrictive FIRB regulations were introduced on the 29th September 1987. Hence this comment seems to show that they made little difference to earlier negative perceptions had of the FIRB by the Gold Coast localists (GCB, 3 April, 1987). Such perceptions could also have been encouraged by a report in the Gold Coast Bulletin (6 October 1987) that is, seven days after the announcement of the tightened FIRB regulations. This report referred to a belief that the FIRB had moved quickly to quell fears that investment
proposals would be lost because of the new guidelines. It was therefore doing everything possible to ensure the quick processing of applications. In fact the tone regarding such fears was being set in Canberra at the highest level. In a speech given by the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke on the occasion of the visit to Canberra of his Japanese counterpart Noburo Takeshita, Hawke gave an unqualified welcome to Japanese investment in Australia, making special mention of real estate. He also said that the attitudes of those who are critical of it ‘are repugnant to the overwhelming majority of Australians’. (ABC Newsvoice, 4 July 1988).

Such deregulatory sentiments and visions of an Australia integrated into a globalized economy were also articulated by numerous individuals from various clusters of Gold Coast and national business groups, such as real estate agents, property journalists and corporate lawyers involved in allied activities (GCB, 6 October 1987, 17 October 1990; The Australian, 6 May 1989, 15 July 1989). What is particularly revealing is that some admitted that the FIRB had minimal impact in restricting the flow of investment capital into Australia, yet they still argued for its abolition. The statement reportedly made by the investment director of the international real estate firm JonesLangWootton, John Henderson, after the end of the boom is the best example of this perspective:

> When the Japanese buyers were making headlines around Australia in the late 1980s with their large purchases, the FIRB calmed people concerned with national interests by appearing to vet foreign interests...Despite this, very few property investments were refused and investment in the capital and exchange markets flourished.....he said the board should go so that Australia could attract the international investment necessary to support its economic recovery.....Removing FIRB would put Australia on the same footing as virtually every other country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

(The Age, 25 November 1992)

Thus it appears that the federal government was perceived by those with globalist philosophies and interests to have been developing procedures and policies in
response to the Japanese investment dispute that appeared to be tightening 
controls to protect the ‘national interest’, while leaving sufficient areas of 
deregulation to enable many foreign property investors to achieve their Australian investment aims. Perhaps this is a case of ambivalent policy formulated by a 
government caught between the pressures of global capital and local political 
action. Government has to act, or be seen to act, for fear of being sidelined by 
forces that some among the voting population perceive to be dangerous. For if it 
is not perceived to taking decisive action, then domestic political damage to it may ensue. On the other hand, if its actions restrict the potential flow of global capital 
too severely, then it may impair the vision of long-term national interest equals 
growth and prosperity that it has adopted. The spectre of the federal government 
being buffeted by such pressures was also evident among the national political decision-making elites in Canberra.

Different Perspectives on Foreign Investment Policy in Canberra:

The perspective of those who are in power compared with those in opposition can 
be expected to show fundamental differences. This is partly because of 
differences in ideological baggage and interest group affiliations which exist 
among different political parties in pluralist democracies, as well as the 
differences in the attitudes produced and tasks that exist with exercising power 
compared with being in opposition. During the whole period of the Japanese 
investment debate on the Gold Coast the Australian Labor Party formed the 
government in Canberra. Thus the formulation of foreign investment policy and 
its implementation discussed in the previous section was their view on this issue.

As is common with government leaders, they seek to gain extra legitimacy and 
political support by seeking to identify their policies with the national agenda and 
interest. The aim of developing a policy with which all, or nearly all of the 
population is in agreement, is to convey the impression that the government in 
power is the owner of the only appropriate viewpoint on a certain issue. Thus 
Prime Minister Hawke called for a political consensus on foreign investment 
policy with the opposition (The Age, 24 May 1989). However political
contestation is most likely to be the purpose of any opposition and that was apparent at numerous stages of this debate. In effect where each major national political party positioned itself in relation to the globalist or localist text on Japanese investment appeared to reveal something of its ideological baggage, the buffeting it experienced during the debate, and the locational relationship of the speaker to the Gold Coast.

Hence the leader of the federal Liberal Party, John Howard made a definitive public statement in which he said that any government led by him would have a more open-door foreign investment policy than the ALP government in power in Canberra at that time (The Age, 5 May 1989). Part of such a policy was the abolition of the FIRB. In the same statement, he warned that if Australia went down the path of ‘blind chauvinistic reaction’ on the matter it would be making a ‘very grave mistake’. A week earlier the Gold Coast Bulletin, reported a speech Howard had made in Brisbane which it headed ‘Foreign investment no problem, but policy is’ (GCB, 28 April 1989). A summary of the foreign investment policies of Labor and the Coalition in the 1990 federal election were published in Brisbane, in The Courier-Mail of 13 March 1990. They read as follows:

Labor-Support foreign investment under the regulatory control of the Foreign Investment Review Board. Allow foreign investment limited categories of property.

Coalition- Support foreign investment as a means of supplementing domestic savings. Support relaxation of some unspecified restrictions currently applying. Will abolish Foreign Investment Review Board.

Thus the Liberal Party appeared to favour the abolition of the main vehicle used by the ALP government to restrict, record and filter foreign capital flows into Australia.

However the continuation of the public controversy on Japanese investment over the next months saw signs of a repositioning of the federal Liberal Party
leadership on this issue. Its leader after Howard was John Hewson, an ex-academic economist and banking consultant. His intellectual and vocational credentials would appear to predispose him to a neo-classical economic world view that was based on globalization. But as early as 4 July 1990, within two months of his election as leader he noted publicly the high sectoral concentration of Japanese investment in real estate. 'That gives you a particular basis for the emotionalism that is emerging,' he said (The Age, 4 July 1990). On the 22nd of October of the same year, he visited the Gold Coast to open the new offices of the Liberal MHR for McPherson, a seat based on the Gold Coast. In his speech on that occasion he spoke of the unhealthy concentration of Japanese investment in that city (GCB, 23 October 1990).

The Liberal candidate for McPherson earlier that year, John Bradford, had already entered the public dispute over this issue expressing opinions and making commitments that were in conflict with his Party's policies. He went public through a letter to the editor in the Gold Coast Bulletin and said that:

....let me say that I am very worried indeed about the level of foreign investment on the Gold Coast. Liberal policy is to abolish the Foreign Investment Review Board, which has proved to be a toothless tiger....and there is certainly no intention to give foreign companies open slather on Australian land and resources. If my stand conflicts with Liberal policy then I shall certainly not hesitate to say so.

(GCB, 26 February 1990)

A fortnight earlier he had already made a public comment on the Gold Coast in which he advocated the more effective operation of the FIRB and an investigation of leasehold titles for foreign buyers of land (GCB, 12 February 1990).

After his election to the House of Representatives, Bradfield continued to be critical of the extent of foreign, code for Japanese, investment on the Gold Coast. He also pointed his finger at the exclusionary nature of some of the projects and the extent to which those on the Gold Coast who are the most fervent advocates of
foreign investment are in fact, like some local estate agents, its major personal beneficiaries (GCB, 6 June 1990; 21 November 1990).

The public controversy on the Gold Coast seemed to flicker and flare as new instances of Japanese investment intentions or decisions gained publicity. Some of the most publicized were the Sanctuary Cove purchase by EIE Corp, Mitsui and Nippan Shinpan Co. buying into the Mirage Resorts of Skase’s Quintex Corp, the construction by Nikko Securities of a golf course resort for its staff from which the locals were to be excluded, and the proposal to built the largely Japanese-funded Multi-Function Polis on a Gold Coast site. The member for McPherson ensured that his comments were heard to echo, albeit in a moderate way, the concerns of those who perceived all such decisions as a danger and threat. The fact that his comments were at odds with the policy of his federal party appeared to be less of a consideration to him than the need to be a weather vane for the population from whom he drew his direct support. However, as mentioned earlier, the fact that there was an occasion when his party leader chose to come and be identified with him showed the level in the Liberal Party to which such sensitivities had risen.

The position of the National Party in the Japanese investment debate also revealed certain ambiguities. They, as was to be expected, were roused by a number of instances of Japanese purchases of rural land (The Sun-Herald, 4 September 1988). Though subsequently, it was the Federal National Party leader, Ian Sinclair, the member for the northern New South Wales seat of New England, who made direct comments on the debate that was occurring on the adjacent Gold Coast. He said that:

His supporters were very worried about Japanese investment and that there was a real wave of disquiet about Japanese investment in the Gold Coast.......Asked how his views squared with the promise of the Opposition Leader, Mr Howard, to allow a more liberal investment policy, Mr Sinclair said the conservatives had always been more liberal in this area....Our concern is the way in which it should be administered.....The Federal
Government's tighter regulations on the foreign purchase of residential properties were 'nonsense'.

(The Age, 8 May 1989)

It appears that the leader of the National Party found himself in the position of having to support a national policy of his Liberal political allies that he realized was in contradiction to the pressures that were intensifying on his own party at a regional level. The result was a statement that can perhaps be interpreted as a desire to convert himself into a target moving around the issue with sufficient speed to avoid being hit by bullets fired by any of the opposing groups in conflict over it. Charles Blunt, Sinclair's successor to the National Party leadership, also appeared to see the necessity of indulging in such ideological mobility on the issue of Japanese investment (The Age, 10 May 1989; The Australian, 16 September 1989).

The fourth significant political party on the national stage during this period were the Australian Democrats. Their position was also summarized in the policy tabulation quoted from The Courier-Mail published of 13 March 1989: 'Democrats- Support stringent controls on foreign investment and borrowing. Establish a register of foreign ownership'.

The following article headlines attest to the consistency of their views on this issue: 'Democrats call for land-owner register,' (The Sun-Herald, 4 September 1988), 'End to foreign land ownership: Haines,' (The Australian, 24 February 1990), 'Senator slams Borbidge and Beanland as sounding like Japanese PR men-Politicians told to work for Aussies, (GCB, 2 July 1990), 'Democrats to focus on foreign ownership,' (The Age, 6 May 1993). Though the Democrats did not place their views into the moral, racist and xenophobic contexts into which many localists in the Gold Coast debate had done, the specific foreign investment policy goals they enunciated seemed to spring from a similar type of Australian national culture, that is, one based on the concept of the nation being the focal entity of meaning. Like the
Coalition parties the Democrats advocated the abolition of the FIRB, but for them it needed to be replaced by a Foreign Investment Review Commission accountable to Parliament and whose main task would be to return land to Australian ownership. Senator Cheryl Kernot, at that time a Gold Coast resident, spelt out her Party’s aim of abolishing the right of foreigners to acquire freehold land and only leasehold would be permitted. She sought to meet the arguments of the globalist deregulators on the linkage between foreign investment and national prosperity by saying that:

If the government restricts overseas sales to leasehold, Australians will still be employed in the construction and running of businesses, while the overseas investor will still enjoy their potential profit.

*(GCB, 2 July 1990)*

The Queensland locale of the above statement echoes the strong reverberations that the Gold Coast dispute over Japanese investment had at the level of state politics there. It is to this perspective that this chapter will now turn.

**Queensland Politics and the Japanese Investment Debate**

Though the Commonwealth Government through the FIRB had final responsibility for the approval of foreign real estate investment decisions, the FIRB guidelines did provide for maintenance of liaison with State Government authorities and taking advice from them (Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1984-85: iii; 1986-87: iii). The position that the State Government took needs to be discussed also because, in the perception of the public, it was the level of government that was deemed to be more responsible for responding to the needs and managing the changes in people’s immediate environment. A populist culture found in Queensland politics already mentioned in Chapter Seven is another sign indicating a probable involvement by that particular government. Thus it can be expected that the Government and politicians in Brisbane would have to assume a position on the Japanese investment dispute, and that is what they did.
The period of the dispute saw a change of government in Queensland (2 December 1989), hence a the repositioning of political parties and individuals in them in relation to power occurred during this time. Until that State election the National Party formed the government and this statement made at the height of the boom in 1988 by the Hon W. H. Glasson, its Minister for Land Management revealed, its view of Australia in the world:

Mr. Speaker, we are in our bicentenary year. It must be understood that the development which has taken place in the last 200 years, whether for better or worse, has resulted from the influx of new settlers to this country, and the investment of money from overseas....it has been said that we should not allow foreigners to own our land. On the other hand, it has also been said that foreigners cannot take the land home. It remains here. The community has to decide the extent and the direction of our future. Obviously, people must realise development produces employment and growth that allows us to maintain and improve our present standard of living.

( Queensland Legislative Assembly Parliamentary Debates (1988): no.6, 19 October, p.1593).

This text provides clear echoes of the views of the globalists in the Gold Coast debate. It does this by verbalizing an image of an Australia created through always having been interconnected with the rest of the world. As already seen in Chapter Seven, this is the type of view that sees and justifies the existence of a synergy between the world and Australia. It does this through the equation that foreign capital flows enable Australia to develop, and development leads to the Good Life, and the Australia we value is the Australia which will give us the Good Life. However in its need to cite the question of land ownership by foreigners, it echoes the key emotive trigger that was unleashed by the Gold Coast debate. The minister’s need to do this was a sign of the extent to which the exclusionary localist views in that debate was perceived to have challenged conventional politco-cultural orthodoxies in Queensland State politics. For the text quoted
above is from a speech made by the Hon. W. H. Glasson, during the second reading of the Foreign Ownership of Land Register Bill. It showed the desire of the National Party government to reposition itself from its long-standing previous stance.

The Queensland National Party under Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen had a reputation of being particularly welcoming to all types of foreign investment. However due to the evidence presented to the Fitzgerald Inquiry at that particular time, this was starting to develop negative political connotations in the eyes of the electorate. This inquiry revealed that in 1986 the president of Daikyo Kanko Corp. had given a secret donation of $110,000 to the National Party (The Age, 17 June 1992). As Appendix I shows Daikyo Kanko Corp. was the largest Japanese investor on the Gold Coast. So the Gold Coast Japanese investment controversy appeared at a time when the weight of corruption allegations against the National Party government, and a reinvigorated ALP opposition increased the pressure on the government to respond to the critics of uncontrolled investment flows.

Thus the desire to retain power on the one hand, and the quest for power by the opposition on the other, led to the Gold Coast Japanese investment dispute assuming a central position in the period leading up to the election on 2 December 1989.

The Leader of the Opposition, Wayne Goss, assumed a position on the foreign investment issue early in the debate. He enunciated a position that legitimized the localists concept of national interest and its role as a preeminent consideration for all policies, but he divorced it from all their connotations of biological exclusivity and racism. He also challenged the National Party Government in Brisbane to forget its ideology and establish a register of foreign-owned land and so attempt to reposition itself in relation to the issues raised by the Gold Coast debate (GCB, 31 May 1988). He kept up the pressure and at the beginning of the election period announced that a government led by him would reject notions of ‘open slather’ on foreign investment and would consult with the FIRB in Canberra on the possibility of applying leasehold title conditions to all land sold in Queensland to foreigners.
The fact that even the consideration of leasehold only conditions for foreign investors was anathema to their ALP colleagues in government in Canberra was seen as irrelevant to the perception of the Queensland branch of the Labor Party that in Queensland an election had to be won and Japanese investment in property had become an emotive issue in the campaign.

The fact that on the 19 October 1988 the National Party-dominated Legislative Assembly had already passed the Foreign Ownership of Land Register Act which led to the establishment of the Foreign Land Register on 17 April 1989, did not change the tone of the ALP election campaign. The ALP Campaign Director, Wayne Swann denigrated the National Party government initiative by saying that the Foreign Land Register did nothing more that record transactions and had no regulatory powers (GCB, 22 November 1989).

In retrospect such repositioning of politicians and their parties on the issue of foreign investment was interpreted by the convenor of Heart of a Nation on the Gold Coast as a sign that he and his group had succeeded in changing the direction of political debate in Queensland. His comment in an interview held on 17 October 1994 was:

After our meeting down here, the National Party promised a foreign land register which I'd never wanted. But, the fact was that that meeting of mine was what got the foreign land register off the ground here. Then Goss said I was to be ignored, but the reason for them having a foreign investment policy was because there were a series of meetings on the Gold Coast.

After the change of government in Queensland the repositioning of the political parties entered a new phase. The National Party now in opposition appeared to return to its deregulatory/free enterprise credo with great ease. When Keith De Lacy, the Treasurer of the Labor Government, made a comment six months after the election that 'Treasury was probing the possibility of leaseholding foreign land
purchases, but no conclusion had been reached' (GCB, 27 June 1990), the Opposition Leader Russell Cooper responded that De Lacy was an embarrassment to the Goss Government and should be sacked. Cooper then conjured up the image of a Labor government proposing the de facto socialization of land ownership where an individual or company is not able to sell to the highest bidder. He then quoted the ALP Prime Minister, Hawke to help him pillory such thoughts in considerable detail (GCB, 11 July 1990).

In the meantime the Goss Government appeared to be seeking to give its statements on foreign investment a new tone. In a speech to the Queensland-Japan Chamber of Commerce in Brisbane, the Premier differentiated between speculative and value-added investment and said that his Government discourages the former, but encourages the latter. The Japanese Consul-General who was present then replied with a speech in which he asked for further clarification of Queensland Government policy on foreign investment (ABC News 3LO, 7.45am 13 July 1990). De Lacy also established a Foreign Investment Secretariat in the Queensland Treasury. Its task was to analyse the data being collected in the foreign ownership register, as well as to prepare reports on the degree of foreign involvement in various sectors of the State’s economy. The first of these appeared within the following year (Queensland Treasury Department, 1991).

The Foreign Investment Secretariat also initiated the publication of a biannual series of reports that gave statistical details of trends in foreign land purchases in Queensland. The first of these gave statistical verification to a situation already known by those who had researched such topics: large pastoral holdings of British and American companies and individuals meant that when measured by area the Japanese presence in Queensland was relatively small. However when measured by value it was significant. Thus in the first such report established that Japanese nationals owned 24,190 ha of land in Queensland, which was 4.13% of the total foreign-owned land; comparable figures for US and British nationals were 333,262ha and 56.91% and 66,127ha and 11.29%. If the value of such land is tabulated then the figures look very different: Japan- $1,786 mill and 65.2% of the total value of all foreign-owned land, USA- $98 mill and 3.6%, Britain- $202
mill and 7.4% (Foreign Investment Secretariat: pp.3 & 8). A breakdown of foreign-land ownership by LGAs revealed that 3% of the land area of the Gold Coast was foreign-owned and that gave an anti-Japanese investment activist the chance to formulate the bon mot quoted in the previous chapter about the body of the Australian nation being infected by only three percent cancer.

In the meantime Premier Goss appeared to accept invitations to inaugurate or open Japanese-funded projects on the Gold Coast with just as much frequency as his National Party predecessors Bjelke-Petersen and Ahern had done. He used such occasions to make speeches that linked foreign investment to Queensland’s prosperity. Thus at the opening of the Surfers Paradise high-rise apartment building ‘Grand Mariner’ he quoted copious statistics of the amount of steel and concrete used and the number of workers employed in its construction. He used these figures to point to the beneficial impact such projects were having on the economy of the Gold Coast (GCB, 14 November 1991). Thus the initial assessment of the new Labor Government by Alan Midwood from Rider Hunt, a Gold Coast firm of valuers and property consultants, and Gordon Douglas of PRD Realty in Surfers Paradise appeared to be correct: foreign investors were unlikely to be worried by the Goss Government (GCB, 6 December 1989).

Bruce Whiteside sensed what had happened and stated in an interview (GCB, 17 April 1991):

> Queensland’s Labor government is now comfortably in bed with Japanese interests.....Despite State Labor’s plethora of noble sentiments expressed before the 1989 State election, the issue of foreign ownership and investment is to be put in its place: out of the public gaze.

He said that the Foreign Investment Review Board in Canberra, the Foreign Ownership Register and the Foreign Investment Secretariat were window-dressing to hide the reality that no government was going to do anything substantial about foreign ownership of Australian land. He did however relate one achievement that showed him that there were limits to the Government’s open-door policy towards
Japanese capital. In May 1990 the State Government announced its support for the Japanese-backed multi-function-polis to be developed on a site at Coomera on the Gold Coast. However most of this land was in private ownership and the estimated cost of buying it at market prices was $384 million and there appeared to be some doubt as to whether all the owners would be prepared to sell:

He (Goss) made the mistake of saying: “We’ll requisition it”. Of course there was a bloody meeting in Coombabah about this straight away. I sent a telegram to Goss to say we’d crucify him if he did this. We’d campaign that “Goss buys your land, with your money to give to the Japanese”. I don’t know, but a couple of hours later at 3pm, Gilman in Adelaide got the MFP.

(Bruce Whiteside, Interview 17 October 1994)

If Canberra was able to respond to the political challenge of the rise of local opposition to Japanese investment with a certain aloof consistency, then at the regional scale in Queensland, governments and politicians saw themselves being forced to respond to the political challenge with greater immediacy and flexibility. This had to be the case even though the outcome appeared to be a thinly-disguised continuity in welcoming the flow of foreign capital. Finally, the role of government at the local level, the scale of the City of Gold Coast, has to be considered.

Local Government and the Japanese Investor

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Gold Coast economic and political elites consisted largely of persons directly or indirectly involved with the development and hospitality industries and they and their priorities could be expected to dominate local politics. During the second half of the 1980s the Gold Coast City Council (GCC) welcomed the surge of Japanese investment and its perceived flow-on effects on the local economy. Globalization was good for the Gold Coast. However already by mid-1989 there were signs that the speed of land purchases and land clearing in preparation for new projects was not being matched by the
rate of commencement of these new projects. The Gold Coast City Council estimated that there were 17 ha of vacant sites in Surfers Paradise, most in the centre of the city. Most of these had been purchased recently by Japanese investors. As described in Chapter Four, these gave parts of Surfers Paradise what locals referred to as the ‘Beirut look’.

In early 1989 the GCC asked its Planning and Development Committee to conduct a probe into the problem of these vacant sites. At the end this investigation the above Committee made the following recommendation:

That the Council advise the Executive member of the Foreign Investment Review Board of Council’s concerns over large sites under foreign ownership remaining vacant for extended periods. Further that the Executive Member be requested to initiate active follow up by the FIRB of any purchase approvals given that were subject to development requirements (being met). Copies of the above to be sent to the Federal Treasurer and the Minister assisting the Treasurer.

(Gold Coast City Council Planning and Development Committee Meeting, 20 June 1989)

(File ref. No. 100/001/006)

Communication nearly two years later from the Planning and Development Manager of the GCC, Noel Hodges (letter 12 March 1992) showed that the GCC was still trying to bring pressure on the FIRB to have development commence on these largely Japanese-owned sites ‘as soon as possible’. However the FIRB appeared to have made the assessment that this was an unrealistic demand, given the depressed Gold Coast property market and the credit freeze imposed by Japanese banks on lending for foreign property projects.

The perception of the GCC that the FIRB in Canberra should intercede on their behalf with these Japanese investors to expedite the commencement of development reflected a view of the FIRB’s powers that may or may not have been valid. For as already mentioned, the Board’s decisions were excluded from the
Freedom of Information Act with all that being known was that its decisions were based on a concept of 'national interest', however that was defined. Past decisions, such as the two mentioned earlier in this chapter, seemed to reflect an aversion to a foreign company buying sites for 'land banking' purposes. In other words, FIRB policy was interpreted by applicants and governments as giving approval for site purchases only if they were accompanied by a definite development proposal with a time-line attached. It is on the basis of such an interpretation of FIRB policy that the GCC sought its help to expedite the disappearance of the Surfers Paradise 'bomb sites'.

The response of the FIRB was initially conveyed in an informal manner to the GCC and it was negative (GCB, 3 July 1989). An FIRB official was quoted as telling Ald Gary Baildon of the GCC that the Board had no real ability to enforce its requirement that development on sites purchased as a result of its approval commence within the designed time-period. Subsequently the GCC wrote an official letter to the FIRB drawing its attention to this matter. The reply dated 4 May 1990 said:

As a result of the Council's concerns, we have written to the companies owning the 17 sites requesting an update of their development plans and encouraging them to talk directly to the Council. But we are also aware that trying to force foreign developers to begin projects at the wrong time in the business cycle may result in an oversupply of developed properties.

The GCC Mayor, Ald Lex Bell was quoted later as having been upset by this FIRB response. The Government appeared to have been worried that to enforce the rules would be seen as a move hostile to the foreign investor (The Australian, 22 June 1990). Thus at the local level, the role of government in the foreign investment issue revealed itself to be quite ineffectual, particularly when the federal level of government did not choose to test the potential of its power against the dictates of the global property cycle. However by the mid-1990s some negotiations between the GCC and a few Japanese owners had apparently taken place. The results of this were becoming visible in central Surfers Paradise. For
many of the vacant sites now featured peripatetic markets, mini golf courses, or temporary car yards. As well as that the lengthening Japanese recession was starting to force some owners to sell to local or other foreign developers. On such sites there were signs of building activity appearing. These signs were a tangible symbol in the urban environment of the upturn in the local property cycle, not some result of the power of government to enforce its regulations.
Summary

As the Gold Coast dispute on foreign investment intensified the federal and state governments were forced to assume positions in relation to it. The ALP government in Canberra had already embraced the main features of globalization and so had little ideological difficulty guiding the progressive liberalization of foreign investment guidelines. Though once the surge of capital mainly from Japan was starting to be perceived as cause of property value inflation, it quickly repositioned itself in relation to this issue and introduced specific controls on foreigners' ability to purchase. It is noteworthy that these restrictions were limited to existing residential property; that is, the politically most sensitive sector of the market. At the same time government spokespeople from the prime minister downwards went out of their way to state that there was continuity of government policy towards foreign investment, and that continuity was of encouragement and welcome. This seemed to show that Canberra sought to reposition itself only as far as was politically necessary to convey its endorsement of specific concerns had by pivotal groups of electors, home buyers of modest means.

As the dispute on the Gold Coast flared the Queensland government found itself in a somewhat more equivocal position. The free enterprise ideological baggage of the National Party government would have instinctively encouraged it to perceive the dispute through the perspective of those who welcomed Japanese capital with open arms, but many of the petit-bourgeois anti-Japanese groups on the Gold Coast would have been National Party voters. These it could ill-afford to lose, particularly when the widespread revelations of corruption were already eroding its support. A newly-invigorated ALP opposition was articulating demands for a restrictive foreign investment policy ever more loudly. The result was a government policy initiative to gather information, to monitor trends, but not to act on them. Once they lost power the National Party politicians were able to resume their original ideological position with impunity, whereas the ALP government modified the rhetoric towards the issue of investment, but in effect continued to offer the same welcome to the foreign property investor. If controversy flared then it was always possible to refer to the overriding power held
by Canberra and its FIRB. As the property boom turned to bust, the issue disappeared from the public gaze and it was only the Gold Coast City Council that had to deal with the aftermath of the eyesore of derelict sites in the centre of Surfers Paradise. The FIRB’s response to this was in harmony with its belief in the necessity to continue an open-door policy towards the foreign investor, even if some of those already here had apparently not followed the guidelines according to which permission for their original investment was given.

It appears that governments, political parties and individual politicians had to position themselves and reposition themselves as the dispute at the interface between global forces and local reaction appeared, crystallized and intensified. If they were unable to do this, governments and politicians were marginalized and that could result in political death. For government has considerable prestige and is perceived as the focus of power that will act for its constituents when they felt afraid or threatened by other/outside forces. It may seek to convey a view of globalizing forces being for the good of its population, but if aspects of that view are seen as a threat by its voters then it has to be seen to change its statements and act accordingly.

Globalization does not appear to have extinguished the perception that the state is there to act for the national interest, but what happens when the government equates the national interest, at least in the economic sense, with globalization? Whether this can be interpreted to mean that the national interest has ceased to be a distinct consideration is a moot point. Here the state has repositioned itself to become a facilitator of globalization. In the case of the federal government during the period under consideration in this study, another interpretation may be more apt: it saw the exposure of Australia to the forces of globalization as the appropriate way of furthering the national interest. Thus its role was to define the appropriate policy text accordingly, and in specific terms, its role as an inhibitor and regulator of economic flows into and out of the country was to be minimized. The problems arose when some groups in the country did not perceive the benefits of such a world view. Governments had to reposition themselves quickly in relation to the epicentre of conflict and enunciate policies that made reference to
both the globalist as well as the localist agenda. This they did through making references do the national interest, but a national interest shed of its dogmatic exclusionary connotations and racism, while at the same time reiterating the virtues of globalist flows of capital, but linking it to a clearly enunciated concept of the national interest. If the result was opaque, ambivalent policies, then this was less of a problem for the government than its desire to be perceived as a main decision maker in the eyes of a population who had the power to give it or withdraw political support.

In the end, it was the downturn in the global economic cycle that was to bury the issue of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast and so reduce the potency for conflict at the interface of global forces and local culture.
Conclusion

This study has attempted to reveal something of the interface between the forces of globalization and the responses to it at a given place. It has not sought to be an examination of globalization as such, but of its interaction with, and penetration of a place and the effects of globalizing forces on that place at a given time. The chosen place becomes the locale, the stage, the interface. This begs the question of what in more precise terms this place is the interface between. Firstly and most obviously, it is the interface between the capital, the agents, the values, the skills and the images of globalization and the local environment and population. These encapsulate all that is from the ‘outside’, all that is the ‘other’ in the perception of those people who have been there at the given place since varying points in time prior to the arrival of these forces of globalization. As has been revealed, the population of the chosen place has responded to the presence of the globalizing forces in diverse ways. Thus the nature of the interface where these interactions occurred has been the fundamental research question of this study. However to reveal this in a diverse and multi-perspectival manner has required an eclectic methodology of study, as well as the investigation of broader contextual economic, political, cultural, social and aesthetic themes that have given meanings to the statistics, events, statements and perceptions found at the aforementioned place.

Thus the enunciation of the concluding themes will be about both the place researched and the broader thematic and contextual frameworks that are seen to have given meaning to the place-specific conclusions reached. The sequence of issues raised, the perspectives considered, and the theories embellished or postulated, should be read in relation to the research questions stated in the introductory chapter of this study. This chapter will in general terms echo the sequence and structure of those research questions.
The time/space compression caused by developments in communication and the
deregulation of capital movements by national governments, resulted in the
heightening of the speculative and spatially-integrative features of modern capitalism
during the 1980s. As far as investment flows were concerned, circuits of capital
investment were fueled by credit ever more furiously, but equally the withdrawal of
credit led to the extinction of investment just as quickly as it had ignited it. It was the
integration of such flows over macro-regional spaces and global space that was the
new feature of this process. Thus the deregulation of Japanese banks and the Bank of
Japan’s policy of low interest rates fueled the property market at chosen locations in
the Pacific Basin, such as the Gold Coast. This increased the surges and deepened the
troughs in the property cycles on the Gold Coast that had previously only been
influenced largely by regional and national economic processes. Similarly when the
Bank of Japan ordered lending for foreign property purchases to stop, the Gold Coast,
Hawaii and southern California found their slide into recession accelerating.

Another aspect of such spatial integration of economic forces warrants mention: the
change in locational relativities among investment locations. If previously the Gold
Coast had established its position as Australia’s most important tourist resort and
sought to implement strategies to maintain its economic primacy in this sector, then
from the mid-1980s onwards increased dependence on Japanese investment into
property forced it to shift its horizons to those locations that were also experiencing
flows of Japanese capital investment. The capitalists now increasingly perceived
themselves having a global choice of locations and each one of these places had to
readjust itself to being in competition with places that may have been on another
continent, thousands of kilometres distant from it. Thus the impact of Japanese
investment on Honolulu became an issue of interest and relevance to the Gold Coast,
whereas previously it was sufficient for the local business elite to focus on Melbourne
and Sydney. New unified spaces of meaning were created that spanned macro-
regional units of space on the globe, whereas previously such unified spaces of
meaning would have been perceived at most on a national scale.
A further aspect of the economic dimension of this study has been the issue of how these economic forces were perceived. At the level of the key economic indicators, it is fair to say that all participants in the globalized economic and financial system would interpret them in the same way. Thus a bank lending rate of a lower percentage in Japan compared with one in Australia could only be seen as providing cheaper credit for the borrower in Japan than his counterpart in Australia, thus giving them a financial advantage (as was the case with the Japanese investor on the Gold Coast during the period under study).

However the direction from which each capital investor came to the global financial system varied greatly. This meant that their previous experiences within their national or regional context provided many meanings that they attached to the economic phenomena that they were interpreting in the process of making investment decisions outside their own country. For example, the population-space ratios and socio-historical conditions of Japan had placed an inordinate monetary and symbolic value on land ownership. This is the direction from which they came at the land/property market on the Gold Coast and so they judged development land and real estate there to be extremely cheap to an extent that amazed the local population, especially the real estate agents. Another outcome of this was that the prices they were willing to pay created an aura around them of infinite wealth, which in the late 1980s heightened the image of the economically invincible Japanese. In other words, Gold Coast realities were reformulated by them on the basis of images they brought with them from Japan.

Another example of such multiple realities among actors in the global financial system were the different meanings attached to the property market. The property market of Japanese experience was one in which limited supplies of land and property, little tradition of speculative investment, and since 1945, a continually rising market, led them to view Gold Coast property as an asset that had to be purchased as
quickly as possible no matter what the price. In contrast most of the local participants in the property market had long accepted the culture of property cycles of boom and bust and regarded the infusion of Japanese capital as a facilitator of the boom that they were enjoying. When the boom turned to bust, the local industry interpreted it in a sanguine philosophical manner, whereas for the Japanese investor it was a previously unknown experience. So on the one hand, the 1980s saw the appearance of a global financial system, but its participants entered it from different socio-economic directions and brought their distinctive cultural baggage with them. This showed that when considered from this perspective, economics is a culturally-situated discipline and needs to be considered in terms of the cultural field(s) of the persons making economic decisions.

If globalization is a process, then the flows of capital constitute one dimension of this flow and they have a destination. Thus this has also been a study of place, the specific place at which capital became grounded, the place at which it engaged with a specific environment and population. Once invested, this capital was converted into tangible elements of the physical landscape that it created in its own image. This means that the city can be seen as a visual and cartographic mosaic that has been produced by a number of cycles of capital investment, and its physical landscape reflects the forms through which each cycle of capital investment is represented in it. These forms in themselves are products of specific market demands and are expressed through the fashions and technologies of the period when the developments occur.

So Japanese investment into Gold Coast real estate created its own ensemble of distinct elements in the built-environment of the urban area. These elements ranged from the designer-label boutiques in the centre of Surfers Paradise and at Main Beach, to the five-star hotels, the luxury high-rise apartment buildings near the coast, and golf course resort developments at the urban fringe. These objects of Japanese investment crystallized Japanese financial wealth and expressed it through the architectural, design and life-style fashions of the late 1980s. This conversion of
investment capital into real estate was made possible by the skills of many service professionals. They were connected to their specialized global networks and so were able to transform the chosen Gold Coast sites according to engineering/design packages put together in their offices from information, skills and images transmitted to them from key cultural centres of the world. Most of the clients for whom they worked, and the consumers who subsequently paid to use these developments, were already part of the global flow of business people, investors and tourists. They expected such globally comparable standards and styles of service. Thus it becomes apparent that globalization of one activity and service sustains and reinforces the other. People, capital, facilities and services, if one globalizes than the others will also follow.

The impact of Japanese investment on the urban area of the Gold Coast was uneven. Its initial focus was exclusively on the urban core, Surfers Paradise. As in most cities of the world, it is the core that defines the urban image and is therefore best known by outsiders and so helps define for them what is desirable property investment in that city. The result of such concentration of foreign investment increases the importance of the central area and sets new accents in its urban development. In the case of Surfers Paradise, the prestigious Japanese companies wanted their investments to reflect their global wealth and status, and those investors who were products of the Japanese bubble economy at home saw their Surfers Paradise projects as the way of gaining global status. Thus, Japanese capital helped convert Surfers Paradise to a centre with many global icons of retailing and the hotel industry. This can be compared with the case of central Los Angeles where Japanese capital played a significant role in giving it globally-prestigious office space and banking services.

This study has revealed another perspective on globalization and place. It is the importance of the place-time relationship in the impact of global forces on the given location. Booms are created by capital investment and speculation, busts by the cessation of these forces. It appears that the phase of economic boom accelerates,
broadens and deepens the forces of globalization, whereas the bust that follows slows and shrinks them. For if a boom can be defined as a phase of exaggerated expectations of profitability, then a bust becomes a phase of disillusionment about any potential for profit. Global capital arrives and withdraws accordingly. In the case of the Gold Coast, the initial investors were largely the new wealthy of the Japanese bubble economy who were followed by the established companies. As the easy credit of the boom continued, more and more individual Japanese investors and family companies were drawn into buying property on the Gold Coast. However from November 1989, as boom turned to bust, the cycle went into reverse: more and more of these investors sought to withdraw from their foreign investments on the Gold Coast and at other locations around the Pacific; with the speed of withdrawal being a function of their overall asset to liability ratios, not to mention the degree of personal financial support which they enjoyed in Japan.

Thus participation by capitalists in global activities is not constant. The identity and number of those participating will increase or decline according to the perception of rewards at any given time. Companies tend to expand spatially and enter more economic sectors during a global boom and retreat to core business and their home base during the bust. Thus what this study has shown is that globalization of capital is a two-way process: during a period of high liquidity capital flows very quickly from the centres of capital accumulation to favoured locations of investment, but this flow is reversed just as quickly when liquidity at the control centre becomes tight and/or profit potential at the investment location becomes unfavourable.

The effect of such two-way flows on projects at specific foreign locations commenced by global investors was found to be quite significant. The project itself may expand or shrink according to the availability of credit from the global financial centre. For example, an initial development plan for a Gold Coast resort may have been based on it catering to an international tourist clientele used to five-star service. However withdrawal of credit from Tokyo forced a fundamental reconceptualization of the
planned project to reduce costs and cater much more to the Australian public. In other words, as international investment capital tightens, so some projects withdraw from the global market to cater to a smaller, less demanding local one. In many cases this changed the scale and opulence of the project and the time-frame of its development. From another perspective, this was also seen to highlight the mismatch between the economic and cultural expectations of the global investors and the relevant features of the place at which they made their investments. What the international investor had judged to be a global resort region was found to much more dependent on local and national patronage.

The cultural baggage that the foreign investors brought to the place of their proposed investment was seen as an important influence of their perception and response to the place as well as the nature of their investment.

There was one particular element of their cultural baggage that they transposed to the Gold Coast in a very direct manner and that was their group competitiveness. Individuals, and especially companies, vied with each other to invest on the Gold Coast and, in some cases, to acquire or develop the most lavish and visually-striking project. This occurred on occasions at the expense of thorough market-research or the advice of local consultants. Subsequent results showed that this could lead to disaster. This indicated that they seemed to regard the economic realities of the Gold Coast locality as less important than acting-out a scenario of behaviour that was practised in Japan. The locale of their investment can therefore be seen as an extension of the home-turf, with perceptions of status and prestige in the eyes of their Japanese competitors being the most important consideration.

However viewed from an environmental perspective, it appears that the Japanese did want to see the Gold Coast as a place that was very different from Japan; that is, they wanted to see the Gold Coast as a reaction to their experience of their home country, Japan. It became the 'other' to their cultural baggage of a Japan with overcrowding,
stress and social constrictions. They saw the Gold Coast as a place of large spaces, sunshine and informality. When their investment projects were considered, it became apparent that from one perspective, it was this perception of the Gold Coast that these projects were meant to signify. Size and scope became one of their most striking features. The traditional simplicity and understatement of Japanese building styles was discarded in favour of an overt magnificence and spaciousness of rooms and communal spaces. Raw materials used and colour schemes chosen showed a conscious rejection of those found in traditional Japanese building styles. The Japanese investors appeared to feel that their wealth and their ability to be on the Gold Coast had freed them from their tradition of restraint and conformity. They did bring cultural baggage, but responded to the Gold Coast by rejecting the substance and meaning of the architectural and stylistic baggage that they had brought.

The nature of the projects that the Japanese funded reveals another perspective of importance: the extent to which the Japanese investors appeared to place a Western cultural signification onto what was stylistically the most desirable attribute of a residential, hotel, or resort project in the world of the 1980s. In other words, the eclecticism of traditional European-North American architectural styles commodified into postmodern packages were seen to signify the most fashionable property products of that time. In doing this the investors were continuing the Japanese tradition of taking chosen forms of Western culture and rearranging them to give the meanings they wanted. These were often projects that were beyond the financial resources of the local Gold Coast investor, or even if not, these investors believed that their assessment of the Gold Coast market told them that such financial and stylistic lavishness was not warranted by it.

In contrast to the local investors, the perspective of the Japanese was global. They saw the Gold Coast in relation to Hawaii, Miami, Banff, Bali, Phuket and Southern California. Therefore they made their decisions with the global traveler and property purchaser in mind. The result of this was that they integrated the Gold Coast not just
into the circuits of global investment capital, but also into the contemporary global culture of architectural styles, landscaping, interior design and spatial configurations and imagery. Though a few of their projects made conscious references to the traditional local vernacular, most sought to utilize, not what was there prior to their arrival, but what their reading of fashionable and prestigious projects in resort cities at other locations in the world told them reflected the highest levels of wealth, success and luxury.

At this point the role of the agents, the intermediaries of global professional skills, styles and images was seen to be very important. The group consisted of gatekeepers and service professionals whose functions were in some cases distinct, but in others overlapping. In this study the specific form that interaction between the outside, global presence and the local environment and population took was the actual process of investment and in many cases followed by project development. The role of these gatekeepers/service professionals at the Gold Coast interface between the arriving global capital and the local place and people became apparent at a number of stages of the investment process.

The first of these was at the very beginning when the estate agent, property consultant, or regional government official sought to sensitize the investors to the possibility of placing their capital at that specific place. This usually involved changing the potential investor's ignorance about or vague image of the place into one that was sharply, and positively defined as a desirable investment location. Here the sensitizing local professional often became the gatekeepers as well. For it was this person who was sometimes also the one who had a personal financial interest in persuading the potential outside investor to purchase a property from their portfolio, or who led them to an estate agent, or planning consultant who sought to persuade them to channel their financial involvement in his direction. Thus many elements of the pattern of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast were determined by this process. In this way, it can be concluded that the spatial restructuring of a specific
investment location by global capital is orchestrated to a considerable extent by local intermediaries and service professionals.

There is another stage in the investment at which such intermediaries were found to appear: during the buying process. This was found to be the cutting-edge of the cultural interface between the foreign investors and the local business culture. At the overt level a property transaction consists of the exchange of money with the tangible asset being purchased, but it became apparent in this study that there was also a cultural context to such transactions that became an important determinant of their progress and final outcome to both sides. It was found in the property transactions between the Japanese and the agents acting for the local vendors that perceptions of trust, rigid vertical thinking and reliance on arbitration were perceived to characterize the Japanese culture of business negotiations compared with lateral thinking, bargaining, negotiating, and individual assessment of the adversary being the hallmarks of the local style. The result appeared to be that the negotiating interface between the global and the local was one of contact, but little comprehension. Each side appeared to come from a different position and have different preconceptions. In spite of this many deals were done. An explanation for this should be sought in the enormity of the investment capital that the Japanese could access and the level of their self-confidence, if not hubris. This meant that the practices of the local business culture were easy to apply, or they became irrelevant. For what significance did bargaining skills have when more often than not the first price quoted was accepted?

There was another perspective of the professional service providers that was revealed to be important, namely, the extent to which they accompanied the flow of global capital to the Gold Coast and were instrumental in the dissemination of global skills, styles and images; or, in contrast, the extent to which the foreign investors utilized local skills and styles for the development of their projects. The patterns that emerged were varied. At one extreme there were Japanese investors who relied on their own service professionals to develop integrated property networks around the Pacific
Basin, if not the whole world. This was facilitated by the spread of Japanese service companies around the globe. In such cases the Gold Coast was just another location that was perceived as environmentally attractive and potentially profitable in the development of the integrated network of hotels or resorts. The interface between the global and local was purely a locational one. At the other extreme were cases where there was exclusive reliance on the skills of the local architect, planner and civil engineer, with the aim of creating a project that made extensive reference to the place to which the overseas investor had brought his/her capital. However the moot point was: can any urban/tourist project that seeks to be opulent and be at the height of fashion remain unaffected by global cultural styles?

The answer to this was sought in the consideration of the position of local service professionals in relation to global centres of culture and the flows of skills, images and artifacts from there. It was found that local service providers, such as architects, designers and planning consultants used the generous budgets that their Japanese clients had to utilize their knowledge of contemporary skills and styles to design projects that made reference to opulent counterparts in North America. In fact, with the already-mentioned desire of the Japanese client to develop a Gold Coast project in the globally most fashionable and prestigious style, Japanese capital was found to have facilitated the replication of key icons of the North American-Pacific basin resort/tourist cities on the Gold Coast. The transmission of such artifacts, skills and images of global culture was also facilitated by the arrival on the Gold Coast of a couple of North American firms of architects/resort designers, who had set styles in the USA, Canada and the Caribbean, as well as the internationalization of the operations of a number of local Gold Coast design and consultancy businesses.

In this way, the global professionals on the Gold Coast assumed the role of intermediaries at the interface between the foreign investor and the local environment. They obviously utilized the capital of one and the skills of the other. However the extent to which they were able to position themselves to interpret one to the other was
much more limited. For the Japanese investor sought the environment and the benefits of the favourable property market of the Gold Coast to buy or develop residential/tourist or resort assets that made reference to contemporary global high fashion. As this helped further their own professional status and income, the local service professional was only too happy to oblige. For some in the local population, this Japanese presence and the change it produced was seen as a process of invasion that would lead to their own marginalization.

For it is obvious from the conclusions discussed already that the Gold Coast in the 1980s became not just an interface between a local population and the new capital and skills and styles that flooded into it, but it also became an interface between two groups of people. On the one hand it was the groups bearing the capital from Japan and the gatekeepers and professional service providers who facilitated their investment, not to mention others who lauded this flow of global capital, people and skills. However on the other hand there were groups of people on the Gold Coast who put a negative meaning on these processes. They saw them as invasionary, signifying a loss of control and power over their local environment, if not the whole of Australia.

As the spokespeople for both points of view rapidly sought to articulate their arguments in terms of the 'national good', the Gold Coast became the interface for a conflict on the philosophical principles that should define the values, behaviour, self-image and policies of the Australian people. If, as was the case, the nation is taken as the prime focus of group identity, then it became an argument about the parameters of group identity and ultimately about what should be regarded as the cultural traits of the Australian people. So a form of cultural contestation erupted over the philosophical principles that should define the culture of the people of Australia. A globalist viewpoint was espoused in which global economic laws and spatial organization were linked to universal principles of human rights and behaviour, with the individual being the ultimate point of reference. A local view challenged this
perspective with an ethno-racial philosophy based on the immutability of the nation/tribe/race and the exclusivity of one nation and/or race to the other. In this cultural text ethnic or national allegiance was found to be the ultimate reference point in the reading of meaning into human action.

The specific features of such a localist perspective are situational, that is, they are a reaction to the specific characteristics of the forms that the forces of globalism at the specific place have manifested. On the Gold Coast in the period under study, it was purchases of land and property by foreign capitalists who happened to be Japanese. This revived old enmities and reactivated the dormant anti-Japanese threads that had tied together these groups of people on the Gold Coast. The propensity of these groups on the Gold Coast to react to the arrival of the Japanese in this way was triggered by the revival of memories of the Pacific War. In effect these people did not see themselves as being at the interface between local values and the global forces impinging on them. They did not regard capital coming into the Gold Coast as unlocking and developing the place, but as the symbol of a hostile, national ‘other’. They were at the ‘frontline’ of a conflict between two nations. In this case they perceived the Japanese investors as representatives of a unified, national juggernaut buying their way into a territorial takeover of the land that they had sought to conquer nearly half a century earlier. Japanese investment on the Gold Coast in the 1980s became a signifier for an attempt at military conquest by other means. Thus a politics of memory crystallized and became the ideological spur for political action that quickly evolved from the local to a regional and even national scale.

The Gold Coast as interface became a place where conflict occurred over the meanings that different groups read into the arrival of foreign capital and its bearers. By transposing personal experience, memories, moral convictions, prejudices and interests to an ideological level, they exacerbated the conflict and by implication articulated a belief in a truth that would have eliminated the interface between two diametrically opposing world views.
For the globalist philosophy had as its ultimate truth the unfettered flow of people, capital, images, ideas so that the Gold Coast would become fully integrated into the network of global capital and the styles and services that its bearers felt was appropriate to its success. According to this world view all individuals in the local population would benefit as a result and the source of cultural conflict would disappear. In contrast, the ultimate logic of the localist view was the elimination of land ownership by foreigners on the Gold Coast (and Australia) and so the resumption of complete control by those who were members of the national-ethnic clan. In this way the global/local interface would also be abolished as such a dominance of exclusionary national priorities would erect barriers between the Gold Coast and global flows and would help reintegrate it into a national space.

The enunciation of such philosophically pure scenarios may be intellectually satisfying, but the reality of the global-local debate very quickly took a more pragmatic direction. The globalists made the link between their advocacy of unfettered capital flows and national development and rising living standards in Australia. Thus they sought to make reference to phenomena that had been part of the national self-image of most Australians. The evocation of the image of the dynamic country that gives its inhabitants the Good Life was seen as a means of making the presence of the foreign capitalist more acceptable to those who had twinges of xenophobia when confronted with the reality of the Japanese investor. On the other hand, those fearful or hostile to Japanese investment did not actually advocate its exclusion, but its restriction. The restriction of the right to acquire freehold title to land by foreign nationals was their stated aim. The fact that ‘foreign’ meant very definitely Japanese, but not really British or New Zealander, gave it an ethno-racial bias that its adherents may not even have wished to deny. The point here though is that the exclusionary localist groups on the Gold Coast never sought to deny the connection between investment capital flowing into Australia and their belief in an Australia of rapid development. They felt that capital could be attracted here without
any loss of control over ownership having to be accepted. It is here that position of government was seen to be relevant.

Globalization has unleashed forces that have often been difficult for governments to control. But at the same time the processes of ‘glocalization’ as manifested on the Gold Coast in the late 1980s demanded government involvement in the disputes that such a dichotomy created. The vocal anti-Japanese investment groups appealed to government to assume its role as the ultimate guardian of ‘the national interest’. A failure to do so would have seen to marginalize it in the dispute and led to broader community unease and so resulted in political damage to the government. At the same time government saw globalization as bringing considerable economic benefits to Australia. However if certain groups in the population did not perceive this to be the case, then the government had to reposition itself in relation to the dispute and be seen to act in a manner that showed it was moving towards the exclusionary view of the localists on the Gold Coast and the broader national sentiment they appeared to have tapped across Australia.

Such strategic repositioning by government resulted in ambivalent or opaque policy formulation. This was seen in the fact that at the federal level restrictions on foreign investment were limited to the tightly defined, politically sensitive sector of the property market and were coupled with non-authenticated hints that appraisal of foreign investment applicants would be conducted in an expeditious and sympathetic manner. In this way the federal government sought to straddle the gap between the groups in the conflict and so counter any perceptions of its marginalization in the dispute. To achieve this it formulated ambivalent policies that were meant to assuage all groups at the global/local interface. It is doubtful whether it was able to achieve this.

The relative proximity of the different levels of government to the scene of conflict was also significant. The closer a government or individual politician was to the
epicentre of the dispute over Japanese investment on the Gold Coast the greater the perceived pressure to position themselves in an advantageous relationship to the views of the Gold Coast exclusionary nationalists. Thus Canberra, though introducing strictly delimited controls on foreign property investment, did not waver in its general public statements welcoming such investment, whereas their political allies, the Goss government in Brisbane, sought to monitor such flows as well as coopting the phrases of the Gold Coast exclusionary groups regarding the desirability of investigating leasehold only rules for foreigners. Such sentiments were never uttered by government spokespeople in distant Canberra. In a similar sense its predecessor the National Party State Government in Brisbane found that the Gold Coast dispute made its ideological baggage of laissez-faire capitalism and xenophobia-tinged populism increasingly difficult to carry. They were being forced to position themselves more and more advantageously in relation to the localists on the Gold Coast, and so introduce at least a monitoring mechanism of foreign property ownership for Queensland. It was going into opposition after the subsequent elections that allowed them to resume their previous equivocal ideological stance with less scrutiny.

At the interface itself local perceptions and pressures became paramount. Thus the representative of the federal electorate that encompassed the Gold Coast spoke of the threat posed by uncontrolled Japanese investment even though the national policy of his Party was one of complete deregulation of controls over capital flows including the abolition of the one federal instrumentality, the Foreign Investment Review Board, that existed to oversee and filter the process. Finally, local government on the Gold Coast was not responsible for policies towards the flow, but for its effects on the built-environment when the consequences of the investment were not those originally foreseen. The fear of empty and derelict sites in Surfers Paradise harming the image of a vibrant, glamorous tourist centre that it sought to project spurred the Gold Coast City Council into action. It approached Canberra to intercede with the Japanese developers to hasten commencement of their projects. This Canberra refused to do.
The reply was that the cycles of global boom and bust could not be influenced by
government and that was that. The assertion made by social theorists that
globalization had resulted in the state losing effective control over macro-economic
processes appeared to have been verified. The emperor had no clothes.

To conclude, the key research questions of this study have been based on the
hypothesis that the processes of globalization are complex and their nature and effects
warrant consideration form both the economic and cultural perspectives. For the full
significance of economic globalization for a place and its people only becomes
evident when the connections between the economic forces and culture are made.
The economic dimensions of globalization are carried by people. So even if the overt
aims of such people are specific economic advantage and profit, their quest for these
will affect the accepted norms, hopes, fears and lifestyles of those where these
economic forces impact. As a result number of specific spatial/environmental and
social consequences can be identified at the interface where globalizing forces impact
on place and people.

One of these is increased environmental fragmentation. Global investors acquire
specific assets at specific locations. Hence the visual and socio-economic differences
between the urban areas where global capital has anchored itself and funded
developments and the districts in which local or regional resources continue to
determine investment cycles, is sharpened. New spatial and environmental
fragmentation also occurs at the urban fringe. Here the sites selected for development
are transformed by global capital from farmland, wasteland, or natural ecology to
urban uses. So the spatial accretion of traditional urban growth is replaced by large
block additions that frequently thrust the urban area in new directions. Another
characteristic of the interface is the presence of economically and stylistically
contrasting buildings, services and amenities. Accommodation, amenities and services
established to cater to the local population are now joined by a new type of service:
that which reflects international specifications, markets and styles. The financial
power of the global investors is such that they tend to expel established activities from central locations, and so the process of spatial segregation between the urban districts favoured by global capital and those it deems to be less attractive is facilitated. In this way, studies such as this one, can make a contribution to spatial theory.

Similarly, a study of the interface also contributes to social theory. Here revelations have been made about the cultural nature of globalization and the way it is perceived by the people at the places affected by it. As such, it also says much about the culture of people at such specific places, and so provides an indication of the importance of the culturally individual, the culturally unique, as counterpoints to the universal ontologies of globalization. There is also the appearance of the dichotomy between the globalizing forces and the local reaction they provoke. It points to the need to differentiate between globalization as a generic force and its manifestation at specific places. Once global processes seek to impact a place they have to enter into discourse with its culture. If there is resistance, then it places an imperative on the agents of globalization and their supporters to reposition themselves in relation to their opposition. Symbols of local culture have to be coopted to the globalist objectives, so that coalitions of support or at least tacit acceptance can be negotiated. This is relatively easy if globalist forces entering a place can find groups whose economic self-interest or world view facilitates rapid cooption. With other groups at the interface, a public dispute or a form of cultural contestation may ensue. The extent to which the agents of globalization at a specific place have to reposition themselves may also depend on their own cultural baggage, the nature and strength of the local reaction, and the prevailing political culture.

Globalizing forces impacting on place may also restructure the socio-political divisions within the community they have entered. Economic and socio-cultural groups based on a consensual world view, may now find themselves in different positions in relation to the people, capital and values that are streaming in from outside. So long -established political allegiances may become strained, or even
break and be reformulated along lines defined by the similarity of attitudes towards globalization. This is a process that was initially illustrated in the late 1980s by the conflict over Japanese investment on the Gold Coast and during the 1990s has created tension among the conservative groups in Australian politics.

This prompts an observation about globalization theory as such. Most literature grounds it in concepts of time/space compression, technological developments and cultural creativity and its dispersion. The truth of this causation is in general terms beyond dispute. However the interconnections between the various forces of globalization can be complex. The relationship between these forces needs further elucidation. For example, the economic forces of globalization that impact on a place may emanate from one key world centre, but the cultural forces of globalization could be coming from somewhere else in the world. What relationship results from these globalizing forces coming from different directions? In this study, we have seen that the agents of global capital had appropriated significant elements of the global cultural forces that came from other places. But, is this always so? Are there instances where global capital and culture come from the same source, are interlinked, and on arrival at a new location seek to extinguish other sources of influence? Arguably nineteenth Century globalization in the form of European imperialism was like this.

The contemporary form of globalization appears to be different. Has this earlier form of globalization been replaced by a one characterized by cross-currents of flows emanating from different core locations of capital, technology and cultural creativity? There are signs that this may be so. For example, a luxury resort may be financed by a global Japanese bank, be designed by a firm of architects based in Milan, be managed by an international hotel chain with its head office in Chicago, and aim to cater to the wealthy of Southeast Asia. The project package created by such service professionals from different cultural backgrounds may, with some references to the local vernacular, be replicated at other locations in the world. Can one therefore
argue that global culture is a hybrid composed of elements from various sources of
capital and creativity and inserted into diverse environments that promise profitable
returns? Perhaps one can go further and point to a symmetry between product and
consumer, by posing the question- Are such hybrid products of global culture mirrors
of the images in the minds of the peripatetic business traveller and tourist? Theory has
to encompass both agents and beneficiaries.

This points at the fact that theory is always not just for some purpose, but by some
one and for someone. There are always those who become advantaged and those who
become marginalized. Thus, while the proponents of globalization theory may
achieve intellectual supremacy, and whose agents at an infinite number of places in
the world can cause socio-economic change, spatial realignments and very acute
forms of cultural contestation, is such a perspective on the globalization theme
exhaustive? Perhaps not.

Globalization also needs to be researched much more in terms of its winners and
losers, in terms of the new cultural cleavages it has created, in terms of its ability to
reposition places within a global context. Some specific questions that arise from this
and that need further research include: What has been the effect of globalization on
the socio-economic hierarchy of the population of a given region? What cultural
changes and conflicts have been produced there by globalization? Into what types of
global networks has the place studied been integrated? This could lead to the
postulation of globalization theories that consider not just economic motivations, but
also take cognizance of the cultural worlds of its agents, and how these cultures acted
as a filter for their perceptions of places on which they sought to impact.
Furthermore, these globalization theories may result in the postulation of a general
theory of global economic forces as cultural products. It is hoped that the study just
presented has been able to make some contribution to this intellectual endeavour.
Appendix I

MAJOR JAPANESE INVESTORS ON THE GOLD COAST
## MAJOR JAPANESE INVESTORS ON THE GOLD COAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INVESTOR</th>
<th>TYPE OF COMPANY</th>
<th>LOCATION OF PROPERTY(IES)</th>
<th>STATE OF INVESTMENT END OF 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ado Star (Aust.) Pty. Ltd</td>
<td>Private company of Katsuhiko Yamagata &amp; Gold Coast partners</td>
<td>Crooked House Restaurant, cnr. Cambridge Rd &amp; Markwell Ave., Surfers Paradise. Aug. 1990, $3.1m</td>
<td>Still own it; also operate 3 other restaurants on the Gold Coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Management Qld. Pty. Ltd (K.K. Alpha Corp.)</td>
<td>Shipping co., ski &amp; golf resort developer in Japan, also in Hawaii</td>
<td>Jim Raptis bought 9.6ha island for $7m, build bridge sold Ephraim Is. in Broadwater Oct. 1989 for $43.5m; plans for $400m low rise Venetian - style resort, include 300 room hotel</td>
<td>Has permits to build on land, no development; Dec. 1995 sale to Lewis Land group, $10m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anabuki Construction</td>
<td>Largest Jap. condominium developer.</td>
<td>1.15ha highrise development site, bought 1989. $21m, Main Beach, Stafford Ave., Lennie, Mount Batten &amp; Tedder Sts., planned $100m, 52 storey apt. building.</td>
<td>Still own it, but on the market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asano, Tormi</td>
<td>Private investor</td>
<td>664m², 3 storey, office building. Glenferrie Drive Robina, Jan. 1991, $6.1m.</td>
<td>Still owns it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axis Ltd. (Dr. B. Ishizaki EIE &amp; McMaster Constructions Pty. Ltd.)</td>
<td>Japanese property consultant &amp; Gold Coast building Co.</td>
<td>Pinewood Lakes, 184 condominium developments, adjacent to Sanctuary Cove. $55m. October 1989 start.</td>
<td>Project abandoned late 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brockson Pty. Ltd</td>
<td>Chemical products manufacturer - Hishiki &amp; Co. headed by baseball star Sadao Hishiki</td>
<td>184ha site, Guineas Crk. Rd., Tullebudgera; Aug. 1991-plans for $123m 18 hole golf course, 152 room hotel, 547 residential units.</td>
<td>July 1992- creditors threatened legal action against the company; banks in Japan withdrew support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVESTOR</td>
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<td>LOCATION OF PROPERTY(IES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calsonic Management Services Pty. Ltd. - a subsidiary of U.S. Co. Calsonic International Inc. This is a subsidiary of Jap. Calsonic Corp.</td>
<td>Japanese industrial firm (car exhausts for Nissan).</td>
<td>600ha site, west of Gold Coast airport to be developed as $200m mini-city-2900 residential sites, shops, 200 room hotel, recreational amenities, industrial sites. bought 1989; spent $4.5m planning dev. and gaining permits.</td>
<td>Project abandoned, site sold in Aug. 1994 to Colibri Ltd. linked to Leda Holdings Pty. Ltd., Sydney. They inc. lots to 4700 and resid. density from 9 to 25 per ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearwater Pty. Ltd. (Travel Planning Corp. of Japan).</td>
<td>Japanese travel chain.</td>
<td>Broadbeach Motor Inn (66 rooms) paid $7.8m.</td>
<td>Sold to HIS Investments Pty. Ltd. $4.5m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearwater Pty. Ltd. (Travel Planning Corp. of Japan).</td>
<td>Japanese travel chain.</td>
<td>Casa Blanca Motel in Broadbeach (37 rooms) at intersection Nerang-Broadbeach Roads, paid $5.5m early 1990.</td>
<td>Sold to HIS Investments for $2.9m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comestock Corporation Australia.</td>
<td>Private co. owned by Eikichi Yazawa, prominent Japanese pop star.</td>
<td>Rhode Is. 172 unit resid. dev. adj. to Surfers Paradise golf course.</td>
<td>Developed it, but had to discount in 1992; Aug. 1994 receiver auctioned last 10 units and development site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable Housing Developments Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Private company of Japanese Gold Coast residents Toshimasa Tamamiza and Minoru Tokita.</td>
<td>Various small - scale residential unit and townhouse projects.</td>
<td>Sold site to local developer (Peter Kurs Group), Dec. 1993, $2.5m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable Housing Developments Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Private company of Japanese Gold Coast residents Toshimasa Tamamiza and Minoru Tokita.</td>
<td>Amalgamated 9500m² site in Bundall Road in 1987-88; $10.9m; plans for 24 storey office tower.</td>
<td>Developed &amp; sold them; 1996 building of 630m² two storey office building, 59 West Burleigh Rd. Burleigh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmo</td>
<td>Tokyo-based company</td>
<td>4064m² site bought Aug. 1989. Old Burleigh Rd &amp; Broadbeach Boulevard, 27 storey, 231 apt. tower planned; 4.4ha site cnr. Sickle Ave, Oxenford Rd., Hope Is. auto museum planned with Aust. co. Hontan Pty. Ltd. 1990, $0.9m.</td>
<td>Defaulted on purchase, Nov. 1989. site sold June 1995, $0.8m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmo</td>
<td>Tokyo-based company</td>
<td>152ha golf course resort site in Currumbin Valley, bought $23.5m, $200m resort planned.</td>
<td>FIRB rejected purchase of site in Sept. 1990; subsequent sale to Kornhauser, Gold Coast developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Daikyo Australia Pty. Ltd. (Daikyo Kanko)</td>
<td>Largest Japanese condominium &amp; resort developer.</td>
<td>Site, Staghorn, Pandanus &amp; Ferny Aves., Gold Coast Highway, bought 1986; $65m, 296 ‘Gold Coast International Hotel’ built.</td>
<td>Rumours of its sale since 1993, most recently, mid-1996 to Hong Kong Carlton Hotel Group, $85m.</td>
</tr>
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<td>347ha site purchased 1985, dev. $30m ‘Palm Meadows’ golf course resort, with $3m clubhouse complex; approval for 400 room hotel.</td>
<td>Golf links, clubhouse, one residential cluster completed; 330ha, incl. golf links sold to Hungtat World Wide Ltd., June 1996, $50m.; 2.5ha to Phil Sullivan, $3.5m for hotel &amp; resid. dev.; 4.42ha to Japan based Sankyo Development, $17.5m; 10ha retained by Daikyo for townhouse project.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Purchased 1986-25% share in Jupiters Trust.</td>
<td>Sold in September, 1992. Plan to develop $250m, 48 level resort-residential project; plan abandoned, still own it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6807m² dev. site on Pandanus, Ocean Ave &amp; Gold Coast Highway, bought Feb. 1987, $9m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
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<td>130ha Mudgeeraba golf course &amp; resort, Somerset Drive, developed 1989 (Manutso-Daikyo).</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Eight storey office building 33 Elkhorn Ave. S. Paradise, bought Dec. 1988, $4.5m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Six storey office building 29 Elkhorn Ave. S. Paradise, bought Dec. 1988, $4.5m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dev. site on Pine Oak, Norfolk &amp; Ferny Ave., bought July 1989, $17.6m, 335 room hotel, shops, apartments proposed</td>
<td>Owner, ex-Daikyo director (as Armboy Pty. Ltd.); reports of its sale in Nov. 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bayview St., Hollywell caravan park, site 6.2ha from Kornhauser &amp; Burchill; planned $120m three star resort and conference centre.</td>
<td>Still own it; would like a small development, head office in Japan against it.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dia Kensetsu Co. Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Third largest housing &amp; condominium developer in Japan. Hotels in Hawaii, California.</td>
<td>Dev. site, Esplanade and adjacent Raptis Plaza bought 1990, $128m; plans 265 room tower hotel &amp; 55 apartments over shops.</td>
<td>Purchased Raptis Plaza and adjacent development site, owns both; no development of site. Option given over airspace above Raptis Plaza to Forrester Parker for possible development, Oct. 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIE International Corporation</td>
<td>Small Co. marketing magnetic tapes, expanded into golf course development in Japan, then in late 1980s into hotel/resort properties around Pacific.</td>
<td>682ha Sanctuary Cove resort, golf course, 250 room Hyatt Regency Hotel; bought from Ariadne, Sept. 1988, $341m.</td>
<td>Still own it, but mortgagee Long Term Credit Bank of Japan assumed control in Aug. 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent Life Corporation (Incorp. in Japan)</td>
<td>Insurance Co.</td>
<td>2841² dev. site Woodroffe Ave &amp; Pacific &amp; Peak Sts. Main Beach, 1988, $2.6m for 24 storey, 16 luxury apartments building.</td>
<td>Sold by LTCB to Univ. of Qld. in 1995, $107m sale challenged by Bond Univ. Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedwood Pty. Ltd. (Royal Airlines of Japan)</td>
<td>Airline</td>
<td>Bought Parkwood international golf course at Musgrave Hill. 84ha site at Gilston in 1988 for development of $25m resort &amp; residential project.</td>
<td>Completed it Oct. 1991 and still own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukumura, Fumikiyo</td>
<td>Private Investor</td>
<td>6ha site, Bourton Rd. Merrimac; 64ha Reedy Creek Station, west of Robina, Dec. 1989, $30m.</td>
<td>Still own it (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanayama Noriyuki</td>
<td>Private Japanese investor, owns Sony Centre in Tokyo.</td>
<td>'Seabank Centre', 8.412m² office bldg. Southport, early 1987, $13.5m.</td>
<td>Hanyama died late 1989; administrators of estate sold to Peter Kurts Group, May 1996, $12.1m.</td>
</tr>
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<td>May 1990 bought Forum shopping arcade ($35m). Both purchases from J. Rapists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIS Investments Pty. Ltd</td>
<td>Hideo Sawada second largest chain of travel agencies in Japan.</td>
<td>Bought 5482m² site on Gold Coast Highway, Clifford St., Hamilton Ave. &amp; Cambridge Road in May 1994; $9m. from P. Zarro mortgagee dev. of 407 room, 21 storey, three-star hotel, $80m. See also Clearwater Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Project built Nov. 1994 - Dec. 1996 - 'Watermark Hotel'.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Moran Hospital of Excellence Tugun 300 bed hospital, 40:20 with Moran Health Care Group &amp; AGC developed at a cost of $320m. High-tech estates of Cobaki dev. to be linked to it.</td>
<td>Westpac withdrew support, not equipped, sold off at a loss as a standard private hospital in Oct. 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Management</td>
<td>Family investment Co. est. by individual who came originally with Daiko.</td>
<td>Low rise 'Elizabeth Broadbeach Waters' Low rise 32 unit residential development (Eady Avenue, Broadbeach, Waters)</td>
<td>Completed and partially sold.</td>
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<td>Corporation</td>
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<td>Jimna Consortium has equal shares among Japan Airlines, Toyo Real Estate Co. Ltd. and Nomura Real Estate Aust. Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Major Japanese airline and property arm of conglomerate and security house.</td>
<td>1.48ha site; 47 Cavill Ave. - N.E. cnr Ferny Ave. &amp; extending northwards, with thin wedge to Gold Coast Highway, L-shaped. Bought March 1988, $65m from Ariadne.</td>
<td>Still own it, originally a $480m. dev. proposed with Lend Lease; Dec. 1991 a scaled-down version of a 28 storey hotel, retail &amp; entertainment space &amp; 28 storey residential tower (serviced apts.) $200m; since early 1995 site of temporary market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jollysea Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>??????</td>
<td>Office building, Upton St., Bundall bought May 1988, $1.5 m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Kenotaira Corp.</td>
<td>Purchased investment building at 16 Queensland Ave.;</td>
<td>Broadbeach, July 1987; $3.8m.</td>
<td>Sold to Peter Kurts Group April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>purchased investment building at 16 Queensland Ave.;</td>
<td>Broadbeach, July 1987; $3.8m.</td>
<td>1994; $2.5m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkby Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Private investment partnership associated with Kameyama</td>
<td>2 small buildings, 3084 G. Coast Highway adjacent to Ataka Restaurant building; bought</td>
<td>On market July 1990, $5m; not</td>
</tr>
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<td>and family from Japan.</td>
<td>June 1988; $2.9m.</td>
<td>sold. March, 1995 on market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishu Railway Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Private rail company, also owns resorts in Japan.</td>
<td>'Quality Beachcomber Hotel' 28 storeys, 300 rooms, bet. Hanlan &amp; Trickett Sts. bought</td>
<td>Still own it, Accor Asia Pacific</td>
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<td>September 1988, $38.5m.</td>
<td>have management rights - “Mercure</td>
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<td>Hotel Beachcomber Gold Coast”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kokusai Motorcars Pty.</td>
<td>Tokyo taxi &amp; tour bus company, property arm.</td>
<td>Paradise Centre - 120 shops and apartments; Ramada Hotel, 406 rooms; Cavill Ave.,</td>
<td>Own it, refurbishing retail area.</td>
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<td>Ltd.</td>
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<td>Hanlan St., Esplanade, G.C. Highway, bought Ramada Hotel Nov. 1986, $47.5m; Paradise</td>
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<td>Centre, December 1988, $130m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koshin Australia Pty.</td>
<td>Tokyo sharebroker Mitsuhiro Kotani est. property</td>
<td>1.36ha development site. Palm, Ferny, Staghorn Ave. &amp; Gold</td>
<td>Fall of Japanese sharemarket,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltd.</td>
<td>investment company.</td>
<td>Coast Highway, bought from Daikyo, June 1988, $30m. gained</td>
<td>Koshin stopped dev. on Gold Coast,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Koshin Co. Ltd.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gold Coast Council approval for 543 room, $250m resort/hotel.</td>
<td>Nov. 1990; declared bankrupt in</td>
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<td>1993. Sold site to Hudson Conway</td>
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<td>Oct. 1993, $10m.</td>
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<td>Sold Oct. 1993, for $11m. to</td>
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<td>Phoenix Investment Holdings in</td>
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<td>Singapore.</td>
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<td>Sold Nov. 1993 to Nifsan Pty. Ltd.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sold Nov. 1993 to Nifsan Pty. Ltd.</td>
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<td>$8m. (four properties bought 1988-</td>
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<td>1993, $34.5m).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumagai Gumi</td>
<td>Japanese civil engineering construction co.</td>
<td>$22m Port Meirion Village, Runaway Bay- resid. units and marina. Joint venture with</td>
<td>Completed 1989 and condominiums</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Concrete Constructions &amp; AGC (K.G. 33% interest).</td>
<td>sold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyowa Wing Aust. Pty.</td>
<td>Suomitsu Ito &amp; Akiko Ito (Nagoya), private investment</td>
<td>Bought in 1988, 6,624m² dev. site; price $14m. G.C. H’way, View Ave (S.W. side) to</td>
<td>Midohsuji Gen. Industrial Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltd.</td>
<td>company of Itoman Co. director &amp; his wife.</td>
<td>Esplanade (L-shaped site); planned 35 storey 300 room “Imperial Wing” hotel/retail</td>
<td>(Itoman group), main creditor, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>complex, $90-100m.</td>
<td>foreclosed on Kyowa Wing, forced</td>
</tr>
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<td>to sell Nov. 1993-$8.16m to Hudson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conway Pty. Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yamanaka, Toshi &amp; Motoko Ida &amp; Hiro Yamanaka. Have travel, property &amp;</td>
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<td>manuf. interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maruyoshi International</td>
<td>Kyoto company.</td>
<td>Bought eight storey resort and retail centre, Orchid Avenue,</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Co. Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 1989; $11.7m.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID Australia Pty. Ltd. (Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd.)</td>
<td>Property arm of second largest electronic group in the world.</td>
<td>ANA Hotel, 408 rooms, cnr. Elkhorn Ave. &amp; Gold Coast Highway, March, 1988 $128.5m purchase.</td>
<td>Own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>202.3ha Royal Pines Resort, Ashmore $500m, include. 330 room hotel, 2 golf courses, and 1050 residential dwellings. Site bought in 1987 for $12.5m from ANZ Bank. To be developed between 1988-1991.</td>
<td>Own it, are developing it, but more slowly and with fewer residential units. Completion: 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui &amp; Co. Pty. Ltd. &amp; Nippon Shippan Co. Ltd. (24.5:75.5)</td>
<td>Major trading house &amp; credit card company.</td>
<td>Sheraton Mirage hotel, 402 rooms, and condominiums, Main Beach, 49% share, paid $275m in 1988; Nov. 1990 bought other 51% $123m when Quintex in receivership.</td>
<td>Still owns it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui Construc. Co. (Kuji Pty. Ltd.)</td>
<td>Orient Finance Japan's largest consumer credit co. &amp; Japan conglomerate construction arm.</td>
<td>Grand Mariner 43 storey 194 unit highrise, built 1990-1992, $150m.</td>
<td>Units in the process of being sold, some discounting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motoji Kurita</td>
<td>Private Japanese investor</td>
<td>Bought five storey office building, 52 Davenport St. Southport, July 1988, $3.725m.</td>
<td>Sold Oct. 1993, $1.95m to Lussac Pty. Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nara Holdings (50:50 with</td>
<td>Japanese construction company.</td>
<td>Nara Hotel, 400 rooms, $60m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Nisan Pty. Ltd. (1989 50:50 with Chartered Pacific Ltd. as Nifco Kangyo Inc.)</td>
<td>Plastics Co., newspaper proprietor and with banking interests - Toshiaki Ogasawara.</td>
<td>77.8ha site, include. Carrara Golf Course; Broadbeach-Nerang Road at Alabaster Drive (1989); to dev. golf centre, $120m. hotel and town houses.</td>
<td>Dev. 18 hole golf course only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niizeki Constructions</td>
<td>Private building co.</td>
<td>1.17ha site. Main Beach - Lennie, Tedder, Hughes and Stafford Aves. Bought in March 1989 for $16.7m.</td>
<td>Sold site, April 1984, $8.6m to developer Harry Triguboff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimiya Shoji Co. Ltd. (Broadleaf Pty. Ltd.)</td>
<td>Isao Kayashima, private investor in Japan - has export firm in Tokyo.</td>
<td>Six storey Cavil Park retail-office complex; bought 1989 $15.5m. Sorrento Village shopping centre, bought 1987, $3.4m. Office building, 5233m² 42 Bundall Road; bought 1990 for $10.25m.</td>
<td>Sold to G. Parlby (Syd.) &amp; Jim Tonge (G. Coast), Dec. 1995, $6m. Sold in 1991 (?). Sold (Nov. 1994) for $3.2m to Lorenzo Galli local developer.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ocean Resort Development.</td>
<td>?????????</td>
<td>445m² development site Main Beach Parade (south of “Golden Sands”); bought early 1991 - $725,000.</td>
<td>Put on market Jan. 1994 - $895,000; taken off market April 1994 (to sell as land-house package later).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK Gift Shop Ltd.</td>
<td>Retail chain owned by Japanese TV star Kay Ohashi.</td>
<td>281m² shop at 23 Orchid Ave., S. Paradise, May, 1996, $3.0m.</td>
<td>Completed $1.7m 5 unit develop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opalsearch Pty. Ltd. (49:51 All Nippon Airways Trading Co. + Van Brugge Holdings Pty. Ltd.)</td>
<td>Japanese airline and Sydney jeweller &amp; opal retailer.</td>
<td>49% share bought 2 storey retail building 21 Orchid Ave, $7.7m. March 1989; bought units 89 &amp; 92 at 23 Orchid Ave, $7.2m, Sept, 1989.</td>
<td>Still own it; reopened after extensive renovations (Nov. 1994); unit 89 sold to OK Gift Shop Co., May 1996 $3.0m; unit 92 sold to Wing Aust. Pty. Ltd. May, 1996, $2.5m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanwa House (Sanwa Home Inc.)</td>
<td>Small house and condominium developer</td>
<td>‘Australis Point’ highrise development and hotel, Marine Pde., Labrador; bought site 1990, $28m; project cost $290m.</td>
<td>Purchase of site not completed, trustees of Aust. vendor suing Sanwa House Inc. for damages, case taken to Japanese courts.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Shinko Australia Ltd. (Shinko Corp.)</td>
<td>Osaka-based builder of golf courses, &amp; sale of memberships.</td>
<td>368ha site, $21m, 1987 built for Hope Island resort, Cooorna - 400 room hotel, marina, golf course, 140 houses. Est: $1.5bil.</td>
<td>Developing it, but more slowly, 18 hole golf course $12m. club house completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tescom Lease Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>???????</td>
<td>7 Mallana St., S. Paradise, 16 level, 28 unit “Vie Meridian”, completed 1991; $14.5m.</td>
<td>Sold Oct. 1994 to Nifsan Pty. Ltd. $5.7m.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Tobishima</td>
<td>Jap. construction Co.</td>
<td>‘Australia Fair’ shopping centre, southport (50:50 with MEPC) $250m include. 246 room hotel.</td>
<td>Tobishima’s share sold to MEPC in July 1991 for $198.2m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toshin Developments</td>
<td>Owner Tajiti Yuichi, architect and developer.</td>
<td>4160m² development site bet. Beach Rd &amp; Surf Pde., S. Paradise, 62 unit apt. bldg. planned.</td>
<td>Sold to Raptis Group June, 1996, $3.9m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>913m² seven unit retail - showroom bldg., cn r. Jade Dr. &amp; Anisair Crt., Ashmore.</td>
<td>Completed June, 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towa Kohmuten Corp.</td>
<td>Japanese develop. &amp; construction Co.</td>
<td>Bought Nov. 1987 for $16m, Kooralbyn Valley Country Club and 4000ha land, bought &amp; added $24m 100 room hotel, also extra recreation facilities added.</td>
<td>Developed it and still own it; April 1996 administrators appointed to clear debts, sale of land proposed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyomenka</td>
<td>Seventh largest trading Co. in Japan.</td>
<td>Dev. $4m, 28 lot resid. estate in Cotlew St. Bellevue Park, 1989-90.</td>
<td>Sold all lots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>‘Vue Mirage’ 9 storey apt. block, Marine Pde. Labrador.</td>
<td>Developed and units sold, but more slowly than anticipated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verde Australia Pty. Ltd.</td>
<td>Private home builder from Hyogo prefecture.</td>
<td>Restaurant and office building at 3120 Gold Coast Highway; bought March 1989, $3.95m.</td>
<td>Still own it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Development sites at:</td>
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<td>Monticarlo Ave., Broadbeach. Paid $1.6m 1989 planned 22 storey residential tower.</td>
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<td>3500m² site, Woodroohe &amp; Cronin Aves., Main Beach. Paid $2.1m 1989.</td>
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<td>4.73 site, Fleay Court, Burleigh Heads, paid $1.4m in 1988, planned town house development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yodogawa Kanko Development Co.</td>
<td>Family owned development company.</td>
<td>Purchase of ‘Ocean Blue’ (409 units) resort, Birt, Oak, Norfolk, Ferny Aves., Surfers Paradise, $34m; Dec. 1989.</td>
<td>Still own it; May 1996 management rights given to Accor Asia Pacific - “Mercure Resort Surfers Paradise”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lands Dept. Brisbane; PRD Realty; Rider Hunt; Do Management Pty. Ltd.; The Australian; Gold Coast Bulletin; The Australian Financial Review; Gold Coast Albert Regional Development Committee; Cityscope; personal interviews.
Appendix II

List of Interviewees
List of Interviewees

Bruce Barclay  Satoru Hashizume  Mick Okawa
John Bate      Neville Haynes    David Parsons
Etsuko Bishop  Philip Jardie     Grayson Perry
Desmond Brooks Akira Kikuchi     Peter Rimmer
Darrell Brown  David Kozik       R. A. Samut
Geoff Burchill Peter Lacey       Zin Sawachika
Ron Burling    Eliza Macrossan   Sir Sydney Schubert
Coleen Coyle   Kotaro Matsuda    N. H. Seek
Max Christmas  Alan Midwood      Peter Sterling
Maury Daly     Bill Morris       Bob Stimson
Bill Faulkner  Pat Mullins       Brian Toyota
Anna Freedom   Paul Murphy        Wayne Trappett
Lyn Gins      Alex McRobbie      Kimiko VanderWal
Ivan Hardman   Dan McVay          Bruce Whiteside
Ken Harris    Chizuko Nakandakari John Wild
Yoshiro Hasagawa Isamu Okada     Sue Willgoose
Appendix III

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