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CREATING THE POLITICAL WILL NECESSARY FOR

ACHIEVING MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT:

THE NEED FOR A PEACE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

by

KEITH DOUGLAS SUTER
BA Hons (Sussex) PhD (Sydney)

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

December 1986
I certify that the thesis entitled "Creating the Political Will Necessary for Achieving Multilateral Disarmament: The Need for a Peace-Industrial Complex" and submitted for the degree of PhD in Social Sciences is the result of my own research, except where otherwise acknowledged, and that this thesis (or any part of the same) has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

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Date 10 December 1986
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC  Australian Council of Churches, Sydney
CCJP  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Sydney
CW  Chemical Weapons/Chemical Warfare
EIU  The Economist Intelligence Unit, London
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Product
IDS  International Development Strategy
IISS  International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
MAD  Mutual Assured Destruction
MOD  Ministry of Defence, London
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
R&D  Research and Development
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
START  Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
UN  United Nations
UNA  United Nations Association
UNGA  UN General Assembly
UNSG  UN Secretary General
USUN  United States Delegation to the UN
WTO  Warsaw Treaty Organization

CURRENCY
All references to sums of money prefixed by $ refer to US dollars at the then current prices (unless otherwise specifically stated.)
SUMMARY

This dissertation deals with the failure to end the central arms race and provides some alternative proposals. Chapters 1 and 2 look at the failure of governmental disarmament negotiations and the ineffectiveness of the non-governmental peace movement. Chapter 3 outlines the author's recommended comprehensive strategy for ending the arms race: both the need for the US to make a dramatic unilateral initiative to break the deadlock (Super GRIT) and a detailed disarmament treaty. The main problem, as argued by the author, is more one of political will and so it is necessary to find a way of creating the political will to stimulate the US to make that dramatic unilateral initiative. He calls for the creation of a Peace-Industrial Complex. The intellectual arguments for the potential basis of such a complex are to be found in the research done by the United Nations; this is examined throughout Part II (Chapters 4-7). Unfortunately very little attention has been paid by governments to this work. Part III (Chapters 8 and 9) deals in more detail with the recommended Peace-Industrial Complex. Chapter 8 looks at its possible creation and method of work. Chapter 9 suggests that the proposed complex creates a transcending vision: from "nuclear winter" to "nuclear spring".
PART I

THE FAILURE TO END THE CENTRAL ARMS RACE
CHAPTER 1

THE FAILURE OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

The arms race between the USA and USSR is the greatest problem confronting the world. It not only represents the overture to a potential World War III but it also colours most international political, economic and social activities. Meanwhile, it is also one of the most expensive undertakings in human history. All these features have emphasized the need for disarmament. And yet there has been very little progress made since 1945.

This dissertation will make the following points. First, the post-1945 disarmament negotiations have been almost completely unsuccessful in resulting in the scrapping of existing weapon systems. At most (except for the prohibition of biological warfare (1)) all that can be claimed is that the negotiations have resulted in treaties which have slowed down what could have been an even faster running arms race between such alliances as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). As at December 1986, no disarmament breakthroughs can be expected. But there is no lack of specific ideas for multilateral disarmament or the mechanism which could commence such a disarmament process; examples of both are provided in Chapter 3. This dissertation argues, then, that what is missing political will. The peace movement is the obvious source of creating that political will.

Second, the peace movement, especially in Western developed nations, continues to grow. If late 1979/early 1980 is taken as the beginning of the current peace movement (which is examined in Chapter 2), then this movement must be regarded as one of the most
important mass political developments since 1945. But, with the exception of some policy changes in New Zealand, the peace movement can claim no major breakthrough for the past seven years of immense effort.

Something is going wrong. Much smaller campaigns on other issues (such as the environment) have been much more successful, often in less time. The third point of this dissertation is, then, that a completely new approach is required. The approach is concerned mainly with NATO and the WTO, which are the world's major military alliances.

There are various explanations for the current NATO-WTO arms race. (This dissertation is not concerned with some overarching theory of conflict but just with NATO-WTO.) The fourth point of this dissertation is that we should begin with President Eisenhower's "Military-Industrial Complex". To counter that complex, a new one is required: a "Peace-Industrial Complex".

Fifth, the basis for the proposed Peace-Industrial Complex exists in embryo - but has not attracted much support from the rest of the peace movement.

Sixth, many of the arguments for such a complex also exist in embryo, especially the work done by the United Nations on the economic consequences of both the arms race and disarmament. This, too, has been largely neglected by the peace movements (and governments).

Finally, the goal of disarmament should not be just the multilateral abolition of weapons. Even if all the existing weapons of NATO and WTO evaporated today, NATO and WTO would begin immediately to devise new weapon systems. The Military-Industrial Complex alone cannot be held responsible for NATO-WTO tensions. Consequently, its removal alone would not erase
completely those tensions. The task of the Peace-Industrial Complex (as will be shown in Part III) is to so convert the Military-Industrial complex - rather than just destroying it - that its conversion contributes to international peace and security and the easing of those NATO-WTO tensions.

A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

I have been an observer (and a very minor participant) in the NATO-WTO arms race since 1964. In that year I joined the staff of the UK Ministry of Defence (Army Department); I left in 1969 to become a university undergraduate. My last posting was in a Financial Branch (1967-9), where I was one of the MOD's youngest executive officers. I was, therefore, able to see the "military-industrial complex" from the inside. (Nothing, however, in this dissertation is derived directly from my MOD experience and so it does not contravene the Official Secrets Act, 1911). I left the MOD amicably and remain convinced that the UK (like all other nations) has a basic right to defend itself.

However, what began to worry me at the time and has concerned me still more of late is whether the UK's defence policy is the correct one. As this dissertation will show, I have grave doubts about the NATO (and WTO) reliance upon mutual assured destruction (MAD) and, even more so, about the growth of the military-industrial complex. Ironically, in recent years, I have been able to note that the then Chief of Defence Staff (Lord Mountbatten) and Chief Defence Scientist (Lord Zuckerman) have travelled a similar path (2).

While still serving in the MOD, I began to take an active role in the United Nations Association of the UK. This opened my mind to alternative ways of viewing the UK's foreign policy, including on defence (3). In
recent years I have increased my involvement in the peace movement, especially the Australian one. For example, I have been President of the New South Wales equivalent of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament: now People for Nuclear Disarmament) and the UNA of Australia.

However, I have developed doubts as to the overall direction of the peace movement, especially in Australia, the UK and USA. This dissertation is derived from my worry that the peace movement has lost its sense of direction. As I will argue in the next chapter, it is more an "arms control" movement, rather than a "disarmament" one, and hardly at all a "peace" one.

Some of the ideas presented here - most notably the Peace-Industrial Complex proposal - have been aired with the peace movement, such as the 1986 International Year of Peace "Peace Hearings" convened by the Australian Council of Churches and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. It is too soon to assess what impact the proposals are having; the ACC/CCJP Report is due out shortly. However, the dissertation reflects the main thinking that I am putting to my colleagues and will continue to do so over the coming years.

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 1

This chapter provides an overview of disarmament. It looks, in the next section, at the various routes to disarmament. The current (December 1986) disarmament deadlock is then examined. The chapter ends with an observation that the post-1945 negotiations have been little more than a form of theatre.
THE VARIOUS ROUTES TO DISARMAMENT

There are many routes to disarmament, especially if disarmament as a goal is joined by "peace".

For example, some people prefer to emphasize the importance of the individual at peace with himself/herself and would claim that all efforts at disarmament are bound to fail if there is not personal peace. This is found in most of the world’s major religions - although its acceptance has not prevented some religions from becoming involved in the current arms race debate (4). The late Arthur Koestler, still on the personal level, claimed that owing to a defect in the biological evolution of humankind, it is destined to destroy itself shortly (5). Some writers have claimed, in Christian terms, that the world is living in the End Times and that the world is due for destruction shortly as a prelude to the Second Coming (6) - disarmament will therefore be achieved in God’s own time and on His terms. Others have tried to set limits on the use of force, such as the development of the international humanitarian law of armed conflicts. In 1625, Hugo Grotius set out some rules of warfare in order that it might be conducted in a more humane manner (7) and this has been continued, for example, in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two 1977 Additional Protocols (8). Others have advocated grand schemes for new international organizations or some form of world government (9). Disarmament can also be imposed upon defeated nations, such as Germany following World Wars I and II. The list is almost endless.

These different routes to disarmament are based partly on differing interpretations of why disarmament is needed in the first place (such as why arms races and armed conflicts take place) and partly on differing interpretations of what would constitute "disarmament".
This dissertation has a narrow interpretation of the problem to be solved and how it is to be solved. It does not offer any grand theory for conflict resolution and it does not propose any grand plan for perpetual world peace.

This dissertation is concerned with four routes to disarmament: negotiations via international conferences; the argument that nations do not distrust each other because they are armed but they are armed because they distrust each other; the need for a political will and the importance of the peace movement in generating it; and the way in which weapon systems are so expensive that nations will need to find an alternative to the present arms race.

One approach, then, is to bring national governments together at some form of world disarmament conference. The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was convened on the initiative of the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, "...with the object of seeking the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments" (Russian note of 30 December 1898/11 January 1899). The Conference, at which 26 governments were represented, assembled on 18 May 1899 and adjourned on 29 July 1899. It failed to reach agreement on disarmament but its treaties contributed to the development of the international humanitarian law of armed conflicts. The Second Hague Peace Conference, at which 44 governments were represented, lasted from 15 June until 18 October 1907. This, too, added to the regulation of hostilities (10). Owing to the outbreak of World War I, the Third Session was never held. The main disarmament conference between the two World Wars was the 1932 World Disarmament Conference, which also failed to make progress (11). Part II of this dissertation looks at
the UN's work since 1945, especially since 1978. Ultimately, any multilateral disarmament agreement has to arise via an international conference. The problem, at least during most of the period between 1945 and 1978, is that the negotiations were conducted with minimal external stimulation. The main point of public unrest occurred in the late 1950s/early 1960s and helped to secure the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. This reassured the general public that progress was being made in the disarmament negotiations and so public participation in the peace movement soon waned. I believe that disarmament negotiations are too serious to be left to governments alone.

A second approach is to emphasize the importance of security. "All governments seek security for their country and people. Keeping out the invader and maintaining the civil peace are the first duties of those who hold political power" (12). This attitude was popularized by a Spanish diplomat who was stationed at the League of Nations, Salvador de Madariaga (13). For him, disarmament negotiations are armament negotiations, in which hostile nations jostle for political and military advantage under the guise of working for disarmament (14). In this context, disarmament must be viewed not as a discrete event but as an aspect of relations generally between nations. Weapons, therefore, are merely the tools of nations; they are not in themselves the cause of conflicts. Consequently, instead of working specifically for disarmament, it would be better to erase the underlying causes of tension between nations. Once such tensions have gone, so disarmament will occur almost automatically since nations will not need to arm themselves against each other. This approach has guided the UN's work (as distinct from the League's) since about 90 percent of UN personnel and programmes are deployed on economic and social co-operation. At first sight, this approach has
much to commend it. I agree that any successful disarmament initiative must include provisions for guaranteeing the continued security of each nation.

However, the approach also has severe limitations. One is that the world may not have enough time for the necessary creation of harmonious relations between nations. Over a decade ago, the late Leonard Beaton identified six main problems for the current balance of power: the creation of a "disarming nuclear strike", spread of nuclear weapons to other governments and even non-governmental entities (such as guerrilla groups), accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, development and spread of new techniques of mass destruction, political miscalculation among nuclear-weapon-nations, and the involvement of the major powers in a local conflict over which they lose control through their own actions or those of their allies (15). In retrospect, Beaton was correct about at least two developments. The "disarming nuclear strike" is more commonly called a "first strike" weapon and some of the fears which have underpinned the current peace movement's growth have been based on the change from a second strike to an alleged first strike nuclear capacity, especially by the USA. Nuclear weapons have spread, though less than I know Beaton initially feared. There are suspicions about Israel, South Africa and Pakistan, for example. The world has - so far - avoided the catastrophe about which Beaton warned.

Another defect in this approach is that the world is militarily very different from that of the 1920s and 1930s. This is particularly so in the context of the "military-industrial complex". This is examined later.

To sum up this section so far, disarmament negotiations have to be freely undertaken at international gatherings and each disarmament agreement has to include provisions
for alternative arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But the negotiations should not be delayed pending the creation of a more hospitable international political environment. On the contrary, success in these negotiations will help create such an environment and so assist international co-operation in other areas, not least economic and social programmes.

But success in the disarmament negotiations needs external stimulation. Governments alone, on their past record, lack the necessary drive and determination to bring about successful negotiations. A third approach to disarmament, therefore, is to rely on the peace movement to help generate the necessary political will among governments. This point is returned to in the next chapter since there is now a great expansion of the peace movement in Western nations.

A limitation of peace movements, however, is that although they can create the political will, they often lack specific programmes on what should be done. This may be seen in the current Australian context, for example, where the peace movement's "textbooks" call for the creation of an "independent, non-aligned Australian foreign policy" without explaining precisely what would constitute such a policy (16). In ending ANZUS completely would this mean a disarmed pacifist nation? Or armed neutrality (which implies conscription and possibly nuclear weapons)? Or a policy of training people in Gandhi-type passive resistance?

Finally, there is the role of military expenditure itself. The arms race may be, to use the vernacular, pricing itself out of existence. War will not disappear - but it may well be that the current high level of weapon systems (especially conventional ones) provides a novel route to disarmament. Mary Kaldor (borrowing Herbert York's phrase) has written about the "baroque
arsenal" in which contemporary weapons are only sophisticated versions of older more basic ones but whose sophistication is achieved at greater expense, resulting in greater complexity and greater vulnerability to human error and malfunction. The new systems have taken their toll:

The 1980s may turn out to be one of those rare moments in history when real change is possible. Modern military technology is currently in crisis. This is manifested in the "unreadiness" of the armed forces, the financial problems of the armours and, above all, the growing disaffection of soldiers and defence workers in many countries.

And this crisis is, of course, part of a wider breakdown in the international system to which armaments have contributed - the instability of the world economy; new rivalries within the West; dissidence and repression in the Soviet Union; mass starvation, revolution, and militarism in the Third World. There is a very real danger of war. But there is also a possibility that the new fluidity of international politics, and the tide of protest in favour of more humane values could lead to a change in direction: to a rejection of baroque arms and the calculus of terror that goes with it and to the recognition that peace between nations, like peace within nations, and human development in the fullest sense can ultimately be achieved only through a process of disarmament. (17)

All four routes to disarmament will be encountered during the rest of this dissertation. In essence, it will be argued, first, that the methods of bilateral and multilateral negotiations have been unproductive and there is a need for a Peace-Industrial Complex to force the negotiations onto a more productive level.

Second, disarmament is a negative aim (the removal of weapon systems) and there is a need for a complementary programme of positive non-military activities. The Biblical metaphor (Isaiah 2: 4; Micah 4:3) of turning "swords into ploughshares" is more significant than is commonly recognized. Disarmament negotiations conducted in a vacuum are bound to be unsuccessful. The overall aim must be both the removal of weapons and the
simultaneous development of alternative security systems and economic and social programmes. In other words, the Old Testament prophets did not just say that the swords should be thrown away - they had to be turned into something useful. Towards the end of Part II of this dissertation, there is attention to a new relationship (which, unfortunately, has not captured the public imagination as much as it should have done): disarmament-development-security.

Third, the peace movement is an amazing new factor in Western politics. As someone who has been involved in the peace movement for two decades, I find the new movement's growth and breadth of public support as welcome as they are unexpected. The reasons for this development are beyond this dissertation's scope. But, as will be shown, it hardly existed in 1978. It has come a long way in eight years. This peace movement does not in itself contain the single key to ending the arms race - but it will play a significant role in helping to end it - providing it transforms itself into part of the Peace-Industrial Complex.

Finally, military expenditure has, in this dissertation, a dual role in the search for disarmament. On the one hand, it will be argued (in Part II) that military expenditure is too high and that it is creating new inducements for finding alternatives to the present arms race. On the other hand, it will be argued (in Part III) that a satisfactory disarmament programme will have to give attention to the alternative uses of military expenditure. Disarmament should not be viewed merely as a process in which the goal is only the abolition of weapons (though that is a laudable aim) but as an opportunity to bring about major economic and social changes.
THE DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

The history of the campaign to restrain the global arms race and divert military expenditures to peaceful purposes is a continuing chronicle of failure, delusion and defeat. Nowhere is the poverty of popular politics more apparent than in the movement to promote disarmament. Since the end of World War II, millions have marched, lobbied and harangued world leaders to reduce their arsenals and elevate their social concerns. Conferences have been convened, treaties negotiated and commissions formed; the paperwork of arms control must by now match the machinery of war, megaton for megaton. And yet, every effort seems to be in vain. The Test Ban Treaty hardly hindered the development, production and proliferation of nuclear bombs. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a toothless tiger. The SALT agreements were designed to rationalize the arms race, not cancel it — and now even their dubious dreams seem to have ended. As the weapons stockpiles grow, the welfare payments shrink, and the doomsday clock ticks ever closer to a midnight alarm. (18)

The prospects for disarmament are not good. Indeed, in a slightly different context from that envisaged by William Barclay, the arms race crisis is a suitable "playground of eccentrics who produce elaborate celestial timetables to toll when Jesus will come again" (19). There is a growth industry in books using rumours of World War III as evidence of impending Armageddon (20). Meanwhile, according to the advertising information for a new book on the arms race "two out of three people in Britain and the United States now expect a nuclear war in their lifetime" (21).

If the state of disarmament negotiations is regarded as the best indicator of whether or not World War III can be avoided, then it has to be admitted that the general public may intuitively have an acute assessment of the extent of the danger. Although there are various disarmament/arms control negotiations currently under way, none is making any progress.
As at December 1986, the negotiations were as follows. The UN Disarmament Committee has been pursuing the outcome of the 1982 Special Session, namely the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament (CPD). No progress was made. The Committee also was looking at a treaty to stop the militarization of Outer Space (22). No progress was made. The third item concerned "radiological weapons" - a Soviet agenda item about which I have never been very clear. The main radiological weapons are nuclear weapons themselves; the use of civilian nuclear power installations as military targets is already dealt with separately (1977 Additional Protocol I, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions). I doubt if anything will come of this agenda item and I cannot see why the western group of nations does not try to have it removed from the agenda. The fourth agenda item concerns chemical weapons. With breakthroughs in new "binary" weapons now occurring, there is a risk of a fresh chemical weapons race. (One of the major problems in CW deployment is the risk of leakage in one's own depot; a "binary" CW contains two substances, stored separately, which are only toxic when brought together in actual use; since each is benign individually this hinders verification techniques). It is possible, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has reported, that a draft CW treaty might be concluded in the next year or so (23). This is a glimmer of hope on CW but this also means that the overall CPD approach is being watered down in favour of a return to the collateral measures approach which made so little progress between the late 1950s and 1978.

The US and USSR, meanwhile, have continued their own private negotiations - again with no prospect of success. Intercontinental weapons have been dealt with by START: Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (SALT's replacement). The European theatre nuclear weapons had been dealt with separately in the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) talks. A third problem was President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative. In other words, SDI actually increased the agenda of problems for the two super powers. This was demonstrated at the Reykjavik Summit Conference in October 1986.

The mass media beforehand were predicting an uneventful summit conference. But the Soviet leader made a dramatic proposal for deep cuts in the nuclear forces. Time magazine summarized "the deal that might have been":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Arsenals</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Iceland Deal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Deployment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Warheads Launchers</td>
<td>2,108 1,608 ICBMs</td>
<td>6,420 1,398 ICBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>2,032 640 SLBMs</td>
<td>3,104 928 SLBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subs</td>
<td>5,694 263 SSBNs</td>
<td>760 150 SSBNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3,554 SSBNs</td>
<td>3,554 960 strategic bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 81-8s</td>
<td>15 81-8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within five years, reduce strategic warheads to 6,000 total* and the number of launchers to 1,600, with Soviets agreeing to &quot;significant&quot; cuts in ICBMs. Within ten years, U.S. wanted elimination of all ballistic missiles but not bomber fleets or cruise missiles. Soviets proposed eliminating all nuclear weapons.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Iceland Deal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Deployment:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads Launchers</td>
<td>108 warheads on Pershing II</td>
<td>1,200 warheads on Pershing II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>160 warheads on cruise</td>
<td>160 warheads on cruise</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Both sides agreed to destroy all of their INF missiles in Europe. The Soviets would be allowed to keep 100 warheads in Asia. The Americans would be permitted to keep 100 medium-range warheads inside the U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Defensive Systems</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Soviet position:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty for ten years but reservation of right to research, develop and test SDI, &quot;which is permitted&quot; by the pact.</td>
<td>Adherence to ABM treaty for ten years, but insistence that SDI space elements be confined to lab research.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Iceland deal" collapsed because of the American insistence on maintaining SDI. There are no plans for a 1987 summit.
I have some sympathy for the USSR. It made great concessions at the Icelandic conference, such as permitting the equation of one bomber as a missile. It has been making various concessions for over a year, such as its unilateral ban on nuclear-weapon testing (which has not been reciprocated by the USA). Tom Wicker, in March 1986, argued that the USSR is repackaging American proposals — but the USA is now rejecting them: restrictions on strategic defence, a comprehensive test ban, a ban on anti-satellite weapons, "deep cuts" to existing nuclear systems and the "zero option" (25).

In yet another development, NATO and WTO had been negotiating Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The negotiations commenced in October 1973 and are designed to reduce conventional force levels in Europe (26). It would be futile to try to summarize all the steps which have evolved since 1973. In a way, they have not even left the first base since there is still some disagreement over the WTO's force levels, with the WTO's estimates being considered by NATO as too small. In order to devise a formula for reducing the force levels, there has to be agreement on what they are to start with. Meanwhile, the components of the forces are constantly changing as troops leave temporarily (such as British troops sent to Northern Ireland) and new equipment is introduced. Meanwhile, since START/INF are dealing with nuclear weapons in Europe, the negotiations are hindered until there are START/INF agreements. I am in favour of all measures to reduce tension in Europe, but am very sceptical of the MBFR negotiations ever resulting in any major disarmament agreement. The negotiations are trying to achieve the impossible. They are trying to arrive at a formula for reducing quantities which are impossible to compare. Since I outline below a new approach for disarmament, it is worth looking at some of the reasons for this deadlock.
The two major states of the WTO and NATO are impossible to compare for MBFR purposes. The Soviet Union is geographically a part of Europe; it has easy access to supply depots and reinforcements. The United States is 3,000 miles away; it has 300,000 troops in West Europe, not all of them stationed in Central Europe (which is the only area covered by MBFR); its economy is stronger than the Soviet Union's and could withstand a protracted conventional war, but there would be delays in transferring troops to the European theatre in the event of a conflict. More generally, what precisely are the numbers in each side's forces? Just because the WTO has conscription, it does not mean that each of its divisions actually contains the appropriate number of men. Some West European states no longer have conscription and the United States has stopped it; these states certainly do have a shortfall in their recruitment.

Soldiers are themselves not easily compared. It can be assumed safely that WTO troops would much rather fight Italian and Dutch troops, for example, than British, German and American ones. What about the French forces - one of the major defence forces in the world? France is boycotting NATO, but could hardly boycott a WTO invasion of Central Europe. Meanwhile, some of the major defence forces in Europe are those of the neutral states - which safeguard their neutrality by having such good forces - and an infringement of their territories would incur their activation. How are these to be covered by an MBFR agreement? There is also the irony that each military alliance claims to be "defensive", while accusing the other side of being "offensive". In negotiations without a common language, how is an agreement possible? When an agreement is reached, how would it be policed? Both sides are security-conscious and would be worried about investigations on the spot by the other side. Since whichever states could reduce
their forces would benefit economically, there would be negotiations within each alliance, once agreement was reached, to see which states would be allowed to reduce their forces. These negotiations would also take time since all states are under domestic pressure to cut defence expenditure.

Overhanging these details, there are the larger questions present in trying to evaluate comparative strength. No NATO/WTO state (except the UK) has had to fight a major conventional war since 1954. There is no clear evidence of how good each is at this now old-fashioned form of fighting. Meanwhile, there is the problem of defining "strength". The world's most powerful military machine, supported by the world's most powerful economy, spent almost 20 years trying to win a war against the Vietnamese and still lost. "Strength" on paper does not necessarily mean strength in combat. Similarly, East Europe is in general less efficient than the West. This refers not just to military matters, but to all walks of life. In other words, notwithstanding the WTO's armed forces, is the WTO efficient enough to sustain an invasion of the West? It is clear from these few issues that the MBFR negotiations are in a quagmire from which no satisfactory, wide-ranging disarmament, agreement can be expected.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, was equally sceptical. In a footnote in his memoirs, he recalls:

Actually, I had relatively little confidence that we would make any progress in MBFR and CTB, and throughout the Carter years I was not very interested in these subjects. I saw them as nonstarters, but out of deference to the President's zeal for them, I went through the motions of holding meetings, discussing options, and developing negotiating positions. My view was that the MBFR was too complicated a process, with too many participants, to yield any tangible results; while I saw CTB as a likely embarrassment
to any effort on our part to obtain SALT ratification. I feared that our legislative circuits would become overloaded if we tried to obtain both SALT and CTB, but I respected the President's deep moral concern over nuclear weapons and I did what I could to move the bureaucratic machinery toward meaningful proposals - yet ones which would not jeopardize our ability to continue the minimum number of tests necessary for our weapons programme. (27)

There has, however, been agreement on some European "confidence-building measures". The Stockholm agreement concluded on 21 September 1986, deals with a system of notification of conventional force deployments in the European theatre and the monitoring of conventional military exercises. This will reduce the risk of war in Europe by accident or miscalculation. It is the first major arms control agreement (other than the South Pacific nuclear-weapon treaty) since the SALT signing in June 1979. As from 1 January 1987, NATO and WTO will give each other as well as other conference participants (12 neutral and non-aligned states) detailed advance information about all land exercises and troop concentrations involving 13,000 or more soldiers or 300 tanks. If more than 17,000 troops are involved, they must invite all other signatory nations to send observers. But sea and air exercises are excluded (28).

It is perhaps an indication of just how unproductive are the current negotiations that this agreement warrants a mention at all. If there were major breakthroughs occurring in disarmament, then the Stockholm agreement would hardly rate a mention. It is all the more ironical that the negotiating body is called the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

To conclude this survey, the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons (Geneva: September 1986) "was a surprising success" (29). The negotiations led to a set of measures on such matters as: an exchange of
information on high-risk biological research laboratories; exchange of information on unusual outbreaks of disease; greater openness in publication of the results of biological research; and an increase in the contacts between scientists involved in biological research. All of these developments are, of course, to be welcomed. But, given the potential destructiveness of biological warfare, they are also to be expected: BW once unleashed, is so potentially destructive to all parties in a war that the international community has banned a form of warfare that has no military value.

As at early December 1986, it seemed that the International Year of Peace was to end on another dismal note, with the USA's decision to breach its SALT II obligations by deploying its 131st B-52 bomber carrying cruise missiles, thereby exceeding the 1,320 limit set for land- and sea-Launched multiple warhead missiles and cruise-carrying bombing (30). While in itself a small step, it represents yet another move by the USA away from the disarmament process.

The USSR will enter 1987 with a distinct propaganda advantage. It can point to its unilateral ban on nuclear weapon testing, the Icelandic offer and the USA SALT II breach as justification for, among other things, resuming testing and expanding its own forces beyond the SALT II levels. It has tried to set an example for the USA and has been ignored; it could now go back to business as usual.

THE PRESENT DANGER

The current US/USSR arms race cannot continue indefinitely. Something, somewhere, somehow will go wrong. The flood of recent books, mirroring the peace movement's growth and publishers' hopes (usually satisfied) for a new market all attest to the wide range
of potential causes of World War III. It could come via an accidental breakdown in the nuclear defence system (31) or from the deliberate launching of a surprise attack by intercontinental missiles (32) or cruise missiles (33) or via the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations or terrorist groups (34) or via a war in space (35). Such a war could result, after a "limited" conflict, in a victory for NATO (36) or the destruction of life on earth as we know it (37).

If we know the risk, what is being done to prevent World War III? A Swedish negotiator once called the disarmament negotiations a "game" (38). I shall argue that the negotiations are a form of "theatre". Until they show more promise, they ought to be ignored by the peace movement.

The way to multilateral disarmament is not via the present disarmament negotiations. This is a fact of international politics which the peace movement should recognize.

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AS THEATRE

The 40 years of disarmament negotiations since 1945 should be viewed as a form of theatre. I am not wishing to suggest that all the negotiations have acted in a frivolous way and I have argued elsewhere that at least one person, John McCloy, was serious in his work (39) and during the period in 1972 when I had contact with Lord Chalfont after his period as Minister of State in the Wilson Government (1964-70), I learned of the seriousness with which he took his ministerial responsibilities in the Geneva negotiations (40).

Nonetheless, the bilateral and multilateral negotiations are best viewed as a form of theatre. First, there are different types of production, ranging from drama (such
as the potential risk of the negotiations leading inadvertently to World War III) or comedy (such as the American and Soviet twists and turns over SALT to START to stop).

Second, there are different "stages" and "playhouses". For most of the time, the negotiations have been "off Broadway" or "out of London's West End", playing to empty houses and attracting little publicity and few rave reviews from the critics (the peace movement). The 1982 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, by contrast, was certainly a "Broadway" or "London West End" production. (It still failed to get rave reviews from the critics, however.) The 1985 and 1986 Summit Conferences were even more "Broadway" productions (with only a slight improvement in the critics' reviews).

Third, the negotiations have been conducted by actors who, as in the theatrical profession, have been present for a "season" and then moved on to other roles. Mrs Myrdal and Mrs Thorsson lingered longer than most but they eventually moved on.

Fourth, as in the theatre, nothing really happens on stage. Gestures are made, lines are spoken, scenery is changed. But at the end of the performance nothing tangible has occurred. This element of acting was noted by William F Buckley during his 1973 period on the US delegation to the UN General Assembly (USUN):

Gromyko's principal ploy was a call for a 10 percent reduction in the amount of money spent by the great powers on armament, the money thus saved to be dispatched to the aid of the Less Developed Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It was hoary (the same thing had been proposed in 1958), non-serious (it is the incremental dollar that provides military security), and schematically cynical (how to define the military budget in China and Russia?). USUN spent weeks manoeuvring to show it up for what it was, which was done; and it was more or less tabled. It would have been fun,
and very nice theatre, if John Scali, accepting the Soviet argument that we spend $80 billion on arms while the Soviets spend only $40 billion, could have got up that afternoon and announced that Congress, acting faster than ever in its history, had segregated $8 billion and put them in escrow with a binding agreement to make them available for such uses as Gromyko had described, upon recoupment from the Soviet Union of $4 billion of hard currency. (41)

Fifth, theatre is a form of diversion. It can help lift people out of their present problems and entertain them or make them feel glad that they are not as disadvantaged as the persons portrayed or simply get their minds off whatever is currently troubling them. The disarmament negotiations 1945-66, have certainly reassured the general public that something was being done to help end the arms race. They have diverted the peace movement's attention away from the larger issues of the arms race; they have often provided the peace movement's own agenda (hence my claim in the next chapter that the peace movement is basically an arms control movement and not a disarmament one). In 1972, Elizabeth Young - in an assessment which, at the time I thought was too extreme but now I accept as valid - claimed: "It would not be unfair to say that during the sixties the super powers have colluded in presenting to the world a series of insignificant treaties at very considerable expense of international time and trouble and breath" (42).

Finally, there is the question of who or what writes the script and does the production? This will be mentioned throughout the dissertation: the military-industrial complex (strictly: the military-industrial-scientific technological-trades union-mass media complex). Gene La Rocque (a retired US Admiral and now head of the Washington DC-based Centre for Defence Information) has said:
We have made big business in the US out of preparing for war in peacetime, and that is new in the American experience. Profits are driving the arms build-up in the US and in my view, the Soviet Union is simply responding to a large extent to the build-up of our forces. That is certainly true in the strategic nuclear area where we have been leading the Soviets for 3 to 5 years in the development of every new strategic weapon. When I first came into the Navy in 1940, we in the Navy made all our own ships, or almost all of them, we made many of our planes, we made all of our guns and ammunition; all of our paint and rope - everything was made in the Navy by Navy employees for no profit. After WW2, we got out of the business of making things in the Navy and they are all made now out in private industry for profit. So when the Navy goes to Congress to get money to build new weapons, we have to wait in line behind General Dynamics, General Electric, Westinghouse and Motorola, Singer Sewing Machines - they are all there in line, to get money from the Congress to build weapons, and these same industries take out full-page ads to scare the pants off the American public about the Russian threat, in order to get the taxpayer to spend more money to get more profit for these industries. That is the military industrial complex that Mr Eisenhower told us to beware of, and it has a very strong effect in our country now, because the military weapons are being made in industries all over our country and, with our political system, members of the House of Representatives representing their district, each of these congressmen are fighting to get more and more contracts for their district to provide jobs for their people, so that the congressmen can get re-elected. Now, I don't see any villains in this, it is just the nature of our political system in the US - we're all hung up in the US on the profit system, free enterprise, capitalism - but in my view we should take the profit out of making weapons in peacetime, I don't think General Electric, for example, or any other big company, should make a profit out of building weapons which are built and manned to defend General Electric's continued operation. (43)

Two recommendations flow from this assessment. The first is that the peace movement should stop wasting its limited energies on the current bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. Some monitoring of them should continue (as is carried out by The Disarmament Times, published by the New York disarmament
non-governmental organizations). But they should not, in themselves, provide the agenda for the peace movement's activities. The peace movement should set its own agenda. (It should also publicize why it regards the current negotiations as futile.)

Second, the peace movement should concentrate on creating its own "script-writer/producer": a peace-industrial complex. The creation of such a complex is not an end in itself but is only a means to an end: reversing the arms race and converting military facilities to civilian use. This recommendation is returned to in the third chapter.

To conclude, this chapter has surveyed recent developments in the disarmament field and found little about which to be optimistic. A new start is required. To create that fresh initiative (to be outlined in the third chapter) it is first necessary to look at how the necessary political will for it could be created: the peace movement.
NOTES


(3) For example, I was one of the co-authors of: Europe and the Two Alliances, London: UNA, 1969.


(13) Salvador de Madariaga *Disarmament* New York: Coward-McCann, 1929.


(15) Supra note (12), pp 29-72.


(20) See: Keith D Suter "Media, the Churches and Peace" *Media Information Australia* (Sydney) November 1986, pp 55-59.

(22) This prospect is examined in Bhupendra Jasani: 
(Editor) Outer Space: A New Dimension of the Arms 

(23) "Conference on Disarmament Concludes 1986 Session" 
United Nations Press Release WS/1300 5 September 

(24) "When to Hold "Em - and to Fold "Em" Time 27 
October 1986.

(25) "Yes" for an Answer" The New York Times 21 March 
1986.

(26) See: Keith D Suter "NATO and Detente in Europe" 
Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi) February 1977, 
pp 52-59.

(27) Zbigniew Brzezinski Power and Principle London: 

(28) Further details contained in "Stockholm Disarmament 
Conference" Disarmament Newsletter (Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs) October 1986, pp 
2-5.

(29) Nicholas A Sims "Biological and Toxin Weapons: the 
1986 Outcome" Bulletin of the Council for Arms 

(30) "US SALT II Breach Draws Fire" The Times (London) 
29 November 1986.

(31) Peter Pringle and William Arkin SIP: Nuclear War 

(32) Robert C Aldridge First Strike! The Pentagon's 


(38) Supra note (14).


(43) "Interview with Admiral Gene La Rocque" *Peace Studies* (Melbourne) November 1985, pp 33-34.
CHAPTER 2

THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 2

Peace movements are not new (1). Nor have they had a good record of successes. The previous chapter noted the immense effort which had gone into multilateral disarmament negotiations since 1945 (partly through peace movements' pressure) and yet there has been little to show for all this work.

However, with all the prevailing pessimism about the current arms race, it is worth bearing in mind that the peace movement has had some success in restraining the rate at which it has been travelling. Sweden, for example, has no nuclear weapons - partly because of the peace movement's work. The late Alva Myrdal, a critic of the US/USSR negotiations, claimed that during the 10-year period from 1955, the Swedish peace movement campaigned successfully to stop Sweden from acquiring its own nuclear weapons system (2).

This chapter will make three points. First, the current peace movement (whose roots go back to 1979/80) is potentially a much stronger movement than its predecessors during this century. Second, the current peace movement is making headway in alerting the general public to the dangers of the US/USSR arms race. Third, however, the peace movement is to be characterized more by its energy than by its sense of vision and direction; it is better at asking questions than suggesting answers.
THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT

The current peace movement should more accurately be considered as the "new" peace movement, rather than simply a revival of the old one of the 1950s. Its growth has stunned everyone — not least persons, such as myself (3), who were active in the "old" one for many years.

The previous peace movement peaked in the early 1960s. Various explanations may be advanced for its decay. The most likely explanations were the completion of the 1963 Partial Test Ban (which encouraged people to believe that this was a forerunner of a flood of arms control measures) and the peace movement's mutation into other conflict issues, such as the Vietnam conflict (especially for the US and Australian movements) and the Nigeria/Biafra conflict (especially for the UK movement). Also, there were other "crises" edging up the international political agenda, such as racism, sexism, environmental catastrophe, wars of national liberation, unemployment, aid to Third World nations, refugees and the population explosion. Meanwhile, the atomic bomb was comprehensible and Hiroshima was still fresh enough in the public memory to shock people — the Hiroshima bomb is now too "small" to be included in the START negotiations. People could understand the issues of radioactive fallout and the threat to humans (from the atmosphere to rain to grass to cows to milk to humans) — whereas the arms race has since become more complex; even the acronyms are hard to remember: SALT, START, ABM, MIRV, MARV, ASAT, NATO, WTO, SATO, CEP, MBFR, CSCE, CENTO, SEATO, CBW, UNGA SSD, CCD, LOW, DEW, SIPRI, ENMOD, CPD, IAEA, ICBM, NPT, CND, PTBT, WDO, GDC, SANE and MAD.

A major difference between the "Ban the Bomb" era and today's peace movement is derived from the structure and
composition of the two movements. The earlier movement reflected the society out of which it emerged. It was centralized, bureaucratic, and easily characterized as "left-wing".

The current peace movement, while it contains some organizations and members from that earlier era, is essentially a new movement. Its strength comes partly from its varied membership - it cannot be so easily dismissed as "left-wing", young, naive etc. Louis Harris described the new US peace movement as "an incredible phenomenon". Harris has been conducting US attitude surveys ("opinion polls") for over 30 years. He says he can recall nothing quite like the "urgent hunger for peace" disclosed by his 1982 surveys.

"There is no way", says Harris, "to paint the people who are affected by this issue into a simple mould and say they check out on this or that stereotype. They don't. This cuts right across the spectrum of social and political divisions in this country. It's an idea that will not go away. It's going to be with us until the final weapons are obliterated." (4)

The new membership with which this chapter is concerned consists of both key individuals and organizations which, in the earlier era, were not involved with the "Ban the Bomb" movement. This section is concerned with those elements of the "Establishment" who are now troubled by the arms race. These people cannot be dismissed as "left-wingers" or "communist dupes". While it is also important to have the general public out in the streets, it is equally important to have members of the Establishment involved who can then neutralize claims about the Western peace movement being run from Moscow.
Indeed, the membership which is of particular interest in this chapter's context consists of people who have - like President Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex" appreciation - changed sides, so to speak, following their retirement. Where you stand depends on where you sit. Senior military and civilian personnel while in office tend to look at the world through the prism of the need to maintain the arms race. Freed from the daily pressures of office they can, upon retirement, look with a different perspective upon their former activities.

Generals for Peace, as the name suggests, is an organization with an exclusive membership. It was formed in mid-1982 by retired NATO generals. In their basic booklet, they argue that the new missiles will upset the overall balance of weapons which exists already between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; that the existing capacity for overkill by the USA and the USSR ensures that any deployment of new weapons will make no contribution to either's security or deterrence; that the new NATO weapons will open a new chapter in the arms race which could result in a retaliatory move by the USSR to deploy comparable weapons within range of USA's heartland; and insist that a freeze on production and deployment, and an agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons, are the two essential pre-requisites of a mutual disarmament process, and they set out a formula for how such a process could be negotiated (5). In May 1984, the organization helped host a meeting of retired NATO/WTO generals - the first ever such meeting of its type. The meeting's Final Statement endorsed the following policies: a treaty on non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the countries of NATO and WTO; commitment of all nuclear states to non-first use of nuclear weapons; agreement on a freeze of all development, testing, production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, agreement on
removal from Europe of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons in the world; the freezing of military budgets and decreasing them step by step; more careful consideration given to major proposals submitted by governments on arms control and disarmament; and regular consultations between European states at all possible levels concerning the problems of European security as a contribution to the implementation of the above measures. (6)

Another critic of the current arms race is Admiral Robert Falls:

The West could afford to reduce its nuclear arsenal unilaterally without weakening its deterrence, the chairman of NATO's military committee, Canadian Admiral Robert Falls, suggested this week.

"If arms control talks don't work", he said in Brussels, "then it might become necessary to act unilaterally to reduce - especially battlefield nuclear weapons - because we have perhaps more than we need."

Admiral Fall's statement is the most forthright endorsement of the partial unilateralist position yet offered by a senior NATO official. The wording is still extremely cautious. He does not advocate doing away with nuclear weapons or the strategy of nuclear deterrence. But he does suggest that many of them are superfluous, or in the case of short-range battlefield weapons, perhaps politically unusable, and that in this case it might be better to get rid of them unilaterally than to wait indefinitely for a reciprocal agreement with the Soviet Union. (7)

An even more surprising recruit to the arms race debate is former US Defence Secretary Robert S McNamara. In December 1983, Newsweek magazine published a lengthy article by McNamara, in which he listed 18 steps which could be taken to reduce the chances of nuclear war. Many of these could be taken immediately, said McNamara, and many of them could be taken unilaterally by the US. He based his arguments on two fundamental principles: firstly, that each side should maintain a stable
deterrent powerful enough to discourage anyone else from using nuclear weapons, and that neither side should move to destabilize the other's deterrent or to provide an incentive for a pre-emptive strike; secondly, that all negotiations, strategies, war plans, weapons development etc., should be based on the recognition that nuclear weapons have no military value whatsoever other than to deter one's opponent from their use. Among McNamara's suggested steps are the following: Negotiate a reduction in the ratio of nuclear warheads to launchers, ultimately moving to single-warhead missiles, which would significantly reduce the temptation to launch a pre-emptive strike; Renounce the strategy of launch-on-warning, with its attendant danger of response to an accident, a human or mechanical failure or a misunderstanding; Announce that the US would not retaliate against a nuclear strike before ascertaining the source and size of the attack and the intentions of the attacker; Unilaterally halt development of destabilizing weapons systems and those which have no deterrent value, for example, the MX (destabilizing because it has a very high kill capability and provides an incentive for pre-emptive strike); the Pershing II missile (destabilizing because the Soviets believe they could be used for a "decapitation" strike); and the neutron bomb (which has no deterrent value). (8)

Senator Daniel Moynihan in an essay (9) has joined the critics of the MX missile project and said that with the US going ahead with it the US is "making perhaps the most fatal mistake in our history". Moynihan does not produce any new arguments against the project. Instead, the essay's significance is derived from the person providing the critique: Moynihan is consistently anti-Soviet and no ally usually of the peace movement. His assessment is, therefore, all the more startling.
To sum up so far, then, the new peace movement has received inspiration and guidance from a wide array of VIPs, most of whom as recently as (say) 1978 would have been most surprised if they had been told that within a few years they would have found themselves in their new role. Among other such VIPs are Field Marshall Carver (10) and Lord Zuckerman (11), McGeorge Bundy (12), "father of the US nuclear navy fleet" the late Admiral Hyman Rickover (13), and former US Ambassador to Moscow George F Kennan (14).

Leaving the secular world of military personnel and politicians, the final examples come from religion:

The US bishops' entry into this debate is something new. It has mostly been left to papal pronouncements and the documents of Vatican II to set the tone and direction for moral reflection on the subject of peace and war. To the American Catholic faithful, the discussion generated by the bishops' stance constitutes a groundbreaking endeavour. Within a decade, the Catholic leadership has moved from a position which criticized the Vietnam War perhaps too reluctantly to one which remarks (in the first draft), "Christians cannot long live by the sign of the mushroom cloud." (15)

The eventual statement (16) created considerable controversy. It is possible to be critical of some of its ideas on disarmament (17), but it is a remarkable document not so much because of what it says but who said it.

Finally, there is the transformation which Rev Dr Billy Graham has undergone. In 1965, he said:

We have to have armies! We have to have military power! We have to have police forces, whether it's police in a great city or police in an international scale to keep those madmen from taking over the world and robbing the world of its liberties.
But in 1979 he said:

The people of the United States want peace. The people of China want peace. The people of the Soviet Union want peace. Why can't we have peace! We don't realize the proliferation of these weapons and the $400,000,000,000 that we're spending on arms in the world are insanity, madness! (18)

In 1982, he went to the USSR for the first time - and he preached on the need to end the arms race (19).

THE PEACE MOVEMENT GAINS GROUND

While we are still perhaps too close to the creation of the new peace movement to provide an accurate chronology of it, I would put December 1979 as its beginning. In that month NATO decided on the deployment of cruise missiles, which brought out into the open the hardly publicized debate on a possible change in nuclear policy from reliance upon second-strike mutual assured deterrence to a first-strike surprise attack, based on the concept of a "winnable, limited nuclear war". This stimulated a wider consideration of recent developments in nuclear technology, such as "launch on warning". In a separate development at the end of December 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan and provoked speculation about an eventual invasion of the Persian Gulf area. President Carter requested Congress to stop its consideration of consenting to SALT II (signed six months earlier). Cold War II was underway.

Since the new peace movement is only seven years old, it is far too soon to try to assess its total potential impact on ending the arms race. Less than two years (October 1981) after its creation, Nicholas Humphrey noted:

Opinion polls carried out in the past year show that, despite all the talk about the effectiveness of a deterrent strategy, nearly half the adult population expects nuclear war within its lifetime.
Despite all the talk about civil defence, fewer than one in ten believe that they and their families would not be killed. Never in recent times, not since the plagues and famines of the Middle Ages, can so many people of this country have had such a pessimistic vision of the future.

But does this pessimism stir them into action? When questioned on behalf of the magazine *New Society*, 70 percent of the public said they were worried about nuclear weapons - but nine out of ten of this 70 percent stated either that nothing could be done or else that they were unwilling to do anything. And even for the one in ten who said they might do something, the actions mentioned would seem to be totally incommensurate with the perceived dangers: they would go on a march, they would write a letter to the newspapers. (20)

Less than two years later, John Kenneth Galbraith felt more optimistic:

Well, I see the military power with a concern that it deserves. But I'm somewhat less pessimistic than I was a couple of years ago, because we are having a great reaction in the United States against the military power. The present administration came in with a very strong commitment to the military build-up, a very strong commitment, a very questionable commitment, to arms control - even SALT II, which was a far from powerful instrument, was viewed as having, and I quote, "grave defects".

Now we have had a strong change in the popular view. SALT II, if it were presented to the Senate, of course, would pass very strongly. And we're having a strong reaction against military expenditure. As we talk, the House of Representatives has defeated a major missile system - the MX - for the first time. (21)

The peace movement has, at the very least, succeeded in getting the arms race on the front pages of newspapers and television lead stories. In contemporary language, the nuclear missile "is an equal opportunity destroyer"; it will spare no-one. People no longer feel so comfortable and secure.
Because military expenditure has been devoted to some of the world's most sophisticated technology, the general public has assumed that it is operated and controlled by equally sophisticated people. Consequently, the general public was satisfied to leave military matters to the military and pay more attention to other subjects. Out of the public eye, the military over-reached itself. It became too ambitious and counted too much on the public's complacency. As this dissertation has shown, even former military personnel (and conservative politicians, like Moynihan) have now become worried about where the arms race is heading. The military, then, has helped to create its own opposition. Thus, for example, the image of the Royal Navy has been tarnished in the post-Falklands Conflict debate by the recent information on how the French-made Argentinian Exocet missiles were so successful. The Royal Navy shipboard computers had, in fact, detected their coming missiles but not triggered the defence measures (such as releasing radar decoy material) because the original computer programmes had never envisaged a situation in which Royal Navy ships would be attacked by "allied" missiles - so the Exocets were deemed to be "friendly" and permitted to hit the target (22). This is hardly a good omen for when NATO and WTO computers move into "launch on warning" systems.

The peace movement is gaining ground. Some hope was provided by former SIPRI Director Frank Barnaby in a book review. He explained his attitude to the arms race (which is in line with the argument contained in this dissertation):

It seems to me that the mess we are in, because of the uncontrolled arms race, can be explained simply by the enormous political lobbying power of those groups within the US and the USSR which continuously press for higher military budgets and for the use of all possible technologies for military purposes. The four main groups involved are: the military (any group which disposes of
$550,000 million a year is bound to have immense political power); the defence industry (which grosses about $130,000 million a year to make it the second biggest world business after oil); the academics (about 40 percent of the world's scientists in research are funded totally out of military budgets); and the bureaucrats (about 27 million civilians work for the military and defence establishments).

Political leaders know that if they resist the demands of the military-industrial-academic-bureaucratic complex they will be thrown out of office or not re-elected. Since political leaders, by their very nature, want more than anything to remain in power, they give in. If this is the situation, public opinion could transform the situation, if it were strong enough to overcome the pressure of "the complex" and convince politicians that in fact they will not be re-elected unless they reverse the arms race and stop the drift to nuclear war.

Later on in the article, he examined the success of the anti-uranium movement as recalled in The Nuclear Barons (23) and the inspiration that movement provided for the new peace movement:

_The Nuclear Barons_ shows how the public woke up to the possible dangers of nuclear energy — the potential hazards of radioactive waste disposal, the consequent exposure to low levels of radiation, the dangers of nuclear-weapon proliferation, the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the sabotage of nuclear transports and so on. Eventually, pressure of public opinion helped to convince many of the decision-makers that the use of nuclear power should be kept to a minimum. Let us hope that it will prove equal to the even more urgent task of persuading politicians to stop the arms race. (24)

Further hope comes from a US journalist writing on the 25th anniversary of the USSR's Sputnik (4 October 1957), which put the USSR ahead in the space race and which led to the "missile gap" allegedly in the USSR's favour. The Eisenhower Administration was obliged (by Democratic and media pressure) to examine the "gap" and there was then a widespread belief that the US had to work much harder to overtake the USSR. The Democrats and mass media were wrong:
The Russians were not ahead of us militarily, either in missiles or in nuclear warheads. James R Killian, Jr, the MIT president who was made missile czar by Eisenhower in November 1957, noted in his memoirs that ballistic-missile technology was much more "qualitatively advanced" in the United States than in the Soviet Union. At the time of all the hysteria, though, few outsiders knew this. As Killian remembers, "Ignorance — the result of excessive secrecy — undoubtedly contributed to the American people's frantic reactions to Soviet achievements." Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, for his part, hadn't helped matters when he declared in June 1957, "We'll bury you."

Unsurprisingly, the Pentagon and the defense industry were quite willing to close the (non-existent) missile gap. Not one, but six, different US strategic-missile systems on the boards — Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Thor, Jupiter and Polaris — were pushed through to completion. By the early 1960s, a real missile gap did in fact appear, one favouring the United States — and the Russians had to play catch-up...

But we are not the same nation of 25 years ago. Certainly, the Soviet military is strong, and Japan is a formidable economic competitor. But neither the Russians nor the Japanese are 10 feet tall, as the panicky are telling us, and I can't see the press, or the public, swallowing whole, without question, whatever lines are being fed at the Washington news troughs. A co-worker of mine from the Sputnik years, since risen to even greater journalistic eminence, once remarked of the daily news, "We print what we're told, and what we can find out; therefore, we print lies..." He's half right. They may still lie to us, but we're better today at finding things out. (29)

We are still too close to this phenomenon to explain fully the growth of the peace movement. John Kenneth Galbraith has advanced a theory which I accept. Its growth has not been due only to the peace movement's work — President Reagan himself deserves the praise:

I cite these efforts not to suggest any seniority in the present discussion but to establish my credentials for affirming that, despite much effort, we were not getting anywhere until Ronald Reagan and his people came along to bail us out.
Concern for the danger of nuclear confrontation and war was, I am persuaded, just below the surface. But like the prospect of death, with which it is so largely identical, it was subject to psychological denial. Better and certainly happier not to think about it.

Needed was a major shock or series of shocks to bring the alarm into the open. This we could not provide. And this was what the Reagan Administration, in a superbly orchestrated effort, has provided. That it was not intended does not subtract at all from the achievement.

The stage was set by the big increase in military spending, which was linked, in turn, to the assault on social expenditures. The first made the second necessary. Many in the past had sought to show military expenditures are at the expense of other public needs. The Administration made the choice clear, vivid and unmistakable, a major exercise in popular education.

Then came the renewed commitment to the MX missile and the extended debate over its basing. This was admirably designed to arouse important and articulate people, and particularly Western Republicans and the Mormon Church. There is a wholly non-partisan aversion to having the MX as a neighbour and target. (26)

The signs of growth in 1980-2 were popping up in various ways. Time magazine reported on the readers' reactions to its lead stories for 1982:

The story that elicited the greatest response was the 29 March cover, "Thinking the Unthinkable: Rising Fears about Nuclear War". Most of the 1,074 people who wrote TIME in the weeks that followed were in fact afraid. Referring to a diagram showing the effects of a single nuclear bomb dropped on a US city, one said, "Although I have been an anti-nuclear supporter for several years, I had never seen an illustration of the damage a nuclear warhead could do to Detroit. How much more frightening it is when the scenario is shifted from Europe to my own backyard!"

Only a minority, 145, took the opposite view, arguing that the US should not let its defences down and attacking TIME for raising the issue. "When in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout," said one correspondence, quoting the common saying. "That describes (your) series of articles. They say nothing, do nothing and propose
nothing." Another argued: "The tougher we get, the safer we will be." (27)

But there is clearly something wrong. The arms race issue appears consistently in the Western opinion polls as a matter of grave concern to the general public. But, leaving aside the case of New Zealand, the politicians have done very little to implement policies advocated by the peace movement (28). Indeed, voters may, via opinion polls, express fears about the arms race but these fears are not carried over when they elect political candidates.

THE FAILURE OF THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT

Despite seven years of increasing effort by the peace movement, not one nuclear weapon has been dismantled as a direct result of all this work. Even New Zealand's banning of nuclear-powered/capable warships is at most only a contribution to arms control rather than disarmament. The purpose of this section is to put forward some explanations for this dismal lack of progress.

First, the concern over "first-strike" nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and now the Strategic Defence Initiative, is all still relatively recent. For veterans of the arms race debate, of course, the basic issues are not new. But for the vast majority of people who have joined peace groups in Western nations, all this is still new.

Second, peace groups are not necessarily peaceful collections of individuals. Groups are created and then fragmented, or else undergo internal upheavals which, though they survive them, nonetheless do absorb vital energy for that period.
Third, no quick breakthrough can be expected. Even a narrowly-focussed campaign like the ending of Australia’s participation in commercial whaling took the best part of a decade to achieve (29).

Finally, the peace movement is essentially in favour of multilateral disarmament but it has to fight, so to speak, a rearguard action against conservative groups that accidentally or deliberately portray the peace movement as being pro-Moscow and seeking to weaken the West by advocating unilateral disarmament. It is difficult to discuss the arms race when the other side prefer to vilify opponents of the arms race rather than examine the actual arguments being made by those persons (30).

At first sight, these appear to be reasonable explanations for the lack of progress. The implication is that, given time, the peace movement will overcome the existing obstacles and will triumph.

I would like to suggest an alternative point of view. First, the peace movement has already achieved a great success in doing what it is best at doing: creating a public concern about something ("consciousness-raising"). The base of public concern can—and will no doubt—be expanded to reach still more of the middle ground. The peace movement can be relied upon to keep the arms race issue on the political agenda; the issue is unlikely to return to the neglect from which it suffered in the 1960s/late 1970s.

Second, the peace movement, which is more focussed on raising alarm about the arms race, has failed to produce an overriding vision of a world without an arms race. Sporadic forays take place in opposition to military developments (deployment of cruise missiles, holding of nuclear weapon tests and the visit of foreign warships).
But all these are basically suggestions for arms control. The peace movement is, in essence, an arms control movement, rather than a disarmament one. Even if all the following goals were achieved, the peace movement would not have scored one disarmament triumph: non-deployment of cruise missiles, cessation of all nuclear tests, complete compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and stopping the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Third, the military component in developed nations (and many developing nations) is now so large, so extensive and so expensive, that it is futile simply to talk about disarmament as an isolated event. Disarmament has to be viewed - especially because of the high rate of military expenditure - in the context of potential economic and social changes. The peace movement too often overlooks that there is more to disarmament than just the removal of weapons.

Fourth, the peace movement does not use the same language as governments. One is seeking, albeit incoherently, arms control and disarmament, while governments seek security first. The latter will become interested in arms control and disarmament ideas only if they fit into governmental perceptions of security. Thus, the "arms race debate" is a dialogue without a common language.

Where does this leave the peace movement? I do not believe that the peace movement is necessarily destined to remain in the same groove playing the same tune. If, however, it does continue to do so, then it faces the same fate as previous peace movements. If it continues to focus on the dangers of the arms race and the risk of World War III, then the general public will become fatalistically resigned to it and turn their attention elsewhere. Smokers, drunken drivers and people who do
not have regular physical exercise all know the warnings of the risks they run - and yet they ignore them.

The task of the peace movement is to shift from doom and gloom to conveying a sense of hope and to project a vision of a world without the current arms race. To do this, it needs to get beyond specific campaigns on weapon systems and to focus more on "security" rather than disarmament. It will also need to tackle head-on the "military-industrial complex" (rather than its manifestations - weapon systems).
NOTES


(3) For a vintage piece bemoaning the lack of a peace movement - written only months before it was suddenly revived - see: Keith D Sutor "The Christian and Militarism" The Ecumenical Review (Geneva), April 1978, pp 127-138.


(14) "Like Lemmings Heading for the Sea" *Disarmament Times* (New York), June 1981.


(19) Information from Rev Dr James S Udy, Uniting Church Minister, Sydney, who accompanied Graham to Moscow.


(21) "Interview: J K Galbraith" *South* (London), February 1983, p 16.

(22) "HMS Sheffield Thought Exocet was Friendly" *New Scientist* (London), 10 February 1983, p 353.


(28) A recent book has argued that US peace movement priorities have been almost entirely ignored in the Reagan Administration and, indeed, the President himself has very little interest in the entire subject. The real pressures, on the contrary, come from within competing parts of the US civil service and ministers. See: Strobe Talbott *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Arms Control* New York: Knopf, 1984.


CHAPTER 3

A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE ARMS RACE

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 3

The late Lord Noel-Baker, who was a participant at the 1932 World Disarmament Conference, claimed that all of the technical problems of general and complete disarmament were solved (1) but that the main failure was that the advocates for disarmament allowed themselves to be obstructed and delayed by people in powerful positions who thought that lasting peace and world disarmament were an idle and dangerous dream. These conservative leaders were men still wedded to the idea of national governments sorting out their own problems, rather than having international intervention in them, and believing that war remained in the final sense the best way to resolve national differences. They believed that war was an inevitable part of civilization. None of these men necessarily welcomed World War II, and few derived financial benefit from what is now known as the Military-Industrial Complex. It was, quite simply, a lack of vision and a lack of faith in disarmament which crippled their outlook towards the League's work and which encouraged them to sabotage the conference.

My last conversation with Lord Noel-Baker, in New York in 1982, consisted of our again sharing views on the lack of vision of politicians and civil servants. The basic problem, then, in my view is not a lack of proposals but a lack of political will and vision. The rest of this chapter is concerned with breaking the deadlock.
SOME UNUSUAL PROPOSALS FOR BREAKING THE DEADLOCK

The first question, ironically, to be addressed is whether the deadlock ought to be broken. As Winston Churchill is reputed to have said, "jaw, jaw is better than war, war". In some respects the disarmament negotiations are now part of the institutionalization of foreign relations between the super powers and their immediate allies. They jostle for power and prestige and try to outmanoeuvre each other in the negotiations - but at least their effort goes into politicking and not fighting.

Colonel Keliher served on the US MBFR delegation during the 1970s. Although this book conveys the frustrations of someone who was annoyed at working hard on unproductive negotiations, he ends by saying that at least the negotiations have contributed to military stability in Europe:

As the years have shown, especially since 1973, there is no easy road or golden key to successful arms control in Europe. Lessening the criticality for such an arms control agreement is the fact that since World War II, the military situation in Central Europe has shown an impressive stability despite the existing asymmetries within the force structure. Hence, there has been a reluctance to tamper with it too much, especially if doing so meant surrendering some of one's national sovereignty (or hegemony in the Soviet case) and jeopardizing existing perceptions of what constitutes adequate security.

In this context, it is worth repeating the prophetic statement made by an anonymous State Department official in January 1972, concerning the results of studies which showed that any MBFR initiative that would be acceptable to the Soviets would jeopardize Western security: "It took us two years and God knows how much money to reach the common sense conclusion that stability in Europe can best be maintained by doing nothing." ("Nothing" in this context meaning not to go forward with an MBFR proposal.)
Unless an arms control agreement can be found which by its provisions meaningfully enhances security in Central Europe, then it is better for the West to continue to take measures which can offset the current Warsaw Pact threat to the balance and thus maintain the stability that kept peace in Central Europe the last three decades.

There is much to be said for the thesis that in critical areas of the world like Central Europe, military stability rather than instability is created by the direct interface of the forces of the super powers. Such military stability has accomplished what, when all is said and done, is the basic objective of any successful arms control agreement - preservation of peace. (2)

That point of view is not acceptable to me. Even if deliberate warfare is avoided by protracted and unproductive disarmament negotiations, there are still the risks of accidental warfare, political miscalculations and insanity triggering World War III. Peace remains precarious when the world is an armed camp. Meanwhile, there are considerable current economic and social costs arising out of the current arms race. Even without a war, people in some respects are still being "killed" by the arms race since they are dying from a lack of welfare projects which could be financed by redirected military expenditure.

A way needs to be found for breaking the disarmament deadlock. Relying upon diplomats and their military advisers will not work - as the recent history of the disarmament negotiations has shown.

The most obvious dramatic act would be some limited form of nuclear explosion - as distinct from the current speculation over a "limited" nuclear war. This idea predates the atomic attack on Hiroshima in August 1945. The US War Department set up a Committee on Social and Political Implications (of the atomic bomb), headed by Professor James Franck. The report, which was not made public for several years, recommended (on 11 June 1945) that the bomb should first be used on a barren island
with appropriate safeguards to be witnessed by representatives from around the world. The Committee, aware of the entirely new level of explosive represented by the atomic bomb, was concerned that it should not be used for a short-term gain (beating Japan) without regard to the long-term implications:

Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, may be deeply shocked by this step. It may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted. Later in any proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement...It is not at all certain that American public opinion, if it could be enlightened as to the effect of atomic explosives, would approve of our own country being the first to introduce such an indiscriminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian life.

Thus...the military advantages and the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and by a wave of horror and revulsion sweeping over the rest of the world:"

Taking all this into account, the report recommended that the new weapon be demonstrated before the world, to be witnessed by representatives of the United Nations. The test bombing would be held on a barren island with appropriate safeguards. (3)

That advice was ignored and the Committee's various predictions have been proved correct.

Twenty-three years later, two former US State Department officials, then specializing in arms control questions, examined the prospects for the 1978 UN Special Session and recommended:

We suggest a step that would be educational, in the most vivid sense imaginable. The United States might propose at the Special Session that the five permanent members of the Security Council (or perhaps France and China, which have not signed the test ban treaties) collaborate to arrange a joint
demonstration of a one-time above-ground thermonuclear detonation, over an uninhabited region, which leaders of all nations would be invited to witness personally.

Such a proposal would doubtless be greeted with scepticism. But every educator and psychologist would agree that the "feel" of nuclear explosive power may be worth a thousand resolutions. (4)

I doubt if such an event would be of much use. First, the Indian explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974 shocked the world but its impact soon wore off and had largely gone by the time of the 1975 Geneva NPT Review Conference (5).

Second, there is no guarantee that the proposed explosion would galvanize into action the people who plod along in the negotiations: the diplomats and their associated experts. As Part II of this dissertation will show, the negotiations have a surreal quality all of their own. An example from outside the arms race will illustrate this air of detachment. One of the major negotiating tasks of this century has been the recent UN Law of the Sea Conference (which resulted in a treaty in 1982). The 1978 Session was derailed over a procedural issue. The question was whether Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, President of the Conference, could retain his position despite the fact that his government in Sri Lanka had changed and refused to include him in its delegation. Thus, he was only an individual, not a representative of a State. The issue was finally resolved by a vote - Amerasinghe was retained - but only after several weeks of irreplaceable time was lost and divisive tendencies in the Conference were aggravated. Another example was the time taken up by the 1974 Session of the Geneva Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, on whether or not the PLO, some African "national liberation movements" and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam may attend and, if so, with what status.
Conference diplomats - like the diplomatic corps generally - virtually live in a world of their own.

Third, Ronald Higgins has speculated on the need for a "profound psychic shock" to jolt the world to its senses over nuclear weapons. But the world soon absorbed the horrors of World War I's trench warfare and World War II's gas chambers and Hiroshima. "If these did not transform mankind's consciousness, I cannot see famines or nuclear terrorism doing so" (6).

SUPER GRIT

There is a way to end the disarmament deadlock. The world community does not need to wait forlornly upon the outcome of the deadlocked bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations or to hope the same cataclysmic catastrophe will force disarmament upon the two super powers and their immediate allies.

Over two decades ago, Charles E Osgood, a specialist in communications, coined the phrase GRIT: Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction (7). He noted that the arms race did not proceed on the basis of each super power negotiating with the other on how many new weapon systems should be deployed - it acted unilaterally. Each step thus constituted tension-induction, and so encouraged the other super power to follow suit or even to go one better. The other side, believing it to be in its national security interests (as perceived by it) would follow suit almost automatically.

Osgood has turned the dynamics of the arms race upside down: by recommending that it be reduced via small unilateral initiatives done in such a way as to encourage the other side to follow suit or even to go one better, thereby paving the way for the next round of
unilateral initiatives. Since each step is small enough to maintain a large measure of military power, GRI is not a form of unilateral disarmament. It does not, for example, expect one side to scrap all of its nuclear weapons in one go.

Over the years, Osgood's 10 basic guidelines have remained largely unchanged (8). Under the heading of maintaining security: (I) Unilateral initiatives must not reduce a side's capacity to inflict unacceptable nuclear retaliation should it be attacked at that level. (II) Unilateral initiatives must not cripple a side's capacity to meet conventional aggression with appropriately graded responses using conventional weapons. (III) Unilateral initiatives must be graduated in risk according to the degree of reciprocation obtained from the opponent. (IV) Unilateral initiatives should be diversified in nature, both as regards sphere of action and geographical locus of application. Under the heading of inducing reciprocation: (V) Unilateral initiatives must be designed and communicated so as to emphasize a sincere intent to reduce tensions. (VI) Unilateral initiatives should be publicly announced at some reasonable interval prior to their execution and identified as part of a deliberate policy of reducing tensions. (VII) Unilateral initiatives should include in their announcement explicit invitation to reciprocation in some form. Under the heading of demonstrating and evaluating the genuineness of initiatives and reciprocation: (VIII) Unilateral initiatives that have been announced must be executed on schedule regardless of any prior commitments to reciprocate by the opponent. (IX) Unilateral initiatives should be continued over a considerable period, regardless of the degree or absence of reciprocation. (X) Unilateral initiatives must be unambiguous and as susceptible to verification as possible.
GRIT has had no specific example of experimentation. The nearest it has come was the period June-November 1963: the "Kennedy Experiment" (9). President Kennedy, speaking at The American University on 10 June, outlined a "strategy of peace", in which he said the US was stopping all nuclear tests in the atmosphere and would not resume them unless the USSR did so. Kennedy's speech was published in full in the Soviet press and, on 15 June, Premier Kruschev reciprocated with a speech welcoming the US initiative, and he announced that he had ordered the production of strategic bombers to be halted. On 20 June, the US-USSR "hot-line" direct communications link was installed. On 5 August, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed. On 9 October, Kennedy approved the sale of $250 million worth of wheat to the USSR. Kennedy was killed the following month (10) and with all the accompanying chaos, the experiment faltered and then died with the increased involvement in Vietnam.

Had this real-world experiment in calculated de-escalation been a success? To most of the initiatives taken by either side, the other reciprocated, and the reciprocations were roughly proportional in significance. What about psychological impact? I do not think that anyone who lived through that period will deny that there was a definite warming of American attitudes toward Russians, and the same is reported for Russian attitudes toward Americans. The Russians even coined their own name for the new strategy, "the policy of mutual example". (11)

GRIT itself does not figure all that much in the current disarmament literature. George Kennan, in a 1981 address, for example, called for a major US initiative—but only to be carried out in simultaneous implementation with the USSR. The "unilateral initiative" component is limited to the US making the suggestion, rather than actually implementing it unilaterally:
What I would like to see the President do, after due consultation with the Congress, would be to propose to the Soviet Government an immediate across-the-boards reduction by fifty percent of the nuclear arsenals now being maintained by the two super powers – a reduction affecting in equal measure all forms of the weapon, strategic, medium range, and tactical, as well as all means of their delivery – all this to be implemented at once and without further wrangling among the experts, and to be subject to such national means of verification as now lie at the disposal of the two powers.

Whether the balance of reduction would be precisely even – whether it could be construed to favour statistically one side or the other – would not be the question. Once we start thinking that way, we would be back on the same fateful track that has brought us where we are today. Whatever the precise results of such a reduction, there would still be plenty of overkill left – so much so that if this first operation were successful, I would then like to see a second one put in hand to rid us of at least two-thirds of what would be left.

Now I have, of course, no idea of the scientific aspects of such an operation; but I can imagine that serious problems might be presented by the task of removing, and disposing safely of, the radioactive contents of the many thousands of warheads that would have to be dismantled. Should this be the case, I would like to see the President couple his appeal for a 50 percent reduction with the proposal that there be established a joint Soviet-American scientific committee, under the chairmanship of a distinguished neutral figure, to study jointly and in all humility the problem not only of the safe disposal of these wastes but also the question of how they could be utilized in such a way as to make a positive contribution to human life, either in the two countries themselves or – perhaps preferably – elsewhere. In such a joint scientific venture we might both atone for some of our past follies and lay the foundation for a more constructive relationship. (12)

I believe that it is time to revive GRIT – though in a more dramatic form. GRIT has two limitations, though both are probably a by-product of its coming from a different era – one in which the arms race was not so frenetic or so expensive.

One limitation is the potential pace of GRIT’s implementation. While one can only speculate on the
"Kennedy Experiment" had he lived beyond November 1963, it is worth noting that Kennedy's "GRIT programme" was directed only at arms control, rather than disarmament itself. The next round of GRIT (had Kennedy lived to maintain the momentum) would probably have been directed to a comprehensive test ban treaty (13) - which remains elusive 23 years after his death. GRIT would have kept up the arms control momentum but would have been probably too slow for the implementation of any general and complete disarmament scheme based on the McCloy-Zorin agreement (to be examined below).

The other limitation is GRIT's lack of attention to alternative security systems. It is directed at reducing current force levels rather than also making proposals to cover, for example, what should be done regarding the reduced military expenditure and converting military facilities to civilian uses.

I propose a revised form of GRIT: Super GRIT. It is based on overcoming these two limitations: there should be a much greater unilateral initiative and the initiating party should use its military expenditure thus saved as an integral part of the overall Super GRIT strategy.

Super GRIT should be initiated by the US. This is done for three reasons. First, the US has always led the arms race with the USSR. This does not deny that the USSR has provoked legitimate concerns in the US and elsewhere regarding its motives, such as the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan (which was the first full-scale invasion outside its "sphere of influence"). But in terms of military hardware, the US has set the pace. It is up to the US to set the pace in actual disarmament (rather than just making statements about it).
The debate over the relative strength of both superpowers has been a constant theme of the cold war. The USSR must bear the major source of blame for this because it has always been reluctant to publish information about its armed forces. Into the vacuum thus formed has flowed a steady stream of fears, allegations and suspicions. The US has reacted, often by overestimating Soviet strength while underestimating its own. A recent example has been identified by the Washington DC-based Council for a Livable World, in a speech made by President Reagan at Ashland, Ohio on 9 May 1983:

Misstatement:

"During the past ten years, the Soviet Union has improved, developed and deployed more than a dozen large, new ICBM systems, while the United States has been thinking one, much smaller, ICBM."

Correct Information:

In the short space of 32 words, Mr Reagan has committed four major errors of fact:

. During the past 10 years, the US has done a great deal more with our ICBMs than "thinking" about them. We have "improved, developed and deployed" six major upgrades in our now-deployed ICBMs.

. We have done more than "think" about our all-new ICBM, the MX. It is developed and ready for testing.

. All Soviet ICBMs are "smaller" than the US MX in destructive effect. By comparing ICBMs in terms of size, the President is using the "awning" theory of strategic analysis, in which a weapon's capability is measured by the number of people it can shade at a picnic. A more meaningful Index is the Pentagon's "counter-military potential", which measures a weapon's first-strike capability to destroy hard targets. By this measure the more accurate MX will be three times larger than the most effective new Soviet ICBM - the SS-18 - more than four times larger than the SS-19, and 16 times larger than the SS-17. It is impossible to compare MX with the rest of President Reagan's "dozen" Soviet ICBMs, since they don't exist.
Even using crude throwweight as the measure, the Soviets have "improved, developed and deployed" one ICBM larger than MX, not "a dozen". (14)

Comparisons of the nuclear forces of the two superpowers are, in some respects, a waste of time since each now has more than enough to kill the other side several times over.

Moreover, the US Defence Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not trade forces:

Senator Carl Levin: "I am wondering whether or not you would swap US military capability overall, with everything that is included in that phrase, for that of the Soviets?"

General John Vessey: "...I would take some of the things that the Soviets have for their forces in terms of numbers and give them to our forces, but overall would you trade with Marshal Ogarkov (Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces)? Not on your life, not to live there or have his job or his responsibilities or to have his forces in comparison to ours."

Senator Levin: "I appreciate your answer. Just focusing on the military capability aspect, is your answer that you would not trade?

General Vessey: "I would not trade."

Senior Armed Services Committee
11 May 1982

Senator Charles Percy: "Would you rather have at your disposal the US nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal?"

Defense Secretary Weinberger: "...I would not for a moment exchange anything, because we have an immense edge in technology."

Senior Foreign Relations Committee
29 April 1982. (15)

The second reason why the USA should initiate Super GRIT is that the US Government is more susceptible to public pressure in general and the peace movement in particular. This will be examined in the final chapter.
Third, the closest the world has come to Osgood’s GRIT was initiated by the US and so it could try again.

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Disarmament negotiations are not new. In 201BC, for example, the Roman-Carthage Treaty limited certain military forces, including the outlawing of the use of war elephants since, owing to their tendency to panic and run amok, these beasts were often more danger to the user than to the nemy. Even earlier, in 1100BC, the Philistines forced a defeated Israel into accepting a treaty which limited Israel’s use of iron-tipped spears. By contemporary standards those agreements were not "disarmament" treaties but "arms control" ones.

The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was convened on the initiative of the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, "...with the object of seeking the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments" (16). The Czar’s main motivation was financial. He had been warned by his advisers that he could not afford both his social welfare programmes and his defence budget. He hoped to save on military expenditure by obtaining disarmament. The Conference, at which 26 governments were represented, assembled on 18 May 1899 and adjourned on 29 July 1899. It failed to reach agreement on the primary object for which it was called, namely the limitation or reduction of armaments, but adopted three treaties which sought to regulate the conduct of hostilities, such as the means and methods of land warfare. Provision was made for the convening of a second conference. This conference, at which 44 governments were represented, lasted from 15 June to 18 October 1907. This, too, made no progress towards disarmament, though it developed additional rules
governing the conduct of hostilities. It recommended the holding of a third international peace conference (in 1915). This did not take place owing to the outbreak of World War I.

Disarmament was a major concern for the League of Nations, which was established after World War I to maintain international peace and security. According to Article 8 of the League Covenant, plans were to be drafted by the League Council for the general reduction of national armaments, which all the League member-nations agreed as necessary for the maintenance of peace. In accordance with Article 8, a Preparatory Commission was formed in 1925 to do detailed work for an international disarmament conference. Progress, not surprisingly, was slow but a draft disarmament treaty was completed by 1930 and circulated to governments for consideration. The World Disarmament Conference opened on 2 February 1932. The omens were good. Public opinion in all the 58 participating nations was running in favour of disarmament. As negative inducements, there were fears that Germany could be taken over by extremists (such as Hitler) and that recent developments in aerial warfare meant that another war would be even more destructive than the last – and so the negotiations had to proceed quickly. The US, which was never a member of the League, was an active participant at the Conference. The USSR, which was not at that time a League member-nation, was also active.

The key phrase at this time was “qualitative disarmament”. This had been imposed upon Germany in 1919 in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and the Allies had in mind to remove Germany’s potential for offensive military activities, while not denying its right to have some forces for self-defence. In short, qualitative disarmament did not represent general and complete disarmament, since some self-defence forces
would be permitted, but it went a great deal further than just arms control measures. Lord Cecil, who was not at that time in the UK Government, described this in 1932 when he claimed that the Conference's chief task should be "the prohibition for all nations of those kinds of armaments which are now forbidden to the vanquished Powers". This, he said, would

...tend to decrease the offensive part of armaments, while leaving defensive power untouched. That eventually must be the chief object of any disarmament proposals. If I am right in this representation of our proposals, it is evident that they will produce a very important increase of security. Carried to its logical conclusion, the removal of the power of aggression would eventually bring about a complete security, and anything which diminishes the power of aggression proportionately to the point of defence, necessarily increases the safety of the world. (17)

Lord Cecil's formula was not utopian. The Allied general staffs already applied it when advising on the drafting of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Since the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden has had a policy of extensive defence forces which are not designed for aggression but which have kept it safe from attack for over 150 years. Since 1945, Yugoslavia has had a similar policy of general people's defence (18). The Swiss probably pioneered this method, which has safeguarded its independence over the centuries. A 1980 study has outlined how a similar system could be followed in Australia (19). Indeed, the precision-guided munition revolution in weapons (as seen in the 1982 Falklands Island conflict in which the Exocet missile destroyed HMS Sheffield) could herald a new era of warfare, in which defence systems can be produced comparatively cheaply - but which would not be of much use for offensive campaigns.

In short, Lord Cecil's plan could have worked. US President Herbert Hoover took up Lord Cecil's general ideas and, on 22 June 1932, proposed a detailed
agreement. Unfortunately, the UK delegation which did not share Lord Cecil’s unofficial views, thought the Hoover Plan was too daring and unworkable. The defence establishments in all the participating nations probably had reservations about the Plan and some politicians really did continue to believe that disarmament was impossible. It was the UK Labour/Conservative coalition Government which expressed these reservations so forcibly and led the opposition to the Plan. The UK, in the form of Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, killed the disarmament initiative in July 1932. The Conference limped along into 1933 but the damage was done. Hitler came to power in 1933 determined to end the system under which Germany alone had defensive weapons. In 1944, Churchill wrote to Lord Cecil: “This war could easily have been prevented, if the League of Nations had been used with courage and loyalty by the associated nations” (meaning the UK and France) (20). Unfortunately, official thinking, especially in the UK and France, was still trapped in the psychology that saw disarmament as dangerous. As the most senior UK civil servant of the 1920s and 30s, Lord Hankey, noted: “If disarmament is carried too far and too fast, a decrease in national virility would result. Unemployment would be created and trade would suffer” (21).

After World War II, there was renewed interest in disarmament. The UN, established in 1945, created by one of its first decisions the Atomic Energy Commission “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters”; in particular, the problems of the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes; the control of atomic energy for peaceful use only; the elimination from national arsenals of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and effective international verification. A number of proposals were made. The most notable was the so-called Baruch Plan of
1946. This US initiative called for an international authority, under UN auspices, to control all phases of nuclear energy production and use throughout the world. The authority would also have had the right of inspection in any UN member-nation to ensure that no clandestine operations were under way. Many nations reacted favourably to the plan. But the USSR (which was secretly developing its own atomic bomb) opposed it. It argued that the atomic bomb - then possessed only by the US - should be banned first, followed by the internationalization of atomic energy. The Baruch Plan did not proceed any further since the US refused to surrender its monopoly of atomic weapons. Meanwhile, there was also political deadlock in the UN Commission on Conventional Armaments, set up in 1946 to reduce conventional weapons.

In December 1950, the UN General Assembly set up a committee to see how the deadlock in both Commissions could be ended. In January 1952, both Commissions were dissolved and the UN Disarmament Commission was established. The omens were not good. The USSR had exploded its first atomic device in 1949, 1952 was to see the US's first hydrogen bomb explosion, with the USSR's coming in 1953. The Korean War was under way and in the US there were great fears (initiated by Senator McCarthy) of Communist conspiracies. The USSR, meanwhile, was worried that it was vulnerable to a surprise US attack.

On 10 May 1955, the world almost achieved nuclear disarmament based to a large extent on the Lord Ceci/President Hoover qualitative disarmament plan. On 24 April 1952, the US presented a paper entitled "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Programme", which is worth quoting at length because it remains valid more than 30 years later:
1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war...by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations.

2. To achieve this goal, all States must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world.

(a) in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no State will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and

(b) in which no State will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other States having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending State could start a war.

3. To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all States would reduce their armed forces to levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities, necessary for

(a) the maintenance of internal security;

(b) fulfilment of obligations of States to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

4. Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme both:

(a) the progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to fixed maximum levels, radically less than present levels and balanced throughout the process of reduction, thereby eliminating mass armies and preventing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to peace, and

(b) the elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruction.

5. Such international agreements must provide effective safeguards to ensure that all phases of the disarmament programme are carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.
6. Such international agreements must provide an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament. (22)

The Six Principles were endorsed by most of the Commission's members. The USSR, still feeling vulnerable to a Western attack, rejected them. No progress was made in 1952 and 1953. On 11 June 1954, the UK and France tabled the "Anglo-French Memorandum" which was clearly based on the six principles. The USSR again opposed it. But by the time of the late 1954 UN General Assembly Session, Soviet opinion had begun to soften and the USSR decided it would accept the Memorandum as a basis of discussion. The Commission's detailed work was done by a Sub-Committee consisting of the leading participants in the nuclear arms race (US, UK, France, Canada and USSR). The Sub-Committee met on 25 February 1955 for the first time following the USSR's General Assembly statement. Throughout March and April, the Western nations appealed to the USSR to accept reductions of manpower and conventional weapons (which for the US would have amounted to around 60 percent), together with the total abolition of all weapons of mass destruction, including all existing nuclear stock, and an international control authority, with an elaborate system of inspectors. On 10 May, the USSR replied by tabling its own disarmament agreement which was substantially in line with the Western proposals. A wave of disbelief swept over the Sub-Committee. According to the French delegate, "the whole thing looks too good to be true".

Mid 1955 was, in retrospect, one of those few periods since World War II in which the international political climate was unusually favourable:

The Korean War had ended in 1953, and the French in 1954 were ready to quit Vietnam after their defeat in the colonial war. There was an imminent threat
of a confrontation between the super powers. Soviet attitudes had mellowed after the USSR acquired the hydrogen bomb in August 1953, thus ending its nuclear inferiority. New leaders had taken over; Khrushchev evidently was preparing for some relaxations, as indicated by the welcome Staatsvertrag with Austria and his reconciliation visit to Tito in Belgrade (both these events only materialized in 1955). And Eisenhower came with a peaceful bent of mind. (23)

The Sub-Committee, instead of following up immediately with the Soviet proposal, adjourned for its summer break. It resumed on 29 August and on 6 September the US withdrew both its Six Principles and its support for the Anglo-French Memorandum. According to Noel-Baker: "The reason given for the withdrawal was as unpredictable as the withdrawal itself" (24). The US claimed that, upon further reflection, the earlier proposals were all flawed by lack of safeguards in the international monitoring system. Alva Myrdal suggested deeper political considerations:

There are signs that during this period Khrushchev was in search of detente. What had happened to the political constellations of the United States? Reference to McCarthy's red-baiting campaign can hardly suffice to explain, but one thing seems certain: there was at this time never any real backing by American public opinion for the ambitious General Disarmament plan. Eisenhower and his emissary Harold Stassen met with strong opposition at home, in the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the United Atomic Energy Commission. Here was a general unwillingness to extend the necessary trust to the Soviet Union. The Governments of Britain and France also probably found the United States' generosity on nuclear disarmament unsettling to their plans to develop atomic weapons. West Germany was disturbed by anything like a threat of United States disengagement in Europe; there were rumblings within NATO as the allies suspected the United States of getting ready to reach agreements with the Soviet Union over their heads. (25)

The international disarmament momentum was lost. By late 1956, the international political climate had changed for the worse. The USSR intervened in Hungary in November 1956, while in that same month the UK and
Franco colluded with Israel to take over the Suez Canal and initiated a new Middle East conflict. The Sino-Soviet split was also underway.

THE McCLOY-ZORIN PRINCIPLES

The last major attempt at a comprehensive disarmament treaty came in 1961. US disarmament delegate John McCloy and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin tabled at the UN on 20 September 1961 the US-Soviet Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. The Principles should be quoted in full:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

   (a) that disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

   (b) that such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

   (a) the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
(b) the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) the abolition of organisations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of military training institutions;

(e) the discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.
7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

Over 20 years later, the Principles remain the best statement setting down the outlines of general and complete disarmament.

It is common in some circles to belittle disarmament activists and even call them Moscow stooges. It is worth recalling, then, that John McCloy hardly conformed to the disparaging image of disarmament activists conveyed by some Australian media. David Rockefeller, although loath to use the word "establishment" because of its vagueness, spoke of McCloy as "the person I think almost everybody would agree would be viewed as a member of the Establishment, if defined almost any way" (27). McCloy was President of the World Bank, then US high Commissioner to Germany, then head of the Chase Manhattan Bank.
McCloy was President Kennedy’s special representative on disarmament. But the previous US Administration, headed by President Eisenhower, had also taken a close interest in this approach to disarmament. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, speaking on 18 February 1960, explained the Eisenhower Administration views:

These measures to create a stable military environment would be the first stage in our approach to disarmament. They would enhance our national security and reduce the danger of war. They would also leave our essential freedom of action and our relative national capabilities unimpaired. Since large national forces would thus still be under arms, national force - not international force - would still be the ultimate resort.

To assure a world of peaceful change, we should project a second stage of general disarmament. Our objective in this second stage should be twofold:

FIRST, the strengthening and development of international machinery to prevent national aggression in a world that has been disarmed, except for internal security forces.

SECOND, the strengthening and development of international machinery to ensure just and peaceful settlement of disputed issues in a disarmed world.

Progress along both these basic lines will be needed if the goal of general disarmament is to be fulfilled...

These then are the broad lines of the renewed effort which the United States Government is about to make to enhance US national security through arms control and eventual general disarmament. (28)

In 1962, the US and USSR separately tabled draft disarmament treaties. The international political environment was soon to move into a new "cold war" phase, with US-Soviet confrontations over Berlin, Cuba and Indo China. Disarmament negotiations are highly vulnerable to changes in the wider political environment and so the disarmament optimism of mid-1961 soon evaporated.
Additionally, there was a growing impatience with the lack of progress in achieving general and complete disarmament (GCD). GCD was seen as being too ambitious, too legalistic and dangerously reliant upon all governments sincerely following their international obligations. A new era - arms control negotiations - was soon to dawn in which maximum attention was focussed on minimum goals. The McCloy-Zorin Principles, while still referred to occasionally, gradually faded into history and a new generation of disarmament activists came into being which had no knowledge of them.

After the early 1960s, therefore, international disarmament initiatives took a completely different path. The prevailing belief was that ambitious proposals were of little use and that, instead, disarmament was to be approached indirectly. The new fashion was for "arms control" or "collateral measures" by which the international community would adopt a series of ad hoc partial measures which would accumulate gradually into some form of comprehensive disarmament system. Although the word "disarmament" was still used, it was no longer seen as an immediate legal and political goal.

Starting with the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, then, the international community embarked upon the creation of eight major multilateral agreements and 13 bilateral (US/USSR) agreements. But, as the 1978 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament Final Document pointed out:

Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the "Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and on their destruction", and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited
restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. (29)

As the UN Special Session pointed out, only the 1972 treaty on biological weapons actually constituted a disarmament agreement. The international community had achieved very little of which it could be proud. It is time to return to the old idea of some form of comprehensive disarmament treaty.

THE US/USSR DRAFT TREATIES

The US and USSR treaties of 1962 had the following characteristics:

1. Each proposed disarmament in three stages. The US proposed for Stage I three years from the date of entry into force of the treaty. The USSR proposed 1.5 years commencing six months after the treaty came into force. For Stage II the US proposed 3 years, the USSR 2 years. As to Stage III, the USSR proposed one year while the US left the period to be agreed, but the reductions were to be completed as promptly as possible.

2. Each made the commencement of Stage II and III dependent on the completion of the preceding Stage but with differing formulae.

3. On manpower strengths there was near unanimity. The USSR proposed a reduction for both super powers to 1.9 million by the end of Stage I and 1 million by the end of Stage II. The corresponding figures in the US draft were 2.1 million and 1.05 million.
4. Each gave separate treatment to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on the one hand, and conventional weapons on the other, but here the draft provisions diverged: the USSR proposed a speedier destruction of nuclear weapons (excluding ABMs), their means of delivery, and foreign bases, while the US included these in a reduction of 30 percent in Stage I and left the quantities of reduction in Stages II and III to discussion and subsequent bilateral agreement. (In the nuclear field each draft was complicated by the need to prevent proliferation.)

5. On conventional arms, including strategic bombers, the US proposed a stage-by-stage reduction of 30-50-20 percent. The USSR proposed for Stage I a 100 percent reduction in all aircraft, ships and artillery capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and all submarines; for the rest a reduction of 30-35-(and by implication)35 percent.

6. Each draft called for an International Disarmament Organization with full and strict powers of verification.

7. Both drafts called for a re-affirmation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and a strengthening of the UN in monitoring peace and security and in the settlement of disputes.

THE McKNIGHT TREATY

In 1978, prior to the UN General Assembly Special Session, Allan McKnight, an Australian civil servant living in retirement in England, decided as a private initiative to draft a treaty which would absorb the main points of the US and Soviet treaties. (Mr McKnight was well aware of the intricacies of diplomacy; after serving in Canberra, he became the first Inspector-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna.) The McKnight version attracted very little attention but I decided to follow it up (having known Mr McKnight for over a decade, I knew how good generally were his ideas). I updated the treaty and arranged for it to be published by the Law Council of Australia (30).

The proposed treaty, in essence, consists of the following four components. First, it is based on existing treaties, such as the UN Charter, the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the post-1945 disarmament and arms control agreements. It fits very well into the contemporary international framework. It does not require any amendment to the UN Charter. It makes use of precedents established by other treaties. Second, it provides a timetable for multilateral disarmament. As with almost all the other provisions, the timetable idea is taken from the official US and Soviet draft treaties. The treaty does not call for one side to surrender its weapons while the other side can evade its obligations. Instead, there is a mutual and balanced reduction in forces over a fixed time frame. This phased reduction will not only reverse the arms race but will also lead to greater international confidence and readiness to proceed to the next step. Third, it provides for the establishment of a World Disarmament Organization (WDO), which will work closely with the UN but will not be a UN specialized agency. The WDO will ensure that: the complying governments are protected against the hazards of evasions by other governments; as far as possible the security of all nations is equal; and the limits on military capability set by the treaty are not exceeded. Finally, nations are permitted some residual forces for national defences. It is possible to have forces which are specifically for self-defence and which do not provide a threat to other nations. This policy has been followed for some years by Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.
After the 1978 UN Special Session, the re-organized UN Disarmament Committee (containing Australia for the first time at the centre of disarmament negotiations) had to negotiate a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD). The CPD represented a turning away from the discredited arms control/collateral measures approach. Little progress was made between 1979 and 1982. The Second Special Session on Disarmament took place in mid-1982. It was presented with a draft CPD treaty, of which about 80 percent was "in brackets", in other words, still not agreed upon. The 1982 Special Session removed about half the brackets but little progress was made on the key areas of difficulty, such as a timetable. The UN Disarmament Committee will need to report to the 1987 regular sessions of the UN General Assembly on its progress. But no progress has been made so far.

The McKnight draft treaty is important not only for reminding the UN of the need to return to the 1962 US/USSR draft treaties, but also because McKnight has sought to fill some of the gaps in the 1962 drafts:

1. A primary emphasis is placed on the forces which nations will be allowed to retain at the end of the process of disarmament.

2. All other weapons are then to be destroyed according to a time and percentage scale laid down. It is impossible to be dogmatic about this scale. Three stages of two years each is a reasonable compromise between the two 1962 drafts. Given the vast increases in weapons which exist today, the time scale will probably need to be longer, if reductions are to be carried out under effective international control, that is, to be verified. Thus an option is stated of the three stages being respectively 3, 5 and 3 years. Under any option
percentage reductions of 30, 50 and 20 percent are specified for the respective stages.

3. A somewhat novel constitution is provided for a World Disarmament Organization. It should be largely a functional and technical organization since its chief task will be verification. Its relation to the United Nations is also defined.

4. Initial methods of destruction of prohibited weapons are also set out, for the very practical reason that the settlement of procedures for verifiable destruction is an immense technical task which should not be left until after the treaty is either ready for signature or, worse, has come into force. All provisions relating to destruction expressly contemplate subsequent refinement.

5. For similar reasons, there are some extensive provisions for verification since the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency shows that post-treaty discussions in an executive organ can lead to tedious delay.

There are still some areas in which further research is required:

a) a military appraisal of the likely military tasks of a UN force and the national contingents which should be automatically available and their armament and composition;

b) a definition by military experts of the characteristics of categories of arms allowed to be retained;

c) the constitution of the World Disarmament Organization and its place in the formal framework of the UN;
d) the technical procedures for verification;

e) the legal requirements of and arrangement for verification;

f) the research needed to provide sensory instruments for non-intrusive verification;

g) the form of organization for the World Disarmament Organization, particularly its inspectors.

But these points can be resolved when negotiations are under way, and their finalization should not hinder work from commencing on the draft treaty itself. The most important decision is to start negotiations on a world disarmament treaty.

The book has received favourable reviews (31) and Australia's new Ambassador for Disarmament is arranging for copies to be distributed to all delegations at the UN Committee on Disarmament.

The book was written to draw attention to the next stage of the peace movement's task: having created public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, it is now necessary to provide some ideas on how the arms race could be ended. The book gave only passing attention as to how the proposed treaty could be implemented. That would have been outside the scope of a book published by the Law Council since it would have intruded too far into the realm of politics.

To conclude, the US/USSR Draft Treaties provide a satisfactory legal basis for disarmament negotiations. They shift the focus away from the comparatively trivial pursuits of the current US/USSR arms control negotiations and deal with deep cuts to existing weapon systems. What is lacking, then, is not some basis for
disarmament negotiations - but the basic political will to initiate and carry out such negotiations. This, in Western political terms, has to emerge from outside government since politicians themselves lack the willingness to conduct such negotiations. This means that we must now look at how the political will could be created - the peace movement.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT SHOULD CHANGE ITS THINKING

Thus the dissertation returns to the need for the peace movement to revamp its thinking.

First, the peace movement should move beyond the dangers of the arms race and should seek to create a new linkage: with the Western business community. This development - which I call the creation of a Peace-Industrial Complex - is, I recognize, a difficult transition to make. Many peace activists - but not all of them - have in other contexts been critical of business activities, such as the War on Want campaign against Nestle's baby milk replacing breast-feeding in Third World nations. But if the transition is not made, the peace movement will find itself with even less political cutting-edge than it currently enjoys.

Second, there is no single key to disarmament. If there were, it would have been found by now. The proposed Peace-Industrial Complex, of itself, will not achieve disarmament. But at least it will help generate the necessary political will.

Third, there is the need to shift away from focussing on the dangers of the arms race (the so-called "Nuclear Winter" speculation) to the opportunities presented by the conversion of military facilities to alternative uses - what I call the "Nuclear Spring". The Peace-Industrial Complex should be motivated less by the fear
of World War III than by the hope of what can be achieved by conversion of military facilities.

Fourth, the military-industrial complex is now so large, so expensive and so extensive that reversing it will take more than just the creation of the Peace-Industrial Complex. This dissertation can only, in the space available, provide a preliminary overview of what the Peace-Industrial Complex should undertake. Once it gets under way and the momentum builds up, it is impossible to predict where it will lead. This air of uncertainty is troubling. But this risk, I believe, is worth taking since we already know the potential risk of carrying on with the present US/USSR arms race.

Such a complex is unprecedented in US politics (and Western politics generally). But the ending of US involvement in the Vietnam War was due partly to pressures from the general public and business interests. The pressures were not co-ordinated (as is being recommended in this dissertation). But they did, however, illustrate the crucial role that such groups could play.

LESSONS FROM THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

The debate continues over how and why the US got involved in Vietnam. For example, a new book views President Kennedy’s involvement in Vietnam as being less of his own making and more of his being drawn unwillingly into a war which the Pentagon itself wanted:

Although distrustful of the military mentality, and aware of the tendency in the Pentagon to falsify facts in order to escalate activity, Jack had given the military control over Vietnam. Some sixteen thousand troops had been sent into the battle zone. The military had asked for jets, napalm, defoliants, free-fire zones; Jack had opposed each in turn but given in when he was pressed. His effort was to try to control the conflict, to
moderate it without having to challenge the assumptions on which it was based, assumptions about which he may have been privately suspicious but which he publicly endorsed. (32)

By contrast, there is far less debate over how and why the US pulled out. There were four main factors in the withdrawal and the debate, such as it is, concerns the relative importance to be accorded to each factor. One factor was the way that the conflict was itself, from the US point of view, unwinnable. Second, the conflict was creating havoc among the US armed forces and there were signs of mutiny among units in the field.

Of greater significance to this dissertation are the two factors of the conflict's impact within the US. One was the role of military expenditure. The Eisenhower Administration (1953-60) saw the need for a balanced federal budget as the primary concern and military considerations had to fit into that priority. Thus, the Administration cut back on (expensive) conventional forces and put greater reliance upon (cheaper) nuclear weapons:

During the Eisenhower Administration the New Look had overtaken military strategy. The New Look was nuclear, and the idea behind it, as worked out by a committee of strategists and Cabinet chiefs, was that in the confrontation with Communism, the new weapons offered a means to make prospective American retaliation a more serious threat and war itself sharper, quicker and cheaper than when it relied on vast conventional preparations and "outmoded procedures". Eisenhower was deeply concerned about the prospect of deficit budgets, as was his Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, who said flatly that not defence but disaster would result from "a military programme that scorned the resources and problems of our economy - erecting majestic defences and battlements for the protection of a country that was bankrupt." (That was thirty years ago.) The New Look was motivated as much by the domestic economy as by the cold war. (33)
Consequently, in 1954 with the Vietminh closing in on French ground forces in Vietnam and France requesting military assistance, the request was subject to economic considerations:

In 1954, General Ridgway had carefully programmed exactly what would be needed to fight the Vietminh and to help the French. The cost for one year would be an estimated $3.5 billion. Eisenhower thereupon called in his economic advisers and his Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey. "George, what would all this do to the budget?" he asked. Humphrey thought for a few moments and then gave a quick answer: "lt'll mean a deficit, Mr President." In a way, thought one man present at the meeting, any idea of intervening in Indochina died at that moment. (34)

Unfortunately, as David Halberstam goes on to record, this economic advice was temporarily ignored during the US's next attempt to get involved in Vietnamese affairs. From mid-1966 onwards, however, the economics of the conflict troubled US conservative financial opinion:

In mid-1966 the economist Eliot Janeway, asked by senators to comment on the funding of the war, estimated that instead of the monthly drain of $800 million proclaimed by the Administration, the real drain was closer to $2 billion a month, and might go up to $3 billion. This did not endear Janeway to the President, who set out to silence future critics of his arithmetic. In May 1967, Ralph Lazarus, president of the Federated Department Stores and a member of the Business Council, held a press conference and publicly criticized Johnson's war budget (he estimated that government spending on the war for the next fiscal year would be $5 billion higher than the government estimate of $21.9 billion). He was immediately telephoned by no less an economic authority than Justice Abe Fortas, who asked Lazarus to tone down his estimates because they were inaccurate; indeed, Lazarus had upset the President very much with his erroneous projections. Unfortunately, the cost turned out to be $27 billion, which meant that Lazarus was right on the nose. Similarly, the deficit for the year was about $23 billion, closely paralleling the cost of the war. (35)
The Vietnamese conflict did not destroy the US economy—though, by the same token, it did not help it either and it certainly undermined some of President Johnson’s “Great Society” welfare programmes. But what is equally significant is that the conflict’s economic cost helped build opposition to it. In so far as the conflict was “lost” at home, it was due partly to pressure from business interests:

Dissent spread to the establishment. Walter Lippmann spent an evening in 1966 persuading Katharine Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, hitherto firmly among the hawks, that “decent people could no longer support the war.” The alarming cost, reaching into the billions, mortgaging the future to deficit spending, causing inflation and unfavourable balance of payments, worried many in the business world. Some businessmen formed opposition groups, small in relation to the business community as a whole, but encouraged when the imposing figure of Marriner Eccles, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spoke publicly for a group called Negotiation Now, organized by Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (36)

The fourth factor was public opinion, as Sean MacBride has pointed out:

For the first time in the history of the world, a full-blown war was stopped in mid-stream by public opinion. The war was stopped by public opinion in America and by international public opinion, which would no longer stand for the obscenity of that war and demanded that it cease. Here, for the first time in human history, a war was stopped by public opinion. It was stopped in mid-stream with neither side winning or losing it. We have not yet realized the full significance of this historic event. (37)

The current arms race between the US and USSR is much more extensive and complicated than the Vietnam conflict. The peace movement’s goal over Vietnam was clearly defined: bring the troops home. It was a domestic movement campaigning against its own government. It is no good calling now for the US
unilaterally to scrap its defence forces. The campaign will need to find a way of simultaneously influencing the USSR for it to reduce its own forces.

Consequently, the peace movement has to move beyond talk of "ban the bomb" and "nuclear freeze". It needs a vision of an alternative to the current arms race. It is pointless trying to destroy an existing structure without a vision for rebuilding a new one.

A PEACE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The task for the new peace movement is threefold (i) reduce the military establishment in NATO and WTO nations (ii) carry out that reduction while having the maintenance of international peace and security as the primary goal (disarmament is only a means to an end: security) (iii) conduct both tasks via the conversion of military facilities to civilian use.

It is impossible, as at December 1986, to set out a detailed vision of a disarmed world. Indeed, our attention ought not to be focussed on a "disarmed" world but a world in which there is greater security.

The challenge at this point is, rather, the need for a scheme by which the peace movement can best commence work on the three tasks listed above. Such is the comparatively poor present situation of the peace movement, that it is necessary to write about beginnings rather than destinations.

The starting point is the need to create a peace-industrial complex in Western nations. I regard the NATO nations as being ahead in the arms race and so any implementation of GRIT will need to commence in NATO, rather than the WTO.
This dissertation, as noted in Chapter 1, is not trying to address the causes of war or to provide some grand new theory of "peace" (however that word may be defined). It has the narrow focus of the NATO-WTO arms race. Even if that arms race were ended, there would still be other international conflicts and internal violence (38). Even this comparatively narrow focus is still an immense subject. For a start, its roots go back at least to 1941, when attacks by the Axis nations had brought the USSR (June) and US (December) into World War II. The Cold War was an inevitable process of the two giants gradually becoming accustomed to each other and to playing the leading roles on the world stage. General de Gaulle, on hearing of the US involvement in World War II predicted: "Now the war is definitely won! And after that will come two phases: the first will be the rescue of Germany by the Allies; as for the second, I fear that it will be a war between the Russians and the Americans." (39)

After 1945, demobilization took place. But not necessarily back to pre-war levels. The enemies changed and most of Germany and almost all of Japan went into the Western camp. The tensions remained. Fears of war remained. Equally significantly, the military establishment did not disappear:

The growth of the military since the Second World War poses a fundamental dilemma for democratic government. On the one hand the weaponry of modern warfare can be employed with such awesome efficiency that no nation can defend itself from a surprise attack without a substantial armed force at the ready. Consequently, governments have been obliged to devote massive amounts of manpower, treasure, and scientific research to military defence. On the other hand, devoting so many resources to the armed forces inevitably increases the danger that the military elite, not the people or their representatives, will ultimately determine the choices made in crucial areas of public policy. (40)
President Eisenhower had seen at first hand the revolution in warfare by which, in only a few decades, the US Army had grown from being smaller than that of pre-war Greece's to becoming the world's most powerful. He was obviously not opposed to defence forces but he did question the continued high level of military preparedness.

In his Farewell Address, President Eisenhower, on 17 January 1961, cautioned his fellow Americans to beware of the twin dangers to freedom from the "military-industrial complex" and the "scientific-technological elite":

...this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

...The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations and the power of money is ever present, and is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. (41)

The speech received a favourable press reaction. Speaking the next day at his final presidential press conference, he replied to questions about how to deal with the military-industrial complex:

Eisenhower said every citizen should keep well informed, because "it is only a citizenry, an alert and informed citizenry which can keep these abuses from coming about." He added that the potential abuses of power and influence by the arms makers could come about "unwittingly, but just by the very nature of the thing." Every magazine you picked up had an advertisement of a Titan missile or an Atlas or what have you, which represented "almost an insidious penetration of our own minds that the only thing this country is engaged in is weaponry and missiles. And, I'll tell you we just can't afford to do that." (42)

President Eisenhower's two warnings haunt this dissertation. It is worth emphasizing that, of course, the US has no monopoly over this type of "complex". In examining the inefficient use of US military expenditure, Senator Proxmire also noted:

If I may digress a moment, the military tends to act alike the world over. The activity of generals is not without its wry humour. When the Soviet defence budget was reduced in 1965, the Soviet military leaders, like their counterparts in this country, conducted what was, in effect, a lobbying campaign against the cut. They lacked the profusion of mass media, the imaginative use of advertising that is a feature of our own lobbying campaigns, and the vast network of public relations specialists found in the Pentagon. Consequently, they confined themselves to the columns of Red Star, the official journal of the Soviet armed forces. But the burden of their argument had a familiar ring. The military budget could not be cut. The country should err only on the side of more defence. Change the typeface and the reports of their remarks could be substituted for testimony
before the Armed Services Committees or an editorial in one of the American military journals. (43)

The extent of the US problem was explained graphically by Ralph Lapp:

The United States has institutionalized its arms-making to a point where there is grave doubt that it can control this farflung apparatus. The machinery of defence is lubricated by politics so that it has become a juggernaut in our modern society. Few Congressmen care to challenge defence expenditures, even if they possess the technical competence to appraise techno-military issues. "We are always afraid", Senator Paul Douglas once remarked, "that if we vote for a reduction in a given expenditure not only will our friends in the Defence Department criticize us, but our opponents in our states and Congressional Districts back home will say: "When you voted to cut back the appropriation, you voted to weaken the preparedness program of the United States."

If this battle-scarred Marine, who at age 50 enlisted as a private, could express such a fear, imagine how Congressmen with no war record might feel about tilting with the Pentagon. (44)

The "scientific-technological elite" is also worth noting. William McNeill has argued that the roots of this problem go back much further. About a century ago, the Royal Navy, for example, began an extensive modernization process. Within three decades, the new military technology began to overwhelm the senior personnel charged with deploying it:

By the eve of World War I, fire control devices had become so complex that the admirals who had to decide what to approve and what to reject, no longer understood what was at issue when rival designs were offered to them. The mathematical principles involved and the mechanical linkages fire control devices relied upon were simply too much for harassed and busy men to master. Decisions were therefore made in ignorance, often for financial or personal or political reasons. (45)
The elite has recently come in for criticism from persons who know it best - former members of it. Former UK Chief Defence Scientist Lord Zuckerman has actually blamed the scientists for maintaining the mad momentum of the arms race:

It is my view, derived from many years of experience, that the basic reason for the irrationality of the whole process is the fact that ideas for a new weapon system derive in the first place, not from the military, but from different groups of scientists and technologists who are concerned to replace or improve old weapons systems - for example, by miniaturizing components - or by reducing weight/ yield ratios of nuclear warheads so that they can be carried further by a ballistic missile (that is to say, by packing greater explosive power into a smaller volume and weight). At base, the momentum of the arms race is undoubtedly fuelled by the technicians in governmental laboratories and in the industries which produce the armaments.

...In the nuclear world of today, military chiefs, who by convention are a country's official advisers on national security, as a rule merely serve as the channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views. For it is the man in the laboratory, not the soldier or sailor or airman, who at the start proposes that for this or that reason it would be useful to improve an old or devise a new nuclear warhead; and if a new warhead, then a new missile; and, given a new missile, a new system within which it has to fit. It is he, the technician, not the commander in the field, who starts the process of formulating the so-called military need. It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength, as though the former were the single and a sufficient condition of military success. (46)

Meanwhile, former scientific adviser to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, Herbert York, not only endorsed Eisenhower's warning but provided his own (1970) which is soon to come to pass through "launch on warning":

We will see in this book how the over-all complexity of systems is already leading us to a situation in which the response to a hypothetical
future attack will be so complicated and the time in which to decide what to do will be so short that it will be necessary to turn to automatic computing machines for the purpose. If we continue with the present style of technological approach to defence problems, the inclusion of human beings in the decision-making loop will seriously degrade the performance of the system. Thus, here too the power to make life-and-death decisions is passing from the hands of statesmen and politicians to lower-level officers and ultimately to computing machines and the technicians who program them. This trend too, if allowed to continue, will result in the capture of public policy by a scientific-technological elite. Eisenhower’s warnings, while based largely on intuition, have pointed up a very real and extremely serious problem. (47)

The rise of the new peace movement is to some extent derived from a heightened awareness of such technological developments as “launch on warning” and fears of accidental nuclear war. Even Hollywood has decided that there is money to be made here—hence the 1983 movie War Games in which a young “hacker” accesses the US Strategic Computer and almost triggers World War III.

Taken together, therefore, there are two complexes identified by Eisenhower: military-industrial and military-scientific. Given the large numbers of persons employed—defence is the US’s largest industry—there is a third complex: military-trades union. A fourth complex also exists (and was touched on at his final presidential press conference): military-mass media (such as, the advertising industry). In essence, then, the entire complex ought to be called the military-industrial-scientific (including technological) -trades union-mass media complex.

To overcome that complex, the peace movement should create an alternative complex drawing not only from the general public at large but also all the components of the population who are not benefiting directly from military expenditure. The peace movement should
therefore seek to recruit sympathetic members from industry, science/technology, trades unions, and the mass media who do not derive direct financial gain from military expenditure.

The basis for a "peace-industrial complex" (a shorthand version of a peace-industrial-scientific-technological-trades union-mass media complex) has existed for much of the period since 1945. Both the proponents and, ironically, the opponents of the arms race have devoted inadequate attention to the economic consequences of the arms race. Ironically, in the case of the opponents, this means that they have overlooked a potential aid for their cause. It is now time to turn to the economic consequences of both the arms race and disarmament.
NOTES


(10) A best-selling "novel of fact" claims that he was killed by conservative interests who thought he was, in effect, being too soft on communism, see: Donald Freed and Mark Lane Executive Action: Assassination of a Head of State London: Charisma, 1973.

(11) Osgood in Laszlo and Keys, Supra note (8), p 86.

(12) George Kennan "The Only Way Out of the Nuclear Nightmare" reprinted in Australian Disarmament Times (Sydney) July 1981.


(20) Supra note (1), p 26.


(22) Supra note (17), pp 12-14.


(24) Supra note (17), p 23.

(25) Supra note (23), pp 82-83.


(32) Peter Collier and David Horowitz The Kennedys London: Pan, 1985, p 386.


(35) Ibid, p 739.

(36) Supra note (33), p 341.


(38) "Every 24 minutes, a murder is committed somewhere in the US. Every ten seconds a house is burgled, every seven minutes a woman is raped. One out of every three households in the US was directly affected by some kind of serious crime last year. Rare is the American who does not personally know at least one victim of violence. Within four or five years every household in the country will be hit by crime. A hand gun is sold in the US every 13 seconds, adding two million a year to the nation's estimated arsenal of 55 million automatics and revolvers. That is one pistol for every four Americans."

F Z Zakaria in The Times of India (Sunday Magazine), 28 March 1982, p 5.


PART II

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COST

OF THE ARMS RACE AND OF DISARMAMENT
CHAPTER 4

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS: THE UN's WORK 1945-78

INTRODUCTION TO PART II

A few years ago, a "Blue Peter" BBC television programme showed children who had been disabled because British hospitals lacked sufficient incubators to cope with the numbers of premature babies who needed them. My son Arthur was watching. He was seven at the time, and knew his own life had been saved because he had had immediate access to an incubator. He was puzzled. "Mummy", he said, "they should build incubators rather than bombs. They should help people to live, not make them die." I agreed, and we talked about it for a few minutes, stressing not the suffering and death that would result if the weapons were actually used, but the pain of children and their parents all over the world who were suffering because the resources that could be used to meet human needs were wasted on armaments and other useless things.

He thought about it for a minute: "Mummy", he said, "it seems so obvious. Why don't people do it?" (1)

A good question. It forms the basis, in effect, of Part II of this dissertation. These four chapters are particularly focussed on the disarmament work of the United Nations.

The first major international disarmament gathering for about half a century took place in 1978: the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Special Session on Disarmament. Although disarmament had appeared on the international political agenda for all the years since 1945, most of the time it existed some way from the top of it. The 1978 UNGA Special Session suddenly increased its visibility. The Special Session also contributed to the revival of the new peace movement.

This dissertation is concerned partly with the UN's work on the economic and social costs of the arms race;
I have examined the UN's overall record on disarmament elsewhere (2).

Part II will show that, over the years, the UN's views have hardened on the adverse economic impact of the arms race and that governments have themselves supplied experts to help the UN's work - and yet governments, in fact, have taken no notice of that work. If nothing else, that work has provided many useful data on which to build Part III's proposals.

This chapter examines the UN's work before the 1978 UNGA Special Session on the economic and social consequences of military expenditure.

Chapter 5 examines the 1978 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. Special sessions are extraordinary meetings of the full UN membership called to discuss urgent world problems. These are rare events. Only 9 were held prior to 1978: Palestine (1947 and 1948), Tunisia (1961), Congo (1963), South West Africa/Namibia (1967), New International Economic Order (1974 and 1975), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978) and Namibia (1978).

Chapter 6 examines the disarmament-development link, forged at the 1978 Special Session, especially in the context of the Thorsson Report. Attention is also paid to two other reports which have a bearing on the link.

Chapter 7 examines the failure of the 1982 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. No progress was made on disarmament generally and the Thorsson Report was almost entirely ignored. The chapter ends with the failure to convene the 1985 Disarmament-Development Conference.
INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 4

The UN has, for several years, claimed that military expenditure overall was harmful to an economy and that there are economic arguments in favour of disarmament. Not all economists, however, have shared that view and the UN's approach has, by implication, been criticized by economists of various political persuasions. In recent years, the UN's point of view has gained additional support.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the UN's role in the debate over military expenditure prior to the 1978 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament.

This chapter will show how the UN, quite early in its career, adopted an approach to military expenditure which it has consistently followed and which is reflected in the 1978 UNGA debate and subsequent events. It will also show how some economists have, by implication, challenged the UN's views. It will also note that most economists have ignored almost entirely the issue of military expenditure.

The next section looks at the UN's earliest specific involvement in the military expenditure issue: the proposed reduction of military budgets. This seemed at one point an opportunity to reduce the arms race by cutting military expenditure. But, as at December 1986, that initiative remains deadlocked.

The third section examines the next economic issue to arise: the economic and social consequences of disarmament. It will show that two decades ago, the UN argued that disarmament would be overall economically beneficial for the world and that some separate studies agreed with that claim. This has continued to be the UN's view.
The fourth section examines the UN's Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race. This Report, a decade ago, endorsed the other Report, two decades ago, that the world would be better off economically without the arms race. This section also examines some reasons why governments have persisted in maintaining a high rate of military expenditure when their own experts have advised against it.

The final section deals with other economic opinions. Most economists have ignored the economic implications of the arms race and disarmament. A few have argued that economies (especially Western ones) need military expenditure to keep them out of a depression. These economists have contributed to governments having little interest in disarmament for fear of disrupting their economies.

REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

In the later 1940s, the UN's twin attempts at atomic/nuclear and conventional disarmament were getting nowhere (3). As a way of assisting the process of finding appropriate methods for negotiations, disarmament India proposed, in a broadly based UNGA Resolution "Peace through Deeds", the following provision which was adopted [Resolution 360 (V)] on 17 November 1950: that "for the realization of lasting peace and security it is indispensable...to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world." As with all UNGA Resolutions (except on domestic UN matters) the resolution was not binding on any nation. But it was an indication of one general suggestion to help the disarmament process. Also, it was an early manifestation of the disarmament-development link.
Proposals for freezing or reducing budgets have been quite a regular feature of UNGA disarmament resolutions. No specific proposal has yet been implemented. On current indication, there is little chance of a political breakthrough in this area.

The USSR and its immediate allies consistently advocated this proposal and kept it alive during the 1950s and 1960s. The USSR refined the proposal at the 1973 UNGA Session by proposing that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, USSR, UK, France and China) should each reduce their military expenditure by 10 percent and that part of the funds thus saved should be used to assist developing countries. The developing nations naturally supported the proposal.

But, as with the more general proposals of the 1950s and 1960s, the US, UK and France all opposed the 10 percent proposal. Their main objections "...remained essentially the same, namely, that there were very serious difficulties connected with the definition of military budgets. They also believed that disarmament and development stood separately from one another and each one should be pursued in its own right." (4). China, by this time, was being represented by the Peking Government and continued the hostility of the previous Taiwanese Government towards the proposal, this time by rejecting the assumption that the permanent members were equally responsible for the arms race and pointed to the comparatively low defence expenditure of China vis-a-vis the two super powers. China opposed the Resolution while the US, UK and France abstained.

However, the UNGA went on to adopt the Resolution 3093A (XXVIII) recommending that all five permanent members reduce their military expenditure by 10 percent, with the funds thus saved to assist developing countries, and expressing the desire that other nations should follow
suit. The Resolution was, of course, not binding on any nation. The proposed Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets was never convened due to differing views among the Big Five.

The basic idea, however, did not die. One of the main problems with it is the need to assess precisely just what constitutes "military expenditure". The UNGA also adopted Resolution 3093B (XXVIII) which requested the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on the reduction of military budgets so as to assist negotiations on what should and should not be included in those budgets.

Two contemporary studies illustrate the problems being encountered at the UNGA at this time. The International Institute for Strategic Studies compared three military allies which published their defence statistics more openly than most other nations: France, UK and West Germany 1968-72. The study noted the problems experienced even under these fairly reasonable circumstances:

The analysis and comparison of national defence budgets is a peculiarly complex operation. Analysis is impeded less by lacunae in official data, troublesome though they are, than by the fundamental problem that, because defence expenditure does not produce any output to which a price can be attached, only the cost of inputs can be considered. Comparison between countries is hindered by the absence of a satisfactory standard measure; even if market imperfections did not prevent exchange rates from giving a perfect picture of international value, those rates, being based upon tradable commodities, could only be applied very loosely to a commodity such as defence which unlike, say, military equipment, is itself non-tradable. Finally, comparison within one country over time faces twin obstacles: much defence expenditure, especially on procurement of major weapons is cyclical while, again because the output has no price, reduction of any series of defence budgets to a constant price basis is
vulnerable to unmeasured changes in the purchasing power of the money spent. (5)

The short article emphasized caution in the interpretation of the figures and concluded tentatively:

Certain cautionary comments on the tables are necessary. Because of the different manner in which national forces are organized and national budgets formulated, it should not be assumed that the categories used are, in fact, precisely comparable between countries, although everything possible has been done to make them so. Nor should it be expected that the figures in the tables here will coincide exactly with those given annually by the IISS in The Military Balance. Here, for example, actual outlays have been preferred to budget estimates and every traceable recollected has been deducted in order to arrive at net figures. In addition, GNP figures have been calculated on the basis of financial, rather than calendar, years. (6)

At the same time, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was studying the meaning and measurement of military expenditure on a world scale. It noted the then fashionable debate over international comparisons of military expenditure. (The alleged "dollar gap" to the US's disadvantage vis-a-vis the USSR, had by now replaced the alleged "missile gap" of the early 1960s which had been shown to be false.) It was fashionable to claim that the US was lagging behind in the arms race since the USSR was spending more. SIPRI questioned the value of such monetary comparisons. Comparisons of absolute "dollar" values overlooked such matters as the differing exchange rates, differing costs of living and the differing contractual arrangements under which the military acquire resources from the general economy. The study continued:

In view of these various considerations it should be apparent that international comparisons of the volume of resources devoted to military uses made on the basis of comparative military expenditure should be interpreted cautiously.
If the object of international comparison of military expenditure is to draw conclusions about relative military strength, then some additional considerations are relevant. Some of the factors that would influence the outcome of a hypothetical military encounter bear no relation whatever and whether one is attacking or defending; others are only tenuously related (for example, the relative capabilities of the weapons of the two sides, the efficiency of the logistic systems and the quality and morale of the troops).

However, we could ignore the finer point associated with the question of who might win a particular fight and simply ask what relation military spending bears to the total size of the military forces. The essential consideration here is an obvious one: the fact that the military forces or, in a crude sense, the military capability which exists at any particular time is not directly related to the prevailing level of military expenditure...

Another possible indicator of accumulated military capability is the value of the stock of military equipment. Since military value is highly subjective, the calculation would have to be made in terms of economic value but some positive correlation between the two undoubtedly exists. The value of the stock in relation to R & D procurement expenditure in any one year would give some idea of the degree of emphasis given to capital investment in the military. It would also reflect the rapidly increasing cost of military equipment.

The general point, then, is that comparative military expenditure at a point in time is a rather poor index of relative military strength. This is both because of the technical difficulties associated with international comparisons and because acquiring a modern military force, since it is highly capital-intensive, takes a considerable period of time. (7)

The UNGA decided to approach the question of the reduction of military expenditure gradually. The initiation of studies of the question's technical points had three advantages. It kept alive the idea of reducing military expenditure while avoiding the sterile Sino-Soviet dispute over who was responsible for the arms race. Second, it would give all nations the opportunity gradually to get used to the idea of
reducing military expenditure. Third, it was clear that more research was required anyway on the technical aspects.

The 1974 UNGA [3254 (XXIX)] requested the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with governments, to study the definition of "military budgets", the feasibility of a standardized system of military budgets, the percentage reductions in military budgets (for the Big Five and all other nations) and an international UN mechanism to distribute funds thus saved to developing countries.

Around this time, however, (1975) the US-USSR tension gave the debate a new twist which has since characterized the proceedings. Western nations have taken part fully in the technical discussions but the USSR and its immediate allies have abstained from them. Summarizing the situation in 1980, a UN publication reported:

Despite the progress made on the reporting system, it has not solved the basic differences in approach to the problem of reducing military budgets. Several States, mainly members of the Eastern European group, have continued to hold that a political decision, followed by substantive negotiations at the inter-governmental level, would facilitate a solution. They have maintained that the expert studies are designed only to delay a political solution. Western and other countries have emphasized the importance of first solving the technical issues to make possible an adequate comparison among the various budgetary systems. Still others, particularly developing countries, have said that the study of technical issues, while useful, should not delay progress on reduction of military budgets as a measure aimed at disarmament and development. (8)

No matter how attractive the idea may seem at first, it clearly is not going to produce any quick results and certainly does not represent a route to disarmament. But it does throw light on just how difficult it is to assess fully how much money is spent on the arms race.
In pursuance of UNGA Resolution 3093 B (XXVIII), the UN Secretary-General appointed a group of experts, which prepared a Report (UN document A/9770/Rev.1) entitled 
Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 percent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries. The Report noted that a prerequisite for negotiating the reduction of military expenditure was agreement on the scope and content of such expenditures. The questions of developing a standardized system for defining and reporting military expenditures and of verifying compliance with agreements to reduce such expenditures were also discussed. The 1974 UNGA invited member-nations to comment upon the Report [Resolution 3254 (XXIX)]. The 1975 UNGA requested the UNSG to appoint a group of experts to examine four issues: (a) the definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures, as well as the classification and structuring of expenditures within the military budgets; (b) the valuation of resources in the military sector, considering different economic systems and different structures of production within the military sector; (c) the deflation for price change in military production in different nations; and (d) the international value comparison and exchange rates relevant to military production [Resolution 3463 (XXX)].

The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) tabled the Report Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures (A/31/222/Rev.1). Some progress was made on the tasks given to the experts. They recommended the implementation of an international reporting system for military expenditures. They also designed a reporting matrix as an instrument for standardized reporting. The 1976 UNGA invited member-nations to comment upon the Report (31/87). Fourteen nations responded to the
Invitation (Report: A/32/194 and Add.1). The 1977 UNGA requested the UNSG to ascertain which nations would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument.

The 1978 UNGA Special Session also discussed this issue. The Final Document’s provisions required “protracted negotiations” (9):

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development. (10)

The basic idea was retained but without any specific directions.
Pursuant to the 1978 UNGA Resolution 33/67, the UNSG appointed an Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting composed of experts from seven nations: Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden and the US. The Ad Hoc Panel submitted to the UNSG, on 31 August 1979, a "Proposed Reporting Matrix and Instruction" (reprinted as Appendix III, in A/35/479). The UNSG circulated it to all member-nations inviting their participation in the experiment. Fourteen nations responded: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the US. (Replies reprinted as Appendix I in A/35/479.) The Ad Hoc Panel considered the replies. It noted that while the number of nations participating in the test had been limited, they did represent a variety of geographical regions, with different budgeting systems. The results of the test, it concluded, showed that the matrix represented a viable and practical means for international reporting of military expenditures. The Panel underlined the close relationship between building confidence among nations and increased openness in matters of military expenditures by way of standardizing reporting; progress towards either of those goals would have positive effects on the other. (11)

The Report was examined at the 1980 UNGA, which requested the UNSG to appoint a Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets to refine further the reporting system (35/142 B). The Group met during 1981 and 1982. Although there were still a few technical matters to resolve, the problem by now was basically political: The USSR and some other nations were unwilling to participate in the scheme. Also, although most nations were now in favour of it (35/142B was adopted, for example, by 113 for, none against, 21 abstentions and 19 absent nations - including China), there was also the problem of even getting the scheme's
supporters actually to galvanize their civil services into completing the questionnaire. Only 16 nations managed to complete the questionnaire: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Turkey and the US. (12)

If this exercise had been a litmus test of governmental attitudes towards the arms race, then clearly it still had a low priority among most governments. It is hard to reconcile this apathy with paragraph 18 of the 1978 UNGA Special Session Final Document's declaration that "Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day."

There are three main explanations for this lack of participation in the exercise. First, as noted, disarmament was not really a major concern of most governments - and this will become even more evident as Part II goes on. Second, governments receive many requests each year from UN bodies for answers to questionnaires. They accorded this one no higher priority than they did the others. Civil servants, in my experience, always put down their lack of response to overwork.

Third, the value of the entire exercise remained under a cloud because of the lack of support for it from the USSR and its immediate allies. The USSR is unwilling to reveal its full defence expenditure. That is why the Western nations have pressed for clarification of basic matters, such as a definition of what constitutes military expenditure. The USSR and its immediate allies have responded by being evasive and accusing the Western nations of delaying the implementation of the 10 percent cut. If the USSR were sincere in its desire for a 10 percent cut, then it would have assisted the UN's work on the technical issues and so deprived the Western
nations of their alleged reasons for proceeding slowly. The refusal by the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies to reveal their full military expenditure is probably the most difficult task in assessing world military expenditure. (13)

To conclude this section, there is little to be gained in urging further work on the reduction of military budgets. Recent UN General Assemblies have made no progress on this matter. The USSR must bear the largest single blame for wrecking a proposal which it had first championed.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT

The late 1950s/early 1960s saw the culmination of the work on a treaty for general and complete disarmament (GCD) (14). The progress apparently being made gave rise to fears that GCD would result in profound economic and social disadvantages. As it happened, the GCD initiative collapsed for political reasons. But the UN's work at this time is worth examining for its contribution to the debate over disarmament - a contribution, alas, which has still not registered fully with public opinion.

The UNGA decided in 1960 [Resolution 1516 (XV)] to establish a group of experts to study the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament (UN Sales Publication No. 62 IX.1) was published in 1961. Its authors were, in effect, representatives drawn from each of the then world's three major economic and political systems: USSR, Sudan, UK, India, Pakistan, Poland, US, Venezuela, France and Czechoslovakia.
The study began by examining the resources devoted to military purposes (current military expenditure then being $120 billion). 85 percent of the total outlays arose from seven nations: Canada, West Germany, France, China, USSR, UK and US. The great bulk of the resources released by disarmament would, therefore, be concentrated in a very few nations.

On the peaceful use of resources released by disarmament, it did not provide a shopping list of where the resources could be used or an alternative programme. It tried to highlight generally some areas where the resources could be used, such as raising standards of personal consumption of goods and services; expanding or modernizing productive capacity through investment in new plant and equipment, promoting housing construction, urban renewal (including slum clearance) and rural development; improving and expanding facilities for education, health, welfare, social security, cultural development and scientific research.

Then there was an examination of the impact of disarmament on national production and employment. The problem of conversion of military resources to civilian uses in 1962 would result in a smaller programme than that required after World War II. Consequently, the study dealt with that conversion programme and noted its success - all the more so since at that time military expenditure and force levels were four times higher than in the early 1960s.

In the context of the structural problems of conversion, the study did not underestimate the extent of the problems involved. But these could be resolved by appropriate government planning, especially in respect to the adaptation of skills to peacetime requirements, the provision of assistance to particular enterprises which had catered previously for military programmes and
the reorientation of research and development programmes.

On the impact of disarmament on international economic relations, it concluded that disarmament was bound to have favourable effects on such relations, such as the relaxation of political tensions reducing the political obstacles to international trade, as well as providing increased foreign aid, which would then be spent on importing more goods and services. Since some nations regard certain domestic industries as important for national security, they have helped them by discriminatory and protectionist policies (such as food). If there were a relaxation in political tensions, then there would be less incentive to have such policies.

As to the efforts of disarmament on the volume and framework of aid for economic development, the study recorded the potential assistance (both in aid and personnel) which could become available as a result of disarmament. It recalled, however, that foreign aid can play only a supplementary role in economic development and so, in effect, foreign aid is not a panacea. The study did not state how a mechanism could be developed which would ensure that cuts in military expenditure would be translated partly into foreign aid.

In regard to some of the social consequences of disarmament, reduced military expenditure could give rise to increased social welfare benefits. People would no longer be haunted by the threat of war. A reduction in political tensions could facilitate international cooperation in scientific research, the arts and cultural contacts.
The study’s last paragraph (195) concluded:

The Consultative Group is unanimously of the opinion that all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.

The Report was examined by the 1962 UNGA, which endorsed the unanimous conclusion of the consultative group of experts that the implementation of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing for all mankind [Resolution 1837 (XVII)].

The Report attracted some contemporary attention. But UN opinion by this time was tending away from general and complete disarmament towards partial measures. The Antarctic had just been declared the world’s first nuclear-free zone (Antarctic Treaty, Article V) and the Partial Test Ban Treaty would be signed a few months later (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, signed on 5 August 1963) (15). The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis had reminded the world of just how serious was the threat of nuclear war. And "...there was a tendency to suppose that somehow the final corner had been turned." (16) It seemed at the time that the world had been warned about the danger of nuclear war and treaties, like the Partial Test Ban Treaty, were proof of the lesson having been learned. Instead of CCD, the world had embarked upon partial measures and two had already been achieved. Others were expected to occur shortly.

Consequently, the UN Report did not have the impact which it deserved. It had addressed the economic
problems of GCD, when the partial measures approach had become the vogue. The implementation of partial measures would not, of course, have the same immediate economic impact as GCD. But, in my view, if GCD could be accomplished with few economic disadvantages, then the partial measures would create even fewer.

SUPPORTIVE ECONOMIC OPINIONS

Most economists have ignored the economic implications of the arms race and disarmament. However, a few economists did agree at the time with the UN's views regarding the economic consequences of disarmament.

In recalling the demobilization experience in 1945-6, Kenneth Boulding commented:

We next see the Great Disarmament of 1945 and '46. It is odd that this has left so little impression on the American consciousness. It was achieved with unemployment never rising above 3 percent and with astonishingly little dislocation. Its history has never been properly written, but it is one of the most extraordinary episodes in all of economic history. Here is the transfer of almost a third of the economic activity of a large and very complex society from the war industry into civilian purposes. It is done in little over a year and with an incredibly small amount of disruption. (17)

The US Government around this time was compiling its own study. On 4 March 1962, William C Foster, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, issued a report which had been compiled by a panel of governmental, industrial and labour persons headed by Emile Benoit (18). This report said that the US economy could meet without serious long-term difficulty the huge cut in defence spending which would result from a general disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. This cut in defence spending "should create small danger of provoking immediate depression in our economy,
assuming sensible adjustment policies and vigorous government leadership to dispel adverse effects on business and consumer anticipations and to provide reassurance that aggregate demand will not be allowed to decline precipitately... These problems can be mastered by application of appropriate policies, the chief obstacles to which would be political resistance rather than deficiencies in our economic knowledge."

Two UK economists arrived at the same conclusion. Dealing with the economic impact of disarmament on the UK economy, Arthur Brown concluded:

Thus, while the general effects of disarmament on levels of living and rate of growth in the British economy would certainly be favourable, given even moderately competent management of its central policy, the effects on its balance of payments would be complex. However, on balance, it seems likely that except perhaps in the transitional period and shortly after it, the current balance would be favourably affected, or at least that policies capable of improving it would be made easier. (19)

Gavin Kennedy, meanwhile, concluded:

The economic problems of disarmament are entirely short-term and do not in themselves constitute an argument against disarmament. On the contrary, the economic case against defence expenditure is far more formidable than the political and moral cases put together. The long-term political problems raised by disarmament are substantial but it is the short-term problems only of economic adjustment that are in any way serious. They are surmountable, however, by a government and community determined to make the adjustments necessary to replace the demand created by defence expenditures. (20)

Also, soon after the UN Report was published, the UK United World Trust (a non-governmental organization) commissioned the Economist Intelligence Unit (the research wing of the conservative magazine The Economist) to assess the economic consequences of
disarmament in the UK. The EIU Report examined the UK post-World War II experience: "From the viewpoint of both output and employment, therefore, the disarmament programme at the end of the 1939-45 war was carried out with a minimum of friction and dislocation. Moreover, this transition to a mainly peacetime economy was achieved without the government having to take massive steps to ease the changeover and to support the level of demand." (21) Moreover, in regard to the problem of demobilization: "It seems clear from these figures that the disarmament programme after the 1939-1945 war did not lead to more than a minor and short-lived reduction in the total level of economic activity, although in real terms the problem was probably at least three times as great as would be faced now." (22) However, this post-war experience would have little direct relevance to 1962's conditions because there was a backlog of demand built up during the war years as a result of a shortage of supplies and destruction of property and consumers during the war had accumulated reserves which they were eager to translate into purchases. Nonetheless, the EIU Report still believed that disarmament could be conducted in the UK with overall minimal economic dislocation.

Apart from the flurry of activity in the early 1960s (to be encountered again in the following section) there was comparatively little scholarly attention specifically to the economics of the disarmament until the late 1970s. This lack of work coincided with the period in which GCD in particular was out of favour and disarmament, generally, was low on the political agenda. As the 1962 US ACDA study indicated, disarmament was not a specifically economic problem (since its economic implication could be coped with) but a political one - there had to be the political will to get disarmament in the first place.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE

On 22 May 1970, UNSG, U Thant, in a statement entitled "Politics of Disarmament", proposed that a study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race. He hoped that such a study would help publicize the extent of military expenditures, the effects such expenditures were having in diverting resources away from peaceful purposes, and would help to create a fuller understanding of the needs and the possibilities for reordering world priorities during the 1970s. (23)

The 1970s, as far as the UN's agenda was concerned, were to be characterized as the decade of "mega-conferences", starting with Stockholm in 1972 (Human Environment) going through Food (1974), Population (1974), Unemployment (1974), Women (1975) and Science and Technology (1979). There was also to be the revival of using UNGA Special Sessions in the mid-1970s for the New International Economic Order. Although U Thant in 1970 could not foresee all the diplomatic gatherings planned for the decade, he was well aware that disarmament did not figure on the list of new priorities which were now attracting the limelight. Like most economists, governments regarded the arms race as a fixed fact of international life and so directed their attentions to what were seen as more alterable features of international life. Thant hoped to get the arms race higher on the international political agenda by examining what a waste of money it was.

The 1970 UNGA considered his proposal and it requested him to appoint a group of experts to report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures [Resolution 2667 (XXV)]. Fifteen experts were appointed, representing all the world's main political and economic systems. Their Report was
adopted unanimously: Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures. It was considered by the 1971 UNGA which "welcomes (it) with satisfaction" [Resolution 2831 (XXVI)].

The Report consisted of five chapters. Many of the figures it provided are now well out of date and so those are not repeated here. But it is notable that between the 1961 UN Report and the 1972 one, military expenditure had risen by 25 percent: from about $120 billion ($150 billion at 1972 prices) to about $200 billion) (paragraph 2).

On the qualitative aspects of the arms race, it said "...that while the cost of the arms race in terms of the resources which it consumes is highly alarming, the mounting sophistication and destructiveness of the weapons which result from it are even more so" (paragraph 22).

In terms of resources, military expenditures were then running at two and a half times what governments were spending on education and 30 times more than the total of all official foreign aid. Military expenditure equalled the combined GNP of developing countries in South Asia, the Far East and Africa (with a then population of 1,300 million) (paragraph 24). Eighty percent of military expenditure came from 6 nations (out of the then total of 120): US, USSR, China, France, UK and West Germany (paragraph 30).

As to the dynamics of military research and development, the arms race should be seen as a technological race, with the achievements of one side spurring on the other to improve the technological advances which it might have made itself (paragraph 43). Before a new weapon is completed, the military designer is already designing a more effective model - obsolescence had also become a
characteristic of the arms race (paragraph 44). Since the military want to employ the best scientists, their bidding for them can have an inflationary effect in the scientific market (paragraph 47). The arms race "...is incompatible with normal economic and social development" (paragraph 52).

On the national consequences of the arms race, military expenditure means that that sum of money cannot be spent on health, education or welfare programmes (paragraph 56). Military expenditure hinders economic growth because that money is not being spent on capital assets (paragraph 59-64). Developing countries which do not have domestic weapon manufacturers divert potential investment capital into buying weapons from overseas (paragraph 65). Private consumption is in direct competition with military expenditure and so money which could be used to increase standards of living is going into military expenditure (paragraph 72). The Report endorsed the 1962 Report's findings that no major economic and social instability need result from disarmament (paragraph 77).

As to the international consequences of the arms race, in terms of the foreign aid goals set by the UNGA [Resolution 2626 (XXV)], it would take only a five percent shift of military expenditure to development to meet those goals (paragraphs 106-109).

The Report concluded unanimously: (i) a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all nations should be brought about as soon as possible, (ii) regardless of their size or their stage of development, all nations share the responsibility of taking steps to achieve this goal, (iii) a halt in the arms race would help the economic and social development of all nations, (iv) in order to draw the attention of governments and public opinion to the direction the arms race is taking,
the UNSG should keep the facts under periodic review (paragraph 120).

An air of unreality surrounds this Report. First, groups of experts are appointed by the UNSG in consultation with governments. The experts (at least from Western nations) tend to serve in their personal capacities. But it is rare for any expert to be appointed if he or she is opposed to the government’s thinking on the matter to be investigated (24). This is why the experts are selected to represent a wide range of political and economic systems. No individual as such can represent a political and economic system. But individuals can be representative of governmental thinking on an issue and so the UNSG ensures that, in effect, all the main UN member-nations are invited to suggest names of possible people. Consequently, the Report was prepared on the basis of at least some general indications of what governments would find acceptable for their experts to state. The experts recalled the 1962 UN Report and went on to identify themselves with the urgency of the topic:

7. We have been asked to approach the same general problem from the point of view of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures. We do so with a sense of urgency, in the recognition that until a halt is put to the race, there can be no assurance of international peace, and the threat of war, and particularly of nuclear war, will continue to plague the world.

But nothing done by most governments would indicate that they then heeded or have since done so the words of their experts. Even at December 1986, disarmament is not treated as the highest priority item by governments.

Second, the 1972 Report (like others which will receive later attention) is clear about the economic advantages to flow from cutting back on the arms race. And yet
this inducement to accelerate the disarmament negotiations was ignored.

Third, the UK expert was Lord Zuckerman, recently retired as chief scientific adviser to the UK Government and previously the Chief Defence Scientist. Zuckerman has recently, in effect, built upon the Report's first chapter by blaming scientists for maintaining the arms race's mad momentum (25). In other words, the UK expert was a former UK Chief Defence Scientist appointed by the UK Government to a group which told all governments (including one of the biggest spenders on military research: the UK's) that scientific military research was jeopardizing the entire world. But the UK Government ignored that advice.

One explanation for this air of unreality is simply that governments were wedded to the belief that they had to possess defence forces irrespective of the costs. Consequently, while acknowledging the economic disadvantages of the arms race, they felt obliged to disregard the views of their own experts since national security had to come first.

Second, military expenditure, the arms race, disarmament, threat of World War III etc, are not major matters of government concern. (Hence, the importance of the new peace movement in forcing governments now to take notice of the arms race issue.) Defence establishments are seen as a fixed part of political life. Consequently, the UN Report, like its other related Reports, sank without trace into a governmental mire of apathy.

A third explanation is "incrementalism", a term political scientists use to describe decision-making (26). Decisions are made on the basis of one increment being added to others and so proceeding slowly. This
precludes major changes of policy (short of a national emergency, like World War II). The UN Report would have required too many changes; politicians and civil servants are not in that business.

Fourth, there is the influence of the military-industrial complex which is itself, in effect, a fixed fact of political life shrouded in secrecy. In 1967, for example, I was in the Finance Branch of the UK Ministry of Defence and all UK Government Departments were supposed to be cutting back on proposed expenditure. I read recently Barbara Castle’s Diaries for this period and was intrigued to hear that Solly Zuckerman was supplying her (as the left-wing Minister for Transport) inside information on how the proposed finance cuts were not really being carried out:

10 October 1967

Lunch with Solly Zuckerman – at his request. Although ostensibly the purpose was to discuss the need to expand R and D expenditure on Inland transport, our talk ranged very widely indeed and Solly made no attempt to hide some of his criticisms of the Government. The System, he believed – quoting Max Nicholson with approval – remained largely unchallenged. Ministers were still being successfully insulated by their civil servants from influence from outside. Most Cabinet Ministers were ignorant of half what was going on...

And, Solly continued, there was one Cabinet committee not even mentioned in the official list – the one dealing with our nuclear policy. To his own knowledge a paper currently being circulated to this committee was advocating the direct opposite of the Party’s policy and he was just off to discuss it with Harold Wilson. It was impossible for anyone outside the Ministry of Defence – and certainly for anyone outside Overseas Policy and Defence Committee of Cabinet – to check whether the paper cuts in the defence programme were really being carried out. In fact, they weren’t. If I wanted to test this I had only to ask how many scientists had been transferred from defence work – as we had been promised they would be, so as to enable civilian R and D to be intensified. (How I
wish there were a Question Time in Cabinet! I know if I raise it what a smoothly evasive answer I shall get.) (27)

Incidentally, the Diaries also reveal another facet of bureaucratic politics: "where you stand, depends on where you sit." In the Wilson Labour Governments 1964-70, Denis Healey was the tough-minded Minister of Defence, who opposed the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Roy Jenkins) who wanted cuts to defence expenditure. In the next Wilson Governments (1974-76), Healey was himself Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mrs Castle recalled how one of her advisers (Brian Abel-Smith) had some inside information on 4 December 1975:

His spies, he said, had told him that the Chancellor had just been to a crucial meeting of OPD [Overseas Policy and Defence Committee of Cabinet], where he had been confronted by a massed array of Chiefs of Staff resisting his proposed defence cuts. It had made Denis "very angry", because from his own knowledge of the Ministry of Defence he knew the cuts were feasible. This demonstration of the Chancellor's mood is all very fine and encouraging, but I can't help being amused because I remember how when he was Minister of Defence he mobilized against Roy the massed ranks of the Chiefs of Staff, threatening resignation if Roy's cuts went through. Times don't change: only people! (28)

The final explanation (which deserves its own section - the next one) is the attitude generally of the economics profession towards the economic consequences of military expenditure.

To sum up, the UN largely pioneered post-1945 concern about the economic and social consequences of the arms race. Its Report, a decade ago, echoed the Report, two decades ago, that the world would be better off economically without the arms race. But its work was a voice in the wilderness. Even most of the economics profession took little interest in this subject.
CONTRARY OPINIONS BY ECONOMISTS

Opinions by economists on the economic consequences of military expenditure come in three categories. One category consists of the economists who would share the views contained in the UN Reports. This category would also include, incidentally, Adam Smith who, two centuries ago said:

The whole army and navy...are unproductive labourers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honourable, how useful, or how necessary soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can afterwards be procured.

The second category would include the vast majority of contemporary economists: they ignore military expenditure. For example, Aubrey Jones (head of the UK National Board for Prices and Incomes 1965-70) wrote a book on inflation which made no mention at all of the contribution which military expenditure might make to inflation (30). I wrote to Jones (2 January 1980) pointing out the UN's views on military expenditure and inflation. Jones replied:

When writing *The New Inflation* I did not take into account the part played by defence spending. This was partly because, as far as the UK was concerned, defence spending as a proportion of GDP was declining. Now, of course, the situation has changed. (31)

Although defence spending was declining as a percentage of GDP (and GNP), UK expenditure was - and remains - by any means of comparison one of the world's biggest.

A check of many books currently being recommended to economics students reveals that they make at most only passing mention of military expenditure (32).
Indeed, in a recent study of policy research analysis of US Governments, the editors noted the lack of research in the defence area generally:

Vietnam set back the credibility of systems analysis, particularly in relation to military issues, in part because analytic techniques were misused or applied to improperly formulated problems. Many analysts who worked within the defence establishment were discredited. Those who ventured outside typically refused to work on defence matters. The nation's understanding of military issues may well have suffered appreciably from the antagonism felt by most emerging young thinkers and analysts towards the assessment of these problems. The absence of defence policy analysis in this volume reflects the paucity of non-government work in this field, particularly within the public policy schools at major universities. It is a serious omission, which the editors regret.

Defence issues, and their relation to more general problems of foreign policy and international relations, are crucial public concerns. Their importance starts with the need to provide security for the nation without excessively draining resources. Careful analytic work could be of great value in examining such issues as the prospects for the NATO alliance; the relative roles of conventional and nuclear capabilities in deterring or stimulating conflicts; mechanisms to reduce levels of nuclear and conventional weapons; East-West economic relations and their effects on the military balance; and the international weapons market and its relation to Third World economic development.

Defence issues also interact with domestic policy concerns: manpower problems raise controversies over conscription, women's rights, and racial balance; weapons procurement spotlights the imperfectly understood relationship between the development of military and civilian technologies. And the foreign policy issue of nuclear weapons control seems likely to have major domestic political consequences in the 1980s. (33)

The final category consists of economists, especially socialist or Marxist ones, who have claimed that the US economy needs the arms race. But it is worth noting that these views are no longer as common as they used to
be - perhaps proof that the UN's views are gaining their acceptance. Two examples of the old view will illustrate this.

Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy created an under-consumptionist model of the US economy in which US military expenditure was the surplus-absorbing mechanism: "On what else could the government spend enough to keep the system from sinking into the mire of stagnation? On arms, more arms, and ever more arms." (34) The problem for these writers is that the US economy has not followed their predictions. Seymour Melman examined the Baran-Sweezy claim fully and concluded:

In sum, evidence of military spending and economic growth among countries and within the United States does not support the theory that the war economy is an economically derived necessity, specific to monopoly capitalism. This conclusion is confirmed by a study of the relationship between military spending, growth and stagnation for eighteen nations by Albert Szymanski. The war economy of the United States, with its great network of enterprises and employees and with expenditures of one and a half trillion dollars since 1946 cannot be explained as an offset to economic surplus in industrial capitalism. For the permanent war economy has itself become a generator of surplus capital and surplus labour. The fact that the war economy of World War II was useful for ending the Great Depression became the basis for a theory that there was no other way to get a full-employment economy. Hence, from an empirical observation that war production restored prosperity, a theory of necessity, of indispensability, of war production to prosperity was derived. (35)

Second, Michael Meacher (a UK left-wing Labour MP) has written on military expenditure, though he has hedged his views. "Arms expenditure", he begins "has undoubtedly been one of the main engines of growth of Western capitalism in the post-war world." (36) He continued:
The significance of arms expenditure in Western capitalism is not only that it is claimed to be a massive source of demand in a system otherwise prone to stagnation because of need saturation (even given the Galbraithian artificial stimulation of needs by commercial advertising); it also has three other special characteristics as a stabilizer. One is that demand for new defence equipment and new weapons systems is open-ended: there is potentially no end to improvements that can be sought in military security networks. Secondly, arms production has a "domino" effect: initiatives by one side have to be countered by equal or preferably superior responses by the other, and all the major economies are thus drawn inexorably into a competitive arms race which in demand terms within each economy is self-perpetuating. Thirdly, arms expenditure has produced considerable civilian "spin-off", and thus has made an important contribution to stimulating the general rate of technological advance. (37)

He then noted that the growth could have come from any other form of government expenditure, such as housing or hospitals. But he doubted if this would have worked because of the size and impact of such expenditure. To support this claim he quotes from "a US Government report" - The Report from Iron Mountain - which stated "Our objections to (welfare expenditure are that)...As an economic substitute for war it is inadequate because it would be far too cheap." (38) The irony here, of course, is that the book was a spoof (which certainly continues to fool at least one person) by one of the US's most gifted commentators on contemporary politics (39). However, Meacher ends by recognizing the limits of his initial claim:

However, there are clear limitations to the arms economy argument as an explanation of growth and slump. It is true that on the arms front Western military expenditure is gradually but steadily losing its proportionate share in each national GNP. Even the Vietnam War did not reverse the declining share of armaments in government spending in the West from 25% in 1955 to 17% in 1965. But such a decline can hardly by itself explain the slide into depression in the 1970s, given that military expenditures still remained at extremely high levels. Moreover, it has been argued that a permanent war economy, as in the USA, is actually
inevitable to productive growth: the USA, with the highest proportionate military spending at 9.2% of GNP in the 1960s compared with Japan's mere 0.8% attained an annual growth rate of only 2.6% per employee during this period, compared with Japan's very rapid 9.5%. Japanese concentration on medium-level technologies, with low-cost overheads, spread over huge export runs, proved a much more effective and enduring post-war growth formula, at least until 1971. (40)

To conclude, there is the speculation of what Lord Keynes would have thought about all this military expenditure. A government should intervene when savings exceeded investment, borrow the excess savings, then spend the money on socially useful projects. The overall aim need not be an increase in the economy's productive capacity but should be directed at boosting the spending stream and creating a full-employment equilibrium. It would not add to the capital stock - if it did, it would make the chances of attaining full employment more difficult next time around:

Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well as the search for precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of many by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. The Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids; two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but not so two railways from London to York. (41)

World War II proved the value of his views:

The war pointed a sharp Keynesian moral. As a public works project, all wars (before the nuclear era) are ideal. Since all war production is sheer economic waste, there is never a danger of producing too much. Even an enlightened nation might build enough schools, roads, houses, parks and hospitals to meet its own standards. What happens when the demand for perfectly useless objects is multiplied almost without limit. What happens when this demand is financed in reality if not in appearance by the printing of new money? In the world of 1941-5, what occurred was full employment, bustling factories and an increase in
the production of useful as well as useless things. In real life these were the consequences of waste. They were also the consequences predicted by Keynes. In the Second World War the equivalent of the Egyptian pyramids, the medieval cathedrals, and the buried bottles full of money were the tanks, the bombers and the aircraft carriers. (42)

However, post-1945 military expenditure has not been operated in a particularly Keynesian way. As Lekachman implies in the above quotation, post-1945 warfare is now more destructive because of the risk of nuclear weapons. More importantly, military expenditure is now capital intensive rather than labour intensive as a UK study has shown. (43)

To sum up, the UN and governments have not received much help from economists, most of whom have simply ignored the economic and social consequences of the arms race and disarmament. Others have helped governments to maintain their old beliefs that the arms race was good for the economy. The UN has had an uphill battle trying to impress an alternative point of view on governments - all the more so since for most of the period covered in this chapter governments did not regard disarmament as a high priority item anyway.
NOTES

(1) Pat Saunders "Poverty and the War Business" Sanity

(2) See: Keith D Suter Peaceworking: The United
     Nations and Disarmament Sydney: UN Association of
     Australia, 1985.

(3) Philip Noel-Baker The Arms Race: A Programme for
     World Disarmament London: Calder, 1958, pp
     181-201.

(4) Disarmament: Progress Towards Peace New York: UN,
     1974, p 37.

(5) Strategic Survey 1972 London: International
     Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973, p 68.


(7) The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure

(8) The UN Versus the Arms Race New York: UN, 1980, p
     113.

(9) Homer A Jack The UN Special Session and Beyond New

(10) Final Document of the UNGA Special Session on
     Disarmament 1978 New York, UN.

(11) Disarmament Study Series No. 4: Reduction of
     Military Budgets: International Reporting of
     Military Expenditures New York: UN, 1981
     (A/35/479), p 51.


(22) Ibid, p 117.


(24) The 1972 UNGA decided to investigate napalm and other incendiary weapons (which were then in the public eye because of the Vietnam conflict). The UK Conservative Government was invited to provide an expert. The UK's main expert was Julian Perry Robinson, who had been critical of the US's napalm policy in Vietnam. The UK Government told the UNSG that the UK did not have an expert. Luckily the World Health Organization engaged Perry Robinson to help the committee produce its report: Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of their Possible Use. New York: UN, 1972. (This information came from sources other than Mr Perry Robinson.)


Letter to Keith D Suter, 13 January 1980.


Meanwhile, the North Holland publishing company, in its 1985 catalogue, describes itself "With their long-standing tradition of excellence, North-Holland's publications have acquired an outstanding reputation amongst professionals economists and have become a must for the library shelf." But the extensive catalogue does not contain a single book on military expenditure! The same may also be said of the books published by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A new western European/North American "major international series...presents state-of-the-art monographs" but there is no mention of military expenditure: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics (16 volumes) London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986.

A third example comes from Harold Bell, who each year, addresses the Institute of Directors in Australia (NSW Branch) on the federal budget; he ignores defence expenditure every time.
Finally, an examination of the following series revealed only a few passing references to military expenditure: John Fletcher (Editor) Economics Working Papers: A Bibliography Dobbs Ferry, New York: Trans Media, The Oceana Group (1983-6 volumes).


(37) Ibid, pp 51-52.


(40) Supra note (36), p 53.


CHAPTER 5

ESTABLISHING THE DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT LINK:
THE 1978 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION
ON DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 5

The previous chapter has described the UN's early and largely unpublicized efforts to alert governments and public opinion to the economic disadvantages of the arms race. Like all other aspects of the need to negotiate disarmament, these economic disadvantages were largely ignored.

This chapter takes the debate over the economic consequences of the arms race a step further by looking, in the context of the 1978 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, at how Sweden obtained approval for a further UN study of this subject. This is still a long way from the implementation of a Peace-Industrial Complex. Indeed, the peace movement in 1978 was still only of marginal political significance. But the 1978 UN meeting should, in retrospect, be seen as the beginning of what I believe could evolve into a Peace-Industrial Complex.

CONVENING THE 1978 SPECIAL SESSION

As at early 1978, the major disarmament initiative came from the bilateral US/USSR negotiations they were obliged to carry out under the NPT (1). The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreement in 1972 consisted of a treaty limiting their anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and an interim agreement on offensive strategic systems (2). SALT I did not constitute a disarmament agreement but, in the thinking of the time, at least it was a good omen for SALT II.
SALT II, which was not signed until June 1979, consists of three basic parts: (i) a treaty to last until the end of 1985, which sets limits on or equalizes strategic nuclear vehicles, multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), heavy bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); (ii) a shorter term protocol that would expire on 31 December 1981 which, until then, barred deployment of certain types of missiles; and (iii) a joint statement of principles and guidelines for subsequent negotiations on SALT III. In addition, the treaty contains a commitment on the development and use of the Soviet backfire bomber; an agreed-upon memorandum listing the number of strategic weapons deployed by each side according to different categories; a set of provisions dealing with quantitative and qualitative limits on the development and deployment of missiles; and verification measures (3). Following the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan, SALT II languished in the US Senate. President Reagan later initiated the Strategic Arms and Reduction Talks (START). Even if SALT II had been implemented, it would only have contributed marginally to disarmament since it was largely concerned with limiting the rate at which the arms race was being run - rather than obliging both parties to get rid of some of their weapons. This failure to achieve even a minor advance in the leading edge of the disarmament negotiations - let alone aiming for a more ambitious general and complete disarmament treaty - is a good litmus test of the bankruptcy of the 1970s disarmament deliberation. The negotiations had devoted too much attention to "arms control" and very little to "disarmament" itself.

Some nations, notably Sweden and Mexico (which have traditionally been active in international disarmament matters) and some Third World countries, sought a way of focusing more governmental attention on disarmament. The route led ultimately to the 1978 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament.
Back in 1964, the Third World nations persuaded the UN General Assembly to attempt to convene a World Disarmament Conference, chiefly to involve the People’s Republic of China in disarmament negotiations, which then excluded Peking. The latter, however, indicated that it did not want to participate and the proposal was shelved. The Soviet Union renewed the proposal in 1971, just as the People’s Republic of China was taking its seat in the UN. However, China strongly opposed participating in any World Disarmament Conference— as did the US. The UN’s Ad Hoc Committee on a World Disarmament Conference agreed that no preparatory committee would be established unless all five nuclear powers agreed to participate. Despite strong pressure by the Soviet Union and many other nations, it appeared that no World Disarmament Conference could be held in the foreseeable future.

To break the impasse over convening a World Disarmament Conference, Yugoslavia first suggested—at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Non-Aligned Countries at Peru in August 1975— the desirability of convening a Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. Since all nuclear powers are members of the General Assembly, it would be easier for them to attend a Special Session than a World Disarmament Conference. This proposal accumulated support and was strongly endorsed by the Fifth Summit of Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries meeting at Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976. A month later at the 31st session of the UN General Assembly, a number of foreign ministers and other speakers in the general debate, urged the convening of a Special Session. Seventy-five Member-States co-sponsored a resolution convening a Special Session. This resolution was adopted by consensus, although China expressed reservations [Resolution 31/1898] (4).
Special Sessions of the General Assembly, extraordinary meetings of the full UN membership called to discuss an urgent world problem, are rare events. Only 9 were held prior to 1978. 1978 was the first time that the arms race/disarmament had been the subject of a Special Session.

OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

The tenth Special Session opened on 23 May 1978 (5). 148 out of the then 149 Member Nations attended. (The absent member was South Africa, which has largely boycotted the UN General Assembly since 1975.) The first three weeks of the Session were devoted to the public debate, where nations which wished to do so made a public statement in the General Assembly Hall. 126 nations chose to make public statements and these were read by heads of state, ministers of foreign affairs, vice-presidents or some other senior government official. During the opening weeks 20 heads of state, 54 ministers of foreign affairs and 24 vice-presidents made brief appearances at the Special Session. It was, therefore, one of the main diplomatic gatherings of 1978.

The political environment was not conducive to tranquil negotiations. The main point of tension concerned the US and USSR, both of which conducted their relations as though the Special Session was not an important event. Neither of the two heads of government attended.

Homer Jack, a veteran American disarmament activist employed at that time by the World Conference of Religions for Peace, commented on President Carter's
absence, his active involvement in military activities during the Special Session and Vice-President Mondale's disappointing speech:

- Vice-President Mondale's speech is memorable for its defence, not of disarmament (he could hardly utter the word) but of NATO: NATO forces, Mondale said, "...will remain prepared to resist attack across the spectrum of conventional, tactical, nuclear and strategic forces."

- During the second week [of the Special Session], President Carter was host in Washington to that NATO Summit, which received far more media attention than the Special Session. Carter was not too busy to speak. He asserted that "the US is prepared to use all the forces necessary for the defence of the NATO area." NEWSWEEK reported that he underlines, "all", in an apparent reference to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

- During the third week of the Special Session, President Carter spoke to the US Naval Academy, giving the Soviets the choice between "either confrontation or co-operation". He added that "the US is adequately prepared to meet either choice..."

Were all these events just a series of Administration or Pentagon accidents or were they purposely contrived? Was their aim to bolster the sagging political image and fortunes of the President, or to downgrade the Special Session?

A good case can be made for the former. It is widely believed that the President did not go to the UN because his image-makers felt at the time that he must not project a disarmament image. If he could "hang tough" toward the Russians, perhaps he could push a SALT II treaty through the Senate as he did the Panama Canal Treaty. The White House did not want to take any chances on the President's appearance at the UN. If in doubt - that was what a Vice-President was for. Besides, White House pundits frankly told the press that they must send "a message to the American people that this guy (the President) is no weakling." They wanted to counteract the perception of an "Administration drift toward softness" (6).
Meanwhile, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev also failed to make an appearance. Moreover, there was a fresh crackdown around this time on Soviet dissidents. As The Times of London commented:

There must have been very serious top level discussions in Moscow before the decision was taken to start the trials this week of Anatoly Shcharansky and Alexander Ginzburg. Both men are members of the group set up two years ago to monitor compliance with the Helsinki agreement. Both have received extensive publicity in the West. It can therefore be assumed that when the Soviet leaders sat down to debate the matter they were well aware that the trials would provoke sharp reactions in the West, that President Carter would have to do something to demonstrate concern, that Congress would become even more reluctant to endorse a SALT agreement, that Jewish and other groups would mobilize every form of pressure available to them. In short, there would be a row. So why was the decision taken? Why was it thought that the trial of these two men would bring benefits sufficient to outweigh the damage?...

But there are other reasons, too. The trial appears to convey two messages. One is that the Soviet leaders do not care what foreigners think. The other is that there is going to be no let-up in the suppression of internal dissent. The first message carries implications for East-West relations that will rebound on the Soviet Union, as the cancellations of American visits has already demonstrated. The second will also damage the Soviet image abroad, since nobody likes a repressive country, but in the long run it will damage internal development as well. Tighter clamps on political dissent inevitably discourage other forms of creativity and diversity, thereby slowing down reform and innovation in all fields. The more the system defeats its critics in the courts the more it is likely to lose elsewhere.

There was little evidence of mass public interest. About 1,200 Non-Governmental Organization representatives from all over the world applied for UN observer passes. Inside the UN they could attend the public debates and some of the committee meetings, though most of the latter were closed to the public. They could get to meet with government delegates from
their own country and from other countries, and just be seen around the meeting rooms and corridors of the UN, which was very valuable (8). (I was present throughout the entire Special Session as a representative of the Geneva-based World Federation of United Nations Associations.)

The traditional peace/disarmament NGOs were in attendance. They organized small seminars, a coffee shop, published the most widely read document: The Disarmament Times newspaper, based at the Church Centre (owned by the US Methodist Church). Throughout the Session, there was a variety of activities organized for the NGOs. There was an unlimited amount of literature provided by various peace groups. All the government speeches were printed and made available free of charge. Each day The Disarmament Times was published. Each day there was an interdenominational service in the chapel at the Church Centre. Every morning there was an hour-long briefing session, which consisted of a short talk to the NGOs by a government delegate or official, followed by an open discussion. These briefing sessions were very helpful and informative. There was a daily vigil for disarmament from noon to 2.00pm outside the UN which was organized by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. There were various demonstrations, most of which were organized and attended by the US NGOs. Many NGO persons, fresh to the disarmament issue, left New York much more informed about the issue and inspired to spread the word.

However, other NGOs which should have also been in attendance, stayed away. I visited several environmental NGOs based in New York and Washington DC to find out why so few were represented at the Special Session. All of them were heavily involved in the campaign against uranium mining and nuclear energy. In Australia, by this time, a clear link had been forged
between the need to stop uranium mining and the need to stop the arms race. That link was rejected by some US environmental groups. The co-ordinator of the New York Friends of the Earth group (Lorna Salzman) in a tense conversation, told me that the arms race issue would be a millstone around the necks of the environmental movement - the disarmament NGOs had made no progress over the decades and the identification of environmental NGOs with those NGOs would harm the environmentalists.

Perhaps the most graphic example of the disarmament NGO community's inability to attract a broader base of support among fellow NGOs and the public at large came on 27 May 1978. The Mobilization for Survival Rally held in New York that day (across the street from the UN's main building) attracted 20,000 participants. The organizers told me they were pleased with the number involved since it represented the largest anti-war rally since the ending of the Vietnam rallies (9). But considering New York's total population (not to mention the foreign influx of NGO representatives) this was, in my opinion, a small rally.

THE FINAL DOCUMENT

The 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament justified all the effort devoted to convening it. It was not a major media event, and there was little public interest in its proceedings. However, the Special Session did at least put disarmament back on the international political agenda.

The 129 paragraph Final Document (10) is the best statement from the UN on disarmament. Right up to the final few days of the Special Session there was doubt whether the Final Document would ever be born. In the weary late hours of June 30 the Document emerged and, although a number of governments voiced their criticisms
of parts of it, almost all of them (except Albania) accepted it. This degree of consensus on what is one of the most contentious of all international issues was seen at the time as a good omen.

It consisted of four parts. The first part, the Introduction, states the importance of disarmament in international politics and the threat to human survival which arises out of the arms race. It notes the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, though it is pleased with the development of detente. It recognizes that general and complete disarmament is of the utmost importance for economic and social development and that governments have a responsibility to work for both ends.

The second part, the Declaration, consists of three sections. The first, a review and appraisal of the present situation, notes that humanity today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the arms race and that the nuclear arms race in particular runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxations of international tension. It calls for greater attention to the provisions of the UN Charter which exist for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the UN should increase the spread of information on the arms race. The next section, on goals and priorities, puts the end of the nuclear arms race as the major goal. Other weapons of mass destruction (like chemical warfare agents) are also a major target. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of the international transfer of conventional weapons. The final section lists the principles to be followed in the disarmament negotiations. All UN member-nations reaffirm their full commitment to their obligations under the UN Charter. The UN organization itself has a central role in the disarmament
negotiations (an implied criticism of the various negotiations which have gone on outside it, such as SALT). Nuclear-weapon countries have the primary responsibility for negotiating nuclear disarmament (an implied criticism of France and China, which boycotted such negotiations). Disarmament measures should be balanced so as to avoid an advantage going to one party or another. The agreements should contain adequate systems for checking that obligations are being met. All countries should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear warfare, such as declarations by nuclear-weapon countries not to use them on non-nuclear-weapon countries. There should be greater attention to creating nuclear weapon-free zones. Resources freed as a result of reducing the arms race should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations. Negotiations on partial measures (like the Test Ban Treaty) should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures - a criticism of the practice whereby the old idea of general and complete disarmament had been pushed aside in favour of concentrating maximum effort on limited goals.

The third part of the Final Document is the main part in that it is the Programme of Action. It reaffirms the importance of general and complete disarmament. The priorities to be worked for are: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (like napalm); and reduction of armed forces. The next few thousand words go on to look more closely at those priorities. The need for nuclear technology to be made available is balanced by the obvious concern to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons do not receive as much attention as other forms of warfare. The European situation, which dominates the
arms race in conventional weapons terms is singled out as the area requiring energetic attention at reaching a disarmament agreement. The international transfer of arms should be examined—bearing in mind, however, the need for nations to be able to defend themselves. (There is no direct criticism of arms sellers, nor is there a suggestion for there to be an international register of arms transfers, which would enable the UN to see where the weapons are going.) There should be further studies as to why the arms race is continuing and what can be done to stop it. Governments and disarmament groups should pay greater attention to educating the public about the arms race. This work should also include courses in educational institutions.

The final part of the Final Document dealt with the UN's machinery for disarmament. Much of the detailed work of the Annual Session of the General Assembly is done in committees. Henceforth, the First (Political) Committee should only deal with disarmament and related international security questions—thereby ensuring that disarmament remained a major item on the UN's agenda. Another body to receive the kiss of life was the Disarmament Commission, which was formed in 1952 and last met in 1965, when it was disbanded. All UN member-nations would be able to join it. It should report to the General Assembly. The Commission would serve, in effect, as the sounding board for ideas, which the Committee on Disarmament may then follow up.

The main practical achievement of the 1978 Session was the upgrading of the UN disarmament machinery. The UN General Assembly First Committee now deals only with disarmament and related security matters. Governmental representatives at each Annual Session now devote more attention to disarmament matters. The reactivated Disarmament Commission is important in giving a sense of direction to the UN's work on disarmament.
The main UN negotiating body used to be called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (based in Geneva). It was dominated by the US and USSR, which drew up the agenda and decided what should be discussed. The renamed Committee on Disarmament has, as a result of the Special Session, a wider membership and the chairmanship rotates among all of the 40 member-nations. The Big Five (US, USSR, UK, France and China) are automatically elected and all other UN member-nations are eligible to stand for election by the General Assembly. (Australia was not a member of the earlier Committee but is a member of the present one.) (France, incidentally, boycotted the earlier Committee, as did China.) Plenary sessions are open to the public and a very important innovation is that non-governmental organizations can present proposals to the new Committee and have them circulated informally to members.

As noted in Chapter 1, however, as at December 1986, the new machinery has not finalized work on any treaty. The UN’s problem remains one of political will. It is not a problem of creating a smoothly functioning machinery. But at least it is comforting that once the basic issue of political will is resolved, the UN has the negotiating machinery in place to convert that will into a treaty or treaties.

THE DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT LINK

Military expenditure was a major concern at the Special Session. It was bound to be, of course, since Third World nations had pressed for the Special Session partly out of the hope that it would lead to a reduction in military expenditure and an increase in foreign aid. As the next chapter will show, there had long been UN attempts to create some form of link between disarmament and development considerations. The Special Session was a major boost for that work.
The Special Session's linkage will be examined under three headings: the preparatory work done before 1978, some recommendations made during the Special Session, and what the Final Document said about the linkage.

**PREPARATORY WORK**

It was widely agreed among governmental delegates to whom I spoke that the Special Session was well organized. Even though it may not have been as productive as some observers may have hoped, it did at least flow smoothly. Most of the detailed decisions were made by a 54-nation Preparatory Committee set up to organize the Special Session.

The disarmament-development link emerged at the Preparatory Committee in various ways. First, some governments raised it, for example, Mauritius:

*Progress in disarmament is also needed in order to end the present trend of a massive diversion to military ends of financial resources, manpower, raw materials, technical skills and research and development capability. There is today a greater awareness that the world is facing a series of urgent and important problems which will require the mobilization of all our energies and resources for their resolution. Chief among these questions is the problem of development and the associated task of establishing a new international economic order. There are, consequently, large claims on investment, research and other resources in direct competition with military demands. The arms race with its economic costs and social and political effects constitutes the single most massive obstacle to effective progress.*

For a number of years, world military expenditure has been around $300 billion per year. Every year, the military absorb resources equivalent to about two thirds of the aggregate gross national product of the countries which together comprise the poorest half of the world's population. (11)
Additionally, the Preparatory Committee commissioned reports (12). The UN Secretariat produced a Report on a Comparative Study of Global Military Expenditures and Development Since 1945 (UN Doc. A/AC. 187/73) in August 1977. It was a short document (12 pages) derived from only a few sources and it contained no descriptive analysis of the data presented and of a possible inter-relationship between the two: military expenditures and development assistance. Its main purpose was to introduce the topic. A few months later, the UNGA decided (Resolution 32/88A) that an Ad Hoc Group should be formed to examine the possibility of researching into the relationship between disarmament and development.

The Ad Hoc Group completed its work in March 1978 (UN Doc.: A/S-10/9 of 5 April 1978). The Ad Hoc Group, chaired by Inga Thorsson of Sweden (13), laid out the basis for a major research programme (lasting two to three years) which should result in a Report which would serve as a basis for decisions on concrete actions and to inform the public on the relationship between disarmament and development. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament could contribute to the establishment of a new international economic order. The Report's three main areas of investigation should be: current utilization of resources for military purposes, economic and social effects both of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures, and conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes. This was the basis of the Thorsson Report (to be examined in the next chapter).

Meanwhile, the Preparatory Committee was also receiving ideas on what should be done during the Special Session. On 28 January 1977, the UN Secretary-General had written to governments requesting their views on what the agenda
should contain. Military expenditure (particularly in the disarmament development) received various mentions, for example:

SYRIA: The implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations concerning disarmament according to the following priorities:

a) The establishment of the new international order on the basis of justice and equality in all political, economic, social, cultural and technical fields; an order which aims at correcting the unequal and imbalanced situations and relations now existing between the Member States of the United Nations in such a manner as to ensure the complete and inalienable sovereignty of States over their natural resources and wealth (UN Doc. A/AC 187/3 of 30 March 1977).

JAPAN: International transfer of conventional arms.

It is striking to realize that four fifths of the total military expenditures of the world are being devoted to the accumulation of conventional weapons. The arms race, in terms of resources, is primarily a race in producing, buying and selling conventional weapons. The recent acceleration in the international transfer of conventional weapons will not only intensify existing conflicts but will increase the risk of provoking new disputes in many parts of the world.

It is the firm conviction of the Government of Japan that the time has come to seek feasible ways to formulate an international agreement to restrict the international transfer of conventional weapons, and it hopes that the Special Session will take up this issue in a most serious way.

World military expenditures, which have now reached astronomical figures, demonstrate how much the diversion of limited resources to military ends has accelerated. There is an urgent need to explore possible ways by which part of the resources released through the reduction of military expenditures can be made available to improve economic and social conditions in all States.

It is to be hoped that the Special Session will take up this question in its deliberations as a long-term goal, the achievement of which would help preserve the scanty resources remaining to the world and would contribute also to the relaxation
of international tension (UN Doc.: A/AC 187/44 of 18 April 1977).

GREECE: The Special Session should pursue (sic) to adopt a declaration of principles setting the foundation on which negotiations bilateral or multilateral, leading to a general and complete disarmament, could be conducted. This declaration should include, inter alia, the following...

Portion of the savings derived from the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to promoting the economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries (UN Doc.: A/AC 187/45 of 10 May 1977).

MALAYSIA: The savings gained through the reduction of military expenditures devoted to the arms race could be constructively channelled to the much needed areas of national development in the developing countries. At the international level, the surplus resources in the developed countries arising from the reduction of their military expenditures could be utilized towards achieving an equitable international economic order (UN Doc.: A/AC 187/53 of 18 May 1977).

BRAZIL: Firm commitments should be made to apply significant portions of the savings derived from disarmament measures to the promotion of economic development in less developed areas. These commitments will facilitate the establishment of a new international economic order (UN Doc.: A/AC 187/49 of 15 May 1977).

These quotations bring out the following points. First, the disarmament-development link was clearly in the minds of a wide range of nations (especially in the Third World). Indeed, few other issues received such treatment. The examples quoted even reveal similar language to express the same ideas, which suggest—though I could not obtain from delegates much evidence for this—some negotiating beforehand on what should be said.

Second, the response was an encouragement to Mrs Thorsson and she told me in New York how pleased she was with the reaction. It showed that her proposed research programme would receive wide backing. This was also a good omen for the programme's final report.
Third, concern about military expenditure was largely limited to the disarmament-development link. In other words, governments saw the link primarily as a new way of obtaining foreign aid.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE SPECIAL SESSION

Various recommendations about military expenditure were made during the Special Session. Most specific governmental recommendations generally did not get included in the Final Document as such, though they were listed in the Final Document's longest paragraph (number 125) in which the Special Session noted the recommendations and asked that they be considered by the appropriate bodies. Most of the recommendations concerning military expenditure suffered this fate. (None of the listed ideas has, at December 1986, been implemented.)

The recommendation which had no problem being accepted was the proposed programme on the disarmament-development link. This is dealt with later in this section.

Military expenditure was a continual feature in the speeches during the opening plenary debate. For example, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the first day recalled the need for "objective and authoritative information and analysis" and his use of export consultants, via General Assembly requests, to study specific aspects of disarmament (such as the Reports mentioned in the previous chapter). He went on:

In this connexion, I consider it important to develop a comprehensive approach to international study in the field of arms control and disarmament. One means of achieving effective utilization of international expertise would be through the appointment of an Advisory Board composed of eminent persons. Such bodies have functioned effectively in other areas of United Nations
activities providing to governmental organs and the
Secretariat useful advice on the range of issues
under consideration. I would very much welcome the
contribution that could be made by such a Board and
hope the Assembly will consider approving the
establishment of such a group.

Continuing with this theme, he went on to make the only
specific new recommendation in his entire address:

In this context, there is a need to intensify and
broaden the scope of national programmes of
information and study concerning disarmament. We
should recall the high investment which is devoted
to research and development in the military field.
No other area of human activity receives a similar
input of scientific resources; nothing remotely
comparable is devoted to research on how the arms
race can be contained and reversed. This
encourages constant competition and change in
military technology which too often directly
affects the overall relations between States. I
would, therefore, suggest that we devote to
national and international disarmament efforts one
million dollars for every thousand million
currently spent on arms. This would constitute a
valuable step in correcting the huge imbalance in
our priorities. It should serve at least as a
moral and political objective to be implemented by
each country within the framework of its national
regional or international disarmament potential.
Some may wish to strengthen their own disarmament
education or information activities; some may wish
to further the work of international organizations.
I do not offer any rigid prescription here, only a
purpose and a goal. (14)

His recommendation contained two components: a specific
reduction in military expenditure and a less strident
suggestion as to how the money should be spent. The
first component has attracted some NGO support (such as
the proposed Australian Peace and Development Research
Institute (15)). No government, however, has adopted
it. The proposal was flawed, of course, by the lack of
agreement on what precisely constituted "military
expenditure". The USSR and its allies were then — and
still are — opposed to an international accounting
system for defining and verifying military expenditure.
The second component - producing still more export studies - has not received much NGO support but the General Assembly has adopted it via calling for more studies (some of which are covered in this dissertation). The irony here, of course, as shown in the previous chapter - and will be shown again in Chapter 7 - is that no matter how good such studies may be, they are not followed up by governments if there is a lack of political will. Indeed, this proposal (with both components) was a safe one for the Secretary-General to make since it would do little to threaten national security and yet it enabled him to give at least the impression that his opening address was not entirely devoid of new thinking.

Iran (still controlled by the Shah) decided to follow a variation of the UNSG's proposal:

The Government of Iran has informed Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that it has allocated 500 million rials ($US7 million) out of its national defence budget for the International Year of the Child (IYC) [1979].

This unprecedented event "represents an important initiative which fully conforms to the objectives of the UN to release resources from arms expenditures for social and humanitarian purposes", Secretary-General Waldheim said.

Responding to the pledge, a UNICEF spokesperson said, "We are ecstatic! We hope that other countries will respond - and that this thing could snowball." (16)

Unfortunately, no other government followed this example, and the Shah himself fled Iran eight months later. The new government did not follow up the decision.
France, (which was then boycotting the UN’s Disarmament Committee) proposed an "International Disarmament Fund for Development" (UN Doc.: A/S 10/AC. 1/28). France said the General Assembly’s approach should be based on: (i) establishing a specific link between disarmament and development; (ii) devising procedures for the transfer of resources according to objective and unchallenged criteria; (iii) utilizing the released resources for development assistance to the poorest nations; and (iv) taking account of the transfers so made in the evaluation of official development assistance in relation to the UN target of 0.7 percent GNP. France proposed that a group of experts be established to investigate, among other things, the Fund’s objectives, organization and guiding principles.

The recommendation has not been implemented. One problem is the old one defining "military expenditure" and the USSR’s customary opposition to that exercise. Second, the USSR and most of its Eastern European allies do not participate in the UN’s assistance programmes for developing countries. They are not, for example, among the 139 nations which are World Bank members (donors and lenders). It would be hard to imagine them overcoming their traditional boycott of the World Bank system (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association and International Finance Corporation) to get involved in the proposed Fund. The USSR believes it can get more political leverage by providing funds bilaterally (Romania and Yugoslavia are both World Bank member-nations). Of course, whether Western nations would themselves want to implement this proposal is another matter— but at least the USSR provides them with a good excuse for not including the idea on their agenda.

These observations would also apply to Romania’s recommendations:
All participating States should agree to freeze military expenditure, military forces and armaments at the 1978 level, while undertaking subsequently, beginning perhaps as early as 1979, to move on to their gradual reduction. In the first stage, up to 1985, the reduction should be between 10 and 15 percent of the present levels and should cover all components of the armed forces; that is, land, sea and air forces, and all categories of weapons, both conventional and nuclear.

The sums of money saved as a result of these measures should be used for peaceful purposes. One part should be allocated by each State for the development of its own economy, social activities and raising the standard of living of its own people; the rest should be deposited in a United Nations fund for assistance to the developing countries, primarily those with annual per capita incomes of $500 to $600, in order to speed up their economic and social development (UN Doc.: A/S-10/AC. 1/23 of 12 June 1978).

Ireland's recommendation had the same problems. It proposed the creation of a group of experts to study the possibility of establishing a system of targets and incentives to promote and encourage progress in arms control and disarmament and, in particular, the possibility of proposing for general adoption a voluntary ceiling (or ceilings) on national defence expenditures, expressed as a proportion of GNP/GDP, which nations should be encouraged to observe.

Ireland explained its proposal:

There are considerable differences in the circumstances of different States and differences in what they consider to be their vital security needs. Accordingly, it would seem best to maintain the idea that while the target or ceiling, expressed as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP) or of the gross domestic product (GDP), should be a matter for general agreement, a decision as to how far it could keep to the target set would be a matter for each State to take on a voluntary basis and without constraint. However, the setting of a general target figure, even on such a voluntary basis, could encourage progress towards disarmament and have a considerable moral force, since it would help over a period to win wider and more general acceptance for the idea of specific and agreed limits to be observed by all States, on arms expenditure and armaments of all kinds (conventional as well as nuclear).
The ceiling to be set by general agreement might be a global one in the sense that a single target figure expressed as a percentage of GNP (or GDP) would be proposed for voluntary adoption by all Member States of the United Nations prepared to accept it. Alternatively, separate targets might be set for particular regions between the States of the region.

If progress is made towards disarmament, it might be possible to envisage that the target or targets set could be steadily revised downward, at suitable intervals. In the course of the study, consideration might also be given to the possibility of an arrangement which would encourage States to devote some or all of any consequent savings on armaments to increasing the funds available for development.

It is recognized that the development of a system of voluntary ceilings and incentives will need to be compatible and co-ordinated with current efforts in the United Nations towards the standardization of military budget statistics as well as with studies on the relationship between disarmament and development. It is also recognized that the effective implementation of such an incentive system would be facilitated if an appropriate United Nations agency were to be given responsibility for the necessary studies and recommendations (UN Doc.: A/S-10/AC. 1/21 of 9 June 1978).

Four observations should be made about these proposals. First, all of them were fairly unambitious. The amount of military expenditure which would have been saved (or transferred to developing countries) would have been very small. While even small sums of money will assist developing countries, none of the proposals would have led to a major reduction in the arms race.

Second, all of the proposals were undermined by the lack of progress on defining "military expenditure". Despite the clear objections of the USSR, the proposals were still made but without any ideas on how the USSR's views could be reversed. The motives of the proposers were unclear. Perhaps they were simply unaware of the USSR's views. Perhaps they hoped that somehow the USSR could be shamed into backing down. Perhaps they knew the
proposals were unworkable and yet still made them, safe in the knowledge that their own sincerity (in following the proposals) would not be tested. Perhaps, by capitalizing upon the Third World's concern for foreign aid, they hoped to get cheap political gain by being advocates of schemes, which although unworkable, would do their own prestige no harm among Third World nations. Perhaps, being well aware of the interest of the Third World concern about foreign aid, they felt obliged to show some willingness in making proposals which would help Third World nations. Perhaps they hoped to embarrass the USSR into changing its policy. Whatever the motives, the proposals say a great deal about the proposers' limited interest and sincerity in disarmament matters.

Third, all the proposals were based on the disarmament-development link. They took little account of the other issues (raised in Part I of this dissertation) about the other implications of military expenditure. In one of the few opening plenary speeches to deal with this, Brad Morse (Administrator of the UN Development Programme) summarized the situation:

Military expenditures were perhaps the "single most inflationary element in the global economic mix", he added. They diminished rather than added to the supply of things needed for everyday living. The diversion of tax revenues from mainstream of socially useful production - with the average citizen world-wide turning over the equivalent of three or four years income in his or her lifetime to military use - exacerbated the problem.

Military spending was clearly not an efficient device for stimulating employment, he went on. He estimated that every $1,000 million spent on education created about 50,000 more jobs than the same amount spent on defence. Similar ratios applied to spending for housing, health care, mass transit and other key public needs.

Equally essential to development progress, he said, was a secure political climate in which trade could flourish unhampered by extraneous considerations,
and welfare rather than warfare attracted man's best efforts and energies.

It was not military preparedness but economic and social progress that could keep "real enemies from the doorstep. It is tractors rather than tanks, machine tools rather than machine guns that give us the best hope for building true security", he remarked (UN Doc.: Press Release GA/5789 of 9 June 1978).

This was a good reminder - which went largely unheeded by the delegates - that there was more to military expenditure than just viewing it as a potential source of foreign aid. Morse was reminding delegates, in effect, of the UN's earlier studies on the way in which military expenditure had grave economic and social implications.

Finally, virtually no nation - except for the abortive initiative by Iran - was willing to go ahead with any of the proposals on a unilateral basis. Sweden (as will be examined in Part III of this dissertation) has undertaken a survey of the impact of disarmament on its own economy as a follow-up to the report done by Mrs Thorsson for the UN. But no other nation has been willing unilaterally either to follow up its own proposal or implement that of another nation.

THE FINAL DOCUMENT: DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT

The Final Document formalized the disarmament-development link. Paragraph 35 of the Final Document's "Declaration of Principles" stated:

There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly to the realization of the latter. Therefore, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.
Meanwhile, in the Final Document’s "Programme of Action" (paragraphs 94 and 95):

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure and armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of the contribution of disarmament to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

Homer Jack commented upon these provisions:

The compromise wording pleased few States, but there was little comment on this issue during the final plenary. Swedish Ambassador Anders I Thunborg expressed encouragement at the agreement to go forward with the Nordic study. (Sweden announced a gift to the UN of one million kronor to supplement UN funds to make the study.) He felt convinced that "the study will receive the necessary support among Member States and that it
will eventually lead to substantive results — for
the benefit not least of the developing countries."

Sri Lanka Ambassador B J Fernando, speaking for the
Non-Aligned States, discussed what he felt was a
hesitation of the Special Session "in regard to the
acceptance of the principle of the interdependence
of disarmament and development". He felt that
there could not be any doubt about "the proposition
that the arms race is distorting the economics of
the developed world, with consequences for the
developing countries, and that disarmament would
have both immediate and long-term beneficial impact
on the economics of the developed world." He
observed that, "in the same context, we were able
to secure the reassertion of the right of all
countries to develop, acquire and use without
discrimination nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes." (17)

Inga Thorsson had, in effect, received the mandate she
wanted. Her Government agreed to help with the
financing of it. The omens were good. Disarmament was
back on the international political agenda — and it was
here linked with one of the UN’s main preoccupations:
economic progress. The group of experts could learn
from the experiences of the earlier groups. It was one
of the few specific recommendations to receive immediate
agreement that it should be implemented. Mrs Thorsson
herself was one of the few diplomats with a long history
of involvement in arms race/disarmament matters and she
had a clear idea of what she wanted to cover. Few other
major UN research programmes on delicate matters had
been initiated in such auspicious circumstances.

To conclude, the 1978 Special Session established the
disarmament-development link as an item on the UN’s
agenda. It agreed to the creation of a study of this
subject and this was to be supervised by one of the
world’s most experienced diplomats in disarmament
affairs (Inga Thorsson). This was still a long way from
the establishment of a Peace-Industrial Complex. But at
least some progress was being made.
NOTES

(1) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); text reprinted in: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington DC, 1982, pp 91-95.

(2) Text reprinted ibid, pp 137-157.


(4) Around this time, the UN decided to stop using Roman numerals as prefixes or suffixes to indicate the number of session (1946 = I) and Arabic numerals were introduced.

(5) As is being commented upon throughout this chapter, the 1978 Special Session was a low priority item for most governments and most NGOs. It was also neglected by scholars. The main background information is contained in the Yearbooks by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), published in London by Taylor & Francies.


(8) Sally Swing Shelley (UN NGO Liaison Officer) interviewed by Keith D Suter, 1 July 1978 (New York).
(9) Terry Provance (Friends Service Committee; Mobilization for Survival) interviewed by Keith D Suter, 1 June 1978 (New York).


(12) The main source of UN disarmament documentation for this period is six volumes of Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UN Doc.: G/A OR A/S-10/1).

(13) More information on Mrs Thorsson herself is contained in Chapter 6 below.

(14) Text of Statement by UNSG, at Opening Session of GA on Disarmament (UN Doc.: GA/5758) 23 May 1978.

(15) Some Australian Labor Party members were able to get this commitment included in the ALP Platform and the Hawke Government, after much negotiation with the Australian National University, eventually established in 1985 a Peace Research Centre, based at the ANU, headed by Andrew Mack. This is not, however, financed by the Defence vote.


CHAPTER 6


INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 6

The 1978 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament received little scholarly attention and those few reactions were mixed (1). The Final Document was welcomed but, given the prevailing political environment, little was expected to come from the Final Document or the reorganized UN disarmament negotiating machinery.

The 1978 Special Session on Disarmament had at least put disarmament back high up on the international political agenda. The UN's disarmament machinery was to be reorganized and it was charged with devolving a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD).

Against this backdrop of heightened activity, the UN conducted an extensive enquiry, headed by Mrs Inga Thorsson, into the economic and social consequences of military expenditure. The Thorsson Report is the focus of the next two sections.

Meanwhile, thanks largely to the renewed "cold war", evidenced by such events as the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan and speculation over US plans for a "limited" nuclear war, disarmament was ceasing to be an esoteric subject. Two other studies also covered the dangers of the arms race and these studies are examined in the fourth and fifth sections.

THE THORSSON REPORT

All UN reports which originate from the Secretariat (as distinct from the Specialized Agencies and other non-
Secretariat UN bodies) are issued in the name of the UN Secretary-General. They are known as "Secretary-General" reports even though, in almost all cases, the Secretary-General would have had no direct responsibility for their compilation (such is the size and complexity of the UN).

It is very rare for a Secretary-General report to become known popularly by the name of the person who chaired the group which created it. It is even rarer - perhaps unique - for a government which has no direct connection with that chairman to finance a popular version of the report to ensure a greater circulation of the ideas contained in it (2).

But then, Mrs Inga Thorsson is no ordinary person. She has had a long and distinguished career in Swedish and international politics. In 1978, she was a member of the Swedish Riksdag and Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Chairman of the Board, Secretariat for Future Studies. She was former Chairman of the Social Democratic Union of Women, and Former Head of the United Nations Division for Social Development. She had taken over from the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Alva Myrdal (another remarkable person), as head of Sweden's delegations at the UN disarmament negotiations. For example, at the stalled 1975 NPT Review Conference (in which the US, UK and USSR refused to co-operate fully with most other nations) she used her own initiative as Conference President to draft a declaration which at least ensured that the conference did not end in disarray (3).

Mrs Thorsson was one of the most active advocates of encouraging persons and NGOs interested in development to also take an interest in disarmament. In 1975, to coincide with UN General Assembly Special Session on Development and International Economic Co-operation (to
help create a "new international economic order"), the New York NGO Forum (composed of NGOs with consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council) organized a two-day conference. The conference was addressed by many of the governmental representatives attending the Special Session, plus scholars in New York for the UN meeting. There were 65 main speakers ("panellists") but only one person - Mrs Thorsson - mentioned disarmament. The conference proceedings summarized her presentation in part:

The place of armaments within the current economic order had been almost entirely ignored. Beside the obvious danger of someone, in a given situation, putting the horrible destructive power of modern arms into use at the risk of the extinction of human life, the quantitative and qualitative increases in the arms race involve the most glaring misuse of economic and, particularly, human resources. Thus disarmament must be an integral part of economic policy and any attempt at shaping the future. Efforts directed towards disarmament must be strengthened in order to achieve meaningful results. This might be done, inter alia, by bringing together in effective co-operation for joint efforts, those who work for disarmament and those who work for development. (4)

Two years later, in 1977, she developed a proposal on behalf of the Nordic nations which she hoped would accelerate the disarmament negotiations. Writing in early 1978, she looked ahead to the Special Session accepting that proposal:

Based on a proposal by the Nordic countries, the Special Session is supposed to initiate a UN study on the impact of the arms race on economic and social development. The study will have to examine the ways in which material and human resources are utilized, as well as the effects of armaments on international and national economies. It will have to lead up to providing the world with the necessary mechanisms to meet the requirements of a redeployment of national resources from military purposes to constructive and peaceful ends. This would include mechanisms for reallocating resources to development efforts in the developing countries. This could dramatically alter the prospects for
economic and social development, nationally as well as internationally, and promote the ultimate realization of the goals of a new international economic order. (5)

Mrs Thorsson received her mandate. In August 1978 the UNSG appointed her as Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. She had 26 colleagues, drawn from all the world’s major economic, political and social groupings (including US, USSR, UK and France). This point should be emphasized since all the Reports’ main recommendations were adopted unanimously.

It is difficult to assess the total cost of the Report (6) but it was well over half a million dollars (para 11). It is, therefore, one of the most expensive UN Reports. It also involved more sub-projects than most other UN Reports: 40 studies were completed and their results incorporated into the Thorsson Report (Appendix I of the Report lists the studies). Yet another unusual feature is that some of the studies have been published separately as commercial publications (7). Meanwhile, UN Specialized Agencies and other parts of the UN system were also mobilized and so made submissions or convened seminars. Various NGOs also assisted the enquiry (para 13).

The Thorsson Report has seven chapters. The terms of reference identify these main areas of investigation: (a) present-day utilization of resources for military purposes; (b) economic and social consequences of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures; and (c) conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes (para 4).

The first chapter introduces the Report. "Development" is said to relate not only to Third World aspirations
(the focus of the previous UN development-disarmament reports) but also to the range of relationships between the prospects for balanced and sustainable global economic and social development on the one hand and disarmament on the other through the reallocation of real resources. The relationship is a complex and multi-dimensional one, and the Group's analysis aims to improve understanding of it as a basis for the formulation of practical aims (para 21). One old problem remains: a lack of "...data for most countries, including some which have very significant military expenditures..." (para 26).

On the framework and scope of the relationship between disarmament and development, the Group strikes the note echoed in this dissertation's first chapter: "Mankind is at present facing the greatest challenge of the century. The level and speed of the arms race are bound to increase the danger of war. The outbreak of a nuclear war would jeopardize the very existence of all mankind. During this decade peoples will be confronted with new technological, economic and social challenges that will be made far more complex if the arms race continues unabated" (para 31). Meanwhile, despite the previous UN studies on disarmament and development, little progress has been made in reordering global priorities. "One can only conclude, therefore, that - regrettably - this broadly moral and logical argument for encouraging disarmament for the sake of development has not in itself been sufficiently compelling to outweigh the concern with military security, that is, concern about the use or threat of use of force in disregard of the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." (para 40).

This chapter then goes on to develop three important points. First, if "security" is so important to
nations, then the starting area for the examination has to be a move away from the standard linear disarmament-development relationship to the triangular disarmament-development-security one. However, "security" is a wider concept than that of military security alone; it has economic and social dimensions (para 43). Thus, it is necessary for governments to recognize the extent of non-military challenges to security, such as energy, food, ecological stresses, the large and widening gap in material standards of living (paras 60-75).

Second, the Report presents a view of the arms race - in effect between NATO and WTO - which I endorse. There are many "arms races" currently being run but the Report is concerned with the central balance's arms race since this easily overshadows all the rest (para 46).

Third, there has to be a new approach to contemporary international economic, social and political problems: "the co-operative management of interdependence" (para 90). In presenting her Report to the 1981 General Assembly, Mrs Thorsson commented:

The appalling poverty, the destruction of the environment, the accelerating arms race and the resulting global economic malaise are largely problems of our own making. Yet the Group was convinced that it is well within our collective capabilities, and within the Earth's capacity, to provide the basic needs for the world's entire population, and to make progress towards a more equitable economic order, at a pace politically acceptable to all. In this respect the arms race is incompatible with the objectives of a new international economic order. Of course, economic growth is possible even with a continuing arms race, but it would be relatively slow and very unevenly distributed both among and within regions of the world. Co-operative interdependent management can be in the economic and security interests of all states. But it is quite improbable if the arms race continues. (8)
The third chapter is an overview of the present-day utilization of resources for military purposes. The chapter does not add, in my view, much that is new to the debate already recorded in this dissertation. Previous UN reports (all to no avail) have recorded the depressing data. The Thorsson Report notes that in 1980 world military expenditure, at $500 billion, represented about 6 percent of world output - in real terms this represents nearly a four-fold escalation over the post-war period and in excess of a 25-fold escalation since 1900. Military expenditure, in terms of world GNP, equals the GNP generated by the 1.3 billion people living in Africa and South Asia. The Report examines the utilization of resources in terms of: labour, military industrial production, raw materials, land, research and development, the international trade in arms, and military expenditures.

The Group reported that NATO and WTO, although with declining military expenditure in total world military expenditure, percentage terms, still account for nearly 70 percent of the total expenditure. The growth areas among other developed nations are also fairly concentrated: China, Japan, Israel and South Africa. "Among the developing regions, the spectacular pace of militarization in the Middle East is clearly reflected. Even excluding Israel, this region accounts for nearly one half of total military spending by the developing countries" (para 165). However, the chapter's main concern is not so much to focus attention on the specific (if sometimes unclear) details of military expenditure, but to emphasize that the cost of military activities has also to be seen in terms of land, labour, raw materials, industrial capacity and foreign exchange (para 172).

The fourth chapter deals with the economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures. Its starting
point is the paradox presented in earlier chapters of this dissertation: on the one hand, there have been various studies (including, of course, UN ones) which have demonstrated the harmful economic and social consequences of the arms race and, on the other hand, the arms race continues despite the warnings. The paradox, according to the Report, cannot be explained away simply by reference to a lack of political will. Unfortunately (in my view), the Group's terms of reference apparently did not permit a detailed examination of the political implications of this paradox.

This chapter of the Report examines some of the popularly held beliefs (as distinct from the warning voices contained in the previous studies). One traditional method of assessing the cost of the arms race is the "opportunity cost": the benefits attached to the alternative uses of these resources which are foregone in favour of military expenditure. The Report draws on the studies commissioned by the Thorsson Group and notes that their findings "...strongly suggest that, irrespective of their current levels of development, all societies engaged in a steadily high or increasing military effort are pre-empting resources which could and would, otherwise, have been utilized for socially productive ends" (para 182).

Also, the arms race "...will impede the world-trade prospects of economic growth and delay the developmental process with serious socio-economic consequences, particularly for the developing countries" (para 185). This argument is then applied to the development of Western nations and east European nations, as well as China and the Third World.

The Report also repeats the view that military expenditure is inflationary. There is the theoretical
view (from at least Adam Smith onwards) that military expenditure fuels the demand-pull, cost-push inflationary spiral. The demand-pull movement has long been noted empirically: expanded military production leading to increased demand for various inputs tends to create shortages, particularly in situations of inelastic supply, and exerts an upward pressure on general price level by pushing up the cost of production.

However, cost-push inflation in the military sector is not quite so clear. Cost-push inflation, in theory, has an autonomous character and so is independent of other factors, and is characterized by wage-costs inflation, mark-up inflation (profit inflation) and imported inflation. In the military sector, defence industries are often trend-setters for wage bargaining (and also the corporations compete against each other to get talented personnel). However, since corporations involved in producing defence equipment and services tend to be operating in a specialized area, the ordinary market pressure on prices and competition does not operate. A defence department, therefore, does not have the same range of options as (say) a housewife and can purchase equipment from only a narrow range of domestic suppliers. Such suppliers, therefore, have a near-monopoly and can mark up prices. "In many Western European economies, the pace of inflation in the military sector has often outrun the inflationary rate in the economy as a whole" (para 204).

A good illustration of the opportunity costs of the arms race is employment. 50 million people are employed worldwide by the arms race at a cost of $500 billion: "...there is no historical evidence to suggest that non-military spending of similar magnitude would not have created employment opportunities or a similar or large scale" (para 211). One study commissioned by the
Thorsson Group suggested "...that an average of two working places could be created in the civil branches of national economy at the expense of one in the military sector" (para 212).

Turning to developing nations, the Thorsson Group identified the following major problem areas: (a) increases in military expenditure as a share of the GDP are associated with reductions in the rate of economic growth; (b) the negative effect of military spending on the formation of fixed capital, consumption in real terms and inflationary trends may not be materially different for the developed and the less developed nations; (c) for an arms-importing developing nation, the price paid for the equipment represents only an initial cost entailing substantial economic and political liabilities which go far beyond into subsequent operation and maintenance; (d) a high degree of vulnerability to foreign political penetration accompanying arms purchases is discerned in a study of data covering 70 developing nations during the period 1960-1975; (e) a case study of three developing nations concludes that not many newly independent nations have succeeded in evolving an indigenous military sector; (f) for a majority of developing nations, ambitious arms-production programmes are likely to overburden their industrial and manpower-base because, by its very nature, manufacture of weapons is not possible in an enclave-type approach; (g) the almost inevitable dependence on imported technology may largely negate the effects of self-reliance advocated by many developing nations as the critical determinant for the domestic manufacture of arms; and (h) almost all the studies identifying major problem areas mentioned above provide strong evidence of a triangular relationship between disarmament, security and development in the military spending of the developing nations.
Previous UN studies on the disarmament-development link stressed that an argument in favour of disarmament would be the opportunity to use the military expenditure thus saved to help developing nations. This moral argument has provided no inducement for disarmament. It should be discarded. Before looking at what the Thorsson Report had to say (para 221) it is worth recalling - as the Report does not - that this argument was a product of its time. The argument was advanced at a time when Western nations were having a rapid economic growth, the future looked bright, few people were worrying about the environment, and developing nations could "take-off" via some foreign aid. That view, by 1981 standards, was naive - but it was well meant. The Thorsson Report calls for a new approach, based on self-interest:

The experience of the past two decades has already shown that of all the factors likely to produce restraint in military spending by the major spenders the least persuasive, so far, has been the need for greater development aid. Such a situation will persist as long as the developing countries are projected as the primary beneficiaries of the disarmament-development relationship. If, on the other hand, development - including the need for sustained and accelerated economic growth of the developed world - is viewed as a global requirement, its linkage with disarmament becomes a matter of universal economic concern, particularly when it is realized that military activities impede not only economic growth but also may help to deny the major military spenders the capability to respond adequately to the emerging non-military threats to the national well-being as in the field of ecology and energy or to adjust to a world of dynamic economic competition and interdependence in ways which will maintain and enhance the welfare of their own peoples (para 221).

The fifth chapter deals with conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes. Conversion is probably the most important word in the 1981 UN Report. It represents one of the main stumbling blocks on the way to disarmament since
many people continue to believe that the arms race is necessary to help the economy and to keep people employed.

I would like to make four points in this context. First, conversion of military facilities to civilian uses is not the only form of conversion that goes on. Every day conversion is taking place throughout every national economy as, for example, a mine is closed, a factory is opened and a farm is closed. It could be argued, of course, that even civilian conversion is not handled very well, such as the introduction of microprocessor technology. But there is nothing intrinsically different from conversion of military facilities to civilian uses as already goes on in civilian economic life on a daily basis with some economic activities finishing and others beginning. Indeed, military conversion should probably be easier because it will be centrally controlled whereas so many economic activities are done by private concerns.

Second, many military facilities can be made available immediately to civilian uses. Dealing with the example of the US military expenditure, only about 20 percent of US defence expenditure goes specifically on nuclear weapons. The remaining 80 percent goes on the conventional forces in the army, airforce and navy. Of that 80 percent, the majority of money is spent on the "tail" rather than the "teeth" (that is, the persons who actually do the fighting). The tail components consist of doctors, teachers, cooks and persons concerned with property. The Pentagon is one of the US's biggest landlords and providers of medical services and food. Many of these facilities could be converted immediately to civilian use. Naturally, the persons concerned would have a number of changes, such as salary and not wearing uniforms. But, intrinsically, there would be no difference between being a doctor on a US base and being
a doctor in a Chicago slum, or building homes on a US military base as opposed to rebuilding the slums in New York, or doing engineering projects in the Third World.

Third, extensive conversion took place after World War II. Conversion continues to take place within defence establishment as old technology is replaced by new ones, such as the cavalry having to get rid of their horses and rely instead on motorized vehicles. Those experiences indicate that the military establishment can, in fact, absorb conversion.

Finally, even though there would be some military equipment for which there would be no direct individual use for civilians, other use can be found for some of the equipment. For example, none of us would have any direct need for the US and Soviet spy satellites, but the spy satellites and their related stations would be of use to an international disarmament organization to ensure that all nations were following their disarmament obligations. Additionally, the spy satellites would be of use in helping to identify from the air new areas of potential resources, vessels in distress and bushfires.

In short, there are no major obstacles to prevent the conversion of military facilities and personnel to civilian uses. Indeed, it is notable, as the Report points out, that in recent years there has been no official governmental study of conversion or on the response of the defence industry to military expenditure cutbacks. (Sweden - to be noted in Part III of this dissertation - has produced such studies recently.)

The sixth chapter deals with possible institutional measures for the international reallocation of resources from armaments to disarmament. The Report recalls earlier proposals, such as the reduction of military budgets, and notes that some new ones were tabled at the
1978 Special Session, such as the French proposal for an international disarmament fund for development. Three basic ideas are contained in the various proposals: (a) the disarmament dividend approach in which the savings resulting from disarmament measures, or a portion thereof, are allocated to development needs; (b) the armaments levy approach, in which national assessments for development contributions are based on some agreed measure of nations' allocation of resources for military purposes; (c) voluntary contributions on the model of numerous other UN funds and specialized agencies (for example, UNICEF) in which each nation determines its own individual contribution (para 348).

The Thorsson Group was not particularly enthusiastic about any of them. The disarmament dividend received, at best, tepid support; the Group recognized that until the world devised some measurement system for military budgets little could be done to implement it. The armaments levy approach received no support because it could be circumvented. The voluntary contributions approach has benefitted some UN funds but there was no guarantee that much money could be raised for a disarmament-development fund. (The 1982 Special Session established the World Disarmament Campaign funding system on this approach and, as at December 1986, the Thorsson Group has been proved right.) The 1978 French proposal was seen as too ambitious.

The final chapter contains the Report's summary, conclusions and recommendations. The Report recommends, first, that all governments, but particularly those of the major military powers, should prepare assessments of the nature and magnitude of the short and long-term economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations so that their general public be informed of them. This recommendation is in keeping with the trend since at least the 1978 Special Session whereby UN
documents have called upon governments to do far more to alert public opinion to the dangers of the arms race and the advantages of disarmament.

Second, governments should urgently undertake studies to identify and to publicize the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources in a balanced and verifiable manner, to address economic and social problems at the national level and to contribute towards reducing the gap in income that currently divides the industrialized nations from the developing world, and establishing a New International Economic Order. In this recommendation, the UN Report once again has forged the link between disarmament and development.

Third, there should be a fuller and more systematic compilation and dissemination by governments of data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers. One of the problems in discussing the economic costs of the arms race has been the problem of reconciling the various military budgets - as already noted in this dissertation.

Fourth, the disarmament-development perspective, elaborated in the Report, should be incorporated in a concrete and practical way in the continuing activities of the UN system. This recommendation relates to the way the 1978 Special Session forged the link between disarmament and development, but this has not been reflected in the work in the UN system. This may be due to an institutional problem since the UN system, like governmental bureaucracies, is split into separate departments which do not necessarily have much connection with one another. The Report has indicated a variety of areas for further research and has identified particular parts of the UN system which should carry out the work, for example, the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations might give greater attention to the central
role of transnational corporations in the production of and trade in arms, and the UN Environment Programme might undertake an examination of the adverse environmental impact of military activities.

Fifth, governments should create the necessary pre-requisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning, to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular, in the developing countries. The Report has made a number of useful points on conversion of military facilities to civilian uses and this recommendation is part of the momentum to get governments to pay more attention to the advantages of conversion.

Sixth, governments should consider making the results of experiences and preparations in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems. There is much work to be done in following up these two recommendations. As far as can be ascertained, there has been no recent attention at all given by most governments to the potential of conversion from military to civilian uses.

Seventh, further consideration should be given to establishing an International Disarmament Fund for Development and that the administrative and technical modalities of such a fund be further investigated by the UN, with due regard to the capabilities of the agencies and institutions currently responsible for the international transfer of resources.

Eighth, the UN Secretary-General should take appropriate action, through the existing inter-agency consultative mechanism of the Administrative Committee of Co-
ordination, to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of the disarmament and development perspective in the programmes and activities of the UN system.

Finally, the Report recommends that the Department of Public Information and other relevant UN organs and agencies, while continuing to emphasize the danger of war - particularly nuclear war - should give increased emphasis in their disarmament-related public information and education activities, to the social and economic consequences of the arms race and to the corresponding benefits of disarmament. This recommendation is once again linked to the need for public awareness and in particular creating public demand in favour of reducing military expenditure.

The Thorsson Report has been examined in great detail because, first, it has built upon the work undertaken by the previous UN Reports (examined earlier in this dissertation). There are few areas in which the Thorsson Report has disputed the previous reports. The exceptions arise out of the passage of time and the acquisition of experience, such as its criticism of those Reports using a moral argument that disarmament should be implemented to assist development.

Second, it addressed some of the perceived weaknesses of the earlier arguments over the adverse economic consequences of military expenditure, such as a Benoit study (9):

A study conducted in the late 1960s by Emile Benoit is much cited as showing that military outlays do not have negative effects on economic growth for developing countries. In reality, Benoit's own conclusion was more modest. He said:

"Thus we have been unable to establish whether the net growth effects of defence expenditures have been positive or not. On the basis of all the evidence, we suspect that it has been positive for
the countries in our sample, and at past levels of defence burden, but we have not been able to prove this.*

This suspected positive relationship of Benoit's has been contested as spurious, since it was simultaneously correlated with other important socio-economic factors in the economies of those developing countries, particularly a high net in-flow of foreign assistance. Based on today's level of research, it can now be confidently refuted. In our study, we do recognize that the availability of un-utilized and under-utilized resources in developing countries may produce short-term results, suggesting a parallelism between high rates of growth and significant military spending, a situation which is, by the way, frequently associated with foreign dependence. In the long run, however, the totality of the socio-economic consequences of sizeable military outlays outweigh any immediate economic spin-offs into the civilian sector. (10)

Third, the Report tried to bridge the compartmentalization which had developed even in the UN's own disarmament work (let alone between it and other subjects, such as economic development), by urging that the UN Disarmament Committee's work on a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament (CPD), should also "...take account of the relationship between disarmament and development" (para 426). Ironically, the UN's flair for compartmentalization had resulted in the disarmament debate being separated into various sub-issues, such as this relationship (handled by the Thorsson Group) and the CPD (handled by the UNDC), with both bodies having few persons in common - indeed, Mrs Thorsson herself is probably the only significant person to have been involved in both ventures.

Fourth, in support of some of the Report's findings, here are two illustrations. During the 1978 Special Session, Rudolfo Piza Escalante, Costa Rica's Permanent Representative at the UN was interviewed by The Disarmament Times:
DT: As one of the two nations that have actually demilitarized themselves, the other being Iceland, has Costa Rica found that much discussed link between disarmament development?

Pizza: Costa Rica is one of the poorest countries in Central America in natural resources. Yet it has a higher income, literacy rate, and life expectancy and better health facilities and lower infant mortality rate than most countries in Latin America. Due to our disarmament, we have been able to develop the country faster. (11)

A second example comes from a recent Newsweek interview with Honda Chairman Hideo Sugiura:

Q: Some critics here say military procurement hurts US industry by removing the market's discipline from design and production. Do you agree?

A: Yes, and I would even carry it a step further. My company has separate departments for research and development. In research, you can't think about costs or you won't get truly original ideas. In development, cost is vital and for that you need engineers. In America, the smartest people become lawyers rather than engineers. Proportionately, Japan graduates three times as many engineers as the United States. Of the engineers you do produce, a great many wind up in military work because the rewards are higher. If there are too few engineers in American industry it is because the demand is too small. If industry hired more engineers and paid them better, more engineers would graduate. If you want to make good products, the system has to reward quality.

Q: Isn't military R&D just as useful as civilian R&D?

A: Japan's economic strength has grown while America's has not. The reason is our constant improvement of productivity and quality. If the Pentagon gave incentives for productivity and quality, maybe America would do better. The US Government spends far more on military and space programmes alone than MITI spends to promote the whole range of Japanese industry. The question is not the amount but how the money is spent. Why can't the US Government support industries it wants to promote? The steel industry got in trouble because it didn't invest in new technology. But even if that was management's fault, shouldn't the Government try to remedy the problem? Loans to do
that wouldn't cost much. The best example is MITI's new law to help depressed industries. It exempts them from anti-trust and makes loans available so they can scrap excess capacity without going bankrupt. I'm not saying the United States should do everything we do, but it could spend money more effectively than it does. (12)

Fifth, the Report has highlighted the military consumption of the world's resources. The consumption does not take place by stealth - it is simply that most of the world has taken the situation for granted. Parallel with the Thorsson study, the Foundation on Reshaping the International Order (RIO) was also looking at the disarmament-development-environment link:

Other consequences of the arms race include such matters as the noise pollution caused by military airfields and installations, the damage to crops and local environments caused by military exercises and, more significantly, the spatial claims made by the industrial-military complex on the earth's surface and the space above. Studies have shown, for example, how the US war industry has changed the geography of such states as California; and military uses take up about one half of the radio spectrum, declared a "scarce resource" by the developing countries at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference. (13)

Finally, as to the Report's recommendations themselves, I am in agreement with them. But they do not go far enough.

All UN Reports are careful about repeating adverse information about UN member-nations (unless they are currently particularly notorious in UN circles, such as South Africa). One limitation of the Report is, then, its lack of specific examples based on information which would embarrass member-nations. The reader has to look elsewhere for such cases. One example concerns Haile Selassie:
Militarization, though attempts at correlation between the size of armed forces and the incidence of coups have not been particularly fruitful, would appear, however, to reinforce the status of the military and to make countries more prone to their intervention in politics in defence of vested economic interests. The freedom of a government to rethink its expenditure priorities because of the risks involved in financial constraint on established armed forces is likely to be restricted. In Ethiopia during the last years under Haile Selassie, defence expenditure ceased to keep pace with the growth of GNP and other budgetary provision: this seems to have helped to generate discontent in the armed forces which contributed to conditions conducive to a coup and the overthrow of the Emperor - a connection which seems effectively to illustrate the dangers inherent in a military establishment which is dependent on its own growth dynamic - a microcosmic military-industrial-complex at work. (14)

Another limitation is the Report's avoidance of really grim predictions. Perhaps Mrs Thorsson and her colleagues really believed that somehow the world's leaders (especially those in the developed "northern" nations, which are responsible for 95 percent of military production) would suddenly recognize the dangers of their military policies and change. A cynic, of course, might note that any government which was creating the economic and social problems identified in the Report would be by definition incapable of showing enough sense to reverse its policies. If it had that much sense, it would not in the first place have got into the situation identified by the Report. However, UN reports usually do err on the side of caution and avoid upsetting governmental readers. Persons outside government have fewer inhibitions:

There can be little question that there is a relationship between violence and economic backwardness and that the trend for such violence is up, not down. There can also be little doubt that ten years from now, a time in which perhaps 30-40 nations will be in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons, our world, torn apart by the struggles between the rich and poor and for resources, will have a nightmare potential for
large-scale violence. A political confrontation virtually anywhere in the world could easily involve nuclear arms.

A growing number of scholars find themselves forced to speculate on the possibility of what Robert Heilbroner has called "nuclear wars of redistribution". "The possibility must be faced", he reluctantly argues, "that the under-developed nations which have "nothing" to lose will point their nuclear pistols at the heads of the passengers in the first class coaches who have everything to lose." Wars of redistribution may not necessarily involve nations, however. They would, more likely, result from acts of terrorism and political extremism. Such possibilities evoke powerful images. As Joseph Nye, another of the doyens of the study of international relations and one not prone to flights of fancy, has asked: "Is it unrealistic to imagine a small group of MIT-trained sons and daughters of Indian, Japanese, and American middle-class parents threatening to detonate a crude plutonium bomb in Boston unless American aid to Asia is immediately increased? Rather than the pacific image of a global village, the growth of transnational communication in a world of enormous inequality may merely bring us Patty Hearst with a global dimension."

We are forced to conclude that there must be a relationship - perhaps a new relationship - between the perpetuation of desperate poverty and the possibility of conflict and violence, between under-development and war. And if this is so, we must also conclude that the acceleration of the development of the Third World could serve to further the cause of disarmament. (15)

A third limitation is the almost exclusive attention to the economic aspects of the disarmament-development, with almost no attention to the political aspects. The mandate (which, of course, was largely devised by Mrs Thorsson herself) provided for only an economic analysis. The Report says nothing, therefore, about the paradox that, since military expenditure does have so many adverse economic and social consequences, why does the arms race continue?

To conclude, the Report nonetheless represents the most extensive programme of disarmament research ever undertaken by the UN. Although it has a few
limitations, it will long remain one of the most important reports of its type ever produced by any inter-governmental organization.

REACTIONS TO THE THORSSON REPORT

The Report was published in October 1981. The 1981 General Assembly Session was already halfway through and so there was not enough time for governments to consider it fully. General Assembly Resolution 36/926 (adopted on 9 December 1981) welcomed the Report, thanked the Group for its work and invited all UN member-nations to comment on it.

The replies, once again, revealed the dichotomy between governmental words and action. The 1978 UNGA Special Session, it will be recalled, adopted in its Final Document para 18 the fine statement: "Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: We must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation." The governmental responses were a litmus test of what they thought of that statement.

23 governments replied (16). This represents about an eighth of the total UN membership. The Group contained persons from 27 nations - if one deducts from the 23 the nations which had experts on the Group, then only Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussia and Cuba represent "new blood" in this issue. Of the nations which had persons on the Group but which failed to comment on the Group's Report, the notable ones are: the Netherlands, West Germany, UK, and India. Another interesting (for me) omission is Australia. When I met the Foreign Minister's disarmament staff in Canberra in May 1982, I was assured that Australia would be replying. The failure of some major nations to comment on the Thorsson
Report is not mentioned to suggest a conspiracy of silence - simply to say that all these nations had persons who could have commented on the Report but evidently felt there was little need in doing so.

Most of the replies were of little use. Senegal's was the briefest: since it had an expert on the Group and had contributed to the Group's work, it had no further comments to make. The Warsaw Treaty Organization member-nations' replies, as is often the case, covered the same ground as each other and advanced the same arguments, such as the Report's under-estimation of SALT's value.

Only four replies stand out. Canada went through each recommendation and explained its point of view (generally favourable). Mexico's reply was very similar. While both gave evidence of having actually studied the Report, neither contributed any more ideas. Sweden, by contrast, gave some information on its planning for conversion, especially in its military aircraft industry. Sweden announced it would arrange for the publication of the Report in the national language. The US, while welcoming the Report, criticized its attention to US military expenditure and lack of attention to other "major powers" (presumably, a reference to the WTO member-nations). It made no comment on any of the Report's recommendations.

On the eve of the 1982 UNGA Special Session, then, the Thorsson Report attracted little attention from governments. This was not a good omen for the 1982 Special Session.

A second way of examining the reaction to the Thorsson Report is the mass media's response. No systematic study has been conducted of the media coverage given to the Report. But it was evidently meagre - it was non-
existent in Australia, for example. At first sight, this may seem odd, given the amount of media coverage by now being lavished on speculation about World War III and the peace demonstrations. But the media had not given previous UN reports much coverage. Evidently, the Thorisson Report was seen as too technical for the readers and viewers. Also, it ran contrary to the popularly held views of the importance of military expenditure to assist the economy and it would take too much space to reply to it. Also, the Report contained good news on what should be done to end the arms race - and the media's newfound interest in the arms race did not extend much beyond the horrors of war and the colour of demonstrations.

If this assessment should appear rather harsh on the mass media, it is worth recalling that the 1960 UNESCO study of a new world information and communication order, also had some harsh comments to make, especially in regard to the Western mass media:

The arms race is a reality of our times, and measures of military escalation are news. But the striving for disarmament is also a reality, and moves to halt the arms race are news too. In a number of countries, the media's coverage of the Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly was disappointingly small. It is always regrettable that people should be led to believe that disarmament is an idle dream, or that full employment and economic growth are impossible without the maintenance of the so-called defence industry. Indeed, serious studies have been made which refute this notion. In our view, it is incumbent on journalists, and on those who shape the policies of the mass media, to inform themselves thoroughly about these studies and bring the conclusions to the attention of the public. Regular meetings between communication professionals and researchers in this field, both within various nations and internationally, might well be organized to exchange experiences and discuss problems related to the task of informing the public on disarmament issues. It is not inevitable that the world should spend vast sums - the total has been calculated at more than $1 billion every day - on weapons of destruction. The
truth is that this represents a colossal waste of resources and of human talent that could be devoted to peaceful construction and progress.

Where a profit-making system prevails, armaments production is a lucrative business. Those who control it naturally exert as much influence as they can, both on public opinion and on political decision-makers, to keep the level of arms expenditure high. An enlightened and active public, aware of the margin in history between chance and necessity, can help to generate the political will and to ensure that it makes itself felt. The military-industrial complex (to cite the phrase coined by President Eisenhower, who certainly knew what he was talking about) is a formidable reality. Even where the profit factor is absent, there are highly-placed officials, in and out of uniform, whose careers and personal interests depend on arms production. The media should be vigilant in identifying those influences, and should never succumb to pressure from them.

The dangers of war are heightened by intolerance, national chauvinism, and a failure to understand varying points of view. This should never be forgotten by those who have responsibilities in the media. Above all national and political interests, there is the supreme interest of all humanity in peace. (17)

The third method of assessment is to look at the reaction by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in development issues. In the disarmament-development debate, NGOs are alas not much better than governments and the mass media:

The assessments, ideas and proposals emerging from the non-governmental sector are not essentially different from those in the inter-governmental sector. Just as their governmental counterparts, the NGOs have devoted more time and energy to development and disarmament separately than to the study of both in their interaction.

Non-governmental activities relating to the International Development Strategy for the 80s and Beyond are being co-ordinated on a large scale by the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA). The potential role of the NGOs in this field was summarized by IFDA's President, Mark Neffin, as follows:
"... there is no reason to leave exclusively to governments and inter-governmental machineries the elaboration of the strategy for the future... It is time to give the "third system" a better chance to have its voice heard in the debate.

"Individuals and institutions outside the United Nations system are in a privileged position to endeavour to open up new approaches, investigate new themes, and experiment with new methods of work. They could address themselves to the "white spots" which are taboo to inter-governmental organizations... they could formulate alternatives to the national and international conventional wisdom; and they could be more free to tackle stumbling blocks which have so far prevented the implementation of the NIEO."

The results of the IFDA-co-ordinated NGO projects are published - monthly - in the IFDA Dossier. Only one of the over one hundred projects, however, deals explicitly with disarmament and development.

Also in the NIO Register, which comprises 56 NGOs active in areas related to the New International Order (NIO), the activities or publications of only 11 NGOs have a "major emphasis" on the arms race/disarmament. (18)

In my experience, this lack of attention to disarmament generally by development NGOs may be explained in three ways. First, members of these NGOs, like most other people, have viewed the arms race as a "given" in international politics and have addressed themselves to other issues which seem a little more amenable to change.

Second, the peace movement's lack of progress over the years did little to inspire new interest in disarmament. As the New York Friends of the Earth's Ms Salzman told me in New York in June 1978, the peace issue would be a millstone around the neck of the environment movement; so it was also seen as a millstone for development NGOs. People will become involved in campaigns which look winnable - the disarmament issue had rarely attracted that image.
Third, many development NGOs devote almost all their resources to the immediate relief of suffering. Many NGOs prefer to avoid political issues. Public stands on such issues could deter potential donors. Also, the laws governing charities in all Western nations distinguish between the collection of funds for relief purposes (which can receive various forms of tax relief) and funds for political purposes (which are not tax deductible). Some NGOs have devoted attention to the middle ground, "development education", in which quasi-political statements are made in the form of educational materials. Others have established separate organizations to do the political work and have often had long-running disputes with taxation authorities (such as the UK's War on Want and the Charity Commissioners). Additionally, many people are drawn to development NGO work because they really do want to help people directly and are not interested in examining the reasons for those people being disadvantaged in the first place. Whatever the cause, then, the disarmament-development link has been viewed by most development NGO persons as too political.

Even the development NGOs (or coalitions thereof) which concentrate on the more overtly political aspects of development have rarely given much attention to the arms race. A particularly notable example of this blind spot was a study commissioned by the London-based International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA) which looked at the crises confronting the world in the 1980s (19). There was no mention at all of the arms race or disarmament.

By the same token, some standard texts for development activists either ignore the arms race/disarmament entirely (20) or mention it in passing in the context of its opportunity cost (21). Much the same, incidentally, could be said of books dealing with the world's environment (22).
The Thorsson Report, then, failed to generate much debate among development NGOs - far less than (say) the Brandt Report (to be examined in the next section). There has been, however, a growing interest among development NGOs in the arms race issue - as a general reflection of the increased community awareness of the spectre of World War III. Even ICDA, for example, has become involved in the disarmament-development debate (23).

Finally, there is the reaction by the UN. The Special Session's reaction (or lack of it) to the Thorsson Report will be examined in the next chapter. But it is worth noting that the compartmentalization which has been criticized immediately above may also be seen within the UN itself. Once again, Mrs Thorsson has been one of the few people to emphasize the link.

The compartmentalization may be illustrated in two ways. First, there are the UN's debates over its "development strategy" for its Development Decades. The International Development Strategy for the 1980s was finalized at the 1970 UNGA Session. The arms race received only a brief mention in the IDS's preamble:

The success of international development activities will depend in large measure on improvement in the general international situation, particularly on concrete progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, on the elimination of colonialism, racial discrimination, apartheid and occupation of territories of any state and on the promotion of equal political, economic, social and cultural rights for all members of society. Progress towards general and complete disarmament should release substantial additional resources which could be utilized for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular, that of developing countries. There should, therefore, be a close link between the Second United Nations Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade. (24)
Meanwhile, with the IDS giving so little emphasis to the arms race/disarmament, so UN studies on development also ignored it. While in New York in mid-1982, I tried to locate evidence of a substantial debate on this subject in the UN's IDS work and the UNGA Second Committee (which does the preliminary work each year on UNGA development resolutions). Alas, there was trace of hardly any attention to it. Even the UN's publications which are designed to give the general public some background information on the IDS and NIEO largely ignore it. (25)

Second, the UN Specialized Agencies dealing with development issues have also ignored it. The World Bank's magazine carried its first study on this subject in March 1983 (26) - after several years of publication. Ruth Leger Sivard in a letter congratulated the magazine for running the article and commented that "...the subject has in the past suffered from a lack of professional attention and in-depth research. It has probably also suffered from a too-narrow view of development, as evidenced in the Benoit study. The significance for development in the broad sense may be considerably greater than the relatively small share of the total economic product that military expenditures represent." (27) Unfortunately, this type of article has not been repeated in the magazine.

To conclude, the reactions to the Thorsson Report were disappointing - not so much because of the adverse comments (I have been unable to find any substantial article or speech critical of it) but because there was so little notice taken of it.

THE BRANDT REPORT

In 1968, the World Bank commissioned a study, headed by former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, of international aid programmes (28). Among other things,
the Pearson Commission popularized the idea of donor nations increasing their aid to 1 percent of GNP as rapidly as possible, and in no case later than 1975, and that not less than 0.7 percent of the 1 percent should be official aid. (Australia, incidentally, has never been as close as 0.6 percent and the 1985/6 aid level is the lowest (as a percentage of GNP) since Australian records began in 1960.)

However, the 1970s did not see any dramatic breakthrough for the UN's development work; indeed, there was even some regression. The then World Bank President, Robert McNamara, was particularly worried:

The atmosphere today is at best one of regret and disappointment, he said in his annual speech later in 1977, "and at worst one of frustration and disillusionment". He was distressed, too, that the richer countries had failed to live up to the target for aid that the Pearson Commission had set eight years earlier: the level of official aid (ODA), he reported, had been virtually stationary for the past decade while the incomes of the donor countries had gone up by forty percent. The United States was giving only 0.26 percent of her gross national product for aid, compared to Pearson's target of 0.7 percent, and both Germany and Japan had reduced their proportion. (29)

Mr McNamara later proposed that there be an enquiry into international development problems and he persuaded Willy Brandt, the former Chancellor of West Germany, to chair it. "However, that is as far as the relationship extends", Mr Brandt later commented. "Unlike the Pearson Commission, not even the costs are borne by the World Bank, and this is no bad thing, since it can never be said with certainty that a particular organization will remain free of criticism. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has welcomed our project and he will be the first to receive the Report. That is the limit of our ties in that direction." (30) This political independence from the UN was useful since it separated the Brandt Commission from some of the left-wing and right-wing criticisms being made about the UN's development work (31).
The Brandt Report has been one of the most popular books written on development for several years (32). The authors were all senior politicians (or retired ones) or persons with other extensive experience in public life. The Brandt Commission, like the Pearson Commission, failed to attract persons from the Warsaw Treaty Organization member-nations, but it did have a more extensive Third World involvement than did the Pearson Commission. Particular mention should be made of the efforts by the UK member, Edward Heath (Conservative Prime Minister 1970-74) to publicize the Brandt Report. Due to political differences within the Commission, in which he was one of the prime protagonists, there was almost no Report at all. He was invited to work with Shridath Ramphal (Commonwealth Secretary-General) to produce the final draft. "And as another commissioner put it", records Anthony Sampson (who helped on the Report's final editing) "If those two can agree, then we all can. And they will agree because they're politicians." (33) The Report was a best-seller in the UK. Mr Heath, having been in the Conservative political wilderness since being replaced by Mrs Thatcher as party leader in 1975, suddenly found himself the doyen of development activists. He addressed large meetings across the UK. The Mass Lobby on Brandt - in which 10,000 persons visited Parliament on 5 May 1981 to lobby their politicians - was the largest Lobby of Parliament on any issue in recent years (34).

It is a pity that the Brandt Report skims over the arms race/disarmament issue. "Disarmament and Development" is examined in one of the Report's shortest chapters (35). The chapter recalls that "more arms do not make mankind safer, only poorer." It then goes on to give some information about both the direct cost of the arms race and its opportunity cost (for example, the World Health Organization's total anti-malaria programme, costing about $450 million, is about one-thousandth of
the world's annual military expenditure). It recalls the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and the adverse effects of the international arms trade. Like the Thorsson Group, the Commission called for a "new, more comprehensive understanding of "security" which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects."

Having alerted readers to the dangers of the arms race, the Commission makes the following recommendations - all are made briefly and without detailed explanation of how they should be implemented. The general public should be made more aware of the dangers of the arms race; all sides should work harder on disarmament negotiations; there should be a new understanding of "security"; efforts must be made to secure international agreements preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; the UN's peace-keeping machinery should be strengthened; there should be a tax on the arms trade (the revenue to be used for international development purposes); there should be more information about arms exports; and more research is necessary into the conversion of military facilities to peaceful uses.

All but two "recommendations" are only a restatement of the obvious - without any indication of how they ought to be implemented. Indeed, if the situation is as bad as presented, surely far more attention should have been devoted to making recommendations?

Two recommendations stand out as being beyond the usual flow of platitudes. Unfortunately (as noted in the second section above), the idea of an international taxation on arms was being simultaneously examined - and dismissed - by the Thorsson Group (36). Meanwhile, the recommendation on information on arms exports has been around for some decades, such as the League of Nations' arms trade register. Although I am not opposed to the
Brandt Report's recommendation, it has to be recognized that no progress has been made in this context during the last 60 years (37).

The Brandt Report, then, was a great disappointment on the disarmament-development link. It would appear as though the chapter is included to preclude criticism that the Commission ignored the arms race (which was fast replacing development as an NGO issue in Western nations - a point hinted at in the chapter's opening sentence). But, having avoided that criticism, it then exposed itself to another: namely, that its work was superficial.

Incidentally, given the success of the Brandt Report in stimulating public debate (though this has not yet been reflected in governmental decision-making), a second Report was published in 1983. It examined the progress (or lack of it) since the first Report and made some more detailed recommendations on development matters.

Disarmament was reduced from the first Report's small chapter to three paragraphs. It recalled the failure of the 1982 Special Session and the publication since the first Report of the Thorsson Report, and it ends namely:

It is beyond the scope of the present document to enter into these issues in detail. All we can do is to add our plea to theirs; that genuine disarmament be pursued as the first priority of international action, to rid the world both of the growing insecurity of the proliferation of weapons, and of their unacceptable costs, which now pose a serious threat to several industrial and developing economics. (38)

THE PALME REPORT

Following the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament, some people decided that one way of following it up unofficially would be to adopt the example set by the
Brandt Commission's method of working. I met one of the prime movers of this project, John Edwards, in Vienna in August 1979. I was told that the gradually increasing interest in the arms race provided a good opportunity to follow the Brandt example (Dr Edwards did not then know just how popular the eventual Brandt Report was to become). His concern was that the arms race debate should move beyond the provision of scarey facts to the presentation of specific disarmament proposals.

Olof Palme, former Swedish Prime Minister, agreed to chair the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. It began work in Vienna on 13 September 1980. Like the Brandt Commission, its funding came from outside the UN system.

Unlike the Brandt Commission, however, the USSR and Poland provided personnel and the Soviet Government provided some of its funds; President Brezhnev received the Commission in Moscow in June 1981. The Commission had three members who were also members of the Brandt Commission: Olof Palme, Shridath Ramphal and Haruki Mori (former Vice Minister, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The Palme Report was published in June 1982 (39) — in time for the 1982 Special Session on Disarmament. The Brandt Report benefitted by being a new significant publication at a time when there was public interest in development but few well-written books currently catering for the movement. The Palme Report, in contrast, hit bookshops at a time when there was a new flood of books on related issues to cater for the explosion in public interest in the arms race. The Palme Report, then, failed to score the same degree of public interest as did the Brandt Report — though the Palme Report did better in the US than did the Brandt Report (40).
The Palme Report devoted over a sixth of its space to the economic and social consequences of military spending. It recalls the opinions of economists towards military expenditure:

Expenditure on military goods and services is a form of consumption requiring resources that could otherwise have been used in civilian society. "Great fleets and armies" were, for Adam Smith, writing after the English-French wars of 1756-63 the model of "unproductive labour". After the more lethal European wars of the 1790s, another classical economist, Jean-Baptiste Say, added the following gloss: "Smith calls the soldier an unproductive worker; would to God this were true! for he is much more a destructive worker; not only does he fail to enrich society with any product, and consume those needed for his upkeep, but only too often he is called upon to destroy, uselessly for himself, the arduous product of others' work."

Military consumption has increased spectacularly over time, as fleets and armies in Europe and elsewhere become more expensive and more destructive. World military expenditure is more than twelve times as great in real terms as it was fifty years ago; it is more than twenty-eight times as great as it was in 1908. (41)

Military spending, in sum, is not likely to return developed economies to full employment. In the 1940s, increased military spending bought boots and tanks and a mass mobilization; not research and military electronics. In the new military context, the precedent of the last depression is an illusion.

The "Keynesian" view of military spending is in large part, of course, a political one. Its premise is that increased military spending may be the only politically plausible way of increasing public demand; that conservative governments, in particular, will only increase deficits in the interest of national security. Keynes himself, in 1940, saw economic benefits in the "vast dissipation of resources in the production of arms": "It is, it seems, politically impossible for a capitalist democracy to organize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand experiments which would prove my case - except in war conditions." Several Marxist economists have also argued that militarism is, in Rosa Luxemburg's words, "a pre-eminent means for the realization of surplus value", in part because capitalists can influence "public opinion" in favour of military production.
Yet, peacetime military spending clearly has economic costs. It creates less employment than other forms of public spending; it is highly changeable; it poses dangers for inflation. And it is no longer the only politically popular form of expenditure. The difficulty certain governments have found in cutting non-military public spending shows not only that there is continuing need for expenditure on health, welfare or old age benefits, but also that there is substantial political and public support for such expenditure. The military-industrial complex of political support for military spending is itself less unanimous than it was in the earlier post-war period — as machinists', aerospace, and metalworkers' unions in several countries have drawn attention to the economic and other costs of increased military activities. (42)

The Palme Report also notes the contribution made by military expenditure to inflation, the distortion of industry to cater for military technology, and the diversion of research and development facilities from civilian uses to military ones. These features are examined in the contexts of Western, east European and Third World nations.

However, turning to the recommendations, military expenditure appears more in the context of what financial benefits would arise from disarmament, rather than as the role of military expenditure in assisting the cause of disarmament (pp 139-140). Five specific recommendations are made. In the context of "short-term measures" there should be regional conferences on security and co-operation which should discuss economic security and reduction of the region-wide costs of military spending; there should be the launching of a major campaign to increase public awareness of the dangers of military competition, including the dangers for economic security; and national plans should be devised for releasing resources from defence budgets for foreign aid (p 179). All three recommendations are reasonable but hardly ambitious — especially in the context of the Report's warnings on the economic and social consequences of the arms race.
Among the "medium-term measures", it is recommended that there be a substantial reduction in military spending in developed and developing countries, thereby releasing resources for national needs and development assistance. (While defence expenditure reductions might be translated into other national programmes, the Report does not deal with the risk that the reductions might not be translated into foreign aid.) Finally, the Report recommends the conversion of a large proportion of military, scientific and technological efforts to civilian purposes — again with no information on the practical implementation of the recommendation.

To sum up, both the first Brandt Report and the Palme Report contain useful material on the economic and social consequences of the arms race. But both failed to break new ground in terms of how to use the concern about military expenditure itself as a tool to aid the quest for disarmament.
NOTES


(7) Mary Kaldor _The Baroque Arsenal_ London: Andre Deutsch, 1982; Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin


(10) Supra note (8), p 15.

(11) "We Rely on Our Weakness" The Disarmament Times (New York) 23 June 1978.

(12) "Competition is Necessary for Progress" Newsweek, 18 April 1983.


(15) Supra note (13), p 23.


(33) Supra note (29), p 321.

(34) See: *Fight World Poverty: Mass Lobby on Brandt, London: World Development Movement*, 1981. (Disarmament, incidentally, was not one of the four themes selected for special attention.)
(35) Supra note (32), pp 117-125.

(36) Supra note (2), pp 101-2 and note (6), paras 375-380.


(40) One factor that should not be overlooked is the contrast between the UK and US members on both Commissions. The Brandt Commission had from the UK Mr Heath, while the US person was a banker and former member of Richard Nixon's Administration Peter G Peterson (who was not such an ardent advocate of the Report). The Polme Commission's UK person was David Owen, former Foreign Secretary and by then heavily involved in the new Social Democratic Party; the US member was Cyril Vance who had had a far longer career in public service.

(41) Supra note (39), pp 71-72.

(42) Supra note (39), pp 79-80.
CHAPTER 7

THE UN's WORK 1982-6

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 7

The period 1978-82 was a dismal one for disarmament negotiations. In June 1978, Mrs Thorsson had been asked what should be achieved to help the next Special Session on Disarmament.

Before a Second Special Session on Disarmament can take place, Thorsson said, there must be "a concluded SALT II, a start on SALT III, a comprehensive test ban treaty, a chemical war convention and a start on the road to nuclear disarmament...." (1)

Since none of these steps was accomplished prior to the 1982 Special Session, it opened under a cloud and never recovered.

POLITICS AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Even before the delegates assembled for the opening session on 7 June 1982, it was clear that the Special Session was taking place in a political environment, even more adverse than 1978's. There had been an increase in US/USSR political tensions. Since then, the 1978 Special Session, the USSR had intervened in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Poland. The Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, was in ill-health and the USSR was evidently avoiding taking any new foreign policy initiatives until a new leader was in power. Mr Brezhnev's non-appearance ended the rumours that his arrival at the UN would facilitate a summit meeting with President Reagan.
Meanwhile, the fact that the Special Session was into its sixth day before the US delegation was even announced, indicated to many that there was little US commitment to the process from the outset. The US was now led by a person very different from Jimmy Carter, though, ironically, there seemed one point in common: confusion in foreign policy. President Reagan had an unclear attitude towards disarmament. In opposing President Carter in 1980, Mr Reagan campaigned against SALT II. However, as domestic US political pressure built up in favour of disarmament (partly fuelled by his Administration's comments on a "limited" nuclear war), a new Reagan approach emerged. Having virtually killed SALT II, President Reagan then said it did not go far enough in ending the arms race and so he proposed a new round of talks, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), as a way of defusing the growing support (partly from, then presidential hopeful, Senator Kennedy) of a nuclear "freeze." In summary, the "freeze" proposals emphasized stopping all deployment and testing of nuclear systems; SALT II would limit the number of missiles and delivery systems, while permitting testing and modernization; while Reagan proposed disarmament itself by effecting reductions in intercontinental warheads and missiles. Meanwhile, there was continual friction within the Administration as to who was actually making US foreign policy: the President or Secretary of State, Alexander Haig (who was also quarrelling with the US Ambassador to the UN, Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick) (2). Mr Haig was only a few weeks away from resigning, which meant that Mr Gromyko would soon have to get to know his eleventh US Secretary of State since he became deputy Foreign Minister in 1949.

The very conservative Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation (which rarely has anything good to say about the UN) provided some advice with which, ironically, I agreed:
The US, on the other hand, must not preach one line on the East River and practice another in Washington. The fundamental strengths of American society—the checks and balances in government and the accountability of political leaders—mean that American policy as to the UN must be consistent, honest, and pragmatic. In short, at present, the US has locked itself into a propaganda battle that it cannot win.

So it is not surprising that the US has not been able to establish the momentum in the UN deliberations. That was clearly true at SSOD-I and may well be the case at the upcoming SSOD-II. The prospect looms that the Special Session will be little more than grandiose verbiage, aimed not at arriving at workable solutions to the rifts between power blocs, but rather at continued efforts to create what many see as philosophical nostrums. The presence of outside pressure groups—both in the halls of the UN and on the streets of New York—will add to the confusion.

But it would be unwise to dismiss the SSOD-II prematurely as useless to the US. Its timing, just after President Reagan's trip to Europe in June offers the possibility of broad lobbying efforts to gain points for the American arms reduction initiatives. The Session also should be seen as a chance to begin redirecting world discussion towards the salient issue in the disarmament process, absolute verification and compliance procedures.

The US, to be sure, has proved itself to be the leader in meaningful arms control efforts. From the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), Outer Space Treaty (1967), Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), and other agreements, the US has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to sign workable and balanced arms control measures. It must emphasize these realities over and over at the SSOD-II.

The onus on American delegates representing their country at the Second Special Session, therefore, will be to take the offensive, to try to gain the momentum, and to move beyond merely "controlling the damage". Otherwise, SSOD-II, like most UN deliberations, will accomplish little of value to the West. (3)

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration did not use the Special Session in that way. Disarmament was not in
1982 - and is not as at December 1986 - a major priority in US foreign policy. Instead, it floats along, being buffeted by the waves of political expediency, generated by such events as US elections, pressure groups, USSR foreign activities and the media. The US could be a pace-setter in disarmament but at the moment the President has no clear disarmament strategy since disarmament is not intrinsically a major foreign policy issue.

The disarmament context was even more gloomy than the political context. Only one agreement had been finalized between the 1970 and 1982 Special Session. This was the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. This had grown out of the work done by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Swiss Government in updating the four 1949 Geneva Conventions dealing with regulation of armed conflicts and protection of victims (4). The international conference, which produced the two 1977 Additional Protocols, was not able to finalize negotiations over such matters as the banning of napalm and fragmentation bombs. This 1981 treaty, then, has its roots not in disarmament or even arms control but in the separate, though important, area of regulating the conduct of hostilities. Although the UN has absorbed the treaty into its disarmament work, it is of only marginal value in the disarmament context. It is perhaps an indication of how low is the international community's disarmament current record, that it should even be mentioned at all by the UN in the disarmament context.

Second, the most important UN body doing the preliminary work on following up the 1978 Final Document and setting the framework for the 1982 Special Session was the 40-
member Committee on Disarmament (CD). This consisted of the five nuclear-weapon nations, 21 neutral and non-aligned countries, seven nations allied to the US and seven allied to the USSR. In terms of maintaining the momentum, this was achieved mainly by the so-called Group of 21, composed of: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. However, the nuclear-weapon states had a veto power since Committee decisions had to be reached by consensus rather than on the basis of a majority vote, and so the minor groups could block a Committee decision which they did not like. Another problem was that many major negotiations between the nuclear-weapon states took place in private outside the Committee on Disarmament. The Group of 21 tried to bring these negotiations more fully within the purview of the CD, where the negotiating nations would be subject to the pressure from other nations which have an interest in seeing them reach agreement. The nuclear-weapon nations tried with some success to ensure that the negotiations remained primarily bilateral, with the CD being left to draft final treaties for ratification by all nations only after agreement had been reached between the original negotiators. In short, although the UN upgraded its disarmament machinery, the two super powers continued their own negotiations outside the UN and contrary to a provision in the 1978 Final Document which stated, "In accordance with the Charter, the UN has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament."

In March 1980, pressure from the Group of 21 led to the establishment within the CD of four ad hoc working groups. One group worked on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This programme would make up for, in effect, the lack of success on arms control measures
prior to 1978, and would be a return to the old idea of
general and complete disarmament. No text was agreed
upon. A second group examined a chemical weapons
treaty. Bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the
US on a chemical weapons treaty had been under way since
1976. They agreed that a treaty should prohibit the
development, production, stockpiling or otherwise
acquiring chemical weapons, but they wanted the treaty
to permit the use of chemicals for military purposes not
related to chemical warfare (such as crowd control) and
some progress had been made on defining key terms. The
major area of disagreement concerned verification
procedures. The US favoured compulsory on-site
verification, whereby it a monitoring satellite
suggested that the treaty was being breached,
international inspectors would have to visit chemical
plants to make sure that new weapons were not being made
and that existing stocks had been destroyed. The USSR
favoured a voluntary inspection system with states being
permitted to refuse admission (though they would have to
explain their refusal). The Group of 21 continued to
press the two super powers to make more progress on this
treaty, as well as to open up the private discussions to
enable more nations to take part. No text was agreed
upon.

A third working group examined negative security
assurances. Non-nuclear weapon nations have, for
several years, been asking for assurances from the
nuclear-weapon nations that they will not attack or
threaten to attack them with nuclear weapons. The US,
USSR, UK, China and France have given individual
assurances over the years. However, the non-nuclear-
weapon nations claim that these statements were vague
and they want a much firmer guarantee made binding by a
treaty. No text was agreed upon. A fourth working
group examined radiological weapons, which are capable
of disseminating radioactive material but without
producing an explosion. The USSR is the major proponent for this initiative but its interest in this subject remains unclear. Nuclear explosive devices are the only radiological weapons so far created and these are specifically excluded from the negotiations. Many nations (and I) regarded this discussion as a waste of time since it is focussing on non-existing weapons which current technology cannot produce.

Finally, no Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was finalized despite the negotiations between the US, USSR and UK for several years. Those nations rejected the establishment of a working group within the Committee on Disarmament, though they did report periodically to the Committee on what was happening. (A CTB Treaty would eventually replace the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty since it would also cover the testing of nuclear weapons underground.)

PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA COVERAGE

The most promising development between the two Special Sessions was, without doubt, the growth of public opinion in favour of ending the arms race (5). The contribution of world public opinion to the disarmament discussion was particularly noted by the 1978 Special Session in its Final Document:

It is essential that not only Governments but also the people of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

In 1982, 550 non-governmental organizations had representatives in at least some of the meetings; some 3,000 NGO passes were issued. The number from overseas would have been even larger had it not been for the US
Government's decision to exclude about 400 persons, allegedly for being, or having been, "communists" (6). NGOs attended excellent daily briefings arranged by the UN Secretariat. The most read document at the Special Session, The Disarmament Times, was a highly informative NGO paper. Various NGO public meetings and seminars were held. The major NGO event was the 12 June peace march to Central Park, involving some 1,000,000 persons - the largest disarmament rally in world history; this had been preceded by demonstrations in other parts of the world.

On 4 June 1978, about 19 million signatures on disarmament petitions were presented to Assistant Secretary-General Rolf Björnerstedt. Almost exactly four years later, about 104 million signatures were presented to the Secretary-General himself in a well-publicized event; I presented over a third of a million signatures alone to him on behalf of the Australian public (the Australian Government itself had arranged for the petitions to be flown to New York).

There were, however, two severe restrictions on NGO activities. Owing to an Iranian student almost assaulting the Iranian delegate on the floor of the General Assembly on 8 June, the Secretariat clamped down on security arrangements, so that NGO persons were unable to move around the UN building and lobby the delegates as is generally the case. Second, most working Group meetings were closed and so NGOs had difficulty in finding out what was happening (or not happening) in them.

The media coverage of the 1982 Special Session was inadequate. UNESCO invited a member of the Glasgow University Media Group to examine the UK television coverage of the 1982 Special Session. This is a particularly important study since so few people have
studied the media coverage of the Special Session. Dr.
Williams found:

TV news presents its audience with a narrow and
circumscribed picture of disarmament and arms
control. It is also apparent that certain
assumptions underpin its description and
interpretation of these issues.

British television news adopted a perspective which
effectively wrote off the event as a waste of time.
The report of the opening of the Session of BBC 1
on 7 June told us that "on past performances its
expectations of success are not good...

The low expectations at the outset were followed at
the end of the Session with a statement that had
emphasized disappointments: "The Special UN
Session on Disarmament has ended with an admission
of defeat after failing to produce a comprehensive
programme for arms reduction and control.
Delegates agreed no progress had been made since
the last Special Session four years ago - they made
no effort to hide their disappointment at failure"
(BBC 1, 10 July). This statement makes no
reference to the launching of the World Disarmament
Campaign, a positive, if modest, outcome of the
Session. Moreover, the coverage of SSD II was so
sparse that the viewer was given no basis for
evaluating what had taken place, what the problems
were and what were the crucial areas of
disagreement.

The prevailing news attitude adopted by the British
media was the Session "won't change anything". This
accounted for the lack of information about the
issues under consideration and the limited
coverage given to the diversity of opinions
expressed at the Session.

Much of the TV news coverage of the Special Session
consisted of the ritual of delegates shaking hands
and sitting round tables. This is a recurring
feature of TV news which, though it provides no
information, gives the impression of immediacy.

THE SPECIAL SESSION AT WORK

The Special Session was from 7 June to 10 July 1982, it
was attended by 155 Member-nations (the two missing were
South Africa and Vanuatu). As is customary at UN
meetings, the first substantive agenda item was the general debate.

Three Working Groups were then established to do the detailed work (mainly in private) on each of the Special Session's main tasks. Working Group I examined the uncompleted Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD). Some of the uncompleted provisions were finalized at the Special Session but the Group failed to complete the CPD. This is not surprising. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament discussions had gone on for much longer than the Special Session, in a more tranquil atmosphere, in which the draft CPD alone was the centre of discussion. One continued area of disagreement was the question of setting time limits on target dates for the achievement of CPD goals. Third World nations, with some support from Eastern European nations, wanted such time limits but this was opposed by Western nations, which argued that fixing deadlines would be harmful to the negotiations.

Working Group II reviewed the implementation of the 1978 Final Document. Leaving aside the UN machinery, which was in existence though hardly productive, most of the Final Document remained unimplemented.

Working Group III dealt with the implementation of the UN's declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, consideration of initiatives and proposals for generating greater public support for disarmament (including the World Disarmament Campaign), and the UN's disarmament machinery. This was the least politically contentious of the three Groups but it, too, made little progress. The World Disarmament Campaign, by prior arrangement, was launched at the beginning of the Special Session but by the end of it no agreement had been reached on its budget, programme of work and who was to be involved in its work. The Special Session
ended one day late, on 10 July. Overall, it was a great disappointment. In retrospect, it could not have achieved the same degree of success as the 1978 Session if only because of the adverse changes in the political environment.

The Special Session's greatest achievement was not, ironically, what happened inside the UN but what happened outside it. First, it had provided a unique focal point for NGO activities. A wide range of NGO activities had taken place simultaneously with the Special Session. Most of the media coverage of the Special Session had been generated by the NGOs.

Second, the 1978 Final Document was reaffirmed in the 1982 Final Document (8). This was tough and go since there were, it is believed, some attempts to weaken it. But Sweden led the campaign to ensure that it was reaffirmed by threatening to pull out of any consensus agreement which did not include that reaffirmation.

Third, the only specific agreement was that the number of UN disarmament fellowships (for diplomats to study disarmament) should be increased from 10 to 25. This programme was established at the 1978 Special Session and began operations in 1979. The fellowships are normally awarded to candidates nominated by their governments.

It is a sign of just how much of a governmental failure was the Special Session, that the last two items should receive a favourable mention at all. Even to have to argue in favour of reaffirming the 1978 Final Document weakened its authority since it implied that it was not still self-evidently worthwhile. The disarmament fellowships might make some diplomats more informed on disarmament issues (and they could certainly do with it) but if there is not the political will among their
political bosses in favour of more action on disarmament, then the training will be of little use.

The failures constitute a much longer list. First, nothing which took place at the Special Session specifically lessened the arms race or the risk of war. The 1978 Final Document was a good document for 1978, but world opinion and military technology had moved beyond 1978 and so merely to reaffirm it was not enough. Nothing of substance evolved, for example, from the CPD deliberations — if anything, the Session must have reinforced the fears of the Geneva diplomats as to how daunting was the task to achieve any progress in any area of disarmament or arms control.

Second, the fact that the Special Session was about to take place was not enough of an inducement at the CD and elsewhere for governments to make compromises for the sake of presenting the Special Session with something more than a largely uncompleted Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Similarly, the Special Session simply agreed to refer the still uncompleted CPD back to the CD for further work in 1983 — despite its lack of progress. This paper-shuffling has an air of unreality about it. This relaxed approach may not be so bad if, say, the problem was the design of a new bill of lading in the six UN languages. It is hard to reconcile this blase, almost haphazard attitude, with all the statements being made by disarmament NGOs about the dangers of the arms race. Indeed, it runs counter to paragraph 18 of the 1978 Final Document:

Removing the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.
Among the initiatives which came to nothing in the Special Session was the Thorsson Report. Like all the other initiatives, it went into the melting pot of the UN's disarmament work. But it certainly had no immediate impact on the disarmament negotiations. In this respect, then, it has gone the way of the studies mentioned in Chapter 4.

In sum, the Special Session was intended to generate a renewed sense of urgency on disarmament matters among all the governments. It failed to do this.

1986 PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

The most recent event (or non-event) in the context of the Thorsson Report concerns a UN-convened International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. This was due to be held in Paris (as the guest of the French Government) from 15 July to 2 August 1986. In 1985, however, there were indications that the US might not be represented. These rumours were confirmed in early 1986. On 22 May, France withdrew its offer to host the conference and requested that it be postponed until 1987.

As the Quaker Office at the UN reported:

Speculation on the reasons for this action includes US pressure on France, the recent change of French Government and the lack of consensus at the April Preparatory Committee meeting. Despite this, the third Preparatory Committee (2-13 June 1986) went ahead with its substantive work on the format and content of a final conference declaration. The new document set out "elements for inclusion in a final document" and provided a focus for "negotiations on what to negotiate". It seems that this was an exercise in trying to maintain the participation of the Western group in the conference and possibly in trying to woo the US back into the process. Though there was considerable pessimism at the beginning of the session over the future of the conference, the committee achieved consensus on the document - much more than it expected. (9)

As at December 1986, there is no indication whether the conference will be held in 1987 and, if so, where.
NOTES

(1) "Failure Thus Far" The Disarmament Times (New York) 22 June 1978.


(6) I was the head of the Australian NGO delegation, about one third of whom were excluded. Ironically, some who got to New York had declared on their visa applications to be communists; others who had never been communists were excluded.


(8) Reprinted in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 26 UN Department of Public Information, New York, December 1982.
(9) "Development and Disarmament (Cont.?)" in and around the UN (New York, Quaker Office) June 1986, p 2.
PART III

A PEACE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX:

ITS CREATION AND PROGRAMME OF WORK
CHAPTER 8

CREATING A PEACE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

INTRODUCTION TO PART III

The proposed peace-industrial complex will not be a new peace group. The word "complex" is used (as in the Eisenhower usage) to refer to a cluster of groups, institutions etc. (A more contemporary word would be "network").

The intention is to forge a close alliance between existing and yet-to-be-created groups within and outside the peace movement to press for a reduction in the arms race, via super GRIT, and the gradual implementation of multilateral disarmament, with military facilities being converted to civilian use.

The proposal here is for a real "peace" movement. The current peace movement is basically an arms control movement which thinks it is talking about disarmament. Thus, the current movement allows its campaign agenda to be set by governments and virtually all governmental negotiations (at the UN and elsewhere) are about arms control. All the present campaigns of the peace movement could (in theory) be implemented and not one nuclear weapon would be destroyed. For example, if there were a nuclear "freeze", comprehensive test ban treaty, no more cruise and SS20 missiles in Europe, an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, a demilitarized Pacific Ocean, no SDI, and no MX missiles, the world would still not be much safer than it is today.

However, I am not recommending simply that the arms control movement become a disarmament movement, such as campaigning for a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament (CPD). That would certainly be an improvement on the
current policy of maximum effort for minimum goals. But CPD is not enough. If the US and USSR did scrap their nuclear weapons (along with the UK, China and France) then an Iran or Pakistan or Israel with (say) 20 nuclear missiles would be a military super power. Thus the abolition of nuclear weapons (and conventional ones) at too fast a pace might create a global situation even worse than today's. (But at least - I suppose - the reduction of total nuclear weapons reduces the risk of a nuclear winter!)

Thus we come to the central irony of disarmament: negotiations for it (and arms control) are only dealing with the symptom of the underlying hostility between the US and USSR, and between NATO and WTO. As President Reagan said at the 1986 UN General Assembly: "Nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other." (1)

The way to disarmament is not via disarmament negotiations! If it were, the world would have got there by now.

Thus, a real peace movement needs an agenda which goes beyond disarmament. Naturally, disarmament should be on the agenda and Chapter 3 has contained my ideas on how the current arms race could be ended via an accelerated form of gradual reciprocated reductions in tension (Super GRI) and that an overall programme of disarmament could be based on the McCoy-Zorin principles. But the peace movement needs to campaign only for what I call a Transcending Vision: a comprehensive package containing: a recognition of the increasing importance of interdependence, a redefinition of "national security", a new approach by NATO (especially the US) to the USSR and a programme for the conversion of military facilities to civilian use. It is a matter of going from a debate on the "Nuclear Winter" to the "Nuclear Spring".
The Transcending Vision requires a different type of mass movement behind it than the current one, which is fixated on arms control and (in the UK's case) unilateral nuclear disarmament. "Think globally, act locally" is often misunderstood by the current movement, which acts locally, rather than thinking globally. Organizing rallies, designing posters and slogans and "getting the numbers" in committee meetings all take priority over the movement standing back and asking: What is the overall objective towards which it is working? The Transcending Vision is proposed as an overall objective - an aid to thinking globally.

The US peace movement (like all current Western peace movements) has no "peace peak council", no overall guiding body. This is an illustration of the peace movement's rapid and spontaneous growth, with individuals responding to the arms race in their own way. While this makes for some chaos in organizing large events, it is nonetheless the price that has to be paid for the new way of evolving mass movements (this is also a characteristic of the women's, environment, and human rights movements). I do not recommend that attention be given to creating a "peak council" for the peace movement since this would absorb time and energy.

Instead, the various components of the peace movement should focus upon the Transcending Vision and then leave it to the components of the movement to respond to that vision in their own way. The basis for establishing that programme is set out in Chapter 9.

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 8

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the peace-industrial complex should be created. The next section examines the spectrum of groups required for the peace-industrial complex. The third section deals
specifically with peace groups composed of business people. The final and longest section deals with the current concern over US military expenditure.

THE COMPOSITION OF A PEACE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The purpose of this section is, in effect, to provide a checklist of the types of groups etc required for the peace-industrial complex. The essence of the complex is the conjunction of activities by the peace movement in general and anti-arms race business people and companies in particular.

The peace-industrial complex spectrum should consist of: peace groups, economist groups and business interests. Chapter 2 of this dissertation examined the growth of the current peace movement.

An important feature of the current (post-1979) peace movement is the growth of narrowly-based groups drawing their memberships from trades or professions. These groups can mobilize specific sectors of the community and can use their particular skills and public standing. This point can be illustrated in three ways.

First, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) was formed in 1980 by Dr Bernard Lown (USA) and Dr Eugene Chazov (USSR) and has members drawn from Western and communist nations. It now has over 135,000 members in 41 nations. It also has affiliated groups, such as the Medical Association for the Prevention of War in both the UK and Australia (2). It has particularly focussed on the medical consequences of the arms race and World War III. It has argued that nuclear war is one of the major public health dangers facing humankind and that health services would be totally unable to cope with the deaths and casualties from a nuclear war. IPPNW won the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.
Second, there have been various groups of scientists (such as Australia’s Scientists Against Nuclear Arms: SANA) which have examined the scientific consequences of the arms race and World War III. An important part of this work has been the debate over the "nuclear winter", in which it has been argued that even those areas not hit directly by nuclear weapons would still be gravely threatened because the resulting dust, debris and smoke would cover the entire globe. (Such an event would not in essence be unprecedented: Lord Byron in his 1816 poem Darkness described the dreadful weather in Europe consequent upon a volcanic eruption in Java in the southern hemisphere in 1815.) The "nuclear winter" debate continues, with such people as Paul Ehrlich and Carl Sagan (3).

Third, various lawyers groups have been formed to look at the legal consequences of the arms race and disarmament. Reference has been made in this dissertation to a book which I helped write, The Forgotten Treaties: A Practical Plan for World Disarmament, which was written under the aegis of the Law Council of Australia’s International Peace and Security Committee (chaired by Sydney Solicitor, Michael Flynn). That Committee is part of the Australian legal profession’s main professional association; there is also a more politically-oriented group independent of the Law Council: Australian Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament (ALND). The British version of ALND, Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament, has organized, among other things, the January 1985 Nuclear Warfare Tribunal which examined the legality of nuclear weapons. Members of LND have also provided professional assistance to UK subjects arrested during peace marches etc. American lawyers have been the most active of all peace movement lawyers world-wide (but, then, America does have more lawyers per capita than any other nation). One organization is the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy,
based in New York, whose Executive Director is Daniel J Arbers (4). The main public international law journal, American Journal of International Law, carries articles regularly on the arms race (5) and the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law has a forum on this subject. One American lawyer, acting for his plaintiffs "The People of the Earth" is even trying to bring an action against the world's five main nuclear weapon nations for them to abolish their nuclear weapons (6).

One omission from the proliferating range of professionally-based peace groups is a group of economists. Part II of this dissertation has already noted the lack of attention given by most economists in the period 1945-86 to the economic consequences of the arms race. This may be illustrated by the way in which some of the profession's main journals for the past 30 years contain no major articles on this subject: The Economic Journal (Australia), The Economic Record (UK) and The Journal of Economic Literature (US). This may be part of a larger malaise afflicting the profession. Wassily Leontief, a Nobel prizewinner in economics (and a participant in the Thorsson study examined in Chapter 6 of this dissertation) has complained about his colleagues being too concerned with abstract mathematical models:

"Page after page of professional economic journals", he writes in a letter to the American magazine, Science, "are filled with mathematical formulas leading the reader from sets of more or less plausible but entirely arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant conclusions." A decade ago, when he was president of the American Economics Association, Mr Leontief first gave warning that academic economics was drifting away from facts towards other-worldly mathematical models. His speech was applauded, but nobody took any notice. "In fact, things got worse", says Mr Leontief.
To prove his point a second time, Mr Leontief surveyed the articles published in The American Economic Review in the past decade. The majority of its academic papers are about mathematical models. Only a minority of articles discuss the problems which most people worry about.

Mr Leontief says that he now works with more engineers, psychologists and other scientists than economists, "because they know how the real world works." (7)

This dissertation has, of course, identified some economists who have researched into the economic consequences of the arms race. John Kenneth Galbraith is perhaps the most well known economist (via his public performances) for opposition to the military-industrial complex (8). In Australia, the most well known economist on this subject would be the University of Sydney's Ted Wheelwright (9).

However, the economics profession has given rise to few groups similar to those mentioned above in other professions. There is obviously much that such an economists group could do. Part II of this dissertation has already identified areas requiring further work, both in terms of original research (such as conversion) and in publicizing available research (such as the way that the arms race is not beneficial for a nation's economy).

The only international group I have been able to trace is the International Defence Economics Association:

IDEA was founded at the 1985 Stockholm meeting of the International Economics Association, with the co-sponsorship of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Its purpose is to assist economists and other disciplinary specialists interested in research and analysis of defence economics, disarmament and economic approaches to peace and international conflict. IDEA proposes to do this through meetings; exchanges of papers, data and other material; and circulation of information about current and future activities in the field.
It will promote interchange between economists and other social science disciplines, and also among academic, government and industry specialists. East-West dialogue will be promoted. (10)

It is too soon to predict how this will operate in practice.

The peace movement should, therefore, accord a high priority to establishing in each nation as appropriate specialist peace groups for economists. There should, of course, also be groups for accountants and auditors.

Mobilizing the Business Sector

The business community is, at first sight, an unusual ally of the peace movement in that it tends to be associated with maintaining the status quo and its members' privileges. The route of the business community into the mainstream of the US peace movement has, therefore, tended to be somewhat different from that of most other organizations and individuals. Or is it? The churches, for example, may see themselves as carrying out their selfless, dedicated roles of being peacemakers, working for the Kingdom of God. But they are also concerned about their own survival. So are business people.

It is important to distinguish between mobilizing the business community and the philanthropic acts of individual business people. Such acts are to be welcomed but do not in themselves go far enough. Ted Turner, a very conservative US multi-millionaire in the media business, donates money to the US peace movement and Greenpeace's maritime activities (including The Rainbow Warrior which was destroyed by French agents in New Zealand in July 1985) (11). Joan Beverly Kroc is the widow of Macdonald's Restaurant founder Ray A Kroc and she also makes donations to the peace movement, such as spending $1 million distributing Helen Caldicott's
Missile Envy to politicians, educators and libraries, free of charge, and giving $500,000 to Admiral La Rocque’s Washington DC-based Centre for Defence Information (12).

It is necessary to devise a comprehensive way of involving business people and companies in a more systematic campaign to end the arms race. Most progress on this matter has been made in the US. But there is still a great deal to be done; the UK and Australia are even further behind.

Business Alert to Nuclear War is an educational, non-profit, non-partisan group formed in 1981 in Washington DC, to mobilize the skills of business people against the dangers of nuclear war. It is concerned with the future of business in an era of nuclear threat. BANW members come from large and small companies and from all levels of business organization. They have come together as a business group because they feel that nuclear war will annihilate everything they strive to create. BANW provides a regular programme of monthly lectures by prominent speakers and promotes special study groups for those interested in discussions in an informal setting on the means for reducing the dangers of nuclear war. BANW initiates and supports projects and activities that educate various segments of the business community and that inform non-business groups on business attitudes on this issue. As the BANW membership leaflet explains:

- The nuclear arms race consumes capital, resources, and talent in the defence industry while foreign competition takes over consumer markets in the US and abroad.

- The waste and devastation of a nuclear war violates the business commitment to the prudent management of property and assets.

- Business could not function in the civil disorder that would follow a nuclear war. (13)
Business Executives for National Security (BENS), by contrast, is more concerned about getting value for military expenditure. BENS President Stanley A Weiss addressed, in October 1983, the US House of Representatives Sub-Committee on General Oversight and the Economy Committee on Small Business:

We have all heard the unbelievable saga of the Pentagon's spare parts procurement, an overwhelmingly non-competitive process, and we applaud the efforts of the subcommittee to reform that procurement process. The Pentagon needs a big dose of capitalism - and this subcommittee is on the right track in helping to provide it...

While we sympathize with the plight of the unemployed in labour-surplus areas, we would note that Pentagon contracts are notoriously unstable as a source of employment. For one thing, such contracts are dependent upon the political winds of one-year appropriations cycles. For another, military acquisition cycles are themselves unstable. Pentagon budget planners must change their priorities, sometimes on short notice, when inflation or expensive design alterations in some acquisition programmes cause costs to edge above budget ceilings. Contracts in completely unrelated programmes can be stretched out or even cancelled as a result.

To have a strong defence, we must permit some jobs to be at risk in this way. But we should not treat defence contracting jobs as though they held the solution to unemployment. Many other approaches to unemployment, involving both the private sector and the public sector, offer much more promising roads to stable, permanent employment. It is better to keep military priorities and economic development priorities conceptually separate. (14)

A newspaper article had this to say about Stanley Weiss and his organization:

He says that one goal of BENS is to "prevent spending ourselves into bankruptcy."

In the face of $200 billion federal budget deficits, many businessmen are worried about careless defence spending.
"We’re throwing money at the military the way Lyndon Johnson threw money at social programmes, with similar inefficient results. We want to bring capitalism back into defence procurement. It’s socialism now", he says. "There’s one buyer – the Department of Defence – who buys 80 to 90 percent from a sole source without bidding."

A second goal is to prevent nuclear war. "Being dead is bad for business", Weiss says wryly.

Between the lines, BENS may seem like an anti-Reagan group. But Weiss says it is non-partisan. He guesses that three-fourths of the members endorse Reagan’s domestic agenda and maybe half would vote for him if he runs again next year.

BENS, which includes "a number of defence contractors", doesn’t side with those who urge unilateral disarmament, Weiss says. Nor does it back expensive weapons such as the MX missile, whose effectiveness is questionable and whose existence may speed up the arms race. It seeks a middle path.

Weiss, who’s a partner in several privately held businesses, traces his involvement in national security issues to the 1970s, when American defence policy was shifting from one of retaliation against nuclear attack to an emphasis on striking first. That led to conversations with other businessmen and the formation of BENS, which is based in Washington DC.

"When we get 10,000 to 20,000 business executives in 435 congressional districts asking for a change, then it will happen. That's our goal. When business talks, Congress listens", Weiss says.

It’s about time that Congress, and the White House, do listen. They would hear from a vast middle that shuns those who would throw weapons away as well as those who want to shoot first.

It’s a bunch of people who want security and who say: "Stop talking about getting "more bang for the buck" and just give me one buck's worth of work." (15)

In The Trimbab Factor, Harold Willens argues that business executives must assume a leadership role in curbing the nuclear arms race and help restore American economic strength. He seeks to convince his profit-conscious audience that an arms race is bad for
business. Rather than engage in a nuclear arms competition which neither side could win, the author would have the US confront the Soviet Union in the marketplace, where the US enjoys a distinct advantage. A shift from a resource-draining military competition to a more productive and stabilizing economic one, Willens contends, will release capital and talent that could spark a world-wide economic renaissance. The Trimtab Factor does not offer an analysis of either the dynamics of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race or a concrete blueprint for restructuring the American economy to accommodate the prescribed shift away from defence-oriented industries. But by exploring the relationship between enhanced security and economic productivity, the book appeals to an understanding of national self-interest and strives to build a consensus for an integrated programme of arms control and economic renewal (16). "Trimtabs", incidentally, are small flaps on the stabilizers of ships which assist in balancing and steadying ships. Willens (President of the Los Angeles-based Wilshop and Factory equipment corporations) suggests that a comparatively small group of people (business executives) are particularly well placed to have an influence out of proportion to their size.

As at December 1986, it could be said that there is a basis for a Peace-Industrial Complex in the US (which is the main nation with which this dissertation is concerned). The arguments in favour of one are, in effect, circulating but there is still much more to be done. Here, again, the US peace movement should accord a high priority to developing these business groups.

The UK experience has not been so promising. Former UK business executive Sir John Whitmore, in 1983, formed the Business and Industry Forum for International Stability. It arranged some public meetings (17).
I wrote to Sir John to enquire of the BIFIS's current situation and he replied in May 1985:

I regret to say however that the organization has been put on the shelf due to a lack of interest from the business community. It had to become an organization of business people for business people. I am not a businessman myself and whilst I was prepared to administer it and advise, it needed a business person to head it. None were forthcoming due to lack of time, knowledge or commitment or an apparent conflict of interest. Perhaps it can be resurrected in the future but in the meantime we are dependent upon other leading figures to make a stand such as your neighbour Lange. (18)

The Australian experience has been little better. The UN Association (NSW Division) has an Arms Race Information Service (ARIS) at an annual subscription of $250. In 1983, Roy Beardmore, a retired company director and Treasurer of the Division, and myself (then both Federal and State President) convened meetings of leading Sydney business people to see if the American experience could be repeated in Australia. We found a marked reluctance upon the part of all business people to get involved in any form of political activity. With political lobbying impossible, we settled for educational work via ARIS by which a monthly information package is sent out. There is only one subscriber.

Why has the business community on three continents been less willing to get involved in ending the arms race than most other professions (except, ironically, the economists)? That question was put by the US magazine Common Cause to Robert Schmidt (Vice Chairman, Control Data Corporation) and Bill Alden (President, Alden Computer Systems Corporation):

Robert Schmidt acknowledges that it's probably difficult for business executives to take a stand on the insanity of the nuclear arms race. "A lot of business people choose not to raise their profile by getting into that kind of discussion.
And I can't say that I necessarily blame them. I don't think it gives them any points with the government or the administration, but that's their business."

Bill Alden agrees. He says many business leaders are unwilling to take a stand because they fear the Pentagon may blackball their companies. (19)

The task for the peace movement, then, is to find ways of expanding the interest of economists and business people in ending the arms race. This does not mean, however, simply focussing on the usual way of scaring the general public into taking an interest in the arms race, such as by speculation of World War III. Instead, first, attention should be drawn to the disadvantages of the current military expenditure (to be examined in the next section) and, second, seeking their involvement in the creation of a transforming vision of an alternative to the current arms race (Chapter 9). Those people may not be affected by speculation over World War III but probably more success will be had in seeking their involvement via a subject in which they have immediate interest: military expenditure. (Lest this seems a mercenary interpretation of their motives, it should be noted that the post-1979 generalized speculations about World War III have had little impact on them - perhaps financial considerations will have a greater impact.)

CONCERN ABOUT US MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Concern about US military expenditure is nothing new. What is new, however, so notable is the way in which the concern has broadened out. Although it is difficult to identify a specific chronological development, it can be broadly claimed that the post-1945 concern has spread in the following ways. Initially, of course, there were people who have consistently claimed that the US was spending too much simply because it was attempting to do too much. Such views have been expressed by conservative neo-isolationists who believed that the US
should only be concerned with its side of the globe, as well as socialists who believed that the US was stifling "national liberation movements", exporting capitalism and generally forcing the "American way" on a reluctant world. These persons, then, argued — and still argue — that military expenditure was too high as a by product of the US Government's policies. They were not necessarily worried specifically about the rate of military expenditure — only what it was buying. Although these views will be encountered throughout this section, the section is concerned primarily with views derived specifically from concern with military expenditure itself — rather than the use to which it is put.

Within that fairly narrow focus, the following approaches may be discerned. First, there are persons (the "value for money" school — as I shall call them) who believe that the US should have a large defence force but who want to see military expenditure spent efficiently. Second, there is growing alarm about what military expenditure is doing to the US economy. There is also a more general concern about the increasing rate of US military expenditure. Finally, there is declining support within the US for the high rate of American military expenditure. All of these approaches provide grounds for the peace movement to seek greater support among the business community (both in the US and overseas) to form specialist peace groups.

"VALUE FOR MONEY" SCHOOL

The "value for money" school has basically a conservative perspective which has become concerned that US military expenditure is not being spent efficiently. This is partly an ideological approach. First, members of this school often have a high opinion of what "management" can attain — and US Secretaries of
Defence have often come from managerial backgrounds - and so excessive expenditure is interpreted as poor management by people who ought to know better. Second, these persons are often loathe to "throw money at social problems" to solve them and so also believe that military problems likewise cannot be dissolved in dollars.

The role of activist defence managers - as in, say, weapons procurement - was examined by Lawrence Lynn and Richard Smith, who assessed:

...the record of Robert S McNamara and Melvin R Laird to determine how their contrasting management approaches affected the development of the US military posture. The conclusion is that there is no management system that will solve the problem of controlling weapons cost and performance. Both McNamara and Laird accomplished similar results. Both succeeded in exercising limited influence over weapons design, procurement and performance through becoming involved, either personally or through their deputies and assistants, in individual weapons projects. A Secretary of Defence's best hope for exerting influence over military capabilities is to make a selective and determined attempt to accomplish a few major goals where the economic, political, and military stakes are overriding. For the rest, their best bet is to look for allies wherever they can find them - among factions within the services, in OMB and the White House, in congressional sub-committees, and among influential outside groups and individuals - and to build a constituency for the changes they regard as important. (20)

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) has for years reported on inefficient military expenditure. Two examples will illustrate this. The US Navy in 1956 embarked upon the Big Dish, a large radio telescope at Sugar Grove, West Virginia which "would be able to detect galaxies billions of light years from the Earth and study them with many times the accuracy of the finest optical telescopes" (21). It was apparently hoping to use it in having the Moon as a relay point for monitoring radio transmissions from the USSR. Its cost was put at $20 million. Then its cost suddenly escalated:
By July 1962, however, Secretary McNamara had had enough of Big Dish and ordered cancellation of the project. At that time, the Navy had obligated more than $96 million for it and had actually spent nearly $43 million. Two years later the project had not yet been officially terminated (even closing down a project takes time and money), and the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated in its postmortem on Big Dish that the project would eventually cost taxpayers between $63 million and $64 million.

It was not until April 1964 that the American people were told the full story of the waste and mismanagement at Sugar Grove. The details of the case were brought together by the GAO, an agency of the Congress responsible for examining government programmes and auditing their costs. In a report with the matter-of-fact title "Unnecessary Costs Incurred for the Naval Radio Research Station Project at Sugar Grove, West Virginia", the GAO concluded that "the factors contributing to the spiralling estimates and costs were (1) the lack of recognition of the complexities of the Big Dish as a precision instrument and (2) the decision, based on military urgency, to proceed with construction of the Big Dish concurrently with the development of design, plans, and specifications." (22)

Two decades later, the GAO is still hard at work on US military expenditure:

Major weapon systems costing billions of dollars are being deployed by the Defence Department without adequate testing, according to a report released today by the General Accounting Office.

The report says the Pentagon has been fully aware of the shortcoming for some time but has taken few secretive steps.

"As a result", the report says, "the department is fielding weapons systems without sufficient knowledge of their ability to survive or function in combat. Field commanders are operating weapons with unknown, perhaps dangerous, limitations." ...

The report acknowledges the difficulty of developing drones and other simulating devices to test advanced new weapons.

But it contends that the main cause of inadequate testing is a failure by the Pentagon to give testing proper priority and financing mainly because of the high cost, the press of time and bad management. (23)
A further source of information has been individuals who have become dispirited by their Pentagon experience (24). The most well known case is Ernest Fitzgerald who has recorded his career in, and disillusionment with, US defence procurement (25). His book also records the case of former Lockheed employee, Henry Durham, who wrote to Senator Proxmire in 1971 reporting on his 20 years' employment with Lockheed and the waste he had witnessed in the building of the C-5A aircraft - he received death threats, had to be guarded by federal marshals, was ostracized by his community (some of whom worked at Lockheed), his wife's requests for spiritual assistance were ignored by the Rev Billy Graham, and his career was ruined (26). The subsequent Congressional inquiry proved him right - though his life remained ruined. Fitzgerald himself suffered no direct physical harm but for six years (1976-1982) he was in US courts filling suit following his dismissal from the Pentagon in 1969 arising out of his evidence to Congress on inefficient military expenditure. He was reinstated, via a court order, in June 1982 and received $200,000 in damages (27). A year later he was back before Congress reporting on the continued financial inefficiency of the Pentagon (28).

Jacques Gansler, by contrast, left the Pentagon more happily after 25 years' service but he was troubled by the state of the post-Vietnam defence industry and so spent three years studying it:

The overriding conclusion of this book is that the industrial base of US defence is becoming both economically inefficient in the production of defence material and strategically unresponsive in terms of the production speed-up required to meet an emergency. Evidence of economic, political, and strategic problems in the defence industrial base has been present in peacetime periods throughout the history of the United States; however, in the post-Vietnam period, rapid domestic and international changes amplified normal peacetime problems and may have created significant new ones. (29)
Another recent study has examined the "iron triangle" (a variation on Eisenhower's phrase): the Department of Defence, plus NASA and the weapons branch of the Department of Energy; the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, plus congressional members from defence-related districts and states; and the firms, laboratories, research institutes, trade associations and trade unions in the industry.

The book contends that, over the years, the defence industry has assumed a major role in defining weapons procurement policies and national security. The result is a group of corporation and government decision-makers and inciders, with narrow views and shared expectations and perceptions, whose decisions on defence policy have led to new generations of increasingly expensive, "baroque" weapons systems of questionable effectiveness—and to the inevitable rise in defence budgets. The author has been particularly skilful in identifying the institutional relationships which hold the iron triangle together: the interlocking of boards of directors, many with broad experience in federal government, which "contribute to the common perceptions of industry and the government"; the interlocking interests of defence firms and financial institutions and auditors, who themselves have the power to influence governmental policy and have, in notable cases, bailed out defence firms such as Lockheed and Grumman; the revolving door of personnel between the Pentagon and industry, which contributes to a community of shared assumptions, tentative conflicts of interests and temptations to show favouritism by Defence Department procurement personnel lured by future lucrative employment in the defence industry; and the close collaboration between Defence, NASA and the industry in defining national research and development priorities, which has considerable impact on the way new generations of weapons are conceived, developed and eventually procured. (30)
Also, the mass media have started to take a more critical approach to US military expenditure. The Pentagon offers plenty of scope for an investigative journalist. Steve Weinberg has provided some ideas on how to penetrate the Pentagon. Behind the shield of national defence lies fertile ground for waste, corruption, inefficiency and conflict of interest. Weinberg tells reporters where to get the annual list detailing the revolving job exchange game of musical chairs played between the military and the defence industry. He points towards records which can help reporters sort out the vast maze of defence documents, in which the government sometimes ends up paying $114 for a 32-cent replacement part (31). *Newsweek* and *Time*, for example, have carried a string of articles in recent years all expressing concern about the efficiency in military expenditure (32).

The Reagan Administration, ironically, is also to be credited with locating evidence of financial inefficiency. President Reagan came to office, pledged to reduce "government inefficiency" and to create "smaller government" (33). The accountants at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO began slicing through social welfare expenditure, subsidies to public transport (notably AMTRAK), and solar energy research. Having developed a taste for expenditure cutting, OMB and the GAO began looking at the Pentagon. GAO staff found, for example, a Californian naval base which purchased ashtrays at $659 each, seat cushions at $529 each and self-locking nuts at $87.55 (which were retailing to the general public at $18.99) (34).

During 1985, the allegations escalated rapidly from ashtrays and seat cushions to extensive overcharging on defence contracts:
General Electric, the sixth-largest US military contractor, pleaded guilty last month to defrauding the Air Force of $800,000 in 1980 on a Minuteman missile project. The company agreed to pay fines and penalties of more than $2 million. The Navy two weeks ago cancelled a pair of contracts with General Dynamics, the third-largest military supplier, and suspended the signing of new ones with two of the company's divisions, which build submarines and missiles. The Pentagon says that General Dynamics has overcharged the Government at least $75 million for overhead expenses that included country-club fees and personal travel for company executives. All together, 45 of the 100 largest US military suppliers are under criminal investigation. Admits a vice president at a top defence contractor: "The public's impression is that everyone in this industry is a thief." (35)

IMPACT ON US ECONOMY

The conclusion is inescapable: the next trillion dollars of American military spending, if undertaken within a five year time span, will result in the impoverishment of major sectors of American society. Inflation will continue to reduce the real incomes of most working Americans. Inflation will drive interest rates to levels where only the government, the military industries, and the largest American corporations will have access to capital and credit. Unemployment will probably continue to rise. In short, a $1 trillion military budget over the next five years will mean that the United States in 1986 will be a poorer and weaker nation than it is now. (36)

That prediction was made in 1980. Nothing has happened which would suggest, at December 1986, that Dr Anderson's prediction would be incorrect.

As earlier chapters have shown, many of the UN's examples of the economic consequences of military expenditure have come from the US. It is superfluous, then, to go over the general arguments again.

What is significant, however, is the way in which there has of late been a slight increase in scholarly attention to the adverse economic consequences of US
military expenditure. Seymour Melman is no longer a voice in the wilderness (37). He is now receiving more coverage in the established mass media (38). Others have now taken up the struggle, such as James Anderson (39), Byung Hong (40) and Lloyd Dumas. It is notable that these persons all have an engineering background — rather than an economics one. This is due to the way in which they have had first hand experience of what military expenditure is doing to the US economy. As Lloyd Dumas has recalled:

For example, in 1974 I met the president of an energy consulting firm which advises businesses in conserving energy. In 1974, his business was booming, and he wanted to hire more engineers to take care of his additional business. He put an ad in The New York Times.

He told me later that he thought he could have built a spacecraft with the people who applied for the jobs. The master designer of the solar panels on one of the major satellite systems asked for work. But my friend couldn't find anyone in that whole group who knew anything about the design or even the operation of an industrial boiler. In fact, one fellow said to him, "You mean they still use boilers in industry?". He finally got the energy engineers he wanted by importing them from Britain.

Clearly, the non-competitiveness of US industry due to this technological retardation has not only generated inflation, but also unemployment. When US industries lose markets, US workers lose jobs. (41)

Coincidentally, I was in New York and talking to Seymour Melman on the day when The New York Times's economics correspondent, Leonard Silk, published one of the first of The Times's critical articles on this subject. Prior to that time, The Times generally accepted the argument that military expenditure was good for the economy. Silk's support represented a turning point:

A great divide in the post-World War II economic history of the United States was reached in the middle of the 1960s. Before then, the nation had
enjoyed relatively rapid economic growth, low unemployment and reasonably steady prices, despite cyclical swings. But starting in the mid-1960s, "stagnation" - that baffling mixture of economic stagnation and inflation - set in, and has not yet been dispelled.

What caused it? Until the correct diagnosis is made, the true cure cannot be devised.

New light on the cause has been shed by the doctoral dissertation of Byung Yoo Hong, a 30-year-old graduate student in the department of industrial and managerial engineering at Columbia University. Dr Hong has just been named assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin in Madison.

His dissertation, "Inflation Under Cost Pass-Along Management", focusses on the sharp drop in the rate of productivity increase from 1965 on. From 1947 to 1964, the average annual gain in productivity per production worker in manufacturing industries was 4.12 percent. But from 1965 to 1975, this rate dropped to 1.65 percent - the lowest over a decade ever recorded in American history.

The productivity slowdown, Dr Hong finds, made it far more difficult, if not impossible, for management to offset rising wage and other costs with more efficient production. So management switched from a cost-offsetting to a cost pass-along strategy for maintaining profits. According to Prof Lloyd J Dumas, under whom Dr Hong wrote his thesis, most American companies entered into "a kind of unintended collusion" with each other to raise prices as costs increased. Indeed, with this pass-along policy, labour was pushing on an open door, and wages went up faster.

But productivity continued to stagnate. Why? The cost of capital goods rose steeply, causing managements to throttle back capital spending. The rate of innovation and technological development by American industry slowed down. The average age of the capital stock increased, and its rate of deterioration accelerated.

As growth slowed, the rate of capacity use declined; paradoxically, sluggish demand, by reducing capacity use, caused unit costs of production to rise, pushing up prices. And, as Prof Seymour Melman of Columbia has stressed earlier, too much United States capital productive investment in military hardware and R and D. Vietnam and the arms race contributed to the productivity slowdown.
Not all American industries, of course, were able to play the price-increasing, cost pass-along game, especially when confronted with growing foreign competition. But "price leadership," and followship, became the order of the day in most industries, often with the Federal Government running interference against foreign opponents. (42)

One of the most active non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now monitoring the economic consequences of US military is the New York-based Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) (though apparently only two staff persons are deployed on the work - another example of the lack of resources going into this subject). In 1981, CEP challenged the US Secretary of Defense:

Many, including Secretary of Defence Caspar W. Weinberger, contend that increased military spending will result in civilian spinoffs. While in the past, military research and development helped create technologies like the jet engine and micro-electronics, two problems increasingly plague defence-related innovations.

First, America's record in translating military advances into competitive civilian products has been especially poor in the past decade. For example, while solid-state circuits were an innovation financed by the military, it was the Japanese who successfully used them to decrease the cost of television sets, stereos, and videotape recorders. And, although the civilian aerospace industry was heavily supported by our military know-how, the American dominance of that industry is disappearing. With Lockheed and perhaps McDonnell Douglas halting production of civilian airliners, soon only Boeing will remain to challenge Europe's Airbus Industrie.

Second, the military's technical needs increasingly emphasize high performance irrespective of cost, making defence technology inappropriate for commercial applications. For example, while military demands are pushing American development of computer chips in the direction of still higher speeds at higher cost, Japanese manufacturers are developing cheaper, more reliable chips with greater storage capacity, and are threatening to dominate the civilian side of this industry by the end of the decade. If the defence market continues to handsomely reward only the most sophisticated and expensive applications of technology, even fewer military innovations will prove useful in civilian life. (43)
These views have more recently been set out in greater detail in a book (44).

What are particularly interesting are the first-hand observations from business persons who can see what military expenditure is doing to their own (non-military) businesses. Inflation is a good example. There are only three ways of raising money for military expenditure: printing new money (which is how the Vietnam conflict was financed – and contributed to US inflation); increasing taxes (always unpopular – and President Reagan is opposed to this method); and borrowing on the money market (which President Reagan is doing). What is this doing to a company which manufactures cutting tools (saw blades, drill-bits etc)? A company director has explained (45). Interest rates go up because the US Government is competing in the market place against other potential borrowers. First, people cannot afford a home improvement loan at 18 percent (or whatever). Second, with the decreasing output, there is increasing unused capacity but the plant cost amortization (machines etc) was done on the basis of anticipating a higher income. Also, retailers cannot afford to carry large inventories – and potential now retail outlets are not opened. Third, stockholders are tempted to leave the equity market for high-yield fixed maturities – and so there is less money for borrowing (such as for an expansion of plant). The German and Japanese competitors, meanwhile, are able to borrow in their money markets at 8 percent. James Anderson again:

However, even a few conservatives are beginning to consider this possibility as they look at the havoc being wreaked on the American economy. The Wall Street Journal recently carried on its editorial page an article titled "Burning up $1 Trillion". Buried away in that article is the following statement: "Government spending of any kind tends to be more inflationary than private spending: it increases incomes without increasing the supply of goods that consumers can buy. Defence spending, in
this sense, is the worst kind of government outlay, since it eats up materials and other resources that otherwise could be used to produce consumer goods" (Wall Street Journal, 22 January 1980). It might be pointed out that if by some miracle peace were to break out, the United States could double the basic capitalization of every firm on the New York Stock Exchange over the next five years.

Instead, it is clear that the only major investment the United States will make in the next five years will be in military production. Investment capital will be diverted from the productive sectors of the economy. (46)

Finally, this point of view is now being more absorbed by senior Americans. Jimmy Carter, for example, has undergone a change of mind since leaving the White House. Speaking on "America’s Position in a Changing World" in March 1978, the President claimed:

Another myth is that our defence budget is too burdensome, and consumes an undue part of our Federal revenues. National defence is, of course, a large and important item of expenditures, but it represents only about five percent of our gross national product, and about a quarter of our current Federal budget. (47)

But he adopted a different attitude when he wrote his memoirs:

I have pointed out to the other members of the National Security Council that the demands for defence expenditures comprise a bottomless pit which we can never fill. One of the most serious problems we have, as I have said many times to this group, is the inclination on the part of our military leaders - the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the civilian leaders as well - to seek more money by savaging ourselves, constantly denigrating America’s formidable military capability. This hurts our own country and our allies’ confidence in us, and might lead the Soviet leaders to make a suicidal misjudgement based on the chorus of lamentations from the Pentagon and defence contractors that we are weak and Impotent.

We all agree that a major continuing commitment to arms control will be imperative - not only for us and our reputation as a peaceful nation, but for
our relations with the Soviets as well. The nation's total budget will be increasingly limited in the years ahead, no matter who might be serving as President. (48)

Lee Iacocca, head of Chrysler, did not criticize the military-industrial complex directly in his best-selling book but he has hinted that there was waste:

Then there’s defence. Eisenhower warned us about this one when he talked about the military-industrial complex. That complex has us spending over $300 billion a year. It’s the only protected industry we have left in this country. It’s the only industry where, by law, the Japanese, are not allowed to compete.

That’s why when we at Chrysler sold our tank division to General Dynamics, a lot of people asked: "Why don't you sell the car business and keep the tanks? The tanks are making you $60 million a year guaranteed and protected!" (49)

The following year (1985) being interviewed by Time he was still reluctant to talk about Pentagon inefficiency, but he did at last state:

I would take the slop out of the military-industrial complex. And I happen to know it exists. I mean, it’s cost-plus, and there’s no competition. What the hell, there has to be slop.” (50)

THE COST TO DEFENCE EFFICIENCY

There are some signs that the cost of military expenditure is beginning to impact upon defence decision-makers. The September 1983 annual survey of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (51) indicates that all defence forces are likely to begin shrinking because of governments' general financial problems. The Institute's Director, Robert O'Neill, was more forthcoming at his press conference in challenging claims about a hectic arms race (52). He predicted a decline particularly in navies and infantry.
Later, a newspaper article (53) examined the declining order books of the major arms contractors. The era of major monster contracts (such as the US AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia in 1981 for $8.5 billion) seems to be over - at least for the present.

However, there should be some caution. First, isolated events such as these do not necessarily amount to a new set pattern. Second, the new era (if any) is being forced upon defence departments because of financial problems. If these problems go (such as an end to the recession) then old spending habits could resume. Also, the cuts are not part of a set disarmament plan. The cuts are not due to a relaxation in international tension.

Ironically, this is a good time militarily for the two super powers to reflect on their defence structures. Both have been beaten in conflicts in which expensive high technology - let alone nuclear forces - has been of no use. The US was forced out of the Lebanon and Vietnam and the USSR shows no signs of winning in Afghanistan. Large defence budgets (as the US should know from Vietnam) are of little use in guerrilla conflicts, where the opponents are well motivated, well organized and fighting on their own ground.

One final observation is Norman Mailer's sardonic comment on "small wars":

Moreover, we had not necessarily succeeded in demonstrating to China that guerrilla wars exacted too severe a price from the Communists. On the contrary, a few more guerrilla wars could certainly bankrupt America, since we now had 500,000 troops in South Vietnam to the 50,000 of the North Vietnamese, and our costs for this one small war had mounted to a figure between $25,000,000,000 and $30,000,000,000 a year, not so small an amount if one is reminded that the Second World War cost a total of $300,000,000,000 over four years, or less than three times as much on an average year as
Vietnam! (Of course, there has been inflation since, but still! What incredible expense for so small a war - what scandals of procurement yet to be uncovered. How many more such inexpensive wars could the economy take?) (54)

CONCERN AMONG AMERICA'S ALLIES

Not only does the US have problems at home, but there is unrest among its main allies: its NATO partners. Virtually since its inception, NATO has grappled with how the defence burden should be shared among its members - with successive US Governments claiming that the US was doing too much and the Europeans too little. (55)

The extent of the problem of burden-sharing in NATO may best be seen in what needs to be done to correct the current problems. Gavin Kennedy does not foresee any major breakthrough coming quickly in this matter and has drawn up eight broad principles to help facilitate burden-sharing - though he provides no ideas on how NATO could proceed to implement them (56). If anything, the burden-sharing situation has become even more complicated in the last few years, especially with President Reagan's ideas in the last five for a rapid US defence expansion:

The danger now is that the defence-spending plans of the United States may get even more out of line with the rest of NATO than they are at present. If so, the United States could be spending proportionately twice as much as West Germany in 1985. Ultimately, such a divergence could cause severe political strains within the alliance - already implicit in Nunn's proposal that Washington freeze any spending hikes in the NATO sphere above the minimum 3 percent target implemented three years ago. Moreover, if Washington tries to shoulder the entire defence burden, there will be a temptation for the Europeans and the Japanese to do even less than they are doing now.

The consensus in Europe is that the United States may be trying to do too much without being willing to raise the tax revenues to pay for it. There is
also a widespread belief that the no-holds-barred American build-up in these circumstances threatens to undermine the economic security of the United States and its allies. That policy, critics say, puts in peril the alliance's future ability to maintain the steady increment in defence spending that everyone agrees is necessary. As one leading French official argues, "Defence should transcend the economic necessities of the moment. It's a form of life insurance." Unfortunately for the allies, the premiums on that policy are growing all the time - and NATO ought to be reassessing just how much coverage the current spending levels provide. (57)

DECLINING SUPPORT AT HOME

Finally, there is evidence of declining support among the American people for the high level of US military expenditure. Opinion pollster Lawrence Kaagan has detected this shift:

For the first peacetime period in the nuclear age, the American people are really thinking about the economic impact of large-scale defence spending. Surveys show us several swings in mood from tempered isolationism to what Lloyd Free has recently called "moderate extrovert internationalism". And we have seen pre- and post-Vietnam fluctuations in what was considered "morally" appropriate levels of defence spending. There has been a resurgence of support for a conscripted army and for bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the phrase "guns versus butter" has clearly taken on new meaning in the arena of American public opinion.

Post-war changes in public support for defence budgets have proved to be among the most dramatic indicators of attitudes towards a US posture in foreign affairs. In 1971, with the war in Vietnam still weighing heavily on the national mood, only an 11% minority of the public said they thought the Pentagon had too little to spend. A decade later in 1981, after becoming disenchanted with a period of détente which seemed to benefit only the Soviet Union, a 51% majority said that the American Government spent too little on military and defence needs.
But in the trend studies by the Gallup Organization, from which these data are taken, support for expanded defence spending has recently collapsed. In Gallup's most recent 1982 reading, only 19% felt that Washington spends too little on defence, a 32% decline - the most precipitous one-year change with respect to this issue since the Korean war...

Responding to what Americans saw as a long string of post-Vietnam humiliations, infringements and threatening developments, public opinion measurements recorded a virtual surge in approval for enlarged defence expenditures. Analysing public opinion changes in their book State of the Nation III, William Watts and Lloyd Free called public support for defence spending in 1976 "little short of phenomenal". That intensity continued to grow through 1980, and the assertive mood it represented helped to propel Ronald Reagan into the White House.

What we see now, however, is the fragmenting of consensus on defence spending that is almost equally phenomenal. And while the growth in public consensus was in large part tied to developments in the international arena, its fragmentation is attributable in an impressive degree to the traumas associated with a faltering domestic economy. (58)

William P. Bundy, a US Government official 1951-1969 and Editor of Foreign Affairs since 1962, admits to changing his mind on US military expenditure: "Along with most Americans, I have supported the necessity for substantial increases [in military expenditure], although - again like most Americans - I am today concerned not only about wasteful practices and management but about the strategic premises behind the naval programme in particular." (59) He then went on to note:

The fluctuations in American public opinion on defence spending in the past decade have been a study in themselves. Since 1974 the Gallup Organization has conducted systematic surveys with the same question concerning current military budget levels. The results have been as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>November 1982</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1982</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Feb 1981</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1980</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>December 1979</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>July 1977</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Feb 1976</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1974</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12 (60)</td>
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</table>

To conclude, there is some evidence in favour of the peace movement providing much more attention to developing peace groups based on the business community and to focusing more attention on the dangers of military expenditure. But the peace movement should not be concerned solely with emphasizing the dangers of military expenditure. It needs also to develop a Transcending Vision of the military expenditure being converted to better uses.
NOTES

(1) "President Reagan's 22 September UN Address" Congressional Quarterly (Washington DC) 27 September 1986, p 2303.

(2) Rob Simpson "Nobel Prize to Doctors Fighting Nuclear Arms Race" Habitat (Melbourne) December 1985, p 38.


(6) Leon L Vickman, Suite 605, 16255 Ventura Boulevard, Encino, California, 91436. (In 1984, women at the UK's Greenham Common US Air Force Base (site of the cruise missiles) brought an action in the US District Court, New York, to try to stop the deployment of the missiles; the court dismissed the complaint and held: that the suit presented a non-justiciable political question not appropriate for judicial resolution; see: Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, AJIL December 1985, pp 746-749.)


(10) "Announcements of New Institutes and Associations" International Peace Research Newsletter (Ohio State University) July 1986, p 49.


(12) "Mrs Big Mac Pays Price for Peace" The Age (Melbourne) 14 October 1985.

(13) Information is available from: Business Alert to Nuclear War, Belmont, Massachusetts, USA.


(15) "Less is More, Say Executives on Defence" Chicago Sun-Times 19 September 1983.


(22) Ibid, p 22.


(24) The most notable examples outside this dissertation's context are Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame (see: Papers on the War New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972) and a former nuclear missile designer who resigned over his latest missiles (Tridents) being constructed for "first-strike" deployment (see: Robert C Aldridge The Counterforce Syndrome Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982). More within this dissertation's context is Robert Bowman, a former Lt Col (USAF) whose last posting was on the preparatory work on "Star Wars"; he later resigned and established his own anti-"Star Wars" NGO: Star Wars: Defence or Death Star? Washington DC: Institute for Space and Security Studies, 1985.


(28) "Pentagon Still Overpays, Analyst Says"
International Herald Tribune 1 October 1983.


(39) Supra note (36) and "Bankrupting America: The Impact of President Reagan's Military Budget" International Journal of Health Services (New York) (Vol. 11, No. 4), 1981.


(46) Supra nonto (36), p 4.


(50) "A Spunky Tycoon Turned Super Star" Time 1 April 1985.


(52) "Astronomical Costs Start Eroding the Weapons Mountains" The Australian 1 October 1983.


(57) "Can Guns and Butter Mix?” Newsweek (US) 14 June 1982.


CHAPTER 9

CREATING A TRANSCENDING VISION:
FROM "NUCLEAR WINTER" TO "NUCLEAR SPRING"

A TRANSCENDING VISION

Chapter 8 has recommended that the peace movement devote particular attention to mobilizing the economics profession and the business community. The purpose of this final chapter is to recommend a programme for the Peace-Industrial Complex to follow. It is not possible to set out a detailed programme for, as will be shown in this chapter, such a detailed programme would go well beyond the space available. Instead, the intention is to itemize the programme’s main components.

The programme amounts to a transcending vision. Earlier chapters of this dissertation have criticized the peace movement for being essentially an arms control movement, rather than a disarmament movement. A more basic criticism is that the peace movement lacks an overall vision. By following the arms control agenda of governments, the peace movement is devoting maximum effort to minimum goals. After seven years of effort (as at December 1986) the peace movement - like governments - can claim few successes. The peace movement should, so to speak, turn the telescope around and look through the other end. It has used the telescope as a microscope by focussing upon narrow goals. By reversing the telescope, it will start looking at larger goals.

One advantage of more business people becoming involved in the peace movement is that there can be the application of business techniques, such as the introduction of goal-setting methods, especially the
system of management by objectives (MBO) (1). Few people doubt the energy and sincerity of peace activists. But are those qualities being channelled in the right direction? Judging by the result so far, the answer would have to be negative.

By "transcending vision" I mean some overall target under which are brought together various goals, each of which needs a separate plan of campaign. An example from warfare will clarify this. In December 1941, a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Winston Churchill and his chiefs of staff sailed on the Duke of York to meet President Roosevelt. While on board; Churchill "mapped out the entire future strategy of the war" (2). Germany should be defeated first; Japan should be held at bay until Germany's defeat; victory in North Africa was the top priority to be followed by the Invasion of Europe. That was the transcending vision. The layer below that consisted of specific objectives or goals (for example, how, when and where to destroy German forces in North Africa?). The bottom layer consisted of specific campaigns to achieve each objective (goal). War is easier to campaign for than peace because there is a clear sense of urgency, a definite enemy and (at least in most cases) a greater national consensus in favour of waging war. Peace is less tangible.

The peace movement, to follow this analogy, has been conducting sporadic guerrilla raids: a demonstration here, a petition there, an attempt for a nuclear-free zone or an attempt to stop the Strategic Defence Initiative. The peace groups hope that, in the end, such raids will bear fruit. But guerrilla leaders, such as Ho Chi Minh, have been able to project a transcending vision of what the various components are supposed to amount to, such as defeat of the French and the independence of a united Vietnam. Without a transcending vision, sporadic raids are not much more than banditry.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are more likely to produce transcending visions than governments. These visions set a nation's political agenda. The campaigns for women's rights, saving the whale, protecting the environment, providing relief to Third World nations, all began with non-governmental organizations. The NGOs often began with only one person and an idea, such as Peter Benenson, a London solicitor, and his idea for "prisoners of conscience" (political prisoners) being released, which led to the formation of Amnesty International (3).

To the extent that the current peace movement has given attention to transcending visions, the visions have been mainly of an arms control nature or a limited disarmament one, such as the nuclear "freeze" campaign in the US (4) and a European nuclear-free zone (5).

The transcending vision should consist of four components: a recognition of the increasing importance of interdependence, a redefinition of "national security", a new approach to the USSR, and a programme for the conversion of military facilities to civilian use. All four components have to be tackled simultaneously. The second layer would consist of specific goals. The third layer would consist of campaigns to achieve each goal, such as petitions, rallies, lobbying politicians, letters to newspapers, and consumer boycotts of civilian products made by arms manufacturers, such as General Electric toasters.

A new matrix is required:
Transcending Vision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interdependence</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
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The "X" means that further work - beyond the scope of this dissertation - is required. It could be impracticable to suggest what the "X" should be in each case. As previously argued, the approach adopted here is to set the transcending vision and to leave it to each peace group in each location to work for the vision in its own way. However, some general ideas are contained in the following pages.

Meanwhile, I also recommend that whatever detailed action is taken does, in fact, conform to this matrix. In other words, a peace activist standing, for example, outside a military factory or military base or writing a letter to a politician has in mind how his or her action (campaign) is contributing to a goal which is, in turn, contributing to one of the four components of the transcending vision. Too often, in my experience, a peace activist (or peace group) does an action because it "seems right" - thereby confusing the "warm inner glow" with "the light on the hill". There is a tendency to assume that just because one is working hard, one is working effectively. The challenge is not to work harder - but to work smarter.

For example, two sets of toasters are made: those by corporations (notably General Electric) which are also part of the military-industrial complex and those which are not also producing weapons. A list should be drawn up by the Peace-Industrial Complex of the latter products and consumers encouraged to buy "nuclear-free toasters". Managers of such
products would, no doubt, in due course be able to mount advertising campaigns based on their "nuclear-free" produce. Every time a consumer makes a purchase, he or she is casting a "vote" in favour of that product. I am suggesting—as with the "Nestle's Baby Killers" campaign—that consumers be encouraged (by the Peace-Industrial Complex) as to what corporations they are "voting" for. Consumer boycotts are examples of my level three (bottom level) activities in the above matrix.

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF INTERDEPENDENCE

The Thorsson Report said that a key task for governments is now the "co-operative management of interdependence". The key word is gradually creeping into the political vocabulary, even though progress is much slower on the key task. Governments remain slow to recognize that there are no national solutions to international problems.

John Naisbitt, in his best-selling book, has warned his fellow Americans of the changes taking place:

The two most important things to remember about world economics are that yesterday is over and that we must now adjust to living in a world of interdependent communities. Some of us find those ideas hard to accept.

We in America have come to love playing the starring role in world economics. Perhaps we rightfully earned that place of honour. During the 1950s and 1960s, our growth and productivity rates and the quality of our products set the pace for the rest of the industrialized world:

- For two decades after World War II, American productivity growth increased more than 3 percent per year.
- In 1960, the United States had about 25 percent of the world market share in manufacturing.
- In the important US market, American companies produced 95 percent of the autos, steel, and consumer electronics sold in 1960.
That was yesterday. Today, we no longer dominate the world's economy.

- Between 1973 and 1977, productivity growth decreased to about 1 percent per year. And in 1979, productivity growth declined 2 percent.

- In 1979, the US share of world manufacturing slipped to just over 17 percent.

- In 1979, American companies' share of the domestic market dropped to only 79 percent of the autos, 86 percent of the steel, and less than 50 percent of the consumer electronics sold in the United States.

Japan has seized from us the position as the world's leading industrial power, having surpassed the United States both in steel and automobile production. On a per capita basis, Japan's GNP is about even with ours, with Japan having the growth edge. We are ahead only because of the sheer size of our economy.

Japan is number one, but that is like a new world champion in a declining sport.

But it is not so much that Japan is taking our place for Japan, in turn, is being challenged by Singapore, South Korea, and Brazil - the dazzling economies of these newly developed Third World nations. Yesterday is over, and tomorrow is not going to last forever, either. (6)

Although Naisbitt does not argue this (or even indeed explain why the US has declined relatively), I have already argued in this dissertation that part of the decline is due to the US's excessive attention to military research and development.

US Secretary of State George Schultz, speaking in 1984 on the ironical title of "trade, independence (sic) and conflicts of jurisdiction" spent most of his address (to the South Carolina Bar Association) on interdependence:

The volume of international transactions has grown tremendously in the last three decades. The contribution of international trade as a proportion of American GNP has doubled since 1945. American exports increased from 43,000 million dollars to more than 200,000 million dollars in the 1970s alone.
The value of world trade more than doubled during that period. American direct investment abroad as of 1982 totalled some 221,000 million dollars: foreign direct investment in the United States in the same year stood at 102,000 million dollars.

One symbol of this age of economic interdependence is the multinational corporation. The conditions that produced the explosion in trade across national boundaries have led to a similar internationalization of industry. Thirty years ago, most American industrial firms conducted their operations top to bottom within the United States. Today, those same operations are often spread out across the globe, whether to produce components at the lowest price, or to produce goods closer to potential markets. Today, virtually every line of trade and industry has been affected - and advanced - by the spread and growth of multinational enterprises. (7)

A final example comes from Edward Heath, MP (British Prime Minister 1970-74 and a member of the Brandt Commission):

Interdependence does indeed run deep in the modern world. World trade and international specialization has developed to the point at which countries imported $1,680 billion from each other last year. By the end of 1981, countries had directly invested $482 billion in one another. The foreign debt of non-OPEC developing countries is estimated to be well in excess of $500 billion.

We in Britain export a third of everything we produce. We no longer exercise sovereignty over the bulk of the lands with which we trade as we did before the dismantling of our Empire. In this sense, Britain and the other nation-states of Europe are in a materially different position to that of the United States whose trade patterns betray (sic) greater economic integrity and self-sufficiency.

The relative freedom of capital movements in the 1980s has made national interest rates dependent upon those in other financial centres. In turn, Central Banks have virtually given up attempts to manage their own exchange rates and the old system of international management has collapsed. No efforts are being made to restore it or replace it. (8)
The concept of interdependence goes beyond the traditional pre-World War I view that by increasing trade governments would reduce the risk of war. Ian Bellamy summed up this view (very much associated with Norman Angell, author of The Great Illusion): as "a liberal economic (or utilitarian) belief that war is the principal obstacle to the growth of general wealth through its interference with the freedom of trade" (9). A J P Taylor's grandfather (J T Taylor), who owned a cotton factory, manifested this approach in 1914: "Can't they see as overtime they kills a German they kills a customer?" a true voice of old Free Trade Lancashire" (10).

Interdependence is about more than just making the world safe for a global market. It represents a new way of looking at the world: seeing the world as a total system, rather than discrete billiard balls (nation-states) jostling one another. What one nation does can often impact upon other nations; what several nations do can often impact upon the entire globe (such as acid rain, the international debt crisis and over-exploitation of fish).

This concept runs contrary to the philosophy of the Reagan Administration: the cult of the rugged individual. The rise of the so-called New Right and its support of neo-classical economies (with its emphasis on the market and minimal governmental intervention) are proof that the concept of interdependence is a long way from finding political acceptance (at least in most Western nations). If anything, the Western political tide is flowing against it. For example, the "common heritage of mankind" principle, which forms the basis of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Treaty, is opposed by the current US Administration, which has refused to sign the Treaty.
The arms race is, in a sense, a manifestation of the cult of the individual. Each nation, not trusting any other or any international peacekeeping system, feels the need to have weapons. Unfortunately, the cult of the individual has imperilled the globe via the prospect of World War III.

We do not need a new set of weapons (such as the Strategic Defence Initiative). We need a new way of thinking. Hence, this chapter's emphasis on - and the endorsement of - the Thorsson Report's concept of interdependence. Speaking at the Sixth (1986) World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of War) Mrs Thorsson summarized the conclusions of the Report:

(1) The world found itself at a crossroads. It could either continue to pursue the arms race or it could move towards a more sustainable economic and political order. It could not do both.

(2) Irrespective of economic systems and level of economic development, all countries would benefit economically from an effective disarmament process. They thus have a mutual enlightened self-interest in disarmament.

(3) In a disarmament situation, governments would face conversion problems. If solutions to those problems were well planned and prepared, they would cause no serious technical and economic difficulties.

The UN study had involved more than a hundred economists around the world and their conclusions and recommendations were unambiguous. Although the time should be ripe for decisions and action, so far the political leaders of the major powers have failed to recognize that an intensified arms race will ultimately bring economic ruin. There could be only one solution: there must be drastic changes in the behaviour of political leaders everywhere, particularly those of the dominant military powers. (11)
Thus, the concept of interdependence, in my opinion, cuts across the crude rivalry represented by the arms race. Nations need to recognize – more specifically: peace movements need to force governments to recognize – that all governments can gain more from interdependence than they can by the continuation of the arms race. They all have a mutual self-interest in disarmament – and none to be gained in continuing the arms race.

THE RE-DEFINITION OF "NATIONAL SECURITY"

STONE: I think the country is being driven into a ridiculous frame of mind by a lot of panicky talk that stems largely from the military-industrial complex and groups that are its lobbies and sounding boards. The idea is spreading that we are a weak country. We’re through. We’re on the skids. Look, America is still the strongest country in the world, the most heavily armed, the one where people most prefer to invest, the one place where they flee. It’s ridiculous to talk in those terms. It’s perfectly true that if you want to count weapons, there’s a lot of weapons where the Russians have more than we do. But there are a lot of fields where they need more. They have the Chinese on one side and their own reluctant satellites on the other, and their land borders, and they need a lot of tanks. They’ve got a lot of tanks. We don’t need all those tanks. When we build tanks we build Cadillacs. The Pentagon loves to build Cadillacs. That’s where the money is. And that’s where you get advancement and where you get yourself a good job when you retire from the Pentagon working for General Dynamics or some other big military-industrial firm. So we’re going into overly expensive, overly elaborate and overly delicate weapons. They are getting so damn good, so exquisitely tooled that one bang on the battlefield is enough to upset them. We don’t need all those tanks. You can’t float a tank across the ocean. It’s a hell of a job to send them abroad on a plane, and we don’t have land border to defend. The Russians have a tremendous land border with China, and the Chinese and the Russians are equally suspicious and paranoid about each other. They have their difficulties in Western Europe where their satellites are highly dissatisfied, and can only be held down by force and intimidation. So they need one hell of a big land army. We don’t need the same kind of an army. Each nation, and this is elementary for military men, builds the kinds of forces required by its geography and its
strategy, and strategy is determined by geography. It's ridiculous to think that we need to match them in every weapon they've got, or because they're foolish enough to build a hell of a lot of weapons of a certain type, we ought to do the same thing. (12)

The United States is still the world's most militarily powerful nation. Misadventures like Indo-China and the Lebanon (1983) show that it has no record for automatic military success. But it is still more militarily powerful than the USSR or any of its Western allies.

Worry about "national security" is, of course, as old as the nation-state. But in the contemporary US context, in particular, it goes back to the closing stages of World War II:

Acheson spoke about the "United States getting itself together". By this, he meant that the country had to become organized for perpetual confrontation and for war. The unified pattern of attitudes, policies and institutions by which this task was to be effected, comprise what I call America's "national security state". It became, in fact, a "state within a state". The attitudes were derived from the two commanding ideas of American post-war foreign policy - anti-communism and a new doctrine of national security. The policies included containment, confrontation, and intervention, the methods by which US leaders have sought to make the world safe for America. The institutions include those government bureaucracies and private organizations that serve in permanent war preparedness. These developments have helped to increase dramatically the power of the Executive branch of the US Government, particularly the Presidency...

And so, the Second World War was succeeded not by the peace that Yalta had promised but by a new conflict, the Cold War, an armed Truce, precarious and dangerous - and still today, the central and defining fact of international life. (13)

Yergin explains two contrasting theories about the USSR which struggled for control of US policy. The first he calls the "Riga axioms", named after the Baltic port and former capital of Latvia, where US officials gathered
information on the early USSR and concluded that the USSR was a menace to the Western world. What broke this group's influence temporarily was the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 and the UK and US assistance to it in fighting the common enemy. The "Yalta axioms" underpinned US-USSR relations 1941-5, and assumed that the USSR was a great power that behaved in a traditional fashion, motivated not so much by ideology, as by self-interest. The "Riga axioms" school have held sway for most of the post-1945 period:

American leaders who accepted the Riga axioms misinterpreted both the range and degree of the Soviet challenge and the character of Soviet objectives and so downplayed the possibilities for diplomacy and accommodation. It was the new doctrine of "national security" that led them to believe that the USSR presented an immediate military threat to the United States. The doctrine, an expansive interpretation of American security needs, represented a major re-definition of America's relation to the rest of the world.

If American interests were in jeopardy everywhere in the world, the exercise of Soviet power anywhere outside Russian borders appeared ominous. Any form of compromise was, therefore, regarded as appeasement, already once tried and once failed.

The doctrine of national security also permitted America's post-war leaders to harmonize the conflicting demands of Wilsonianism and realpolitik to be democratic idealists and pragmatic realists at the same time. So emboldened, American leaders pursued a global, often crusading, foreign policy convinced that it was made urgent by something more earthly than the missionary impulse of Woodrow Wilson. (14)

This approach to "national security" has, in my view, three main weaknesses. First, the US has no way of securing itself against a Soviet attack on the US mainland. It can destroy the USSR in retaliation and it can hope that the threat of retaliation will deter the USSR from launching the attack in the first place. But it cannot destroy the incoming missiles. This is the first time in world history that this paradox has arisen
due precisely to the explosive capacity and virtual invulnerability of nuclear missiles. By contrast, Hitler's Operation Sealion (the 1940 invasion of the UK) was stopped by the RAF in the Battle of Britain in which it had to shoot down only 10 percent of the German aircraft to deny the Germans air superiority. During World War II, an estimated equivalent of 3 million tons of TNT was used (including the two atomic bombs). The US and USSR have 16,000 million tons of TNT in their nuclear weapon - the equivalent of 5,000 World War IIIs. Each US Trident submarine alone carries the equivalent of 5,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs in its nuclear missiles (15). This new era of nuclear explosive, alone, means that traditional notions of "national security" no longer apply.

Second, the US is vulnerable to low intensity nuclear warfare. The extent to which the US may yet become affected has been shown in two books. Clyde Burleson has recorded cases of stolen US uranium, attempted assaults on US nuclear power plants and various nuclear accidents (16). Meanwhile, a novel has been written by Collins and Lapierre dealing with the way in which Libya's Muammar Al-Qaddafi illegally uses a French nuclear installation in Libya to produce a nuclear device which is then shipped secretly to New York and which is used as a lever on the US President to change US policy towards Israel:

"Mr Fundseth. There was a catch in the President's voice as he addressed his Deputy Secretary of State, as though he, too, sought to be reassured by Crandell's brutal declaration. "What is the population of Libya?"

"Two million, sir, give or take a hundred thousand. Census figures over there aren't very reliable."

The President turned down the table towards the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. "Harry, how many people would we lose if a three-megaton device went off in New York? Without evacuation?"
Sir, it would be difficult to give you an accurate figure on that without looking at some numbers.

I realize that, but give me your best estimate.

The Chairman reflected a moment. "Between four and five million, sir." (17)

Third, in a military sense, national security is not part of the solution - it is part of the problem. The central arms race is governed partly by an action-reaction phenomenon, with each super power responding to the other. But, given the lead time in producing weapon systems, each super power estimates where it thinks the other will be in a fixed period hence and develops its own weapons to match the anticipated weapons of the other super power. Those officials wanting to acquire more weapons will assume the worst possible figure of the other super power so as to ensure the maximum number for their own side. This phenomenon may be seen, for example, in the 1960 "missile gap" allegations. As former US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara recalled in early 1982:

Scheer: One of the arguments that is made by the [Reagan] Administration is that the Soviets are engaged in - I forget the exact words - the most unrelenting, massive military build-up, in both conventional and strategic weapons, and that we now have to counter that.

McNamara: I don't want to get in an argument with the Administration; I just want to state what I believe is a fact, which is that we overstate the Soviets' force and we understate ours, and we therefore greatly overstate the imbalance. This is not something that is new, it has been going on for years.

Scheer: Did it go on while you were Secretary of Defence?

McNamara: Of course it did. I tried to correct it; I frequently made statements correcting it, but because it appears to serve the interests of some to consciously or unconsciously overstate the Soviet strength and understate ours, that frequently occurs.
Scheer: Who are the "some"?

McNamara: Well, particular elements of our society that feel their programmes are benefitted by that. The missile gap of 1960 was a function of forces within the Defence Department that, perhaps unconsciously, were trying to support their particular programme - in that case, an expansion of US missile production - by overstating the Soviet forces. I don't want to state that they were consciously misstating the facts, but there is an unconscious bias in all of us. In any case, it was a total misreading of the information and, by early 1961, all who had examined the evidence concluded that there was no missile gap, despite the fact that in the latter part of 1960 it was a rather common belief. (18)

The "missile gap" controversy is important not only as the most famous of such "gaps" but also because 1961 could have been a time of delaying the arms race - rather than accelerating it:

In early 1961, some of the White House people like Science Adviser Jerome Wiesner and Carl Kaysen of the National Security Council were trying to slow down the arms race, or at least were in favour of a good deal more talking with the Soviets before speeding ahead. At that point, the United States had 450 missiles; McNamara was asking for 950, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asking for 3,000. The White House people had quietly checked around and found that in effectiveness, in sheer military terms, the 450 were the same as McNamara's 950. Thus a rare moment existed, a chance to make a new start, if not turn around the arms race, at least to give it a temporary freeze.

"What about it, Bob?" Kennedy asked.

"Well, they're right", McNamara answered.

"Well, then, why the nine hundred and fifty, Bob?" Kennedy asked.

"Because that's the smallest number we can take up on the Hill without getting murdered", he answered.

Perhaps, thought one of the White House aides, by holding back we might have slowed the cycle rather than accelerated it. But in 1961, the advocates of disarmament encountered an Administration which considered the issue a little peripheral, not something that could be taken up immediately, something that would have to wait. (19)
The re-definition of national security should take three forms. Overall, it is necessary (as implied by the Thorsson Report) to see national security in a new light. It is not merely a matter of defence forces and rate of military expenditure.

First, it is necessary, in terms of military expenditure to distinguish between "inputs" and "outputs".

It is important to make this distinction because defence expenditure is not an end in itself but simply forms a major ingredient of, or input into, a process which produces as its output "defence", in the same way that the expenditure on iron ore can be regarded as an input to the production of any particular value of steel output. The output of "defence" is clearly the more abstract, however, as we have already seen that armed forces may be required to play a number of roles. Even so, we may fairly take the military's primary task to be the maintenance of "security", the defence of the nation from internal and external threat and the potential to successfully attack others.

In the theoretical world of the neo-classical economic model with fixed prices and constant returns to scale, an X-fold increase in the expenditure on iron ore would yield an equivalent increase in the value of steel output, all other things remaining equal. The input of iron ore, in other words, effectively represents the output of steel. In the case of defence, however, can we be sure that such a principle still applies, for it is only if it does that our two questions amount to the same thing? Indeed, there are several reasons for believing that expenditure and security might be unrelated, that is, for believing that "more" does not necessarily mean "better". (20)

Whynes goes on to examine the US's military record:

The obstacles to the deployment of weapons of high levels of sophistication may be political as well as purely strategic. This may be seen in more concrete terms by considering the cases of the involvement of the USA in Korea (1950-3) and Vietnam (1955-73). In purely military terms, the USA is possibly the strongest single nation on earth, accounting for some 25 percent of global military spending. How then can we explain what Bose (1977) terms the "Vietnamese paradox", namely that this particular nation got the better of a far
more powerful rival, "both in the battlefield and in the conference room"? Why did the USA not simply obliterate its enemies with the vast destructive power at its disposal?

Clearly, the reasons are complex, but we may note that, in spite of General McArthur's protestation to the contrary, it did appear that there was a substitute for victory. In both of these cases, the USA was obliged to fight a "limited" war for fear of antagonizing any or all of three interest groups. First, massive escalation of military effort in either instance would have increased the probability of the USSR entering the conflict, involving the USA in a far more serious confrontation. Secondly, the USA's allies within the NATO became progressively more unconvinced of the validity of continued US involvement in these particular theatres (although their disapproval was felt more immediately in the case of Korea). Finally, and especially in the case of Vietnam, public opinion within the USA itself prevented all-out involvement and eventually obliged the US Government to withdraw from that theatre altogether as the futility of limited warfare became all too apparent.

The purpose of these illustrations has been to dispel the myth that a low level of defence spending necessarily means a low level of security. Indeed, we have probably examined enough possibilities to suggest that military expenditure per se constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for security... (21)

It is necessary, therefore, to break the nexus between perceptions of "national security" and the amount of money going in military expenditure.

The second step is to expand the perception of what constitutes "national security":

Underlying this definition is the assumption that principal security threats come from other countries. Yet, the threats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of humanity to nature. For many countries, desert encroachment or soil erosion may do more to undermine national survival than invading armies could.
Even though rapid population growth can destroy a country's ecological system and social structure more effectively than a foreign adversary ever could, national government expenditures on population education and family planning fail to reflect this fact. Countries spend large sums on tanks and planes to defend their territorial sovereignty, but little or nothing to protect the topsoil on which their livelihood depends. National defence establishments are useless against these new threats. Neither bloated military budgets nor highly sophisticated weapons systems can halt the deforestation or solve the firewood crisis now affecting so many Third World countries.

The erosion of soils, the deterioration of the earth's basic biological systems, and the depletion of oil reserves now threaten the security of countries everywhere. Ecological stresses and resource scarcities have already given rise to economic stresses -- inflation, unemployment, capital scarcity, and monetary instability. Ultimately, these economic stresses will translate into social unrest and political instability.

Regrettably, non-military threats to a nation's security are much less clearly defined than military ones. Because the processes that ultimately lead to the collapse of biological systems are gradual and cumulative, they are too seldom given much thought until they pass a critical threshold and disaster strikes. For this reason, it is easier for government councils of developing countries to justify expenditures for the latest model jet fighters than for family planning, which could alleviate the population pressures that are leading to the deterioration of their croplands. (22)

In short, "national security" should not be defined simply in terms of percentages of GNP going on defence, and armed forces alone cannot be seen as the sole guarantors of national security since the threats to national security go beyond military ones. Governments are still not accustomed to thinking according to this broader conception of national security and so the world lacks a system for assessing the full range of threats to national security. More particularly, the US itself is under threat not only from the international economy and environment, and other external threats, but the US economy itself is in severe trouble.
The third component of a new assessment of "national security" is, therefore, the need to reduce military expenditure to help the US’s own economic problems. Two sets of words are becoming fashionable in describing the US’s internal economic problems: "decaying infrastructure" and "de-industrialization/re-industrialization". The decaying infrastructure was graphically illustrated by Kirkpatrick Sale:

The latest estimate for even modest repairs for the New York City infrastructure - just to keep it going, mind you, not for any new or expanded construction - is $30 billion. There is not a hope in hell of the city ever coming up with that money. It is not quite broke, as it was a decade ago, but it is running close to the line, and there isn't anything even approximating that kind of cash to repair the basic sinews of the city. The infrastructure of the city will simply continue to erode, the services falter, the emergencies multiply, because this is a land where the tomorrows always engulf the yesterdays.

America’s flamboyant growth ethic, an unheeding, reckless train for more than 30 years now, is running headlong into the wall of economic reality. We have built and built and built, we have given no thought to repair and restoration, all thought to construction and enlargement. We have chosen to not look back, with the motto that - as the great baseball pitcher Satchell Paige put it some years ago - "Don’t look back, someone might be gaining on you."

But now it’s not only gaining, it may have caught up.

The American highway system, no more than three decades old, is crumbling, and the Department of Transportation says it will take $700 billion through the 1980s just to maintain present levels of service - an amount that exceeds all the public works expenditures of the 1970s by all forms of government and will never possibly be allocated. American bridges are collapsing, some spectacularly, some steadily, and the Transportation Department says one of every five needs reconstruction, at a cost of something like $33 billion; that, too, will never be forthcoming. Urban water systems are springing leaks with alarming regularity, and at least $75 billion will have to be spent just to keep them in working order. American railroads are falling apart from
lack of maintenance, and more miles of track are being taken out of service every year than are being added. (23)

Sale’s description is amplified in a book which provides a case for rebuilding the US’s infrastructure (24). The authors trace the decline in public works investment and explain how this has contributed to a decline in the economy.

"Re-industrialization" was a popular word in the 1980 Presidential Election. It has been popularized, in academic literature by sociologist Amitai Etzioni (25), who has written about the dangers of over-consumption and under-investment. This is linked with "de-industrialization" as the US’s industrial base contracts in comparison with, particularly, Japan and West Germany. As Lester Thurow has written:

In the period from 1972 to 1978, industrial productivity rose 1 percent per year in the United States, almost 4 percent in West Germany, and over 5 percent in Japan. These countries were introducing new products and improving the process of making old products faster than we were. Major American firms were reduced to marketing new consumer goods, such as video recorders, which were made exclusively by the Japanese. In many industries, such as steel, we are now the ones with the "easy" task of adopting the technologies developed by others. But we don’t. Instead of junking our old, obsolete open-hearth furnaces and shifting to the large oxygen furnaces and continuous casting of the Japanese, we retreat into protection against the "unfair" competition of Japanese steel companies. The result is a reduction in real incomes as we all pay more for steel than we should. As a result, our economy ends up with a weak steel industry that cannot compete and has no incentive to compete, given its protection in the US market. (26)

Along with the decaying infrastructure and industrial problems, there are the human costs of, among other things, government cutbacks in social welfare expenditure. The number of homeless Americans, for
example, in early 1985 was between 300,000 and 2 million (27). Michael Harrington who, two decades ago, alerted fellow Americans to the extent of poverty in the US, has reminded them that "the poor are still here" (28).

Military expenditure — the largest single item in the US Government's budget — is not assisting in these problems. On the contrary, it is absorbing money which ought to be spent on solving them:

It is unfortunate the extent to which we try to justify any military programme on the basis of job creation. It is not a governmental welfare programme and it seems to me that it should be justified on the merits of whether or not it contributes to a cost effective defence posture for the United States at home and abroad.

...If the name of the game is to apply hard earned taxpayer's dollars in the most cost effective way to create jobs for unemployed Americans, probably the last place to go is the defence industry.

...because the defence industry is not a labour intensive industry. If you are going to spend a dollar of federal money to create jobs, you don't do it in the defence industry... It doesn't create as many jobs as a federal dollar spent on education, on health, on environment or transportation.

Secondly, when you talk about unemployment in America, the real problem is the chronic, hard core unemployed in the ghettos, in Appalachia... You don't build a defence plant there and the reason is the defence industry, because of its high sophistication, is dependent on white collar expertise to a disproportionate extent. (29)

This chapter recommends, then, that the US Government should re-define "national security". While the new definition should include military considerations it should move out well beyond such considerations. Given the way in which the US is such a trendsetter for most other governments, the US Government's new method of assessment of "national security" will soon be copied by other governments.
Incidentally, Lester Brown (who has called for a redefinition of "national security") has written that some nations have now embarked upon that task:

A few governments have begun to redefine national security, putting more emphasis on economic progress and less on buying arms. At a time when global military expenditures are rising, some countries are actually cutting military outlays. A handful are reducing them sharply, not only as a share of GNP, but in absolute terms as well. Among these are China, Argentina, and Peru.

As recently as 1972, China was spending 14% of its GNP for military purposes, one of the highest levels in the world at the time. Beginning in 1975, however, China began to systematically reduce its military expenditures, and, except for 1979, it has reduced them in each of the last eight years. By 1985, military spending had fallen to 7.5% of its gross national product.

Indications are that this trend may continue throughout the 1980s. In July 1985, Beijing announced a plan to invest $360 million over two years to retrain a million soldiers for return to civilian life. Such a move would cut the armed forces in China from 4.2 million in 1985 to 3.2 million in 1987 - a drop of 24%. And worldwide, it would reduce the number of men and women under arms by some 4%.

In Argentina, the military government that was in office in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased military expenditures from the historical level of 1.5% of GNP to almost 4%. One of the first things that Raul Alfonsin did as newly elected president in late 1983 was announce a plan to steadily lower this figure. By 1984, arms outlays had been cut to half the peak level of 1980, earning Alfonsin a well-deserved reputation for reordering priorities and shifting resources to social programs.

More recently, Peru has joined the ranks of those announcing plans to cut military expenditures.

It is tempting to recommend that the entire term be scrapped and for another one to be used. The temptation is resisted because such is the popularity of the term that the old term would soon be resurrected to cover the specifically military components of the new term and so,
in the long term, there would co-exist two equal terms "national security" (military matters) and the new term (for all the non-military matters).

Why should this chapter be so concerned about a term? Simply because the language of peace and warfare is itself a key to understanding the US-USSR arms race process. The rhetoric of warfare - and not military necessity - is central to the arms race. The world has long passed the point at which each super power could destroy the other. The super powers have run out of people to kill during World War III. And yet the arms race continues and there is speculation of "limited", "winnable" nuclear wars. All this is done in the name of "national security".

A NEW APPROACH TO THE USSR

The US "national security state" (in Daniel Yergin's phrase) was created in response to the post-war need to deal with the USSR. The USSR has since coloured virtually all of the US's foreign policy developments. While the new peace movement is doing good work in alerting people to the dangers of the current arms race, a more basic issue has to be confronted: What is to be done about the perceived differences between the US and USSR? After all, even if the US and USSR reduced their ICBMs to (say) 400 on each side, the world would still be endangered if the two super powers had not also somehow reduced their mutual antipathy. Hence, this chapter's concern to provide a comprehensive package of recommendations since a piecemeal approach will not be sufficient.

The new approach should consist of five factors: (i) the recognition and acceptance of basic current differences between the US and USSR (ii) avoiding over-estimating the USSR's power (iii) emphasizing points of similarity (iv) the expansion of human contacts, and (v) the expansion of trade.
RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENCES

There are basically two ways of looking at the USSR. One is to see the USSR as following some carefully devised, well thought out super-subtle Marxist-Leninist conspiracy to take over the world. This perception is found in various manifestations, such as the activities of the KGB (31). Ironically, the current arms race is based on a high degree of trust. First, nuclear deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what the US (or USSR) may think itself. Thus, each super power trusts the other to act rationally. Neither side could stop incoming missiles but each has nuclear missiles to deter the other side from launching its nuclear missiles for fear of retaliation. Providing no machine fails and both sides act rationally, the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction pays off. Second, the same US Government which is so scathing about untrustworthy Soviets nonetheless trades with them and has arms control negotiations with them. This irony was highlighted in the UK:

The British Government’s new film, The Peace Game, illustrates this psychological process. After a 30-minute diatribe about the wickedness of the Russians we are suddenly told, at the end, that negotiations with these diabolical characters are taking place, and so all will be well — if we let the Government control our minds and our consciences! (32)

An alternative way of seeing the USSR is as an opportunistic super power, highly pragmatic in what and whom it supports, but at the same time fearing the outside world; a nation more to be understood in terms of history than ideology. As George Kennan has commented:

I see a group of troubled men - elderly men, for the most part - whose choices and possibilities are severely constrained. I see these men as prisoners of many circumstances: prisoners of
their own past and their country’s past; prisoners of the antiquated ideology to which their extreme sense of orthodoxy binds them, prisoners of the rigid system of power that has given them their authority; but prisoners, too, of certain ingrained peculiarities of the Russian statesmanship of earlier ages - the congenital sense of insecurity, the lack of inner self-confidence, the distrust of the foreigner and the foreigner’s world, the passion for secrecy, the neurotic fear of penetration by other powers into areas close to their borders, and a persistent tendency, resulting from all these other factors, to overdo the creation of military strength. I see here men deeply preoccupied, as were their Czarist Russian predecessors, with questions of prestige - preoccupied more, in many instances, with the appearances than with the realities. I do not see them as men anxious to expand their power by the direct use of their armed forces, although they could easily be frightened into taking actions that would seem to have this aim.

It is my belief that these men do indeed consider the Soviet Union to have been increasingly isolated and in danger of encirclement by hostile powers in recent years. I do not see how they could otherwise interpret the American military relationship with Iran in the time of the Shah or the more recent American military relationships with Pakistan and China. And these, I believe, are not the only considerations that would limit the freedom of the Soviet leaders to indulge themselves in dreams of external expansion, even if they were inclined toward such dreams. They are obviously very conscious of the dangers of disintegration of their dominant position in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Poland; and this not because they have any conscious desire to mistreat or oppress the people involved but because they see any further deterioration of the situation there as a threat to their political and strategic interests in Germany - interests that are unquestionably highly defensive in origin. (33)

It would be comforting to say that time will tell which of the two perceptions is the more accurate. Unfortunately, as shown throughout this dissertation, there may not be enough time to test whether the current perception - the first one - followed by the US Government is accurate.
Instead, the US Government should accept the second perception of the USSR. We know where we got by the US Government following the first perception: the brink of World War III.

This factor does not assume that somehow the US and USSR can become permanent allies. There will be no outbreak of peace between them. But this does not rule out a change from the head-on arms race to alternative ways of manoeuvring for global influence. "England", as Lord Palmerston pointed out over a century ago, "has no permanent friends; she has only permanent interests" (34). This implied that England had no permanent enemies either. British foreign policy over the past century, with all its twists and turns, would prove the accuracy of Palmerston's observation. The UK and France are still manoeuvring against each other. But their lack of armed conflict is not due to both having nuclear deterrents. They have learned - the hard way, via war - to have alternative ways of competing with each other, such as feuding over the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy in Brussels.

Short of invasion from outer space, I can see no crisis that will force the US and USSR to become firm allies. Besides, military alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience. In other words, I believe that the world has to tolerate the US-USSR rivalry in much the same way as the rise of previous great powers also resulted in tensions, such as Spain and the Netherlands, the UK and France, France and Germany. In the next century the rivalry will be between Japan and China.

But if rivalry is inevitable, the current arms race is not. Indeed, from a US point of view, the current methods may be counterproductive. If the US wishes to win friends and influence people, then money - rather than weapons - may be a more effective method. Jerry Hough, of Duke University, has claimed:
The Western economic system has been "the decisive element in defeating the Soviet Union in the Third World". Because the United States has not understood this, it has "exaggerated the importance of military force and neglected the importance of interest rates and the value of the dollar as elements of national security". Though notes that the only radical revolutions have been occurring in such pre-industrial countries as Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. "The possibility of weaning a radical country from a foreign policy sympathetic to the Soviet Union or of moderating its internal policy through economic incentives rather than economic ostracism is often neglected... When the United States tries to increase the costs for the Soviet Union by imposing sanctions on its allies, it faces the paradox that it is interfering with Western mechanisms, both outside investment and the domestic market, that have been the most powerful US tools in winning the Third World...

"Twenty-five years of boycott [of Cuba] have meant that the economic forces that moved many radical regimes of the 1960s to the centre have not had the chance to work in Cuba. Clearly, the policy followed has not moderated either Soviet policy in Cuba or Cuban support for the Soviet Union. One cannot be certain whether a different policy would have led to a different evolution of policy in Cuba or whether it simply would have lessened Soviet costs, but the burden of proof is on those who think the American policy was effective." (35)

If the US wishes to retain its global status, then there are smarter ways of doing so than relying on weapons. If the US Administration is heedless of moral arguments regarding the arms race, then perhaps it may take more heed of an argument that appeals to its sense of self-interest.

THE US SHOULD NOT OVER-ESTIMATE THE USSR'S POWER

The US in 1945, was the world's one and only super power. And yet, as the late C Maxwell Stanley pointed out, fear was the main theme of US foreign policy:

No factor has had greater impact on US foreign policy since World War II than fear of communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. As the
US-Soviet wartime unity waned, a series of events fostered a growing fear that the security of Western Europe and, indeed, of the United States, was in jeopardy. Stalin ruthlessly dominated the formerly free nations on Russia's western boundary, tyrannically suppressed opposition, rejected the US Baruch proposal for nuclear internationalization, and strengthened Soviet military forces. Mao's victory in mainland China, together with rising Marxist influence elsewhere, stimulated the perception that monolithic communism, threatening free enterprise and the democratic regimes of the United States and its allies, was spreading.

Our response to these fears was prompt. The Truman Doctrine set the stage for a containment policy. US military forces were rebuilt, the nuclear arms race was launched, and unilaterally we began to lend overt and covert military support to nations perceived to be facing communist threats. This process led to our tragic Vietnam intervention. (36)

The US Government should not over-estimate the power of the USSR. The main motivation for this is the demonology of seeing the USSR somehow behind all that is evil in the world - and for rallying domestic American support in favour of large military expenditure.

This approach has four problems. First, it is not correct. Various studies (as mentioned earlier) have shown that the US is, if anything, still ahead of the USSR. Of course, with the capacity to fight 5,000 World War IIs, who is leading whom is a pointless exercise. But just because something is pointless, it does not mean that it is not politically useful. Just prior to the current "gap" controversy - the so-called "window of vulnerability" - there was the "dollar gap" in which it was alleged that the USSR was spending more on military expenditure than the US. The gap was derived by costing USSR military forces according to US terms. Since the post-Vietnam era, defence forces had been all-volunteer so US military costs had risen sharply to attract recruits. The absurdity of using the "dollar gap" system of calculation is that if the US salaries went back to the pre-volunteer pay rates, so the Soviet
military "expenditure" would drop overnight. The Washington-based Friends Committee on National Legislation calls this the Midas Touch:

For a President, a Congress, and a public looking for security in a chaotic world, the Department of Defence has the answer: send us more money. Indeed, the Pentagon has a rationale for almost every event.

If the Soviets are already doing it (spending more money, building bigger missiles), so should we.

If the Soviets aren't yet doing it, we should spend more to stay ahead.

If the gross national product goes up, so should Pentagon spending.

If the gross national product goes down in a recession, more Pentagon spending is needed to prime the pump.

When there is detente with the USSR, rapprochement with China, or a SALT II Treaty, increase spending.

When relations deteriorate with the USSR over Afghanistan, spend even more.

When an abortive Iran raid or waste or mismanagement raise questions about the ability of the Pentagon to spend the billions it has already been given, ask for even more. (37)

Second, by over-estimating the USSR's power, the US has the wrong perception of the world's affairs. This is illustrated by the following June 1969 incident involving Henry Kissinger and the then Chilean Foreign Minister:

Valdes recalls his impromptu talk as "the most difficult time in my life." He had come to the White House with the other Latin American officials knowing that the State Department had lobbied against his visit. At one point in his Oval Office talk, Valdes says, he told Nixon that Latin America was sending back 3.8 dollars for every dollar in American aid. When Nixon interrupted to challenge the statistic, Valdes retorted that the number had come from a study prepared by a major American bank. "As I delivered my speech", Valdes
Kissinger's perception of the world meant that he was unprepared for crises in which the USSR had no direct involvement, such as the 1973 OPEC oil price increase and the 1974/5 debate over a new international economic order. He over-estimated the role the USSR could play in ending the Vietnam War (Hanoi had no great enthusiasm for Moscow, either) and the new European communist parties have not been particularly pro-Moscow.

Gwyn Prins has done a survey of the USSR's foreign influence:

But beyond the sphere of influence, what is the Soviet track record? In 1958, the Soviet Union had influence in countries which between them (excluding the countries of the cordon sanitaire - the satellite states) represented 31% of the world's population and something like 10% of the world's gross national product. In 1979, the Soviet Union had influence in countries beyond the cordon sanitaire which contained approximately 6% of the world's population, and 5% of the world's GNP. The implication is that far from the image that is proposed by cold warriors, the Soviet Union has in terms of its long-reaching influence, been marching steadily backwards. Let us be more specific. In that intervening period the Soviet Union was kicked out of Indonesia (the sixth most populous country in the world and Asia's prime oil producer), China, Iraq and Egypt (the key countries in control of the Middle Eastern balance), India and Somalia (the only country outside its own territorial sphere where the USSR had an overseas
naval base). Where has influence been newly gained in these years? In a handful of poor countries of minimal political significance to the west: Mozambique, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and countries regarded by the cold warriors as "cats' paws" (Cuba and Angola for example). A detailed study of relationships of those countries reveals that they were in fact themselves in dispute with the Soviet Union, in an idea which is completely alien to the bi-polar world view. I am not saying that the Soviet Union does not have any policy at all or that the Soviet Union is in some way entirely blameless in world affairs. The USSR in the post-war world and in relationship to the wars of the post-war world, has behaved in many ways just like any other independent nation state: a state in the jungle of the disunited nations. The USSR has, generally speaking, pursued a rather cautious but nonetheless unprincipled policy in exactly the same way as other countries, but perhaps rather less adventuristically than the United States. On all occasions and in all places where the Soviets have felt that they are able to wrong-foot their superpower competitor, they have attempted to do so but, as I have indicated, generally speaking, their record of success in this has been meagre. (39)

Third, the USSR does have significant weaknesses. At home, it has severe economic problems. A journalist from The Guardian has actually compared it with a Third World nation:

This sense of realism is important for, in spite of its pretensions, Moscow does not feel like the capital city of a super power. It feels - and officials do not thank you for saying so - more like some Third World country, somewhat forgotten and neglected, with a distinctly provincial tone.

And seen through a Third World perspective, perhaps the Soviet Union has not done too badly - compared, say, with India and China. At least in Moscow the people seem to live well above the breadline. And how do Russia’s achievements compare with those of other countries with large populations - with Brazil, say, or Mexico, or Indonesia, or Nigeria? Perhaps not too badly either. Of course, official Russia wants to be compared with the United States or with Western Europe, and there the gap - though closing - is laughable.

To anyone from Western Europe, Russia still seems backward, symbolized by the abacus in every shop and stall, which was remarked on even by visitors in the 1930s. (40)
Raymond Aron made a similar point:

The Soviet Union has lost her prestige in Europe as the first Socialist country or the centre of Marxism-Leninism. Even the Parisian Intelligentsia - which, after World War II, had taken over the reinterpretation of Marxism from the Germans - rejects not only the Soviet model but Marxist philosophy itself, which Sartre called until recently "insurpassable". If the cold war was fought for men's minds, it is the West which has gained the victory in Europe. (41)

Strobe Talbott, of Time magazine, wrote recently in the lead-up to the 1986 Reykjavik Summit:

Gorbachev has his own domestic agenda to consider. He is deeply committed to his crusade for perestroika, an overhaul or restructuring of the entire Soviet economic and social order. His vision entails far more than just reducing drunkenness on the job and replacing petty-minded bureaucrats with efficient technocrats. He wants to make the Soviet Union an economic superpower as well as a military one.

To accomplish that, Gorbachev knows, he must reduce the oversize portion of the annual gross national product carved out by the military - as much as 14%, by some estimates - and devote more money to domestic economic growth. If he genuinely wants to modernize Soviet society and produce goods that can compete with Western products in world markets, he will have to divert more young men from military service to computer and technical training.

Arms control is one way - perhaps the most efficient way - to effect that change. The American Strategic Defense Initiative disturbs the General Secretary not because it would render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, as Reagan puts it, but because the effort to build their own Star Wars system could strain the Soviets' treasury. (42)

The converse of this point is the danger of escalating the arms race so as "to spend the Russians into the ground". As this dissertation has already argued, US military expenditure has already done what the USSR (short of World War III) cannot: damaged the US
economy. To spend the Russians into the ground implies that the Americans can continue its high rate of military expenditure; this I doubt.

More to the point, is it in the US's own interests to try to spend the Russians into the ground? If the Argentinian use of the 1982 invasion of the Falklands is any guide, it is precisely when things are going so bad at home that a foreign war unites the nation, ends industrial unrest and takes citizens' minds off domestic problems. (A cynic might suggest that Mrs Thatcher's response was inspired by similar considerations.) In other words, a USSR with a declining economy and increasing domestic problems, might be tempted to indulge in foreign incursions precisely to unite the nation.

Finally, those persons and organizations who claim that the USSR is stronger than the facts suggest may ultimately be defeating their own ends. In a paper read at the 1983 Australian National University Seminar on "Asian Perspectives on International Security", Paul Dibb argued:

One nation's security is its neighbour's insecurity. It is one thing to explain Soviet behaviour as a manifestation of security, as this paper has, it is something quite different to condone the Soviet military build-up. At the same time, it is important that the West does not exaggerate the Soviet Union's military strength, which is the fashion at present. Otherwise, Soviet leaders may be encouraged to believe that the risks of military action are low and, hence, worth taking before they deteriorate later in the 1980s. (43)

**EMPHASIZE POINTS OF SIMILARITY - NOT DIFFERENCE**

The US and USSR already co-operate in the UN's social work, which absorbs much of its finance and personnel. They also co-operate outside the UN's aegis, such as being consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty and
in some joint space activities. All the arms control agreements concluded by both nations are being honoured - except the US’s recent breach of SALT II.

The US should adopt the "greater goal tactic" in which the US should invite the USSR to co-operate in working together in tasks with potential benefits much greater than the continued arms race, let alone the outcome of mutual assured destruction. The USSR’s ambitions should be escalated beyond their current level of conducting a defensive strategy against a perceived US offensive (diplomatic and military).

The example of food amplifies the paradoxes in the US-USSR’s relationship. Although it is the world’s largest wheat producer, the USSR does not produce enough to satisfy domestic demand and so Kansas, in some respects, is the breadbasket of the USSR (44). Kansas farmers are apparently politically conservative but their surplus-producing efficiency is keeping alive the USSR’s communism. Indeed, in this current nuclear age - in which no nation can directly defend itself from a nuclear attack - the Kansas farmers provide the US with some defensive cover since it would be rash of the USSR to engage in a nuclear war with its primary source of imported wheat. Meanwhile, Colonel Gerard Berkhof, a Dutch Army Assistant Chief of Staff, has suggested a lack of food as one cause of conflict (and, by implication, the need for east-west food co-operation):

Berkhof also suggested that a curious paradox in the Soviet system could conceivably lead to war: its centralized economy was good at producing weapons, but not food. He argued that acute food shortages in the Warsaw Pact countries could eventually cause political instability, making the Soviet Union instinctively more aggressive - if not directly in Europe, then certainly in the Third World and the energy-producing countries. This would be even more likely, he added, if the less centralized Western economies, which are better at producing food than weapons, did not change their priorities. (45)
If the US continues to see the USSR in a poor light, then it will bring out the worst in Soviet intentions. The US, on the contrary, should try to find ways of bringing out better Soviet intentions. An immediate task should be assistance with the USSR's food problems.

The next section deals with a conversion strategy for the US military-industrial complex. Some of the military funds thus saved could be used to purchase durable consumer goods (manufactured in Third World nations - to help their financial problems) and offered as outright gifts to the Soviet people, for example, colour television sets. The Soviet people (and most East Europeans) represent a new frontier for durable consumer goods. US corporations could also assist - such as electric toasters, refrigerators, and washing machines. This policy would have four motivations. Words are cheap - people take much more notice of stated sincerity if it is supported by gifts. Second, the Soviet Government would have to admit that it and the US Government were working for a greater goal: a better material living standard for the Soviet people. Third, it would help lock the USSR into the world's international economic system. Finally, by the careful acquisition of goods, the programme could help worldwide economic recovery.

EXPAND HUMAN CONTACTS

According to the late C Maxwell Stanley:

A second factor strongly influencing US foreign policy is parochialism. With too few exceptions our citizens, as well as many of our officials, have little knowledge of the countries beyond our borders - their people, their cultures, their strengths, their resources, their aspirations, and their expectations...

Inspired by our heritage of democracy and with intense pride in our economic and social accomplishments, we are overly confident that we
have the answers to all of the complex global problems. We have developed a patronizing, missionary mentality. We believe that the rest of the world has only to follow in our footsteps, create democratic governments to deal with political problems, and rely on free enterprise to stimulate economic and social progress. Our rigid adherence to these beliefs often detrimentally affects our foreign policy. Moreover, the rest of the world often views us as arrogant, inflexible, and naive. (46)

Andrew Rock of Tulane University has commented that this lack of people-to-people knowledge is common to both the US and USSR:

In this connection, it is instructive to observe that there are currently more teachers of English in the Soviet Union than there are students of Russian in the United States. Also of interest are the results of various surveys that have been taken over the years examining public knowledge about the Soviet Union. Some 30 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, a public opinion poll revealed that 40 percent of Americans did not know that Russia had a communist government. In the middle 1960s, after 20 years of Cold War, only 38 percent of those questioned knew that the Soviet Union was not a member of NATO. People in the Soviet Union may be studying English more than we are studying Russian, but their level of knowledge of this country remains at an equally primitive level. A sophisticated Russian university student in Leningrad queried an American exchange student as to whether it was true that all American houses had steel doors to prevent gangsters from firing into the home. A Soviet delegation to the United States, on being shown around a Safeway grocery in Washington, refused to believe that it was not a "restricted" store available only to the elite of the sort common in the Soviet Union. (47)

There should be a massive exchange of US and Soviet people on a temporary basis. This could begin via students from both nations doing a year's study in the other nation. Various non-governmental organizations already provide short-term programmes (such as summer vacation work camps) and so there is some experience to guide the implementation of the scheme. Besides fixed academic tours, there could be visits by persons wanting
to learn, for example, chess (the USSR would be the more popular training ground) and pop music (the US). In other words, some imagination should be used - and not limit the tours to formal academic work. The emphasis should be on human exchange and learning about the other society at first hand.

All nations are insular. But the world cannot afford to have the two super powers locked up in their respective insularity in such a way as to imperil the safety of the whole globe. Therefore, imaginative ways should be followed to break down the barriers.

Funding will not be a problem. The Peace-Industrial Complex should show how to divert the current level of military expenditure into peaceful uses, such as this proposal. The logistics of the tours could be handled by the current clerical staff handling armed personnel movements. As with some converted World War II aircraft in the late 1940s, some of the current transport aircraft could be used in this new role of ferrying civilians between the US and USSR.

It is pleasing to note that some small steps have been made in this direction, including taking advantage of improvements in communication technology. A recent survey indicated that American visits to the USSR tripled in the five year period 1980-5, from 12,922 to 45,049 (48). The Phil Donahue Show television programme in September 1986, used a teleconference system in New York and Moscow with audiences of ordinary citizens asking one another questions. The USSR did not edit the programme, despite some (for them) embarrassing questions on the treatment of Soviet Jews. Conservative businessperson Ted Turner (mentioned in the previous chapter) helped finance the 1985 Moscow Goodwill Games. These are all small steps - but they are in the right direction.
Real security comes from self-confidence. No nation can have much self-confidence when it feels itself threatened (rightly or wrongly) by other nations. The expansion of direct human contact will help remove mutual fears of the other super power's perceived threats.

INCREASED TRADE WITH THE USSR

Former UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym MP, has described the USSR's economic problems:

In agriculture, the Soviet record is one of continuing failure. In spite of rising investment - now up to 27% of their total national investment - agricultural production has actually fallen by 3% over the last five years. In Western Europe and the United States, agriculture absorbs less than 3% of national investment, yet we are self-sufficient in temperate products. Our worries are about surpluses, not shortfalls.

Right across their economy, the Soviet Government simply does not get a full return for its money. There was a 3% growth in 1982, a 6% growth in capital stock, and yet GNP grew by less than 2%. So the figures confirm falling capital productivity and very low labour productivity.

On top of these basic economic problems come inflated defence commitments which are going to eat even further into the civilian economy. If, as some experts think, present commitments will require real growth of around 4% in defence spending for the next few years, this would actually mean, at best, stagnation, or more likely a fall in the standard of living of the average Russian, which by our standards, of course, is miserably low already. And, in addition, they have social and ethnic problems, truancy and drunkenness, not to mention the strain of keeping their own people and their satellites in a state of permanent suppression. For Soviet leaders, the satellite states must be the great recurring nightmare. (49)

The USSR's economic problems present two opportunities in the context of this chapter's transcending vision. First, although the USSR's own military-industrial
complex may not like the idea, a cut back in US military expenditure would strengthen the argument within the USSR for a similar reduction.

Second, in the words of Henry Steele Commager, "commerce is an instrument of peace, not war" (50). The use of trade for coercive purposes, notably economic sanctions, has not been at all successful, as over Rhodesia in the 1970s (51). But trade can be used to foster improved relations between nations - as an inducement, rather than as a coercion. "The strongest man in the world", according to an old Jewish saying, "is the person who can make his enemies his friends." Thus, there has been a considerable improvement in US-Chinese relations (despite the antagonism between 1949 and 1972): "Today, some American business men are setting up factories in Communist China because they find the conditions there more satisfactory for American capitalism than in the lands of America's friends, the rightist dictatorships of Latin America and South East Asia." (52)

The USSR is an economically "under-developed super power" (53). The US should help the USSR become a more economically developed nation, such as via the greater use of computers for citizens:

The computer revolution, in particular, may have a contribution to make in improving US-Soviet relations. As part of their attempt to develop trade and acquire Western technology, Soviet leaders have made a commitment to introducing personal computers into the Soviet Union - because they realize they have no choice.

If these plans proceed, if Soviet citizens gain access to personal computers and data banks, the flow of information within the Soviet Union is bound to increase. Introducing computer technology into industry would probably lead to some decentralization of the Soviet economy. One can only speculate at this point, but it seems quite likely that some loosening of Soviet society would occur in this case. The United States should encourage this trend by increasing its trade with
the Soviet Union and by increasing US-Soviet technological exchanges. This would be a much more positive, productive goal than the current one of trying to bleed the Soviets white by forcing them to over-spend on defence.

China was as thick a communist state as the Soviet Union is. But China is now moving toward greater freedom, in part because of the enlightened position the United States took toward it. The same thing could happen with the Soviets. This is, in any event, the only hope. The present nuclear build-up is unlikely either to transform the Soviet Union or to make the West more secure. (54)

The Peace-Industrial Complex should, therefore, devise a strategy for increasing trade between the USA and USSR.

CONVERSION

Many recent recruits to the new peace movement are impatient for an end to the arms race. They assume that the bare facts of the arms race's impact and the possibility of World War III are enough in themselves to end the arms race. Information alone, however, does not provide motivation to bring about policy changes.

This dissertation has shown both how complicated are the basic causes of the US-USSR arms race and how there is not any single key to unlocking the door to disarmament. Two important components have been examined: the concern over military expenditure and the growth of the peace movement. The proposed Peace-Industrial Complex will bring both components together via, among other things, a programme for converting military expenditure to civilian use.

FIVE TARGETS

The proposed Peace-Industrial Complex should devise a strategy based upon achieving the following five targets. They are all based upon mobilizing self-interest in favour of ending the arms race.
First, the US Government should establish its own Department of Conversion. Civil Servants need to have a vested interest in maintaining the conversion momentum.

Second, while some military business people may really believe that their products and services are vital to the nation's defence, I would argue that their more basic motivation is a desire for profits. This ignoble interpretation of motivations is derived from the lack of evidence of corporations deliberately disadvantage themselves financially in the interest of providing defence equipment.

This concern for profit can be used to help end the arms race. In the immediate future, all new defence contracts should contain a clause on conversion which would oblige the contractor to prove that, if in the event of the contract being cancelled because of disarmament, it has reserve plans to convert its military plant and equipment to civilian uses. In the longer term, the proposed Department of Conversion should devize plans to ensure that there will be no financial disadvantage for corporations which had built up an exclusively or largely military clientele. In short, there should be a bridging period in which the profits from conversion projects should be no less than those currently being derived from military work.

A related matter is the unhealthy dependence which develops in a corporation that is largely or wholly dependent upon defence contracts to maintain its profits. If the Department of Defence is its prime or sole source of contracts, then that corporation has a vested interest in the arms race continuing. On the other hand, if the contracts represent only a small part of its business, then the prospect of disarmament is less threatening. Therefore, a policy should be introduced that contractors must rely on military work
for less than 25 percent of their total business. This will not only reduce considerably the unhealthy dependence but will oblige contractors to put more effort into finding work in the civilian sector.

Third, workers in defence projects (both military and civilian) need to be reassured that conversion will only mean redeployment — and not unemployment.

Fourth, as a further way of helping the workers (especially civilians) to accept the advantages of conversion, the trade unions should be guaranteed some form of consultative status — along with corporations — in the Department of Conversion.

Finally, it is necessary to get the converted military expenditure flowing rapidly through the civilian sector so as to create a constituency, so to speak, of voters living off recycled military expenditure. For example, the Pentagon as one of the US's largest restaurant chains should set up cantoons to feed the hungry and the Army Corps of Engineers should begin building temporary housing units for the homeless.

Many of the arguments for these points have already been dealt with in this dissertation and so it is unnecessary to go over all the arguments again. Instead, this section consists of five recommendations for further study by the Peace-Industrial Complex.

FOLLOW SWEDEN'S EXAMPLE

First, an immediate step should be to follow the Swedish Government's recent example. In 1983, the Swedish Government decided to commission a study of the relationship between disarmament and development in the Swedish context. Inga Thorsson (Sweden's former chief disarmament negotiator who chaired the 1981 UN study)
chaired the 1983 Swedish survey (55). The Report surveys Sweden's defence arrangements, including the characteristics of the defence industry, the research and development work done for defence matters, and the impact of the defence sector on the economy.

The key chapters for this dissertation are the final three. The analysis in Chapter 9 is based on the proposition that disarmament would produce a 50 percent reduction in the defence forces during the period 1990-2015. The number of "military" personnel would be cut in half which would mean a total reduction of nearly 9,000 fulltime employees or a yearly reduction of 350. Taking into account the need for the recruitment of new personnel and the fact that some employees will retire voluntarily, it can be estimated that 470 people will have to accept early retirement each year. Reductions in the number of "civilian" personnel employed by the armed forces would primarily affect those working in the units and schools as well as in the various agencies of the armed forces. Just over 11,000 people would be affected if the number of civil personnel were reduced by 50 percent. If new recruitment and voluntary retirement are taken into account here as well, the average annual reduction would be in the order of 400 people. At present, the armed forces are planning to reduce civil personnel by 700 per year during the remainder of the 1980s as a result of the current saving programme.

Chapter 10 deals with opportunities for conversion. A reduction in the size of the Swedish defence effort along the lines discussed in this report would result in 34,000 fewer jobs within the armed forces and the defence-industrial sector over the course of a 25-year period. If new recruitment and retirement were taken into account, some 1,430 people would have to leave their jobs in the defence sector each year as a result
of disarmament. This would involve less than 1 percent of Sweden's labour force. From a macro-economic point of view, conversion would scarcely present any serious problems. The armed forces and the defence-industrial sector employ many well educated individuals with considerable technical capabilities who, in the event of disarmament, could use their skills for civil purposes. As to the physical resources of the armed forces, there are many examples of the alternative uses to which they could be put. If previous conversion experiences could be systematically surveyed, it would greatly assist future closures of defence installations. It would be virtually impossible for employees of the armed forces to transfer to other jobs within the military services. The local availability of work would be the decisive factor in obtaining other jobs. This would particularly be the case for people who are tied to a particular community for family or other reasons. But, the disarmament envisaged in the Report, which would imply a halving of the Swedish defence sector over a 25-year period, would not necessarily create any insurmountable conversion problems. Moreover, in view of the dependence of the defence-industrial sector on the government, it is important that the conversion process be planned. Contacts which currently take place on an ad hoc basis between the defence producers on the one hand and governmental ministries and agencies on the other hand are not sufficient to set in motion an active conversion programme.

Chapter 11 reviews several measures which Sweden could adopt to join in efforts to create an effective relationship between disarmament and development. Sweden ought to be prepared to exceed the current target for development assistance which amounts to 1 percent of GNP. Just how large this additional transfer of resources would be is a political question upon which government and parliament must decide in light of future
needs. If the WTO and NATO were to begin a process of disarmament, it can be assumed that the UN would succeed in convincing Member-States to agree to set up an International Disarmament Fund for Development. Under such conditions it would be natural for Sweden to promote efforts to link disarmament and development by making annual contributions to this Fund. Sweden should also promote the increased transfer of resources to the Third World on a bilateral basis in the event of disarmament. The 1981 UN Report demonstrated that the Third World countries need to import a considerable amount of mining and water-power machinery, agricultural equipment and medical apparatus. The defence industry's production resources should be able to be used for the manufacture of these kinds of equipment. If the global economic situation were to improve in the future - inter alia as the result of the introduction of a new international economic order - it is likely that many Third World countries would have the means to purchase such equipment on a commercial basis. There are good reasons for Sweden to begin to survey the technical know-how available in the defence-industrial sector. An inventory of these capabilities ought to produce a list of the technical systems which correspond to the potential import needs of the Third World.

One recommendation, then, is that the Peace-Industrial Complex should press the US Government to establish a national enquiry similar to that carried out in Sweden.

A NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON CONVERSION

A second recommendation is that the Peace-Industrial Complex should establish a non-governmental National Committee on Conversion to publicize the benefits of conversion. This Committee should be composed of representatives from the different organizations concerned about this issue, such as trade unions, the
arms industry, the peace movement, the Third World movement and invited observers of the different government departments concerned.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Third, the debate over conversion should be conducted in the wider context of the emerging technologies. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber has spoken of a new "New Deal":

Today the United States needs another kind of New Deal, a new New Deal that will employ US citizens to build the new infrastructure of the computer age - no automobile highways but fibre-optics highways, data banks, computer workshops, and telecommunication systems. Powerful, well-connected personal computers should be made widely available, so that US citizens anywhere can connect with these new networks of information and communication. Public computer literacy must be the priority. Because the United States and Europe cannot compete with the cheaper labour of the Third World, we can prosper only by reordering our priorities so as to fully develop our human and intellectual resources. (56)

A FUND FOR PEACE RESEARCH

Fourth, the US should establish a fund, derived from one percent of annual US military expenditure, to finance peace research. This could cover projects, conducted both in the US and overseas, dealing with such matters as: a strategy for converting military facilities in particular locations to civilian use, the creation of alternative ways of settling international disputes, and the development of "early warning systems" for potential armed conflicts.
DEFUSING THE "DEBT BOMB"

Finally, to use Denis Healey's phrase, this dissertation has examined only the "atom bomb" and has said nothing about the "debt bomb" (57). Healey himself, incidentally, treats the two "bombs" as separate potential explosions; he does not see any link between them, as to either their manufacture or potential "defusing".

There are the implications for national security arising out of Third World debts. The debts total, ironically, an amount equal to about one year's total world military expenditure. (But whereas there is considerable attention to the debts there is far less attention to military expenditure.) The international financial system - whose main centre is in the US - could be in severe trouble if there were a "debtor's" OPEC which refused to pay the debts:

Even more probable and certainly more imminent is the threat of a nervous breakdown in the fatafully interconnected world economy. Whatever it is triggered by (just now a cascade of defaulting debtors, perhaps induced by some sort of "debtor's OPEC", seems a likely trigger), the scenario is all too readily imaginable: financial panic... the ungluing of alliances in the face of epidemic global inflation and unemployment... a hardening North-South confrontation leading to government-sponsored terrorism and the interruption of ocean choke points (all the main ones are in the Third World)...and a paralysis of will immobilizing the world's centres of affluence. (58)

This debt is not only unpayable - it is also uncollectable. The most likely defaulters are in the dollar bloc, notably Latin American.
The long-term challenge for the US comes from the Third World, rather than the USSR. Contrasting political ideologies are nothing new in world politics, such as the pre-1914 alliance between Czarist Russia and liberal France. In due course, barring World War III, the US will have to learn to live with the USSR in much the same way as it has come to terms with China. But the Third World problem is very different. The USA is vulnerable to the Third World in two ways that it is not vulnerable to the USSR.

First, there is the risk of a "debtor" OPEC, whose members, confronted with a worsening economic crisis at home and deciding that the situation is now sufficiently serious, simply announce that they will make no attempt to repay their debts until certain conditions are met. The "debtor" OPEC can make a strength out of their weakness. They could use their leverage to insist, for example, on some form of new international economic order, improved terms of trade, increased official aid or the reduction of military expenditure and its conversion to official aid to Third World nations.

Second, the US is now much more dependent on the Third World:

The United States used to be one of the most self-sufficient countries. That situation has changed much. About 20% of industrial US output is now exported. So is 40% of its farm products. Some 30% of all its exports by value have the developing countries as their final destination. About 20% of all US imports come from developing countries. A significant proportion of US energy needs is now imported. US commercial banks have accumulated billions of dollars in claims upon debtors in developing, industrial as well as oil exporting countries. Direct US investments have created jobs and wealth in Europe, Asia, Canada and Latin America, so economic performance outside of the United States now has a direct and major impact in the economy of that country. (59).
The Peace-Industrial Complex should encourage the US Government to devise a strategy by which conversion of military facilities under a programme of multilateral disarmament should include ways of ensuring that the "defusing" of the "atom bomb" would also assist in defusing the "debt bomb".

To conclude, none of the foregoing implies that the current peace movement has neglected conversion entirely. The UK Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, for example, has published some items in its magazine (60), as has European Nuclear Disarmament (61) and there have been some pamphlets (62). But this type of campaign has received only marginal attention by the British peace movement. Meanwhile, the US equivalent of CND, SANE, also treats conversion as a comparatively minor campaign, though it does publish an occasional newsletter: The Conversion Planner: A Newsletter of Action on Economic Conversion (available from SANE's Washington DC office). Lloyd Dumas (identified elsewhere in this dissertation as one of the few people taking an interest in this subject) wrote recently: "Over its 20-year history, conversion has not been a major priority of any large group of social or political activists, trade unionists, or legislators [in the US]. No mass peace movement or any other mass movement for social change has made conversion a central focus of its activities" (63).

In this nuclear age, the best defence against war is peace. It is not the production of still more sophisticated weaponry - that is the way we got into the present crisis. The challenge confronting humankind, especially the US, which is leading the arms race, is to find alternatives to the arms race that will guarantee long-term survival, security and development.
The problem is not one of devising an appropriate disarmament treaty; a draft version already exists; the McKnight Treaty (as updated by myself) could serve as a basis of discussion. It is not a problem of having an appropriate mechanism for triggering disarmament negotiations; the GRIT method could be used (since the USSR has used it for over a year in refraining from nuclear testing and has been ignored by the US, the US should be the first to use it). The problem is, instead, one of generating the necessary policy political will.

This dissertation has criticized current attempts by both governments and the peace movement in their work on disarmament or, more accurately, arms control. The peace movement, which has done so much in the last seven years to arouse public awareness of the potential dangers of the arms race, needs to make some major changes in its structure and campaigns. First, it should recognize that the current negotiations represent too much effort on too limited a goal and, even if successful, will not amount to much. The peace movement should not base its own agenda on these negotiations.

Second, the peace movement should give particular attention to broadening its links with the business community. While it is true that the Pentagon's budget is larger than any total governmental budget in the world (except for the US, USSR and Japan), nonetheless this dissertation has shown that there are still business interests, especially small ones, which do not derive their income from the Pentagon. As in the era of the Vietnam War, some of the business community also has an interest in ending the arms race.

Finally, the peace movement should end its piecemeal approach. It should, instead, adopt a transcending vision and use this as the basis of its campaigning. It should move from doom and gloom to a message of hope and vision.
NOTES


(8) Edward Heath "The Place of Sovereignty in an Interdependent World" 1984 Corbushley Memorial Lecture, pp 4-5. (Available from Mr Heath at the House of Commons, London.)


(18) Robert Scheer With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War New York: Random House, 1982, pp 214-215. A recent book has argued that Senator John Kennedy's advocacy of the "missile gap" was due not only to its value to him as a way of criticizing the Eisenhower Administration but as a way of getting extra defence spending for his state (via missile building); see: Peter Collier and David Horowitz The Kennedys London: Pan, 1985, p 288. They also suggest (p 331) that Kennedy never "believed in the missile gap anyway".

(19) David Halberstam The Best and the Brightest London: Pan, 1973, p 91. Incidentally, I have often wondered whether the immediate impact of
Elsonhowor's "military-industrial complex" warning was diluted by being overshadowed by Kennedy's Inaugural Address, with its stirring call to arms, pledging America to bear any burden, support any friend and oppose any foe to ensure the success of liberty. By implication, the military-industrial complex was reaffirmed and endorsed by Kennedy. See: John F Kennedy "Inaugural Address" in George W Hibbit (Editor) Book of Speeches New York: Dolphin, 1965, pp 283-287.


(27) "Coming In From the Cold" Time 4 February 1985, p 26.


(33) George F Konnan "What About the Russians?" in David Hoffman (Editor) *Evolutionary Blues* Vol II (San Francisco) 1984, p 49.


(42) "Does Gorbachev want a Deal?" Time 13 October 1986.


(44) Keith D Suter "Food: A Bridge Between Nations" The Australian (Sydney) 13 October 1983. Indeed, a nation which is so reliant upon "enemies" for the supply of basic foodstuffs may not even warrant the title of "super power" because it is so potentially vulnerable to outside pressure, for example, the US could buy all the world's surplus foodstuffs and burn it, thereby adding to the USSR's domestic difficulties.

(45) "Old Soldiers go to War Over Visions of Nuclear Holocaust" The Sunday Times (London) 26 April 1981.

(46) Supra note (36), pp 10-11.

(48) "Americans and Russians Continue to Practice Citizen Diplomacy" The Christian-Science Monitor
31 October 1986.


(51) For an account of the oil companies evading the economic blockade to get oil to the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), see: Martin Bailey Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal, London: Coronet 1979.

(52) Supra note (32), p 46.


(56) Supra note (54), pp 573-4.


A NOTE ON SOURCES

INTRODUCTION

Schedule A (Rules on the Preparation and Submission of Theses for Higher Degrees) of the Administrative Guide at Rule 5(g) states that following the main text of the thesis (5(e)) there should be "Bibliography or list of references, unless lists of works consulted are appended at the ends of chapters".

Each of the chapters of the thesis does end with a list of works etc cited specifically in the chapter.

The purpose of this note is to identify the sources (printed or otherwise) that I have found particularly useful (one way or another) in writing this dissertation. Some have been quoted in the dissertation and so are listed in the footnotes following each chapter; others have set up novel chains of thinking which have led on to new ideas.
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTATION

All the documents referred to below may be examined at the UN Libraries in New York and Geneva. Some of the most important documents are held at the UN Information Centre, Sydney.

The best compilation of key UN disarmament documents for the period 1945–78 is contained in the six volumes attached to the Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: General Assembly Official Records: Tenth Special Session: Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), Volumes II to VI (Volume I is the Report itself). The Final Document of the 1978 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament was published separately in 1978 by the UN Department of Public Information, New York (DPI).

Because of the extensive work done by the Preparatory Committee for the 1978 Special Session, the 1982 Special Session did not require a compilation of UN documentation. The Special Session's Final Document has also been published by DPI.

The best source of UN General Assembly Resolutions is the annual DPI Press Release Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly in its X Session (this is published immediately the session ends – end of December/early January – and is literally years ahead of the official UN Yearbook, also published by DPI).

Major UN Secretary General Reports on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and disarmament have been referred to, especially in Part II. These may be consulted in New York and Geneva. These were also made available at the time as "Sales Items", and so were available at the UN's bookshops in New York, Geneva and wherever Specialized Agencies are located (as distinct from Information Centres, which do not handle "Sales Items") and governmental bookshops such as Her Majesty's Stationery Office shop in the UK and the Australian Government Publishing Service shop in all capital cities.

In accordance with a decision made soon after the 1978 Special Session, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (New York) commenced publication of Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations.
This contains the texts of some UN, governmental and non-governmental disarmament reports (this is a "Sales Item").

A magazine-format item, aimed at the general public and available free of charge is the Disarmament Newsletter, published by the World Disarmament Campaign Unit of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. (The WDC, it will be recalled, was launched at the 1982 UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament).
BOOKS AND ARTICLES

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AMBROSE, Stephen E Eisenhower: The President London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1984.

ANDERSON, Marion The Impact of Military Spending on the Machinists

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Arms Control and Disarmament

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Economic Impacts of Disarmament


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BOULDING, Kenneth E (Editor) Peace and the War Industry Aldine (USA):
Transaction, 1970.

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Common Crisis: North–South: Co-operation for World Recovery (the

Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament: The Report of the
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme

DOLMAN, Antony J Disarmament, Development, Environment: Three Worlds
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1963.

FALK, Richard A and MENDELOVITCH, Saul H (Editors) Disarmament and

FERGUSON, Thomas and ROGERS, Joel "The Myth of America's Turn to the


JACK, Homer A Disarm - or Die: The Second UN Special Session on Disarmament New York: World Conference on Religion and Peace, 1983.


KALDOR, Mary The Baroque Arsenal London: Andre Deutsch, 1982.


MADARIAGA, Salvador de Disarmament New York: Coward-McCann, 1929.


SCHELL, Jonathon The Fate of the Earth: London: Jonathan Cape, 1982.
SCHEER, Robert With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War
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SIMS, Nichols A Approaches to Disarmament London: Friends House,
1979.
SMITH, Dan and SMITH, Ron The Economics of Militarism London: Pluto,
1983.
SIPRI The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure, Stockholm,
TALBOTT, Strobe Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the
TALBOTT, Strobe Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II New York:
THEE, Marek (Editor) Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament Paris,
THOMPSON, E P and SMITH, Dan (Editors) Protest and Survive London:
THORSSON, Inga In Pursuit of Disarmament Stockholm: Swedish Government,
1984.
UNITED NATIONS The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1985 New York:
WALLIS, Jim (Editor) Waging Peace: A Handbook for the Struggle to
WEBBER, Philip, et al Crisis over Cruise: A Plain Guide to the new
WEINBERGER, Casper W; WEIDENBAUM, Murray L and LA ROCQUE; Gene R,
The Defense Budget Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute,
1972.
WHEELWRIGHT, E.L. "Crisis of the American Economy: War, Usury and
WHYNES, David K The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure


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**ADIU Report** (Armament and Disarmament Information Unit, University of Sussex, UK).

**Bulletin of Atomic Scientists** (Chicago).

**Defense Monitor** (Center for Defense Information, Washington DC).

**Disarmament Newsletter** (Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra).

**Disarmament Times** (NGO Committee on Disarmament, 777 UN Plaza, New York).

**In and Around the UN** (Quaker UN Office, New York).

**NATO Review** (Brussels).


**Royal United Services Institute Journal** (London).

**Sanity** (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London).

**South** (London).

**Survival** (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London).

YEARBOOKS/ANNUAL REPORTS


**SIPRI Yearbook** London: Taylor & Francis.

**Strategic Survey** London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

**World Military and Social Expenditures** Washington DC: World Priorities.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

BALL, Nicole Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study (1981?).

BALL, Nicole Military Expenditure, Economic Growth and Socio-Economic Development in the Third World (May 1982).

Both documents available from Utrikespolitiska Institute (Swedish Institute of International Affairs), Stockholm.
INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

The following persons have all supplied information which has been of benefit in producing this dissertation; some have done so through formal interviews and others have done so via informal conversations.

BADGER, Don: Former Economist, ANZ Bank, Sydney.


BALLENTYNE, Edith: Secretary-General, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Geneva.

BAXTER, Richard: Former Judge, International Court of Justice, The Hague. (the late)

BUTLER, Richard: Australia's Ambassador for Disarmament.


CORNELIUS, Stella: Director, International Year of Peace Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.

EDWARDS, John: Writer, Vienna.

ENNALS, John: Former Director, UN Association, UK.

EVANS, Gordon: Former Economic and Social Secretary, UN Association, UK.

EVERINGHAM, Doug: Former Labor Cabinet Minister, Canberra.

FIELD, Frank: Former Secretary-General, World Federation of UN Associations, Geneva.

GREEN, James Frederick: Former State Department official, New York.

HARBOTTLE, Michael: General Secretary, Generals for Peace, London.


HAYDEN, Bill: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra.

HIGGINS, Ronald: Former Foreign Office official, writer, London.

HUGHES-HALLET, John: Vice-Admiral RN, UK UNA Disarmament Committee. (the late)

JACK, Homer A: Secretary-General, World Conference on Religion and Peace, New York.


KENT, Bruce: General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London.


MELMAN, Seymour: Writer, New York.

MERTIN, Marc: General Secretary, International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon.
NOEL-BAKER, Lord Philip: Former UK Labour Politician, Nobel Peace Prize
   winner.

OAKS, Sheila: General Secretary, UK National Peace Council.

PRICE HOLMES, Eric: Former Chairman, UK UNA, London.
   (the late)

PROVANCE, Terry: Co-ordinator, 1978 Mobilization for Survival, New
   York; Friends Service Committee.

SALZMAN, Lorna: Director, Friends of the Earth, New York.

SHELLEY, Sally Swing: NGO Liaison Officer, UN, New York.

SIMS, Nicholas A: Lecturer, London School of Economics.

SIVARD, Ruth Leger: Editor, World Military and Social Expenditures.

TACCHI-MORRIS, Kathleen: President, Women for World Disarmament, UK.

THORRSON, Inga: Swedish Government.

VALLENTINE, Jo: Independent Senator for Disarmament, Western Australia.

WADLOW, Rene: Writer, Geneva


Notes:
(1) The titles are meant for identification purposes only.
(2) The titles relate to the offices held by the individuals when I
    interviewed them.
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION
I also derived great benefit from colleagues in the following organizations:
Ministry of Defence (Army) 1964-69
UK UN Association 1966-72
Australian UN Association 1973-
Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament (now People for Nuclear Disarmament) 1973-
Methodist Church/Uniting Church in Australia 1976-
Executive Committee, Australian Branch, International Law Association 1978-
National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs 1985-
Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament, London, 1980-