Risk
and the Regulation of Youth(ful) Identities
in an
Age of Manufactured Uncertainty

by

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For Mum and Dad,
Noreen and Georgia
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Abstract

The Question(s) of Youth, of what to do with them, of how to school them, or police them, or regulate them, or house them, or employ them, or prevent them from becoming involved in any number of Risky (sexual, eating, drug (ab)using or peer cultural) practices are questions which have a substantial historical aspect. In the Liberal Democracies at the end of the millennium the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) is a key marker in theoretical, political and popular debates about Youth. This thesis explores the 'conditions of possibility' which enable discourses of Youth at-Risk to function as true (Henriques et al 1984). I argue that the truth of Youth at-Risk rehearses, in part, the historical truths of Youth as Delinquent, Deviant and Disadvantaged. I will also argue that a historically novel aspect of the truth of Youth at-Risk is that, potentially, every behaviour, every practice, every group of Youth can be constructed in terms of Risk.

This thesis is not about the practices, behaviours and dispositions of young people. Rather, my concern is with the ways in which institutionally structured processes of expert knowledge production construct the truths of Youth (at-Risk). The thesis is concerned with the processes by which these largely autonomous systems of expert knowledge production are constitutive of both the 'institutional reflexivity' which characterises contemporary settings, and the forms of identity which emerge in these settings (Giddens 1994 c). I am also concerned with the ways in which these systems of expertise mobilise categories of Risk in diverse attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of certain populations of young people under the conditions of 'reflexive modernization' (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994).

The thesis argues for a productive convergence between theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality. This convergence enables Youth at-Risk to be examined at two (interconnected) levels. In the first instance Risk is understood as constituting a metanarrative in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty. In the second instance the identification of Risk factors and populations at-Risk will be understood as techniques mobilised in diverse attempts to 'make up' rational, choice making, autonomous, responsible citizens within (Neo)Liberar projects of government (Rose 1996).

Foucault's (1991) theory of governmentality foregrounds the practices and relations implicated in the processes whereby 'human beings are made into subjects' (Foucault 1983). Governmentality is a useful and strategic analytic for understanding the diverse attempts by various experts and centres of expertise to regulate young people's identity through the construction of populations of Youth at-Risk.
Processes of reflexive modernization are marked by the emergence of a degree of collective awareness that our contemporary conditions of existence are characterised by the thoroughgoing penetration of the social and the natural by reflexive human knowledge. Such a situation leads, not to a position in 'which collectively we are the masters [sic] of our destiny'; but rather to a series of settings in which we are confronted with the possibility that, as a 'consequence of our own doings', the future becomes 'very threatening' (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994).

In problematising the truth of Youth at-Risk this thesis will also engage with various problematisations of Left (critical) intellectual and political practices in domains which take Youth as their object. This thesis is explicitly located in the space of 'critical' (Educational) scholarship in Anglo settings which is structured, historically, by the 'European Marxist social philosophy' of the Frankfurt School and Gramscian (British) Cultural Studies, and French and Italian Feminism and Post (Structuralism and Modernism) (Popkewitz and Brennan 1997). The thesis argues that in order to problematise the truth of Youth at-Risk it is necessary, also, to problematise the processes of truth production mobilised from the Left in an engagement with the material and discursive realities which enable Youth at-Risk to function as a truth. Examining the truth of Youth at-Risk in the frameworks enabled by a convergence of theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality is a contribution to the processes of rethinking the intellectual and political positions which the Left might mobilise at the end of the millennium, when, as Beck (1994) argues, 'uncertainty returns'. I will argue that Left intellectual and political practice has no choice but to be open to the uncertain nature of truth telling which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. The tensions generated within these processes are not resolvable. Nor should the 'return of uncertainty' be seen as immobilising in the context of political and intellectual practice.

The thesis argues that theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality highlight the dangers of intellectual and political positions which invest heavily in 'modernity's war on ambivalence' (Bauman 1990 b). In settings where the practices and activities of expertise have so thoroughly penetrated the natural and the social, where these processes of colonisation have resulted in the 'return of uncertainty', then the practices and activities of expertise promise, paradoxically, to 'exterminate ambivalence' by telling the truths of Youth at-Risk (Bauman 1990 b). This thesis argues that in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty the mobilisation of rationally grounded Risk discourses in attempts to regulate Youth emerges as a paradoxical, and dangerous, Quest for Certainty (Bauman 1990 a).
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We live in an Age of Uncertainty. Various experts argue that today's Youth are at-Risk of not finishing school, of catching STDs, of taking drugs, of eating disorders, of something. Although all Youth can be at-Risk it is claimed that those most at-Risk are the disadvantaged. This thesis examines the benefits and dangers of allowing experts to intervene in the lives of Youth, and their families, on the basis of assessing them as being at-Risk. Uncertain times provoke increased expert surveillance of Youth, and attempts to regulate these uncertainties. Interventions can benefit Youth. However, this thesis highlights the dangers of expert promises to prevent Risk by intervening in people's lives on the basis of what is perceived to be normal or good.
INTRODUCTION

I therefore turned my attention more particularly to the young; and as my residence was, for some years previous to 1816, on the south side of the river, the most direct way to which lay through the Saltmarket, the very 'St Giles of Glasgow', my eyes and ears were shocked several times a day by the profanity, indecency, filth, and vice, which were exhibited by hordes of young and old, and even infants, who were growing up pests to society, and ruined in themselves, for whose souls or bodies no one seemed to care, and whose wretchedness was enough to disgrace a professedly Christian community. Could nothing be done to stem this torrent of vice and ungodliness?

... My object was to seize a dozen of these wild human beings on the streets, and try what, by the blessing of God, might be done with them.1

It was as if William Hogarth's Gin Lane stretched for blocks. The streets were littered with drunks, some vomiting where they stood. The footpaths outside the hotels were strewn with broken glass. People argued with and hurled abuse at one another. Others with vacant eyes stood mumbling soundlessly to themselves, arms whirling like aimless windmills. Through the streets surged packs of feral teenagers with bruitish faces and foul, mindless mouths.2

Behind the problems of youth suicide, alcohol and drug abuse and delinquency exists a constellation of psychological traits: alienation, anomie, frustration, confusion, hopelessness, impotence, loneliness. At the end of it all is a crippling lack of self esteem.3

Picture a thirteen-year-old boy sitting in the living room of his family home doing his math assignment while wearing his Walkman headphones or watching MTV. He enjoys the liberties hard won over centuries in the alliance of philosophic genius and political heroism, consecrated by the blood of martyrs; he is provided with comfort and leisure by the most productive economy ever known to mankind; science penetrated the secrets of nature in order to provide him with the marvellous, lifelike electronic sound and image reproduction he is enjoying. And in what does progress culminate? A pubescent child whose body throbs with orgasmic rhythms; whose feelings are made articulate in hymns to the joy of onanism or the killing of parents; whose ambition is to win fame and wealth in imitating the drag-queen who makes the music. In short life is made into a nonstop, commercially prepackaged masturbation fantasy.4

The issue of adolescents and tattoos is a relatively neglected area of research and intervention. Studies indicate that there is an association between having tattoos, increased risk taking and antisocial behaviours. Young offenders are found to have tattoos significantly more than do community samples of adolescent high school students. While tattoos can sometimes reflect an antisocial orientation, it is argued that tattoos can also increase the risk of antisocial

4Bloom, 1987, pp.74-75.
outcomes, that is, by creating a particular image they can further increase risk among youths who are already "at risk".\textsuperscript{5}

Whereas once youth might be comfortably regarded as something one eventually grew out of, as an interim stage in the movement towards normality, to be incorporated into the (w)hol(i)ness of adulthood, now this orderly passage has become fraught with hazardous uncertainty. Increasingly alienated, in the classical sense, young people are also increasingly alien, alienated others, differently motivated, designed, constructed. And the awful possibility presents itself, insistently: they aren't simply visiting us, after which they'll simply go away; rather, they are here to stay, and they're taking over.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{The Question(s) of Youth (at-Risk)}

Beneath two portraits of a girl and boy in their early teens a full page newspaper advertisement announces that from 'today' over 150 corporations, government departments and research centres, will 'understand our generation a whole lot better'. The advertisement, which lists the names of these organisations, heralds the merger of two Australian market research companies, ACNielsen-McNair and Reark Research. The merger, it is claimed;

\begin{quote}
will offer the most comprehensive range of services in retail and media measurement and customised research. And, most importantly, we'll now have the added ability to integrate all this vital marketing information. Meaning a more complete picture of today's consumers for our clients. Which in turn, gives our clients an even greater edge in the global marketplace. \textit{We might even find the answer to the vexed question of today's youth}. (\textit{The Age}, 9/12/97, p.A13, emphasis added)
\end{quote}

The Question(s) of Youth, of what to do with them, of how to school them, or police them, or regulate them, or house them, or employ them, or prevent them from becoming involved in any number of Risky (sexual, eating, drug (ab)using or peer cultural) practices are questions which have a substantial historical aspect.\textsuperscript{7} In the Liberal Democracies at the end of the millennium the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) is a key marker in debates about Youth among intellectuals, social commentators, market researchers, politicians, bureaucrats, religious groups, (self-appointed) moral guardians and experts

\textsuperscript{5}Puttnins, 1997, p.13.
\textsuperscript{6}Green and Bigum, 1993, pp.121-122 (original emphasis).
\textsuperscript{7}For an Australian perspective on these histories, and the ways in which class, gender and race have been significant in these histories see, Beasley (1991), Bessant (1991), Carrington (1991), Collard & Palmer (1991), Irving (1991), Maunders (1991), Sherrington (1991), and Wyn (1991).
in various domains of expertise. This thesis will argue that the truth of Youth at-Risk rehearses, in part, the historical truths of Youth as Delinquent, Deviant and Disadvantaged (Swadener and Lubeck 1995). However, a historically novel aspect of the truth of Youth at-Risk is that, potentially, every behaviour, every practice, every group of young people can be constructed in terms of Risk (Tait 1995). These discussions about youth(ful) populations and their families, their schools, their often Risky (anti-social) behaviours and practices, their chances of being employed (and of being employable) are, in the context of this thesis, important at a number of levels.

In the first instance, these discussions about Youth are about populations of historically situated, social, and embodied beings. These populations of young people experience or are exposed to many ways of being-in-the-world; ways of being which are potentially rational or irrational; ways of being in which cognitive and affective or emotional aspects of being can be in tension; ways of being in which their embodiment, or 'enfleshment' (McLaren 1991) is experienced as (dis)enabling or (dis)empowering; ways of being in which their performance or (dis)ability is judged by significant or more powerful Others in terms of success or failure; ways of being which cast or position them as adolescent, as being less autonomous, more dependent, less mature, as becoming (adult) rather than simply being (young people). These ways of being are also fundamentally shaped by institutionally structured gender relations, class locations and relations, ethnic background and geographical situation.

At another level, these discussions and debates about the Question(s) of Youth (at-Risk) are about the discourses which structure the categories of Adolescent, Youth, Young People and Risk. At this level these intellectual abstractions, these processes of discursive production are more than mere representations of the transparent reality of Youth(ful) experience. Indeed, a central theoretical and political concern in the

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8Swadener and Lubeck (1995), for instance, claim that in the US since 1989 over 2500 articles and conference papers have focussed on the issue of children, families and youth at-Risk. They further claim that the narrative of at-Risk structures 'countless' school district, State and Federal task forces which address the 'crisis' of America's Youth. See also Withers and Batten (1995) and Batten and Russell (1995) for reviews of the extensive Youth at-Risk literature from the US, Canada, Britain and Australia.

9McRobbie (1996) mobilises the notion of 'different youthful subjectivities' to capture some sense of difference and generation in her examinations of what Youth might mean in Cultural and Sociological studies of Youth. Before I became aware of McRobbie's use of 'youthful' I had used 'youth(ful)' to self consciously acknowledge that in commenting on Youth I was less than youthful; that in commenting on Youth I became implicated in that new class Adult process of constructing 'fantasies'(Walkerdine 1997) about contemporary youth(ful) populations as Other.
discussion which follows will be to argue against the possibility of apprehending, or representing the real in any unmediated or transparent way. Youth at-Risk will, instead, be understood in terms of the 'conditions of possibility' which enable discourses of Risk to function as true (Henriques et al 1984, p.101); and to function as true within institutionally structured spaces marked by differences in the 'power to mean' (Watts 1993/94).\textsuperscript{10} Nikolas Rose (1990) has argued, in this context, that:

Childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence. In different ways, at different times, and by many different routes varying from one section of society to another, the health, welfare, and rearing of children have been linked in thought and practice to the destiny of the nation and the responsibilities of the state. The modern child has become the focus of innumerable projects that purport to safeguard it from physical, sexual, or moral danger, to ensure its 'normal' development, to actively promote certain capacities or attributes such as intelligence, educability, and emotional stability. Throughout the nineteenth century and our own, anxieties concerning children have occasioned a panoply of programmes that have tried to conserve and shape children by moulding the petty details of the domestic, conjugal, and sexual lives of their parents. (p.121)\textsuperscript{11}

At a quite fundamental level this thesis is not about the practices, behaviours and dispositions of young people. Rather, my concern is with the ways in which institutionally structured processes of expert knowledge production construct the Question(s) of Youth (at-Risk). I am concerned with the processes by which these largely autonomous systems of expert knowledge production are constitutive of both the 'institutional reflexivity' which characterises contemporary settings, and the forms of identity which emerge in these settings (Giddens 1994 c). I am also concerned with the ways in which these systems of expertise mobilise categories of Risk in diverse

\textsuperscript{10} Central to an argument about the 'power to mean' is a view of language as constitutive. Watts (1993/94), for example, argues that 'to think the State' is a preferable phrase to the more familiar phrase 'to think about the State'. It is preferable, argues Watts, because it avoids some of the problems of the 'conduit model of language'. My sense of this model is that it is through the conduit of language that we are able to access the real outside of language; in this instance the essence of the State. To 'think the state' however suggests a model of language as constitutive of that which is being signified; a model which is consistent with the views on discourse and representation which I will engage with throughout this thesis.

\textsuperscript{11}While this passage refers to Childhood I intend to argue that, where Youth is marked as a process of transition from Dependence to Independence, and where this transitional process is lengthening for contemporary populations of young people, then the processes which Rose refers to can be seen to increasingly take Youth as their object.
attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of certain populations of young people under the conditions of 'reflexive modernization' (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994).

These purposes are mirrored in the structure of this thesis. *Part One: Expertise and the Question of Youth at-Risk* is centrally concerned with the processes of expert knowledge production which both construct categories and factors of Risk, and the forms of intellectual and political knowledge which might be mobilised to critique these 'ordering processes' (Law 1994). *Part Two: Risk and the Problematics of Government in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty* is concerned with mobilising a form of intellectual and political practice able to apprehend the tensions, the rationalities, and the sensibilities which enable the truth of Youth at-Risk to mean so powerfully in diverse attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty (Giddens 1994 a).

In this endeavour I will argue for the possibilities of a productive convergence between theories of *reflexive modernization* (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994) and *governmentality* (Foucault 1991). This convergence enables Youth at-Risk to be examined at two (interconnected) levels. In the first instance Risk will be understood as constituting a *metanarrative* in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty. Secondly, the identification of Risk Factors and populations at-Risk will be understood as *techniques* mobilised in diverse attempts to 'make up' rational, choice making, autonomous, responsible citizens within (Neo)Liberal projects of government (Rose 1996 a). Examining the question of identity is fundamental in this project.

**The Question of Identity**

Identity politics, the politics of being and 'becoming somebody' (Wexler 1992), a concern with the relations, practices and processes which are mobilised in the construction of a sense of self and of others are questions and issues which have a central place in the recent history of Black, feminist, gay and lesbian, indigenous (postcolonial), and other (often marginalised) social movements. Who am I? Who are we? Who can I, or we, speak with, or to, or about, or for? These *baseline* questions are often posed in the framing of individual and collective political agenda. Epstein (1991), in locating the emergence of the issue of identity politics in the 'fluidity and fragmentation' of contemporary Western societies, argues that certain group identities become;

increasingly attractive, since they offer an intermediate link between the individual and the mass. In recent years, identity has emerged as the organizing principle of a new politics - exemplified by the black
power movement, feminism, and lesbian and gay liberation...in which the assertion and elaboration of a group identity is linked inextricably with a program for social change. (p.827)

Similar questions about identity have informed recent and ongoing debates in a number of academic fields, such as Literary Theory and Cultural Studies. Postmodernism, poststructuralism and psychoanalytic discourses have shaped discussions exploring the connections between cultural texts and forms and their intended and actual audiences and consumers; their subjects. Who are these subjects? What occurs in the text/reader encounter? How are audiences differentiated (by class, gender, ethnicity)? How does difference, and identity, structure or mediate these encounters? How is identity shaped or changed in, and by, these encounters? Here, Richard Johnson (1987) argues that 'texts' are, 'encountered promiscuously; they pour in on us from all directions in diverse, co-existing media, and differently placed flows. In everyday life, textual materials are complex, multiple, overlapping, co-exist, juxta-posed, in a word, 'inter-textual' (p.67).

In Cultural Studies it is argued that these issues have a particular importance in seeking to understand the relationships between individual and group subjects and the globalisation of electronically mediated cultural texts and forms (and their inter-textual companions, their associated commodities). These relationships are often seen to be important when discussing the ways in which contemporary youth(ful) populations construct individual and group identities. As significant aspects of what has been labelled 'techno culture' (Green and Bigum 1993), these relationships and practices are seen to be both natural environments for rising generations, and environments which are different to those in which older generations became somebody. In this sense the generation gap is seen to be not only difference structured by age but by immersion in, engagement with, and understanding of this 'techno culture'. Green and Bigum (1993), in this context, construct contemporary Youth as 'postmodern subjects par excellence'.

**The Crisis-of-Youth (at-Risk)**

In Chapter One of this thesis I will situate contemporary constructions of the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) in settings which are characterised, from a variety of intellectual and political positions, as Uncertain, as Reflexive, as Post (Modern, Traditional, Industrial), and/or as Global. In this context an engagement with intellectual abstractions which construct a Crisis of Youth (at-Risk), or which position themselves in some form of relation to these constructions generates various tensions. The nature of certain of these tensions will be initially illustrated via an engagement with Green and Bigum's (1993) construction of Youth as Aliens. I will argue that postmodern Cultural Studies (of Youth) 'rule the roost' in contemporary social theory discourses (Lash 1994 b). These
discourses are useful in that they foreground certain emergent forms of identity, and of the social, in 'techno culture'; that is these discourses tell certain truths about the conditions of existence of a Crisis of Youth (at-Risk). However, I will argue that cultural postmodernism is less useful in acknowledging continuities in the institutional structuring of Youth, and the central place that concerns about government and regulation continues to occupy in relation to Youth (McRobbie 1996).

Attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of young people in the institutionally structured spaces of post compulsory secondary schooling (PCSS) illustrate the significance of these concerns. At this particular historical moment a variety of emerging, developed and decaying cultural, economic and social forces are at work to mark PCSS as the time and space of transition for the majority of young Australians. This moment is marked by; an established trend to near universal retention rates in secondary schooling; an emerging trend to further post compulsory education and training; a paradoxical coupling/decoupling of schooling and work (schooling and school knowledge should be more closely connected to workplace knowledge and needs - schooling emerges as warehousing as the youth labour market decays and school knowledge no longer gets you a job); a 'conservative restoration' (Wexler 1987) in many Western Nation States linking an 'education crisis' to the success of national economies and individuals within globalising economic processes (Apple 1993, Goodson 1994). This contested transitional space - from dependence to in(ter)dependence, from school to (un)employment, from non adulthood to adulthood, from non sexual to sexual - is a space in which 'becoming somebody' is at the core of young people's activities (Wexler 1992). This period of schooling, then, is emerging as a setting, a pattern of relationships and a series of practices which is a defining experience of present and future identity options and life chances for most young people. Indeed, it is argued that those young people most at-Risk in these settings are those who fail to complete PCSS. Under such conditions it becomes possible to suggest, as Fitzclarence et. al. (1995) do, that:

The notion of identity is quite crucial here. How is identity formed in these circumstances? What are the contexts and resources for identity work? How is identity itself to be understood? And what has changed and is different about postmodern identity formation? This is an important insight for understanding life in and out of school and the changing circumstances and subjectivity of young people today, as well as the widespread public anxiety about contemporary realizations of youth and schooling. (p.147, original emphasis)

12A point stressed in the report of the Australian Education Council Review Committee (1991), Young People's Participation in Post-Compulsory Education & Training. This report will, hereafter, be referred to as the Finn Review after Brian Finn, the committee's Chair.
The Problematic of Thinking Youth(ful) Identities

At the present historical moment any academy based examination of the question of identity must, at the very least, engage with poststructuralist discourses on identity. In brief these discourses suggest a non-essential, non-unified, contingent, in process, often contradictory, discursively constructed identity. Informing this view of a discursive identity is a view that language is not a transparent transcendent system which represents the real. Instead, language constructs a sense of the real and constructs and positions us within representations of various realities. These representations are historically, socially, and culturally situated and (re)produced. Meaning and representation is not fixed. Identity is therefore not fixed or essential. Jane Kenway (1992) sees poststructuralism as a 'very loosely connected set of ideas' which seeks to explore the ways;

in which meaning is struggled over and made, the way it circulates amongst us, the impact it has on human subjects and finally, the connections between meaning and power. For post structuralists, meaning is not fixed in language or in cultural symbols and neither is it fixed in consistent power relationships. It shifts according to the way in which a range of linguistic, institutional and, cultural factors come together. It is influenced by and influences shifting patterns of power. And finally, it constitutes human subjectivity which is, again, regarded as shifting, many-faceted and contradictory. (pp.2-3)

(De)constructions of the Self as provisional, non-essential and contingent are valuable in understanding the ways in which identity, our sense of self and others, is constructed for and by us within a complex discursive matrix of meanings. A matrix which is historically, socially and culturally located and struggled over. Importantly, it is made concrete and embodied in our relations with others. Yet what is often missing from poststructuralist accounts is any sense that individuals and groups strive to produce shared meaning and, importantly, continuity in and through social relations. In everyday relations and practices (and for inter, and intra generational understanding) individuals and groups struggle to construct shared meaning, understanding and representation in relations with others. Which is not to say that such meaning or representation is fixed or uncontested. It is also not to say that meaning or representation is not possible. In calling for a 'post-post-structuralist' account of subjectivity Johnson (1987) stresses the need to return to 'some older but reformulated questions - about struggle, 'unity', and the production of a political will' (p.69). This is not, as Johnson makes clear, a denial of the major post structuralist insights; 'subjects are contradictory, 'in process', fragmented,

13 Kenway and Blackmore (1994), for instance, point to the 'hegemony' of poststructuralism in feminist discourses in the academy.
produced. But human beings and social movements also strive to produce some coherence and continuity, and through this, exercise some control over feelings, conditions and destinies' (p.69, original emphasis).

**Government as the Regulation of Youth(ful) Identities**

It is in the intellectual spaces opened up by poststructuralist accounts of the processes of identity formation that this thesis will be situated. Thinking about identity in this space will mean thinking about identity in terms of Foucault's (1991) notion of government; where government is conceived in terms of the diverse attempts to conduct the conduct of expertly identified populations (of Youth at-Risk). In Chapter Three of this thesis I will argue that the literature on governmentality, which builds on Foucault's 'opening gambits', provides powerful intellectual resources for understanding the practices and relations mobilised in the processes whereby 'human beings are made into subjects' (Foucault 1983).^{14}

Foucault (1991) argues that the 'discovery of populations', or more correctly the discursive construction and systematising of populations, and of populations within populations, became central to the art of European government from the sixteenth century onwards. Foucault traces the production of regimes of truth, or the production and mobilisation of power/knowledge in a variety of domains, as these discourses - on madness, on punishment, on pedagogy, on sexuality - work to define the field in which true and false statements can be made; statements about both these particular fields, and the interconnections between these discourses, these practices and the various sites and populations which they seek to define, construct and govern. For Foucault, the art of government, of governing oneself and others, is made possible and reproduced, refined and done better - within general and more particular rationalities, and through a variety of techniques - by coming to define, construct, (dis)assemble and know better the diverse persons, groups and populations which are the objects and the subjects of these various rationalities and technologies. Applying Foucault's work to an understanding of youth(ful) populations Gordon Tait (1993 b) argues that youth; 'is best understood as an example of the governmental formation of specific types of persons. That is, 'youth' constructed as an object of knowledge at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations' (p.3).

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Governmentality, it will be argued, is a useful and strategic analytic for understanding the diverse attempts to regulate young people's identity through the construction of populations of Youth at-Risk. Again the regulation of youth(ful) identities through mass compulsory schooling is usefully understood in these terms. The schooling of youth(ful) populations is marked by both compulsion and coercion, by the legislated, policed and compulsory attendance of young people at schools until some arbitrary age. In a very real sense, power is exercised in this instance by imposing constraints on large populations who are not yet citizens, who are deemed not to be responsible, autonomous members of society, who are being schooled and trained for future participation in economic and social life.

At the same time much of this schooling is also concerned with normalising individuality and autonomy, with 'making up citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom' (Rose and Miller 1992, p.134), including the 'freedom' to remain in some form of post compulsory schooling and training. Discourses on governmentality are useful in understanding how Youth comes to constitute a particular domain of knowledge, of how certain rationalities work to construct 'axes' of normality (Tait 1993 b) around which Youth is made and remade. The ways in which for example, various experts and centres of expertise come to 'articulate' (Hall 1985) schooling, training, cognitive skills and the economy to construct a pervasive, dominant understanding that thirteen plus years of schooling are necessary in order to make Youth employable.

Further, the choice young people make to stay in post compulsory secondary schooling is often made in an attempt to secure that particular view of future autonomy and freedom offered by a good job. Of course, what this good job might be and what the good life which it (hopefully) secures will look like will differ among young people. However, the normalising discourses which circulate around, and construct these notions of the good job/life, the stories and narratives which young people are told and which they construct, and which constitute, in part, their repertoire for 'colonizing' their futures (Giddens 1991) are an important illustration of this 'making up' in action. Government, here, as Rose and Miller (1992) suggest, is;

intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of meaning an all pervasive web of 'social control', but of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement. (p.175)
Reflexive Modernization and the Return of Uncertainty

I will argue that the social practice of intellectual abstraction ('the activities of expertise') which is manifested in attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of youth(ful) populations via the mobilisation of at-Risk discourses, is dominated by those discourses which seek to represent the complexity of being-in-the world as more or less calculable, quantifiable, predictable and knowable within certain narrow rationalistic limits. Moreover, as a social practice this form of discursive production is vested with a form of authority, or seeks to establish legitimacy and authority, through its claims to know, or to predict, or calculate. In this instance expertise and authority are claimed through an ability to know and calculate and measure better the Risks associated with being young in the last decades of the 20th century. This legitimacy and authority is achieved within social processes which are contested and negotiated, that is, they are political processes. In the social and institutional milieux in which legitimacy and authority is struggled over little of this intellectual abstraction demonstrates much self-consciousness with regard to its limitations as a form of discursive production. In the contexts of epistemological debates about the modern and the postmodern this is a decidedly modernist, Enlightenment orientation to knowledge production and its role in the quest for meaning and certainty.

In Chapter Four I will argue that processes of reflexive modernization render problematic the quest for certainty which characterises at-Risk discourses. Giddens (1990), for instance, argues that the conditions of 'radicalised modernity' are marked by processes of reflexivity in which claims to certainty in knowledge production - the very bedrock of Enlightenment thinking - become intensely problematic. So much so that the intensification and globalisation of reflexively produced knowledge results in a 'runaway world', of 'dislocation' and 'uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a, p.3). Giddens (1994 a) argues that human existence is not necessarily more risky under contemporary social conditions but that the origins of risk and uncertainty have changed. For Giddens 'manufactured risk is the result of human intervention into the conditions of social life and into nature' (p.4 original emphasis). Moreover, 'what was supposed to create greater and greater certainty - the advance of human knowledge and 'controlled intervention' into society and nature - is actually deeply involved with this unpredictability' (p.3). Giddens (1994 a) argues that the 'uncertainties and opportunities' which are a consequence of the 'advance of manufactured uncertainty' are 'largely new':

They cannot be dealt with by age-old remedies; but neither do they respond to the Enlightenment prescription of more knowledge, more control. Put more accurately, the sorts of reactions they might evoke
today are often as much about *damage control* and *repair* as about an endless process of increasing mastery. (p.4 original emphasis)

For Beck, Giddens & Lash (1994), this 'paradox of human knowledge' is central to understanding processes of reflexive modernization. These processes are marked by the emergence of a degree of collective awareness that *our* contemporary conditions of existence are characterised by the thoroughgoing penetration of the *social* and the *natural* by reflexive human knowledge. Such a situation leads, not to a position in 'which collectively we are the masters [sic] of our destiny'; but rather to a series of settings in which we are confronted with the possibility that, as a 'consequence of our own doings', the future becomes 'very threatening' (p.vii). At the end of the millennium, as Beck (1994 b) argues, 'uncertainty returns'.

One consequence of processes of reflexive modernization is the prominence of 'institutionally structured risk environments' (Giddens 1991). Modern institutions, argues Giddens (1991) 'both permit and entail' a 'concentrated reflexive monitoring' of various environments of human interaction (p.16). The narrative of Risk emerges in this context as a concern with constructing some sense of 'future happenings', as these possible futures are related in particular ways to 'present practices' (p.117). Diverse configurations of time-space, and the reflexivity generated by the penetration of abstract systems into the everyday lifeworlds of modernity, provoke, argues Giddens (1991), a general concern with the 'control of time'. Risk, in this sense, is about the 'colonisation of the future' (p.111, original emphasis). In these settings, argues Giddens (1991), 'all action', including that which adheres to traditional forms and practices, 'is in principle "calculable" in terms of risk' (p.112).

This impulse to construct and calculate risk scenarios becomes energised within those abstract systems which appropriate the tasks of regulating the disintegrative effects of modernity. Particularly those systems of expertise which attempt to colonise the futures of youth(ful) populations, whose involvement in any number of practices (might) jeopardise desired outcomes (futures). Thus the narrative of Risk, with regard to particular populations of young people, can structure attempts to regulate; young people's involvement in Schooling (in relation to future employability or good citizenship); young people's engagement in sexual activity (the possibility of becoming pregnant, or of contracting HIV/AIDS); the chance that they might attempt suicide; and the likelihood of young people becoming homeless or (ab)using drugs or becoming involved in criminal activities. As Giddens (1991) argues, 'an assessment of likely risks can be made for virtually all habits and activities in respect of specific outcomes' (p.112).
In that Chapter I will further argue, following Beck (1992), that these largely autonomous processes of reflexive modernization, which 'tend to dissolve' the 'traditional parameters of industrial society', result, paradoxically, in a 'surge of individualization' and of 'standardization' (pp.130-131). Under the conditions of reflexive modernization class, gender and family coordinates recede (but do not disappear), and individuals themselves tend to become *the reproduction unit for the social in the life world* (p.130, original emphasis). Here there is a sense in which individuals 'inside and outside the family' must assume the role of makers of their own 'livelihood'; a livelihood and a Do-It-Yourself (DIY) project of the Self which is at the same time dependent on and shaped by markets, education and other forms of governmental regulation (p.130).

Within processes of reflexive modernization, and within (Neo)Liberal projects of government which attempt to make up citizens capable of bearing this form of regulated freedom, individuals are compelled to choose; we must choose and decide about 'education, profession, job, place of residence, spouse, number of children' (Beck 1992 p.135). As Beck (1992) argues, the domains of existence, the aspects of the lifeworld 'which are fundamentally closed to decision-making' are diminishing, while those aspects of individual biographies which are 'open and must be constructed personally' are increasing (p.135). These processes force young people, in this instance, to 'learn on pain of permanent disadvantage', to see themselves, to construct themselves, 'as the centre of action' (p.135). Yet these individualization processes, which are institutionally structured, are also, increasingly, institutionally dependent, and thus increasingly 'susceptible to crises', to institutionally generated risks. The risks for the DIY Self under conditions of reflexive modernization are increasingly individualised. In this sense, 'the floodgates are opened wide for the subjectivization and individualization of risks and contradictions produced by institutions and society' (p.136). These institutionally generated risk environments, and the consequences they have for individual biographies emerge as 'no longer just events and conditions' which are visited upon individuals. Rather these risks are the *consequences of the decisions they themselves have made* (p.136 original emphasis).

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15 Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel (1997) refer to this paradox as the 'epistemological fallacy of late modernity'.
Globalisation and the Nation State

Chapter Five is primarily concerned with understanding the ways in which these processes of reflexive modernization, which carry processes of globalisation, are implicated in the (re)structurings of those regulatory practices of contemporary Nation States which position young people as being at-Risk. This chapter will examine ways of understanding the Nation State in a period when transformations in the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Nation State indicate that processes of globalisation may very well serve to render the notion of Nation(al) sovereignty problematic. There is, I will argue, a need to (re)think the State at a time when so much (Party) political discourse, and theoretical commentary on these discourses, is concerned with reconfiguring the ways in which political and theoretical publics view the State, and its rights, roles and responsibilities. These discourses have a tendency to be framed in a manner which foregrounds the relations between the State, Civil Society and The Economy and the rights, roles and responsibilities of these seemingly autonomous, separate spheres. These discourses about the State and its Others, have a focus, in many Anglo (Australasia, North America, the UK) and European contexts, on reconfiguring the nature of State regulation and government of Civil Society and The Economy. These ongoing political and theoretical debates about the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Liberal State, as a Welfare State, have tended to be structured by a language which seeks to capture a sense of the exercise of power in Liberal Democracies through the positing of certain oppositions; 'between state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.174). Not only do these oppositions seek to grasp the nature of the limits of the rightful exercise of power, they also seek to mark out the spaces in which this exercise of power can rightfully occur.

In this Chapter I will argue that these 'principled positions' (Hunter 1994) fail to capture the diversity of interests and the mobilisation of various forms of expertise which characterise attempts to regulate the disintegrative effects of processes of reflexive modernization. Further, these ways of 'thinking the state' (Watts 1993/94) cannot adequately account for the ways in which global 'economies of signs and spaces' are transforming the narratives of Nation(alism), and the attempts to regulate Youth(ful) identities in these emerging spaces. In this context I will argue that Risk, can be understood as both a metanarrative of Uncertainty, and as a technology of (Neo)Liberal governmentality which promises to render operable certain projects of government which take as their object populations of young people. The mobilisation of Risk discourses is, then, an attempt to refine the project of government, an attempt to do
better the art (practice) of government, precisely at the time when the practice of government (by the Nation State) becomes increasingly more difficult.

(Neo)Liberalism and Risk

In Chapter Six my intention is to engage with the notion of governmentality in the more restricted sense of understanding the practices of government of the Nation State. I will argue that this way of mobilising the notion of governmentality enables an examination of contemporary transformations in the practice of government, in ways which problematise the constitutive opposites of much principled Left and Right discourse on the (ideal) relations between the State, Civil Society, and The Economy. This form of problematising practice is enabled by Foucault's (1983) particular way of characterising the 'nature' of governmental power relations and their 'effects'. Further, this intellectual practice understands the problematics of government as being structured by the contingent and historically variable interrelationships between particular 'political rationalities' and certain 'governmental technologies' (Rose and Miller 1992).

This form of analysis is useful for understanding the contemporary conditions of existence of powerful governmental discourses which attempt to regulate youth(ful) populations through the narrative of Risk. A concept such as governmentality is useful in this instance because it points to the practices of government, rather than to a primary identification of the ideological or philosophical underpinnings of (Left or Right) political discourses and their principled articulation of the appropriate relations between the State, Civil Society and The Economy. Further, this understanding of the contingent and historically variable interrelationship between certain rationalities and technologies of government is useful in apprehending the ways in which contemporary practices of government are transformed by the 'deeper currents' (Hinkson 1992 b) of reflexive modernization and globalisation.

Nikolas Rose (1996a) provides a reading of both Liberalism and (Neo)Liberalism which is generative in this particular context. Rose (1996 a) sets himself a number of tasks in examining (Neo)Liberalism as a practice of government. Not least among these is his intent to problematise 'those political logics', of both the Left and the Right, which give the appearance of making it 'easy and self evident to be "for" or "against" the present' (p.61). For Rose, the transformations in the problematics of government, which he identifies as 'advanced liberal', are indeed of a different order than that indicated by the 'neo-liberal political rhetorics' which have dominated political discourse in the Parliamentary Democracies over the past three decades. Here Rose (1996 a) situates transformations in the practice of government (of young people) in the context of "deeper
currents'; currents which are, I will argue, characterised by processes of reflexive modernization.

This last point is an important one. I want to argue that (Neo)Liberalism, understood not as a coherent ideological or political movement, but as a rationality of government has been, more or less, successful in transforming the practices of government in Anglo-American contexts, partly due to its capacity to articulate narratives of 'personal autonomy, enterprise and choice' (Barry et.al. 1996, p.10) to these transformed problematics of government. Moreover, these narratives connect with certain experiences and/or concerns about the social transformations structured by these deeper currents. Here I am thinking of the tendencies within reflexive modernity for the individual to be cast free (set adrift) from more traditional anchoring points in time, space, place and communitarian (class) relationships. Beck (1992) has identified these processes as individualization processes. Giddens (1994b) talks about the reflexive project of the self in post traditional social contexts. This is a project in which individuals are compelled to be free; condemned to choose. Or as Rose (1990), in a different context, has suggested, 'we are obliged to be free' (p.213).

This thesis will argue, then, that theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality permit a focus on those diverse forms of expertise (rationally) producing vast amounts of information and various forms of understanding about the truths of populations of young people at-Risk. Expert knowledge which is produced and reflexively circulates, largely autonomously, structuring and restructuring, with foreseen and unforeseen consequences, the understandings of these diverse populations of young people, and the understandings of young people of their lifeworlds (past, present and future). Moreover, where the conditions of reflexive modernization subject these claims to mastery and certainty (truth) to the principle of radical doubt, they also impel expert systems to further processes of knowledge production. These further processes seek to know better these populations in order to attempt to regulate the largely autonomous processes which continuously threaten to escape the limits of expertise. In these conditions of manufactured uncertainty the mobilisation of rationally grounded Risk discourses in attempts to regulate populations of young people emerge in a paradoxical, and dangerous, quest for certainty.

**Intellectual and Political Practice In an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty**

A point to stress at this stage is that constructions of Risk in relation to populations of young people can be, in Foucault's (1980) formulation of power/knowledge, productive
and enabling. The argument here is that there should be some recognition that these normalising discourses are not inherently bad. Mobilising discourses of risk in the attempted 'making up' of certain types of (young) person can bring into being positive, progressive potentialities. For example, the mobilisation of Risk in safer sex discourses has the potential to bring into being new forms of identity which produce new forms of relationships and understandings of gender and sexuality (Harrison and Dempsey 1997). Some key political and theoretical questions to ask here include: What 'technologies of the self' (Foucault 1988) are being mobilised? What are young people at-Risk of not becoming? What forms of identity are they at-Risk of not performing? What might be the grounds on which concerns with particular forms of identity be constructed? It is, I will argue, a political and theoretical imperative to take seriously Foucault's (1983) admonition: 'My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous then we always have something to do' (pp.231-232, emphasis added).  

Foucault's caution that 'everything is dangerous', and the 'paradox of human knowledge' which is foregrounded in theories of reflexive modernization, render problematic the grounds on which at-Risk discourses are constructed. Indeed, taking seriously these concerns also renders problematic any political or theoretical interrogation of these at-Risk discourses which is grounded in 'principled positions' with regard to Education, Identity, Youth and Government (Hunter 1994). This is a position I will develop in Chapter Two of this thesis; a Chapter which will engage with the representational, political and intellectual problematics generated within and by discourses of postmodernism.

The problematic of Youth at-Risk, and its construction and critique by various experts in diverse centres of expertise, generates, then, a number of tensions for an intellectual and political practice which is concerned with power and its effects in telling the truth of Youth at-Risk. This form of intellectual practice can be constructed, broadly speaking, as Left. Further, it can be situated in that space of 'critical' (Educational) scholarship in Anglo settings which is structured, historically, by the 'European Marxist social philosophy' of the Frankfurt School and Gramscian (British) Cultural Studies, and French and Italian Feminism and Post (Structuralism and Modernism) (Popkewitz and Brennan 1997). The tensions generated within this contested intellectual space can, in a reflexive sense, be generative.

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16Foucault follows this advice with a statement which indicates the politics of his intellectual practice: 'So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper - and pessimistic activism' (p.232).
This thesis is situated institutionally in a Faculty of Education. Education (with a capital E) as an institutional practice - in universities and schools - is fundamentally a rationalist enterprise, even though that enterprise can be understood in terms of multiple rationalities and heterogenous interests. Moreover, Educational processes and practices can be understood as being concerned primarily with the 'making up' of certain types of (young) person. Ian Hunter (1994), for example, has argued that the 'self reflecting moral person' is a comportment which education reformers and critics (conservative, liberal and radical) have consistently mobilised in debates about mass public schooling and the 'ideal formation of the person' during the last one hundred and fifty years. Identity, and the processes and practices and relations necessary for the development of certain preferred, ideal types of identity are, in this conceptualisation, foundational concerns of Education.17

Education, as an expert system, is then, underpinned by a 'transformative logic' (Walkerdine 1997). Diverse forms of Educational practice take as their objects individuals and groups with the intent to transform the behaviours and dispositions of these populations; to (critically) educate them. Positioned in relation to expertly constructed ideals about appropriate or desirable behaviours and dispositions, these populations of young people are constructed, within a transformative logic, in terms of lack or deficit. Education, as manifested in the mass compulsory expert system which has increasingly targeted children and youth during the last century and a half, has been justified and critiqued, at various times, for various purposes, and from various intellectual and theoretical positions (Left and Right), within this logic of transformation. Adult new class (educational) experts, within competing and/or complimentary rationalities, seek to tell the truth about young people (rendered knowable through particular representations of class, gender, ethnicity, and geography); and the forms of Education which might enable the 'making up' of certain (ideal) types of young person. Education is thus transformative and interventionist, and it is so because those who are to be educated are constructed, principally, in terms of deficit.

In this thesis I will argue that the 'popular' and 'promiscuous' construction of youth(ful) populations at-Risk (Fine 1995) is a continuation of this historical process of constructing certain populations of young people in terms of a (cultural) deficit (Swadener 1995). Constructing Youth as being at-Risk provokes the possibility of

17Identity may be a foundational concern of Education, but this concern has, at various times, been signified through a variety of narratives such as 'socialisation', 'cultural deficit', 'class culture', 'gender roles', 'citizenship'. See, for instance, Bartos 1993, Kirk and Spiller 1993, McCallum 1993, Meredyn and Tyler 1993, and Tyler 1993.
diverse forms of intervention in order to transform those behaviours and dispositions which place young people at-Risk. This thesis will work to make problematic the interventionist and transformative logics which underpin this truth of Youth at-Risk. A further aspect of this project will be to problematise both the modes of discursive production which construct this truth and which seek to critique this truth via a further form of truth telling. Thomas Popkewitz and Marie Brennan (1997) call, in this context, for a 'rigorous questioning of the will to truth embodied in educational work and educational research'. In so doing they acknowledge that 'such an invitation may be difficult to accept', especially in an intellectual domain 'centrally concerned with training in truth production' (p.313).

It can be argued, however, that 'critical' intellectual abstraction has no choice but to be open to the uncertain nature of truth telling which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. The tensions generated within these processes are not resolvable. Nor should the 'return of uncertainty' be seen as immobilising in the context of political and intellectual practice. Popkewitz and Brennan (1997) argue that a form of intellectual hubris underpins a concern that a lack of intellectual certainty or prescription undermines the very chance of political action in uncertain times. They argue that: 'People do continue to act; they have no option but to act in their daily lives' (p.313). Further, they suggest that 'we have been living under the specter of certainty since the late seventeenth century', and that 'since certainty has not worked', it may be time to 'give skepticism a try' (p.313).

Zygmunt Bauman (1990 b) argues, in a similar manner, that the 'history of modernity' is a history of attempts to 'exterminate ambivalence: to define precisely - and to suppress or eliminate everything that could or would not be precisely defined' (p.165). The return of uncertainty in the last half of the twentieth century is, thus, a return of the suppressed. This return generates enormous tensions, tensions which are played out in the emergence of a 'secular fundamentalism' (Giddens 1994 a); in the re emergence of religious, ethnic and nationalist conflict; and in a politics of difference structured by narratives of Multiculturalism, Assimilation, the Mainstream and the Margins. The outcomes or consequences of these tensions are, indeed, uncertain. The intellectual and political practice which structures this engagement with the processes of truth production about Youth at-Risk is shaped within these tensions, and takes some guidance from Bauman's (1990 b) hopes for what might emerge out of modernity's 'anti-ambivalence war of assimilation':

It would be futile to decide whether modern culture undermines or serves modern existence. It does both things. It can do each one only
together with the other. Opposition is its positivity. Dysfunctionality of modern culture is its functionality. The modern powers' struggle for artificial order needs culture that explores the limits and the limitations of the power of artifice. The struggle for order informs that exploration and is in turn informed by its findings. In the process, the struggle sheds its initial hubris: the pugnacity born of naivety and ignorance. It learns, instead, to live with its own permanence, inconclusiveness - and prospectlessness. Hopefully, it'll learn in the end the difficult skills of modesty and tolerance. (p.166)
PART ONE

EXPERTISE

AND THE

QUESTION OF YOUTH (AT-RISK).
CHAPTER ONE:
THE CRISIS OF YOUTH (AT-RISK)

Introduction

This Chapter will present an initial engagement with certain material and discursive relations and practices which mark the late 20th century as a (global) series of settings of Uncertainty and Crisis; and which work to construct the powerful truth that there exists a Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) in these settings. Narratives of Uncertainty and Risk are powerful elements in diverse intellectual, political and popular discourses about the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk). An important aspect of this thesis will be to demonstrate that these discourses are interconnected in various ways. There is, as Giddens (1984, 1990) would argue, a process of reflexive generation and (re)appropriation of knowledge about the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) across and within diverse material and discursive spaces.

The first half of this Chapter sets out to examine the features which mark this Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) in a number of expert discourses. These discourses, about the behaviours, dispositions and lifestyles which position young people at-Risk, are structured by a certain quest for (intellectual) certainty about the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) under conditions where the 'return of uncertainty' (Beck 1994 b) makes such a quest problematic. Further, these discourses of Youth at-Risk are framed by truths which construct Youth at-Risk in terms of lack and deficit. Such truths serve to (re)produce the phenomenon of a 'moral panic' around Youth as Delinquent, Deviant, and Disadvantaged. Youth at-Risk discourses, which construct Youth in terms of transition from (stable) Childhood to (stable) Adulthood, are also structured by the truth that Youth, itself, is characterised by Uncertainty and Crisis. In this sense all Youth at some time can be constructed as at-Risk. However, I will argue that processes of 'reflexive modernization' (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994) unsettle the apparent stability of (dependent) Childhood and (independent) Adulthood. The first part of this Chapter, then, represents the first stage in the process of rendering the truth of Youth at-Risk problematic.

The second part of this Chapter initiates an engagement with discourses of the postmodern. This engagement is structured by the significance which these discourses assume in contemporary Cultural Studies Of Youth. Here there will be a move to interrogate postmodern representations of contemporary material and discursive
realities; representations which foreground the impact of 'techno-culture' (Green and Bigum 1993) on transforming these realities and the processes of youth(ful) identity formation which emerge in these transformed settings. Postmodern Cultural Studies of Youth are useful in that they focus on many of the conditions, rationalities and sensibilities which provoke the construction of the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk). I will argue, however, that these discourses are limited in so far as they push into the background continuing concerns about the institutionally structured regulation of youth(ful) identities.

*Constructing the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk)*

**Youth as Society's Miner's Canaries**

Richard Eckersley's *Casualties of Change* (1988), *Youth and the Challenge to Change* (1992), and *Values and Visions* (1995) represent a consistent, prolonged attempt by one commentator to construct a view of Youth in Crisis.1 In order to construct this view Eckersley (1992) outlines a context which, he argues, indicates that 'grave social and cultural problems confront Australia and other technologically advanced industrial societies' (p.v). More specifically;

the pressures Australia faces are common to the whole of the modern world - pressures of increasing urbanisation, industrialisation, centralisation, mechanisation, individualisation; of growing populations, increasing global economic competition and accelerating change; of a strengthening material and economic domination of our lives and a weakening spiritual and moral influence; of the development and employment of ever more powerful and complex technologies that diminish the individual's place in society and sense of control over his or her destiny. (p.18)

Such a litany is reminiscent of Giddens' (1990) 'risk profile of modernity'. In many ways it is also a 'profile' to be found in many popular (mass), party political (through the spectrum from Right to Left), Green, and religious discourses. There is much in this list that should cause concern. What is missing, however, is a sense that there can be productive, beneficial, enabling, or empowering possibilities in these tendencies or 'pressures'. This sort of litany serves, as Eckersley's final claim demonstrates, to close off the possibility of human agency in these various processes. Humans are reduced to beings who are acted upon, who react to processes, rather than beings who, in various contexts, initiate or contest such processes. Eckersley (1988) underscores this argument

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1 Eckersley is a Senior specialist, Strategic analysis, Resource Futures Program, CSIRO Division of Wildlife and Ecology.
when he cites, in an introductory quote to *Casualties of Change*, Stephen Boyden's view of human agency:²

If a frog is placed in hot water it will make frantic efforts to escape; it is said, however, that if the animal is put into cold water, which is then slowly heated it may...be boiled to death without so much as a struggle.

Does this boiling frog principle apply to the human species in civilization? The evidence shows it does, on the level both of the individual and of society. (p.ii)

In supporting this construction of the species Eckersley (1992) suggests that, in a 'society that has become increasingly hostile to our well being' (p.4), we are able to see 'the worsening plight of young people, expressed in rising suicide rates, drug abuse and crime, and also more widely in their social conservatism, political apathy and materialism' (p.3).³ Moreover, in the 'cultural and social turmoil' which characterises 'Western civilisation in the 1990's', 'the young suffer most' as they 'face the difficult metamorphosis from child into adult, deciding who they are and what they believe, and accepting responsibility for their own lives. It is a transition best made in an environment that offers stability, security and some measure of certainty '(p.5).

Eckersley (1992) argues that this suffering is evidenced by: increased youth suicide rates, most pronounced in males between 15 and 24 years old (pp.5-6); drug (ab)use - with concern expressed about 'binge drinking' (as illicit drug use apparently declines) among young people (p.6); and 'increases' in violent crime (pp.6-7). For Eckersley these trends are well illustrated ('vividly described') by Graham Goodman in *The Bulletin*, and his account of a late night stroll through inner Sydney in the early 1990s:

It was as if William Hogarth's *Gin Lane* stretched for blocks. The streets were littered with drunks, some vomiting where they stood. The footpaths outside the hotels were strewn with broken glass. People argued with and hurled abuse at one another. Others with vacant eyes stood mumbling soundlessly to themselves, arms whirling like aimless windmills. Through the streets surged packs of feral teenagers with brutish faces and foul, mindless mouths (p.7).

³ In an acknowledgment of the level of generalisation which characterises both his (cited) texts, Eckersley (1992) argues that, 'in relation to the culture of modern youth, I want to emphasise that I am describing the characteristics and qualities of a generation, not every individual member of it; nor in criticising some of those features am I levelling blame. Rather I see youth as the miners canaries of our society, acutely vulnerable to the peculiar hazards of our times' (p.5).
I am not familiar with Hogarth's *Gin Lane* ⁴, but my sense is that such a scenario, while not *pleasant or nice*, could be characterised (in the service of various interests) as Dickensian (a century later), or as indicative of street life for the Larrikins in late 19th, early 20th century Sydney or Melbourne, or the 'Bodgies' of the 1950s, or the Punks of the 1970s, or many other groups and individuals in different time and space locales.⁵ *Street life* has historically offended the sensibilities of would be guardians of *morality* and *good order*, and provoked diverse attempts to intervene into, and regulate the behaviours and dispositions of young people on the street.⁶ This emphasis on good order often leads commentators, such as Eckersley (1992), to focus on 'delinquency' as being a defining 'characteristic and quality of a generation' (p.5).

In a move to further define the generational characteristics of contemporary populations of young Australians Eckersley (1992) cites various surveys conducted by Australia's Commission for the Future, advertising agencies and market researchers which claim that Australians in general are 'pessimistic, bewildered, cynical and insecure'. Moreover, this 'malaise', seen as a consequence of people feeling 'destabilised and powerless in the face of accelerating cultural, economic and technological change', has resulted in a 'people who are deeply alienated from the country's major institutions, especially government' (p.10). These concerns of the 'silent majority' are mirrored in similar surveys which identify young people as their demographic (p.10). A view which leads Eckersley (1992) to argue that: 'Behind the problems of youth suicide, alcohol and drug abuse and delinquency exists a constellation of psychological traits: alienation, anomie, frustration, confusion, hopelessness, impotence, loneliness. At the end of it all is a crippling lack of self esteem' (p.7).

These psychological traits are seen to manifest themselves not only in youth suicide, drug (ab)use and delinquency, but also in youth cultural production. Eckersley (1992) cites a review (again it comes from *The Bulletin*) of the Next Wave Festival, Melbourne's biennial youth arts festival, which seeks to argue that 'youth theatre, being responsive and immediate, acts as a societal alarum' (pp 11-12). The reviewer, using

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⁴ Hogarth (1697-1764) was an English engraver and painter. He is noted for his series of engravings 'satirizing the vices and affectations of his age' (*Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition, 1986, p.729).

⁵ See, for instance, Howe 1978.

this 'crisis warning' as a context, suggests that the 'outlook for our society is pretty damn bleak', for;

whether the authors have chosen to explore the past, present, or future, the message is the same - deprivation, violence, depression. Some hope and humour go into each Next Wave production but even the most positive of messages is intercut with fatalism. We get no sense of youth celebration, only a grim determination to survive. (p.12)

In a preamble to discussing the findings of the market research report, Young Australians (Mackay 1989), Eckersley (1992) suggests that modern industrial societies have failed to 'imbue people's lives with a sense of worth and meaning'. As a consequence, 'we appear to have entered an era of mass obsession, usually with ourselves: our appearance, our health and fitness, our work, our sex lives, our children's performance, our personal development (p.14). In this environment, characterised by an 'absence of belief in much beyond ourselves', Eckersley (1992) seeks to identify 'young peoples cultural response to the ephemerality of today's world' (p.14). These responses are documented, argues Eckersley, in Mackay's report which found that; young Australians are 'fast trackers, accustomed to rapid change'; young people have a 'strong need to have fun', 'fun is the ultimate antidote to pessimism, anxiety, pressure and boredom'; young people are 'insatiable' in their quest for the 'latest, newest, fashion', yet their 'span of commitment is short and they have few enduring heroes, fashion or favourites'; young people are 'materialistic and indulged', the 'right brand names symbolise security and being loved'; young people have a strong need for 'security and belonging', a need often filled by 'peer groups' (pp 14-15). Summarising his reading of the Mackay report Eckersley (1992) constructs a view of Youth in Crisis, a view of a youth culture;

that may be meeting the needs of its members in terms of providing them with meaning and identity, but only just. It is...a culture that is barely holding together, certainly not enduring - a mass media culture marked by frenetic fashions and polarisation between self destructive recklessness and abandon, and a more insidiously debilitating cautiousness, social withdrawal and self-centredness. (p.15)

This understanding of Youth, and the sense of crisis which characterises this particular view, leads Eckersley to question whether;

the greatest wrong we are doing to our children is not the broken families or the scarcity of jobs (damaging though these are), but the creation of a culture that gives them nothing greater than themselves to believe in - no god, no king, no country - and no cause for hope or optimism. It is a culture whose main effect appears to be
demoralisation. Of course, for those young people without loving families and jobs, this demoralisation is all the greater, not least because of the importance of both to the process of cultural induction. (p.15)

'God, king and country' can be read as a literal, nostalgic hankering for some golden past, where religion, the crown, and nationalism purportedly provided a framework for individual and collective (national) identity. Or it could be read metaphorically as a desire for a centredness and locatedness in some common, agreed value system. Whichever reading is made this construction does, indeed, touch on certain theoretical, political and popular concerns about contemporary settings ('new times', Hall and Jacques 1990), and the Questions of Youth which emerge in these settings. These concerns structure various theoretical debates about the nature of modernity/postmodernity; the very idea (nature) of Self (Identity) in these settings; and the forms of theoretical and political practice which are possible in these times. A fundamental concern in this present discussion is the manner in which the discourse of Youth at-Risk comes to mean so powerfully, and how this metanarrative can be understood as representing a quest for certainty in the context of the return of uncertainty. Many of these issues, and the possibilities for engaging these concerns, both theoretically and politically, are central to the task of understanding the ways in which discourses of Risk are mobilised in diverse attempts to regulate certain populations of young people.

Constructing Youth at-Risk

The Youth at-Risk literature is extensive.7 Swadener and Lubeck (1995), for instance, claim that in the US since 1989 over 2500 articles and conference papers have focussed on the issue of children, families and youth at-Risk. They further claim that the narrative of at-Risk structures 'countless' school district, State and Federal task forces which address the 'crisis' of America's Youth. As a construction of diverse forms of expert knowledge the narrative of Youth at-Risk is, potentially, encompassing of all Youth(ful) behaviours and dispositions. Indeed, the expert literature is unskeptically explicit on this very point. Ogden and Germinario (1988), for instance, in their attempt to identify 'high risk' student populations argue that: 'All

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children are at times students-at-risk' (p.xvii). Withers and Batten (1995) and Batten and Russell (1995), in extensive reviews of this literature, also point to this 'central' theme in at-Risk discourses. Mobilising a developmental psychology understanding of adolescence Withers and Batten (1995) argue that the psychological, physiological and 'social stresses and tensions' experienced during adolescence mean that 'all youths are in some sense at risk' (p.1).

This view that all young people are potentially at-Risk signals a historically novel development in attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities. At-Risk discourses constitute, in part, a historical continuity in the construction of certain youth(ful) populations in terms of deviacy, delinquency, and deficit. At-Risk discourses, however, provide a technique, and a narrative, for attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of young people which is potentially 'endless' (Tait 1995, p.128). In Chapters Four and Six of this thesis I will examine Risk at the level of a metanarrative of a more fully 'reflexive modernity' (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994); and as a technique of government which promises the possibility of regulating youth(ful) identities under these conditions. Understood in this manner the historically novel character of at-Risk discourses becomes evident in that no youth(ful) relations, practices, behaviours and/or dispositions remain outside of the domain of these discourses. As Tait (1995) argues, 'nothing', in at-Risk discourses, 'remains beyond governmental intervention. Since "risk" can be legitimately found anywhere, there is therefore no one who is not at risk of something' (p.128, original emphasis).

It is important here to avoid any sense of total government by an all powerful State; a State which through its activities represses the possibility of full human potential in the name of social control. Rather, theories of government, as the 'conduct of conduct' (Foucault 1991), construct government and regulation in terms of historically contingent attempts to 'make up' particular (ideal) types of youth(ful) identity (Rose and Miller 1992). Moreover, these attempts at regulation are not the sole province of a monologic State. Rather, government is structured by the diverse attempts of various experts and centres of expertise ('psy' scientists, teachers, (post) critical theorists and administrators, in courts, schools, universities and medical centres) to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of young people (Rose 1996a).

Risk: Costs and Benefits
Withers and Batten (1995) provide one avenue for entering the vast discursive terrain of Youth at-Risk. Their review of the at-Risk literature identifies two central and often

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8 See Hunter's (1993) critique of Donald (1992) on these grounds.
'competing' concerns within at-Risk discourses. They identify, in the first instance, a 'humanistic intention' which structures the identification and intervention processes enabled by constructing Youth at-Risk. This intention is grounded in concerns about harm, danger, care, and support, for those young people who might be at-Risk. In the second instance an 'economic intention' legitimates these attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities. This intentionforegrounds the costs and the benefits - to young people and families, but primarily to communities and the Nation - of identifying Risk factors and populations at-Risk, and of mobilising certain interventions on the basis of these identifications (pp.5-6). Withers and Batten (1995) suggest that these two intentions are not necessarily 'conflicting or contra-distinctive'. Rather, their review of the at-Risk literature suggests a 'competition for primacy' between these humanistic and economic concerns; a competition which can be identified in any number of interventionist programs which take as their object Youth-at-Risk.

One example of where these concerns appear to co-exist and compete in at-Risk discourses can be found in Fenwick English's (1988) foreword to Ogden and Germinario's (1988) The at-risk student. Here English suggests that occasionally it is necessary to 'explain why a book has been written. This one requires no such justification' (p.xiii, original emphasis). The problems that at-Risk students present for 'parents, teachers and school administrators' are self evident in statistics which English cites 'from news articles and editorials in the nation's press'. These US statistics suggest that: 'Student suicide has increased 140 percent; Teenage homicide increased 232 percent; Juvenile delinquency rates rose by 131 percent; The illegitimate birth rate increased by 141 percent' (p.xiii). Against this backdrop of Youth in Crisis, English highlights Nationwide calls 'for dealing with at-risk students', as a matter of urgency lest this 'most compelling agenda' threatens 'America's position as a world economic power' (p.xiii, original emphasis).

The competing claims between a humanitarian concern for the treatment of disadvantaged or delinquent Youth, and the economic costs associated with the social problems which Youth at-Risk represent, also emerges in Ogden and Germinario's (1988) program for school based responses to the Crises of Students at-Risk. Ogden and Germinario (1988) identify Students at-Risk as those sections of the school population

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9 English does not reference the sources of these statistics, or indicate the time frame in which these increases occurred, or provide definitions of concepts such as 'delinquency'. Further, there is no reference, in an academic text, to the possibilities of media sensationalism or manipulation in the reporting of these issues. They are self-evident. English is the chair of the Department of Educational Administration, College of Education, University of Cincinnati.
who demonstrate 'a lack of the necessary intellectual, emotional and/or social skills to take full advantage of the educational opportunities available to them' (p.xvii). Ogden and Germinario suggest that all children, at different times, could be conceived, in this sense, as being at-Risk. However it is those children who consistently display these lacks who constitute the 'high risk' school populations; the populations who 'become disenchanted, and ultimately openly or passively reject school' (p.xvii).

In order to maximise the schooling opportunities and outcomes for all students Ogden and Germinario (1988) argue that school administrators and educational experts need to identify, then 'control' and 'eliminate' the 'effects of those factors which limit the learning and potential of children' (p.xvii). This process of identification and intervention is justified on a number of grounds. Ogden and Germinario (1988) argue that the identification of the factors which place students at-Risk is an equity issue. 'Disaffected students', can, in this sense, be positioned in much the same way as the 'disabled child, the bilingual child, the gifted child'. That is, 'disaffected students' constitute an identifiable population, marked in this instance by deficit, which requires 'specialized programs to truly benefit from their educational experience' (p.xvii).

The second ground for mobilising processes for identifying at-Risk students concerns the sorts of (causal) relationships which can be constructed between a 'variety of social problems' and an 'inadequate education'. Here, Ogden and Germinario (1988) argue for a form of cost-benefit analysis which indicates that in the long term the 'cost of poor schooling may be significantly higher than the costs associated with good schooling'. For Ogden and Germinario, the truth of the matter is that a 'poorly educated person is more likely to require social welfare and institutional services and is increasingly more likely to be involved in the legal system as a result of criminal activities' (p.xvii).

In the third instance, Ogden and Germinario (1988) argue that schools are increasingly positioned, within various official and popular discourses, as being responsible for the 'teaching of essential life skills that were traditionally within the domain of family and church' (p.xviii). The need to identify those factors which place student involvement at-Risk is, in this context, set against a backdrop of changes in family structures wherein; 'parents of at least 40 percent of the children born this year will divorce. One in four girls will become pregnant at least once during her high school years. Only one in one thousand college freshmen [sic] women plans a career as a homemaker' (p.xviii). Finally, argue Ogden and Germinario (1988), this process of identification and intervention is justified by the fact that 'disaffected or at-risk students have potentially negative effects on the attitude, behaviour and achievement of other students' (p.xviii).
Risk Factors: Behaviours, Dispositions and Lifestyles

A report from the Panel on High-Risk Youth for the US Commission on Behavioural and Social Sciences and Education (National Research Council) (1993) also argues that Americans are 'alarmed' by the increases in the 'numbers of adolescents who engage in high risk behaviours', and/or who 'adopt "risky life-styles", lifestyles characterized by drug use, unprotected sexual behaviour, dropping out of school, delinquency and violence' (p.1). The Commission argues that these behaviours, of a population (adolescents) who 'naturally' experiment and 'take risks', 'compromise their health, endanger their lives, and limit their chances to achieve successful adult lives' (p.1). Colthart (1996) canvasses similar themes when he cites a Western Australian Government report on Youth Affairs which positions Youth as being at-Risk 'if their life circumstances threaten physical, psychological or emotional well-being and preclude or limit the normative developmental experiences necessary to achieve healthy adult functioning' (p.31). The 'major categories of risk factors' which jeopardise the achievement of, or transition to, 'healthy adult functioning' include:

- failure to complete Year 10: unemployment or being in marginal or insecure employment: engagement in behaviour likely to bring one into the criminal justice system: engagement in unsafe health practices: and being subject to a family environment which fails to provide adequate safety and/or fails to convey a sense of self-worth. (pp.31-32)

A major concern for the legislators who authored this Government report is that population of young people 'who have multiple risk factors'. These at-Risk young people are often 'seriously troubled' and alienated from mainstream society' (p.32). The language of pathology, of being the victim of a disease, of having 'multiple risk factors' is very evident in this context. As Swadener (1995) argues, this discourse of Risk emerges in part, from 'epidemiological and public health' discourses. As a consequence metaphors such as 'immunization', 'innoculation', 'identification' 'intervention' and 'treatment' are prominent in the discursive field of Youth at-Risk. Colthart (1996), for instance, reports on a number of expert studies which argue that, interventions into the lives of at-Risk Youth which are structured by promoting participation in sport and recreation activities, display positive outcomes in terms of reducing 'delinquency', 'alienation', 'boredom', 'anti-social behaviour', and a 'sense of hopelessness'. At the same time these sorts of interventions, it is argued, lead to increases in 'self esteem', 'self

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10 This is a theme which I will return to in some detail in Chapter Six.
concept', 'social and interactional skills', and to the 'promotion of mental health and social adjustment' (p.32).\textsuperscript{11}

Aldis Putnins (1997) also rehearses an epidemiological discourse in his argument that tattoos are mark(ers) of Risk; one highly visible factor identifying populations of Youth at-Risk. Putnins (1997) argues that a number of studies have established a statistically valid (causal) relationship between 'having tattoos, increased risk-taking and anti social behaviours' (p.13).\textsuperscript{12} A study of motorcycle fatalities in South Australia during 1984-85, for instance, found that 'all subjects investigated at autopsy' had tattoos (p.13). Research from the UK claimed a 'positive and statistically significant relationship between having tattoos and offending risk among adolescent and adult males' (p.13). Finally, a Victorian study of intravenous drug users in one prison setting found that; 97% of subjects had tattoos; 73% of these adult prisoners had been in Juvenile Justice Centres; and the average age at which these subjects got their first tattoo was 15.2 years (p.14).

Putnins (1997) argues that these sorts of statistics 'clearly' establish a number of truths about tattoos and at-Risk Youth. These include; the link between 'tattoos and offending is already evident in adolescence'; tattoos are 'often associated with group membership', where risk taking characteristics such as 'fierceness, brazeness and daring' are commonplace; tattoos are a 'marker for increased risk' in the sense that they project an image of delinquency which can lead to 'difficulty getting a job' thus 'restricting access to a constructive non-delinquent activity' (pp 13-15). Putnins acknowledges that while tattoos are 'associated with increased offending risk' they are not 'the major cause of juvenile delinquency'. His proposal to publicly fund tattoo removal for young people referred by agencies which 'deal with young offenders and other "at risk" youth' is identified as one of many possible interventions which should be available for 'treating' at-Risk Youth (p.15).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} These claims appear frequently in that literature on at-Risk Youth which takes as its focus the structured participation in physical activities by populations of young people. See, for instance, Cheffers (1997), Collingwood (1997), Danish and Nellen (1997), Miller et al (1997), Pitter and Andrews (1997).

\textsuperscript{12} Putnins is the Chief Clinical Psychologist for the Residential and Youth Services Division of the South Australian Department for Family and Community Services. His field of expertise is ethnopsychology and delinquency.

\textsuperscript{13} For a reply to Putnins (1997) see Peterson (1997) who argues against constructing Youth as a 'threat' in times of economic and social crisis. Particularly when the 'threat' is grounded in concerns about tattoos as markers of risk and delinquency.
Youth suicide is another (troubling) social phenomenon which can be conceived of as a public health issue. Constructed thus, youth suicide can be understood within a concern with the population of (potential) youth suicides, and the factors which might place members of this youth(ful) population at-Risk of suicide. Davidson and Linnoila (1991), for instance, outline the findings of an expert Working Party attached to the US Department of Health and Human Services, Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide, which was charged with clarifying 'the environmental, behavioural, socio-cultural, biological, and psychological factors which have been associated with an increased likelihood of suicide among young people' (p.xi). While Davidson and Linnoila (1991), acknowledge that available research made quantifiable estimates of relative risk a goal as yet unmet (p.xii), they, nevertheless, argue that there is a range of factors which are 'clearly linked to youth suicide' (p.xi). These include; substance abuse; psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, and borderline personality and affective disorders; 'parental loss and family disruption'; family 'traits', including 'genetic traits such as predisposition to affective illness'; 'low concentrations of the serotonin metabolite, 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), and the dopamine metabolite, homovanillic acid (HVA) in the cerebrospinal fluid'; homosexuality; having a relation with a suicide victim; impulsive and aggressive behaviour; previous attempts at suicide; 'rapid socio-cultural change'; media reports on suicides; and 'access to lethal methods, such as guns' (pp.xi-xii).

This summary of the Risk factors for Youth suicide draws on a variety of expert reports prepared for the Working Party which mobilised diverse forms of expertise in seeking to tell the truth of Youth at-Risk of suicide. The 'diversity of risk factors' which these reports identify suggest to Davidson and Linnoila (1991), that intervention and prevention strategies need to be 'targeted' better, via improvements in research design and 'surveillance systems', and changes in the flow of expertly produced knowledge about Youth suicide Risk factors to those who deal with Youth in various settings (pp.xii-xiii). This particular example also highlights how the mobilisation of Risk discourses provokes a process of expert identification of Risk factors; a process which promises a more sophisticated, scientific, scholarly, identification of those behaviours and (genetic pre)dispositions which place Youth at-Risk. This 'risk factor information' also serves an economic concern within governmental programs which target Youth at-Risk. As Davidson and Linnoila (1991) argue, this 'risk factor information' can be mobilised to 'better target interventions and prevention services': 'Limits on the distribution of resources for suicide prevention compel us to direct our efforts to those persons in greatest need and those most likely to benefit. Risk factor information fosters prudent allocation of resources among those programs intended to prevent youth suicide' (p.xiii).
This initial engagement with the Youth at-Risk literature not only foregrounds certain humanistic and economic concerns running through this discursive terrain. What also emerges is the dominance of a particular form of intellectually produced knowledge, and an associated view of the usefulness of this form of intellectual abstraction for apprehending the complexity of human being-in-the-world. It is an epistemology which foregrounds narratives of scholarship, science, and of progress towards certainty with regard to the truth of Youth at-Risk. There is a sense here that processes of intellectual abstraction about the factors which place Youth at-Risk are marked by processes of 'reflexivity' (Giddens 1990, 1991) which aim to better tell the truth of Youth in settings characterised by Crisis and Uncertainty. Running alongside this quest for certainty is a view of Youth itself as being marked by Uncertainty, Crisis and Transition. Youth here is about becoming (adult) rather than simply being (non adult).

**Youth as Transition, as Becoming (Adult).**

The discourse of Youth at-Risk mobilises a form of probabilistic thinking, about certain preferred, or ideal Adult futures and the present behaviours and dispositions of Youth. This sort of probabilistic thinking attempts to construct statistically valid, causal relationships between these different configurations of time and space; between these different constructions of Adolescent and Adult. Constructions of Youth at-Risk, and of the behaviours and dispositions (Risk factors) which place young people at-Risk, are, in this sense, constructions of 'intellectually trained' (Sharp 1985), new class Adults within various expert systems. These expert systems generate discourses which seek to tell the truth of Youth at-Risk. These truths concern the manner in which present behaviours and dispositions place desirable future outcomes at-Risk. The truth of Youth at-Risk is thus grounded in a narrative of Youth as becoming; as being a space of transition from Childhood to Adulthood.

Such a view of Youth is to be found, for instance, in John Freeland's (1991, 1992, 1996) identification of those factors which place this transitional process at-Risk for certain populations of young people.\(^{14}\) Citing Coleman and Husen (1985), Freeland (1996)

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\(^{14}\) Freeland's (1991) commissioned report for the Finn Review (1991) of Young People's Participation in Post Compulsory Education and Training, underpins much of the discussion in Chapter 7 of the Review; 'Participation in Education and Training by the Disadvantaged'. In that Chapter there is a special focus on the factors affecting the 'educational participation' of a 'sub-group of the 'at risk' population; a group who are 'classified as deeply disadvantaged'. Here, Aboriginal youth, young people from Non English Speaking Background (NESB), 'some' young women, homeless youth, long term unemployed young
constructs Youth as a 'stage of life between childhood and adulthood'. Childhood is identified with 'physiological immaturity, emotional and economic dependence and primary ties with parents and siblings'. Adulthood, in this view, is framed in terms of 'physiological maturity, emotional and economic autonomy, and by primary ties with the adult partner and children'. Youth, as a transitional process, involves attempts to resolve 'a range of questions relating to personal morality, sexuality, politics and economics, all of which contribute to one's personal identity' (p.7). Youth is thus a 'process of simultaneously "un-becoming" a child and becoming an adult'.

This particular construction of at-Risk and 'vulnerable' populations of young people rests on identifying and quantifying a range of factors which place at-Risk those 'teenagers' unable to 'effect' a 'secure transition to adulthood'. Freeland (1996) argues that Youth emerges as a transitional 'stage of life' in the context of post Second World War changes in the 'patterns of teenage participation in education and the labour market. For the 'vast majority' of young people who were becoming adult in the 1950s and 1960s, the 'transition to adult independence occurred after the completion of ten years of schooling and with a trouble free entry to the labour market' (p.7). The 'long term structural collapse of the teenage full-time labour market' since the 1960s has, argues Freeland (1996), 'severely dislocated' the process and experience of transition for all young people. This dislocation is, however, not 'uniform', and is marked by a complex of 'interrelated social divisions based on class, gender, race, ethnicity and region'. This 'combination of factors', Freeland (1996) suggests, places a 'significant proportion of teenagers at risk of not effecting a secure transition to adulthood' (p.7).

Freeland (1996) determines the 'proportion' of Youth at-Risk via an analysis of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Labour Force statistics. Using these official figures Freeland identifies three categories which 'constitute those who can be classified as being at risk in the transition to adult autonomy';

- those who are not in full-time education and who are unemployed;
- those who are not in full-time education and who are not in the labour force; and
- those who are not in full-time education and who are employed part-time (p.8).

For Freeland (1996) the populations of young people in the first two categories constitute Youth who are 'at grave risk in the transition to adulthood'. Young people in the third category are 'at some risk'. In August 1994 the population of 'at grave risk' young people 'numbered 128,700 (60,800 males and 67,900 females) or 10 percent of

people, young people in 'isolated communities', young offenders and disabled young people, are constructed as identifiable, distinct populations of Youth at-Risk (p.134).
the 15 to 19 year old population'. These figures are further broken down by Freeland to show that, '2.5 percent of 15 year olds, 7 percent of 16 year olds, 10 percent of 17 year old, 15 percent of 18 year olds and 16 percent of 19 year olds fell into this at grave risk category' (p.8). However Freeland (1996) argues that these figures tend to underestimate the size of the gravely at-Risk population insofar as the numbers for the 15 to 17 year old group tend to ignore 'the reality that a significant proportion of this age group are students 'who are not succeeding at school'. These Students at-Risk are, in this view, 'merely postponing their eventual transition to that at grave risk category' (p.8).

From a position on the Left (broadly defined) Freeland (1996) stresses the importance of seeing the problem of at-Risk Youth in 'structural' terms. That is, in terms of structural changes in labour markets, curriculum restructuring around notions of 'quality and relevance', structured training and entry level employment opportunities for Youth, and in terms of institutionally patterned relations of (dis)advantage in which class, gender, ethnicity, geography, and disability structure life options and choices (pp.9-11). Yet Freeland's (1996) construction of at-Risk Youth is an instance of Left theoretical practice which unproblematically rehearses the historical construction of disadvantaged (at-Risk) Youth in terms of lack and deficit. Disadvantaged, at grave Risk Youth, Freeland argues, 'have access to fewer cultural resources and life cycle opportunities' which they might mobilise in their 'search for solutions to the problems of identity and transition' (p.11). In this view the 'richer the socio-economic and socio-cultural resources the broader the array of phenomena included in the analysis and understanding, the wider the range of possible courses of action available to the individual and the cultural group' (p.11).

Constructing Youth at-Risk in terms of deficit provokes an interventionist, regulatory regime which takes as its object the transformation of the cultural resources of the Disadvantaged. My concerns with this unproblematised 'logic of transformation' (Walkerdine 1997) will be developed in the following Chapter. A further concern is the manner in which Youth is constructed as a process of transition, of unbecoming and becoming. Thinking youth(ful) identifies in this manner foregrounds the relational and institutional characteristics of Youth. There is an emphasis here on the 'relationship between specific groups of young people and institutions', and between Childhood, Youth and Adulthood (Wyn and White, 1997, p.147, original emphasis) However the 'return of uncertainty' under the conditions of reflexive modernization (Beck 1992) 'challenges' the narrative of 'adulthood as a point of arrival' (Wyn and White, 1997, p.148). Uncertainties with regard to (un)employment, gender relations and relationships generally, class relations and the nature of Identity, 'undermine the taken-for-granted
meaning of adulthood' (p.148). If Adulthood is rendered problematic by these uncertainties so too is the notion of Youth as transition, and the discourse of Youth at-Risk of not 'effecting a secure transition to adulthood' (Freeland 1996). Further, the primary markers of this process of transition, the construction of notions of dependence and independence, fail to account for the inter dependent nature of human interactions. Indeed, narratives of Childhood as dependence, Adulthood as independence, 'embody', argue Wyn and White (1997), 'particular moral and political values which in the context of youth studies, tend to reinforce individualism and self interest' (p.150). Moreover, such constructions are gendered, with (hegemonic) Masculinity marked by independence and (emphasised) Femininity marked by dependence (Connell 1995).

In the last part of this Chapter I will move away from a direct engagement with discourses of Youth at-Risk. My intention is to examine the social, cultural and intellectual conditions which structure contemporary constructions of the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) from the standpoint of postmodern Cultural Studies of Youth. In the discursive domain of critical Education Theory the processes of telling the truth of Youth have, during the last two decades, been heavily influenced by British Cultural Studies, and more recently by an articulation of postmodernism with Cultural Studies.\footnote{The intellectual legacy of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) is a dominant influence in critical theories of Education.} Within this articulation concerns with telling the truth of Youth are structured, largely, around questions of the Self and the processes by which youth(ful) identities are formed and regulated. Moreover, within these discourses there are concerns with understanding contemporary settings as postmodern; as settings which, in a material and discursive (representational) sense, are situated in relation to an earlier or different phase (understanding) of modernity. Postmodern Cultural Studies of Youth argue that these changed material and discursive realities need to be understood in particular ways in order to understand processes of identity formation for contemporary populations of young people.

\textbf{Youth as Postmodern Subjects Par Excellence}

The case is very different for those who live postmodernism. For them, the denaturing of time means that they have no history. To live postmodernism is to live as schizophrenics are said to do, in a world of disconnected present moments that jostle one another but never form a continuous (much less logical) progression. The prior experiences of older people act as anchors that keep them from fully entering the postmodern stream of spliced contexts and discontinuous time. Young people, lacking these anchors and immersed in TV, are in a better position to know from direct experience what it is to have no sense of
history, to live in a world of simulacra, to see the human form as provisional. The case could be made that the people in this country who know most about how postmodernism feels (as distinct from how to envision or analyze it) are all under the age of sixteen (Hayles 1990, p.282 original emphasis)

**Alien(s) in the Classroom**

Bill Green and Chris Bigum's (1993) *Aliens in the Classroom* is a useful text for engaging with the sorts of issues (truths) which are produced when Postmodern Cultural Studies take Youth as their object. *Aliens* is an explicitly and avowedly 'provocative' piece of 'educational fiction', or 'thought experiment' (p.120). It aims to unsettle, or transform educational debates about what types of students are populating contemporary school settings. Green and Bigum express disappointment and dissatisfaction with much of what passes as debate about youth and schooling and education in various arenas in Australia at the present time. Because it is so explicitly provocative it opens up this debate to include issues and perceptions which are often excluded or marginalised in much of the *mainstream* discussions about retention rates, curriculum and schooling’s connections to, and situation within, wider material and discursive relations and processes. Key organising concerns for Green and Bigum (1993), in this context, include:

> Are schools now dealing with a student who is quite different to students of previous eras? A subordinate question is: Have schools and educational authorities developed curriculum rationales on what are essentially inadequate and obsolete assumptions about the nature of students. (p.119)\(^{16}\)

In attempting to address these concerns Green and Bigum (1993) situate their 'educational fiction' within current debates about 'youth, media culture and postmodernism' (p.120). Within the space where these various discourses converge Green and Bigum engage with a variety of issues related to 'moral panics'; about 'youth-in-crisis'; about globalising processes within popular culture; about the emergence and proliferation of new information and communication technologies; and about the ways in which these 'technologically mediated' processes, practices and relations are 'implicated in the (re)generation of student identities and cultural forms' (p.120). In this space Green and Bigum argue that Youth should be seen as the 'subject *par excellence*

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\(^{16}\) See also, Green 1993, Green, Fitzclarence and Bigum 1994, Bigum, Fitzclarence and Green 1994, and Fitzclarence, Green and Bigum 1995
of post modernism, especially in its techno-cultural inflection' (p.124 original emphasis).\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Postmodern Subject(ivity)}

Green and Bigum's (1993) construction of contemporary populations of young people as postmodern subjects \textit{par excellence} places in the foreground a variety of issues and concerns related to the new and emergent information technologies. These technologies include \textit{hardware} and \textit{software} such as: television, video, music recording and performance technologies, telephony, modems, fibre optic cable networks and satellites; and new multi media technologies which \textit{promise} (portend) convergence in a tremendous range of digital technology applications. Foremost in many discussions about the promises, possibilities and problems of new technologies is the development of computing hardware and software which enables the modelling and penetration of \textit{natural} and \textit{social} complex systems (genetic engineering, economic modelling, reproductive technologies, Chaos science, global warming). Computer technologies also enable (on a global scale) the instantaneous and simultaneous generation, circulation, storage, and retrieval of vast quantities of information. Further, these technologies make possible the generating and sustaining of any number of virtual realities (worlds), and \textit{simulations} of environments, relations and practices.\textsuperscript{18}

Green and Bigum (1993) signal a number of important issues in locating young people's identity work in the context of this new 'techno-popular cultural' environment. They point to the 'speed' of development and proliferation of these new technologies; the

\textsuperscript{17} What is Postmodernism? Generating a shared sense of what the postmodern might mean is an exercise which provokes frustration. Indeed, it could be argued that this problem of representation is both symptomatic and characteristic of the postmodem. The problem of representation, or the construction of shared meaning emerges as intellectuals, whose work, in part, is that of representation, problematise the practice (the very idea) of representing reality, of constructing or \textit{fixing} (however provisionally) shared meanings about the \textit{nature} of \textit{reality}. The theoretical and political problematics which are structured by postmodernism will be more fully explored in Chapter Two, where I will argue that these movements render problematic the possibilities of theoretical and political engagement with at-Risk discourses. My engagement with theories of reflexive modernization, and governmentality also occurs in the intellectual spaces opened up by postmodern and poststructuralist discourses. For discussions on what the postmodern \textit{is}, its relation to the modern, and critical commentary on the theoretical and political possibilities structured by these debates see Featherstone (1988), Frisby (1988), Gill (1991), Haraway (1985), Norris (1992) and Wexler (1987).

\textsuperscript{18} For a review of some of these issues, from perspectives which are immersed in these developments, see Rheingold (1984, 1991) and Kelly (1994)
ways in which the proliferation of these technologies is overlayed on existing historical practices, relations and processes; the ways in which these technologies might transform existing relations and practices, and the ways in which these technologies generate or structure new social relations and practices. These new information and communication technologies, and the 'techno-culture' which both generates them and is generated and (re)produced by them, are argued by Green and Bigum to be important markers of both postmodern culture and cultural postmodernism. It is under these changed and emergent conditions that Green and Bigum outline certain aspects of what they term a 'post modern subjectivity, one constructed directly out of technologically mediated social relations and practices and their psycho-symbolic codings' (p.131). They write of; 'computer obsessives', 'hackers and cyberpunks'; the TV 'couch potato' merged with remote control devices; 'normal' children and adults spending long periods of time at a keyboard, video control panel, or in front of the television (pp.134-135). In these circumstances Green and Bigum question the boundaries which 'we' construct to delineate 'machine' and 'organism', 'text' and 'context'. Citing Hayles (1990) they suggest that there is a need for 'new descriptions to account for the coupling of organism and cybernetic machine':

Physically intact, the player is nevertheless already a cyborg for he [sic] is joined to the computer by a continuous interplay between his neural system and the computer's circuitry. In this view, to have non detachable cybernetic implants is simply to reify the detachable connections that already bind humans to computers in thousands of video arcades and computer centres across the country (Hayles, 1990, p.277, cited in Green and Bigum 1993, p.133 original emphasis)

Distinctions should be drawn here between cultural postmodernism as a form of cultural representation or intellectual abstraction, and postmodern culture. Postmodern culture, it is argued, is marked by changed cultural and social practices and relations, processes and spaces. Cultural postmodernism, on the other hand, signifies changes in the modes of representing or abstracting material realities. Such representations are not transparent in that they do not refer to, or correspond in any unmediated or uncontested way to the processes, practices and relations they construct or represent. This is an important point to keep in the foreground in this discussion of Green and Bigum's (1993) construction of Aliens in the classroom. It is a point which Green and Bigum stress when they refer to their own thesis as a provocative 'education fiction or fantasy' (p.119), and which Bill Green (1993) expands on in a later context by arguing that the:

thesis has always been intended as provocative...a self conscious image or trope, a rhetorical figure that draws attention to itself and therefore hopefully all such descriptions-as-constructions. ('Youth' for
instance, or the new social, legal and psychological categories of the 'delinquent' and the 'adolescent', dating back in Australia to the 1950s.) I want to stress this matter of rhetoric and strategy: the 'aliens' thesis is a deliberately unstable formulation and in our usage it always has been. (pp.8-9)

It can be argued then, that Aliens as a construction is firmly grounded in a particular kind of intellectual practice and abstraction. More explicitly this intellectual position sees 'a particular value in engaging the new insights and images to be drawn from cultural postmodernism and new science' (Green and Bigum 1993 p.121). Further, Green and Bigum suggest that '[i]ncreasingly there would seem to be a general and extremely generative convergence between social theory and science fiction' (p.121). Here they cite the work of Hayles (1990) and Haraway (1991) as providing potentially progressive and challenging ways of understanding how what they refer to as 'techno-popular culture' is increasingly implicated in the formation of students/youth as postmodern subjects.

**Moral Panics about Young Aliens.**

Green and Bigum's (1993) intellectual and political mobilisation of Hayles' (1990) cultural postmodernism and Haraway's (1991) cyborg imagery is, however, problematic on a number of grounds. These concerns will be addressed in following sections. At this point I want to discuss the manner in which Green and Bigum construct a connection between the material and discursive developments they characterise as postmodern, and contemporary debates about schooling, youth culture, media culture and various 'moral panics' concerning the way in which these relations and practices are implicated in the 'development' or '(re)generation' of youth(ful) identities. In these contexts 'cyborg' and 'alien' imagery is, arguably, more successful in addressing the construction of difference between generations: a construction which rests, primarily, on the power of older generations to 'mean' in the spaces of Educational, Cultural, Economic and Social policy and commentary.

This difference across the generations structures what Green and Bigum (1993) identify as Conservative 'moral panics' about what is to be done with or about contemporary youth(ful) populations. For many commentators 'today's youth' - and their peer cultural values, practices and relations and their uses and appropriations of new technologies - appear as aliens. The key to this particular use of alien imagery is Green and Bigum's argument that the spaces, relations and practices generated by or within techno-culture are 'natural environments' for rising generations, and are, in significant ways, different environments to those in which previous generations 'became somebody'(Wexler 1992). In this sense the generation gap can be seen to be not only difference structured by age,
but by immersion in, engagement with, and understanding of, this 'techno-culture'. For Green and Bigum (1993):

The unsettling glimpses of augmented children, children who exist somewhere in the space delineated by the human, the post human and the alien remind us that, although we share a common geo-physical space with the young, we may well find it difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to share in the many virtual spaces or worlds they inhabit in the digital ecosystem. (p.132, original emphasis)

Green and Bigum’s (1993) explicitly provocative use of ‘cyborg’ and ‘alien’ imagery in this context makes possible the connections between the construction of generational difference and ‘moral panics’ about Youth in Crisis. This generation gap, this construction of difference between generations along a variety of ‘normalising axes’ (Tait 1993) - age vs youth, high culture vs popular culture, print based culture vs image (visual) based culture - is shown by Green and Bigum to be fundamental to many Conservative constructions of contemporary Youth in Crisis. These constructions of Youth in Crisis, these moral panics need to be;

understood as not just a direct response on the part of the dominant-cultural bloc to a perceived 'crisis' in the orderly processes of social and economic 'reproduction' but also, ironically, as capturing and re-articulating the reproduction thesis itself, along with its associated rhetorics and political strategies. What this has been realised in is a renewed emphasis on cultural production, specifically on the part of and in the interests of the Right and its constituencies. Central features of this cultural offensive have been sustained attacks on public schooling, literacy pedagogy, educational progressivism, contemporary youth, and popular culture. (Green and Bigum 1993, pp.125-126)19

This deficiency view of youth, and the associated mobilisation of at-Risk categories, has particular significance for any number of governmental initiatives (schooling, youth work, parenting advice, juvenile justice) directed at youth(ful) populations and assorted attempts at the formation of certain types of young person. This emphasis on deficiency in representations of youth(ful) populations in crisis, or at-Risk, constructs

19 As Giddens (1994 a) argues, Conservative is a problematic signifier in contemporary settings where Conservatism embraces Radicalism (in the form of markets), and Socialism appears as Conservative in reaction to these transformations. In this context Conservative Socialism also critiques the debasement of community, culture, and tradition which is structured by this commodified popular techno-culture. Willis (1990) addresses the problems this poses for Left political and intellectual practice which takes Youth as its object.
contemporary populations of young people, youth culture and techno-popular cultural forms as deficient or of less weight, seriousness or importance than prior generations of young people, cultural forms and peer cultural practices and relations. Green and Bigum (1993) illustrate this deficiency thesis in a number of ways. They cite Neil Postman's (1985) argument that, in the context of a cultural shift from a print based epistemology to a tele-visual based view of knowledge and meaning; 'we are getting sillier by the moment' (cited in Green and Bigum 1993, p.128). Further, they cite Allan Bloom's (1987) thesis concerning the decline of American cultural 'values', institutional decay and the dominance of a tele-visual popular culture. In Bloom's thesis the march of philosophical, scientific and political 'progress' culminates, at the end of the millennium, in an MTV generation characterised (caricatured) by:

A pubescent child whose body throbs with orgasmic rhythms; whose feelings are made articulate in hymns to the joy of onanism or the killing of parents; whose ambition is to win fame and wealth in imitating the drag-queen who makes the music. In short life is made into a nonstop, commercially prepackaged masturbation fantasy. (Bloom, 1987, pp.74-75, cited in Green and Bigum 1993 p.129)

**Aliens: a Problematic Representation**

Green and Bigum's (1993) move to connect the emergence of a techno-cultural dimension to processes of identity formation to conservative moral panics about contemporary youth is an important insight. However, I would also want to argue that Left, progressive commentators are just as implicated in the struggle to tell the truth about contemporary populations of young people. Indeed, Lawrence Grossberg (1988) argues that it is appropriate; 'to think of youth as a field of diverse and contradictory practices, experiences, identities, and discourses. Moreover, at the present moment, youth is a battlefield on which adolescents, baby-boomers, parents, and new-rightists are struggling to control its meanings and powers' (p 126). This thesis is no less a construction, no less a political intervention into the discursive terrain of Youth than the various constructions and representations I draw on. My intent, however, is to make problematic the intellectual practices (of the Left and the 'new-rightists') which attempt to tell the truth about the Crisis of Youth (at-Risk). Part of this process must, in the tradition of scholarly work, involve an interrogation of the merits of particular forms of truth telling relative to the object (Youth at-Risk) at hand. Scott Lash (1994 b), in an engagement with the reflexive modernization theses of Beck (1992,1994) and Giddens (1994 b), signals his agreement with Giddens' (1994 c) contention that cultural theory does, indeed, 'rule the roost' in contemporary academic abstractions of various social and cultural processes and practices. For Lash this is a 'deplorable state of affairs as cultural theory is often useless in addressing issues of everyday life and politics'
(p.215). In this context the 'social' - theoretical interventions of Beck and Giddens must be warmly greeted' (p.215, original emphasis). Lash argues however, that this agreement does not indicate a blanket rejection or opposition to 'post-structuralism and cultural theory'. Rather, Lash argues that social theory, 'drawing selectively also on concepts from cultural analysis' is able to 'do a better job in understanding the cultural dimension, in our institutions and the sensibility of our private lives, than can the cultural theorists' (p.215).

Angela McRobbie (1994, 1996) raises similar concerns in a discussion about the ways in which the academic disciplinary boundaries which mark off Cultural Studies from Sociology impact on contemporary discussions about the Question(s) of Youth. McRobbie argues for a form of interdisciplinarity in an academic engagement with the lifeworlds of young people; a 'cultural sociology of youth' as she terms it. McRobbie (1994) acknowledges the limits and possibilities of contemporary work in both disciplines. However, she outlines certain silences in (postmodern) Cultural Studies of youth which limit the political and theoretical impact of these analyses of 'different, youthful, subjectivities'. McRobbie (1994) highlights the tendency for Cultural Studies of Youth to take as the objects of its analysis 'specific discourses', or 'specific texts', or the 'forms of mass media', and to neglect the diverse interactions of these 'various discourses', and the institutional and social processes which continue to structure young people's lifeworlds (p.180). McRobbie further argues that issues around 'the state and social control, questions of institutional practice and policy' are not foregrounded in contemporary Cultural Studies of Youth (p.185).

'During the 1980s,' argues McRobbie (1994), 'the focus on youth which had been such a visible characteristic of cultural studies in the 1970s' - particularly that work which emerged from the CCCS - fractured around 'a number of other interests which overlap with or touch on Youth without really acknowledging this fact' (p.182). McRobbie (1994) argues that this 'splintering' in the concepts of central interest in Cultural Studies saw the emergence of 'race, state and nation; sexuality and representation; education and ethnography; and more recently, postcoloniality and postmodernism', as the four themes of principal significance in Cultural Studies.20 This development, argues

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20 Julie McLeod (1997) rehearses a similar argument, citing both McRobbie (1996) and Michelle Barrett (1992). McLeod cites Barret's argument that recent theoretical work in the social sciences is marked by a movement away from a concern 'with [sociological and material] things... towards a more cultural sensibility of the salience of words'. Barret's argument is that this movement signals a 'preoccupation' with 'analysing processes of symbolization and representation - the field of "culture" - and attempts to
McRobbie (1994) occurred via the 'rejection of the primacy of the youth and social class couplet which had underpinned the development of "subcultural theory" (p.181). In this context there has been little attention paid to rethinking Youth as a category or concept which might be useful in cultural inquiry (p.182).

McRobbie (1994) argues however, that Sociology continues to foreground the 'importance of institutional practices as key forces for shaping continuity and change' in the experiences of contemporary youth(ful) populations. This emphasis is something which McRobbie argues is 'largely absent' from Cultural Studies (p.178). The discussion thus far, which has foregrounded the ways in which Youth at-Risk discourses, in part, share a historical continuity with moral panics about Youth, demonstrates McRobbie's (1994) argument that 'youth remains a key point for social and political anxiety'. The construction of crises and moral panics about Youth at-Risk indicate, argues McRobbie, that: 'Issues around the state, social institutions and governmentality...are much too important to ignore' (pp.180-181).

It is in this context that I want to signal my departure from, or differences with, Green and Bigum's (1993) construction of contemporary youth/students as 'post modern subjects par excellence'. This is an ambivalent departure in a number of senses.

Historically, what has, at various moments, been named as science 'fiction' has often portended a more concrete, grounded reality. Futures are uncertain, multiple, open ended and, in Giddens' (1991) term, waiting to be 'colonized'. They are 'colonized', in part, through the practices, processes and narratives of the present. Green and Bigum's Aliens is a 'thought experiment' of the present which is arguably, very much oriented to future forms of sociality and being. It foregrounds and gives prominence to emergent practices and spaces, suggesting that these emergent practices and spaces are significant in contemporary youth(ful) identity work. A chief concern is that this foregrounding of a particular emergent form of sociality has the effect of pushing into the background, both differences within the category of youth, and continuities in diverse attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities.

(post)Modern Youth(ful) Identities: Continuities of Class, Gender, Bodies, and Difference.

This examination of a particular construction of young people as 'young cyborgs', as 'strangers in a strange land', as 'aliens' has attempted to map the terrain that such postmodern representations mark out. Such a mapping could point to alternative develop a better understanding of subjectivity., the psyche and the self' (Barrett, 1992, cited in McLeod, 1997, p.2)
movements across that terrain. These alternative movements will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. For now, though I want to foreshadow these movements by focussing on the ways in which these representations of young people's experience of postmodernity, display a tendency to discount the ways in which difference might structure any experience of the postmodern. My purpose here is not to celebrate difference, per se, but to suggest that (social) institutional relations and practices continue to differently structure the lived experience of youth(ful) populations, including the construction of those populations of young people most at-Risk under these conditions.

Postmodern representations position young people as different, at the same time as they discount differences within the particular construction. Social relations and contexts are seen to be 'technologically mediated', yet there is no indication that these relations and contexts are also differentiated and mediated by gender, class, ethnicity, geography, sexuality, ability...; and that these institutionally structured relations and practices continue to regulate forms of identity within so-called 'digital ecosystems'. For instance, Wexler (1992), in his analysis of the ways in which identity is constructed for and by young people in the intense 'interactional economy' of schools, argues that against the backdrop of a 'seemingly shared mass youth culture', a youth culture (re)produced within a 'mass electronic image production apparatus'; 'what students struggle for in becoming somebody and how they engage that interactional life project during high school is different depending on where their school is located in the larger societal pattern of organised social differences and inequalities' (p.8).

Wexler (1992) is arguing here for the primacy of social class in the patterning of social identities. As he argues: 'The ideal and the route to becoming somebody in the suburban white working class is not the same as becoming somebody in a high school in a professional middle class suburb. Both are as different from urban under class among youths, as it is for their parents' (p.8 original emphasis). Yet within certain constructions of post modernity a globalised, informationalised techno-culture and its incredible circulation of image and commodified relations is often seen to transcend such 'old', 'modernist' boundaries as class, gender, time, place and body. Lindsay Fitzclarence (1993), for instance, suggests that, 'the media fuses life in different geographical areas and different social class locations. Or, as neatly put by one interviewee 'Kids from Lalor and Toorak live in the same worlds; they are linked by popular image culture' (p.18). Importantly, in the context of this discussion, Fitzclarence follows this claim with a cautionary note that if 'traditional class divisions now emerge out of different cultural circumstances...enduring class inequities remain manifest, and as such provoke the need for sober consideration' (p.18). 'Sober consideration' of these continuities
within changed social contexts would point to that fact that young people, as gendered, embodied individuals continue to live, work, play and go to school within particular geographical locales, particular configurations of time, space and place. Time, space, place and bodies continue to limit and place boundaries around their activities. Identity work continues to take place within contexts and relations embedded within particular, concrete, place based relationships. These relations continue to be structured and regulated within spaces which are institutionally (re)produced and dependent.\textsuperscript{21} Johanna Wyn and Rob White (1997), for instance, argue that a 'class analysis' must have a 'central place in any rethinking of youth' as a category which can continue to be useful in theoretical and political discourses. Class, gender and ethnic relations, 'as power relations', continue to 'frame the contours of youth experience and the shape of institutional and cultural processes' which attempt to regulate youth(ful) identities (p.148).

However, a number of postmodern Cultural Studies of Youth often ignore, or discount, the reality that most young people become somebody in family relations and practices marked by degrees of dependence. Young people are dependent on family location within a range of material conditions and patterns of relations. This is not to deny that dependence is struggled over, or that it is a shifting and evolving set of relations - most notably marked by age, but also by gender and ethnicity - or that this dependence is also mediated by relations and practices external to this so-called private space. Here (social) class, and young people's position in class structured relations of dependence, can be seen as a complex intersection of a variety of material forces and relationships such as; family relationships and background; educational background and opportunities; neighbourhood and community (the place where you live and, particularly for young people, the place where you develop, sustain and sever important social relations); (un)employment; income sources and levels and related consumption activities; work patterns inside and outside the privacy of families; and understandings of Self and Others, of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and ability which are constructed, contested and negotiated within these spaces and places. Thinking class in this way is an attempt to see both the enabling and constraining influence(s) of class in constructing a sense of self. It is an attempt to understand the limits and boundaries which social class continues to place on the everyday lives and experiences of embodied, gendered young people. As Wexler (1992) argues:

\begin{quote}
What I underline is how much the experience and meaning of everyday life - perhaps both cause and effect of achievement and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21}This argument will be further developed in the following chapters.
income inequalities - are different. It is not simply a question of
deficits or deprivations and advantages, but of different life worlds and
dynamic organizational economies that generate and sustain diverse
understandings and aspirations. (p 8)

What is also often missing from a number of postmodern accounts of young people's
identity work is any notion that the self which these writers are (de)constructing is a
gendered self. There is little acknowledgment of how the experiences of, and within,
'techno culture' may be differently felt and shaped by a positioning which is structured
by, and through, gender.22 In Green and Bigum's (1993) representation of postmodern
youth(ful) subjectivities, for instance, there is little accounting for how image
(re)production and consumption are patterned and mediated by the gendered positioning
of both the producers and the consumers (as producers of meaning) of these images.
There is little explicit understanding of how the continuities and discontinuities in social
relations may, in many important ways, be gendered and embodied.

Youth(ful) bodies of a particular type are privileged bodies. Certain bodies have always
been privileged within particular historical and cultural milieux - Classical Greek bodily
aesthetics and Rubenescque bodies are examples. One difference at this particular
historical juncture - and it is a difference substantially implicated in young people's
identity work - is the electronically enabled proliferation of these commodified,
idealised, privileged, representations into many aspects of daily embodied existence.
Another difference is that few actual bodies correspond to this representation. This
pervasive and powerful image based construction of the ideal, privileged, objectified
body - both female and male, although young female bodies are privileged, idealised
and objectified above all others - is, however, experienced and made sense of in
gendered, embodied intersubjective ways (Harrison 1995). Moreover, the diverse,
institutionally structured attempts to regulate the harmful (risky) consequences of young
people's immersion in this image saturated environment are, fundamentally, gendered
projects which take as their objects populations of young women.23

22For a feminist reading of 'computer culture' see Sofia 1993. For a market research perspective on
gendered differences in Internet use see Apple Report No. 2, 1997.
23Schools based education programs about body image, self esteem, diets and eating disorders
constructed as risky practices, or as indicators of risk), emphasise the rational, cognitive thinking about
bodies, the split between the mind and the body, of mind over matter almost (Kempley and Weber 1993,
Ogden and Germinario 1988). Yet this absent bodied approach to understanding the identity work
involved in the embodied, intersubjective encounters between gendered bodies and an image based
culture appears to be spectacularly unsuccessful (Kirk 1993). However, this apparent failure of a critique
Where there is a tendency to construct young people as non gendered postmodern subjects there is also, seemingly, a move to confuse new forms of social relations for all forms of social relations. One instance concerns the so called disembodied relationships between the users of the Net - that vast computer enabled information and communication web that strangles the 'planet of noise' (Wark 1994) - a form of relationship within a new social space which is often seen as exemplifying the new identity work of postmodern subjects. For Green and Bigum (1993) 'cyberspace' is a term 'used to describe the vectorial space through which millions of computers are interconnected. In this space where little remains of context in the traditional, modernist sense, vast amounts of information are held in a kind of noisy fog of 1s and 0s' (p.133). As Green and Bigum (1993) point out - whilst failing to acknowledge that what they describe is a form of relation both subtly and explicitly differentiated by class, gender, and global economic processes (What percentage of the world's population does not have access to a telephone let alone a computer terminal ?): 'Projected into this space are virtually anything from recipes, weather forecasts and stock prices to practical debates, religious ideas and sexual fantasies. More recently, academics have begun 'attending' conferences in cyberspace' (p.133).

I want to suggest that, emphasising the apparent disembodiment of what have been called 'technologically mediated relations' (Sharp 1985) - that is, relations which do not rely on embodied co-presence, but which are mediated through technologies such as the written word, or telephony, or fibre optic cables - there is a tendency to make a number of wrong moves. For instance, there is a tendency to ignore, or discount, the fact that fundamentally any social relation is an embodied relation. In order to read or write these words, or to make a (mobile) phone call, or watch and make (no)sense of a video, or surf the Net requires that there is firstly a sentient, situated, gendered, embodied subject involved or implicated in these relations and practices. This is not to argue that this subject is whole, or complete, or unitary prior to these relations, or indeed transcends these relations. This point can be tellingly illustrated by reference to a Frances Dyson (1996) interview with Dr Sandy Stone, the director of the Advanced Communication of these relations provokes further attempts to generate intellectually produced knowledge about the nature of these intersubjective encounters; as evidenced in feminist poststructuralist and postmodernist attempts to theorise the nature of subjectivity and of active readings of these texts by young people (see, for instance, Harrison 1995, Lupton 1994, Nava 1991, 1992, Walkerdine 1997). A range of issues arising from this reflexive generation of expert knowledge and the roles it plays in attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities will be explored in the following chapters.
Technology Laboratory, University of Texas (Austin). Dyson argues that Stone's 'transgendered self has become a model for cybernauts aspiring to "liquid identity"' (p.70). For Stone: 'Cyberspace is a space of subversion - and that is the space of transgender, which is one of the spaces of liquid identity; which is to say, manifesting that which breaks free of location technologies which are intended to create singular identities' (cited in Dyson 1996, p 71).

In this new space signifiers such as 'body', 'meet', 'place', and 'space' mean 'something quite different from our accustomed understanding' (p 71). BUGS (body units grounded in self) in (cyber)space problematise, for Stone, the notions of bodies, identities and gender. Yet, in what is a cautionary note to this potentially cyber hyperbole, Stone argues that: 'We forget about the body at our peril' (p 70). Moreover, from Dyson's standpoint:

We are dependent on our BUGS despite the heavy emphasis on endless deferral of the referent - of any kind of 'ground' - in poststructuralist and cyber theory. We are dependent because, as Stone insists again, we cannot escape our bodies: 'We are still referents, we still are here, we still live in bodies and ultimately we still have to fall back on the basic primitive...we do live at this time in bodies and those bodies are the object of political power'. (p 72)

Theoretically and politically it continues to be important to construct the body, and young people's embodied situation in various institutionally structured practices and relations as fundamental to any understanding of the diverse attempts to regulate their identities. Intellectual 'imaginings of social space' and social relations and social identities within these changed spaces are limited if they do not account for the real and continuous patterning of these spaces and relations by institutionally structured and regulated practices.25

24 Stone, originally a heterosexual man, chose to become a transgendered lesbian woman and now describes herself as a heterosexual woman' (Dyson 1996, p 70).
25 In an end note to a point that they make about the need for new descriptions to account for the coupling of organism and machine, man and machine, Green and Bigum (1993) gesture towards this issue by arguing that 'the masculinist bias of what is variously described as 'techno culture' and 'cyborg discourse' needs to be borne constantly in mind' (p.138). The reproduction of this masculinist discourse is particularly problematic with regard to the construction of Youth, given that Youth has historically been constructed as Masculine (Bessant and Evans 1997, Harrison 1995, Hudson 1984, McRobbie and Nava 1984)
Green (1993), however, argues that 'boundaries and distinctions', in general, will become 'more blurred' as social relations and practices emerge as being 'not simply technologically-mediated', but 'technological in their very nature' (p 10). Green suggests that there are both profound problems and possibilities for new forms of the social under such conditions. In grappling with the possibilities which might emerge Green returns to an engagement with Haraway's (1991) 'concept-image of the cyborg: the cybernetic organism, a particular meshing of human and machine' (p 10, original emphasis). Green (1993) argues that within what is 'irrevocably a complex technoscientific world', we need to think of identity as emerging from different human/technology relationships:

Rather than through 'interactivities' with other human beings, that is, we can contemplate the possibility and indeed the likelihood that 'socialization', however that is understood, will increasingly occur through 'human machine' interactions; and that, moreover, the boundaries between 'humans' and 'machines' will become increasingly blurred, as will boundaries and distinctions more generally. (pp 10-11)

In a very real material and discursive sense, 'boundaries', and 'distinctions' are often, in what Giddens' (1994 a) has called a 'post traditional social order', markers of difference which become elaborated and/or emphasised, rather than blurred. The political and identity projects that have emerged, and been structured around struggles over naming difference, suggest that we take seriously, and engage rhetorically, the positive and/or regressive potentialities which might (re)surface under these conditions. Theoretically and politically this means engaging with: The (re)emergence, in post cold war Europe in particular, but elsewhere as well (Rwanda, India, Kurdistan...) of ethnic and religious rivalries and violence: A (re)surfacing of a certain form of nationalism in conflict with multiculturalism (as 'unassimilated difference', Green and Bigum 1993). This nationalism is a politics of identification which Other's Aliens, undesirables and those outside of the mainstream through naming difference in particular, exclusory ways:26 An eruption of a 'secular fundamentalism' in response to the emergence of a 'post traditional social order' in which traditional understandings of religion, ethnicity, the family, gender, bodies..., become things which have 'to be decided about' rather than just taken for granted' (Giddens 1994 a, p.6, original emphasis). In this context Scott Lash (1994 a) suggests that while processes of reflexive modernization produce a very strong programme of 'individualization', writ large in Beck's (1992) 'I am I' (and 'I am I' precisely and fundamentally because I am not You or Other);

26This form of politics was successfully mobilised by the Liberal (conservative) Party in the 1996 election for Australia's Federal parliament.
the unfolding process of modernization has not yielded the end-of-
history convergence Fukuyama foresaw...towards the 'I' of market
democracy. Instead we have witnessed at the same time - and perhaps
more than ever - a revenge of the repressed 'We' of ethnic cleansing, of
eastern German neo-Nazi skinheads and the nationalist fragmentation
of the former USSR. (p 111)

It is in these terms that it is possible to understand the emergence of Australian MP
Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party and the challenges it poses for social integration,
and for possible Left and Right political responses to her concerns and those of her
constituency. 27 Kevin Robbins (1989) questions whether, under these conditions,
'national and nationalist identities can be transcended in favour of more meaningful
identities or whether they will simply transform in regressive and alienating ways' (p
150). He cites Manuel Castells' bleak observation that: 'On the one hand, the space of
power is being transformed into flows. On the other hand, the space of meaning is being
reduced to microterritories of new tribal communities' (Castells 1983, p 4, cited in
Robins 1989, p 150).

The Dangers of Uncertainty.

In contemporary settings boundaries and borders are, at some levels, being blurred and
transgressed. McRobbie (1993), for instance, sees postmodernism as 'embracing' the
'idea of difference and hybridity' which is generated 'within the tracks of the meta-
communications networks of the new global order' (p.133). At other levels there are
countertendencies to elaborate and re articulate boundaries (of Age, Class, Gender,
Ethnicity, Nation) as immutable, natural markers of difference. It is in the context of
these material and discursive realities that the processes which construct, as true, a
Crisis of Youth (at-Risk) can be understood as 'dangerous' (Foucault 1983). Dangerous
in the sense that the construction of this Crisis within contexts of Uncertainty provoke
diverse, and increasingly sophisticated, processes of surveillance, identification and
intervention. These processes target particular populations of young people (the

27 Hanson, as at early 1998, is an independent member of Australia’s Federal Parliament. ‘Pauline
Hanson’s One Nation Party’ is her self titled, registered political party, established after her election as an
independent in the 1996 election. With few articulated policies her concerns coalesce around notions
that: Asian migrants are ‘flooding’ Australia and threatening to overwhelm Australia’s Anglo-Celtic
culture: Australia’s indigenous population is not the most disadvantaged section of society, but rather
enjoys privileges denied to non indigenous Australians: A cultural elite has foisted multiculturalism on
‘mainstream’ Australia, at the same time silencing debate on these issues under the banner of ‘political
correctness’: Australia’s economy is threatened by foreign ownership and economic rationalism.
Deviant, the Delinquent, the Disadvantaged, the at-Risk) in various attempts by experts and centres of expertise to regulate and manage the Uncertain in the name of Order and Certainty. For Zygmunt Bauman (1990 a) modernity's 'scandal of ambivalence' is a scandal which has structured powerful ongoing 'quests for order'. Moreover, Socialism, as the theoretical and political project of the Left, a project which casts its shadow across, and indeed structures, diverse discourses which take Youth as their object, has, historically, invested heavily in this quest for order. Bauman cites English socialist and novelist H G Wells, who argued that the hope of Socialism was 'a complete organization for all these human affairs that are of collective importance...In place of disorderly effort, each man doing what he pleases, the socialist wants organized effort, and a plan'. Moreover, the Socialist, according to Wells;

seeks to make a plan as one designs and lays out a garden, so that sweet and seemly things may grow, wide and beautiful vista open, and weeds and foulness disappear...what makes all its graciousness and beauty possible, is the scheme and the persistent intention, the watching and the waiting, the digging and burning, the weeder clips and the hoe. (Wells 1984, cited in Bauman 1990 a, p.34)

In the following Chapter I want explore what might be worthwhile intellectual work under material and discursive conditions which have meant a 'crisis for the left' (Hall 1988a, McRobbie 1993), a crisis which has profound consequences for any theoretical and/or political engagement with those discourses of Risk mobilised in diverse attempts to regulate, to order, youth(ful) populations and the forms of identity which mark of the Normal from the at-Risk.
CHAPTER TWO:

POSTMODERNISM, THE LEFT AND YOUTH (AT-RISK)

There has been a revolution that has affected almost every academic field of studies in what used to be called the 'humanities' and 'social sciences'. Arguably its effects have been felt even in the 'hard sciences' as well. Without for the moment getting hung up by definitions, I will call this revolution the 'postmodern turn'...In discipline after discipline, it raises issues of epistemology and the processes of intellectual and textual production, in a way that is cumulatively so radical that the previous practices of disciplinary knowledge can no longer be assumed as given by those aspiring to profess them at any level. (Bob Hodge, 1995 p.35)

Introduction

Why bother with postmodernism? At a quite fundamental level I need to recognise, and work within, the reality that in my workplace (the University) there has been a thorough going problematisation of a fundamental aspect of production; that is, there has been a radical unsettling of what it means to do intellectual work, where intellectual work is constructed as textual or cultural production or representation. In the following sections, I intend to explore a number of currents which structure postmodern constructions of a 'crisis of representation', and an associated 'crisis of the Left' (Hall, 1988 a,b,c,d). An engagement with these crises is fundamental to the project of this thesis. That is, in order to problematise the truth of Youth at-Risk it is necessary, also, to problematise the processes of truth production mobilised from the Left in an engagement with the material and discursive realities which enable Youth at-Risk to function as a truth.

This process is especially necessary in Education, a discursive domain 'centrally concerned with training in truth production' (Popkewitz and Brennan 1997, p.313). In this domain Left intellectual practice (dominated by the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory), remains largely structured by essentialist narratives of truth and emancipation, and of 'an ahistorical subject' (Dean 1994), who stands in a false relation to the real nature of oppressive social relations. This false relation provokes the mobilisation of interventionist and transformative logics by 'new class Left intellectuals' (Fine 1994, Walkerdine 1997) in diverse attempts to
educate these Subjects. Education cannot be other than interventionist and transformative.¹ My purpose, however, is to make problematic the grounds from which these processes of intervention and transformation are mobilised, and the ends to which these processes are targeted. This is a particular imperative when much of this Left intellectual practice positions those at-Risk in terms of lack and deficit.

A Crisis of Representation.

Postmodernism as Intellectual Ambivalence

A sense of what I mean by naming these 'crises' of representation, and of the Left (which are, arguably, constitutive), and of the direction that this engagement will take can be gained from the following, rather circular outline. The crisis of representation is related to the crisis of the Left, is related to changed material and discursive conditions. Material in the sense that the late 20th century (global) world is a changed world. Now whether this changed material reality is characterised, or understood, as reflexive, or postmodern, or late modern, or post industrial, or globalised, or the information society is a matter of representation, which is a discursive matter. It is a discursive matter, or a problem of representation whether, or not to: Periodize or not periodize these changes, marking off some epochal rupture between, say modern(ity) and postmodern(ity): Foreground the ways in which changed material realities are carried by, and indeed carry, changed discursive (representational) possibilities (as in, for instance, the emergence of new communication and information technologies): Highlight the unsettling of older, more certain material relations and practices and discursive representations, such as class, gender, race, identity. This unsettling can be represented in a number of ways; as a consequence of the emergence of gay, feminist and post colonial social movements (ruptures); as instances of intensified 'individualization' within 'risk society' (Beck 1992); as aspects of a 'reflexive project of the self' in 'late modernity' (Giddens 1991); as markers of a postmodern self constituted in fleeting, open networks of association with others, with images, with commodities (Hinkson 1991, 1997): Problematise categories of reason, rationality, scientific progress and certainty, which were promised by Enlightened human intervention into, and control over the social and the natural. Particularly when the Holocaust, the Gulags, Year Zero, Ground Zero and Global Warming are, in part, consequences of these emancipatory ideals.

¹ This thesis, located in a Faculty of Education, is connected, via a set of institutional practices to Deakin Centre for Education and Change. This is a naming which makes explicit, though not necessarily problematic, the transformative logic which structures Education.
This 'incredulity towards metanarratives', as a signifier of 'the postmodern condition' (Lyotard 1984) is well captured by Lyotard (1989):

Neither economic or political liberalism, nor the various Marxisms, emerge from the sanguinary last two centuries free from the suspicion of crimes against mankind [sic]. We can list a series of proper names (names of places, persons and dates) capable of illustrating and founding our suspicion. Following Theodor Adorno, I use the name Auschwitz to point out the irrelevance of empirical matter, the stuff of recent past history, in terms of the modern claim to help mankind to emancipate itself. What kind of thought is able to sublate (Aufheben) Auschwitz in a general (either empirical or speculative) process towards a universal emancipation? (p.9)

Featherstone (1988) argues that the collapse of the Enlightenment notion of the progressive emancipation of humanity through the metanarratives of Science, Reason, and Rationality has, as a consequence, witnessed a collapse in the legitimacy and the authority of intellectuals. This intellectual 'identity crisis' (Bauman 1988) emerges because modern intellectuals, as 'enlightenment figures', 'found their legitimacy, the legitimacy of the public speech through which they designated the just cause and made themselves the spokespersons, in the grand meta narrative of emancipation' (Lyotard 1988, p.302). This loss of authority and legitimacy, results, Lyotard (1989) argues, in a ' sort of sorrow in the Zeitgeist (p.9).

This is a view supported, from a different perspective, by Zygmunt Bauman (1988), who suggests that the notion of 'postmodernity', in essence, captures the 'novel experience of just one, but crucial social category of contemporary society: the intellectuals' (p.217). 'Postmodernity', Bauman proposes, calls forth a new intellectual self awareness; a focussing of intellectuality on the practice of intellectuality; a (textual) turn which results in intellectual 'skills, techniques and raw materials' becoming the 'conscious object of self perfection and refinement and the true and sufficient subject-matter of intellectual work' (p.218).2

Elsewhere, Philip Wexler (1992) has touched on similar concerns suggesting that postmodernism, as an academic discourse in the 'New Sociology of Education', 'was at once the most flashiest, but also the most academicist of these status displaying academic

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2 See also Fraser and Nicholson 1988, Milner 1991, and Stauth and Turner 1988, for commentaries on certain intellectual dilemmas given expression through postmodernism.
discourses' (p.147). Wexler's elaboration of this notion of 'academicism' points to the problematic of engaging with certain material and discursive realities post postmodernism; whilst seeking some 'ground' under these conditions. Wexler (1992) argues that while the discourse of postmodernism;

maybe illuminating, I think it is also engaging because it amplifies and represents ongoing organized social events. Without that grounding, all such discourses operate as tools of alienation, and render the theorist in sociology and education a late coming status seeker to the academicist university forms that were valued for a decadent moment in industrial capitalism's cultural history by literati. Like large segments of the professional middle class to which they belong, they have generally eschewed commitment to society and have ignored class society. (p.147)

For the purposes of moving this discussion forward; to move it, if you like, out of a closed, self-referential feedback loop (intellectual abstraction - academic intellectuality - intellectual abstraction), I want to reiterate a difference between cultural postmodernism and postmodern culture (postmodernity). I am aware that this process of ordering the postmodern is problematic for any number of reasons. Among these is the suggestion that postmodernism, as an intellectual (aesthetic) movement, arises from particular social conditions. That is, postmodernism, can only be understood in terms of the emergence of a postmodern culture. In many ways this is the position which the editors of Arena (in its various incarnations) adopt in their critical engagement with the questions raised by postmodernism.3 Without suggesting that this complex engagement can be synthesised in this brief space, it is possible, nonetheless, to get a feel for this position from Gerry Gill's (1991) discussion on the 'social origins of postmodernism'. Gill argues that poststructuralism, as ideology, emerges within the Social Sciences and Humanities, carried by a more abstracted form of the social. An abstracted form whose penetration into culture is witnessed by a 'more fluid, open and arbitrary sign system', and which is produced by, and indeed produces, a 'self-active, self-synthesizing mode of subjectivity' (p.44). For Gill (1991):

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3 Arena was an Australian journal of 'marxist criticism and discussion'. Its successor from 1993, Arena Journal, is published as 'a place for theoretically and ethically concerned discussion on the prospects for cooperation within contemporary life. Our central focus is on interpretive and technical intellectual practices and their relation to the reconstruction of social processes: class relations, forms of selfhood and community life' (Jacket notes).
This ideology has been produced by and taken hold amongst people who are formed as 'ego-identities' in the open forms of the intellectual culture, they confront a world being penetrated and transformed by abstract intellect, and are placed at a distance from its more concrete practices by the highly wrought mental/manual division of labour. They are active subjects who stand in an abstract relation to an increasingly abstract society. (p.44)

The positions of both Wexler and Gill address a number of my concerns with the possibilities for/of intellectual abstraction (work) under contemporary social conditions. Most particularly these concerns centre on the ways in which the intellectually trained stand in such an abstract relation to class society, and occupy positions remote from the contexts, relations and Others which are the objects of their diverse forms of representation. In certain respects these experts and their forms of expertise are also constitutive of these very settings and the forms of identity which emerge, and are regulated in these settings. This point, as it relates to various forms of expertise which work to constitute Youth (at-Risk) as an artefact of government, will be developed in the discussion which follows. This form of analysis brings into the foreground the roles which expertise plays in the processes which structure contemporary conditions, and in the diverse attempts to regulate these processes.

The Politics of Representation

In many ways what concerns me in this engagement with postmodern representational problematics is how intellectual abstraction can contribute to a 'politics of social and cultural transformation' (Gill 1991) post postmodernity; that is after the foundational claims of the Social Sciences have been so thoroughly problematised. For Anna Yeatman (1993 a) this 'epistemological politics' is postmodernity's 'most interesting feature' (p.13). Yeatman's reading of postmodernism is one which disassociates itself from postmodern 'positivism', 'nihilistic relativism' and 'anomie' (p.10). Her 'critical postmodern feminism' is intimately concerned with 'an epistemological politics which contests and foresewars the foundationalist presuppositions of modern and modernist discursive formations' (p.13). A critical postmodern feminism presents, for Yeatman, a 'thoroughgoing critique' of classical theories of representation which were grounded in the notion that 'meaning or truth preceded and determined the representations that communicated it' (Ryan 1988, cited in Yeatman 1993 a, p.13). Yeatman's postmodern feminism, which problematises academic engagement with material and discursive realities via a 'politics of representation',

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interrogates the 'historically contingent, determinate but not closed, discursive or representational formation', in which reality is constituted (pp 13-14).

Set against this position are those postmodernisms and poststructuralisms (marked by a 'nihilistic relativism') which appear to argue that reality is merely representation and that representation is the play of often incommensurable 'language games'; so that the process of fixing meaning or representation does 'violence' to that which is represented. In terms of both the theoretical and political positions to be developed in this thesis this understanding of postmodernism generates considerable tension. My scepticism, often antagonism, in relation to some postmodernisms and poststructuralisms, surfaces out of a sense that being human constitutes, in part, an ongoing, never ending, intersubjective engagement in a variety of material and discursive social relations and formations with Others. These engagements, positive and/or negative, and always structured by relations of power (as dominance, as negotiation, as productive), are grounded in a struggle to construct, impose, share, fix, negotiate meaning and representation. Put another way, meaning and representation is possible and does occur in diverse settings and relations. In contemporary settings, for instance, vast numbers of experts and centres of expertise are engaged in processes of ordering, designing, developing and implementing governmental interventions and regulations which target youth(ful) populations via the identification of Risk factors. These ordering processes are structured by representations of young people, and of the various behaviours and dispositions (Risk factors) which are constructed as being consequential in their work of being and becoming. These technologies of government have profound, often dangerous consequences for the lived realities of young peoples' lives. They are decidedly more than playful, free floating, endlessly deferred surface effects; effects without referent. Youth(ful) bodies (as populations, as flesh), forms of regulation; and processes of normalisation which produce, and are produced in, these ordering processes, are at the same time both effects of these discourses, and the material objects (with depth) of these discourses. These issues are taken up by Gill (1991) who detects in many postmodern texts;

the echoes of Derrida's notion of play, Baudrillard's account of the modern image as 'simulacra', discourse theory, the end of grand-narrative theme. All this with a gush of insouciant celebration of the new era's openness,

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possibilities for playful hedonistic intellectual pleasures and the blowing apart of older constraints. (p.39)

At issue here is the purposiveness of intellectual work, the suggestion that for particular purposes, in particular contexts, in the (absent) presence of particular audiences, then particular forms of intellectual abstraction, and textual (cultural) production can be mobilised. There is no suggestion that for all times, purposes and contexts there is no place for 'hedonistic intellectual pleasures', or that 'older constraints' are, indeed, in need of 'blowing apart'. However, as Gill (1991) so strongly argues:

What gets up the noses of many of us is the way in which much postmodernism (as an 'ism' and as a sensibility) is implicitly or explicitly antipathetic to political, social or cultural struggle. Ours is an era of ecology crisis, nuclear weapons, intensifying social inequalities, an emerging under-society; a politics of social and cultural transformation equal to addressing these problems would have to be concerned with the development of shared understandings, interpretations, values and meanings, all sufficiently grounded, centred, fixed, strong and compelling to be the basis of common practices, struggles and commitments. Quite the reverse of the unconstrained play of images insouciantly celebrated by postmodernists. (p.39)

Similarly, John Knight (1995), adopts a sceptical stance in relation to the proposal that 'the age of totalizing frameworks and metanarratives' are, in reality, truly past. For Knight there is a 'fear' that a 'new synthesis of biology, psychology and sociology' is a 'dangerous' possibility. Such a possibility; suggested by science's continuing search for 'the grail of a unifying field theory': the possible development of a biological model which promises 'a fully developmental theory of the phenotype from gene to organism'; and developments in psychology which change 'our knowledge of the brain-mind interface' (p.33), portends a more 'thorough understanding of human nature', a new and effective technology of behaviour, a posthuman constructing indeed' (p.33). Knight's fears are grounded in the possibilities of 'for surveillance, schooling and training of Youth in this 'brave new posthumanworld'. A cogent rider to Knight's discussion, particularly in relation to intellectual practice in the Social Sciences (in Education more specifically) *post* postmodernism, suggests that these developments are occurring 'despite (indeed, ignoring) post-structuralism, post modernities, literary theories, nihilisms, existentialisms, sociologies, phenomenologies, hermeneutics' (p.33). And yet, argues Knight, 'we continue to debate the number of subject positions on the point of a pin' (p.33, emphasis added).
With due deference to these concerns I want to argue that postmodernism, as, principally, an academic discourse about the nature of academic discourses, has, indeed, rendered problematic the purposes, usefulness, and politics of intellectual work. It is for this reason that some engagement with these discourses is fundamental in this thesis' attempt to problematise Youth at-Risk discourses, and the positions (grounds) from which this critique might occur. Indeed post (modern and structuralist) discourses have been particularly problematic for Left theoretical and political practice.

The Problematic of the Observer

Recent debates in feminist, post colonial, poststructuralist and postmodernist discourses have problematised the notion of the intellectual worker (author) as the unitary, disinterested, objective, apolitical, seeker of truth. Such a problematisation has enabled epistemological issues to be constructed as political issues (Yeatman 1993 a). Within this epistemological politics, questions about what counts as worthwhile knowledge, the ways in which it might be produced and represented and the consequences, intended or otherwise, of these processes of knowledge (cultural) production have emerged as legitimate questions for intellectual workers. So too have questions about the intellectual worker as subject, as author. Michelle Fine (1994), for instance, argues that much qualitative research (critical, feminist, postmodern) continues, often contradictorily, to reproduce a 'colonizing discourse of the "Other"' (p.70). Often the intellectual tools of the social sciences are tools of 'domination' in their 'inventions of Others' (p.70). Fine's (1994) intent is to pose a 'messy series of questions about methods, ethics, and epistemologies as we rethink how researchers have spoken "of" and "for" Others while occluding ourselves and our own investments, burying the contradictions that percolate at the Self-Other hyphen' (p.70).

Fine (1994) argues that when we (academics/intellectuals) 'opt', in the traditions of objective, dispassionate, scientific, scholarship, to 'write about those who have been Othered, we deny the hyphen' (p.72, original emphasis). For Fine the hyphen is that (metaphorical) space where the Self and Other 'join in the politics of everyday life'. The hyphen, in this sense, is that space which 'both separates and merges personal identities

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6 Edward Said 1989

with our inventions of Others' (p.70). In the traditions of intellectual abstraction in the social sciences, scholars produce representations of Others via the 'god trick' (Haraway 1988) presuming, argues Fine (1994), 'to paint the Other from "nowhere"' (p.74). Fine suggests that in these institutionally structured spaces enduring notions of good science position some intellectuals to 'self consciously carry no voice, body, race, class or gender and no interests into their texts' (p.74). There is a sense in which this mode of intellectuality seeks to render the researcher transparent. Within this tradition of constructing (youthful) Others there is no recognition of the hyphen. This is a point that Edward Said (1989) also addresses:

Look at the many pages of the very brilliantly sophisticated argument in the works of the meta-theoretical [anthropological] scholars...and you will begin perhaps suddenly to note how someone, an authoritative, explorative, elegant, learned voice, speaks and analyzes, amasses evidence, theorizes, speculates about everything - except itself. Who speaks? For what and to whom? (Said, 1989 p.212, cited in Yeatman 1993 a, p.32)

Fine (1994) acknowledges the difficulties associated with working the space at the hyphen. She highlights the processes of identification in everyday life in which the Self is secured, however provisionally, via the construction, representation and positioning of that which is not Self; the Other. Fine also acknowledges that contradictions 'litter all narrative forms' and that such narratives 'about Others both inscribe and resist othering' (p.75). Given these difficulties research in the Social Sciences ought to acknowledge that it stands, always, in some relation to the reproduction of Self-Other binaries. It is in the spaces in which Fine (1994) positions her work, produced principally by feminist, post colonial and gay and lesbian scholarship, that I intend to acknowledge some of the interests and the tensions (embodied, classed, gendered) which contribute to the structuring of this discussion.

Much of the (Social, 'Psy') Scientific discourses which construct certain populations of young people in terms of being at-Risk, position these young people (as Others) in terms of deficiencies and deficits, deviance and delinquency. Beth Swadener and Sally Lubeck (1995), for instance, argue that in many respects the pervasive discourses of Risk in the 1990s are rearticulations, by both 'conservative' and 'left-liberal' intellectuals, of the discourse of 'cultural deficit' which 'locates problems or "pathologies" in individuals, families and communities rather than in institutional structures that create and maintain inequality' (p.3). Within these scholarly at-Risk discourses Swadener and Lubeck (1995) identify a 'long history' of intellectual Othering from both the Right and the Left.
Underpinning this history is an assumption of 'the need to correct or at least take into account', the deficits of the poor in those processes of surveillance and intervention which mark attempts to govern the behaviours and dispositions of these populations (p.3).

Fine (1994) also highlights the role of forms of expertise in the construction of the so called 'underclass' of poor adults and children, as Others. She cites from Michael Katz's (1993) analysis of the role of Social Scientific discourses in constructing and encoding a division between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. Much of this discourse, argues Fine (1994), works to 'insinuate' specific 'moral boundaries of deservingness' in research and policy representations which are appropriated by diverse groups in a manner which helps us to 'believe that we can distinguish (and serve) those who are "deserving" and neglect honorably those who are "undeserving" and poor' (p.74). These Others, who are 'banished' to the margins of official and popular discourses can then be constructed as 'unworthy, dangerous, and immoral, or as pitiable, victimized, and damaged' (p.74). The 'imperialism of such scholarship is evident when we consider whose 'lives get displayed', whose 'stories are surrounded by "compensatory" theory and whose 'dirty linen' gets 'protected' (p.73). As Fine (1994) argues, there is a sense in which much Social Scientific scholarship (Conservative and Left/Liberal) colludes, often by omission, in reproducing the poor as the dysfunctional Other to a privileged (white) 'normal', 'rational', 'transcendental' Subject:

Protected then, twice, by the absence of social surveillance - in welfare offices, from public agencies, through social researchers - and the absence of a scholarly discourse on their dysfunctionality, the elite, with their "new class" academic colleagues, retain a corpus of social science material that fingers Them while it powders the faces of Us. (p.73)

These twin processes of rendering visible the behaviours and dispositions of the poor, of the 'working class lads' and 'girls' (Willis 1977, McRobbie 1978), the 'louts and legends' (Walker 1988) in various contexts via the practice of intellectual abstraction; and, by omission, the rendering invisible of the behaviours and dispositions of those groups who are able to privatisé their dysfunctionality generates further tensions for the intellectual practice of representing the Other. In many respects, as Fine (1994) indicates, these concerns appear only as a consequence of attempts to explore the Self-Other hyphen; to make explicit a range of issues about the forms of Othering which might emerge in the new class process of constructing others (as Youth at-Risk).

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8 See also Lubeck & Garrett (1990).
These representational problematics are often structured by, and produce their own, tensions. Tensions and contradictions which exist in relation to institutionally structured patterns of exclusion, marginalisation, surveillance and intervention. Fine (1994), for instance, points to certain tensions in speaking for Others in institutional contexts which exclude the voices of these Others as 'underarticulated'. Certain aspects of her work include representing the 'words and voices' of marginalised (at-Risk) groups of young people who 'drop-out' of high school (Fine 1991). This representational practice occurs in 'texts', 'courts' and 'public policy debates', where her race and class privileges code her representations as 'good science' (p.80). In these spaces Fine (1994) argues that the 'power of my translation comes far more from my whiteness, middle-classness, and education than from the stories I tell' (p.80). Yet Yeatman (1993 a) argues that this 'problematic of the observer' (Said 1989) is 'irresolvable'. Particularly if this accounting for positionality is to avoid becoming a 'self-referential', 'confessional discourse' - 'I am a white, working class, heterosexual male, would be academic. And telling you this somehow explains why I do what I do!' In this instance positioning oneself explicitly as a working class hetero male academic 'thrusts a politics of positionality back into the confessional modes of accountability of the bourgeois sovereign self' (Yeatman 1993 a, p.23). It is as Yeatman suggests, a mode of address, or an attempt at accountability which takes the form of closure, cutting off the possibility of dialogue within 'political publics' or audiences by admitting no discussion of what it might mean, for an epistemological politics, to be...whatever. As Yeatman (1993 a) argues: 'Positionality cannot be declared in advance. A politics of positionality - and the accountability it enjoins for specific subjects - is specified in terms of the dialogical, rhetorical practices which open up in any particular discursive terrain'(p 23). In other words, it is not enough to simply declare or identify beforehand one's position(s) and situate oneself as the sovereign subject/author. The practice of intellectual abstraction ought to work through discursively, in a manner which attempts to avoid intellectual authoritarianism or closure, the problematic of representation.

Further, within the tensions which Fine (1994) foregrounds in relation to the institutional structuring of privilege and marginalisation, there is a sense, as Yeatman (1993 a) demonstrates, that attempts to produce 'reasonably good and democratic policy' rest on the practice of observation and representation of Others by 'oppositional intellectuals' (p.39). That is, the institutional position of Intellectual can confer certain forms of legitimacy to the modes of analysis I (we) might mobilise. A legitimacy marked in terms of 'good science' or 'scholarly work'. In this sense a politics of withdrawal or retreat does nothing to alter the institutional landscape within which Youth at-Risk is generated and located.
Instead, this institutional legitimacy can be mobilised within the spaces generated by these tensions, in ways which attempt to problematise the modes of intellectual abstraction which construct certain populations of young people as being at-Risk.\(^9\)

Foucault (1984) provides one other way of thinking about the issues generated within this 'problematic of the observer'. In problematising the 'author-function' Foucault 'hopes' for social (intellectual) conditions where 'We would no longer hear the questions that have been rehashed for so long: Who really spoke? Is it really he and not someone else? With what authenticity or originality? and what part of his deepest self did he express in his discourse?' (p.119) In place of such inquiries, and guided by 'an indifference' to who is speaking ('What difference does it make who is speaking?') Foucault proposes that more important questions could include: 'What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?' (p.120).\(^10\)

Intellectual abstraction, as a work practice of new class experts, positions members of this new class in certain Self-Other representational relations: in this instance, with certain populations of young people constructed as being at-Risk. A construction which, in part, rehearses notions of cultural deficit in those populations constructed as being most at-Risk (working class youth, young people from non Anglo backgrounds, indigenous youth, young women in all these populations, Finn Review 1991). Of concern also is the manner in which the discourse of Risk takes as one object a certain construction of the 'mass mind', or working class consciousness. This is a way of conceiving the problem of the Risks for these populations which is structured by a 'logic of transformation' (Walkerdine 1997). That is, the factors which put such populations at-Risk need to be identified and programs of intervention formulated in order to transform these Risky practices and behaviours. What I

\(^9\)Foucault's intellectual and political practice is one instance which illustrates this point well. Didier Eribon's (1991) biography highlights Foucault's practice as an oppositional intellectual in French governmental spaces commanded, at different times, by both the Gaullists and the Socialists.

\(^10\)The English translations of Foucault's work always use the masculine pronoun. To avoid an excessive use of [sic] I will cite this work as translated. At the same time I would indicate here my awareness of the problems and possibilities some feminists have identified with Foucault's work (among these its problematisation of the possibility of a feminist emancipatory project, and its apparent silence on gender relations; see for instance McNay 1992, Lloyd, 1996, Sawicki 1996).
want to move towards, in terms of theoretical and political practice, is the 'dangerousness', in a Foucauldian sense, of the forms of surveillance and intervention which are mobilised within this logic of transformation. This concern can be situated, more generally, in the context of a theoretical and political 'Crisis of the Left'.

**A Crisis for/of the Left.**

**Left on the Margins**

Stuart Hall's work (particularly 1988 a) provides one way of thinking how this problematic of representation is constitutive of a crisis of for the Left (broadly constructed). In terms of political and intellectual practice the Left continues to struggle to find some ground from which changed material and discursive realities can be broadly engaged. Hall's work has been structured by a sustained theoretical and political engagement with Thatcherism; as an instance of (Neo)Liberalism triumphant within a particular historical, cultural and national space - Britain in the last four decades of the 20th century. For Hall (1988 a), the ascendency of Thatcherism is intimately connected to: in the first instance, the contradictions and crises of Labour Party government during the 1960s and 1970s; in the second instance, 'the left's historic incapacity...to meet the challenge of Thatcherism on equal terms' (p.2).12

11It could be argued that various social movements such as Feminism, Gay Liberation, Post colonial (Indigenous, Black) Coalitions - have been successful in developing theoretical and political positions structured by a politics of identity and difference. It would be appropriate also to think of a number of these positions as being broadly Left. However, such successes are fragile and often strategically challenged by the mainstream. Moreover, this mainstream includes sections of what might be considered the Old Left, and its constituencies - groupings who do not identify with, indeed may be alienated, by this politics of difference. A politics of representation which was framed within narratives of Ordinary Mainstream Australians vs Special Interest Elites (read Feminists, Ethnic Groups, Unionists) was successfully mobilised by the Liberal (Conservative) Party of Australia in its Federal election victory of 1996.

12A situation not necessarily changed by the election of Tony Blair's 'New Labour' Party in May 1997. Debate continues on whether this victory was a challenge to Thatcherism on 'equal terms', or on its own terms. Indeed, understanding these processes in terms of a problematisation of government shifts attention from political rhetoric to the practices of government facilitated by the activities of expertise. In this sense transformations in the practice of government can be understood other than as a shift in ideology. This argument will be developed in Chapters 5 and 6.
The challenge of (Neo)Liberalism is complex, multifaceted and played out, strategically, through various political, economic, cultural and ideological 'articulations' (Hall 1985). Indeed, in later chapters I want to argue that one way of understanding the complexity, and importantly the contingent, partial and provisional nature of these 'articulations', is to think of (Neo)Liberalism in terms of governmentality; that is, as a mentality or rationality of government. Government here is understood in terms of the historically contingent attempts to conduct the conduct of certain populations (Foucault 1991). Thatcherism, in this sense, attempts to regulate and govern;

the recomposition and 'fragmentation' of the historic relations of representation between classes and parties; the shifting boundaries between state and civil society, 'public' and 'private'; the emergence of new arenas of contestation, new sites of social antagonism, new social movements, and new social subjects and political identities in contemporary society. (Hall 1988 a, p.2)

Hall's (1988 a) response to these social transformations, and the apparent inability of the Left to politically and theoretically engage, in the broad sense, with these new alignments, these new articulations of identity and government and regulation, has been to formulate strategic interventions into Left theoretical and political discourse which 'avoids the temptations to economism, reductionism or teleological forms of argument' (p.3). In Hall's (1988 a) view, Left political and ideological analysis, as 'conventionally practiced', lacks any:

sense of the specificity or real effectivity of what we might call the political and ideological instances in the shaping of contemporary developments. This is not because the left is stupid but because, in both its orthodox Marxist and economistic variants, it tends to hold to a very reductionist conception of politics and ideology where, 'in the last instance' (whenever that is) both are determined by, and so can be 'read off' against, some (often ill-defined) notion of 'economic' or 'class' determination...it is partly the product of inherited habits of a low-flying economism masquerading as 'materialism', or the search for some philosophical guarantee that the law of history will, like Minerva's owl, take wing at five minutes to midnight, rescuing us from the vicissitudes of the present. If Thatcherism has done nothing else, it has surely destroyed for good these fatal consolations. (pp.3-4)

Much contemporary Left intellectual and political practice concerns itself with attempts to theorise the Subjectivity (Psychology) of the Other (the masses), in order to understand the 'vicissitudes of the present'. The masses (rendered knowable via ever more sophisticated
articulations of Gender, Class, Ethnicity, Geography) who are seemingly so easily duped and unaware of the contradictions of (Neo)Liberalism; the masses, who in a post war explosion of consumerism, have foregone the possibility of transforming the conditions of their oppression and settled for the politics of Individualism offered by (Neo)Liberalism (Walkerdine 1997). Indeed, for the Left, the masses are a central and ongoing cause of concern.

**New Class (Left) Intellectuals and the Problem of/with the Masses**

The changed material and discursive conditions of 'new times' generate a deal of tension in much Left intellectual practice in the Social Sciences (Education more specifically). Smith (1995) characterises this tension as a 'concern about the intellectual role as such in an age when it is increasingly perceived as irrelevant by the very people whose interests academics value' (p.3). I intend to argue that a key element in the structuring of this tension within Left intellectual practice is a continued (unproblematised) attachment to the emancipatory project of Education, as a practice of (transformative) enlightenment, and to the role of the intellectual in this project. This critical project continues to be structured, at a quite fundamental level, by the practice of ideology critique.

As a practice, ideology critique is suggestive of notions of true and false consciousness; of ideology as the masking of the true or real nature of oppressive social practices and relations; and of intellectual practice as a critical engagement with these practices in the process of revealing (unmasking) their true nature. As an intellectual practice ideology critique positions the Left intellectual in the *vanguard of history*, profoundly implicated in the project of enabling liberatory or emancipatory processes of knowledge production (pedagogies). In some instances these processes aim to enable young people to come to a more critical, reasoned understanding of the true nature of their existence. Alternatively, those involved in the government and regulation of youth(ful) populations can develop a less false, more true, understanding of the oppressive nature of the practices which structure this government. In this sense, these false understandings position non-intellectuals as the *dupes of history*. Ideology critique, as a practice of new class academics, and the liberatory project of Critical Theories, will result in the emancipation of these subjects. The *end of history* if you like.

Such a *bald* explication of the practice of ideology critique runs the risk of creating a straw target. A target which can be easily picked off, say, from a poststructuralist perspective. Such an explication would also be difficult to find in the critical theory literature.
Nevertheless, I would argue that whilst such a bald outline would be difficult to find there would be traces, or shadowings, of just such a position in much recent feminist, poststructuralist and critical postmodernist theorising, particularly in Education. This is precisely the argument of Julie McLeod (1995) in her examination of the intersection(s) of feminist poststructuralism and Education theory; a convergence in which poststructuralism powerfully critiques the 'universalist and transcendental claims of critical theory', yet then exhibits a tendency to reinscribe Education with 'new dreams of liberation' within 'utopian pedagogical projects' (pp.34-48, particularly pp.45-46).

Such shadowings are also evident, for example, in the Left intellectual practice of Henry Giroux (1990). This intellectual practice, given expression in his theorisation of a 'critical postmodern border pedagogy', exhibits a continuing attachment to the emancipatory potentialities of Schooling. Giroux (1990) argues that 'at its best', critical pedagogy is an engaged, critical practice, enabled and authorised by teachers (intellectuals) as 'transformative intellectuals'. In part, this practice is structured by the 'utopian project of educating students simultaneously to locate themselves in their particular histories and to confront the limits of their own perspectives' (p.33). 'Border pedagogy', more specifically, is attentive to postmodernism's redefinition of 'community', 'language', 'space' and 'possibility'. Further, within this redefined critical project there is not only an 'acknowledgment of the shifting borders that both undermine and reterritorialise different configurations of power and knowledge'; there is also, a vision which links the 'emancipatory notion of modernism with a postmodernism of resistance' (pp.33-34).

The work of Valerie Walkerdine (1997) illuminates certain tensions generated within this form of (Left) intellectual practice. In a number of spaces (books, articles, therapy) Walkerdine has attempted to give voice to various tensions she experiences in relation to being educated out of her English suburban working class childhood and up to a position of prestige and success within the academic middle (new) class. Walkerdine (1997) argues that her Left intellectual practice needs to be 'understood' in the context of a central preoccupation and tension in her work as a new class academic; 'the place of the working class in Left and feminist theory'. For Walkerdine there is a strong sense in which she has been long 'smouldering about middle class views of the ordinary working people with whom I grew up' (pp.12-13).

Walkerdine (1997) begins to trace her 'anger' in relation to much Feminist and Left constructions of The Working Classes via the work of British Cultural Studies theorists
Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart. Walkerdine suggests that both Williams and Hoggart identify some of the tensions associated with the experience of being 'educated out of the working class', and of moving up the social ladder. The climb up the ladder, both metaphorically and literally, is, suggests Walkerdine (1997), a phenomenon which incites tensions within working class lifeworlds. This process, motivated by family concerns for a better life for rising generations, provides a strong impulse for working class children to be educated 'out of their culture and into a new one and of course, in so doing, rise above their parents and community' (p.13). Implicitly, and often quite explicitly, the social ladder, as metaphor, marks working class culture in terms of deficit and lack. It is in this sense, a cultural milieu which is found wanting or lacking in relation to the middle class lifeworlds further up the ladder.

While Raymond Williams argued that there are, indeed, 'no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses', Walkerdine (1997), drawing on Foucault, argues that the 'idea of the masses is a fiction, a concept made to be truthful in the regulation of ordinary working people' (pp. 14-15). Here the distinction to be made is between the idea that the masses as fiction works as an ideology imposed on subjects; and the Foucauldian notion that the concept of the masses as a regime of truth suggests a range of 'practices of disciplining and regulation which are, at the same time, practices for the formation of subjects' (p.15). In this sense, the working classes, as the Objects of particular problematisations constructed by various expert systems, exist as a 'fiction functioning in truth'. For Walkerdine (1997) these fictions have, historically, exhibited little 'interest in the way that working people actually survived and lived and coped during particular historical periods in particular places and circumstances'. Rather, what has been of central importance in these fictions are the 'discourses and practices of how they might become something else' (p.32). In Left and Liberal intellectual and governmental traditions, then, the 'concern about the conditions of the masses' was a concern with how to transform the masses, either in the direction of revolution, or in the cause of regulation and government (p.33). For Walkerdine (1997) certain 'assumptions about the mind of the masses have been central to their regulation' (p.15). In many respects the masses have occupied a space in Anglo and European intellectual and governmental traditions as the 'object of fear, phobia and fetish' (p.32). These assumptions constitute a series of 'fantasies which are centrally projections', by various forms of middle class expertise onto the working class (p.15). Particular constructions of the working classes as 'lacking in self-control and self-regulation', as being 'dangerous' and the 'opposite of civilized man' have functioned as truths in these governmental programs (pp.29-30). Diverse governmental projects, which take as their
objects the mind of the working class, are structured, Walkerdine (1997) argues, by a rationality which positions 'middle classness' as 'normal', and 'working classness' as the Other; a 'deviant pathology' to be transformed where possible by 'correctional strategies that will make working class subjects more like their middle-class counterparts' (p.29); which will make at-Risk Youth more like Normal Youth.

The assumption by Left intellectuals in Cultural Studies, for instance, of an 'active resisting audience', is, for Walkerdine (1997), of a similar order to the 'mainstream' assumption of a 'docile, easily manipulable mass mind' (p.15). What is at work here are processes of middle class projection onto a mass working class of 'fantasies of Otherness which invest the class with everything which is either, good and revolutionary, or bad and reactionary'. Walkerdine 'suspects' that these projections are indeed 'poles of the same fantasy' (pp.15-16). These fantasies of the mind of the masses have a long history in diverse forms of intellectual abstraction; a lineage which Walkerdine (1997) traces through the emergence of social psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis, and the Frankfurt School's Marxist account of the rise of Fascism and Nazism as being 'linked to particular forms of personality: a psychopathology of the masses' (p.17). This work on the mind of the masses was also, as Walkerdine argues, to be found in Marxist accounts of ideology and the formation of working class consciousness. The masses, in this fantasy, had to be transformed in order to conceive of themselves as a class 'which was conscious of the exploitation and oppression which formed it' (p.17). Only then would such a class be 'capable of facing and transforming the conditions of its oppression' (p.17). Walkerdine's (1997) engagement with these essentially middle class projections onto the working class provoked a strong sense that;

this Marxist idea demonstrated not the least interest in ordinary working people who did not display the necessary self knowledge, and that it implicitly therefore blamed such people for their own oppression. Furthermore, in practical terms there had always to be a group of others whose job it was to make people see, to understand their own position. This role is usually taken by the middle-class intellectual left, for whom ordinary working people are always potentially the solution and always actually the problem. (pp.17-18, emphasis added)

The Left intellectual practices which generated subcultural theories of Youth are a case in point. Walkerdine (1997) argues that the intellectual Left, in producing subcultural studies of youth(ful) resistance, demonstrated an ambivalence to the working classes that they took as the objects of their investigations. This objectification of the masses, and the forms of
representation employed by these new class intellectuals suggested that they were 'only interested in those aspects of cultural production which could be understood as subversive of, and resistant to, the status quo' (p.19). This tendency, suggests Walkerdine, is evident in the 'fascination for, and fetishization of, the Other'; where these Others are 'working class youth resisting through rituals, anti-school lads and safety-pinned punks' (p.19).  

This is a criticism echoed by Roman (1987) (although her initial fascination with the spectacle of punk provided the impetus for her semiotic reading of punk femininity), and by other feminists in Cultural Studies (Roman and Christian-Smith 1988, Harrison 1995). McRobbie (1982), for instance, in an early feminist reading of Willis (1977) and Hebdige (1979), raises two points which are relevant to this present discussion. In the first instance such accounts of male working class youth subcultures by male Left intellectuals displayed a tendency to get lost in the romance and thrill of it all. 'Writing about subcultures', argues McRobbie, 'isn't the same thing as being in one' (p.40). In the second instance this 'Sociology of Crime/Deviance/Subculture' can be understood, historically, as a challenge to the institutional 'hegemony of Parsonian functionalism'. McRobbie (1982) argues that in the 'vanguard of this attack' were the 'radical young sociologists' recruited from the 'New Left, from the student movement of the late Sixties and even from the hippie counterculture'. This new class, Left intellectual vanguard was, prior to the emergence of Feminism in the institutional spaces of the academy during the 1970s, fundamentally concerned with a critique of 'the family, the bourgeois commitments of children and the whole sphere of family consumption' (p.39). In some senses, suggests McRobbie (1982), the 'literary sensibility of urban romanticism that resonates across most youth subcultural discourses' (p.40), is indicative of an intellectual practice which defines itself 'against the family and the trap of romance as well as against the boredom of meaningless labour' (p.39). In so doing, this practice gives the appearance of being 'drawn to look at other, largely working class groups who appear to be doing the same thing' (p.39).

This fetishization of spectacular working class youth subcultures by new class Left intellectuals positions negatively, or ignores completely, the less spectacular, the invisible majority of working class youth. The great mass of ordinary working class people (kids) often remained outside the inquisitive gaze of those Cultural Studies theorists intent on not constructing the working class in terms of a quiescent mass. Philip Brown (1987) positions his study of Schooling Ordinary Kids in relation to this intellectual tradition which assumes

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that 'ordinary kids have not been an appealing object of sociological enquiry', or that such kids are 'somehow duped into quiescence' in settings contrary to their class interests (p.3). Brown argues, however, that for the great mass of ordinary working class kids, school life is marked by efforts to construct some sense of command of their lives and some sense of dignity and respect, and to 'get on' in a working class career after school (p.3). In this sense Brown's (1987) work is about the 'invisible majority' of 'ordinary working class pupils who neither 'left their name engraved on the school's honour boards, nor gouged them into the tops of classroom desks' (p.1).

Walkerdine's (1997) engagement with new class Left intellectual practices provoked a sense that her working class childhood lacked any of the markers of 'exotic sub-cultural resistance that cultural studies wanted to find' (p.19). For Walkerdine, this lack had the effect of making 'me feel dully conformist and once more to see my life as worthless' (p.20). The tensions provoked by Walkerdine's step up into new class intellectual spaces can be understood in ways other than as the idiosyncratic inadequacies of one individual getting above herself. It might be more appropriate to see in such responses certain historical tensions generated by middle class Left intellectual constructions of, investments in, and assumptions about the masses. Walkerdine (1997) suggests that, historically, certain new class intellectual fantasies of the working class have been mobilised for particular purposes. These purposes include (crudely put); 'to regulate the workers, to produce the revolution, to combat a political pessimism, to show that the working classes were not duped, to allay the fears of the masses taking over' (p.25). A common logic underpins these diverse accounts of the mind of the masses. These processes of intellectual knowledge production are fundamentally framed by a transformative logic. Within this logic there is a sense that mass consciousness and working class culture are marked by a deficit or lack. The identification and construction of these lacks then becomes the impetus for transformative interventions into the lifeworlds of the masses in order for these deficits to be overcome.

The transformative logic which structures aspects of Left intellectual practice rehearses these discourses of deficit and lack in critiquing the complicity of the working classes in the triumph of (Neo)Liberal political projects in the Liberal Democracies. This (cultural) deficit model of the masses provokes an unproblematised mobilisation of a logic of transformation; a logic which locates both the problem of, and the solution to (Neo)Liberalism in the transformation of the mind of the masses. This is a framing of the problem and the solution which 'fingers' the masses while rendering non problematic the
positions of new class Left intellectuals as purveyors of truth. In order to problematise the truth of Youth at-Risk the processes of discursive (truth) production by new class Left intellectuals need, themselves, to be rendered problematic. Stuart Hall's (1985) theorisation of 'articulation' is a useful step in this direction.

**Necessary Correspondence is Different to Necessarily No Correspondence is Different to No Necessary Correspondence.**

Hall's (1988a) engagement with (Neo)Liberalism's attempts to rearticulate and realign the relationships between the State, Civil Society, the Economy and the Self, is useful in structuring an examination of similar transformations in the Australian social context. These transformations, not necessarily understood as progressive, or oppressive, do, indeed, exhibit certain globalising characteristics. These changing relationships are seen as being both consequential to the regulation and government of youth(ful) populations - (Neo)Liberalism's redefinition of the Welfare State and the government of (one)Self is important here; and to ways in which the Left has, more or less unsuccessfully, responded (reacted) to these developments. Hall's (1985) theorisation of 'articulation' provides one way to think differently the processes of truth production about Youth at-Risk. He achieves this both in relation to poststructuralism's emphasis on the socially constructed nature of the reality of Youth at-Risk; and in relation to the traces in some Left discourses of a residual attachment to a true mode of being and representation. These questions are addressed by Hall (1985) through a rethinking of Marxist notions of ideology, in which the 'social' was 'determined' by a 'necessary correspondence' with the 'economic'; the classical formulation of base/superstructure. Hall argues that in 'advanced post-structuralist theorising', which retreats from this 'necessary correspondence', there has occurred an almost 'unstoppable philosophical slide all the way over to the opposite side'. That is, there has been a 'slippage' into what 'sounds almost the same but is in substance radically different - the declaration that there is 'necessarily no correspondence' (p.94). An expression, suggests Hall, which summarises some poststructuralist positions that 'nothing really connects with anything else', or that, 'of necessity', there is 'no correspondence' (p.94). Hall's (1985) position is that: 'I do not accept that simple inversion. I think that what we have discovered is that there is no necessary correspondence, which is different'. What is more, the notion that there is no necessary correspondence 'implies that there is no necessary non-correspondence' (p.94, original emphasis).

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In terms of understanding ideology as the 'systems of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another' (p.103), this identification of 'no necessary correspondence' between the conditions, or origins of a social relation and/or practice and the various ways that it can be represented makes the epistemological ground of ideology critique problematic. As Hall argues: 'Every social practice is constituted within the interplay of meaning and representation and can itself be represented. In other words, there is no social practice outside of ideology' (p.103). Ideology can, thus, be understood as the systems of representation in which we 'live'; not in some purely biological, genetic form but as 'the life of experiencing, within culture meaning and representation. It is not possible to bring ideology to an end and simply live the real'. Moreover, we will 'always need systems through which we represent what the real is to ourselves and others' (p.104). The problem which this creates for ideology critique as a fundamental aspect of Left intellectual practice is summed up by Hall (1985):

The point at which we lose sight of the fact that sense is a production of our systems of representation is the point at which we fall, not in to Nature [or common sense] but into the naturalistic illusion: the height (or depth) of ideology. Consequently, when we contrast ideology to experience, or illusion to authentic truth we are failing to recognize that there is no way of experiencing the "real relations" of a particular society outside of its cultural and ideological categories. (p.105)

Here Hall's (1985) theorisation of articulation, of the conditions of existence of particular truths, provides a bridge to Foucault's (1983) problematisations of the conditions of possibility which enable discourses (of Youth at-Risk) to function as true. Hall (1985) uses the notion to enable an understanding of what he calls the necessity of thinking 'unity and difference; difference in complex unity, without this becoming a hostage to the privileging of difference as such' (p.93 original emphasis). A key point to this discussion is the manner in which Hall (1985) engages with poststructuralism's focus on difference; difference as a marker of various forms of social contradictions, its origins and its social effects (p.92); and difference as (Derridean) difference or the endless deferral of meaning, the perpetual slippage of the signifier (p.93). For Hall, this poststructuralist tendency to 'privileged difference as such', and to emphasise (celebrate) this perpetual slippage ignores, in an important institutional context, the ways in which the State, for instance, 'condenses' or 'articulates' meaning around any number of domains; for example, society, family, gender, youth, the economy. This government is achieved, more or less successfully, through a 'systematic practice of regulation, of rule and norm, of normalization, within society. The
State condenses very different social practices and transforms them into the operation of rule and domination over particular classes and other social groups' (p.93).

Articulation in Hall's (1985) usage refers to a linkage or joining together 'which is not necessarily given in all cases', but which, indeed, depends on certain 'conditions of existence', if it is to exist at all. Further, such articulations have to be 'positively sustained by specific processes', they are not 'eternal', and they have to be 'constantly renewed'. Moreover, under certain circumstances these articulations can disappear, or be 'overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections - re-articulations - being forged' (p.113). The concept of articulation provides a way of thinking about 'difference in complex unity'. As Hall (1985) argues:

> It is also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that they become identical or that the one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct determinations and conditions of existence. However, once an articulation is made, the two practices can function together, not as an "immediate identity" (in the language of Marx's "1857 Introduction") but as "distinctions within a unity". (pp.113-114)

Hall makes this discussion more concrete by exploring the different meanings which his 'blackness' connotes in different contexts and relationships; in different class and economic relationships, and in different cultural and geographic settings in the West Indies, the UK and the USA. Hall (1985) argues that: 'The same term, in short, carried quite different connotations because it operated within different "systems of differences and equivalences". It is the position within the different signifying chains which "means", not the literal, fixed correspondence between an isolated term and some denotated position in the colour spectrum' (p.108).

This theorisation of articulation, then, provides one way of exploring the processes by which various experts and centres of expertise attempt to construct a pervasive, dominant understanding that schooling, training, cognitive skills, and international competitiveness should be key signifiers in contemporary efforts to regulate and govern youth(ful) populations. Risk, too, emerges as a key linkage in this articulation. Hall's (1985) use of the concept of articulation points to the fluid, partial, contingent, and inherently unstable nature of these articulations; their 'not necessary' character. This a position, in terms of a representational politics, which enables Hall (1985) to question: 'What is ideology but precisely this work of fixing meaning through establishing, by selection and combination, a
chain of 'equivalences' (p.93). Importantly, without this fixing, this articulation, 'there would be no signification, no meaning at all' (p.93).

Important here, also, is Hall's (1985) suggestion that ideologies are not singular; there is no ideological moment of false consciousness in the sense that ideologies operate, 'in discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic fields, in discursive formations'. Further, these systems of representation, 'connote-summon-one another. So a variety of different ideological systems or logics are available in any social formation' (p.104). Understood in this way, notions of 'dominant' and 'subordinated' ideologies emerge as inadequate for the task of 'representing the complex interplay of different ideological discourses and formations' (p.104). In contemporary complex systems an ideological field is not constituted as a formation of 'mutually exclusive and internally self-sustaining discursive chains'. Instead, argues Hall (1985), these various 'clusters' contest, and possibly contradict each other, 'often drawing on a common, shared repertoire of concepts, rearticulating and disarticulating them within different systems of difference or equivalence' (p.104).

Understanding ideology in this way, as a signifying process, as a representational process, is a generative step away from understanding ideology in terms of a 'false consciousness'; an understanding which suggests a true consciousness; a truth or reality which in terms of meaning is outside of representation or ideology.

Towards a Problematising Intellectual Practice

This interrogation of Hall's (1985) engagement with postmodern and poststructuralist problematisations of representation and meaning, and his theorisation of articulation enables a movement away from some of the reductionist and essentialist tendencies of Left critique in relation to the regulation of youth(ful) populations. This essentialism finds expression in the practice of ideology critique; a practice embedded in narratives of truth, emancipation and oppression, and of history 'as the resting place of the identity of an ahistorical subject, and the scene of a final reconciliation of humanity with nature, reason or itself' (Dean 1994, p.4). Mitchell Dean (1994) identifies his 'critical and effective histories' (what Foucault has called 'histories of the present') as 'problematising' practices. This form of intellectual practice is, for Dean grounded in an analysis 'of the trajectory of the historical forms of truth and knowledge without origin or end'. This intellectual practice retains its critical impulse by dint of its refusal of 'taken-for-granted components of our reality and the 'official' accounts of how they come to be what they are' (p.4). As a problematising activity this practice is 'geared toward the critical use of history to make intelligible the possibilities in the present and so can yield to neither universalist concepts
of rationality and subjectivity nor meta narratives of progress, reason or emancipation' (p.21).

Ian Hunter (1994) problematises both the 'principled position' of the critical intellectual in Education, and the mode of being (comportment) which is embodied in this position, that of the 'self reflecting moral person'. Hunter argues that a less 'principled' intellectual practice would involve letting go of 'metaphysical distinctions between the ideal and the real, the abstract and the concrete, theory and history' (p.3). With regard to critiquing schooling as the 'failed realisation of a 'deeper' or 'higher' educational principle' Hunter suggests, instead, a position which treats 'adherence to educational principle itself as an historical phenomenon'. This principled position, this 'adherence to the principle of self-reflective and self realising personhood', ought, rather, be understood 'as a practice engaged in by a particular category of individual for particular ends'; it is an 'historical practice' of particular social groups (pp.3-4). In this sense the elevation of this practice of the Self to the status of the realisation of the fullest development of human potential, and the positioning of this practice as being repressed by the 'actually existing' (Hall 1988 a) Schooling system, needs to be problematised. Elsewhere Hunter (1993) rehearses Marcel Mauss' (1985) argument that the Subject of Consciousness,

is the product of religious and moral institutions peculiar to the West. The capacity to problematise one's conducts and abilities by relating them to an inner principle of ethical self-scrutiny and control is indeed a real capacity, but it is not the foundation of these abilities and it does not lie behind all departments of life. (p.128)

Hunter (1993) argues that this capacity to 'conduct oneself as the 'subject' of one's thoughts and actions' is, then, a 'product of special ethical practices with a specific distribution (as can be seen in the formation of strata of priests, intellectuals and other ethical virtuosi)' (pp.128-129). The work of Mauss and Weber, suggests Hunter (1993), demonstrates the historically novel character of 19th and 20th century attempts to mobilise this comportment across National populations via 'Protestant pedagogy' and mass, universal, compulsory schooling. This problematisation of the Subject has profound implications for both understanding the conditions of existence of the truth of Youth at-Risk, and for rendering problematic this truth. Rendered problematic also is the transformative logic of Education which constructs youth(ful) populations (at-Risk) in terms of deficit or lack. As Hunter (1993) argues:
If by agency we mean human capacities for thought and action then, given the irreducible positivity, variety and dispersion of the technologies of existence and conduct of life in which such capacities are formed, it is implausible to assume that agency has a general form; and it is even more implausible to identify this general form with that special Western conduct that we call the formation of the subject. (p.129)

What are young people at-Risk of not becoming? What forms of identity are they at-Risk of not performing? What might be the grounds on which concerns with particular forms of identity be constructed? Youth at-Risk; the behaviours and dispositions which position Youth at-Risk; the forms of future (Adult) personhood placed at-Risk by these present behaviours and dispositions; and the forms of intellectually produced knowledge which generate discourses of Risk around (ideal) constructions of human identity are rendered problematic via this problematisation of the Subject. The following Chapter develops this argument further by considering Youth (at-Risk) as an artefact of diverse forms of Expertise.
CHAPTER THREE:
YOUTH (AT-RISK) AS AN ARTEFACT OF EXPERTISE

Introduction

In Governing the Soul Nikolas Rose (1990) is concerned with examining the ‘powers that have come to bear upon the subjective existence of people and their relations one with another: political power, economic power, institutional power, expert power, technical power, cognitive power’ (p.ix). Central to this project is an examination of the ways in which the government of human subjects ‘has become bound up with innovations and developments in a number of scientific discourses that have rendered knowable the normal and pathological functioning of humans’ (p.ix). The ’Psy’ Sciences, Criminology, Sociology, Cultural Studies, Critical Pedagogy, Feminism, Bio-Genetics..., the whole panoply of institutionalised expert discourses are implicated in processes which have;

taken up and transformed problems offered by political, economic, and moral strategies and concerns, and...have made these problems thinkable in new ways and governable with new techniques. In the course of these events these ways of knowing have profoundly and irreversibly transformed political rationalities, institutional life, moral discourse and personal life itself. (Rose 1990, p.ix)

In this chapter I will develop a framework which enables an engagement with long run historical processes of expert knowledge production about the truths of Youth; an engagement which suggests that Youth can be understood as an artefact of both these diverse forms of expertise, and of attempts by these expert systems to regulate (govern) the behaviours and dispositions of populations of Youth, via the mobilisation of the truths of Youth produced by these forms of expertise. As Rose (1990) argues;

For perhaps a century and a half, social and political concerns have linked the rearing and well-being of children with the welfare of society at large. Social ills from crime and juvenile delinquency to military defeat and industrial decline have been connected with incorrect or ignorant practices of child care within the family. Around the child, lines of force have been established between the objectives of government and the minute details of conjugal, domestic and parental behaviour. (p.xi)

Rose's (1990) work, and the work of this chapter, is indebted to Michel Foucault's problematisations of Power (and its effects), and of the Subject. Much of the intellectual
and political work of this chapter is concerned with interrogating these problematisations; an interrogation which is fundamental to thinking the nature and the effects of attempts to regulate populations of Youth at-Risk in the Liberal Democracies at the end of the 20th century. This historical situation of Youth at-Risk is important. Youth at-Risk represents both a continuity and a break with historical processes of regulating Youth. The last section of this chapter begins an engagement with Giddens' (1990) theories of (reflexive) modernity. This orientation to the 'nature of modernity' foregrounds the institutional reflexivity of modernity, and the ways in which expertise is fundamentally implicated in these processes of reflexivity. There are, I will argue, certain productive intersections between aspects of theories of governmentality and Giddens' (1990) way of constructing modernity. These convergences enable a focus on the ways in which various experts in diverse centres of expertise, construct the truth of Youth at-Risk, and how, in contemporary settings, this truth comes to mean so powerfully.

**Youth as an Artefact of Expertise**

**Youth Studies: In the Realm of the Experts**

A point of entry into this discussion is provided by a debate begun in the pages of *Youth Studies Australia* in 1992, which took as its object the theoretical means available for telling the truth about Youth. This debate is useful for a number of reasons. In the first instance it introduces Foucault's problematisations of Power and of the Subject into the intellectual domain of Youth Studies. In the second instance this debate foregrounds the contestation between particular intellectual traditions as forms of truth telling in relation to Youth. This debate, then, is indicative of the processes of colonisation, and constitution of Youth (as population, as discourse), by diverse forms of expertise. These processes work at a number of levels; via the construction of a concept of Youth, a concept rendered knowable in particular ways; through the emergence of an (institutionalised) intellectual domain named as Youth Studies; and through the contestation within this domain between the expertise of Psychologists, Sociologists, Youth Work professionals, Cultural Studies academics..., over claims to tell the truth about Youth. Rob White (1993), in an introduction to an edited collection which emerged from this debate highlighted, in a positive, unproblematic sense, the increasingly 'sophisticated', institutionalised processes of expert knowledge production which take as their object the truths of Youth:

As "youth studies" has emerged as a distinct field of inquiry, with identifiable writers and its own youth-specific institutions (such as the Youth Research Centre at the University of Melbourne), so too discussion in the field has become more sophisticated, and the scope of
analysis has likewise broadened. It is in this framework of rekindled intellectual interest and vigour that we are now seeing concerted efforts to stretch conceptual boundaries, to more readily engage in considered argument about relevant empirical and theoretical matters, and to think more seriously about the politics of research and analysis. (p.vii)

White also foregrounds the processes of differentiation which mark a field such as Youth Studies. Thus, locations within different intellectual disciplines (Sociology, Psychology, Education, Criminology, Cultural Studies); different objects of intellectual abstraction (Youth as Unemployed, Students, Homeless, Juvenile Offenders, Adolescents, Young Men and Women); different methods, forms and levels of analysis; and different interpretive frameworks, work to constitute the discursive terrain of Youth. A terrain marked by differences in the 'power to mean' (Watts 1993/94) with regard to the truths of Youth.

This particular debate about how to tell the truth of Youth, emerged as a consequence of the publication of an article by Gordon Tait (1992, 1993 a) which sought to introduce Foucault's discussions about knowledge/power, regimes of truth and government into the domain of Youth Studies. Tait's purpose was to argue that Youth, as constituted by various experts in diverse centres of expertise, could be conceived as an 'artefact of government', constructed at the 'intersection of a wide range of governmental strategies'. An intersection marked by expert problematisations of Crime, Education, Family, the Media, Popular Culture, (Un)Employment, Training, and Risk. Tait's strategy in arguing for the efficacy of a Foucauldian analysis of Youth, rested on positioning this form of analysis in relation to the intellectual legacy of Youth Subcultural Theory which emerged from the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). Tait (1992) argued that the legacy of CCCS analyses of Youth subcultures had resulted in 'contemporary discourses on youth' taking on a 'rather familiar' appearance (p.12). The unproblematic reiteration of constructs and concepts derived from this legacy posed the danger, argued Tait (1992), of youth research continuing to produce 'work which is, at best, unaware of its own origins, or, at worst, outdated and anachronistic' (p.17).

Youth Studies: Foucault or Marx?

Tait's (1992) purpose was partly served by restating a number of critiques of Youth Subculture Theory. Tait rehearsed an established Feminist critique which pointed to an emphasis on class and age (generation) as markers of youth subculture, and the neglect of other structuring elements such as gender, race and geography (McRobbie 1980,

1Howard Sercombe 1992
Roman 1987, Walkerdine 1997). Further criticisms by Tait focussed on the 'fetishization of the exotic' (Walkerdine 1997) and the spectacular as markers of male youth culture in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Britain (and Australia). 'Ordinary kids' and normal kids are positioned within subcultural intellectual traditions as 'quiescent' (Brown 1987), or as 'too drab and passive to warrant investigation' (Tait 1992, p.13). Moreover these intellectual constructions of male working class youth culture tended to project onto the working class the revolutionary 'fantasies' of new class Left intellectuals (Walkerdine 1997). These revolutionary fantasies were structured by particular (Neo-Marxist) understandings of ideology, hegemony, and working class consciousness (the 'mass mind', Walkerdine 1997), which constructed spectacular male working class youth subcultures as the sites of 'counter-hegemonic resistance' (Tait 1992, p.13). As Tait (1992) argues, in this form of intellectual abstraction, 'mods became quasi-revolutionaries and skinheads became the last line of resistance against post-war anomie' (p.14). One other criticism which Tait rehearsed with regard to the CCCS legacy in Cultural Studies of Youth was that Subcultural Theory is economically determinist in that representations of (sub)cultural formations, structured by narratives of class interests and class consciousness, are reduced to the relationship between the Economic, the Political and the Ideological (Hall 1988a).

For Tait (1992), however, these well rehearsed criticisms of subcultural theory have often worked to reconfigure and recuperate discourses of Subculture, rather than 'to challenge the foundations upon which it is built' (p.14). Tait argues that Foucault's investigations of power/knowledge and its effects, and his problematisations of totalising discourses do, indeed, render the CCCS orthodoxy 'outdated' and 'redundant' (p.14). At this point my intention is to outline Tait's (1992) argument, to provide a sketch of a number of central themes to be more fully developed in later sections.

In this first instance Tait (1992) argues that the (Neo)Marxist framework which structures Subcultural Theory conceives of power as a 'totalised global generality, possessed by the ruling classes and used to coerce and subjugate' the working classes. In this framework power is possessed by some, and lacked by others (p.14). In this sense spectacular youth subcultures can be constructed as instances of resistance to this totalising form of ruling class power. Against this construction Tait (1992) positions Foucault's theorisation of contemporary forms of pastoral power as non totalising, and as 'constituted by different knowledges, practices and technologies' (p.14). In a Foucauldian analysis power 'must be understood in relation to specific locations', and practices, and with an acknowledgment that it is not 'fundamentally repressive'. Rather, power in this sense is conceived as 'productive, in that it creates a vocabulary of new capabilities and aptitudes' (p.14).
A second theme which Tait (1992) addresses is the central concern of Subcultural analyses to understand youth(ful) resistance in terms of 'counter hegemonic struggle'. Here the emergence of diverse forms of youth subcultural resistance is seen as one aspect of the process by which the 'working classes eventually free themselves of dominant ideology - the distortion of the truth created by class interests' (p.14). This subcultural framework, which is centrally concerned with understanding the processes which lead to the transformation of youth(ful) consciousness about the true nature of working class oppression, is set, by Tait (1992), against Foucault's argument that truths are multiple, and produced 'within definite contexts', as the consequence of the mobilisation of 'specific knowledges' (p.14). (Neo)Marxist narratives of true and false consciousness, and of ideology as a distortion of the truth, are problematised by a view of power as elemental to the construction of a 'pervasive political rationality which positions individuals within a field of distribution' (p.14).

This problematisation of ideology has the consequence of provoking a re-assessment of 'hegemony', which is for Tait (1992), 'the most vital aspect of subculture theory' (p.14). Tait argues that narratives of hegemony and counter hegemonic resistance within youth(ful) subcultures construct subcultural practices in terms of struggle against the attempts, by dominant ideological formations, to force, coerce, or win the consent of subordinate classes to the interests and projects of the ruling classes. Against this manner of conceiving of power and truth Tait (1992) positions Foucauldian analyses which conceive of the effects of power/knowledge and truth in terms of 'governmentalisation'. Here there is an emphasis on understanding the diverse range of 'techniques, routines, and procedures' which both penetrate and constitute 'cultural practices, thereby facilitating social cohesion' (p.14).

The final aspect of Tait's (1992) critique of CCCS Subcultural Theory is a concern to problematise the notions of consciousness and culture which are fundamental to this way of constructing Youth. Within the CCCS tradition youth subcultures are conceived as being formed at the juncture of two forms of consciousness: those related to social class and to age' (p.15). A youth subculture then is constituted by a specific consciousness, a 'specific way of seeing, understanding and relating to the social world', which is formed by the interaction of relations and forces of class and age (p.15). Tait (1992) seeks to problematise this framework by suggesting that it rests on a view of consciousness as a 'single entity, a unified capacity'; and on a view of culture as a 'total', 'distinctive way of life', a 'generalised' set of 'meanings, values and ideas' which are transmitted 'from one generation to another as some form of social inheritance' (p.15). Against this view of consciousness as a unified capacity, or as a collection of shared
meanings and values, Tait (1992) proposes a view of consciousness 'as being necessarily piecemeal, fragmentary and incomplete' (p.15). Such a problematisation also destabilises the concept of culture as a distinctive (organic) way of life which can be understood as determined by material conditions. There is, argues Tait (1992), 'no global, totalised entity which can be defined as working-class culture, any more than there is its mental equivalent: working-class consciousness' (p.16).

In the sections which follow, I want to elaborate on a number of the themes introduced by Tait (1992). Indeed, the discussion in the previous chapter is echoed in Tait's critique. There is much, then, in Tait's problematisation of the intellectual legacy of CCCS Subcultural Theories of Youth with which I would agree. At this point I want to return to the debate which Tait's article generated. My purpose here is to highlight certain aspects of these discursive struggles to tell the truth about Youth. These struggles are characteristic of the reflexivity of processes of expert knowledge production, and are central to understanding Youth as an artefact of government.

**Youth Studies: Reflexive Expertise and the Truths of Youth.**

Howard Sercombe (1992, 1993) provided the initial response to Tait's article. Sercombe (1993) suggested that Tait's critique was a 'welcome and refreshing contribution to theoretical debates in Youth Studies. Youth Studies, as an institutionalised intellectual domain, tended, argued Sercombe (1993), to be dominated by empirical, 'descriptive studies' at the expense of any 'serious, critical' debate about categories such as *transitions, or adolescence or school leaver*, or *Youth* (p.7). Yet Sercombe also argued that Tait's critique of the CCCS legacy tended to *freeze* Subcultural Theory in the late 1970s with its focus on *Resistance through Rituals* and *Learning to Labour*. Further, Tait's focus on spectacular Youth subcultures as somehow defining the field of Cultural Studies of Youth failed to acknowledge that: 'Spectacular youth subcultures are a titillating but marginal phenomenon in work around youth, involving a tiny minority of young people' (p.7). For Sercombe (1993) there is a sense that what Tait's critique is really about is the 'contest for the general theoretical ownership of the youth phenomenon...His argument is that the CCCS approach is no good, and that Foucault's approach is' (pp.7-8).

At this level, this is a debate about the practices of intellectual knowledge production; practices whose motive forces include not only diverse attempts to tell the truth of Youth, but also to tell the truths about the processes of truth production about Youth. In the institutional spaces in which these diverse forms of expertise produce constantly expanding knowledge about the truth of Youth (at-Risk) there is also contestation, marked by unequal relations of power, about the efficacy, the utility, the value and the
consequences of particular forms of truth production. In these settings the truth of Youth emerges as only one concern in the contest between diverse forms of practice capable of producing these truths. Indeed, this thesis, with its concern to foreground the processes of truth production about Youth (at-Risk), is an instance of this particular aspect of intellectual knowledge production. A central element of this project, however, is to situate my practice in a domain which problematises this aspect of intellectual knowledge production, in order to problematise the truths about Youth (at-Risk) which are generated within these institutional spaces and practices. The domain marked out by theories of governmentality enables a focus on the processes of truth production about Youth, as it problematises both these processes and the positions from which these processes are generated and critiqued.

So while Sercombe (1993) may be correct in arguing that Tait’s (1992) scholarly critique is limited, or flawed, or that in fact its purpose is to stake a claim for the ‘theoretical ownership of the youth phenomenon’, his propositions, his critique of the critique, serves to support Tait’s (1993 b) argument that Youth ‘exists as a governmental object at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations’ (p.10):

> For example, youth has been constructed and operationalised as a category through the different mechanisms and knowledge associated with law enforcement - primarily within terrains such as drug abuse, prostitution, petty theft and gang related crimes. The policing of youth itself has drawn upon rationales of behaviour and discourses circulating within a variety of other terrains, from jurisprudence to career guidance, from psychology to medicine, from sociology to welfare and from demographics to marketing. (Tait 1992, p.16)

Indeed, what Sercombe (1992, 1993) and White (1993) both fail to acknowledge is that this increasingly ‘sophisticated’ process of institutionalised intellectual knowledge production about Youth is fundamentally implicated in the formation of populations of Youth 'at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations'. Moreover, these processes of expert knowledge production, including the observation by Tait (1992) that the CCCS legacy in Youth Studies is the product of 'critique' and 'recuperation', are instances of the 'institutional reflexivity' of 'abstract systems' under the conditions of reflexive modernization (Giddens 1994 c). A reflexivity which is characterised by the monitoring of both the processes of truth production about Youth (at-Risk), and the truths produced by these processes. This 'institutional reflexivity' is characteristic of processes of reflexive modernization; processes which structure the institutional spaces and practices which are fundamental to enabling Youth (at-Risk) to function as a truth, and the mobilisation of this truth in diverse attempts to regulate the identities of young people.
Processes of reflexive modernization are further characterised by the thoroughgoing penetration of the natural and the social by systems of expertise and the knowledges they produce. Characterising processes of reflexive modernization in this manner gestures towards a phase in the historical development of these expert systems which makes it increasingly difficult to think of Youth other than as a an artefact of expertise. Thinking of Youth as an artefact of expertise signals one aspect of the convergences I want to foreground between theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality; convergences which enable a focus on the ways in which various forms of expertise attempt to tell the truth of Youth (at-Risk), and attempt to regulate Youth(ful) behaviours and dispositions. The nature of these convergences will be more fully explored in the last half of this chapter.

At this point I want to address a concern that Youth is more than a mere artefact of expertise; that youth(ful) flesh and blood (bodies) are more than the sum of expert attempts to regulate their behaviours and dispositions. In doing so I want to argue against a view that reflexive modernization tells a truth about the technical and scientific domination of the natural and the social by abstract systems. I also want to argue against a view of regulation and government as total, complete and repressive. Rather, government is always an incomplete project and reflexive expertise is involved in constant attempts to know better the truths of Youth (at-Risk) and the ways to produce these truths, as youth(ful) bodies, motivations, behaviours and dispositions (however these are understood) elude and escape the frames and categories which attempt to order them. Yet it is only within representational frameworks that these truths come to mean anything. It is the dominance of these representational frameworks by systems of expertise which characterises processes of reflexive modernization, and hence, which makes it possible, historically, to conceive of Youth as an artefact of expertise.

An example. Contemporary constructions of the Adolescent Subject are principally structured by a narrative which suggests that it is only by productively engaging in an extended period of compulsory and post compulsory schooling, that young people will 'adequately develop into the kinds of adults who can function effectively in the complex and demanding world of modern society' (Faye 1991, p.66). This construction of Youth as Students emerged as a 'compelling truth' in the context of Australia's post war reconstruction. This truth, argues Faye (1991), ought to be analysed in such a way as to examine the rationalities and techniques mobilised in the diverse programs which took as their object this particular construction of the figure of the Adolescent. Faye's
analysis foregrounds the construction (fantasy) of the Adolescent, in various efforts to make schooling *work*, as a 'desiring', 'motivated' subject who wanted to learn;

who wanted to belong, who willed his/her own membership of the democratic community, willed in fact his/her own *subjuction* as a democratic citizen. This subject would not need persisting and external forms of coercive discipline, because s/he has successfully internalised the normative social rules and was self-disciplined, had in fact chosen 'the right path, not merely by making it impossible...to do otherwise, or through fear of punishment, but from a *desire* to do the right thing!' (p.68, original emphasis)²

This construction of the Adolescent as the 'self guiding/self governing subject', is principally shaped within Psychological discourses. These discourses successfully articulated this truth of human motivations, behaviours and dispositions to concerns about how to *educate* (make up), active citizens within the institutional spaces of schooling. Faye's (1991) analysis highlights certain processes which enabled this articulation of Adolescents as 'repositories of hope and objects of desire' to take hold (p.67). In the first instance, Faye foregrounds a concern within Educational Psychology to construct a narrative of *progressive* Education in which schools could be conceived as; 'happy, democratic communities, full of interest and reality and activity, where the educational programme is fitted to the pupil and not the pupil to the programme' (p.69).³ Faye's (1991) analysis also foregrounds the processes which resulted in the establishment, within the Victorian Education Department, of the Psychology Branch (in 1947). This particular centre of expertise emerged, partly, as a consequence of various submissions from the Department's 'first official psychologist', who argued that an extension of 'psychological services' to all schools would meet a concern to understand, 'all aspects of the cognitive and the *normal* emotional life of the child' (p.70, original emphasis). This Educational concern was to constitute the domain of;

the psychologist, the medical officer, the psychiatrist, the research worker...if instruction and development of well integrated personalities are to proceed on the sound bases of a full understanding of each child, his [sic] native endowments, restrictions placed upon him and his future needs, and a good adjustment of the educational process to the

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²The final part of this passage is cited from Major General A.H. Ramsay, Director of the Victorian Education Department, in *The Age*, 16 October 1949, p.5.

individual as he progresses through our schools. (Jorgensen 1945, cited in Faye 1991, p.70)⁴

Of interest here is Faye's (1991) proposition that it matters little, in terms of this analysis, when, how and why schools would inevitably fail in their attempts to 'make up' this Adolescent Subject of Educational Psychology. What matters here is that such failures provoke renewed discussion, argumentation, critique and propositions with regard to these failures. Debate which emerges from within diverse ways of conceiving the problem (Liberal, Critical, Conservative), and the measures appropriate to attempts to alleviate the problem. Indeed, as Faye (1991) argues;

the more that attention was drawn to the reasons why schools did not or could not achieve this objective - whether it was because of inadequate and inappropriate accommodation, inadequate numbers of teachers, or inappropriate curriculum and teaching methods - the more the truth which linked the adolescent to the school in this particular way was consolidated. (p.68)

Thus, in 1998 it is natural to construct Youth as Students. Indeed it is almost an absurdity to think otherwise. A history of one hundred and fifty years of mass compulsory schooling, including fifty years of mass (post) compulsory secondary schooling, weighs heavily on attempts to problematise this truth. Moreover, the historical truths of Youth as Delinquent, Deviant, Maladjusted, Disadvantaged, and at-Risk, have been constructed, in diverse domains of expertise, in relation to this truth of Youth as Student. These historical problematisations of Youth have assisted in articulating this truth of Youth as Student. It is primarily through attempts to school (Educate) these Youth that Delinquency, Deviancy, Maladjustment, Disadvantage, and Risk will be regulated. Institutionally generated concerns about regulating Youth in relation to social norms and institutions, cement processes which institutionalise Youth via the construction of Youth as Students and Youth at-Risk of not being Students.

These processes of truth production are not solely the province of a repressive, monolithic, monologic State apparatus. Indeed, my engagement with theories of governmentality is structured in part, by the need to think differently the practices of government, to foreground the practices and activities of various experts in diverse centres of expertise. The legacy of CCCS Subcultural Theory, for instance, is appropriated by various experts in domains which have some connection to Youth, in order to know better certain populations of young people and to operationalise the

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⁴Capt. C. Jorgensen and the Victorian Education Department 1945-47, Victorian Public Record Office, (VPRS), Series 794, Unit 1238, Item 2131.
diverse regulatory projects of these forms of expertise. The governmental project of Critical discourses in teacher education is characterised by attempts to 'make up' certain kinds of teachers ('transformative intellectuals', Giroux 1990). These discourses appropriate aspects of the truths of Learning to Labour, Louts and Legends, Making the Difference., for example, in certain ways to extend the knowledge that teachers-to-be are able to mobilise in order to understand the truths of the young people they will teach. This process of knowing better is enabled by constructing certain populations within populations (ear'oles, lads, Greeks, footballers, Ockers and disco maniacs), in ways which enable the critical governmental project to be more successful on the terms it sets itself within its own rationalities.

This process of reflexive knowledge production is fundamental to the processes which structure diverse governmental problematics. In this sense it becomes increasingly difficult to see Youth other than as an artefact of expertise, and of the attempts by expert systems to regulate populations of young people. In the following section I will engage with Foucault's problematisations of the Subject and Power in his theorisation of government as the 'conduct of conduct'; an engagement which visits, in more detail, a number of the themes which have emerged in the discussion thus far.

**Governmentality and the Regulation of Populations**

Maybe what is really important for our modernity - that is, for our present- is not so much the etatisation of society, as the governmentalization of the state (Foucault, 1991, p.103)

**Populations as the Objects of Government**

Foucault's (1991) conceptualisation of 'governmentality' was structured by the concern to understand the emergence of a 'set of problems specific to the issue of population' (p.87). Foucault argued that the 'discovery of populations', or more correctly the discursive construction of populations, and of populations within populations, became central to the art of European government from the sixteenth century onwards. Foucault traced the production of regimes of truth, or the production and mobilisation of power/knowledge in a variety of domains, as these discourses - on madness on punishment, on pedagogy, on sexuality - worked to define the field in which true and false statements could be made; about both these particular fields and the interconnections between these

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6I explore these themes in more detail in an unpublished Honours thesis on the discursive construction of student teachers in critical pedagogies in pre service teacher Education. See Kelly 1990.
discourses, these practices and the various sites and populations which they sought to define, construct and govern. For Foucault, the art of government, of governing oneself and others, is made possible and reproduced, refined and done better - within general and more particular rationalities, and through a variety of techniques - by coming to define, construct, (dis)assemble and know better the diverse persons, groups and populations which are the objects and the subjects of these various rationalities and technologies.

This concern was given expression in a series of lectures at the College de France in 1978 and 1979 which were entitled, respectively, Security, territory and population, and The birth of biopolitics (Gordon 1991). Gordon (1991) argues that governmentality signals Foucault's interest in 'government as an activity or practice, and in arts of government as ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried on' (p.3). This focus on the rationalities of government directs attention to the systems of 'thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed)' (p.3). Foucault's series of lectures developed this theme on the art of government in a number of historical domains; the classical Greek and early Christian concern with government as a form of 'pastoral power' (the 'shepherd-game'); the early modern European 'doctrines of government' which were 'associated with the idea of reason of state and the police State'; the emergence, from the mid 1700s, of Liberalism, conceived as an 'art of government'; and post Second World War 'forms of neo-liberal thought in Germany, the USA and France, considered as ways of rethinking the rationality of government' (Gordon 1991, p.3).

For Gordon (1991) these series of investigations need to be situated in relation to Foucault's earlier work, most particularly his investigation of the 'microphysics' of power in Discipline and Punish.7 Foucault's focus there was on the 'techniques of power' (power/knowledge) which were mobilised within certain modern institutional settings (prisons, schools, hospitals) to 'observe, monitor, shape and control the behaviour of individuals' in those settings (pp.3-4). Gordon (1991) argues that Foucault's lectures on governmentality were framed, in part, as a response to criticisms of this earlier work. These criticisms centred, in the first instance, on Foucault's supposed neglect of the nature of the relations between the State and Civil Society as a consequence of his emphasis on the 'detail' and 'texture' of the 'micro physics of power'. A further criticism, suggests Gordon, concerned the perception that Foucault's 'representation of society as a network of omnipresent relations of power seemed to preclude the possibility of meaningful freedom'. Finally there was a criticism of Foucault's apparent politics of 'nihilism' and 'despair' in relation to his 'markedly bleak account of the effects of

humanitarian penal reformism' (p.4). Foucault's (1983) investigations of the rationalities of modern government, can, then, be seen as an attempt to continue his investigations of 'the modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects', within a framework which seeks to respond, both rhetorically and through various modes of analysis, to a number of these criticisms (p.208).

A principal concern in Foucault's (1991) investigations of the forms and effects of modern governmentality is to foreground the emergence of the idea of population. Foucault's investigations are grounded in the proposition that, from the 16th century through to the early 19th century, there was a transformation in the ways in which European government was conceived. This transformation involved a movement from a concern with the nature of the relation between the Prince and his subjects (an issue of sovereignty), to a concern with the nature of the relations between the State and the government of its populations (a concern with the art of government). Foucault's (1991) tactic for examining this transformation rests on positioning the literature on the problematics of government of this period in relation to Machiavelli's *The Prince*. *The Prince* was most often read as being concerned with securing the Prince's, always tenuous, sovereignty over his territory and subjects. Foucault, however, argued that this literature was not solely positioned in relation to *The Prince*. This literature also needs to be read in the context of that thing 'which it was trying to define in its specificity, namely an art of government' (p.89).

The art of government, argued Foucault (1991), is 'not at all the same' as 'the prince's ability to keep his principality' (p.90). To speak of the art of governing is to refer to the practice of governing, among other things; 'a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, a family'; while a governor, one who practices the art of government, can be a 'monarch, emperor, king, prince, lord, magistrate, prelate, judge and the like' (p.90). This concern with the practices of government is indicative of a number of early modern problematisations of government which take as their focus; 'How to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor' (p.87). Foucault is concerned here with constructing government, as the 'conduct of conduct' (Gordon 1991). Government, in this sense 'is a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (p.2). Foucault (1991) argued that in this early modern literature on the arts of government, the practice of government was conceived with regard to 'three fundamental types of government, each of which relates to a particular science or discipline' (p.91). There is the 'art of self - government' which is concerned with 'morality'. The 'art of properly governing a family' is a concern of economy, where economy is, principally, about the practice of 'managing individuals, goods and wealth
within the family. The 'art of governing the state' is a question of politics, a 'question of defining the particular form of governing which can be applied to the state as a whole' (pp 91-92).

**Government as the Conduct of Conduct**

Gordon (1991) argues that the interconnections between these arenas and modes of government are a crucial concern for Foucault. In some quite fundamental ways a concern with government, conceived as a practice directed toward the conduct of conduct, is a mode of analysis which serves to problematise a form of binary thinking about power; where power is conceived through the form of oppositions such as Structure/Agency, Macro/Micro, Domination/Subjectivity, State/Civil Society, Oppression/Freedom. Within these oppositions power is conceived in terms of domination, or in terms of disciplinary practices; as being possessed by some and lacked by the Other(s). Dean (1994) argues that this emphasis on the practices of government signals an attempt by Foucault to 'cut the Gordian knot of the relation between micro- and macro- levels of power' (p.179). In this mode of analysis there is a shift from an earlier focus on 'disciplinary practices' to a 'more general concern for governmental practices seeking the direction of conduct' (p.179). An analysis of the practices of government, as the conduct of conduct, provides a way of understanding the ongoing management, regulation and incitement of actions, thoughts, behaviours and dispositions of subjects (populations) across diverse domains, at various levels of practice.

Government, as the 'exercise of power', can be conceived, then, as the 'way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed', and where, further, this government might include the conduct 'of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick' (Foucault 1983, p.221). Central to this way of thinking government is Foucault's play on the ambiguous meanings of *conduct*. For Foucault (1983) the 'equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations' (p.220, original emphasis). Conduct, in this ambiguous use, points both to the action of leading others, and to a 'way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities' (pp 220-221).

Governmentality then, as a mode of analysis of the practice of government, is underpinned by an emphasis on a quite specific form of power. Foucault (1991) preserves a distinction between three forms of power, the operation and effects of which mark each as distinct from the other, at the same time as they are intimately connected through their concern with populations. Foucault (1991) argued that;
we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security. (p.102)

This manner of conceiving power is central to developing the argument that the mobilisation of Risk categories is a technique directed toward the conduct of conduct of Youth; an attempt to make up certain types of young person under the conditions of 'manufactured uncertainty'. Moreover, this mode of analysis of power and its effects is central to any attempt to move away from essentialist constructions of the Subject.

The Subject and Pastoral Power

Foucault (1983) argued that his concern was with that form of power which 'applies itself to immediate everyday life', a form of power which 'categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity'; and which, further, 'imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him' (p.212). This understanding of power is centrally concerned with identifying the form of power 'which makes individuals subjects': Subject, in one sense, to 'someone else by control and dependence'; in another sense, subject to and tied to 'his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge' (p.212). Within the modern governmental State, this form of power, which Foucault (1983) argued is grounded, in many important ways, in the Christian technique of 'pastoral power', can be characterised as consisting of a 'tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques, and of totalization procedures' (p.213). For Foucault (1983) the modern State, in this sense, can be conceived as a 'matrix of individualization', in which a form of pastoral power takes as its object the integration of individuals, whose individuality 'would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns' (pp 214-215). There are a number of characteristics of this form of power which bear directly on this discussion.

Foucault (1983) argued that in its ecclesiastical mode pastoral power takes as one object the eternal salvation of the individual; a salvation which is made possible through a 'knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it' (p.214). Within the development of the institutional structures of the Governmental State 'salvation' takes on new meanings. Here a more secular form of pastoral power takes as its object, the 'health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security' of the population, and of individuals within the population (p.215).
For Machiavelli's Prince the 'ensemble of objects' of his power consists of two 'things'; namely territory and the continued sovereignty over the inhabitants of this territory. There is a fundamental concern here with questions of territorial and juridical sovereignty; and the practices which might be mobilised in the maintenance of this sovereignty. However, within the domain marked out by a concern with the art of government, there is a shift to conceive of government as the 'right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end' (Foucault 1991, p.93). To speak of 'things' in this instance is not to speak, primarily, of territory, or of juridical sovereignty. Rather, what is of concern in this definition of government is the 'imbrication of men and things'; the relation between populations and 'those other things' such as 'wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility'. Further, this emphasis on the disposition of things takes as its legitimate concerns those relations between populations (and individuals) and their 'customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking'; and the relations between populations and 'accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death' (Foucault 1991, p.93).

This emerging concern with the right disposition of things so as to lead to some convenient end, implies, for Foucault (1991), a 'plurality of specific aims', a 'whole series of specific finalities' as marking the ends of the practice of government. A key element in this framework is the notion of disposition. To dispose signals a further shift from the notion of a transcendental sovereignty which achieved its end, of obedience to the Sovereign (Law), through 'obedience to the laws'. Law and sovereignty here 'were absolutely inseparable' (p.95). In the concern to conceive of the arts of government there is an acknowledgment that government cannot solely be a question of 'imposing law on men'. Rather, in emphasising the disposition of things, the art of government becomes more a question of; 'emphasising tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved' (p.95).

This is a quite specific characterisation of power in its pastoral form; a characterisation which marks pastoral power off from power as domination, or from a relationship of violence. For Foucault (1983), this form of power relation is defined, not as a 'mode of action' which acts 'directly and immediately on others', as in a relationship of violence which 'forces', 'bends', 'destroys' and/or 'closes the door on all possibilities' (p.220). Rather, a power relation, in this sense, is characterised by 'action upon action', on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future' (p.220). In this view, a power relationship is further characterised through two elements. Firstly, in a power relation, the Other, 'over whom power is exercised', must be 'recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts'. Secondly, within such a relationship of
power, a 'whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions may open up' (p.220). Power here is a 'set of actions upon other actions'; it is a 'way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' (p.220).

Government, then, can be thought in terms of the structuring of the 'possible field of action of others', where that action might well be different to that envisaged, and which, in turn, might well open up the possibility of inciting a variety of measures or responses which seek to conduct future actions: 'Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free'. Freedom, in this context, indicates that individuals and groups (populations), as the subjects of power, are situated in a 'field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realised' (Foucault 1983, p.221). Conceiving power in this manner avoids some of the problems associated with seeing power and freedom as *oppositions*, as being 'mutually exclusive (freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised)' (Foucault 1983, p.221).

Foucault (1983) sees the 'interplay' between power and freedom in the 'shepherd game' as being far more complicated: 'In this game freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination)' (p.221).

This complex relationship between practices of government and subjects (populations), who in all probability might (choose to) act other than as envisaged within certain fields of action, is further characterised by Foucault (1983) as a 'relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation' (p.222). This mode of analysis of the practice of government suggests that power relations are, indeed, 'rooted deep in the social nexus'. Government, as the conduct of conduct, is not 'reconstituted "above" society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of' (p.222). Instead, argues Foucault (1983), this focus on government emphasises the view that, 'to live in a society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible - and in fact ongoing' (p.222).

What is important in terms of the present discussion is the ways in which power relations, conceived in terms of actions upon actions, have, in the space of the modern Nation State, become 'governmentalized'. Foucault (1983) argues that the forms of the 'government of men by one another in any society are multiple'. These power relations, these actions upon actions, can be 'superimposed, they cross, impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes reinforce one another' (p.224). However
what is of concern with regard to the particular forms of power in contemporary societies is that, 'the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power - even if it the most important - but that in a certain way all other forms of power relation must refer to it' (p.224). Here, Foucault's argument rests not on the notion that these other specific relations of power are derived from the State. Instead there is a sense in which other forms of power relations - in schools, in the justice system, in families, in economic relations - are increasingly regulated, deregulated and re-regulated by the State. These diverse relations and settings, these various fields of actions upon actions, have become 'governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized and centralized in the form of, under the auspices of, state institutions' (Foucault 1983, p.224). As Rose and Miller (1992) argue, government in this mode of analysis can be conceived as being, intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of meaning an all pervasive web of 'social control', but of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement. (p.175)

Governmentality provokes certain possibilities in thinking the regulation of Youth via the mobilisation of discourses of Risk. These possibilities will structure the second part of this thesis. The mobilisation of Risk within diverse projects of government constitutes a certain historical continuity in the regulation of youth(ful) populations via the interventions and activities of expertise. Discourses of Youth at-Risk constitute, also, a historically novel problematisation of the truth of Youth. The final section of this chapter will initiate an engagement with theories of reflexive modernization, as these theories help to situate the historical continuities and discontinuities which mark these governmental projects. This engagement is facilitated via an interrogation of Anthony Giddens' (1990, 1991) examination of the 'nature of modernity'. This examination foregrounds the institutional dimensions and reflexivity of modernity; and the facilitation of this reflexivity as a consequence of the activities, practices and institutional location of diverse forms of expertise.

Modernity, Expert Systems and the Regulation of Populations

The Nature of Modernity

Giddens (1990) positions his investigations of the conditions and 'consequences of modernity' in relation to intellectual abstractions of these conditions which, characteristically, point towards the emergence of, or transition to, postmodernity. Here Giddens identifies Lyotard's (1984) characterisation of the postmodern as 'incredulity
towards metanarratives' (Science, Reason, Progress, Enlightenment); and the emergence of an 'outlook' which allows heterogenous claims to truth as the privileged place of the metanarratives of the Enlightenment are problematised. Where others have argued that the Enlightenment (Modernity) is an incomplete project, or that a 'coherent epistemology' is possible, Giddens adopts a different strategy in his engagement with the discourses of postmodernism (p.2).\(^8\) In order to understand the social conditions under which it becomes possible to think in terms of 'incredulity' towards the project of modernity; or to question, in terms of anxiety, or uncertainty, our contemporary conditions of existence, requires, according to Giddens (1990), an understanding of the 'nature of modernity itself' (p.3).

Giddens' (1990) strategy for apprehending the 'nature of modernity' rests on two moves. Firstly, he argues for a multi dimensional institutional model of modernity. Secondly, he argues for an account which acknowledges the 'extreme dynamism and globalising scope of modern institutions', and the 'nature of their discontinuities from traditional cultures' (p.16). A more complex understanding of the dynamic and unsettling nature of modernity is enabled by constructing modernity as being 'multi dimensional on the level of institutions' (p.12, original emphasis). Within this framework Giddens (1990, pp 55-63) outlines four 'organisational clusters' as being constitutive of a multi dimensional, institutional account of modernity. Importantly, for Giddens, it is the interrelationships between these four clusters which provide a means to understanding the dynamic, transformative processes of modernity.

At one pole, Giddens situates capitalism as a dynamic process of commodification and accumulation within competitive labour and product markets. These processes of commodification and accumulation, which appear as ceaselessly competitive and expansionist, drive near constant processes of technological innovation and change. These processes of change and innovation suggest one form of connection to another pole in Giddens' framework; Industrialism. Processes of industrialisation are implicated in the ordering of modernity at a number of levels. These processes lead to the transformation of nature, and the emergence of the 'created environment'. Further, these processes are characterised by the utilisation of 'inanimate sources of material power in the production of goods', and the primary role accorded 'machinery in the production process'. They are dynamic in that they transform processes of production through the 'regularised social organisation of production' in order to co-ordinate human activity, machines and the inputs and outputs of raw materials and goods'. Processes of

\(^8\)Giddens here refers to Jurgen Habermas' (1987) defence of the Enlightenment project in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.*
industrialisation serve to constitute the realm of the social (the *public* and the *private*), through the dynamic reorganisation of processes of production, transportation and communication, and social life (Giddens 1990, pp 55-56).

Assorted attempts to manage or regulate (govern) these dynamic processes are, in Giddens' (1990) account, dependent on the development of 'apparatuses of surveillance' within the emergent 'delimited territorial arenas' of the modern Nation State. Surveillance capacities, understood in reference to the development of apparatuses for the 'control of information and social supervision', thus forms a third organisational cluster in Giddens' institutional model of modernity (p.57). Surveillance, understood here in terms of the 'supervision of the activities of subject populations' within novel arenas of modernity, including the Nation State, can be framed as either 'direct' or 'indirect'. In either instance this surveillance capacity is dependent on the 'control of information', and the generation of expert knowledge with regard to subject populations. Surveillance capacity is, indeed, 'fundamental to all the types of organisation associated with modernity, in particular the nation-state' (pp 58-59).

For Giddens (1990) the final dimension to understanding the institutional 'nature of modernity' involves accounting for the control of the means of violence within the modern Nation State. This (near) 'successful monopoly' of the means of violence, to the extent to which the modern Nation State maintains, across time, a territorial integrity, is connected to the 'industrialisation of war'. Industrialism here structures both the 'organisation of the military and the weaponry at their disposal'. Further, both the monopoly of the means of violence, and the industrialisation of war makes possible the very idea (actuality) of 'total' (World) War, and the 'nuclear age' (p.58). At another level this control by the Nation State of the means of violence rests upon the relationships between the institutions which secure this monopoly and the surveillance apparatuses and capacities of modern institutions.

The usefulness of Giddens' account of modernity becomes more apparent with the move to add additional constitutive elements to his framework. For Giddens (1990) the task is to construct an understanding of the processes, or 'facilitating conditions', which energise the emergence and development, on a global scale, of the 'organisational clusters' of modernity, and which, in turn, are constitutive of these institutional structures. Giddens, here, is not subscribing to, or constructing, a teleological view of inevitable historical progress from some originary set of processes. Rather, his aim is to identify the institutional dimensions to, and the facilitating conditions of, processes which mark off modernity, in certain radical ways, from the 'premodern' ordering of social life. Moreover, his work also seeks to argue that these processes are, in the last
half of the twentieth century 'becoming more radicalised and universalised than before' (p.3).

Giddens' (1990) strategy for understanding these transformations rests on identifying the 'dynamism of modernity' as being a consequence of; *the separation of time and space,* and their 'recombination' in various forms so as to 'permit the precise time-space 'zoning' of social life'; the 'disembedding' and 'reembedding' of social systems and relations; and the *reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations* as a result of the ongoing generation of expert, 'intellectually grounded' (Watts 1993/94) knowledge about these social relations (pp.16-17, original emphases).

Universal, compulsory schooling is one highly consequential practice for regulating and 'making up' Youth which becomes thinkable in certain useful ways within this account of modernity. In terms of the preceding discussion, the interrelationships between the institutional dimensions of modernity can be seen to be evidenced in the dynamic structuring and ordering of these processes which shape the schooling, education and training (regulation) of youth(ful) populations. Further, schooling can be thought in ways which construct this enterprise as an instance of the manner in which 'abstract systems' lead to both the 'disembedding' and 'reembedding' of social relations.

Schooling can be thought in terms of processes which 'lift out', or disembed, social relations from particular settings of presence as a consequence of the abstracted coordination of the activities and relations of large populations across differing configurations of 'empty' space and time; thirteen (plus) years of schooling; age grading; the timetabled day; the school year; the subject lesson; the (National) curriculum. Yet, as a consequence of this capacity for the abstracted ordering and regulation of the activities of large populations across time and space, social relations grounded in co-presence become re embedded. Schools, classrooms, playgrounds, neighbourhoods and peer groups emerge as settings and relations fundamentally structured by relations of co-presence, as a consequence of the regulatory practices mobilised in schooling as an abstract system. Such contexts and relations of co-presence become, under the conditions of modernity, highly consequential in the identity work of young people. As Wexler (1992) argues so powerfully, these settings and relations constitute 'interactional economies' in which the (identity) work of 'becoming

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9In his earlier elaboration of 'structuration theory' Giddens (1984, pp 132-139) positions schools as 'disciplinary organizations'. Here the ordering of activity within routinized, bounded configurations of time, space and regions is fundamental to the capacity to regulate and coordinate the behaviour, dispositions and learning potential of large populations of young people.
somebody' is the product of 'interactional labour' in concrete local settings; such 'work' is very much 'action in the public sphere' (p.11).

The Separation of Time and Space
Giddens (1991) argues that in pre-modern social orders time and space were largely 'connected through the situatedness of place' (p.16, original emphasis). That is, the 'modes of time-reckoning', and the 'ways of situating' oneself and others spatially were fundamentally connected with a 'special awareness of place'. Within these premodern configurations of time-space 'when' questions were 'connected not just to the "where" of social conduct but to the substance of that conduct' (p.16). For Giddens (1990, 1991) the emptying of time, or the emergence of the idea of an empty dimension of time, precedes and is a necessary precondition for the emptying of space. The development of the mechanical clock and its spread throughout the population was crucial to the development of the notion of a uniform, empty dimension to time. This development enabled processes of standardisation and routinization, across time and space, through the capacity to precisely 'zone' time. Time as something to be filled, or utilised, or commodified became fundamental to the ordering processes of modernity. These processes, and their contested, (historically, culturally, Nation(ally)) contingent nature, are expressed in notions such as: Time is Money. Time Wasting. The School Day. The (Long) Weekend. A Productive (Working) Life. Leisure Time.

For Giddens (1991) the utilisation of clock time 'facilitated, but also presumed, deeply structured changes in the tissue of everyday life'. Such changes could not only be local, they were also (inevitably) globalising (p.17). This capacity to precisely and (ultimately) universally zone time facilitated the separation of time from space, and further, suggests Giddens (1990), the separation of space from place. 10 Again the significance of these separations is illustrated by reference to the connectedness of space and place in premodern social orders. Here Giddens (1990) argues that space and place 'largely coincide, since the spatial dimensions of social life' are fundamentally structured by relations of copresence. Place, understood as the physical location of social activity structured by copresence, was in premodern settings, coterminous with the spatial organization of social life (p.18).

10 Cyber-space, that virtual space disconnected, at one level, from any particular locale or place is a powerful example of this point. At another level, this space reconnects to place, and indeed restructures place, through the reflexive circulation and appropriation of this information space. The Asian currency crises of 1997-98 witnessed the transformation of the space of the Nation State, and the place of the factory floor and the village, as a consequence of the digital flow of virtual money in cyber-space. More on this in the following section.
The processes of modernity are facilitated by, and indeed, further facilitate, both the separation of time and space, and their reintegration in various configurations. The emergence even dominance, of relationships which do not rely on physical copresence; the regularised structuring of relations between absent Others; the ordering of localised interactions through the (abstracted) institutional structuring of empty time-space zones are indicative of the ways in which the possibility of engineering numerous time-space configurations are implicated in the dynamism of modernity. As Giddens (1990) argues these empty dimensions to time and space work to sever the intimate relationships between social activity and place (as a context of copresence). In doing so, the capacity to endlessly reconfigure relations of time-space opens up the 'possibilities of change by breaking free from the restraints of local habits and practices' (p.20). This potential is expressed most powerfully in the modes of rationalised organisation which structure modern institutions, and their capacity to plan, organise and coordinate (govern) aspects of the local and the global in a manner which 'routinely affects the lives of many millions of people' (p.20). The capacity of modern school systems to order and regulate the activities, capacities and dispositions of the Nation's Youth is a powerful expression of this ability to rationally organise large populations across time and space.

**Abstract Systems and the Disembedding of Social Relations**

The reflexively organised institutions of modernity are disembedding and reembedding in the sense that they lift out social relations from 'local contexts of interaction' and restructure them across 'indefinite spans of time-space (Giddens 1990, p.21). For Giddens (1990) this capacity for ongoing and strategic 'alignments of time and space' (p.22) is an integral element in the 'tremendous acceleration in time-space distanciation which modernity introduces' (Giddens, 1991, p.18).

Giddens (1990, 1991) argues that the disembedding mechanisms which are characteristic of modern social institutions are of two types. He identifies these as 'symbolic tokens' and 'expert systems'. These separate mechanisms when taken together form the 'abstract systems' which are fundamental to the dynamic structuring of modernity. In Giddens' (1991) schema symbolic tokens comprise various 'media of exchange' which are 'interchangeable across a plurality of contexts' (p.18). Such tokens, or systems, of which money, is, for Giddens (1990), the most 'pervasively important', are able to be circulated and/or appropriated and utilised with little or no 'regard to the specific characteristics of individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture' (p.22).
It can be quite useful to think of professional qualifications and the various markers of these qualifications - (wall mounted, framed) certificates, letters, (PhD) and titles (Dr) - in terms of symbolic tokens signifying certain presumed forms and levels of expertise. Such tokens are integral to the structuring of relations in contemporary settings, and indeed, to the structuring of the various settings in which relations are (dis)embedded. In modern schooling systems, as abstract systems, qualifications and their markers are the 'currency of exchange', the symbolic tokens, which serve to lift out relations from the particularities of place (classroom, schools) and reconfigure them across distanciated time-space. Distant Universities, Technical and Further Education (TAFE) Institutions, Professional (Accreditation) bodies, prospective employers, are implicated in the structuring of possible futures for large populations of young people through their highly consequential emphasis on tokens of achievement (Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE), Tertiary Entrance Ranking (TER) and Certificates of Vocational Education and Training).

In the sorts of relations structured through the mobilisation of symbolic tokens, there is, initially at least, little regard for the specific characteristics of the persons or institutions involved in the relations. The vast majority of University entrance (acceptance and/or rejection) transactions are structured, initially at least, via the medium of exchange of Student Numbers and TERs. It could be argued that TERs are indicative of certain quite specific characteristics of the individual, as student. The issues here, however, are that such scores are abstracted or lifted out of the embedded relations of place; that these symbolic tokens do, in fact, structure, and indeed, incite quite particular forms of relations in distant classrooms and schools; and that they give little regard to other quite specific characteristics of individuals, as these individuals are constructed as belonging to a certain population (of prospective University Students). TER's, as a particular technology which enables University selection to occur, provoke a particular form of government of the population (Youth as Students), and incite particular regulatory practices in attempts to 'make up' University Students.

In a discussion of the importance of 'money economies' to the dynamism of modernity, Giddens (1990) highlights a conceptual difference between money as a 'material commodity' (coinage, notes) and money as 'pure information'. In both instances money is a mechanism for 'bracketing' time and space through its capacity to promote exchanges across time and space between institutions, individuals and groups, in ways which do not rely on co-presence. It is, in this sense, a mechanism of time-space distanciation which disembeds social relations. In some instances money, as a symbolic token, continues to structure the re-embedding of social relations in the context of exchange relations grounded in co-presence. Here money often still assumes the form of
a material commodity. However, such exchanges are increasingly *cashless* in the sense that these exchange relations are about the transfer of money as information ('Select an account please'. 'Enter your PIN please'. 'Press OK'. 'Thankyou. Have a nice day'). Money in this sense is pure information. In this electronic *virtual* form, money structures relations of co-presence, yet it increasingly enables exchange relations across vast tracts of time-space; it brackets 'time-space by coupling instantaneity and deferral, presence and absence' on a global scale (Giddens 1990, p.25).

The dynamic, facilitating characteristics of money, as pure information, as a disembedding mechanism which lifts out and reconfigures social relations across seemingly unbounded tracts of time-space become 'radicalised' when coupled to late 20th century Information and Communication (I &C) structures (Lash and Urry 1994, Lash 1994). Global Capital Markets, World Currency Markets, Futures Trading, Commodity Futures Markets, Electronic Funds Transfers, and Exchange Relations on the Net are not only disembedded processes and relations with little or no attachment to place or reliance on the embodied presence of the Other. They are also processes which restructure or reconfigure relations in places, as settings of co-presence. It is in this sense that Giddens (1990) can suggest that 'place becomes increasingly *phantasmagoric* ' under the conditions of modernity. Here place still matters but it becomes more 'thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant' from it (p.19, original emphasis).

The globalising of modernity can be understood, in this sense, as a consequence of processes of time-space distanciation in which social life is increasingly ordered across global configurations of time and space. Within this framework Giddens (1990) focuses attention on the relationships between *local involvements* (circumstances of co-presence) and interaction *across distance* (the connections of presence and absence) (p. 64 original emphasis). Processes of globalisation thus increase or 'stretch' the levels of time-space distanciation. In this sense the potential 'modes of connection between different social contexts or regions become networked on a truly 'global' scale (p.64).

The possibilities for the reordering of the *social* and the *natural* in these circumstances become radicalised within processes of reflexive modernization. These possibilities (and problems) have fundamental implications for the government of populations and for the ways it is possible to think regulation and government under such conditions. It is in these conditions of 'manufactured uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a) that discourses of Risk emerge, and *mean*, so powerfully, in the context of attempts to regulate youth(ful) identities.
Regulating the Dynamism and Disintegrative Effects of Modernity

Late 20th century identity (Selfhood), as embodied, as grounded in place determined relations of co-presence, and in networks of time-space distanciated relations, is thoroughly penetrated by distant influences, by attempts to regulate identities from a distance (Rose and Miller 1992). Here there is another intersection between Foucauldian inspired genealogies of government, and of the Self, and Giddens' (1990, 1991) positioning of expertise and abstract systems as being constitutive of the dynamism of modernity. Expert systems are 'systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise'. As such they are substantially implicated in the structuring and ordering of the 'material and social environments' of modernity (Giddens 1990, p.27). These expert systems are, argues Giddens (1991), disembedding mechanisms in so far as they ' bracket' time-space by mobilising 'modes of technical knowledge' in ways which have 'validity independent of the practitioners and clients' who utilise them (p.18).

The point which both Foucauldian genealogies of government and Giddens emphasise in relation to expert systems and expertise is that such systems are not only fundamentally implicated in the structuring of social and material environments, but also, in the penetration, deconstruction and recombination of the natural (the end of the idea of nature as a domain external to the social). Such systems are also, as Giddens (1991) remarks, highly consequential in the ordering of 'social relations themselves and the intimacies of the self' (p.18). Here Giddens (1991), in addressing the themes of the discussion thus far, argues that the 'doctor, counsellor and therapist are as central to the expert systems of modernity as the scientist, technician or engineer' (p.18).

Rob Watts (1993/94) provides a useful summary of the themes which have structured the discussion in this chapter. Watts' work also provides a means to link this discussion to the themes which will structure Part Two of this thesis where the problematics of government in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty will be constructed as being largely structured within a narrative of Risk, and rendered operable via the identification of Risks and Risk Factors. For Watts (1993/94) thinking the problem of the State, and the problematics which structure its attempts to regulate, in this instance, the behaviours and dispositions of young people, means constructing the problem as a discursive phenomenon within the 'transformative dynamics of the modernizing project' (p.108). Here modernity is conceived as the 'project of the intellectually trained', a project which 'sustains a discursive or constitutive process that is central to the manifestations of
governmentality' (p.108). In turn, governmentality can be understood as the varied attempts to regulate the 'disintegrative effects of modernity' (p.108).11

Watts (1993/94) is concerned with understanding what it is about the conditions of modernity that has called up new forms of governmentality' (p.126). The 'true pathos' of modernity, argues Watts, can be found in the 'response of the chief architects of modernity to what they have helped to make' (p.126). Governmentality, in its historically variable manifestations, is, in this sense, an ongoing process marked by 'attempts to manage the fragmentation endemic to modernity' (p.126). What is at issue here is that over the past two hundred years in particular, 'scientific and professional discourses about our bodies, our minds and our relationships to each other and society' (p.120), have worked to produce 'distinctive forms of governmentality' (p.126). Doctors, health professionals, lawyers, social (youth) workers, teachers, statisticians, 'psy' scientists and many other experts in various centres of expertise have, in these processes

11In referring to the 'intellectually trained' Watts is locating his argument within an intellectual framework developed over a thirty year period by the editorial collective of Arena (Journal and Magazine), a Melbourne based journal of Left cultural and theoretical critique. Part of Watts' argument is that like all intellectual frameworks Giddens' account of modernity and expert systems provides a partial reading of some of the dominant features of contemporary settings. An engagement with the Arena thesis on the dominance of the 'intellectually trained' is, for Watts, a necessary complement to Giddens. Watts argues that, in order to capture the 'full significance of the effects of increasing distanciation and disembedding of social relations and interactions on the one hand, and the recursive effects of increased intellectually grounded 'knowledge' on the life-world on the other' (p.132), requires an engagement with the Arena position that the intellectually trained (experts) are constituted within practices which are;

carried on by way of extended interchange: historically, first by writing, then by print, and in more recent times by way of the whole computer related system of information and telecommunications. In each of these variations, technological mediation is the constant factor which marks the break with face-to-face relations. (Sharp, 1992, p.191, cited in Watts, 1993/94 p.133)

The Arena position on these disembedded intellectual practices suggests, for Watts, a way of further understanding both the dominance of the intellectually trained (as a social grouping) in the project of modernity; and the ways in which the intellectually trained are constitutive of the dynamism of modernity. My point in acknowledging this argument in this manner is to signal the intellectual debt I owe to an engagement with this tradition of thought. (see for instance Hinkson 1992 (a) and (b), 1993, 1995 and Sharp 1985, 1992, 1993, 1995). Whilst my reading of the Arena position informs this discussion it does not, as in the work of Watts, assume a central or core prominence.
of 'intellectually grounded' knowledge production, constantly reformulated ideas about, among other things; 'badness, madness, youth, health, education and sexuality' (p.120). All this in a manner determined by the 'application of certain tenets and procedures which claim reason or reality as their guide' (p.120). Government is thus a process of meaning making in which 'the meaning of social power hinges on the power to mean' (p.121). Under these conditions it is 'hardly surprising', argues Watts (1993/94) that; 'the distinctive ontology of modernity that is itself a product of the increasing authority of the intellectually trained is also the field of action in which the same group 'discover' the problem of social integration and order' (p.126).

Modernity is dynamic, unsettling and disintegrative of traditional modes of social organisation; including the modes of sociality distinctive of modernity. Yet it is so largely through the practices of abstraction and intellectuality where these practices penetrate and colonise all areas of life, natural and social. The problems of social order and integration; of the regulation of populations of young people in this instance, which are endemic as a consequence of modernity, then become the field of action in which forms of abstraction and intellectuality are deployed as distinctive modes of government; as distinctive forms of the conduct of conduct.
CHAPTER FIVE:
GLOBALISATION AND THE NATION STATE

There was this Englishman who worked in the London office of a multinational corporation based in the United States. He drove home one evening in his Japanese car. His wife, who worked in a firm which imported German kitchen equipment, was already at home. Her small Italian car was often quicker through the traffic. After a meal which included New Zealand lamb, Californian carrots, Mexican honey, French cheese and Spanish wine, they settled down to watch a programme on their television set, which had been made in Finland. The programme was a retrospective celebration of the war to recapture the Falkland Islands. As they watched it, they felt warmly patriotic, and very proud to be British. (Raymond Williams, 1983, p.117)

Introduction

This chapter is primarily concerned with understanding the ways in which processes of globalisation might be implicated in the structuring of those regulatory practices of contemporary Nation States which position Youth as being at-Risk. Building on the previous chapter's development of the notion of reflexive modernization my intention is to situate certain powerful governmental practices within the context of social transformations in which notions of uncertainty, anxiety, ungovernability and Risk are prominent. In the following chapter I intend to construct the contemporary Nation State as a governmental State, as a State concerned with problematising the practices of regulation of its population(s). A key concern in this endeavour will be to understand how this practice of government is (re)structured across different configurations of time and space, and with regard to different populations. At different times, in different spaces, the regulation of different populations produces different problematic of government. In this sense then this particular chapter will examine ways of understanding the Nation State in a period when transformations in the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Nation State indicate that processes of globalisation may very well serve to render the narrative of National sovereignty problematic.

I will argue that Risk, understood, in this context, as a technique of government, represents an attempt to refine the project of government, an attempt to do better the art (practice) of government, precisely at the time when the practice of government (by the Nation State) becomes more difficult. This argument will be more fully developed in a later examination of the ways in which Foucault's theorisations of governmentality can inform an understanding of the ways in which (Neo)Liberalism problematises the art of
governing the Nation State. To arrive at that point requires, firstly, an examination of
the processes of globalisation which are transforming the rights, roles and
responsibilities of the Nation State. Secondly there needs to be some engagement with
various abstractions of the State, an engagement which can serve to locate my use of
Foucault's notion of governmentality. The remainder of this chapter will address these
points.

**Global Economies of Signs and Spaces**

**The Nation State and Youth at-Risk**

Leslie Roman (1996) provides a poststructuralist semiotic reading of a Canadian
government policy document which takes as its objects Youth at-Risk of *dropping out*
of high school. Roman's purpose is to mobilise certain tools of deconstruction to
'challenge the truth' of this policy document, and its constructions of Youth, the
narrative of at-Risk, and the *crises* which face the Canadian Nation State as a
consequence of young people failing to complete high school. To indicate an intent to
challenge the truth of this at-Risk discourse is 'not to assert that it is all lies or that it is a
conspiratorial imposition of dominant group interests'. Rather, argues Roman (1996), 'to
challenge its truth is to demonstrate how it works as text' (p.14). Her strategy in this
project is to frame the discursive field in which Youth at-Risk is articulated in terms of
a 'moral panic'. Roman (1996) draws on a Cultural Studies tradition in which the
concept of a 'moral panic' refers to the periodic (episodic) phenomenon of a
'manufactured crisis' which attempts to articulate concerns about social order and
integration to the problematic practices, behaviours and dispositions of certain
populations (p.3). This development of the concept of a moral panic is grounded in an
analysis which identifies the discursive articulation of *deviant, dangerous, threatening*
and *Risky* practices and dispositions of certain populations - for instance, working class
(male) youth, Black and Asian youth - to *official* and *common sense* concerns about law
and order, gender and sexual relations, and the state of the Nation. For Roman (1996)
this understanding of moral panics as historically contingent, unstable and contradictory
processes of representation is useful in that it 'addresses the articulation of a range of

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1 Lash & Urry (1994)
2 Ministry of Supply and Services, (1990) *A National Stay-in-School Initiative*, Ottawa
3 Roman (1996) here refers to the tradition in British Cultural Studies (via the CCCS) of this use of 'moral
panics' as an analytic. See Cohen (1972), Hall et.al. (1978), Hall and Jacques (1990), Gilroy (1987), and
conflicting interests within and across such diverse sites as the family, national policies, the welfare state, and lived cultural formations of particular groups' (p.3).4

In this analysis there is an attempt to understand the historical conditions of existence which enable the Canadian Government's Initiative to function as truth, and the discursive articulations which construct this truth. For Roman (1996) the generation of these sorts of crises (moral panics) with respect to the Question(s) of Youth is 'as old as the invention of adolescence itself'. Given this historical tendency Roman is principally concerned with exploring the ways in which representations of uncertainty and Risk in National and globalising economic settings (where unemployment, international competitiveness and national(ist) economic concerns provide a backdrop for National policy formation) are articulated with notions of a 'Caring Nation' (constituted by 'caring' parents, communities, businesses and the State). The Nation here is (ought to be) concerned with securing continued future prosperity and economic certainty for 'all Canadians'. Particularly for those future generations, as represented by contemporary populations of high school students, whose prosperity is at-Risk under these conditions (pp.14-19). The construction of a moral panic with regard to Youth at-Risk, then, can be 'seen as a metaphor for a nation at risk in a global economy' (p.14).

In this discursive field the young people most at-Risk are those who 'drop-out' of high school. These young people Risk being positioned by prospective employers as 'functionally illiterate', 'largely untrainable' and 'mostly unemployable'. Furthermore, 'Canadian industry' sees these 'drop outs' as 'trapped in cycles of unstable work and dependency, a situation that will perpetuate low self-esteem, and one that invites increasing problems with illiteracy, innumeracy and poverty' (cited in Roman 1996, p.16). Represented thus, argues Roman (1996), young Canadian 'drop outs' become the objects of a discursively produced moral panic which positions the National

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4This use of 'moral panic' which is echoed in my engagement with Green and Bigum's (1993) construction of moral panics about young aliens is not unproblematic. The concept provokes a view that common sense is a misguided or false reading and that intellectual (semiotic) readings of these moral panics are unproblematic. Further, McRobbie (1994 b) questions the continued efficacy of the concept in an age of 'post modern mass media'. She suggests that more fluid, diverse and fragmented media flows, and the positions of audiences and experts (Youth Workers and Advocates) as possibly antagonistic to the construction of certain populations as 'folk devils' makes the concept of moral panic more problematic. If we take seriously Hall's (1985) theorisation of articulation, then the discursive field of the moral panic is more unstable and uncertain within an increasingly contingent, complex and contradictory informationscape.
government in a 'leadership role' responsible for the identification of those populations of young people at-Risk (who also place the Nation at-Risk):

As perhaps never before, Canada in the 1990s needs well educated well trained people in large numbers. They are indispensable to the productivity gains that our industry must achieve to survive and thrive in a highly competitive world. Yet as matters stand, we could see one million young people abandon secondary school over the next 10 years, seeking to enter the labour market that increasingly views them as functionally illiterate, largely untrainable and most unemployable...we must act now...Unchecked, the current dropout rate implies an unacceptable loss of human potential, higher social costs, and a serious deficit in the supply of skills needed to expand employment, productivity and incomes for all Canadians.. (cited in Roman 1996, pp.15-17 original emphasis)

This discourse is structured, then, by the sorts of humanistic and economic narratives which appear frequently in the at-Risk literature. In Chapter One I argued that these concerns were not necessarily 'conflicting or contra-distinctive'. Rather these concerns can be seen as 'competing for primacy' within any number of interventionist strategies which take as their object Youth at-Risk (Withers and Batten 1995). I have little argument with Roman's (1996) attempt to problematise these truths of Youth at-Risk. Indeed, her focus on the processes of truth production about Youth at-Risk, and the roles which various experts and diverse centres of expertise play in producing these truths of Youth as 'subjects of blame, deviancy and pathology' informs the work of this thesis (p.22). I would, in this context, agree with Roman that:

Talk of youth putting the nation at risk for losing its competitive edge in the global economy or failing the nation's moral expectations is emblematic not only of the appeal of the new corporatist state and the authoritarian populism of the Right, but also the failure of the Left to offer what Hall and Jacques call a "popular modernizing rhetoric" that can capture public disenchantment with some aspects of the social democratic welfare state in order to inaugurate a new phase of socialist (and, I would add, feminist) development and alternative economic and political strategies. (p.22)

My concern, here, is that Roman's construction of the regulatory responsibilities of the Nation State is grounded in a truth of the nature of the Nation State which fails to position contemporary practices of the government within the context of processes of reflexive modernization; processes which serve to render both the 'self understandings' of Liberal Democracies and their practices of government problematic. As Beck (1992) argues; 'While governments still operate within the structure of nation states, biography is already being opened up to world society' (p.31). These processes ought to be
accounted for in any reckoning of the ways in which Liberal Democracies attempt to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of Youth at-Risk at the end of the 20th century. Indeed, these 'new times' also problematise the processes of truth production about the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Liberal Welfare State; so that, as Roman herself argues, the Left is compelled to engage these transformations within new rhetorics, new ways of telling the truth about the practices of government of the Nation State.

A Question of Sovereignty
Lash and Urry (1994) situate their discussion about the transformations in the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Nation State in the context of the view that 'contemporary nation-states are now too small for the big problems of contemporary social life and too big for the small problems' (p.279). Lash and Urry (1994) point here to certain economic transformations with 'implications for nations, regions and localities'; to an emergence of an awareness of global environmental change (Think Global. Act Local); and to 'the nature and implications of a "global culture" for nationality and locality' (p.279). These transformations find concrete expression to the extent that environmental risks, such as Chernobyl, acid rain and global warming are events and processes which 'know no national boundaries'. Further, the oil crisis of the mid 1970's, the transnational flows of capital as information, and international agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) demonstrate that 'national economic policies cannot be conducted independently of international transformations'. Finally, mass media(ted) events such as the Olympic Games, The Second Gulf War (1991), and the recent (1997) funeral of the Princess of Wales are indicative of a situation in which large world audiences can 'imagine themselves as part of the same cultural experience' (p.279).

For Lash and Urry (1994) these transformations serve to provoke a number of questions. In light of these transformations how should we think, or construct society, the Nation State, a Nation(al) economy? Notwithstanding the need to think differently in terms of these fundamental categories Lash and Urry (1994) wonder, also, whether 'the importance of international / global processes' have indeed been 'overstated'. These processes of globalisation often have a 'double'. Alongside these processes of globalisation, there are also processes of 'localization' at work (p.280). These 'parallel processes' ought to be accommodated in any theoretical and political discourses which seek to represent these processes.

For Lash and Urry (1994) such propositions have a salience which is connected to a presumption, widely held in the West for two hundred years at least, that 'societies are coterminous with nation-states'. This presumption was grounded in a sense that Nation
States, as Liberal Democratic States, were constituted around a narrative of 'community'. This way of constructing 'community' was grounded in the truth that such a community 'governs itself' and determines its own future' (p.280). Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1995) further suggest that this 'claim to exclusive control of a definite territory' was, to a large extent, a product of 'national agreements between States not to interfere in each other's internal affairs'. This process was 'important in establishing the power of state over society' (p.409). In this context, argue Lash and Urry (1994), the modern democratic Nation State 'presupposed a national community of fate' (p.280); a presupposition evidenced in the various forms of nationalism which ebb and flow around changing commitments to the idea of The Nation.

The global character of the changed material and discursive realities which Lash and Urry (1994) outline has served to problematise the narrative of Nation(al) sovereignty. Lash and Urry's framework for thinking these transformations provides a useful way of engaging with intellectual abstractions of these processes.\(^5\) It should be remembered also, that these processes of transformation (globalisation) have, often, a 'double', a counter tendency; a tendency which is frequently a potentiality (for action, or response, or imagined connection), but which in certain circumstances can assume a more concrete dimension. Here it is helpful to keep in mind the proposition that the abstract systems which energise processes of globalisation in contemporary settings, can be conceived as disembedding mechanisms which also work to reembed social relations. Time-space distanciation is thus both a stretching phenomenon and a process of compression. These abstract systems are also reflexive in so far as the local, or more accurately, the abstracted knowledge of the local, restructures more abstract global processes.

**Transnational Flows**

Lash and Urry's (1994) analysis is situated in an understanding of these conditions as being structured by processes of reflexive modernization. This analysis emphasises the

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\(^5\)Robertson (1996) points out that in the 1990's 'the issue of globality has burst on to the academic scene, cutting across disciplinary boundaries in stimulating but confusing ways' (p.127). The literature on globalisation covers a diverse range of issues such as environmental change; the Nation State and world governance; World Systems Theory; global markets and economies; the Americanization of culture; the emergence of an awareness of self and Others in global terms; and identity, ethnicity and fundamentalisms in a globalising order. See, for instance, the collection edited by Featherstone (1990). See also Castles (1997), Gare (1994/95), Hirst and Thompson (1992, 1995, 1996), Kline (1995), McGrew (1992), Robertson (1992), Wark (1994 a & b). This literature informs my reading of Lash and Urry's (1994) framework as it is relevant to the present discussion.
consequences of globalising 'economies of signs and space' in which objects and subjects are conceived as being 'amazingly mobile'. This mobility, understood in terms of 'flows', is, under these conditions, both 'structured and structuring' (p.3). Lash and Urry point to a vast expansion in transnational practices and flows of 'capital, money, goods, services, people, information, technologies, policies, ideas, images and regulations' (p.280). This mobility, which for the theorists of modernity illuminated the ephemeral, the fleeting and the contingent as important aspects of 19th and early 20th century modernity, has, Lash and Urry (1994) argue, 'shifted up several gears' in an era of; mass (migratory, business and tourist) air travel; mass public and, importantly, private transit capacities; and electronically enabled communication and information generation and transfer. (p.13)\(^6\)

Lash and Urry (1994) suggest that these flows, 'do not simply derive from single countries, nor even from one particular geographical area'. In this sense such transformative practices are 'relatively independent' of individual Nation States (p.280). However Lash and Urry (1994) caution against seeing these flows as entirely free, or unregulated, or as unbounded by time and space. Indeed, particular flows are 'highly specific to particular times and particular spaces' (p.12). Embodied subjects, as migrants, as tourists, are less mobile than digital information flows. Moreover, these various configurations of time-space 'through which labour, capital and signs flow' are institutionally structured. (p.12). Indeed, under the conditions of reflexive modernization the continual monitoring of these flows by expert systems results in these flows themselves becoming highly consequential structuring processes.

Core-Periphery Relations

For Lash and Urry (1994) the transformative processes of globalisation are unequal processes; that is they have different points of origin and different strengths, different directions of flow and different 'localized' consequences. In this framework 'Globalization is really advanced capitalist globalization', given that the 'development' of these transnational flows is driven by 'particular localized sites' in the North Atlantic rim and Asia Pacific rim countries. Hollywood (Los Angeles), Tokyo, The City financial district in London, and New York are significant sites in this sense (p.280). These processes signal the emergence of new core-periphery relations in a 'post-organized capitalist order'. Here Lash and Urry argue that these new relations 'represent a major shift from the older order's central cluster of Fordist industries' (p.12). These new cores cluster 'around the control functions centred in the head offices of the global cities of the major transnational firms' (p.12). It is in these 'information-saturated,

service-rich, communication-laden' cores that the most 'significant processes of flexible specialization, localization and globalization are developing' (pp.12-13). The periphery in this account consists of relationally 'isolated areas in the same countries' as the network rich global cities. It also consists of areas 'in the former Eastern Europe, or in the Third World' (p.28).

In some senses Australia continues to occupy a position on the periphery in these transformed transnational flows; a historical location which has always produced a particular set of problematics for the government and regulation of international flows of capital, labour and trade. Hirst and Thompson's (1992) analysis of the effects of processes of globalization on nation(al) economies, an analysis which is not unsympathetic with that of Lash and Urry (1994), suggests that Australia occupies a perilous position in these emergent core-periphery relations. Situating Australia in the Cairns group of 'advanced agricultural and primary product producers', Hirst and Thompson argue that the nation(al) economies of this group of countries are 'particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the international market' (p.392). This vulnerability is a consequence of their reliance on primary commodities; their relative remoteness from large centres of population; and 'cyclical swings in their terms of trade' which result from their dependence on 'the prosperity of the major manufacturing centres' (p.392). Hirst and Thompson (1992) characterise these countries, including Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Argentina, as having 'an advanced "industrial" set of expectations but who still effectively specialize in primary products' (p.392). Australia and South Africa are special cases in this grouping because they control 'significant mineral wealth'. However, the populations of these countries are effectively 'mineral rights pensioners', surviving through commodity 'boom and bust' cycles, on the 'rents skimmed from the exports of minerals' (pp 392-393).

It is in the context of these transformed core-periphery relations that Lash and Urry (1994) are able to argue that the localized spatial concentration of 'network rich' global cities 'signals, at least in the medium term, the victory of both markets and hierarchies over other, state, corporatist and associational, forms of governance' (pp.26-27 original emphasis).

A 'Hollowing Out' of the State
This apparent victory of market governance, regulated from the service rich core of global cities makes it possible to conceive of a 'hollowing out' of the State. Lash and Urry (1994) argue that in these circumstances the Nation State finds that it is increasingly difficult to control or regulate the 'cross border flows generated by these transnational processes' (p.280). The very nature of these flows renders problematic the
notion of 'effective policy instruments' in a nation(al) context. It becomes more problematic for the State to 'control activities' which occur within its territorial borders, so that there is a tendency on the part of the Nation State to 'reduce the range and type of activities undertaken' (p.280).

This tendency to transform the practices of the Nation State, to discursively reconfigure the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Nation State in a globalising context finds widespread expression in the Liberal Democracies at the end of the century. In the Australian state of Victoria the 1992 election resulted in the election of a Conservative government committed to a policy platform of radical deregulation and a transformation in the practices of government. This new government articulated a perceived (real) State debt crisis to a particular construction of these globalising flows. A massive privatisation of State owned assets, a restructuring of the provision of State services, and a State withdrawal from direct provision of infrastructure was articulated to the urgent need for debt reduction. A key element in this discursive field was a constant focus on multiples of the capital letter A, as an expression of the State's credit rating from New York based credit ratings agencies Standard and Poors, and Moody's. \textit{AA, AAA} became significant markers of the progress of this transformation in the practices of State government as assessed by the rationalities of market governance. Market agencies in the network rich global cities rendered problematic the practices of State government at the periphery.\footnote{The Leader of this government, the Premier of Victoria, Mr Jeff Kennett, insists that his government's 'prudent management' of the State's finances remains, five years after this election, 'sacrosanct'. The 'restoration of the AAA credit rating is his holy grail: of major symbolic importance, and fundamental to the state's economic wellbeing' (Parkinson 1997). This government's 5th Annual Report, \textit{ENTERPRIZE VICTORIA}, reports that the State has 'one more step to go to return to the coveted AAA credit rating'. The report cites Moody's rating agency's decision to upgrade the State's credit rating as being due to the 'Kennett Government's dramatic reduction in State debt through privatisation as well as continuing improvement in the budget' (p.3).}

A danger here is to see such transformations only in terms of a hollowing out of the State, or merely in terms of a reduction or withdrawal of the State. In terms of this particular discussion it is more appropriate to think in terms of re-regulation rather than de-regulation; to see these transformations as an instantiation of a problematising of the practices of government. Hirst and Thompson (1995) make a key contribution here. They argue that while these global transformations have served to problematise 'the state's exclusive control of territory', the contemporary Nation State is able to secure a continued 'territorial control' through its central role in 'the regulation of populations'.

For Hirst and Thompson this regulatory capacity and responsibility continues to give the contemporary Nation State a 'definite legitimacy internationally in a way no other agency could have in that it can speak for that population' (p.409). Attempts, by the State, to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of Youth do not cease under these conditions. Rather narratives of Risk, which tell particular truths about the future of the Nation, the chances of securing economic well being for all, and the uncertainties associated with globalising economies of signs and spaces, are mobilised within particular problematisations of the practice of government; problematisations generated by the activities and practices of expertise.

**Processes of Regionalization**

The international context is also transformed by these flows. For Lash and Urry (1994) these transformations lead, in some highly consequential ways, to an increased integration and interdependence between Nation States, and between Nation States and trans(nation)al agencies and organizations. This integration takes the form of a restructuring of older established groupings and bilateral agreements (such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and the UN), and/or the emergence of newer articulations (NAFTA, APEC). These forms of integration are constructed as being *necessary* to 'offset the de-stabilising consequences of global interconnectedness' (p.280). In this context the 'double' of globalisation is often an emergent, though not uncontested or necessarily stable, regionalisation.

In the Australian context, this ambivalent regionalisation is given material and discursive substance in varied attempts to *insert* Australia into Asia, or more specifically, into the Asian Pacific Rim region of transnational flows and practices. My earlier reference to the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, can be conceived, in some quite fundamental(ist) ways, as a consequence of this contested, unstable, and highly consequential process. The Asian Pacific Rim currency and economic *crises* of 1997-98 also demonstrate the instability and the (uncertain) consequences (for the individual, the community and the Nation) of these processes of interconnection. There is, in this sense, no *end* to history signalled by the current dominance of forms of market governance. Indeed, these *crises* are further indication of the measure of Uncertainty which structures human interactions (on the level of the Local, the National and the Global) as a consequence of processes of reflexive modernization. Uncertainties which, in the context of National governance, provoke ongoing attempts to do better (problematisate) the art of government.
Presumptive Global Governance

At another level, the 'rights and obligations, powers and capacities', of the Nation State are being redefined and restructured, suggest Lash and Urry (1994), as a 'putative pattern of global governance' develops. This presumptive global government (the conduct of conduct of Nation States), which emerges through a variety of 'transnational bureaucracies, international representative organizations and very many international agencies', serves to redefine the problematics of Nation State governance. This redefinition means that certain fundamental functions (practices) of government can no longer be quarantined from 'global or regional relations and processes' (pp.280-281).

The current (1995-98) negotiations by member States of the OECD in relation to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is a dangerous example of these processes. The proposed agreement would prohibit all levels of government of the Nation State (Local, Regional, National) from discriminating against foreign investment. Investors who were aggrieved under the proposed guidelines would have recourse to international tribunals for compensation. While expert and popular and political debate continues over what, exactly, the consequences would be of such an Agreement, the MAI certainly, renders problematic traditional notions of National sovereignty, and of the Nation State as a shared community of fate which 'governs itself and determines its own future' (Lash and Urry 1994). Indeed, new areas of uncertainty open up as a consequence of expert attempts to regulate aspects of globalising flows of capital.  

Nation(al) policies on schooling, curriculum, education and training and other highly consequential processes mobilised in the regulation of youth(ful) identities are increasingly framed within spaces structured by these practices of international governance. The UN's Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) is one instance in this process. In this particular case this international convention argues that Education ought to be directed at 'developing the child's personality, talents and mental and physical' capacities. Further, such Education should 'prepare the child for an active adult life in a free society', and be structured so as to 'foster respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, and for the cultural background and values of others' (p.10). There is then, a sense in which the regulatory practices of the

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8The ABC Radio National program Background Briefing (30/11/97) pointed out that Internet sites around the globe 'are thick with instructions on how to lobby politicians to put a stop to the MAI'. Leftlink@vicnet.net.au is one such site. Nichols (1998) and Kemp (1998) provide examples of the differences between various experts about the consequences for Nation(al) sovereignty of the MAI.
Nation State with regard to a particular population are problematised in the context of the emergence of technologies of global governance.

Wild Zones/Tame Zones
In Lash and Urry's (1994) examination of these processes of transformation they highlight one other emergent process which is particularly relevant to the discussion thus far and to its development in later sections. Lash and Urry argue that a 'range of different kinds of socio-spatial entities are emerging which are not nation-state societies of the north Atlantic sort' (p.281). Here Lash and Urry are suggesting that the 'idea' of the Nation State, as the 'obvious and legitimate' source of authority in/over Civil Society, is rendered problematic by these transformed transnational flows. Such a problematisation is evidenced through the emergence of 'societies which are not coterminous with the nation-state'; 'Nation-states that are barely societies'; and 'societies that are not states in the 'conventional sense' (p.281).

The possible forms which these emergent entities might take include the following: A 'Europe of the regions', in which socio-spatial groupings reflect both ancient and more recent attachments and conflicts: Two Italys (North and South): Two Englands (North and South): An Independent Scotland in Europe (Lash and Urry, 1994 pp 282-283). The development of truly interconnected global cities is one other example of these emerging entities. Global cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Sydney, are the 'new homelands' of 'cosmopolitan subjects' who exhibit little of the older attachments to the Nation, as a shared community of fate. These 'reflexivity winners' in the transformed world of transnational flows might, instead, identify with 'neo-worlds' such as; 'the art world, the financial world, the drug world, the advertising world, as well as the academic world' (Lash and Urry, 1994, p.323).

This concept of 'neo world', when connected to a notion such as life world, would seem to suggest that those whose life world is constructed within quite distinct and delimited, physical and imagined boundaries might have a less cosmopolitan, more nationalist identification with the social and cultural spaces of the Nation State. Life world here seems to suggest something fundamentally different to the transnational cosmopolitanism of those who populate the neo life worlds of the art world or the financial world. Here there would appear to be a more abstracted level of attachment to the idea of the Nation State; a more abstracted level of commitment to any idea of a shared future or common fate. Economic Nationalists, from the Left and the Right, share, here, a common point of critique of the practices of transnational corporations, international finance brokers, and various experts (lawyers, accountants, managers) who
facilitate and regulate these practices with little regard to traditional understandings of National interests (Pusey 1991).

The 'double' of cosmopolitanism points to the emergence of, and indeed, an increase in, large populations of 'reflexivity losers' occupying extensive 'wild zones' in these transformed spaces. For Lash and Urry (1994) the idea of 'wild zones' is suggested, at one level, by: 'collapsing empires (USSR), imploding nation-states (Yugoslavia), ungovernable First World Cities (Los Angeles), tracts of desertification (South East Africa) and countries dominated by narco-capitalism (Colombia)' (p.324). Lash and Urry (1994, pp 324-326) and Lash (1994 a, pp 127-135) characterise these 'wild zones' in terms of a deficit of forms of regulation (State, Market, Self), and the 'flight' to the 'tame zones' by those with the capacities to do so. These 'tame zones' are marked both by 'economic, political and cultural security', and by an ability to, more or less successfully, secure the borders of these zones. Often these practices of exclusion take less material or physical forms. Exclusion here is discursive, symbolic or imagined. At other times these boundaries are indeed physical and concrete. Exclusion, in this sense, is marked by the electronically surveilled walled enclaves of the reflexivity winners.

An obvious, and often dangerous and violent, manifestation of this concept of 'wild zone' can be found in the 'impacted ghettos' of many global cities. Here, in close proximity to highly regulated, network rich 'tame zones' there is an 'emptying out' of social structures. In the US context, Lash (1994 a) points to the situation in which Black, Hispanic and other minority groups (the new underclass) are increasingly excluded from Civil Society as labour markets, commodity (super)markets, trade unions, State welfare institutions, the churches, the 'respectable working and middle classes', and indeed 'the family', as institutional forms of an earlier modernity 'subside' as a consequence of these transformed transnational flows (pp.130-131).

The notion of wild and/or tame zones is, thus suggestive of patterns of exclusion and inclusion in spaces which are transformed by Information and Communication (I&C) structures, and the transnational flows generated by these structures. Here Lash (1994 a) has suggested that 'winning' and/or 'losing' in processes of reflexive modernization, the reflexivity chances, if you like, of populations is increasingly determined by positions within these I&C structures. Thus, for Lash, structures or structuring processes do not disappear under the conditions of reflexive modernization. Rather, they are transformed by, and into, (increasingly) transnational flows. These I&C structures consist of 'the networked channels in which information flows', and the 'spaces in which the acquisition of information - processing capacities take place' (p.121). Under the conditions of reflexive modernization life chances emerge as being fundamentally
structured not by 'access to productive capital or production structures', but, rather, by 'access to and place in the new information and communication structures' (p.121).

Production and production relations are still important here. It is just that these production processes become 'subordinated' to the information flows which structure production, and to the networks structured by these flows (Lash 1994 a, p.129). These networks, in which, for instance, information about possible employment, or the capacities necessary to gain employment might flow, have always been significant in industrial modernity. Indeed, these networks (old boy/girl, family, community) have certain class and gender characteristics which have been fundamental to the structuring of life worlds, life chances and the likelihood of livelihood within industrial modernity. However, the structuring properties of these flows are enhanced under the conditions of reflexive modernization, where embodied, classed and gendered Subjects, and the reflexivity chances of their DIY projects of the Self, emerge as being increasingly dependent on the structuring capacities of these global flows.

Within these emerging socio-spatial entities, these 'wild/tame' zones, the winners and losers from these transformed flows often occupy proximal spaces. There is evidence of an emerging 'patchwork' of 'enormous social and spatial inequalities, of ungovernable wild zones next to highly disciplined tame zones'. This patchwork of inequality indicates, for Lash and Urry (1994), a situation in which these transnational flows result in 'an absence of a national context for policy' (p.325). Moreover, within the transformed Nation State/Civil Society relationship, as articulated in (Neo)Liberal constructions of the ideal nature of this relationship, the socio-economic governance previously conceived as the domain of the State was to be 'displaced' by the institutional governance of market regulation. Yet, for Lash (1994 a), there is a sense in which these 'wild zones' are emerging as spaces marked by a deficit of governance per se. In this view the violence of young males, gang bonding, racial violence and the narcotics economy which characterises many of these spaces, can be understood as indicative of a situation in which the 'heteronomous monitoring' of an earlier modernity 'has not been replaced by reflexive modernity's self-monitoring'. Here, 'in the absence of the displacement of earlier forms of structure by the I&C structures, 'the outcome is neither heteronomous nor self monitoring but very little monitoring at all' (pp.131-132).

**Youth as the Inhabitants of the Wild Zones**

Youth as a population, as a signifier of apparent ungovernability, has a history of emerging from, of indeed occupying, certain wild zones in the collective imagination of modernity: the Poor, the Promiscuous, the Violent, the Abusive, the Illiterate, the Idle, the Addicts, the Binge Drinkers, the Joy Riders, the Homeless, the Drop Outs.
Particular populations of young people - rendered knowable and calculable in public discourse (imagination) in some form of relation to those who are not thus (the Normal) - have historically occupied such wild zones. This tendency is enhanced within the technologically mediated I & C structures which energise processes of reflexive modernization. These structures, and their transnational flows of images, cultural goods, and metaphors (The Crisis of Youth) provide new spaces and transform older spaces in which such imaginings can take shape. The moral panics which structure contemporary commentary on the Crisis of Youth - which Green and Bigum (1993) represent so powerfully in their *Aliens* thesis - the representations of the 'wretchedness and ungodliness' of 19th century Glaswegian youth, and of the 'packs of feral teenagers with brutish faces and foul mindless mouths' in late 20th century Sydney; these can all be seen as manifestations of this collective imagining: 'And the awful possibility presents itself, insistently: they aren't simply visiting us, after which they'll simply go away; rather they are here to stay and they're taking over' (Green and Bigum, 1993, p.122).

Electronic digital technologies increase (dangerously) the capacities for surveillance of these wild zones, and of the activities of their inhabitants. Video and audio surveillance technologies are increasingly mobilised in commercial (Private) and Public settings to protect the property, the interests and the good order of the community from the activities of those who threaten this good order (most often the threat is embodied by Youth). Increasingly the Risk of these threats is enough to see these technologies mobilised in the service of safety, security and order. Often these surveillance practices are mobilised to protect young people from their own Risky practices. In a Melbourne Secondary College in 1997 the school administration secretly installed video surveillance cameras in the male toilets on the suspicion that students were using these spaces (wild zones) to deal and take drugs. When a number of students were caught on camera engaged in these activities this surveillance was revealed, and justified by the results of the surveillance. In a series of newspaper articles which followed from these revelations it was claimed that in Australia there are 500,000 surveillance cameras in public spaces (supermarkets, malls, department stores, streets) and a further 200,000 in private premises. Improvements in digital video technology are resulting in 20 percent annual growth rates in the deployment of these cameras. Video and audio surveillance, electronic tagging of Youth to police night curfews, and other possibilities portended by technologically enhanced capacities for watching those who threaten good order (*You have nothing to worry about if you are not doing anything wrong*), are dangerous practices in settings where narratives of Uncertainty and Risk structure regulatory practices in the name of the *public interest*.9 These practices are even more dangerous

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when they become a part of the taken-for-granted background of a 'televisual society'; a taken-for-grantedness expressed through a large scale 'indifference' to the increasing presence of these cameras (Allen 1994). As Allen (1994) argues:

Now the camera - the Technologically remote, disembodied eye - serves not merely as a tool of surveillance but also its sign. Despite the much broader array of meanings which can attach to 'surveillance', it is the metaphoric power of the visual which lies at the heart of such analysis. And, more popularly, Orwell's classic and unavoidable text of surveillance, *Nineteen Eighty Four*, has ensured that whatever else 'Big Brother' is doing to monitor society, 'he' is always and first 'watching you'. The video camera system has taken over from the 19th century Panopticon, Bentham's revolutionary prison in which all the inmates lived in a circle of cells with the constant possibility of being observed from a central tower, as the most representative sign of a surveillance society. (p.138)

The narrative of ungovernability, the sense of a lack of self regulation which structures these surveillance practices, also tends to provoke more sophisticated attempts at regulation by those expert systems which appropriate the task of governing the disintegrative tendencies of modernity (Simple and Reflexive). The narrative of Risk emerges as a significant marker in this process. However, Risk is not some end point in this process. In the context of a 'subsiding' of social structures in the inner cities of the US, for instance, the notion of youth as being 'under served' has emerged. That is, while certain populations of young people can be thought of as being at-Risk, they, and other populations of young people, can now also be thought of as being 'under served'. As social structures of an earlier modernity 'empty out' in these 'wild zones', there is a move to articulate new forms of regulation around the notion of 'the underserved'.

**The Nation State and its Others**

**Thinking the State**

The possible consequences of a transformed Nation State can be seen as positive and/or negative. As Lash and Urry (1994) argue, any checklist of the 'achievements' of the modern Nation State would need to include; both the development of Liberal Social Democracy, and the Holocaust of National Socialism; both the notion of civil liberties and the bureaucratised, complex regulation of populations; and both the capacity for peace-keeping and (total) war making. In light of the preceding discussions of processes

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11Rob Watts (1993/94).
of reflexive modernization and globalisation how might it be useful to think the State, and the transformations in the practices of government provoked by these processes?

In the last part of this chapter I intend to provide a brief representation of the positions which are foregrounded in various abstractions of the State. My aim is not, however, to present a history of, or theoretical (philosophical) justification for, these positions. My intent is to indicate the limitations of thinking the State within these constructions; limitations which become most evident in the ways in which the relations between the State and its Others (Civil Society, The Economy) are formulated. Foremost within this project is a view that these constructions, grounded as they are in various idealised (principled) notions of the State, Civil Society and The Economy, represent 'actually existing' (Hall 1988a) examples of the State (and its doubles) as 'failed realisations' of 'deeper' or 'higher' principles (Hunter 1994).

At another level, the need to (re)think the State in particular ways is an issue at a time when so much (Party) political discourse, and theoretical commentary on these discourses, is concerned with reconfiguring the ways in which political and theoretical publics view the State, and its rights, roles and responsibilities. Again, these discourses have a tendency to be framed in a manner which foregrounds the relations between the State and its Others, and the rights, roles and responsibilities of these seemingly autonomous, separate spheres. These discourses about the State, Civil Society and The Economy have a focus, in many Anglo (Australasia, North America, the UK) and European contexts, on reconfiguring the nature of State regulation and government of Civil Society and The Economy. As Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (1992) point out, the collapse of Eastern European 'party states' and contemporary transformations in Western 'post war welfare states', has 'suffused' recent debates about the State and the rightful exercise of political power with; 'images of the state as malign and potentially monstrous. Only 'beyond the State', it appears, can life worthy of free human individuals begin' (p.173).

Indeed, these developments have served to render the question of the State, in Left discourses, 'very problematic' (Hall 1988 a). Writing before the collapse of Eastern European Communist States, Hall (1988 a) argued that the experience of 'actually existing socialism', suggested that far from 'withering away' the State had emerged as a 'gigantic, swollen, bureaucratic and directive force, swallowing up almost the whole of civil society, and imposing itself (sometimes with tanks), in the name of the people, on the backs of the people' (p.221). Set against this experience of the State under the conditions of 'actually existing socialism', is the development of the State in Western Liberal Democracies; a development marked, particularly in the post war period, by a
'gigantic expansion of the state complex within modern capitalism'. An expansion which sees the State playing an 'increasingly interventionist or regulative role in more and more areas of social life' (p.221).\textsuperscript{12}

As Hall (1988a) points out, the regulatory or interventionist practices of the Liberal State are most evident in the practices of the Welfare State; practices which are often 'experienced by masses of ordinary people in the very moment that they are benefiting from it, as an intrusive, managerial and bureaucratic force in their lives' (p.221). These practices include the more obviously welfare provision of income support for the aged, the sick, the unemployed (unemployable) and supporting parents.\textsuperscript{13} However, these interventionist and regulatory practices are also mobilised (and experienced) in the provision and surveillance of universal Public education, health and community services; (juvenile) justice; and in State interventions into, and structuring of, economic activities.

These ongoing political and theoretical debates about the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Liberal State, as a Welfare State, have tended to be structured by a language which seeks to capture a sense of the exercise of power in Liberal Democracies through the positing of certain oppositions; 'between state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.174). Not only do these oppositions seek to grasp the nature of the limits of the rightful exercise of power, they also seek to mark out the spaces in which this exercise of power can rightfully occur.

At this stage I want to engage with a number of contemporary problematisations of the ideal nature of the relationships between the State and its Others. This engagement is complicated by a situation in which older certainties of situating a commentary as Left or Right no longer seem to apply. Conservative and Radical political positions give the appearance of being inverted. The Left appears as the conservative defenders of welfare

\textsuperscript{12}Hall situates his reading of these developments in the context of Nicos Poulantzas' (1978) characterisation of a new juncture in the 'class democracies'; a 'moment' formed by 'intensive state control over every sphere of socio-economic life, combined with radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called "formal" liberties, whose reality is being discovered now that they are going overboard' (Poulantzas 1978, cited in Hall, 1988a, p.151). For Hall this last phrase is 'especially relished' as it reminds him of 'how often the fundamentalist left is scornful of civil liberties until they find themselves badly in need of some' (p.151).

\textsuperscript{13}For a feminist reading of welfare interventions and their implications for the construction of gendered identities see Fraser 1989. Particularly Chapters 7 and 8.
institutions. The Right assumes a radical position of championing market relations and the rapid and dramatic changes these relations provoke. As Giddens (1994a) puts it: 'Conservatism become radical here confronts socialism become conservative' (p.2). In some sense these difficulties point to the limitations of thinking the State within the frameworks which such commentaries mobilise; albeit with marked differences in how the relations between the State and its Others should, ideally, be structured.

**Free to Choose**

An indication of the positions articulated from the Right can be found in the work of Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), whose status as economic theorists and popularisers of free market principles has given them influence in post war (Neo)Liberal discourses which have attempted to reconceive the nature of the rightful relations between The State, Civil Society and The Economy. The Friedmans treat the political system (government) 'symmetrically' with the economic system. Both systems are conceptualised as 'markets' in which various outcomes are 'determined by the interaction among persons pursuing their own self interests (broadly interpreted) rather than the social goals the participants find it advantageous to enunciate' (p.x). Central to this view is a notion of the person as autonomous, rational, choice making and (self) interest driven. For the Friedmans (1980) this 'self interest' should not be interpreted as the 'myopic selfishness', of 'calculating' *homo economicus* (Gordon 1991). Instead self interest, 'broadly interpreted', is 'whatever it is that interests the participants, whatever they value, whatever they pursue'; a pursuit which should be judged by them, 'by their own values' (p.27).

For the Friedmans (1980), economic freedom is a fundamental, and necessary, prerequisite for political freedom. Economic freedom is enabled by, and practiced in, free markets unencumbered by external (State) coercion or intervention. Drawing on Adam Smith's notion of the 'invisible hand of the market' the Friedmans argue that an unregulated market system can 'combine the freedom of individuals to pursue their own objectives with the extensive cooperation and collaboration' necessary for the economy to produce basic food, shelter and clothing needs (p.1). Adam Smith's fundamental premise was that free, autonomous, participants in market relations could derive mutual benefit 'so long as cooperation was strictly voluntary' (p.1 original emphasis). Exchange relations will not occur, then, unless there is mutual benefit. In this sort of understanding, no 'external force, no coercion, no violation of freedom is necessary to

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14 Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman 1980.  
15 Milton Friedman is the 1976 Nobel Prize Winner for Economics.  
produce cooperation among individuals, all of whom can benefit' (p.2). The Friedmans (1980) argue that 'enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction' (pp 2-3) delimits the scope of the exercise of power. Further, the free market, in 'dispersing power' counter balances any tendency for the concentration of political power. They argue that this principle of the combination of economic and political freedom 'produced a golden age in both Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century' (p.3). This era of freedom and prosperity, argue the Friedmans, was more pronounced in the United States because: 'It started with a clean slate: fewer vestiges of class and status; fewer government restraints; a more fertile field for energy, drive, and innovation; and an empty continent to conquer' (p.3).\textsuperscript{17}

Central to the Friedmans' (1980) view of how this prosperity occurred is the conviction that 'private initiative operating in a free market open to all' (p.3), was unencumbered by government 'interference', and further, did not rely on government 'assistance' (p.4). This freedom, and its dependence on a limited form (view) of government, was given expression in the (1801) inaugural address of US president Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson's view of the State as 'umpire', not 'participant', underpinned the ideal of a, 'wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men [sic] from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement' (cited in Friedman & Friedman 1980, p.4). This 19th century Liberal view of the State, and its relations to its Others, constructed the State as minimalist, as non-interventionist, and as the guarantor of the rights of individual freedom and of self-interest. This ideal or principled view of the State, and its rights, roles and responsibilities, changed during the course of the 20th century, the Friedmans suggest, under the intellectual influence of Fabian socialism (in the UK), and New Deal liberalism (in the US). In the Friedmans' (1980) argument, the popular attraction for increased State regulation and intervention was articulated through the view that in an 'imperfect world', in which there 'were still many evils' (p.4) then 'good', 'strong' government in the 'right' hands could fill the role of a 'parent charged with the duty of coercing some to aid others' (p.5)

The tremendous post war growth of the 'paternalistic' Welfare State (Thatcherism's Nanny State) is identified by the Friedmans as the main threat to individual freedom,

\textsuperscript{17}The Friedmans make no mention of the violence which was integral to this conquering process, and which Noam Chomsky (1995) suggests has been a continuing powerful presence in US culture and international relations. Further, indigenous populations do not figure in this 'golden' history. The Friedmans do briefly refer to the 'shame of slavery'; suggesting that individual initiative was liberated with the abolition of slavery.
autonomy and prosperity in Liberal Democracies. The 'public waste' of large State bureaucracies is, for the Friedmans (1980), 'distressing' enough. However, the 'major evil' of paternalistic welfare programs is their impact on the very 'fabric of our society' (p.127). Such programs 'weaken the family; reduce the incentive to work, save and innovate; reduce the accumulation of capital; and limit our freedom' (p.127).

The State - Socialism's Old Caretaker\textsuperscript{18}

This \textit{free market} critique of the State, and its rights, roles and responsibilities in relation to Civil Society and the Economy, has echoes in Hall's (1988 a) problematising of the Welfare State from a Left perspective. This scenario, of some sort of convergence in certain Left and Right critiques of the Welfare State, creates a number of significant dilemmas for the Left. In one sense, argues Hall (1988 a), those who critique the Welfare State from the Left are seen to be keeping company with the 'Thatcherites, the new right, the free market gospellers, who \textit{seem} (whisper it not too loud) to be saying rather similar things about the state' (pp.221-222). In another sense, certain 'Statist' sections of the Left, as traditional champions and defenders of the Welfare State as an alternative centre of power to the market, as an alternative to the logic of the market, are positioned, politically and intellectually, as responsible (culpable) for the growth of big government. So that the Right is able to, more or less successfully, articulate 'widespread popular dissatisfactions' with welfare State regulatory practices to an 'anti-Left, "roll back the state" crusade' (Hall, 1988 a, pp.221-222). In this political and theoretical context, in which the State and its Others are conceived of as \textit{doubles}, and the ideal relationship between these principled constructs is a cause for debate, Hall (1988 a) poses a number of questions for the Left. 'Where, to be honest, do we stand on this issue? Are we for 'rolling back the State' - including the Welfare state? Are we for or against the management of the whole of society by the state?' (p.222, original emphasis).

Michael Pusey (1991) is prepared to adopt a 'principled position' in relation to this problematic of the State. Pusey's work is a study of the ways in which Australia's Federal bureaucracy has been transformed by a 'new culture' of political administration (characterised by Pusey as economic rationalism). These transformations, argues Pusey, have occurred under a succession of Social Democratic (Labour) and Conservative (Liberal) administrations since the mid 1970s. This new culture is set (nostalgically) against 'what was once a friendly and intelligent Australian federal bureaucracy'; a system of public administration which occupied a 'space that was once a "public sphere"

\textsuperscript{18}Stuart Hall (1988 a)
of constructive deliberation that the bureaucracy had itself nourished' (p.11). For
Pusey (1991) this transformation of the culture of public administration has been
marked by a process of public sector 'reform' articulated through; concerns about
'ungovernable democracies', and 'overloaded states' (p.3); a welfare retreat framed in
terms of 'more individual initiative and less state provision' (p.5); and notions of
'flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness' (p.11). This 'depoliticised' language of
systems efficiency modelling - which marks, for Pusey, the 'intellectual triumph of'
formal models over practical substance' (p.8) - has served to create an 'insulating
distance' between the poles of State and Civil Society; a distance which: 'Protects the
political administrative system from both intellectual and 'ordinary' culture, and so from
participation, from interpretations of need, and from many of the normal and
supposedly normative prerogatives and entitlements of citizenship in a liberal social
democracy' (pp.11-12, original emphasis).

Pusey's (1991) framework for interpreting these transformations and rationalisations is
structured by the 'premise that "developed" societies are obligatorily coordinated
through the two structures of state and economy'. Further, the 'features' of these
conceptually distinct structures 'are to a large extent given in those of the other' (p.9).
Moreover, this truth of the rightful relation between the State and its Others is, at a
fundamental theoretical level, informed by the notion that; 'in delivering their
functionally indispensable benefits, each of these coordinating structures exacts its own
costs both for the individual and for civil society, culture and identity' (p.9). At each end
of this bipolar model the 'cast of politics' and the 'cost of coordination' become
'obvious'. So that, as in Eastern European Party States, the 'costs' to Civil Society of
'excessive' State coordination are apparent. So too, argues Pusey (1991), are the forms
of 'social degradation' and 'colonisation' which emerge when the 'burden of
coordination' is moved to the laissez-faire market end of the spectrum. As is the case,
suggests Pusey, under economic rationalist regimes in 'the great stateless societies' of
the UK and US (p.10). Within this sort of theoretical framework, which Pusey (1991)
acknowledges as being somewhat 'oversimplified', social democracy, as a theoretical
and political ideal, is a 'quest on some imaginary horizontal line for a balance between

19Watts (1993/94) is critical of Pusey's principled attachment to this view of a benign, paternalistic state.
Watts observes that for Pusey the state was not a problem 'when run by an increasingly large-scale
Keynesian technocracy', yet it 'is a problem when run by an 'economic rationalist' technocracy' (p. 104,
original emphasis). This unproblematic attachment to an idealised view of the Keynesian Welfare State
echoes much Left political and theoretical discourse as it responds to (Neo)Liberal discursive
articulations of the rightful relations between the State and its Others. My concerns with these principled
positions will be developed in what follows.
economy and state' (p.10). On the vertical axis social democracy is a 'quest for a reconciliation of coordination "from the top down" with norms of democracy grounded per force "from the bottom up" in immanent requirements of identity, civil society and culture' (p.10).

Pusey's (1991) definition of the State is irreducible to the elected (Party political) government. Instead, he posits a view of the State as being inclusive of police, the military, a constitution and a 'state apparatus' of 'legal, political and bureaucratic institutions' (p.14). He locates this conception of the State within an intellectual and political framework which positions the State as an 'actor' which both structures Civil Society, and the 'relationships between civil society and public authority' (p.14). In this view of the State, and its relationships with its Others, there is a 'conviction that the State would be the most likely protector of individual rights against other agencies of social coercion' (p.1). More explicitly, this way of thinking the State, particularly in the context of the transformations which have reconfigured the rights, roles and responsibilities of contemporary Liberal States, conceives of the assemblage of public administration apparatus as 'alone [standing] between individual citizens and market structures' (p.2). This is a view of the State which sits at one end of a bi-polar historical continuum; an end identified by Pusey (1991) as 'continental European', in which the State is 'represented as the embodiment of ethics, reason and collective will' (p.14). At the opposite end of this continuum is the 'Anglophone, libertarian and Mayflower' conception of the State. A construction which sees the State, as the 'main impediment' to freedom, the 'natural right' to the 'enjoyment of property', and to the 'pursuit of individual happiness' (p.14). The Friedmans (1980) sit comfortably at this end.

Pusey (1991) argues that Australia's colonial and post-colonial development has been characterised by a 'strong' State which 'led' capital in 'a direction' that 'protected domestic industries and their workers from what would have otherwise been crushing external pressures' (p.15). In this sort of understanding there is a suggestion that the State is (has been) 'relatively autonomous'; relatively independent of 'vested interests' and with a relative and 'historically variable' capacity to contain 'economic development and private behaviour within the discipline of the "generalisable" common, and public interest' (p.13). In light of the transformations in the rights, roles and responsibilities of the State which Pusey (1991) identifies, he queries how much 'effective authority of this ostensibly strong state apparatus will survive' (p.150). A key element in Pusey's attack on the role of economic rationalism in restructuring Australia's public administration apparatus, is his contention that this restructuring has led to a situation in which Australia, as a 'middle ranking' Nation in global economic processes, as a Nation on the periphery of global economies of signs and spaces, has placed in jeopardy the integrity,
or relative autonomy, of the Nation State. This integrity is jeopardised, argues Pusey, as a consequence of the tensions which mark the 'new world economic order'; tensions which exist in an important sense, between 'internationally coordinated positions and movements of capital, and the increasingly defensive positions of labour movements that remain perforce bound by the inherited structural and other particularities of national context and situation' (p.16).

For Pusey (1991) these tensions point towards the 'allegiances' and 'intellectual orientations of Nation(al) 'public and private elites' (p.16). Pusey argues that where, as in some Western European Nation States, the 'captains of business are nationalists first and capitalists second' then both the 'national interest and the integrity of the State can be more easily secured within corporatist arrangements' (p.16). However, when such elites are 'drawn into an anti social internationalism', as Pusey suggests has occurred within the transformations he identifies in the Australian context, then a more Risky, Uncertain situation emerges in which these elites seek to overwhelm 'whatever independence and "relative autonomy" stands in the way' (p.16).

Judith Brett (1997) addresses similar concerns in an article which concerns itself with the tensions which exist between the global economic strategies of large Australian companies and the 'national interest' as defined by Federal political leaders. The article is situated in the context of Australia's largest industrial company, Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP), closing down its Australian steel making operations (with the loss of Australian based jobs) and investigating the option of buying into an Indonesian steel working enterprise. Brett argues that this sort of global strategy is indicative of the ways in which 'globalisation is pulling the interests of politicians away from the interests of the big nationally based companies'. This situation is a different one, argues Brett, from the 1950s when a 'cosy circle of mutual interest' saw politicians defending the interests of big companies on the basis that these corporations provided jobs and promoted economic (job and profit) growth; and politicians were seen to be doing a good job in encouraging these business interests. As Brett suggests, when Australian businesses pursue their interests on a 'world rather than a national stage, the circle of benefit is decisively broken'. When this occurs the interests of our 'politicians and nationally based companies no longer coincide' (p.15).
A Problematization of the State

Where, to be honest, do we stand on these issues? Are we for rolling back the State, including the welfare State? Are we for or against the management of the whole of society by the State?20

At one level, Hall's (1988a) questions are important in any 'project of renewal' of the Left. In party political terms, and in theoretical terms the Right has been successful in articulating popular positions in relation to these questions. Contemporary transformations of the relations between the State and its Others involve, to some significant extent, an ideological or representational problematic. These transformations are ideological in the sense that while the State is irreducible to parliamentary government, the representational problematics of party politics are highly consequential for the practice of government. In Liberal Democracies political parties, as Governments, as Oppositions, are compelled to articulate representations of the 'problematics of government' in order to be elected. Changes in parliamentary government have the potential, at least, to transform the logic or practice of government; to trigger the emergence, or otherwise, of different political rationalities, and the types of techniques which might be mobilised within changed 'problematics of government'.

I want to argue, however, that these are not the appropriate questions to ask if, as Rose and Miller (1992) argue, we are to understand contemporary 'problematics of government'. More so when such problematics structure the regulation of youth(ful) populations. Posing such questions, and responding to them in either/or ways, results, I suggest, in thinking the State within the limits imposed by thinking in terms of oppositions such as: The State/Civil Society, Oppression/Emancipation, Public/Private, Coercion/Choice, Waste/Efficiency, Power/Agency, Regulation/Freedom. As Rose and Miller (1992) argue, a 'political vocabulary' structured by such oppositions fails to 'adequately characterise the diverse ways in which rule is exercised' within contemporary Liberal Democracies. Following Rose and Miller (1992) my intent is to develop the view that in contemporary settings, 'power is exercised through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities' in a variety of projects which seek to govern various 'facets of economic activity, social life and individual conduct' (p.174).

However, the either/or thinking which structures much thinking about the State, on the Left and Right, fails to grasp this reality, or its consequences for thinking the State.

20Hall's (1988 a) questions for the Left as it confronts processes which are transforming the traditional truths of the State.
Further, this either/or thinking positions Left intellectual and political practice (as dialectical critique) in a negative or positive relation to one or other of the elements in the binary. A defence or negation of one of the poles is often a principled process, underpinned by an ideal or higher conception of the recuperated pole in the opposition. Further, mounting a (dialectical) critique of these oppositions, of for instance, the relations between the Market and the State, serves to trap this intellectual practice in the 'orbit of the binary concepts that it seeks to problematize' (Hunter 1993, p.125). As Hunter (1993) suggests, critique, in this sense, becomes little more than a 'theoretical oscillation between these concepts' (p.125). Within this process of oscillation each element of the dualism is 'temporarily held in suspension, while its oppositional partner is affirmed, and then reaffirmed as the pendulum of critique reverses its swing' (p.126). One result of this sort of intellectual practice, for Hunter (1993), is that neither pole of these oppositions is 'decisively criticized or permanently renounced'. Problematising a constitutive element in the practice of (dialectical) critique is 'always a prelude to its reaffirmation as, with the reversal in the axis of critique, the dubious concept takes it turn as the self evident ground for another round of problematization' (p.126).

In thinking The State in terms of oppositions, there is a further tendency to essentialise the oppositional elements; to position them as existing in some way differently to the constructs used to 'describe' them, or indeed, as existing prior to their representation in discourse. Now this does not mean that the State and its Others have no material reality or effects outside of discourse. Rather, it is again a stressing of the view that discourse is constitutive, it enables or allows certain, particular ways of thinking (the State). In this sense discourses should not be understood as 'merely cognitive or contemplative' entities, but as 'articulating practices' which constitute and organise 'social relations through the use of constitutive categories' (Watts, 1993/94, p.121). In constructing the State as one element of a binary, by representing certain material and discursive processes as State processes there is, in effect, a move to construct the State. Yet this construction is only made possible by positioning the State, constructed thus, in a relationship of difference to its Others. In this sense, the terms which comprise such binaries 'only derive significance' through their 'structural relationship' with each other (Harrison 1995, p.59).21 The mobilisation of oppositions suggests that each element has an essential, given character; a natural autonomy which can be jeopardised by the other element in the binary. This is a move which further leads to a principled affirmation or negation of the binary element.

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21 See also Moi (1987), Weedon (1987), and Davies (1993) for further discussion on the constitutive dimensions of binary constructions.
At another level, thinking the State (and its Others) in this way serves to suggest a certain unity of purpose, or a consensus of interests, or a cohesiveness or autonomy for each element in the binary. This unity of interests is then seen to structure the contested transformations in the relations between the State and its Others; a restructuring conceived as a clash, or contest, over differing interests: Business interests vs National interests, Public interests vs Private interests, Patriarchal State vs Women's interests, Middle Class interests vs Working Class interests. Again, Stuart Hall (1988 a) is instructive in understanding the problems and limitations associated with thinking the State in these terms. Hall argues that the political project of Thatcherism and its transformation of the State's relations to its Others has been, in some quite 'obvious and undeniable ways', structured by attempts; to 'restore the prerogatives of ownership and profitability'; to produce the 'political conditions for capital to operate more effectively'; and to attempt to encourage a culture underpinned by a view that there is 'no measure of the good life other than "value for money"' (p.4). In this context Hall cites Marx on Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism, as a measure of the New Utilitarianism which Hall sees as dominating the culture encouraged (allowed) by Thatcherism. For Marx, Bentham 'takes the modern [19th century] shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper as the normal man. Whatever is useful for this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present and future' (cited in Hall, 1988 a, p.4).

In Hall's (1988 a) mind there is little doubt that at one level these cultural processes 'profit' the 'industrial and business classes of society'; the new prophets of an 'enterprise culture' who (re)emerge as the 'keepers of the moral conscience and guardians, inter alia, of our education system' (p.4). However, Hall also acknowledges that thinking of the 'interests' which are served by these transformations becomes problematic when attention is focussed on Thatcherism's successful articulation of 'different social and economic interests within its political project' (pp 4-5). In this situation, it becomes difficult in any 'precise' way to argue 'which class interests are represented by Thatcherism', since, for Hall, it is 'precisely class interests which in the process of their "re-presentation" are being politically and ideologically redefined' (p.5). Moreover, this idea of class 'recomposition' ought to be set against a problematization of the notion of class 'interests' itself; a view which often conceives class 'consciousness' as reducible to the relationships between the 'economic', the 'political', and the 'ideological' (p.5).

Thinking about publicly funded (State) schooling, in terms of its actually existing (variable) relationships to the State, Civil Society and The Economy, provides an illustration of these difficulties. What interests are being served here? Who or Where or What is the State in this instance? Is it the popularly elected politician as Minister for
Education? Is it another Minister with complimentary or competing ideas (claims)? Is it the (whole) political Government (of the day)? The Opposition? The Ministry of Educational Bureaucrats? Other State bureaucracies? Officials within different levels of these bureaucracies with competing or complimentary agenda? Teachers in school classrooms with a variety of notions about children, young people and their parents, and of education and its social and economic purposes? Ditto School Principals? Various experts in diverse centres of expertise whose problematisations of Schooling, Management, Teaching, Literacy, International Competitiveness and Youth at-Risk are mobilised in any number of related, or contradictory, endeavours in Education? (Would be) intellectuals (as State employees) in publicly funded Universities who might be supportive and/or critical of the State and its policies?^{22}

Faced with such difficulties it becomes increasingly problematic to think of the State, conceived as an assemblage of apparatuses for (of) public administration, as cohering around a common interest or purpose, or as possessing a 'sovereign will', or a 'unifying moral or intellectual rationale' (Hunter 1993, p.131). What becomes apparent, as Hunter (1993) suggests, is that the 'instruments of government'; that is, the 'systems of management', of police, the military, state schooling, public housing..., all had 'diverse' origins and have developed their own 'forms of expertise and ethical imperatives' (p.131).

It is in this sort of theoretical and political context that Foucault's genealogies of government and the self emerge as potentially useful aspects of a problematizing intellectual practice. Mitchell Dean (1994) argues that these genealogies 'effect a displacement' within 'conventional forms of ethical and political analysis'. Foucault, argues Dean, 'juxtaposes an analysis of the practices of government to the theory of the state' (p.177). Colin Gordon (1991) points out that Foucault, in response to (Left) criticisms that his genealogies lacked a theory of the State, or a theory of the relations between Society and the State, acknowledged such criticisms by remarking that he 'refrained from a theory of the state, "in the sense that one abstains from an indigestible meal"' (p.4). So that in Foucault's conceptualisation of governmentality rather than a theory of the State we find an analysis of the 'operation of governmental power, the techniques and practices by which it works and the rationalities and strategies invested in it' (Dean 1994, p.179).

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^{22}Smith (1995) canvasses the practical difficulties intellectuals face 'working within publicly funded institutions and engaging in activities like teacher education and government consultancies, while criticizing them'(p.3).
(Neo)Liberalism's Attempts to Govern the Ungovernable

In Anglo-European settings the political triumph of Reaganism, Thatcherism, Economic Rationalism, the New Right has resulted in a Crisis of the Left. Stuart Hall (1988 a) has argued that Left theoretical and political discourses have demonstrated a 'historic incapacity' to engage, in any broad based way, with the transformations of the social (the end of the social) which Beck et al (1994) have identified as being structured by processes of reflexive modernization, and of globalisation. These processes tend to disrupt traditional social relations and groupings; they tend to force individuals to engage in a life long reflexive DIY project of the self; and they structure conditions in which narratives of Uncertainty and Risk become dominant as a consequence of the penetration of all aspects of the social and the natural by the activities of expertise.

The discussion thus far has highlighted the limits of thinking these transformations in government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy, and the Self) from principled, Left and Right, positions on the ideal nature of the relations between the State and its Others. Indeed the limits of thinking within this framework are emphasised by naming these transformations from within a Left/Right binary logic.23 As Giddens (1994 a) has argued, there is a need to move Beyond Left and Right. Nikolas Rose (1996 a) provides a reading of both Liberalism and (Neo)Liberalism which is useful in this particular context.24 Rose (1996 a) sets himself a number of tasks in examining (Neo)Liberalism as a practice of government. Not least among these is his intent to problematise 'those political logics', of both the Left and the Right, which give the appearance of making it 'easy and self evident to be "for" or "against" the present' (p.61). For Rose, the transformations in the problematics of government, which he identifies as 'advanced liberal', are indeed of a different order than that indicated by the 'neo-liberal political rhetorics' which have dominated political discourse in the parliamentary democracies.

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23 Acknowledging the limits imposed by this form of binary thinking is one thing. Moving beyond them is another. I know of no more useful way of signifying the range of positions contained within this binary other than as Left and Right. Radical and Conservative is just as problematic. For this reason I will continue to use Left and Right, arguing, however, that governmentality provokes a way of thinking (differently) the transformations of government which moves away from this principled, binary form of thinking.

over the past three decades. (Neo)Liberalism, which in this discussion mirrors Rose's (1996 a) 'advanced liberalism', is thus of a different order to the political rhetorics of Reaganism, Thatcherism, Economic Rationalism, and the New Right.

The consequences of thinking within the limits of these principled positions, and the logics of Left or Right, are as much an issue for the Right as they are for the Left. It is, however, a more pressing concern for the Left, as the Right emerges with the capacity to articulate (problematically and provisionally) a practice of government under these conditions. In this context Left theoretical and political discourse has largely turned conservative, seeking to defend or protect what remains of the practice of Liberal Welfare Government (Hall 1988 a, Giddens 1994 a). This move to conserve is evidenced in contemporary debates, in the Australian context particularly, around the effects of Economic Rationalism as the Ideology of Restructuring (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy, and the Self). Here what remains of (on) the Left elects, largely, to (unproblematically) defend the interventionist, bureaucratised practices of the Liberal Welfare State; an art of government so disparagingly dismissed by Thatcherism as the Nanny State. Such principled defences seemingly signal an end to history. There is a sense that an articulation of the ideal nature of the relations between the State and its Others renders these relations non problematic: For now, in the future, for all time. As if the practices and institutional relations of the Liberal Welfare State, as a solution to the art of government, evidenced the pinnacle of achievement in terms of equity or social justice or transparent ethical practice in government (of the Nation, of schooling, of juvenile justice, of the family, of children, of the Self).

Rees et al (1993), for instance, set themselves the 'difficult' task of 'lifting the ideological veil' (p.8) masking the reality of the social transformations writ large under the banner of 'economic rationalism'. Their attempt to 'go beyond the market' rests largely on the need to challenge the uncritical reliance on a particular economic theory as the means of determining political goals and ways of evaluating them' (p.10 emphasis added). Part of this attempt involves 'rediscovering' certain important 'caveats' (truths) in economic analysis. Truths which, for Rees et al (1993), find expression in the discourses of Keynes and Galbraith, and in the practices of the Welfare State. In many respects this is important work. 'Economic efficiency' and 'managerial effectiveness' need to be problematised as markers of certain forms of governance and regulation. Yet the work of Rees et.al. (1993) and that of Pusey (1991) can also be read as (pre)supposing that Keynes and Galbraith and the practices of the Welfare State provided the solution (for all times and spaces) to the art of government. Here the uncritical reliance on neo classical economic theory by the 'economic rationalists' has, as its double, an unproblematic defence of many of the practices of the Welfare State by
those who profess a grounding in concerns about social justice and equity, and transparency.

There is however, no end to history in the practice of government. As Giddens (1994 a) argues, 'the welfare state was formed as a 'class compromise' or 'settlement' in social conditions that have now altered very markedly' (p.17). Moreover, Foucault's (1983) theorisation of governmentality indicates that the conduct of conduct is indeed ongoing, and 'rooted deep in the social nexus'. A 'society without power relations', in this understanding, 'can only be an abstraction' (pp 222-223). For Foucault (1983) this understanding of power relations does not suggest that 'those which are established are necessary' ('no necessary correspondence' in Hall's (1985) terms), or that 'power constitutes a fatality at the heart of societies'. Rather, Foucault argued that both the problematisation of power relations, and the 'provocation' ('agonism') between 'power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence' (p.223).

In the following chapter I will engage, therefore, with those discourses of governmentality which think (Neo)Liberalism as a problematisation of the practice of government. Colin Gordon (1991) argues that a central concern in Foucault's investigations of governmental rationalities, and of the emergence of Liberalism in the 18th century and of post war (Neo)Liberalism, is to move away from thinking Liberalism in terms of ideology, or doctrine or as political or economic theory. Instead Foucault's purpose is to construct (Neo)Liberalism as a 'style of thinking quintessentially concerned with the art of governing'; and as a set of practices and techniques mobilised in this style of thinking to render operable this problematisation of government (p.4). Both Liberalism and (Neo)Liberalism, as contingent, historically located solutions to the practice of government may emerge as dominant in specific historical settings. However, this dominance is also situated in a historical context which must be constantly referred to in the various attempts to make concrete the practice of government. It is situated, in this sense, in a less than ideal context. As such the practices of (Neo)Liberal government emerge as contingent attempts to govern in particular regulatory settings such as Schools, Work Places, Courts, Hospitals, and Clinics. (Neo)Liberalism's problematisation of government is thus located in time and space, in particular Nation(al), judicial, legislative, bureaucratic, institutional and territorial configurations inherited from history; from prior orderings of the social as the concrete manifestations of previous attempts to make government work.

These apparently successful articulations are inherently unstable. Under the conditions of reflexive modernization, the practice of government (of the Nation State) becomes
PART TWO:

RISK AND THE PROBLEMATICS OF

GOVERNMENT

IN AN

AGE OF MANUFACTURED UNCERTAINTY.
Chapter Four:
Risk as a Metanarrative of an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty

Introduction.

Any problematising political or theoretical practice which engages the construction of Youth at-Risk ought to be grounded in an acknowledgment of the often powerful and enduring nature of these constructions. Stuart Hall's (1985) theorisation of ideology as a signifying or representational process operating within discursive clusters or formations is useful in this context. So too is his theorisation of 'articulation', with its emphasis on understanding the 'conditions of existence' which work, both positively and negatively, to enable these clustering processes to mean (something). This meaning making process ought, however, be understood as provisional and contingent, not eternal. It is a process marked by contradiction, tension and contestation. Yet, in allowing for the 'not necessary' nature of these articulations, some weight should also be attached to the enduring nature of many representational problematics; their non problematic status almost, particularly with regard to the Question(s) of Youth. What should be done with, for, or to them?1

The enduring character of certain problematisations of Youth becomes most evident, I suggest, if and when those articulations which serve to structure or represent Youth, are examined in a way which foregrounds their concerns with public order, social integration and ideals of morality and normality. In this context David Stow's 'shocking' encounters with early 19th century Glaswegian 'profanity, indecency, filth and vice', and with youthful 'wretchedness' and 'ungodliness'; is echoed across time and space in Graham Goodman's late night, late 20th century encounters in inner city Sydney, with 'packs of feral teenagers with brutish faces and foul, mindless mouths'.2

Any attempt to move beyond the discursive formations which have, historically, been successful in constructing both the problem of Youth, and its solutions; any attempt to problematise the taken-for-grantedness of these representations, ought to be situated in the contemporary 'conditions of existence' of these articulations. There is a need to

1Hall (1986) argues that the social is not 'a totally open discursive field' where 'anything is or isn't potentially articulatable with anything' (p.56).
2These references are drawn from the representations of Youth which I used at the beginning of the Introduction to this thesis.
'submit everything to the discipline of the present reality, to our understanding of the forces which are really shaping and changing our world' (Hall 1988 a, p.14). Moreover, any broad Left 'agenda of renewal' cannot, argues Hall, occupy a 'different world' from that in which a currently triumphal (Neo)Liberalism dominates representational politics with regard to the Question(s) of Youth. As Hall suggests, in the context of his critical engagement with Thatcherism; 'we can only renew the project of the left by precisely occupying the same world that Thatcherism does, and building from that a different form of society' (p.15 original emphasis).3

This imperative structures the final part of this thesis. This part of the thesis is less concerned with Youth than it is with understanding the processes which structure the various attempts to construct, and to regulate populations of Youth through narratives, and techniques of Risk. My purpose is to suggest that the regulation of youth(ful) populations is a process which, at particular historical moments, dominates governmental horizons. It has done so at various times in the past. It does so in the present. It will, in all probability do so at some future time. Even when it is not a dominant concern it is a constant one. As Rose (1990) has argued: 'Childhood [youth] is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence'. Moreover, this government of the 'health, welfare and rearing of children' has, in a variety of forms and contexts, and under particular historical conditions, been articulated 'in thought and practice to the destiny of the nation and the responsibilities of the state' (p.121). These narratives of Youth penetrate deeply into, and structure the sorts of common sense, taken-for-granted assumptions about young people; about the rights and responsibilities of various experts in diverse centres of expertise to regulate and construct the identity spaces of Youth; and to do so in ways which are structured, quite fundamentally, by concerns about social order, social integration and ideals of morality and normality.

This chapter will examine the social conditions of the present, the contemporary 'conditions of existence' of Risk discourses, in order to understand the ways in which the narrative of Risk becomes so powerfully articulated with the regulation of youth(ful) populations. My intention is to construct an understanding of these conditions which situate powerful, contemporary governmental practices within the

3Hall cites Laclau & Mouffe (1987) as further support for his position. Laclau & Mouffe argue that the Left needs to 'accept in all their radical novelty, the transformations of the world we live in, neither to ignore them nor to distort them in order to make them compatible with outdated schemes'. Further, Laclau & Mouffe argue that renewal of the Left must start 'from that full insertion in the present - in its struggles, its challenges, its dangers - to interrogate the past and to search within it for the genealogy of the present situation' (Laclau & Mouffe 1987, cited in Hall 1988(a) p.14).
broader context of social transformations in which narratives of uncertainty, anxiety, apparent ungovernability, and Risk figure prominently.4

An Age of Manufactured Uncertainty

An Age of Anxiety

Certain representations of the 'social transformations of our times' (Giddens 1994 a) characterise contemporary conditions as marking the transition to postmodernity, constructed in some form of relationship to modernity. In Part One of this thesis I signalled my agreement with both the significance of a number of these transformations in the structuring of the life worlds (chances) of populations of young people, and with the need to account for these transformations at the level of intellectual abstraction. At that time, I also indicated my departure from certain postmodern abstractions of these transformations in so far as they failed to account for particular, highly consequential continuities in the processes which structure the identity spaces of Youth. Here I am thinking of my earlier discussion of the need to account for the ways in which social relations continue to be differently structured by embodied relations of gender, class, ethnicity and geography (as particular configurations of time, space and place). A further related concern with certain postmodern abstractions of these transformations is the tendency, identified by Gill (1991), for much of these representations to be 'antipathetic to political, social or cultural struggle'.

Moreover, much postmodern intellectual abstraction further fails to provide any account of the ways in which young peoples' behaviours and dispositions continue to be fundamental concerns within contemporary problematics of government. Here I am suggesting that youth(ful) identity work and its regulation continues to be a primary concern for the State's work of social integration. My concerns here are well summarised by Hall's (1995) disagreement with those versions of postmodernism which suggest, more or less explicitly, that 'identity is nothing, or that it is dispersed and that one is free to choose in a consumer market by popping in today and popping out later' (p.52). In this postmodern view of the self as 'nomadic', there is a sense of an 'absolute move into an entirely different world'. In such a world 'community is finished! We are just wandering stars, wandering postmodern stars!' (p.67). These postmodern stories of apparently unconstrained open networks of association miss the 'double' of these

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4In the Australian context such representations of the 'nation's mood' or the 'mood of the people' have been a constant presence in the popular, theoretical and political discourses as the millennium draws to a close. See, for instance Mackay (1989, 1993, 1997). I will visit a number of these representations in this and the following chapters.
processes - the forms of regulation and institutionalisation which structure these open networks (Beck 1992). It is these sorts of concerns which lead to my engagement with the work of Anthony Giddens (1984, 1990, 1991, 1994 a&b), Ulrich Beck (1992, 1994), and Scott Lash (1994), and Lash and John Urry (1994), and their theorisation of the ways in which processes of reflexive modernization, and of globalisation are transforming contemporary social settings and relations.

A principal element in this engagement, particularly in the context of my concern to understand the conditions of existence which make Risk such a powerful marker in the government of Youth, will be the foregrounding of the 'paradox of human knowledge' which is central to understanding processes of reflexive modernization (Beck et.al. 1994). These processes are marked by the emergence of a degree of collective awareness that our contemporary conditions of existence are characterised by the thoroughgoing penetration of the social and the natural by reflexive human knowledge. Such a situation leads, not to a position in 'which collectively we are the masters [sic] of our destiny'; but rather to a series of settings in which we are confronted with the possibility that, as a 'consequence of our own doings', the future becomes 'very threatening' (p.vii). Under the conditions of reflexive modernization this paradox emerges as an important concern within the institutional and day-to-day lives of human beings who must learn to live within (through) the consequences of this paradox.

Under these conditions, the narrative of Risk, and its mobilisation across numerous domains can be understood as thinking, reflexively, in terms of 'as-if' scenarios. As Beck et.al. (1994) suggest: 'In most aspects of our lives, individual and collective, we have regularly to construct potential futures' (p.vii). Such a claim appears, at first, unremarkable, until this 'colonization of the future' (Giddens 1990) is understood in terms of reflexivity. That is, futures are uncertain and unpredictable precisely because our processes for ordering these possibilities (probabilities) construct 'new areas of unpredictability' as a consequence of various 'attempts to seek to control them' (p.vii).

Hugh Mackay (1989, 1993, 1997), a prominent market researcher and social commentator has, over a period of ten years, collected and represented evidence which suggest that these sensibilities are widespread among sections of the Australian population. Indeed, Mackay (1997) argues that insecurity has become Australia's 'national characteristic'. More than twenty five years of 'unprecedented social, cultural, economic and technological upheaval', have, according to Mackay, resulted in the emergence of this 'mood'. Pointing to; declining marriage rates and birthrates; rising divorce rates and relationship insecurities; uncertainties about the Economy generally, and (un)employment particularly; the impact of information technology; and a 'whole
generation of kids who are heading nowhere', Mackay reads 'the mind and the mood' of Australians as 'feeling a bit like the nervous country...or even the disappointed country' (p.23).

In a series of related articles Michael Gordon (1997 a&amp;b) argues that a 'detailed stocktake' of the nation's 'mind and mood', by 'one of Australia's most respected social researchers, Hugh Mackay, has revealed that Australia is a nation that sees itself as being 'at risk'. For Gordon (1997 a) these 'findings are evidenced, at one level, by Mackay's argument that: 'People with apparently secure jobs remark that no job is secure...People with stable marriages are conscious of the increasing instability of the institution of marriage' (p.1). At another level Gordon (1997 b) suggests that a reading of Mackay's research indicates that Australians are 'deeply concerned' that 'leaving things to the market' increases the nation's vulnerability in the face of the 'pressures of globalisation'. Further, there is a sense, from Mackay's study, of a 'growing ruthlessness among corporations'; a sense which is connected to a belief by many working participants in the research, that they are 'working harder than ever'. Connected to these anxieties is a scepticism about the impact of information technologies on employment. This scepticism is expressed through a belief that such technologies, on balance, are responsible for a shrinkage in employment opportunities (p.4).

In an earlier report on the 'mind and mood of Australia in the '90s' Mackay (1993) canvassed similar themes. There the concerns by Australians about the social transformations of the last three decades were characterised by Mackay in terms of 'the last straw syndrome'. The experience, suggests Mackay, of 'stress and anxiety' related to these transformations is so overwhelming that 'even quite minor upsets can feel like one thing too many' (p.11). In reporting on these concerns Mackay mobilised a number of other labels to name contemporary sensibilities. 'The Age of Redefinition', of which 'The Big Angst' and 'The Age of Anxiety' are but symptoms, is a manifestation of more than twenty years of change and uncertainty in which the 'Australian way of life' has been challenged 'to such an extent that growing numbers of Australians feel as if their personal identities are under threat as well' (p.19). In Mackay's (1993) terms The Age of Anxiety is both a symptom of a fear of the future, and a consequence of a past which is perceived as more stable and certain. An anxiety about possible futures emerges, not as a consequence of a rational 'fear' of the potential 'horrors which the future seemed capable of visiting upon us' under the (mushroom) cloud of 'total war'. Rather, contemporary anxiety about the future 'is not so much based on what the future holds as on our inability to chart a confident course through it' (p.20). Here Mackay touches on the paradox of human knowledge which is central in theses of reflexive modernization; a paradox which sees not increased certainty as a consequence of increased
'intellectually grounded' knowledge about the *natural* and the *social*. Rather, processes of reflexive modernization signal the emergence of 'manufactured uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a).

**The Reflexivity of Human Action**

Giddens (1990) has argued that modernity's dynamism is a consequence, in part, of the 'reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations in the light of continual inputs of knowledge affecting the actions', of institutions, groups and individuals (p.17). Reflexivity is a fundamental concept in this particular attempt to understand the contemporary conditions of existence which structure the mobilisation of Risk discourses in the regulation of Youth. Processes of reflexive modernisation are characterised by 'radical doubt'. This 'manufactured uncertainty' becomes central in the ordering of social relations as a result of the emergence of an awareness that human knowledge, as a consequence of its reflexive nature, its inherent tendency to 'chronic revision', and its provisional, contingent and probabilistic nature, results in a 'runaway world' of 'dislocation' and 'uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a, p.3).

Giddens (1991) distinguishes between the reflexivity which is characteristic of all human activity, and the reflexivity which is characteristic of modernity (p.20). The remainder of this section will examine what Giddens means in relation to the reflexivity which characterises all human action. This is a necessary first step to understanding the radicalised institutional and self-reflexivity which characterises the 'post traditional social order' of late modernity (Giddens 1994 b). Further, this construction of reflexivity and the manufactured uncertainty which characterises contemporary settings, is grounded in an argument that *doubt* and *uncertainty*, particularly of the order which appears frequently in contemporary popular, political and theoretical discourses, is 'existentially troubling' for large numbers of people (Giddens 1990, 1991). It is this context that Risk (and its partner Uncertainty), as a narrative of our times, comes to mean so powerfully in so many settings.

Giddens' (1984) earlier elaboration of structuration theory pivots on the concept of the 'duality of structure'. Central to structuration theory is the suggestion that 'structural properties of social systems exist only in so far as forms of social conduct are reproduced chronically across time and space' (p.xxi). Fundamental to this understanding is a view of human action (agency) which suggests that humans have, 'as an inherent aspect of what they do, the capacity to understand what they do while they do it' (p.xxii). Further, this reflexive capacity inherent in human activity is 'characteristically involved in a continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the contexts of social activity' (pp.xxii-xxiii).
In developing this theory of a reflexive monitoring of action by human agents Giddens (1984) moves to introduce a series of distinct levels to the knowledgeability of human agents. To be a human being is to be a 'purposive agent, who has both reasons for his or her activities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon these reasons (including lying about them)' (p.3). There is then a discursive consciousness aspect to knowledgeability. However, argues Giddens (1984), the reflexive capacity of human agency 'functions only partly at the discursive level'. The knowledgeability of human actors, what they 'know about what they do, and why they do it', is 'largely carried' at the level of 'practical consciousness' (p.xxiii). Practical consciousness comprises those aspects of human action which 'actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression' (p.xxiii). Central to this conceptualization of practical consciousness is the emphasis Giddens places on the habitual, routinized character of 'day-to-day' social activity. These routinized aspects of being, or 'going on', are vital to the 'psychological mechanisms whereby a sense of trust or ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of social life' (p.xxiii).5

The related notions of trust and ontological security are key elements in Giddens' (1991) elaboration of reflexivity as inherent in human action. These concepts are important for understanding the ways in which 'manufactured uncertainty' and 'radical doubt' can be disturbing ('existentially troubling') for individuals under the conditions of reflexive modernization (pp.20-21). Feelings of ontological security find their 'cognitive and emotive anchor' in the practical consciousness dimension of human action. This anchoring helps to 'bracket' the potentially overwhelming feelings of dread and anxiety which 'lurk' on the 'other side of the ordinariness of everyday conventions'. Such a claim is grounded in Giddens' reading of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiments on 'trust', and in the concept of 'basic trust' which is a fundamental concern of object relations psychoanalytic theory (Giddens 1991, pp.36-37).

5In moving to distinguish between different levels of consciousness, Giddens (1984) also affirms a view of the unconscious as comprising 'those forms of cognition and impulsion which are either wholly repressed from consciousness or appear in consciousness only in distorted form' (pp 4-5). At this stage, this additional distinction is not central to my discussion. In the following sections, however, I will return to these distinctions in the context of Lash and Urry's (1994) and Lash's (1994) critique of Giddens' use of reflexivity.
Ethnomethodology and Ontological Security.

Garfinkel (1967) argues that human actors use 'background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation'. These background expectancies comprise the 'unexamined', the 'socially standardized and standardizing', the 'seen but unnoticed, expected...features of everyday scenes' (p.36). The task of ethnomethodology is to bring such background experiences 'into view' (p.37); to learn how an agent's 'actual, ordinary activities' are enabled by 'methods' that are directed towards making 'practical actions, practical circumstances' and 'common sense knowledge of social structures' meaningful (pp.vii-viii). This view of human action sees ethnomethodological studies starting 'from familiar scenes' and asking: 'What can be done to make trouble'? What operations, asks Garfinkel, (1967) would need to be performed so as to:

multiply the senseless features of perceived environments; to produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation and confusion; to produce the socially structured effects of anxiety, shame, guilt and indignation; and to produce disorganized interaction; in ways which might reveal something about how the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely produced and maintained. (pp.37-38)

It is in these attempts to introduce methodical doubt into the everyday that ethnomethodology seeks to make visible certain 'elemental characteristics of human existence' (Giddens 1991, p.36). A sense of the operations mobilised by Garfinkel, and the sorts of (unexpected) responses which they provoked, can be gained from Garfinkel's commentary on his experiments with 'trust':

It was unnerving to find the seemingly endless variety of events that lent themselves to the production of really nasty surprises. These events ranged from those that, according to sociological commonsense, were 'critical', like standing very, very close to a person while otherwise maintaining an innocuous conversation, to others that according to sociological commonsense were 'trivial', like saying 'hello' at the termination of a conversation. Both procedures elicited anxiety, indignation, strong feelings on the part of the experimenter and subject alike of humiliation and regret, demands by the subjects

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7Garfinkel (1967) reports on a number of these experiments in Chapters 2-6 of Studies in Ethnomethodology.
for explanation and so on. (Garfinkel, 1963, p.198, cited in Heritage 1984 p.306)

For Heritage (1984) these outcomes suggest that human action is fundamentally a 'temporal' affair which is reflexively accountable. In other words, it is by means of the application of methods of practical reasoning to a temporal succession of activities that all aspects of social action are rendered accountable (p.308, original emphasis). Heritage (1984) argues that the operations mobilised in ethnomethodological experiments indicate that while human agents are able to 'trust' that their ordinary, common sense 'methods' are 'adequate' to the 'tasks' at hand, then they continue to 'employ them with varying degrees of cognitive discomfort' (p.306). However, when the very 'applicability of the methods themselves' are rendered problematic then 'anger and bewilderment made their appearance' (p.306). In this sense, then, actions can be conceived as not merely the 'products of individual dispositions nor of external restraints', but rather as 'reciprocally organized within a setting in which the actors' cognitive frameworks are instantiated as patterned interaction' (p.307).

Giddens (1991) argues that Garfinkel's experiments indicate the 'fragility' of our 'going on in the world', a fragility which is anchored, in usual circumstances, by a degree of ontological security. Ontological security thus forms the basis by which we are able to, more or less successfully, and at different times, bracket out 'questions about ourselves, others and the object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity' (p.37). Giddens (1991) suggests that this bracketing presents the means by which existential questions 'about the frameworks of existence' are able to be 'answered'. In some quite fundamental ways, remarks Giddens, the 'anchoring aspects of such 'answers' are emotional rather than simply cognitive' (p.38).

**Object Relations and Basic Trust**

For Giddens (1991), the emotional and cognitive 'trust' invested in the 'existential anchorings of reality' is a measure of the 'confidence in the reliability of persons' which is, importantly, 'acquired' through the experiences of childhood (p.38). Drawing primarily on the work of object relations psychoanalytic theory Giddens, here, is arguing that this 'basic trust' is a form of 'emotional inoculation'; a sort of 'protection' which 'allows the individual to sustain hope and courage' in the face of diverse 'existential anxieties'. This 'protective cocoon' offers the possibility of carrying 'the individual through transitions, crises and circumstances of high risk' (pp.38-40).

Stephen Epstein's (1991) engagement with object relations theory is structured by a critique of Freudian 'drive theory', a theory which saw Freud, at the level of 'meta psychology', conceptualising human beings as the 'carriers of drives seeking discharges'
Epstein argues that object relations theorists also locate their work in opposition to drive theory, at the same time as they are 'firmly rooted in Freud'. An apparent contradiction which is explained, for Epstein, by Freud's clinical practice which was framed within a 'vision of selfhood as a quality forged through intense personal relationships with significant others' (p.835). Epstein (1991) argues that these tensions in Freud's work provide the spaces in which the so-called 'British school' of object relations is able to argue that, 'humans are born into the world in a state of utter dependence, with needs - both material and relational - that can only be satisfied by others; what they fundamentally seek, therefore, is not so much pleasure as connection with others' (p.836). This sort of understanding enables a focus on the stages which 'the person' passes through in her or his relation to others', rather than, say, 'speaking of stages that libido' may pass through in 'its' development (p.836 original emphasis). Such a move constructs human nature as 'fundamentally and profoundly social' (p.836). More importantly, it is a view of a 'relational self' which 'moves psychoanalysis away from a monistic, bounded, individualism and toward a more sociological and historical conception of selfhood' (p.837).

Within object relations theory the development of self is seen to emerge in the process whereby the infant comes to differentiate between itself and its environment, a differentiation which, initially, it is unable to conceive of (p.836). In terms of the present discussion this process of differentiation is fundamental to the formation of 'basic trust'. For Giddens (1991) this process of differentiation, between self and others and the 'object world', emerges through the infants 'emotional acceptance of absence: the 'faith' that the caretaker will return, even though she or he is no longer in the presence of the infant' (p. 38, original emphasis). Epstein (1991) further argues that this process operates through the taking in of imagined aspects of the personalities of the important people in the infants life, but culminates in the perception of a distinct identity, bounded off from the rest of the world. That is, out of the various internalized objects, a practical unity can come to be forged. (p.836)

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9 Jane Flax's (1990) feminist reading of object relations theory points to silences on gender and gender relations, and, further, critiques essentialist, ahistorical and acultural notions of the 'good enough mother' in Winnicott's work. Flax, however, reflexively recuperates aspects of object relations theories as a way of understanding the relational, social, embodied and, importantly, the gendered nature of the Self. Here
This manner of conceiving the Self is situated in relation to certain poststructuralist (postmodernist) constructions of the self as 'fictive', or 'decentred', or 'inevitably fractured' (Epstein 1991). In positing the potential for the development, in 'usual circumstances', of an 'inter dependent autonomy' and a 'core sense of self', Epstein (1991) argues that object relations theories provide a useful critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis in which 'even modest claims of autonomy are a myth', and where human subjectivity is conceived as 'necessarily and inevitably fractured and heteronomous' (p.839). Giddens (1990) adopts a similar position suggesting that while Lacan's work is valuable in that it helps to capture the fragility and fragmentation of the self, it focuses, 'in common with post-structuralist thought in general', upon one type of process. Object relations theories, in contrast, shifts attention to 'counter tendencies towards integration and wholeness'. In this sense: 'Object relations theory is informative because it analyses how the individual obtains a sense of coherence, and how this connects with reassurance in the 'reality' of the external world' (p.96). A final word in this reading of object relations theories, situated in some sort of relationship to poststructuralism, comes from Flax (1990) who cites her work with 'borderline patients', patients who;

lack a core sense of self without which the registering of and pleasure in a variety of experiencing of ourselves, others and the outer world are simply not possible. Those who celebrate or call for a 'de-centred self' seem self deceptively naive and unaware of the basic cohesion within themselves that makes the fragmentation of experiences something other than a terrifying slide into psychosis. These writers seem to confirm the very claims of those they have contempt for, that a sense of continuity or 'going-on-being' is so much a part of the core self that it becomes a taken-for-granted background. (pp.218-219)

**Reflexivity and the Problematic of Risk**

Ontological security and basic trust is thus the other side of fragmentation and dispersal; the other to the disconnectedness characteristic of Flax's 'borderline patients'. As such the emphasis which Giddens accords these concepts in his understanding of the reflexivity inherent in human being (in the world) is useful at a number of levels. This reading continues my engagement with poststructuralism (postmodernism). This is an engagement which acknowledges a number of important insights within these frameworks. At the same time, this discussion foregrounds certain 'counter tendencies'
in the practices of human being-in-the-world. This attention to certain *elemental* characteristics of human 'going on' emphasises the incidence and significance of these aspects of human being in the world. Ontological security is something to be secured, cognitively and emotionally, in the face of that tendency to existential dread, or the tendency to dispersal and fragmentation of a sense of Self which characterises human existence.

This focus on trust and ontological security would suggest, that at one level, Risk, as a metanarrative of uncertain times, tells certain powerful truths about a number of *elemental* characteristics of human existence; characteristics which, under particular conditions, suggest that the experience of doubt and uncertainty is existentially troubling. Yet, for Lash and Urry (1994), the prominence which Giddens gives to the notion of ontological security indicates an inbuilt 'conservative bias' in Giddens' use of reflexivity. Lash and Urry argue that 'the sense of continuity and order in events' (Giddens 1991, p.248) which grounds the 'ontologically secure individual' evidences a bias towards social reproduction in Giddens' work (p.39). Giddens (1994a) himself makes this strand in his work an explicit issue. In contemporary settings, where there is much discussion of *endings* (the *end* of history, the *end* of ideology, the *end* of the social and of the natural, the *end* of the millennium), Giddens questions whether:

> far from the possibilities of change having been closed off, we are suffering from a surfeit of them? For surely there comes a point at which endless change is not only unsettling but positively destructive - and in many areas of social life, it could be argued, this point has certainly been reached. (p.2)

Here Giddens (1994 a) is connecting, empirically, to, arguably, widespread sensibilities; sensibilities which figure prominently in popular, political and theoretical discourses about the 'social transformations of our times'. In these discourses Uncertainty, Risk and Insecurity provide a narrative structure for various attempts to regulate aspects of these transformations; particularly the forms of Youth(ful) identity appropriate for these times. In this context it is worth returning to Mackay's (1989, 1993, 1997) reading of the 'mind and mood' of Australia; a reading which tells a truth about Australians feeling *uncertain and anxious* as a consequence of these transformations. I want to sketch a number of concerns I have with these truths.

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10 As Giddens (1994 a) admits, such a train of thought tends to lead away from Radical political philosophy towards an Old Conservatism. More particularly towards an appropriation of certain aspects of Old Conservatism in which 'traditions need to be saved, or recovered...in so far as they provide generalizable sources of solidarity' (p.48).
Mackay (1997) argues that one indicator of the mood of Australians in the late 1990s is a sense that: 'We wish we - and especially our kids - were not so materialistic, but we keep buying more and more things'. Yet Mackay's research, as social research, is first and foremost market research. As research its primary concern is to inquire into, and represent, in quite particular, quite accessible (non contradictory) ways the 'mind and mood' of a particular population (demographic). This form of research, then, aims to assist marketing agencies design strategies to colonise the hearts and minds of targeted populations so that we will keep buying more and more things. In a concluding section of an earlier study of the 'emerging mind and mood of today's Young Australians' Mackay (1989) outlines the 'Seven key marketing and advertising implications' of his findings. In this research report Mackay (1989) tells a truth of Young Australians as being 'fast trackers accustomed to rapid change'; as being influenced by their parents' 'anxieties and insecurities'; as being independent from an earlier age because their 'mothers are generally involved in paid employment outside the home'; as being an 'indulged generation' who are compensated for parental absence through material possessions; as being 'confused' as a consequence of conflicts over redefinitions in gender roles; as suffering from 'shadows of doubt and disappointment' about present and future prospects for Australia; as having a strong need for 'security' and 'belonging' which is met variously within the family and peer groups, and through an association with the Right Brand ('sporting the wrong brand can be a humiliation'); as seeing in 'fun' (having it, looking for it) the 'ultimate escape' from 'pressure', 'insecurity', 'unhappiness' or 'boredom'; as finding it 'hard to identify an accepted moral framework' at a time when 'moral values are in decline' (pp.2-3).

In light of these findings Mackay (1989) outlines a number of key implications for advertisers (the absent presence in this research). Mackay's advice to this audience covers a number of concerns. The most relevant to this present discussion is Mackay's finding that today's Young Australians have 'deep security needs' related to an uncertainty about their own, and Australia's future, and to the 'rapid rate of change' and social transformation. For Mackay (1989) these particular findings suggest that 'there are big opportunities for brands which offer security and a sense of identity', and that advertisers should not be 'afraid of messages which encourage (and appeal to) national pride' (pp 58-59). Here anxiety and insecurity are represented as being the defining characteristics of the mind and mood of a (younger) generation. Advertisers should tap

11This report was commissioned by the Chiat/Day/Mojo advertising agency. Aspects of this report were visited in Chapter One of this thesis, in the context of examining Eckersley's (1992) construction of a Crisis of Youth.
into these feelings in order to encourage (incite) young people to buy their products. Presumably this sort of \textit{shopping therapy} can provide a measure of (temporary) relief from the anxieties which this (market) research has identified.

Now it could be argued that this particular representation of young people's sensibilities provides a one-dimensional (flat), stereotypical portrait of contemporary Youth. It could also be argued that the politics of this research is problematic. On the one hand it identifies anxieties and insecurities, and expresses some concern about these sensibilities. On the other hand, this research is designed so as to identify emotional states (anxiety) around which advertising campaigns can be structured. It would be quite (too) easy to argue against the contradictions and questionable morality of this research. In terms of a Left political and theoretical discourse, it would be reflexive, but not \textit{reflexive}, to adopt a principled (op)position against advertising, market research and the penetration of most aspects of personal existence by market relations.\footnote{Langman (1991) reads 'mass consumption society' as manipulating 'desire' and transforming the 'self and social interaction in everyday life' (p.108). In this reading, where Marx meets Goffman and Foucault in the shopping malls of America, modern anxiety and alienation is situated in a society of 'unending spectacles and carnivals, fast food, faster technologies and a universalization of consumption; a society which provides ersatz gratifications in a fragmented world of everyday life that is situated in consumption based routines and lifestyles' (p.108). This Left reading of popular culture, which constructs consumption (shopping) as feminine, as being the Other of production and \textit{falsely} gratifying, is an instance of Socialism become Conservative in the context of these social transformations. Hall (1988 b,c,d), Willis (1990) and Nava (1991, 1992) provide readings of these processes, from positions on the Left, that are more reflexive.} However, it might be more useful to think of market research as social research \textit{par excellence} in settings which are so thoroughly penetrated by market relations. Mackay's market research might, therefore, speak to certain significant aspects of the contemporary conditions of youth(ful) existence.

In another sense these research findings might \textit{really} be pointing towards the anxieties and insecurities of certain, less than youth(ful), commentators and experts who are \textit{allowed} to construct Youth and to tell the truths about the contemporary conditions of their existence. Insecurity, anxiety and angst about uncertain futures, and the place of youth(ful) populations in these (possible), futures could be more indicative of the 'mind and mood' of old(er) populations. Indeed, these sorts of sensibilities have the potential to energise the discourses of expertise which appropriate the responsibility for the regulation of Youth. I am suggesting here that processes of social change and transformation, and the management (regulation) of these processes, creates differing
perceptions of Risk, Risk environments and Risky practices. Old(er) generations, the
generations with the 'social power to mean' (Watts 1993/94), may construct or perceive
certain processes and practices in terms of risk. Youth(ful) populations may conceive
them differently; in terms of fun, adventure, experimentation, exploration,
independence. Giddens (1991), for instance, suggests that various forms of 'cultivated
risk-taking' represent, in some respects, an act of self-vindication and a demonstration,
to the self and others, that under difficult circumstances one can come through' (p. 33).
For Giddens the feelings of 'fear' and 'mastery' which characterise acts of cultivated risk
taking are embedded in the 'courage to be', which structures early childhood
constructions of the me/not me aspects of identity (p. 133). Risk (in various settings and
forms) might, therefore, be seen by certain individuals and groups as something to be
embraced as part of being alive. 13

An example. The Premier of the Australian State of Victoria, Mr Jeff Kennett, is
characterised by Tony Parkinson (1997) as a 'brash', 'swaggering', 'perennial risk taker'.
Mr Kennett is seen (positively and/or negatively) as a political figure who has
established a national 'reputation for never letting slip an opportunity to push the pedal
on reform'; or to further the 'radical reappraisal of the role of government'. The Premier
himself characterises his government as one which has; 'acquired the ability to shape a
vision and create a way of life which embraces change and is able to move with it. This
is a government of the times. Complacency must have no domain in Victoria' (cited in
Parkinson, 1997, p.6). In response to a proposition that there exists a 'general
community mood' which suggests that 'Australians are suffering reform fatigue after
more than a decade of economic restructuring', the Premier argues that: 'I don't accept
the Hugh Mackay research that shows people want to be comfortable. People do want
security. But they also want excitement, colour and light. I think that's what we provide'
(cited in Parkinson, 1997, p.6).

13 There is a large and diverse institutionalised intellectual (academic) domain marked out by the study of
Risk (Management, Assessment, Perception). Sociological, Psychological, Anthropological and
Educational discourses constitute this domain. The Centre for Cultural Risk Research (Charles Sturt
University, NSW, Australia), for instance, aims to 'investigate the socio-cultural bases for differences in
individual perceptions, values, attitudes and behaviours around 'risk' ' (Tulloch 1997, p.2). This Centre
(of expertise) produces intellectually grounded knowledge about the emotional, affective and cognitive
processes structuring perceptions of the Risks (of crime and STDs, and to bodies, lives, relationships and
the planet). Perceptions which are largely generated in the context of reflexively produced expert
knowledge about institutionally structured Risk environments. See also, Douglas (1985), Kasparsen
One final proposition. This concerns the conservative move towards security and away from change which these representations of 'mind and mood' appear to exhibit. Various social movements of the last half of the 20th century have struggled against tradition, conservatism, and powerful (vested) interests. The status quo. At some quite fundamental levels many feminists, indigenous people, gays and lesbians, and environmentalists would argue against the notion that there has been enough (too much) change in the various relations, practices and processes they have mobilised against. There is a sense also that Uncertainty and Anxiety are mainly constructed in the negative, as something to be avoided, as feeling states which are dangerous, or bad. However, Uncertainty and Anxiety, as being existentially troubling, can be generative, productive, a motive force for progressive transformations in domains of human interaction. Understood thus Uncertainty and Anxiety are potentially positive.

Whilst these reservations are important, in some ways they are marginal concerns in terms of understanding the processes which are at work in transforming contemporary settings. Indeed, what this sort of exchange demonstrates is the very reflexivity which leads to the emergence of manufactured uncertainty as a consequence of processes of reflexive modernization. Everything is provisional. Everything needs to be defended or redefined or recuperated in the face of radical doubt. The reflexive generation, appropriation and reformulation of claims to knowledge (certainty) with regard to particular conditions is an ongoing process. It is in this sense that I want to suggest that (manufactured) uncertainty is a key structuring element in the contemporary conditions of existence of those discourses which attempt to regulate youth(ful) identities through narratives of Risk. In the final half of this chapter I will argue that discourses of Risk attempt to construct certainty in the context of the 'return of uncertainty' (Beck 1994 b). I will argue that the reflexive practices of diverse forms of expertise are constitutive of the institutional reflexivity which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. The reflexivity of institutionalised expert systems provokes the return of uncertainty; in this context the construction, by diverse forms of expertise, of the truth of Youth at-Risk represents a paradoxical, and dangerous, quest for certainty.

**Reflexive Modernization and the DIY Self**

**The Risk Society**

Beck's (1992, 1994 a & b) reflexive modernization thesis is situated theoretically in relation to debates about modernity/postmodernity. For Beck (1992) there is a sense that in the last half of the twentieth century, and on the threshold of the new millennium 'we' are 'eye witnesses' to a 'break within modernity, which is freeing itself from the contours of the classical industrial society and forging a new form - the (industrial) "risk
society" (p.9). Beck (1992) argues that in much the same way as industrial modernity 'dissolved the structure of feudal society', so processes of reflexive modernization have 'consumed and lost its other', and now undermine 'its own premises as an industrial society along with its functional principles' (p.10 original emphasis). These processes signal a 'demystification' of the roles and functions of 'science and technology in classical industrial society'. Similar processes of doubt and uncertainty are attaching, within contemporary settings, to 'modes of existence in work, leisure, the family and sexuality' (p.10). For Beck (1992) these principles of industrial modernity - the forms of 'traditionally inherent in industrialisation' - are written into the structures of industrial society in diverse ways (p.14 original emphasis). They are expressed, in a material and/or discursive sense in narratives about; Classes, The Nuclear Family, Work, Science, Progress, Democracy.

Importantly, in terms of Beck's (1994a) thesis on the 'reflexive' character of these processes, the transformations in these principles are occurring largely outside of the political, planning, or regulatory ambit of Liberal Democratic Nation States and the 'democratic self understandings' of these societies. These processes are not the result of rational, cognitive contemplation about the direction (progress) of modernity. These processes occur, largely, 'surreptitiously and unplanned in the wake of normal, autonomized modernization' (p.3). Autonomous here refers to the manner in which these processes are generated within rationalities, frameworks, interests, forms of regulation and management peculiar to particular settings, institutions and centres of expertise. These processes answer not to a single logic, or rationality or overriding (National, community) interest. The consequences of these processes are, then, Uncertain; and the Uncertainty of these processes can be on the scale of the global (the future state of the biosphere) or the personal (relationships, diet). For Beck (1994 a) 'modernization as a process of autonomized innovation', leads, as an inherent consequence of this autonomization, to the 'emergence of a risk society'. This development is carried by processes of reflexivity in which 'social, political, economic and individual risks increasingly tend to escape' the activities and practices of the various experts in diverse centres of expertise which attempt to regulate the disintegrative effects of modernity (p.5).

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14Giddens (1994c) prefers to characterise contemporary transformations in terms of 'institutional reflexivity'. He argues that reflexive modernization connotes a 'completion' or an end stage of modernity, in which 'previously dormant' facets of the social and the natural are brought into view (p.185). For Giddens this reading 'supposes' a clear 'developmental' direction or logic within modernity. In some ways this reading sits uncomfortably alongside Giddens' (1990, 1991) earlier characterisations of contemporary settings as 'Late Modernity', 'Radicalised Modernity' and 'High Modernity'.

Beck (1994 a) constructs the emergence of the 'risk society' as occurring in two phases. The first phase is a stage in which 'the effects and self-threats' of risk society are 'systematically produced', but these effects 'do not become public issues or the centre of political conflicts' (p.5). The 'self concepts of industrial society' (Science, Progress, Democracy, Growth, Education, Family) remain dominant; thus 'both multiplying and "legitimating" the threats produced by decision-making as "residual risks"' (p.5). Here risks are conceived as tolerable side effects. The second phase in the emergence of the 'risk society' is a stage in which the dangers and Risks of industrial society 'begin to dominate public, political and private debates and conflicts'. In this phase the relatively autonomous, unforseen, unplanned consequences of modernity become 'socially and politically problematic' (p.5 original emphasis). Under such conditions the 'certitudes of industrial society (the consensus for progress or the abstraction of ecological effects and hazards)' are rendered unstable (untenable) (p.5). Yet these problematics are not merely matters for/of reflection, as might be suggested by the notion of reflexivity. Indeed, Beck (1994 a) argues that:

Risk society is not an option that one can choose or reject in the course of political disputes. It arises in the continuity of autonomized modernization processes which are blind and deaf to their own effects and threats. Cumulatively and latently, the latter produce threats which call into question and eventually destroy the foundations of industrial society. (pp.5-6)

 Reflexive modernization, then, 'means not less but more modernity, a modernity radicalized against the paths and categories of the classical industrial setting' (Beck 1992, p. 14). The inherent dynamism of modernity, illustrated by Marx and Engel's aphorism 'All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned' (cited in Beck 1992, p. 2, emphasis added), points to new processes of modernization, marked, not by the crisis of capitalism but by its successes. Here modernization processes undercut and dissolve the contours and principles of industrial society. Reflexive modernization ought to be understood as a process in which the 'self confrontation with the effects of risk society' cannot be accommodated within the 'institutionalized standards' of industrial society (Beck 1994 a, p.6). This does not mean that at some stage these effects cannot (do not) become subjected to processes of reasoned public, political, scientific reflection. Rather Beck's (1994 a) argument suggests that this later reflection cannot 'obscure the unreflected, quasi-autonomous mechanism of the transition: it is precisely abstraction which produces and gives reality to risk society' (p.6).
Here Beck is gesturing towards a series of crises which bear directly on those metanarratives which have legitimated and been constitutive of processes of modernization. Indeed, these stories have been fundamental to the practices of government in the modern Nation State. What these crises reveal are the institutional foundations and the effects of modernization processes. At the same time these crises indicate the limited capacity of these institutional practices to effectively engage the consequences of modernity. This does not mean, however, that in a 'risk society', these institutional structures cease to function, or no longer mobilise assorted attempts to intervene into, or reflect upon these processes, and their potential (uncertain) consequences. For Beck (1994 b) there is a crucial distinction to be made between reflection and reflexivity. Beck argues that:

the 'reflexivity of modernity and modernization in my sense does not mean reflection on modernity, self-relatedness, the self-referentiality of modernity, nor does it mean the self-justification or self-criticism of modernity in the sense of classical sociology; rather...modernization undercuts modernization, unintended and unseen, and therefore also reflection free, with the force of autonomized modernization. (p.176 original emphasis)\(^{15}\)

Beck's (1994 b) position is one which is situated in an engagement with the 'optimism' of the 'cognitive theory of reflexive modernization'. Beck argues that his use of reflexivity can accommodate the 'reflection theory of modernization - but not vice versa' (p.177). This cognitive theory of modernization cannot account for the 'possibility that the transition into another epoch of modernity could take place 'unintended' and 'unseen' (p.177). Rather, the optimism of a cognitive theory of reflection on modernity would suggest that more must mean better. More 'reflection, more experts, more science, more public sphere, more self-awareness and self-criticism' must result in more certainty, more control, 'better possibilities for a world that has got out of joint' (p.177).

There are strong connections, here, with Giddens' (1994 c) construction of 'manufactured uncertainty' as being a dominant characteristic of post traditional social orders. Contemporary transformations in the social and the natural domains of human (inter)action can be conceived in terms of manufactured uncertainty. This situation, in which diverse aspects of contemporary settings have become structured by 'scenario thinking, the as-if construction of possible future outcomes' is one not anticipated

\(^{15}\)Beck (1994 b) stresses this point in relation to Lash's (1994) reading of reflexive modernization theses, a reading on Lash's (1994) part which critiques the apparent emphasis on cognitive reflection in Beck and Giddens' use of reflexivity. More of this shortly.
within the philosophical and epistemological project of the Enlightenment (p. 185). This manufactured uncertainty is of a different order to the uncertainty and contingency which is an elemental characteristic of human existence. It is not so much that contemporary existence is 'less predictable' than it might have been in earlier social formations. Rather it is the 'origins of unpredictability' which have altered. Under the conditions of reflexive modernization 'the uncertainties which face us today have been created by the very growth of human knowledge' (p.185). Processes of human knowledge production about the *social* and the *natural* and the diverse attempts to apply this knowledge in the quest for certainty in human interventions into, and interactions in, these domains, constitute the motive forces of this manufactured uncertainty.

Beck (1994 b) argues that reflexive modernization is marked both by the growth of 'obligations to justify things', and of uncertainty and insecurity; indeed, 'the latter conditions the former' (p.181). In the last half of the twentieth century 'uncertainty returns' (p.183), as reflexive modernization provokes transformations which are structured 'not just by what is seen and intended but also by what is unseen and unintended' (p.181). In this sense it becomes possible to think of the mobilisation of Risk categories in diverse attempts to regulate populations of young people as being instances of a form of intellectual abstraction in which expertise and authority are claimed through an ability to know, and to calculate and measure better, the range of Risk factors associated with being young in the last years of the twentieth century. The work of Beck and Giddens, however, provides a powerful argument against the claims to mastery and control and certainty which structure the mobilisation of narratives of Risk in these attempts to govern the behaviours and dispositions of Youth.

**Risk and the Colonisation of the Future**

This manner of conceiving the processes which are at work in transforming the life worlds and life chances of populations (of young people), suggests that categories of Risk are attempts 'to make the incalculable calculable' (Beck 1994 b, p.181). For Beck (1994 b), and others, the insurance principle (the dialectic of Risk and Insurance) emerges within the epistemological and philosophical frameworks of industrial society. The spread of this 'calculus of risk and insurance' occurs within rationalities which are structured by 'two types of optimism: linear scientization and faith in the anticipatory controllability of side effects' (p.181). These forms of optimism represent ways of rendering reality thinkable which are embedded in the metanarratives of Science and Progress. In these *modern* stories more *intelligent* applications of newer, better forms of knowledge will render *problems* more amenable to human control.

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(intervention): Youth at-Risk can, thus, be treated via the interventions of expertise. The irony, for Beck (1994 b), is that as a consequence of processes of reflexive modernization, the insurance principle, and the 'technical and social institutions of the "precaution state"', are confronted by processes which 'nullify, devalue and undermine' the notion of calculability to its very core; the 'self-reflection of late industrial society remains and blinds us to the confrontation with incalculable threats, which are constantly euphemized and trivialized into calculable risks' (p.182).

Giddens (1991) argues that a distinguishing characteristic of modern institutions is 'not so much their size, or their bureaucratic character; but rather 'the concentrated reflexive monitoring they both permit and entail' (p.16). One consequence of this reflexive monitoring of various environments of human interaction, which includes the institutional practices and processes which enable this monitoring, is the prominence of 'institutionally structured risk environments' (p.117). Risk is fundamentally concerned with constructing some sense of 'future happenings', as these possible futures are related in particular ways to 'present practices' (p.117). Diverse configurations of time-space, and the reflexivity generated by the penetration of abstract systems into the everyday lifeworlds of modernity, provokes a general concern with the 'control of time'. Risk, in this sense, is about the 'colonisation of the future' (p.111, original emphasis). Giddens (1991) argues that within this increasingly generalised phenomenon of institutionalised reflexivity, the future emerges as a 'new terrain - a territory of counterfactual possibility'. The unknowable (future) becomes a domain amenable to colonisation by 'risk calculation' (the knowable) (p.111).

For Giddens (1991) post traditional modernity is a 'risk culture', a culture not necessarily more Risky than prior orderings of the social, but rather a culture in which Risk becomes fundamental to the ways in which experts and (non)experts order social relations. Under the conditions of a more reflexive modernity the 'future is continually drawn into the present by means of the reflexive organization of knowledge environments' (p.3). Yet this colonisation of the future, via the constant proposition of 'as-if' scenarios, is in effect, an incomplete project. At one level these forms of future

\[17\] Lash and Urry (1994) argue that in representing these institutionalised environments in terms of reflexivity, Giddens is 'unlike Weber in this view of the bright side of institutional rationalization'. He is in this sense, argue Lash and Urry (1994), a 'sort of anti-Foucault in his assessment of the enabling side of discourses such as social science and versions of psycho therapy' (p.39). Lash and Urry's reading of Foucault is at odds with my reading of Foucault and the convergences I identify between Foucault's work and that of Giddens. Watts (1993/94) offers a similar reading to the one which structures this present discussion.
oriented Risk assessment suggest notions of certainty and calculability. At another level these probabilistic ways of reflexively organising social relations and environments 'contain numerous imponderables'; a situation which emerges as a consequence of the reflexive nature of modern institutions, and the 'mutability' of the knowledge claims of expertise and abstract systems (pp.3-4).

In these settings, argues Giddens (1991), 'all action', including that which adheres to traditional forms and practices, 'is in principle "calculable" in terms of risk' (p.112). This impulse to construct and calculate Risk scenarios becomes energised within the abstract systems which appropriate the tasks of regulating the disintegrative effects of modernity. Particularly those systems of expertise which attempt to colonise the futures of youth(ful) populations, whose involvement in any number of (present) practices might jeopardise desired outcomes (futures). Thus the narrative of Risk can structure, with regard to particular populations of Youth, attempts to regulate young people's involvement in Schooling (with regard to future employability or good citizenship); young people's engagement in sexual activity (the possibility of becoming pregnant, or of contracting HIV/AIDS); the chance that they might attempt suicide; and the likelihood of young people becoming homeless or (ab)using drugs or becoming involved in criminal activities. As Giddens (1991) argues, 'an assessment of likely risks can be made for virtually all habits and activities in respect of specific outcomes' (p.112).

The institutionalised Risk environments of modernity increasingly penetrate the activities and understandings of 'virtually everyone, regardless of whether or not they are players within them'. Globalising Labour Markets and Money (Futures) Markets are examples of institutional systems which are structured by Risk scenarios. Such institutionalised risk environments 'actively create the "future" that is then colonised' (Giddens 1991, pp.117-119). These systems, argues Giddens (1991) link 'individual and collective risks' in a manner which indicates that individual life chances are increasingly interconnected in ways which render individual life projects uncertain and inescapable. Within these interconnected environments the 'reflexive monitoring of risk' becomes, for Giddens (1991), a principal concern of both expertise and 'public discourse'. 'Risk profiling' in this sense becomes a domain of expertise which takes as its object the 'distribution of risks' in a specific arena of (inter)action with regard to the (possible) relation between present knowledge of this arena and desired (probable) outcomes (p.119).

The concern with Risk, and with imagining possible futures is not merely the domain of expertise. A preoccupation with Risk is, for Giddens (1991), illustrative of the forms of
reflexivity which structure identity in contemporary settings. Here Giddens is concerned with highlighting the manner in which reflexive monitoring of Risk knowledge, and Risk scenarios, informs the everyday understandings, behaviours and dispositions of lay populations who reflexively appropriate such knowledge. Diverse understandings of expert(ly) generated knowledge about health Risks (diet, sexuality, exercise, smoking); relationship Risks (divorce rates, counselling and self help therapies); education Risk (class, gender and ethnic background); employment Risks (retrenchments, retraining, reskilling); and financial Risks (mortgages, retirement planning) inform and influence the behaviours and dispositions of particular (lay) populations. In turn, these dispositions (changed or otherwise) are reappropriated by forms of expertise to better understand the motivations and choices of these populations.

This reflexive monitoring of Risk environments and practices, and the penetration of this expert knowledge about life worlds into these lifeworlds, is constitutive of the manufactured uncertainty which characterises contemporary settings. Radical doubt in relation to the claims of expertise about diet, sexuality, relationships, employment, the economy and schooling, indicate, argues Giddens (1994 b), that:

we are all caught up in everyday experiences whose outcomes, in a generic sense, are as open as those affecting humanity as a whole. Everyday experiments reflect the changing role of tradition and, as is also true of the global level, should be seen in the context of the displacement and reappropriation of expertise, under the intrusiveness of abstract systems. Technology in the general meaning of 'technique', plays the leading role here, in the shape of both material technology and of specialized social expertise. (pp. 59-60 original emphasis)

The DIY Self\textsuperscript{18}

Within processes of reflexive modernization this uncertain and apparently unconstrained openness forces individuals, groups and communities to be 'set free from the certainties and modes of living of the industrial epoch' (Beck 1992, p.14, original emphasis). For Giddens (1994b) these institutionally structured processes mean that 'we have no choice but to choose how to be and how to act' (p.75). Central to these processes are the diverse forms of expertise produced and mobilised within the discourses of the human and the natural sciences. These discourses are 'inherent elements of the institutional reflexivity of modernity' (Giddens 1991, p.2). The mass of intellectually grounded knowledge, and the plethora of 'guides to living' (in the form of self help manuals, and the therapeutic industries), which take as their object the Self and its relations to Itself and Others are instances of the manner in which expert systems are

\textsuperscript{18}Ulrich Beck 1992.
constitutive of late modernity's reflexivity, and, indeed, of the 'reflexive project of the self' (p.2). Expert systems serve, quite routinely in Giddens' framework, to reshape the 'aspects of social life they report on or analyse' (p.14). The proliferation of self help manuals, age and gender specific magazines and therapies directed at the initiation of relationships, relationship maintenance and/or negotiation of relationship break ups are examples of this reflexive process. Individuals in relationships, seeking relationships or recovering from a relationship breakdown are increasingly aware, at the level of both discursive and practical consciousness, of what is going on in terms of relationships, partly as a consequence of this mediated, expert knowledge.

Within these reflexive processes, then, this mediated abstract knowledge becomes constitutive of the arenas of the social they describe or analyse. Under these conditions Giddens (1991) argues that 'self identity' becomes a work-in-progress; a biography which is reflexively lived and 'organised in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life' (p.14). Modernity, in this sense, can be understood as a 'post traditional' social order in which questions about 'How shall I live?' assume both a novel significance, and indeed, become highly consequential to the 'outcomes' of this reflexive project of the self (p.14). A post traditional society, for Giddens (1994 a) is not one in which 'tradition disappears - far from it'. Rather, in a post traditional order 'tradition changes its status'. Traditions, in this view, 'have to explain themselves, to become open to interrogation or discourse' (p.5). Forms of association, gender roles and expectations, generational relations, ways of thinking and acting, the forms of authority or knowledge which are referred (deferred) to; all aspects of the social and the natural are subjected to the manufactured uncertainty and the contingency which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. Giddens (1994 c) takes as one example of these processes of detraditionalization, the elements of choice and reflexive monitoring of expertise which increasingly attach to the question of human reproduction. This is a question which emerges as a question only as a consequence of processes of 'individualization' (Should I/we have a child? When? How many? What if we can't?), and of the penetration of the natural by intellectually grounded knowledge (IVF, Contraception, Bio Genetic Engineering). Here 'many traits that used to be 'naturally given' have become matters for human decision-making' (p.189).

Processes of 'individualization' are, for Beck (1992), 'neither a phenomenon nor an invention of the second half of the twentieth century' (p.127). However processes of reflexive modernization can be characterised by the transformation of the 'systems of coordinates in which life and thinking are fastened in industrial modernity'. These transformations foreshadow, for Beck, a 'new twilight of opportunities and hazards'
within the 'contours of a risk society' (p.15). These largely autonomous processes of reflexive modernization 'tend to dissolve' the 'traditional parameters of industrial society' in a 'surge of individualization'. While 'relations of inequality' appear as relatively stable, individuals are increasingly released from prior groundings in a 'conscience collective' of class, gender, and family relations (p.87). Under these conditions, where class, gender and family coordinates recede (but do not disappear), individuals themselves become 'the reproduction unit for the social in the life world' (p.130, original emphasis). Here there is a sense in which individuals 'inside and outside the family' must assume the role of makers of their own 'livelihood mediated by the market as well as their biographical planning and organization' (p.130).

For Beck (1992) these processes of 'individualization' are carried by, and indeed, carry processes of 'standardization'. The penetration of market relations and of abstract systems into every aspect of the lifeworld compel the individual to choose. At the same time these processes promote, paradoxically, forms of market and institutional dependency, forms of 'standardization'. These individualization and standardization processes assume, under the conditions of reflexive modernization, a 'novel' character structured by the 'contradictory double face of institutionally dependent individual situations' (p.130 original emphasis). In this context the 'apparent outsides of the institutions becomes the inside of the individual biography' (p.130).

In the discussion which follows I want to suggest that Beck's framing of these processes of individualization and standardization in terms of their institutional characteristics, provides a powerful means for conceiving the contradictory impulses which shape the identity work of young people in contemporary settings. Importantly, this manner of constructing these processes illustrates the sorts of convergences I have highlighted in the theses on reflexive modernization and governmentality. Particularly as these convergences assist in understanding the means by which institutionally generated narratives of Risk about institutionalised Risk environments become so powerful in attempts to regulate (standardize) populations of young people. Moreover, understanding reflexive modernization in terms of largely autonomous processes which answer not to a single logic or rationality, which emerge not through processes of (critical) reflection on outcomes or consequences, and which provoke the return of uncertainty, renders problematic the traditional positions on the Left from which these processes might be critiqued. In this sense my earlier engagement with the Crisis of Left can be revisited in terms of a post traditional social order; an order which forces the traditional political and intellectual positions of the Left to 'explain themselves, to become open to interrogation' (Giddens 1994 a).
Beck (1992) argues that the reflexive shaping of biographies across 'institutional boundaries' emerges as a consequence of 'their institutional dependency'. Here 'liberated individuals become dependent on the labor market'. As a consequence individuals become

dependent on education, consumption, welfare state regulations and support, traffic planning, consumer supplies, and on possibilities and fashions in medical, psychological and pedagogical counseling [sic] and care. This all points to the institution - dependent control structure of individual situations. Individualization becomes the most advanced form of societalization dependent on the market, law, education and so on. (pp 130-131 original emphasis).

These processes of individualization, carried increasingly by market relations, deliver individuals 'over to an external order and standardization' that was unknown in the enclaves of familial and feudal structures' (Beck 1992, p.132 original emphasis). This form of standardization is of a different order precisely because it occurs within processes which compel individuals to 'choose', which set them 'free' from traditional coordinates, and which make them responsible for their own biographies.¹⁹ These 'inherent contradictions in the individualization process', suggest that possibilities for 'individual autonomizations' actually diminish in the face of these processes (p.131 original emphasis). Here Beck (1992) suggests that forms of dependence on market relations, on mediated expert knowledge about how one ought to live, and on time-space distanciated institutional practices, mean that 'individualized private existence' becomes increasingly 'dependent on situations and conditions that completely escape its reach' (p.131). These largely autonomous institutionalised processes supersede, or are superimposed on the class, gender and family co-ordinates of industrial society. Moreover, these processes enter into reflexive biographical projects in ways which are structured by, and indeed structure institutionalised conceptions of the life course: Childhood, Adolescence, Adulthood, Retirement (p.131).

These 'institutional biographical patterns' are, suggests Beck (1992), 'determinations of and interventions in human biographies' (pp.131-132 original emphasis). Institutionally patterned markers such as; School Starting Age, School Leaving Age, Age at which Income Support is Payable, The Age of Citizenship, Retirement Age, indicate that 'individualization thus means precisely institutionalization' (p.132 original emphasis).

¹⁹Scott Lash (1994 a) constructs these processes in a somewhat similar manner, suggesting that these processes represent, in some respects; 'the freeing of agency from structure. Or rather structure effectively forces agency to be free' within vastly expanded networks of capital accumulation and exchange relations (p.119).
The ability (desirability) to institutionally structure individual biographies is often not a consequence of coordinated, planned attempts to structure, reflexively (reflect on), the life course. Rather these outcomes have a tendency to be the side effect, or the unplanned consequence of diverse, largely autonomous, attempts, by various experts in diverse centres of expertise to regulate assorted aspects of these institutionally structured biographies (p.132). In this framework the private - that space of the freedom to choose, that space of individual motivations, dispositions and behaviours - is, for Beck (1992), 'not what it appears to be'. Indeed, the private ought to be conceived as the 'outside turned inside and made private of conditions and decisions made elsewhere, in the television networks, the education system, in firms, or the labor market, or in the transportation system, with general disregard of their private, biographical consequences' (p.133, original emphasis).

These twin processes of individualization and standardization generate contradictory impulses within and for certain generational clusters. Again these impulses are institutionally structured. Populations of young people, in this instance, are increasingly constructed, and construct themselves, as being responsible for their own biographies. In this sense the future participation by young people in the good life is in their own hands. Individualization processes result, argues Beck (1992), in individual biographies becoming 'self reflexive' and 'self produced'. The self in this sense becomes a Do-It-Yourself (DIY) project (p.135). Individuals are compelled to choose; we must choose and decide about 'education, profession, job, place of residence, spouse, number of children' (p.135). The domains of existence, the aspects of the lifeworld 'which are fundamentally closed to decision-making' are diminishing, while those aspects of individual biographies which are 'open and must be constructed personally' are increasing (p.135). These processes force young people, in this instance, to 'learn on pain of permanent disadvantage' to see themselves, to construct themselves, 'as the center of action' (p.135). Yet, as Beck (1992) argues, these individualization processes, which are institutionally structured, are also increasingly, institutionally dependent, and thus increasingly 'susceptible to crises', to institutionally generated Risks. In the case of young people this susceptibility is shaped by a number of processes; processes which impinge in diverse ways on the DIY project of the self (p.133).

Livelihood, suggests Beck (1992), is secured, tenuously, in the labour market. Increasingly, 'suitability' for the labour market is dependent, for young people, on participation in schooling. Individuals and groups who are 'denied access to either' are confronted with the very real possibility of 'social and material oblivion' (p.13). Particularly in the context of labour markets which demand flexibility, generic skills and transportability of credentials. Here argues Beck (1992), an absence of the 'proper
training' is 'every bit as devastating as is training but without jobs' (p.133). The Risks for the DIY Self under conditions of reflexive modernization are, thus, increasingly individualised. The 'floodgates are opened wide for the subjectivization and individualization of Risks and contradictions produced by institutions and society' (p.136). These institutionally generated Risk environments, and the consequences they have for individual biographies emerge as 'no longer just events and conditions' which are visited upon individuals. Rather these Risks are the 'consequences of the decisions they themselves have made' (p.136 original emphasis). Here the problems and the issues associated with transformed labour markets, globalising economies, and the types of schooling (education) which might be appropriate for these changed circumstances, are concerns which affect large populations. Yet, as Beck (1992) points out, in the face of these largely autonomous processes of individualisation 'what does that mean for the forging of my own fate, which nobody else can do for me?' (p.135, emphasis added).

There are then, profound material and discursive processes at work, largely beyond the regulatory ambit of the institutional structures of an earlier modernity, which take as their object the trajectory and outcomes of individualised, reflexive biographical projects. Beck (1992) argues that under these conditions abstract systems and institutional structures increasingly assume 'a kind of representative function for the fading industrial period' (p.134). A function which sees such systems and structures moving to 'intervene normatively with pedagogic and disciplinary actions in ways of life "deviating" from the official standards of normality' (p.134). In this sense, the mobilisation of narratives of Risk, and the associated identification of Risk categories by diverse forms of expertise with regard to the behaviours and dispositions of contemporary populations of Youth, can be seen as a powerful instantiation of these individualization and standardization processes.

The processes of detraditionalization which are carried by, and indeed, carry processes of individualization and standardization open up the DIY Self to diverse, and distant, forms of association and regulation in globalising 'economies of signs and spaces' (Lash and Urry 1994). This is a theme I will address in the following chapter. There I will draw largely on the work of Lash and Urry (1994) to examine, with regard to transformations in the rights, roles and responsibilities of the Nation State, Beek's (1992) argument that

the biography is increasingly removed from its direct spheres of contact and opened up across the boundaries of countries and experts for a long distance morality which puts the individual in the position of potentially having to take a perpetual stand... While governments (still) operate within the structure of nation states, biography is already
being opened to the world society. Furthermore, world society becomes a part of biography, although this continual excessive demand can only be tolerated through the opposite reaction of not listening, simplifying and apathy. (p.137 original emphasis).

To this I would add; feeling Uncertain.

Coda

Not only, argues Beck (1992) do ‘pedagogy and medicine, social law and traffic planning presume active ‘thinking individuals’, as they put it so nicely, who are supposed to find their way in this jungle of transitory finalities with the help of their own clear vision’ these and other diverse forms of expertise; the abstract systems which increasingly colonise both the present and future lifeworlds of the various objects (individuals, populations) of their discourses, also, ‘dump their contradictions and conflicts at the feet of the individual and leave him or her with the well intentioned invitation to judge all of this critically on the basis of his or her own notions’ (p.137 emphasis added).

The DIY Subject of Expertise is constructed, thus, as a rational, (free) choice making, autonomous individual responsible for her/his own actions, and the consequences, intended or otherwise, of these actions. Notwithstanding the increasing dominance of this form of subjectification, Lash and Urry (1994) and Lash (1994 a&b) are critical of both Beck and Giddens' use of reflexivity, suggesting that their notion of reflexivity is underpinned by a 'one sided ego psychology', which leaves 'only a small place for the work of the superego and morality or for the aesthetic play of the unconscious of the French poststructuralists' (Lash and Urry 1994, p.44). Lash's (1994 a) intent in this critique of Beck and Giddens is to suggest that both these writers reduce the notion of reflexivity to the level of a cognitive reflection on, and by, the embodied Self. Lash and Urry (1994) argue that Giddens, for instance, pays little attention to aesthetic or hermeneutic sources of the Self. Indeed, in this reading, Giddens is positioned as relying on a view of reflexivity which conceives of the reflexive project of the Self as being an 'almost cybernetic - like monitoring of conduct' (p.44). This construction of 'reflexivity via monitoring', is, for Lash and Urry (1994), 'the opposite of a view of the self which involves ideas of metaphor and of depth' (p.44).

Lash (1994 a) intends, via this reading, to develop the notion of 'hermeneutic reflexivity and community, against the individualisation theses of both aesthetic and especially cognitive reflexivity' (p.165). For Lash, there are three analytically separate 'sources' or 'moments' of the contemporary self. These 'cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic - communitarian moments', appear, for Lash, to 'exist in us in an often contradictory and
irreconcilable way' (p.165). Lash's (1994 a) purpose in emphasising the hermeneutic communitarian aspect of the self is, he suggests, as a counter to the 'cognitive - utilitarian and aesthetic-expressive individualism' of 'our present age' (p.165). Anthony Elliot (1996) mounts a similar critique. Elliot draws on Lash and Urry's critique to argue that both Beck and Giddens provide an excessively cognitive, rational account of subjectivity (pp.65-75). There is a certain critical purchase in Elliot's, and Lash and Urry's readings of Beck and Giddens. This is a point which, to some extent Giddens (1994 c) acknowledges, and which Beck (1994 b) contests with regard to what he sees as a misreading of the notion of reflexivity.

My purpose, here, however, is to suggest that Elliot, and Lash and Urry, to some extent, miss the point. In a later discussion Elliot (1996) argues that the expert systems which are constitutive of contemporary settings embody 'a fantastic illusion of omnipotence - the illusion of mastery'. These expert systems are often impelled by a 'can do' mentality; not by a sense of what is 'desirable' but what is 'do able' (p.79). In some respects this truth accords with Beck and Giddens, and their construction of reflexive modernization; a construction which highlights the autonomous aspects of these processes, aspects which answer not to a single logic, or rationality, or with reference to a common (community, National) interest. Increasingly, much of this expertise constructs as its purpose the necessity to produce intellectually grounded knowledge about morality, the unconscious, the aesthetics, of human existence, in order to know better, and regulate better, those aspects of the non (rational, cognitive) which continually threaten to escape the limits of expertise. As it is instantiated in the discourses which structure this thesis, and the intellectual abstraction of Elliot, Lash, Urry, Beck and Giddens, and the discourses of the Experts, this expertise is, fundamentally, rational and cognitivist.

I take as my lead here a point which Lash (1994 a) makes with regard to the work of Giddens in particular. Lash argues that however much 'one might want to dispute the normative implications of Giddens' theory, its purchase on late modernity's empirical reality is considerable' (p.117). Lash, in this context, is commenting on the emphasis which Giddens' accords the forms of expertise which reflexively structure and penetrate deeply into the natural, the social, the everyday embodied, psychic lifeworlds of individuals. This is precisely the point which I have sought to emphasise in this examination of processes of reflexive modernization. My concern has been to understand the ways in which diverse systems of expertise structure the Risk environments of an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty, and the ways in which these expert systems attempt to regulate the disintegrative consequences (for the DIY Self) of these processes.
Moreover, I have attempted to represent these processes in a manner which highlights certain convergences between this manner of conceiving these processes, and the positions which Foucauldian genealogies of government outline with regard to modernity's rationalities of government. In Chapter Six of this thesis, I intend to make these connections more explicit. There I will argue that these genealogies of government point to the processes of individualization and normalization at work in the practices of modern government. Increasingly, these practices take as their objects the unconscious, the soul, desire, aesthetics, the body as well as the rational cognitive mind of the individuals and the populations they attempt to govern. Here the why aspects of human behaviours and dispositions emerge as the objects of expertise impelled by concerns for certainty and mastery and order.

With respect to Youth these processes have a special significance. In this context the quest for certainty in relation to; youth(ful) behaviours and dispositions; young people's motivations and desires; their embodied, desiring, partial and provisional subjectivities; and their identity work, emerges as the object of diverse forms of expertise. The Psy Scientists. The Social and Youth Workers. The Counsellors. The Health Professionals. The Community Workers. The Cultural Commentators. The Journalists. The Police and the Juvenile Justice System. The Economists. The Teachers. The Feminist Post Structuralists. The Post Modern Cultural Theorists. The Post Colonial, Gay and Lesbian Intellectuals. The Critical Theorists. The Foucauldian Genealogists. Diverse forms of expertise producing vast amounts of 'intellectually grounded' information and diverse forms of understanding about the past, present and future lifeworlds, and life chances of populations of young people. Expert knowledge which is produced and reflexively circulates, largely autonomously, structuring and restructures, with unforeseen and unforeseen consequences, the understandings of these diverse populations of young people, and the understandings of young people of these lifeworlds (past, present and future). Moreover, where the conditions of reflexive modernization subject these claims to mastery and certainty to the principle of radical doubt, they also impel expert systems to further processes of knowledge production. These further processes seek to know better these populations in order to attempt to regulate the largely autonomous processes which continually threaten to escape the limits of expertise. Under the conditions of Manufactured Uncertainty the mobilisation of rationally grounded Risk discourses in attempts to regulate Youth emerges as a paradoxical, and dangerous, Quest for Certainty.
increasingly problematic. Reflexive modernization is marked by radical doubt, manufactured uncertainty, unforeseen consequences. In a 'risk society', or under contemporary conditions of 'manufactured uncertainty', the institutional practices of a less reflexive modernity become more or less redundant, or less capable of dealing with the processes which are transforming Nation States and the life worlds of their populations. In the contexts of these processes of transformation it becomes possible to think of the ungovernability of the Nation State; at least in terms of more familiar practices of government - such as the Welfare State, or the Interventionist (Keynesian) State. However, given this apparent ungovernability, there are also moves to reconfigure the practices of government. The practice of government of the Nation State sees the increasing mobilisation of expertise in more sophisticated (dangerous) attempts to govern the ungovernable. As part of this ongoing process, there are attempts to narrow, and to strengthen, the boundaries which mark the Normal from the Deviant, the Normal from those at-Risk. Understood in this manner the historically novel character of at-Risk discourses becomes evident in that no youth(ful) relations, practices, behaviours and/or dispositions remains outside of the domain of these discourses. As Tait (1995) argues, 'nothing' in at-Risk discourses, 'remains beyond governmental intervention. Since "risk" can be legitimately found anywhere, there is therefore no one who is not at risk of something' (p.128, original emphasis).
CHAPTER SIX: 

(NEO)LIBERALISM: INDIVIDUALIZATION AND RISKS; RESPONSIBILIZATION AND REGULATION

Introduction

In this chapter my intent is to mobilise the concept of governmentality as it might inform an understanding of the problematics of regulating Youth(ful) populations in contemporary Liberal Democracies. I want to argue that this way of mobilising the notion of governmentality enables an examination of contemporary transformations in the practice of government, in ways which problematise the constitutive opposites of much principled Left and Right discourse on the (ideal) relations between the State and its Others. This form of problematising practice is enabled by Foucault's particular way of characterising the 'nature' of governmental power relations and their 'effects'. Further, this practice conceives the problematics of government as being structured by the contingent and historically variable interrelationships between particular 'political rationalities' and certain 'governmental technologies' (Rose and Miller 1992).

This form of analysis is particularly useful for understanding the contemporary conditions of existence of powerful governmental practices which attempt to regulate youth(ful) populations through narratives of Risk. A concept such as governmentality is useful in this instance because it points to the practices of government, rather than to a primary identification of the ideological or philosophical underpinnings of (Left or Right) political discourses and their principled articulation of the appropriate relations between the State and its Others. Further, this understanding of the contingent and historically variable interrelationship between certain rationalities and technologies of government is useful in apprehending the ways in which contemporary practices of government are transformed by the deeper currents of reflexive modernization and globalisation.

(Neo)Liberalism signals a problematisation of the practices of Liberal Welfare Governance, and as such signals a transformation in the way that government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy, and the Self) is conceived. These transformations structure, differently, the political rhetorics mobilised in the Anglo/European parliamentary democracies, including the rhetorics mobilised by the Social Democratic Labour Parties in these settings. Indeed, Rose (1996 a) argues that 'advanced liberal' problematisations of Liberal Welfare Governance 'can be observed in national contexts from Finland to Australia, advocated by political regimes from left to right, and in
relation to problem domains from crime control to health' (p.53). My concern to situate transformations in the practice of government (of young people) in the context of deeper currents (of reflexive modernization) is indebted, in part, to Rose's (1996 a) reading of these transformations.

I want to argue that (Neo)Liberalism, understood not as a coherent ideological or political movement, but as a rationality of government has been successful in transforming the practices of government in Anglo/European contexts, partly due to its capacity to articulate narratives of 'personal autonomy, enterprise and choice' (Barry et.al. 1996, p.10) to these transformed problematics of government. Moreover, these narratives connect with certain experiences and/or concerns about the social transformations structured by these deeper currents. Here I am thinking of the tendencies within 'autonomized' processes of reflexive modernization for the individual to be cast free (set adrift) from more traditional anchoring points in time, space, place and communitarian (class) relationships. Beck (1992) has identified these processes as individualization processes. Giddens (1994 b) talks about the reflexive project of the self in post traditional social contexts. This is a DIY project in which individuals are compelled to be free; condemned to choose; or as Rose (1990), in a different context, has suggested, 'we are obliged to be free' (p.213).

In the first part of this chapter my intent is to focus on the style of thinking which characterises Liberalism and (Neo)Liberalism as problematisations of the practice of government. This represents a focus on the rationalities of government, the ways of rendering government thinkable. This emphasis on the 'political rationalities' (Rose and Miller 1992) which structure (Neo)Liberalism is necessary in order to understand the post World War 2 emergence of a (Neo)Liberal governmentality which takes as its object a problematisation of the practice of Liberal Welfare Government. In this context I will argue that this manner of thinking government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy, and the Self) has been successful in articulating a rationality of government to the social transformations structured by processes of reflexive modernization and globalisation; a rationality which attempts to regulate identities by conceiving the Subject as rational, autonomous, choice making and responsible. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with understanding the manner in which the identification, calculation and measurement of Risk environments, factors and practices emerges as a technique which enables (Neo)Liberal arts of government to be made concrete. It is in this sense that I will argue that Risk emerges as both a narrative and a technique which promises to facilitate the Regulation of Youth(ful) Identities in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty.
Liberalism as an Art of Government

Liberalism and the Constitution of the Public and the Private
One way to understand (Neo)Liberalism as a series of solutions to the problem of government, is to understand the emergence, and practices of Liberalism in similar terms. Foucault (1991) argued that Liberalism, understood as a problematisation of the practice of government, emerged, partly, in relation to 'mercantilism' and the 'science of police' (p.96). 17th and 18th century mercantilism was structured, argues Scott Gordon (1991), by the view that the regulation of every aspect of economic activity was an 'affair of state' (p.125). Further, mercantilism held that 'harmony in economic progress does not spring from the natural play of individual interest, but must be created by the wise governor' (p.224). In this sense Adam Smith's (1776) 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations' can be read as a tract against 'mercantilism'; a tract which takes as its objects both the pervasiveness and extensiveness of economic regulation by the Sovereign State, and the 'corrupt and inefficient' bureaucracy which administered these regulations (Scott Gordon 1991, pp.145-146).

Colin Gordon (1991) argues that for Foucault, the Wealth of Nations marks, at another level, a 'transformation in the relationship between knowledge and government' (p.14); a transformation which was linked, in terms of this discussion, to Liberalism's problematisation of the art of governing. What is of importance here are the connections between mercantilism and the 'science of police'. For Osborne (1996) the science of police, as a science of populations, can be characterised by both its 'heterogeneity of concerns', and its 'totalizing aspirations' (p.100). Within the science of police the regulation of all aspects of social and economic activity was framed by a sense that minute, exhaustive, detailed knowledge of all aspects of such activity, and of the State's concerns with this activity, and of the territory and its inhabitants, could be mobilised towards the end of the State's continued strength. A strength and prosperity to be secured, suggests Colin Gordon (1991), through the happiness and productivity of the population. For Osborne (1996), the nature of these 'concerns' and 'aspirations' of the science of police is indicated by the 'things' which are conceived as the objects of government; religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, highways, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, manservants and factory workers, the poor'. In the Police State, nothing 'was to be impervious to the gaze of knowledge' (p.100). For Rose (1996 a) the Police State, as an art of government, sought to 'ward off disorder through a fixed ordering of persons and activities' (p.43). Faced with the 'problem of calculating detailed actions appropriate to an infinity of unforeseeable and contingent circumstances', the Police State mobilised 'exhaustively detailed knowledge of the governed reality of the state itself, extending (at least in aspiration) to touch the
existences of its individual members' (Colin Gordon 1991, p.10). Within this particular problematisation of the practice of government 'action on the governed' is not limited to the 'general form of laws'. Rather, government is practised by the 'means of specific, detailed regulation and decree' (Colin Gordon 1991, p.10).

Osborne (1996) argues this understanding of the science of police is a useful means for thinking the emergence of Liberalism, conceived, in this sense, not as doctrine or ideology, but as a 'critique of State reason': a 'kind of habitual suspicion related to the means and ends of government'. Liberalism can be thought, then, as a rationality of government made concrete (practised) through the mobilisation of techniques of government capable of enabling 'forms of government detached from totalizing forms of sovereignty' (p.101). Rose (1996 a) argues that Liberalism 'repudiates' the megalomaniac and obsessive fantasy of a totally administered society' (p.43). Instead, within this emerging art of government, the State must confront certain (new) realities. These 17th and 18th century realities can be situated in relation to the intellectual and philosophical project of the Scottish Enlightenment, the emerging institutional forms of modernity (Giiddens 1990) and revolutionary moments (and movements) in Europe and the Americas. Liberal government in these transformed material and discursive spaces is faced with 'subjects equipped with rights and interests' which are conceived as existing outside the legitimate realm of 'the political'. Moreover, these various realms - the 'social', the 'private', the 'markets', 'civil society' - cannot be governed 'by the exercise of sovereign will' because the State lacks 'the requisite knowledge and capacities' to achieve these diverse ends. Instead, within emerging Liberal rationalities of government, the conduct of conduct is reconfigured with the object of ensuring that these domains 'function to the benefit of the nation as a whole' (Rose 1996 a, p.44).

**Political Rationalities and Governmental Technologies: Rendering Government Operable**

Liberalism in this sense emerges as the governmentality of modernity. As a rationality of government it seeks to regulate the disintegrative effects of modernity. At the same time Liberalism is structured by apparent internal contradictions and tensions. Philosophically and politically, it is structured by oppositions such as State/Civil Society, Public/Private. Yet it is a way of thinking government which attempts to provide solutions to these contradictions. Liberalism, argues Rose (1996 a), attempts to practise the art of government within spaces structured by 'the need to govern in the interests of morality and order, and the need to restrict government in the interests of liberty and economy' (p.39). Osborne's (1996) discussion of the tensions within Liberal rationalities between 'the ideals of a liberal order and the mechanisms of security that are set in place to secure it', indicates that there can be no 'reconciliation', no final
'closure' to these tensions (p.117). There can be no closure because these tensions are indeed, generated 'within liberalism itself'. The very 'restlessness of liberal rationalities', and their 'contradictory encounters' with the variety of technologies which are mobilised in this practice of government can be seen as accounting 'for the very dynamism of liberalism, not as a political philosophy, but as a principle for the criticism of reality' (p.117). Here Osborne (1996) is suggesting that the 'oppositions', the 'failures' which characterise Liberalism as a practice of government, lead, not to Liberalism's demise, but to constant processes of the 'reconfiguration of liberal rationalities and principles themselves'. Liberalism in this sense 'thrives upon its own failure' (p.117).1

For Rose (1996 a), the rise and role of expertise is fundamental to understanding how 19th and 20th century Liberalism, as a problematisation of the art of government, is 'rendered operable'. Expertise, understood as 'authority arising out of a claim to knowledge, to neutrality and to efficacy' (p.39), was increasingly mobilised within the practices of Liberal government. This mobilisation rested on the 'capacity of various knowledgeable persons' to make concrete the Liberal arts of government within the 'sanctity' of those oppositions which marked out the 'necessary limits of political authority' (p.39). This capacity found expression in the 'truths produced and disseminated by the positive sciences of economics, statistics, sociology, medicine, biology, psychiatry and psychology' (p.39). Moreover this capacity was embodied in the 'rise of the expert figures of the scientist, the engineer, the civil servant and the bureaucrat'. The increasing demand for expertise, for knowledgable persons with the capacity to authoritatively manage and regulate populations across various configurations of time and space, produced 'new techniques for the ethical formation and capitacitation' of such persons (p.39). Here is witnessed the rise of the professions, of professional training, and of practices and techniques of education capable of providing such intellectual training. Knowledge, as being productive and enabling of Liberal arts of government, reflexively circulates;

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1 Giddens (1994 a) argues that (Neo)Liberalism, as political rhetoric (Thatcherism), has become 'internally contradictory and this contradiction is increasingly plain to see' (p.9, original emphasis). These contradictions, between the radically autonomous, choice making individualism of the Market Subject, and the 'secular fundamentalism' which structures Conservative attachments to the Nation, the Family, and Gender, are of a different order to the contradictions which provoke the dynamism of Liberalism. Any hope by the Left that these obvious contradictions will lead to (Neo)Liberalism's demise, a demise that will absolve the Left of the need to articulate a governmentality of a more reflexive modernity is, in this sense, a vain hope.
around a diversity of apparatuses for the production, circulation, accumulation, authorization and realization of truth: in the academy, in government bureaux, in reports of commissions, public enquiries and pressure groups; it is the "know how" that promises to render docile the unruly domains over which government is to be exercised, to make government possible and to make government better. (Rose 1996 a, p.45)

This mode of analysis of the diverse, multiple and changing problematics of Liberal government is further facilitated by understanding these problematics in terms of the historically contingent interrelationships between 'political rationalities' and 'governmental technologies' (Rose and Miller 1992). Rose (1996 a) suggests that political rationalities constitute the 'intellectual machinery'; the various cognitive frameworks which render 'reality thinkable' in ways which make such diverse realities 'amenable to political programming' (p.42). For Rose and Miller (1992), these rationalities can be understood as;

the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors. (p.175)

Governmental technologies in this form of analysis are conceived as the historically contingent matrix of 'programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures' which are mobilised by diverse authorities in various attempts to make concrete the range of 'governmental ambitions' (Rose and Miller 1992, p.175). For Rose (1996 a), these diverse techniques and procedures, the 'materials and forces' which come to hand within contingent attempts to regulate certain behaviours and dispositions of target populations are indicative, not of;

the implementation of idealized schema in the real by an act of will, but of the complex assemblage of diverse forces (legal, architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgemental), techniques (notation, computation, calculation, examination, evaluation), devices (surveys and charts, systems of training, building forms) that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organizations in relation to authoritative criteria. (p.42)

This, then, is the crucial point in understanding Liberalism and (Neo)Liberalism as historically contingent attempts to render operable particular problematisations of government. Government is practised in less than ideal settings, in particular
historically, socially, culturally and institutionally structured configurations of time and space. Configurations which are inherited from history, from prior orderings of the social as the concrete manifestations of previous attempts to make government work. Under the conditions of reflexive modernization, in settings rendered knowable via narratives of Uncertainty and Risk, (Neo)Liberalism, as a problematisation of government, attempts to render government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy and the Self) thinkable in particular ways. However, this rationality can only be made concrete by the mobilisation of the 'materials and forces', the 'calculations and techniques' which come to hand in particular regulatory settings, where the conduct of conduct is practised. Yet not all available techniques are constructed as useful, or enabling within these ways of thinking the art of government. The activities of diverse forms of expertise are structured by institutionally patterned differences in the 'power to mean' (Watts 1993/94). Truth, as a thing of this world, is contested and struggled over in these spaces. Moreover, particular rationalities provoke certain ways of thinking, certain ways of rendering reality knowable. Within particular rationalities it is difficult to conceive of particular claims to knowledge as being truthful. It is in this sense that I want to argue that the processes of identification, measurement, calculation and intervention which Risk discourses mobilise and enable, promise powerful technologies for rendering (Neo)Liberal governmentality operable. I will return to this theme in the final part of this chapter.

Rose (1996 a) provides a useful analysis of the transformations in the problematics of government which mark off the postwar emergence of (Neo)Liberalism from earlier Liberal problematisations of the practice of government. The nature of these transformations can be addressed by examining the differences in the ways in which expertise is conceived and mobilised in changed Liberal arts of government; and in the ways in which the Subjects of government are differently conceived within these changed problematics.

Expertise and the Subject in Liberal Problematics of Government

For Rose (1996 a) early modern Liberal problematics of rule can be 'characterised by the hopes that they invest in the subjects of government' (p.45). Philosophical, moral, legal and political conceptions of the citizen, invest in the Citizen Subject certain notions of 'freedom, liberty and rights' which 'are to be respected' in so far as they fall outside of the legitimate realm of 'political or legal regulation' (p.45). This construction of a realm of the social beyond the direct reach of laws and decrees, the space of freedom, requires that Liberal practices of government become 'dependent upon devices (schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic asylum, the reformatory prison)' which have the capacities (ideally) to 'create individuals who do not need to be governed by
others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves' (p.45). Increasingly this government of the Self is conceived and practised in domains which mark the Normal via the construction of the Abnormal; a process enabled via the reflexive circulation of discipline based, intellectually grounded knowledge. For Rose (1996 a), this is the 'moment of the disciplines'. Discipline based knowledge attempts here, to 'simultaneously specify subjects in terms of certain norms of civilization', and to further erect certain divisions 'between the civilized member of society and those lacking the capacities to exercise their citizenship responsibly' (p.45). For Rose and Miller (1992), understanding these processes in terms of contingent and 'restless' problematics of government opens up a mode of analysis which is centrally concerned with understanding the 'associations formed between entities constituted as political and the projects plans and practices of those authorities - economic, spiritual, medical, technical - who endeavour to administer the lives of others in the light of conceptions of what is good, healthy, normal, virtuous, efficient or profitable' (p.175).

This continual process of knowing better is, in certain highly consequential ways, enabled by the development of statistics. Statistics, as the science of the State, is integral to this concern with populations and its 'regularities' (Foucault 1991). Ian Hacking's (1991) genealogy of the practice of statistics highlights the 'avalanche of numbers' associated with 18th and 19th century processes of 'sanitary reform and philanthropic effort' (p.193). Hacking positions his investigation of the practice of statistics in relation to Foucault's historical investigations of pastoral power and its mobilisation in the emerging Liberal arts of government. Hacking (1991) argues that this 'bio power' concerns itself both with 'micro practices' of 'the body', and with the 'comprehensive measures, statistical assessments and interventions' which have as their objects 'the social body'; the populations of classed and gendered Children, Youth, and Adults rendered knowable, measurable and, hence, governable (from a distance) via the practices of the science of the State (p.183).2 Hacking's history is not of central concern to this discussion. Yet his investigations do point to the ways in which the developing science of the State (statistics) was mobilised (as a technology of government) within certain early modern rationalities of government. These articulations, in the context of 18th and 19th century social reforms, had as their object certain populations and their past, present and future dispositions. The Statistical Survey of Scotland (1791-99) is one early example of the form which such inquiries took. This twenty one volume collection, which is the record of 'an inquiry directed at the conditions of life of a

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country, in order to establish the quantum of happiness of the inhabitants’ (cited in Hacking 1991, p.94), is an instance in a 'game that would establish a "calculus of felicity"' (p.94). Hacking argues that this developing 'game', this 'moral science' was fundamentally shaped by the Utilitarian principle ('the greatest happiness to the greatest number'). Within this moral framework, the practice of Liberal government found it, 'necessary to count men and women and to measure not so much their happiness as their unhappiness: their morality, their criminality, their prostitution, their divorces, their hygiene, their rate of conviction in court' (p.195).

Statistics, as the science of the State, provided, to no small degree, the means of rendering reality calculable and measurable, across time and space, and from a distance, in such a manner as to operationalise Liberalism's problematisation of the art of government. The techniques made available by the development of statistics emerged as central to the development of the Insurance Principle as a form of probabilistic thinking. Later in this chapter I will argue that this dialectic of Insurance and Risk, where the future (the unknowable) is rendered knowable via the measurement and calculation of the present and its Risk Factors (as the knowable), becomes so powerful in diverse (Neo)Liberal projects of government because it promises to operationalise such programs across different (distant) configurations of time and space, and with due reference to certain humanistic and economic concerns.

Rose (1996 a) argues that during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century there were various transformations in the problematics of Liberal government. These transformations witnessed the emergence of the notion of social welfare as a rationality of government which would seek to "social-ize" both individual citizenship and economic life in the name of collective security' (p.48). These transformations in the problematics of Liberal government were situated within and against various processes which rendered problematic the rationalities of early Liberal arts of government. The 'philanthropic and disciplinary projects' of 19th century Liberalism, which took as their object the maintenance of 'moral order in urban labouring classes' had 'failed' in the 'face of the forces of social fragmentation and individualization of modern society' (pp.47-48). In this sense, the Welfare State emerges, in a contested fashion, as a consequence of these transformations in Liberal arts of government. Understood thus, the Liberal Welfare State appears as the result of diverse attempts to 'recode', across a variety of domains, 'the relations between the political field and the management of economic and social affairs' (Rose 1996 a, p.48). For Rose (1996 a), this reconfiguration of the practices of government along the lines of 'social welfare' invested in political authorities, certain responsibilities as 'guarantors' of both the 'freedom of the individual and the freedom of the capitalist enterprise'. As a 'formula of
rule', the Liberal Welfare State was, in this sense, 'somewhere between classical liberalism and nascent socialism' (p.48). The contested nature of these transformations was most apparent in the domain of the economic where State regulation and intervention 'weakened' the 'privacy of the market and the enterprise while retaining their formal autonomy' (p.48). This transformed practice of government, which took as its main object 'economic security', also provoked tensions and resistances through the diverse attempts to regulate and 'act upon' the 'social milieux within which production and exchange occurred' (p.48).

'Social insurance' and 'social work' as two forms of this transformed practice of government, indicate the nature or the (new) domains which are marked out within these reconceived political, moral and economic rationalities. An analysis of these two 'axes of government' provides some indication of both the changed ways in which expertise is mobilised within the State of Welfare, and the ways in which the Subject of Welfare is reconfigured (Rose 1996 a, pp 48-49). Rose (1996 a) argues that social insurance is an 'inclusive' technology of government, in so far as it has as its object (contested) notions of 'social solidarity' (p.48). These technologies of government, such as the Schooling System, Child Welfare Practices, Unemployment Benefits, Widows' Pensions, Supporting Parents' Benefits, attempt to 'collectivize' the regulation of the disintegrative effects of modernity. Here the 'dangers' and 'risks' associated with a 'capricious system of wage labour, and the corporeal riskiness of a body subject to sickness and health', are reconfigured, within the problematics of Welfare Government, as rightfully falling under the 'stewardship of a "social" State' (p.48). As a practice of Liberal Welfare Government, social insurance is an attempt, then, to establish new articulations between "public" norms and procedures and the fate of individuals in their "private" economic and personal conduct' (p.48). As a consequence of these emerging problematics of government, which found expression in such diverse schemes and procedures as public housing development, 'health and safety legislation and laws on child-care', there was a diminution in the relative 'autonomy of both economic and familial spaces' (p.49). For Rose (1996 a) the emerging practices of the Welfare State can also be thought as promoting 'new vectors of responsibility and obligation' between 'State and parent, child or employee' (p.49).

Rose (1996 a) suggests that this attempt to regulate, in the name of collective security, the 'vicissitudes' of individual 'life histories' within the disintegrative processes of modern social life, was complimented through the emergence of the practice of social work. Social work, as a practice of Liberal Welfare Governance, represented a strategic intervention into individual life processes which sought to 'individualize' and 'responsibilize' the citizen subject within these processes. There were moves here,
within 'complex assemblages' of centres of expertise (schools, courts, hospitals, health centres, State bureaucracies) to target, most often within the 'matrix of the family', citizens and would-be citizens (the Child, the Adolescent) judged to be 'pathological' in relation to social norms. Expertise, in this sense, is concerned with the production and circulation of knowledge, about the 'everyday activities of living, the hygienic care of household members, the previously trivial features of interactions between adults and children' (p.49). Moreover, argues Rose (1996 a), these reflexive processes of discipline based knowledge production, these forms of expertise, promised, as 'technologies of expert social government', to 'align the self-governing capacities of subjects with the objectives of political authorities by means of persuasion, education and seduction rather than coercion' (p.50).

There is then a particular relationship between expertise and the citizen subject within the problematics of Liberal Welfare Government, which is signalled, for Rose (1996 a), by a particular articulation of 'security' and 'responsibility'. This articulation sees the Subject of Welfare; 'reconceptualized as a citizen, with rights to social protection and social education in return for duties of social obligation and social responsibility, both refiguring and retaining the Liberal character of "freedom" and "privacy" ' (p.49).

(Neo)Liberalism as a Problematisation of Liberal Welfare Government

(Neo)Liberalism and the Reconfiguration of the Public and the Private
The post World War 2 emergence of a problematisation of Liberal Welfare practices of government is traced, within Foucault's investigations, primarily through the work of the German Ordoliberalen and the American Chicago School of Economics. Gordon, (1991) argues that in the case of the Ordoliberalen, the problematisation of the interventionist practices of government ought to be situated within the historical experience of National Socialism (p.41). Burchell (1996) argues that for the Ordoliberalen, National Socialism is not 'some monstrous aberration'. Instead the Ordoliberalen conceive the experience of Nazism as the 'quite inevitable outcome of a series of anti-liberal policies' (p.22 original emphasis). In the historical context of the emergence of the German Nation State, these policies include the experience of 'national protectionism, the welfare policies of Bismarckian State socialism, wartime economic planning and management, and Keynesian interventionism' (p.22). Post war American (Neo)Liberalism emerges primarily from the Chicago School of Economics and the work, amongst others, of Milton Friedman and Frederich von Hayek. Burchell

3 The Ordoliberalen are so named through their involvement in the journal Ordo (Gordon 1991)
(1996) argues that while the historical context is quite different to German post war (Neo)Liberalism, the 'general form of the argument is quite similar'.

Rose (1996 a) argues that for Hayek, the 'logics of the interventionist State', as practised within war time planning and regulation of the economic and the social, were 'inefficient and self defeating' (p.50). Moreover, Hayek (1944) saw in such practices the Road to Serfdom. That is, interventionist practices of government impel the Nation State in the direction of the Police State as it emerged, and would emerge, in Nazi Germany, The Soviet Union and China. Robert Heilbroner (1969) argues that Hayek saw in National Socialism the operation of an 'internal law' which emerged at a certain level of government intervention into the market order. There was a sense, for Hayek, that once this level was reached, government 'had no alternative but to embrace the economy in a top-to-bottom rigid grip' (p.272). Heilbroner (1969) argues that Hayek was not against government regulation per se. Instead Hayek's concerns were directed towards forms of economic regulation or planning which were; 'characterised by a peculiar inability to call a halt to itself. Once set in motion, an inner necessity forced it to expand' (p.272, original emphasis). This logic did not stem from the intentions, or 'personal motives', of planners, bureaucrats and experts to plan more, but rather from the inability of plans to match the contingencies, failures and unplanned for, aspects of human interaction in complex extended orders (such as modern markets). In the context of these failures, this rationality of government regulation suggested the need for better planning, more surveillance and greater intervention into these complex systems. For Heilbroner (1969), this logic, as Hayek identified it, was evident in State attempts in England during the 1940s, to 'achieve the planned production of the nationalized coal mines'. In order to realise these governmental ambitions;

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\text{it was necessary to introduce a plan for the recruitment of labor, and in order to achieve the planned recruitment of labor, a planned schedule of wages had to be set up, and in order to keep coal-mining wages at a suitable differential over other wages, the whole national pattern of}
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industrial pay became a matter of concern. What had started as a simple output plan became necessarily a far wider one. (p.273)

Heilbroner (1969) argues that Hayek saw in such attempts to 'make plans work', a form of rationalised planning which 'led inexorably to what Lenin called Who Whom: who plans whom, who directs, chooses, allocates what to whom? (p.273). Hayek's articulation of this view, at a time when other Western intellectuals were arguing that post Depression and War time practices of government had demonstrated the 'feasibility' of a 'central State' governing 'the whole of the productive and social organization of a nation', would emerge thirty years later in political critiques of Western Liberal Welfare Governance (Rose 1996 a, pp.50-51).

For Hayek (1988) the origins, and the survival, of 'our civilization', as a form of the social which is able to sustain large populations and economic growth, and promote ideals of 'liberty, property and justice', is dependent on what he calls 'the extended order of human co operation' facilitated by the 'competitive market order' (pp.6-7). Hayek (1988) argues that this extended form of co operative human interaction 'resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously'. This extended form of the social becomes dominant, suggests Hayek, as a consequence of processes which 'unintentionally conform' to various;

traditional and largely moral practices, many of which men [sic] tend to dislike, whose significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they cannot prove, and which have none the less fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolutionary selection - the comparative increase of population and wealth - of those groups that happened to follow them. The unwitting, reluctant, and even painful adoption of these practices kept these groups together, increased their access to valuable information of all sorts, and enabled them to be 'fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it' (Genesis 1:28). This process is perhaps the least appreciated facet of human evolution. (p.6 original emphasis)\(^6\)

\(^5\)See also Hayek (1967a) 'The Road to Serfdom after Twelve Years'

\(^6\)John Hinkson (1995) critiques Hayek's 'benign, even romantic, attachment to this unconstrained "extended order"', suggesting that the market order 'deconstructs', and 'decenters' more concrete, face-to-face forms of association. Moreover, argues Hinkson, the extended order becomes radicalised within contemporary techno-cultural processes producing more 'radical possibilities' for (bio genetic) 'social engineering' than that which Hayek critiques in the practice of Socialism. At this level I am sympathetic to the terms and form of Hinkson's critique, which resonate with much of the discussion thus far. At the level of understanding the emergence of (Neo) Liberal problematisations of the practice of government, Hayek's articulation of the extended order of the market as the 'ultimate civilising impulse' needs to be
In articulating a view of epistemology and ethics as 'evolutionary' Hayek (1988) argues that the 'formation' of 'highly complex self-maintaining orders' can only be accounted for in 'terms of processes which 'transcend' our 'capacity to observe all the several circumstances operating in the determination of their particular manifestations' (p.9). This construction of the processes which lead to the emergence and maintenance of extended forms of human interaction is situated in relation to a Socialist epistemology which Hayek (1988) argues is 'wrong about the facts' (p.6 original emphasis). Socialism and Liberal Welfare Government, for Hayek, take, as a fundamental premise, the view that reason and rationality can be mobilised in the design and implementation of a system of human interaction in such a way as to provide a better, more productive, form of the social than the 'spontaneous' extended order of cooperative human interaction facilitated by the competitive market order. The conflict, for Hayek (1988) between the Socialist Welfare State and (Neo)Liberalism is one between, in essence, 'those who demand deliberate arrangement of human interaction by central authority based on collective command over available resources', and the 'advocates of the spontaneous extended human order created by a competitive market' (p.7). Hayek (1988) argues that Socialism's position is both 'factually impossible to achieve or execute', and 'logically impossible' (p.7). For Hayek the important issue here is Socialism's assumption that 'since people had been able to generate some system of rules' governing their conduct, then, logically, 'they must also be able to design an even better and more gratifying system' (p.7 original emphasis). Here, the Fatal Conceit of Socialism is, for Hayek, set against (Neo)Liberalism's promise that;

by following the spontaneously generated moral traditions underlying the competitive market order (traditions which do not satisfy the canons or norms of rationality embraced by most socialists), we generate and garner greater knowledge and wealth than could ever be

situated in the context of 'actually existing' (National and Welfare) Socialism. In this context I am less convinced by Hinkson's critique.

Giddens (1994 a) puts it another way suggesting that processes of reflexive modernization result in a world which is 'not one subject to tight human mastery'. It is the promise of just such a form of mastery which informs 'the ambitions of the left' (p.3). Giddens (1994 a) argues, further, that in contemporary settings we ought also 'disavow providentialism - the idea that human beings only set themselves such problems as they can resolve' (p.21). Processes of reflexive modernization, carried in many respects by the extended form of the competitive market order, render such views intensely problematic. In the concluding chapter to this thesis I will return to Zygmunt Bauman's (1990 a&amp;b) discussion of the danger's which are provoked by modernity's 'war on ambivalence', a war waged with some vigour from positions on the Left.
obtained or utilised in a centrally-directed economy whose adherents claim to proceed strictly in accordance with 'reason'. (p.7)

Hayek's (1988) intention is to 'attack the presumption of reason on the part of socialists' (p.8, original emphasis). Here there is a concern to construct, counter to Socialism, a view of reason (and reasoned human action) which 'recognises its own limitations'. Further, these limitations, learned through processes of reason, suggest, for Hayek, 'that order generated without design can far outstrip plans men [sic] consciously design' (p.8).

**Expertise and the Subject: Individualization and Responsibilization**

For both the American and German (Neo)Liberals, the Market is no longer constructed, argues Gordon (1991), as 'being a spontaneous (albeit historically conditioned) quasi-natural reality'. An attachment to this classical Liberal view would 'constrain government to the practice of laissez-faire' (p.41). Within emerging (Neo)Liberal problematisations of the relations between The State and The Economy it becomes 'incumbent' on government 'to conduct a policy towards society such that it is possible for a market to exist and function' (p.41).^8

In this intellectual framework there is a sense that the central problematic of government 'is not the anti-social effects of the economic market, but the anti-competitive effects of society' (Gordon 1991, p.42). The idea of the death of the Social, given expression in Margaret Thatcher's proclamation that there is no such thing as society, signals an attempt within (Neo)Liberal rationalities to govern through the behaviours and dispositions of individuals, rather than society (Rose 1996 a&c). Government, as it is conceived here, ought have as its object, a furthering of 'the game of enterprise as a pervasive style of conduct, diffusing the enterprise-form throughout

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^8 There is a certain degree of confusion centred on the question of the use of spontaneous in (Neo)Liberal discourses. Hayek (1967 b) argues that:
The central concept of liberalism is that under the enforcement of universal rules of just conduct, protecting a recognizable private domain of individuals, a spontaneous order of human activities of much greater complexity will form itself than could ever be produced by deliberate arrangement, and that in consequence the coercive activities of government should be limited to the enforcement of such rules, whatever other services government may at the same time render by administering those particular resources which have been placed at its disposal for those purposes. (p.162)
Spontaneous here signifies much the same as in Gordon's explication of the Ordo Liberal's construction of the State's rights, roles and responsibilities with respect to the Market.
the social fabric as its generalized principle of functioning' (Gordon 1991, p.42). Citing Alexander von Rustow, as an important member of the Ordoliberalen Gordon (1991) argues that this particular problematisation of government 'proposes that the whole ensemble of individual life be structured as the pursuit of a range of different enterprises' (p.42). The range of these enterprises is diverse. From the number of possible relations of oneself to oneself (as a reflexive project), through to the conduct of professional, family, work and cultural relations. These relations are 'all to be given the ethos and structure of the enterprise-form' (p.42). This vitalpolitik (vital policy), for von Rustow, would seek to 'foster a process of "creation of ethical and cultural values" within society' (Gordon 1991, p.42).

This recasting of 'the social as a form of the economic' proceeds via a process whereby the 'territory of economic theory' is enlarged through a 'series of redefinitions of its object' (Gordon 1991, p.43). For Gordon (1991) this process witnesses a movement from a neo-classical view that 'economics concerns the study of all behaviours involving the allocation of scarce resources' to diverse ends, through to a view that economics takes as its object all rational thought and action 'entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means and promises' (p.43). This process of rearticulation promises, within (Neo)Liberal rationalities of government, a way of rendering reality thinkable in a manner which addresses 'the totality of human behaviour' (p.43). Conceiving human motivations, dispositions and capacities for action and thought in this manner provides (Neo)Liberalism with a 'purely economic method of programming the totality of governmental action' (p.43). Where Hayek (1988) identifies Socialism's Fatal Conceit in diverse attempts to rationally plan all aspects of the economic and the social in order to facilitate the greatest common good, this reduction of all forms of human thought and action to the realm of 'economic choices' can be identified as (Neo)Liberalism's own Dangerous Conceit.

Gordon (1991) argues that homo economicus, as the Subject of (Neo)Liberalism, is 'both a reactivation and a radical inversion' of the Subject of Scottish Enlightenment Liberalism. This 'reactivation' centres on the conceiving of human behaviours and dispositions in terms of rational, choice making man. For early Liberalism this male pronoun was an entirely appropriate way of constructing the Subject as a 'rational, interest-motivated economic ego', engaged in 'private, individual, atomistic, egoistic' exchange relations which emerge from a particular 'natural and historical milieu' (Burchell 1996, p.24). In this sense, argues Burchell (1996), Liberal rationalities of

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9Nancy Fraser (1989), and Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994) have argued that this view of the Subject, as masculine, as rational choice making homo economicus underpinned the development of Liberal Welfare
government must take as their object, 'the natural private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market exchanging individuals', in so far as the behaviours and dispositions of such individuals are the foundation which 'enables the market to function optimally in accordance with its nature' (p.23, original emphasis). The 'radical inversion' of this principle of Liberal rationalities of government takes a number of forms. Gordon (1991) argues that the Subject of Liberalism, originally signified a Subject whose motivation 'must remain forever untouchable by government'. For (Neo)Liberalism however 'homo economicus is manipulable man,' a Subject who is 'perpetually responsive' to environmental 'modifications'. Within this way of thinking the Subject, 'economic government joins hands with behaviourism' (p.43). This articulation works to construct a view of the Subject as an 'individual producer-consumer' who, in certain quite fundamentally new ways is 'not just an enterprise, but the entrepreneur of himself or herself' (p.44).

Where the meanings of life are transformed, largely autonomously, into meanings which are structured by the market form, then the Subjects of (Neo)Liberal rationalities of government emerge, argues Burchell (1996), as 'free', 'entrepreneurial', competitive and (economically) rational individuals. However, within these changed problematics of government, this 'form is not so much a given of human nature as a consciously contrived style of conduct' (pp.23-24). That is, this Subject has to be 'made up' (educated) via the mobilisation of diverse techniques, as the active, autonomous, responsible entrepreneur of her or his own DIY project of the Self. Rose (1996 a) argues that the Subject, in this sense, is conceived as an active, Self creating individual seeking to 'enterprise' herself or himself. Individual biographical projects are the result, within this rationality, of the 'maximization' of the chances for a 'good life' through 'acts of choice'. Life is accorded 'meaning and value to the extent that it can be rationalized as the outcome of choices made or choices to be made' (p.57). There are, then, certain connections within (Neo)Liberal rationalities to the largely autonomous processes of individualization which compel Subjects, in a more reflexive modernity, to engage in lifelong reflexive projects of the Self: and which, further, subjectivize and individualize the institutionally generated Risks for the DIY Self which emerge as a consequence of the enhanced forms of institutionalised dependence under these conditions.

Burchell (1996), for instance, argues that emerging (Neo)Liberal practices of government 'offer' individuals, groups and communities new opportunities to participate 'actively' in various arenas of action 'to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the

practices of government. Such practices most often position women and children in relations of dependence to this Subject.
responsibility of authorized governmental agencies' (p.29). Thus the widespread privatization of formerly public areas of responsibility (crime prevention (Crime Stoppers), the management of schools, the management of health services systems, the regulation and care of the Self as an enterprise), can be conceived as a new form of 'responsibilization'. Here, individuals, groups and communities are 'encouraged freely and rationally, to conduct themselves' (p.29 emphasis added). However, as Burchell (1996) argues, the 'contractual implication' of these processes is that individuals and communities 'must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out, and of course, for their outcomes' (p.29). Furthermore, suggests Burchell (1996), these processes of 'responsibilization', as institutionally dependent processes of individualization and standardization, incite and encourage the 'individual as enterprise' to 'conduct themselves in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action' (p.29).

An example. The relatively widespread 'political acceptability' of large scale unemployment in late 20th century Anglo European settings, can be partially understood in terms of a rationality which renders the Subject as an 'enterprise'. To conceive of the (DIY) biography as the 'enterprise of oneself' suggests a set of conditions which compel the Self to remain 'continuously employed in (at least) that one enterprise, and that it is a part of the continuous business of living to make adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one's own human capital' (Gordon 1991, p.44). This, then, is the form of a 'care of the self' which largely structures (Neo)Liberal constructions of the Subject; a duty of care structured by new processes of individualization and responsibilization. Moreover, there is a powerful articulation of this conception of the DIY Self to a pervasive 'psychological culture'. In this sense there are moves by that whole discursive repertoire of the 'psy' sciences to (articulate) 'symbiotize aptitude with self-awareness and performance with self realization (not to mention self-presentation)' (Gordon 1991, p.44).

Richard Gosden (1997) provides one illustration of the emerging tendencies within this rationality of government to psychologize the problem of unemployment, and to identify, via a range of Risk factors, those unemployed individuals who might require some form of psychological assessment and intervention in order to render them employable. Gosden's examination of these processes of 'responsibilization' foregrounds the role played by the former Australian Labour Government's 1994 White Paper on Unemployment (Working Nation). Following the publication of this Paper, the then Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET) mobilised, as a technology of government, a mix of public and private 'case management' for the long
term unemployed. Gosden (1997) argues that this mix (public/private) will increasingly shift to a form of 'privatised' case management with the mobilisation of 'competitive principles'. These principles will reward Case Managers on the basis of their capacity to place long term unemployed people in some form of employment, or labour market programme, or training setting. In order to facilitate this process Case Managers have a range of techniques at their disposal. When, as Gosden (1997) points out, an unemployed person is 'difficult to place' these (expert) Case Managers of DIY biographies are able to mobilise what is called the Special Intervention Programme. This programme enables Managers to render knowable the particular problems of an unemployed person within four categories: English-as-a-Second Language Needs; Literacy and Numeracy Problems; Outdated Work Skills; Employment-Related Personal Development Needs (ERPDN) (p.39).

While all four of these categories are indicative of processes which individualise Risks within institutionally structured Risk environments, it is the last category which is most relevant to this present discussion. Gosden (1997) points out that the assessment of ERPDN is the domain of psychologists employed by DEET, or registered with DEET on a consultancy basis. The particular expertise of these psychologists is also available to private Case Managers. Gosden (1997) argues that this emerging process for 'shrinking the dole queue' is grounded in 'psy' scientists' constructions of mental illness. Within these rationalities 'mental disorder' is conceived as a condition which 'causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning' (cited in Gosden, 1997, p.40). These truths emerge in the tender documents which prospective psychological consultants received from DEET in the ACT/Illawarra area during 1996. These documents render knowable those long term unemployed people who might require psychological assessment and intervention through a range of factors:

Low work motivation and negative orientations to labour market participation: Low self esteem or self awareness in relation to the labour market: Those who may become discouraged because of their lack of success in finding work: Those who may be resistant to change or have unrealistic work expectations: Those are unable to control aggression or relate to others in positive ways: Those who might have

10 As Gosden (1997) points out 'case management' is a term with a long history in psychiatry. Its appropriation within discourses on (un)employment is a recent phenomenon, and is one indicator of the individualization processes which are central to this discussion.

11 Here Gosden cites from, but does not reference, DSM IV as the 'most commonly' used 'psychiatric diagnostic manual' in Australia (p.40)
high levels of anxiety and other personal difficulties that inhibit their employment prospects: Those with poor presentation and grooming skills: those with other interpersonal difficulties (e.g. shyness or an inability to get along with others). (cited in Gosden 1997, p.39, original emphasis)

Gosden (1997) argues that, within this emerging rationality 'participation in the productive/social system at the expected level generally offers' individuals some 'protection' against this form of psychological assessment and intervention. However, long term unemployed individuals are confronted - in this way of constructing the responsibilities of the DIY Self to 'preserve, reproduce and reconstruct one's own human capital' (Gordon 1991) - by the prospect of institutionally structured processes of intervention, via the expertise of the 'psy' sciences. For contemporary populations of young people these possibilities assume a particular, and dangerous, significance. As Gosden (1997) argues, with youth unemployment in Australia having, apparently, stabilised at 30%, there exists the possibility that large populations of young people will be pathologised as suffering from 'occupational impairment', or 'occupational dysfunction' (pp.40-41). Here Gosden cites the power of this articulation as it becomes reflexively reproduced in expert discourses on mental illness and youth unemployment:

Unemployment is a particular stressor, both for the mentally ill and those who are at risk of mental illness. It may lead to, or exacerbate depression, anxiety and other mental disorders. The most recent research has indicated very adverse effects on health generally - and mental health in particular. Recent studies have indicated that more than 50% of unemployed young people suffer from depression. (cited in Gosden, 1997, p.40 original emphasis)12

Within largely autonomous processes of reflexive modernization, the 'responsibleization' of the DIY Self takes the form of individualising and pathologising, within the rationalities of the 'psychological culture', the 'reflexivity losers' in these transformed flows (Lash 1994 a). Rather than conceiving these articulations as the 'triumph of autonarcissism' within a psychological complex, Gordon (1991) suggests that these institutionally dependent and structured processes of individualisation can be identified as being part 'of the managerialization of personal identity and personal relations which accompanies the capitalization of the meaning of life' (p.44).

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The emergence of new forms of 'responsibilization' within (Neo)Liberal problematics of government extends, also, to the practices and activities of expertise (Johnson 1993). Here, discourses of managerialism, and processes of marketization reconfigure the practices of regulation of expert (professional) systems. Within these new regulatory practices the 'enclosures of expertise are to be penetrated through a range of new techniques for exercising critical scrutiny over authority - budget disciplines, accountancy and audit being three of the most salient' (Rose 1996 a, p.54). As Rose (1996 a) argues these practices of audit are 'simultaneously modest and omniscient', promising new forms of accountability in problem domains as 'diverse as the appropriateness of a medical procedure and the viability of a university department' (p.54). These processes signal 'a new way of "responsibilizing" experts in relation to claims upon them other than those of their own criteria of truth and competence' (p.55). Corporate Managerialism, as the activities of (expert) accountants and managers, is often constructed as an ideology in the activities of (expert) Left intellectuals. Particularly in schools and universities where an emphasis on budgets, accountability and paying the bills by the accountants (the bean counters) is set against the Educational, Research and Critical practices of intellectuals, teachers and researchers engaged in unmasking the truths of the world (including the truths of corporate managerialism). Corporate Managerialism is often twinned, ideologically, with marketisation; the process by which formerly non Market activities and practices are reconfigured within the logics of exchange, choice and competition.

Anna Yeatman (1993 b) argues that 'corporate managerialism', as the ideology of restructuring the Australian Public Sector, has witnessed (since the mid 1980s) the 'replacement of the idea of public service by that of management'. In this construction of the truth of the Welfare State and its transformation into a 'Competition State', there is an argument that this transformed public sector is no longer concerned with the 'delivery of public values'. Rather this sector emerges as concerned 'about the management of scarce resources' (p.3). These regulatory practices do, indeed, need to be problematised. These rationalities often work to reconfigure the practices of government in ways which see the withdrawal of formerly publicly funded services; often in areas where the logic of the Market would see such services subside. However, it is problematic to construct the Welfare State as a good - for Yeatman (1993 b) this good is signified by the notion of public service, a view of a 'collegial culture of public service which cut across the hierarchical divisions of position and status', and the practices of professional expertise which were better able to identify the needs of clients than the clients themselves (pp.4-7) - against the Competition State as a bad. Much of this principled Left critique of privatisation, marketization, and managerialism misses the possibilities for transforming the relations between Experts and Subjects which
these changed regulatory practices provoke; possibilities provoked by reconceiving the dependent, client subject of Welfare, for instance, as the choice making, autonomous Citizen Consumer of expertise. When the regulation of expertise, via technologies of accounting and audit (‘a cruel accounting’ Thomson 1998), is articulated with a conception of the Subject as autonomous, responsible and choice making, then there is potentially, a certain ‘reversibility’ in the ‘relations of authority’ between Experts and Subjects (Rose 1996 a). Indeed, this construction of the Subject opens up diverse possibilities; possibilities which have the potential to escape the governmental ambitions in which they are constructed.

Burchell (1996) argues that the tensions between the practices of freedom and the practices of government, which are inherent in Liberalism do not disappear within (Neo)Liberal problematics of government. Here the relations between ‘government and the governed’ increasingly depend upon the ‘ways in which individuals are required to assume the status of being the subjects of their lives, upon the ways in which they fashion themselves as certain kinds of subjects, upon the ways in which the practice their freedom’ (pp.29-30). While the practices of government increasingly ‘impinge on individuals in their individuality’, the outcomes of these practices of freedom and responsibility are unstable and uncertain. There is a sense, argues Burchell (1996), that practices which structure autonomy and choice and responsibility, while they are institutionally structured and dependent, and conceived, often in narrow limits, open up a new ‘uncertain, often critical and unstable domain of relationships between politics and ethics, between the government of others and practices of the self’ (p.30). Rose (1996 a) identifies similar tensions in the changing nature of the relations between the Experts and the Subjects of (Neo)Liberal rationalities. While practices of the Self remain institutionally dependent, Subjects are, indeed, to ‘become “experts of themselves”, to adopt an educated and knowledgable relation of self-care in respect of their bodies, their minds, their forms of conduct and that of the members of their own families’ (p.59).

These emerging processes of responsibilization, which promise a certain ‘reversibility’ in ‘relations of authority’, are fundamentally grounded in the mutability of expertise which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. These changing relations of authority, Rose (1996 a) argues, structure, and are structured by, their own ‘complexities' and 'logics of incorporation and exclusion’. However, the 'power effects' of these emerging relations 'certainly do not answer to a simple logic of domination' (p.59). Rather, within these new relationships between practices of government and practices of the Self (as Enterprise), which can see Subjects (re)coded, for instance, as at-Risk, there is a sense in which the 'marginalized' or 'excluded' Subject becomes
'potentially and ideally an active agent in the fabrication of their own existence' (p.59). Rose (1996 a) here identifies potentially positive articulations between psychological narratives of (Self) empowerment, (Neo)Liberal constructions of the Self as Enterprise, and Left discourses of emancipation and autonomy from structures of domination. Rose (1996 a), however, also expresses his 'cynicism' and 'repugnance' at the processes of renaming which (re)code the Unemployed as Jobseekers, or the Homeless as Roughsleepers. Further, he does not discount the 'misery' and 'impoverishment' which is visited upon certain individuals and groups by practices of government which construct Subjects as autonomous, choice making and responsible for their own fate. Rather, Rose argues that these transformations do not merely reflect the 'vicissitudes of a single political ideology' (Thatcherism, The New Right). This reconfiguration of the 'ethics of personhood' around concerns of self actualisation, self empowerment, and self responsibility, signals, instead, transformations in the practices of regulation which are 'complex, and have no single origin or cause' (p.66). Instead these transformations can be understood in terms of largely autonomous processes of reflexive modernization, in which the competing, mutable claims of expertise structure restless problematisations of reality (in the quest for certainty), and of the forms of regulation appropriate to these realities, and of the practices of the Self necessary for active participation in these processes.

**Regulating Youth: Risk and Responsibilization**

Youth, as an object of diverse forms of regulation seeking to incite, encourage and provoke certain practices of the Self, certain capacities necessary for active, autonomous, responsible citizenship, is increasingly positioned within new forms of responsibilization. Pat O'Malley (1992, 1996) argues that within (Neo)Liberal problematisations of government, the management of Risk, by active, responsible citizens, signals a new 'prudentialism', which 'removes the key conception of regulating individuals by collectivist risk management ['social insurance', Rose (1996a)], and throws back upon the individual the responsibility for managing risk' (O'Malley 1992, p.261). These processes of responsibilization, in which the Subject is compelled to prudently manage the institutionally structured and dependent Risks of her/his own DIY project of the Self, 'produces a field characterized by uncertainty, plurality and anxiety, thus continually open to the construction of new problems and the marketing of new solutions' (Rose 1996 c, p.343).

Transitions from school to work, for instance, were, in a less reflexive modernity, relatively simple processes to manage for large populations of young people. Indeed, the concept of Youth, as a transitional process and phase of life, emerges as a truth which dominates governmental horizons when these transitions become problematic,
and when the practices for regulating these transitions become problematic. From these problem spaces emerges the truth of Youth at-Risk of not effecting a secure transition to Adulthood (Freeland 1996). The nature of these transitions emerge as Uncertain and Risky as a consequence of a range of largely autonomous processes. The return of large numbers of women to the labour market, the decline in entry level jobs and a withdrawal from training by employers, the decline in labour intensive manufacturing and service jobs, casualisation, flexibility, core and periphery workforces..., are processes which, directly and indirectly, in intended and unforeseen ways, render (Youth) transitions Uncertain and Risky. This uncertainty provokes the mobilisation of various forms of expertise in assorted attempts to govern the Risks of previously stable processes of transition. Various forms of expertise, energised by the institutional reflexivity which characterises processes of reflexive modernization, seek to tell the truths of Youth transitions and the Risks associated with these transitions, in ways which render the regulation of transitions an increasingly, complex and uncertain affair. The choices and the (lifelong) consequences of the choices made within this expert system (Schooling, Vocational Education and Training) become, within (Neo)Liberalism's problematisation of government (of the Self), the responsibility of Youth and their Families.

It is useful in this context to return to the understanding of Youth as an artefact of expertise. Youth, as a means of constructing, in particular ways, certain populations, is an artefact of a history of diverse ways of thinking the behaviours and dispositions of those who are neither Child or Adult. Indeed, as an artefact of expertise, Youth is principally about becoming; becoming an Adult, becoming a Citizen, becoming Somebody, becoming Independent, becoming Autonomous, becoming Mature, becoming Responsible. There is some sense in which all constructions of Youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition. Moreover, there is a sense in which becoming automatically invokes the future. Youth, as it is constructed in at-Risk discourses, is at-Risk of jeopardising, through present behaviours and dispositions (desired) possible Futures. These possible futures, as additional artefacts of the activities of expertise, are fundamentally normative. There is a strong sense here that there are preferred futures awaiting these populations in transition. The narrative of Risk provokes this normative epistemology. These preferred futures, whatever they might be, are placed at-Risk through the present behaviours and dispositions of certain populations of Youth and importantly, of their Families.

As a technique which promises to render operable (Neo)Liberal problematisations of government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy, and the Self) Risk works to responsibilize both Youth and the Family. Youth(ful) Subjects are constructed as
responsible for future life chances, choices and options within institutionally structured Risk environments. The choices and practices, behaviours and dispositions of young people are their responsibility. The future consequences of these choices, about Schooling, diet, sexuality, substance (ab)use, are outcomes which young people are responsible for. However they are not solely responsible. The Family, as the setting of nurturance, care and Child/Adolescent development is increasingly responsibilized, within (Neo)Liberalism's reconfigurations of government, for the care of the Youth(ful) Self. This process of responsibilization of the Family is of a different order to the narrative of Traditional Family Values which structure the political rhetorics of the New Right. New forms of prudentialism in Uncertain times indicate deeper transformations in the ways in which Subjects are conceived as choice making and as responsible. These transformations are not solely the province of political rhetorics. They are structured by the activities of various experts in diverse centres of expertise which restlessly monitor and problematise the nature and truths of the Subject and the forms of regulation which promise to 'make up' this Subject.

The pedagogic Family (Donzelot 1979), with the assistance of the truths produced by various forms of expertise (about the raising of Children and Adolescents), is responsible for making the right choices for the sake of the Children. Schools and Health Services, as examples of social insurance institutions, are institutions inherited from an earlier problematisation of the art of governing (through society). Historically, these and similar centres of expertise sought to regulate the social and corporeal Risks which characterise modernity by collectivising these Risks: by, in the case of those who were dependent on these institutions, removing elements of choice and responsibility from families and individuals. Within emerging practices of regulation, these institutions increasingly attempt (within the contingencies of the past and the present) to responsibilize Youth and the Family, as autonomous, choice making, consumers (customers). For those who remain dependent on these social insurance institutions, the narrative of choice, and the consequences of responsibility can be life damaging and limiting; choice continues to be a problematic truth. Indeed, the logic of the market, and the energising impulse of electronically enabled I&C structures (Lash and Urry 1994), facilitate increasingly globalised 'economies of signs and spaces' which structure the life options and choices, and chances of Youth and Families. However, Youth and Families, by adopting, freely and by choice, the practices of the responsible Self, can attempt to ward off the Uncertainty and Risk structured by processes of reflexive modernization. Those Families and Youth whose behaviours and dispositions fall outside of the regulatory boundaries rendered knowable via the practices of expertise are those at-Risk in these settings. Gordon Tait (1995) argues that, 'in effect, the character of the 'at-risk
youth' is used as the pretext for modifying and expanding the boundaries and responsibilities of the pedagogic family' (p.133)

The sorts of tensions which provoke the dynamism of Liberal problematisations of the nature of regulation do not disappear or become resolved within (Neo)Liberalism's problematisation of reality. Here the tensions between processes of 'individualisation' and 'standardization' (Beck 1992) continue to provoke the restless mobilisation of expertise. Within transformed practices and spaces of regulation there are moves to normalise Youth as rational, choice making citizens (to-be), who are responsible for their future life chances through the choices they make with regard to School, career, (sexual) relationships, substance (ab)use. At the same time there are increasingly sophisticated attempts to differentiate among Youth(ful) populations, via the identification of Risk(y) behaviours and dispositions (factors) which place at-Risk those practices and capacities of the Self which can effect a secure transition to these preferred futures. Risk, as the double of (Social, Private) Insurance, is a technique which promises to make these new practices of prudentialism concrete. This is a powerful promise. The techniques of Risk, its objective, scientific identification, measurement and calculation, and its competing humanistic and economic concerns, promise to render uncertain (future) realities thinkable in ways which provoke prudent, choice making Subjects to be responsible for the consequences of their own behaviours and dispositions. As Francois Ewald (1991) argues:

For an event to be a risk, it must be possible to evaluate its probability. Insurance has a dual basis: the statistical table which establishes the regularity of certain events, and the calculus of probabilities applied to that statistic, which yields an evaluation of the chances of that class of event actually occurring (p.202).

Here there is a sense that identification and intervention (via Education, Counselling, Psy diagnosis), as techniques facilitated by narratives of Risk, and enabled by the activities of expertise, recode institutionally structured relations of class, gender, ethnicity, (dis)ability and geography as complex, but quantifiable, factors which place certain Youth at-Risk. Once identified, measured, and quantified within probabilistic rationalities, modes of intervention can be designed and implemented to enable regulatory projects which promise to minimise the harm of these factors. The techniques provoked by conceiving Student failure, for instance, in terms of Risk factors, promise to render government more efficient and effective by facilitating earlier identification of those at-Risk, and by targeting interventions to those most at-Risk. As Tait argues:

Social influences impinging upon students can be understood in terms of risk factors which endanger the successful completion of an
education...The logical conclusion of this approach is that failure can eventually become correlated with a range of these risk factors...Furthermore, having delineated the risk factors correlated with any given undesirable outcome (delinquency, truancy, poor grades, etc) the emphasis is then upon the early observation of such risk factors within specific members of the school population. (p.124)

In this context it becomes possible to argue that the narrative of Risk, and the techniques which both facilitate and are facilitated by conceiving of Youth at-Risk, signal a historically novel development in attempts to regulate Youth. At-Risk discourses rehearse historical truths which construct Youth in terms of deviacy, delinquency, and deficit. However, at-Risk discourses and techniques also promise practices of regulation which are potentially 'endless' (Tait 1995). As Tait (1995) argues, 'nothing', in terms of Risks, 'remains beyond governmental intervention' (p.128). Moreover;

the notion of 'risk' operates as an important component of a grid of governmental intelligibility. It allows for an augmentation of the possibilities of governmental regulation (especially 'youth'), and not only that, it operates as a productive element of a larger system which records its observation, intervenes strategically and steers conduct in socially, economically and morally appropriate directions. The calculability, specificity and versatility of 'risk' make it a far more efficient tactic for describing 'youth' than any of it predecessors. (pp.132-133)

The Dangerousness of Risk

Robert Castel (1991) argues that there has been a shift in the tactics of 'preventive strategies of social administration' which indicate a fundamental departure from the 'traditions of mental medicine and social work' (p.281). Broadly constructed, these strategic innovations in the practices of regulating populations involve a dissolution of 'the notion of a subject or concrete individual', and its replacement by a diverse combination of 'factors, the factors of risk' (p.281 original emphasis). Where Risk and the identification of Risk factors emerges as a dominant technique for regulating populations then the practice of 'intervention no longer takes the form of the direct face-to-face relationship between the carer and the cared, the helper and the helped, the professional and the client' (p.281). Rather, there is a displacement of the face-to-face relationship by an emerging practice grounded in the 'collation of a range of abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk' with regard to certain behaviours and dispositions of a given population (p.281). The emergence and power of these practices is, further,

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13With due acknowledgment to Robert Castel (1991) From Dangerousness to Risk
connected to changed processes of responsibilization and regulation of various forms of expertise. Here, imperatives of efficiency and accountability work to position the 'specialists' (the 'psy' counsellors, the social and youth workers, the teachers) as 'mere executants', interpreters of abstracted knowledge generated at a distance via the practices of other forms of expertise and collated and prioritised as a range of factors (p.281).

Castel (1991) argues that 19th century 'psy' discourses conceived Risks in terms of the 'danger embodied in the mentally ill person capable of violent and unpredictable action'. Dangerousness, in this sense, is a 'rather mysterious and deeply paradoxical notion' (p.283). In the first instance dangerousness connotes a 'quality immanent to the subject (he or she is dangerous). In the second instance it is a quality which is a 'mere probability, a quantum of uncertainty'. As Castel argues 'there can only ever be imputations of dangerousness, postulating the hypothesis of a more or less probable relationship between certain present symptoms and a certain act to come' (p.283 original emphasis). For classical psychiatry this technique was subject to a 'double limitation'. One rested on the imputation which grounded the diagnosis of the dangerous individual. The second was grounded in the fact that a diagnosis of future dangers rested on a prior intervention. That is, an individual had already to be identified as dangerous, to be under surveillance (treatment) in order to be thought of as presenting some future danger (p.283).

In the context of 19th century sanitary and social reforms conceiving of dangerousness in these terms was problematised within rationalities of prevention and intervention; rationalities which begin to examine the frequency of mental illnesses and other abnormalities among the most disadvantaged' populations. These calculations were then related to the 'living conditions of the subproletariat - malnutrition, alcoholism, housing conditions, sexual promiscuity' (Castel 1991, p.284). These moves, argues Castel (1991), mark the emergence of a rationality which sought to construct the problems and the techniques of intervention in terms of objective risks: that is to say, statistical correlations between series of phenomena' (p.284 original emphasis). There is a shift here to 'reason in terms of risks rather than dangers' (p.285). Castel (1991) argues, however, that this problematisation of the practice of preventing social ills was limited by the lack of 'specific techniques' to render this form of regulation operable (p.285). While there were tendencies to think in terms of 'populations at risk' (p.284), or to conceive prevention in terms of 'generalized moral treatment' (p.285), these practices of intervention continued to be structured by the necessity to 'enter into contact with and take responsibility for individuals' (p.285). Prevention of certain future Risky or dangerous practices still rested on the rehabilitation of previously identified and treated
individuals subject(ed) to ongoing surveillance and intervention. These limitations to preventative, interventionist practices in the 'psy' sciences, in social and youth work, in the 'care professions' are reduced, argues Castel (1991), 'if one breaks this direct relation with the assisted subject' (p.287). This break is enabled by rendering 'the notion of risk...autonomous from that of danger'. This shift signals the emergence of a rationality which conceives of a Risk as not 'arising from the presence of a particular precise danger embodied in a concrete individual or group'. Rather, the Risk, in this sense, is the 'effect of a combination of abstract factors which render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour' (p.287 original emphasis).

Castel (1991) illustrates the form which these new practices of prevention can take through an analysis of a French system for the 'automated' management of mothers and infants. This computerised technique is based on the practice of 'systematic examination' of mothers and infants (at a few days, a few months and 2 years old). These examinations aim to collect data on 'all possible abnormalities of child and mother, whether physical, psychological or social' (p.287 original emphasis). The collected data are computerised and organised by Risk factor type. Computer generated correlations alert a 'specialist' (social/health worker) who is;

sent to visit the family to confirm or disconfirm the real presence of a danger, on the basis of the probabilistic and abstract existence of risks. One does not start from a conflictual system observable in experience, rather one deduces it from a general definition of the dangers one wishes to prevent (pp.287-288).

Rose (1996 b) and Tait (1995) express some concerns about the dangers which Castel (1991) identifies in this transition From Dangerousness to Risk. Tait (1995), for instance, senses a move to mobilise a social control view of government in Castel's (1991) argument that:

'Prevention' in effect promotes suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of probability. To be suspected, it is no longer necessary to manifest symptoms of dangerousness or abnormality, it is enough to display whatever characteristics the specialists responsible for the definition of preventative policy have constituted as risk factors. (cited in Tait 1995, p.128)

For Tait this view of the potentially 'limitless imposition of the unwanted forces of government' misses the productive capacity of at-Risk discourses. Here, the mobilisation of Risk emerges 'as a means of equipping the population with new attributes (or equipping a new, wider population with such attributes)' (p.128). Rose (1996 b) too questions the prospect that Risk, as technique of regulation leads,
unproblematically, to the 'totalization...of surveillance, with the prospect of the prophylactic assignation and guidance of individuals to certain paths in a kind of rationalized dystopia' (p.17). Rose argues, instead, that Risk (assessment, management and prevention) can (might well) provide a technique for responsibilizing the activities of diverse forms of expertise (through, for instance, legal and administrative sanctions for failing a duty of care - You should have been aware of the Risks). In many respects these sorts of cautions have been central to the discussion thus far. My discussions of the contingent and problematic practice of government, of Foucault's problematisations of power and its effects, and of the Subject, point to the inevitable failures of government and the limits of expertise. I have also argued against seeing (Neo)Liberal governmentalities as totalizing, essentially repressive and closed (the end of history of government).

However, my concern to understand Risk as a metanarrative of an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty, points to the dangerousness of our times; a dangerousness indicated by the apparently widespread sense of unease, anxiety and uncertainty in Anglo/European Liberal Democracies. Here Uncertainty attaches to the future outcomes for/of the Planet, the Nation State, National (Mono/Multi Cultural) Identity (Spaces), the Economy, Relationships, Diet, Sexuality, Gender Relations, the Self. When the ('limitless') possibilities for government which Risk techniques promise are situated in the context of the transformations structured by processes of reflexive modernization, and of globalisation, the dangerousness of Risk (the Risks of Risk), become more evident. Particularly in the regulation of Youth as a population constructed in terms of transitions to preferred (ideal) futures, and historically, as emerging from the ungovernable 'wild zones' of modernity's imaginings. Here the enhanced capacities for (electronic, computerised, audio/visual) surveillance of populations, developments in biogenetic (social) engineering, the possibilities of for cyborg futures, and the global flows of signs and spaces structure new spaces and relations in which regulation can occur.

Castel (1991) captures the dangerous possibilities provoked when, as Rose (1996b) argues, 'we allow all cultural practices to be 'vivisected at the micro-level' and give our experts the duty of defining and managing them in order to eliminate or minimize any possible features that might prove dangerous' (p.20). For Castel (1991):

The modern ideologies of prevention are overarched by a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as the irruption of the unpredictable. In the name of this myth of absolute eradication of risk, they construct a mass of new risks which constitute so many new targets for preventive intervention. Not
just those dangers that lie hidden away inside the subject, consequences of his or her weakness of will, irrational desires or unpredictable liberty, but also the exogenous dangers, the exterior hazards and temptations from which the subject has not learnt to defend himself or herself, alcohol, tobacco, bad eating habits, road accidents, various kinds of negligence and pollution, meteorological hazards, etc. Thus, a vast hygienist utopia plays on the alternate registers of fear and security, inducing a delirium of rationality, an absolute reign of calculative reason and a no less absolute happiness for a life to which nothing happens. This hyper-rationalism is at the same time a thoroughgoing pragmatism, in that it pretends to eradicate risk as though one were pulling up weeds. Yet throughout the multiple current expressions of this tranquil preventive conscience (so hypertrophied at the moment in France, if one looks at all the massive national preventive campaigns), one finds not a trace of any reflection on the social and human coast of this new witch-hunt. (p.289)
A NON REDEMPTIVE SPACE

If it is true that young people are the nation's most precious resource, then the nation needs better means of measuring the overall effectiveness of the socialization process. Systematic efforts are needed to assess the adolescent population over time. Such efforts will require multifaceted measures that examine a range of adolescent attributes, including perceptions, behaviors and accomplishments. Data collection must be organized to produce findings according to age, gender, race, ethnicity, and socio-economic status.

The need to adequately monitor adolescents from low-income families is especially urgent. Relatively little is known about the exposure of the adolescent population to high-risk settings on a national and regional basis. In addition, studies do not adequately sample by race or ethnicity, and hence little is known about some of the most vulnerable populations. Finally, studies must allow for disaggregation into smaller age subgroups; for example, most national health surveys group young adolescents with children, and older adolescents with adults. (Panel on High-Risk Youth 1993, pp.255-256)

Thomas Popkewitz and Marie Brennan (1997) argue that (post)Marxist critical Educational research traditions continue, with 'some hesitations and some dissent', to be grounded in 19th century modernist narratives of 'redemption' and 'progress' through Education (Schooling). Within these intellectual traditions there is a powerful sense that 'intellectual work should provide universal norms and directions for social change emerging' from critical research on Schools, the Economy, Youth, Power, Privilege, Oppression. The truths unveiled via the 'critical interrogations of social conditions will produce a new synthesis from the identified contradictions'. These conclusions emerge, argue Popkewitz and Brennan (1997), in the 'redemptive' space of the "obligatory last chapter" of critical research reports' (p.292). This space at the conclusion of an engagement with the truths of Risk and the Regulation of Youth(ful) Identities in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty is A Non Redemptive Space. For it to be otherwise would involve constructing a conclusion which contradicted the theoretical and political positions which have structured this engagement with the truths of Youth at-Risk.

This thesis has not been about identifying or measuring the Risky behaviours and dispositions of young people. Nor has it been concerned with the programs that are, or might be mobilised in order to intervene into and transform these Risky behaviours and dispositions. Rather, my primary concern has been to examine the rationalities, the processes, and the practices which structure expert constructions of Youth(ful) behaviours and dispositions in terms of Risk. My intent has been to examine the 'conditions of possibility' which enable discourses of Risk to function as true (Henriques
et al 1984); and to function as true within institutionally structured spaces marked by
differences in the 'power to mean' (Watts 1993/94). I have highlighted the
dangerousness of the processes of expert identification, measurement and intervention
which are provoked via the construction of Youth at-Risk; processes which are well
illustrated in the research recommendations of the Panel on High-Risk Youth.

I have argued that the impulse to construct and calculate Risk scenarios becomes
energised within those forms of expertise which appropriate the tasks of regulating the
disintegrative effects of modernity. Particularly those systems of expertise which
attempt to colonise the futures of youth(ful) populations, whose involvement in any
number of (present) practices might jeopardise desired outcomes (futures). I have
demonstrated that the narrative of Risk can structure attempts to regulate young people's
involvement in Schooling (with regard to future employability or good citizenship);
young people's engagement in sexual activity (the possibility of becoming pregnant, or
of contracting HIV/AIDS); the chance that they might attempt suicide; and the
likelihood of young people becoming homeless or (ab)using drugs or becoming
involved in criminal activities. Within rationalities and practices which mobilise Risk
discourses there is a promise that, 'an assessment of likely risks can be made for
virtually all habits and activities in respect of specific outcomes' (Giddens 1991, p.112).

I have argued throughout this thesis that Youth (at-Risk) is usefully understood as an
artefact of the activities and practices of diverse and competing forms of expertise;
expertise which claims scholarly and scientific authority via its capacity to generate and
tell the truths of Youth (at-Risk). In exploring the contemporary 'conditions of
existence' (Hall 1985) of the powerful truths of Youth at-Risk I have examined the
possibilities of a productive convergence between theories of reflexive modernization
(Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994) and governmentality (Foucault 1991). Exploring this
convergence has enabled Youth at-Risk to be examined at two (interconnected) levels. I
have suggested that Risk can be understood as constituting a metanarrative in an Age of
Manufactured Uncertainty. Further, I have argued that the identification of Risk factors
and populations at-Risk can be understood as techniques mobilised in a variety of
attempts to 'make up' rational, choice making, responsible citizens within (Neo)Liberal
projects of government (Rose 1996 a).

Processes of reflexive modernization are characterised by institutional and expert
reflexivity in which claims to certainty in knowledge production become intensely
problematic. The practices and activities of institutionalised expertise result in a
'runaway world', of 'dislocation' and 'uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a). Human existence is
not necessarily more Risky in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty. Rather, the origins
of Risk and uncertainty have changed. Processes of intellectually grounded knowledge production about the social and the natural and the various attempts to apply this knowledge in the quest for certainty in human interventions into, and interactions in, these domains, constitute the motive forces of this manufactured uncertainty. This 'paradox of human knowledge' is central to understanding processes of reflexive modernization (Beck et al 1994). These processes are marked by the emergence of a degree of collective awareness that our contemporary conditions of existence are characterised by the thoroughgoing penetration of the social and the natural by reflexive human knowledge. The intensification and globalisation of reflexively produced knowledge results in a 'runaway world', of 'dislocation' and 'uncertainty' (Giddens 1994 a); at the end of the millennium 'uncertainty returns' (Beck 1994 b).

Thinking government as the conduct of conduct enables a focus, not on the political rhetorics or ideologies of a monologic or monolithic State. Rather, governmentality shifts attention to the historically contingent interrelationships between 'political rationalities' and 'governmental technologies', and to the activities of various experts in diverse centres of expertise who promise to render government (of the State, Civil Society, the Economy and the Self) operable. I have argued that these transformations in the problematics of government are of a different order than that indicated by the 'neo-liberal political rhetorics' which have dominated political discourse in the parliamentary democracies over the past three decades (Rose 1996 a). (Neo)Liberalism is thus of a different order to the political rhetorics of Reaganism, Thatcherism, Economic Rationalism, and the New Right. Yet, as I have argued, it is these rhetorics which have provoked a principled, largely conservative defence of the practices of Liberal Welfare government in Left intellectual and political discourses.

I have argued that attempts to responsibilize Youth (at-Risk) and their Families within diverse (Neo)Liberal projects of government represent a certain historical continuity in attempts to regulate Youth(ful) identities. At-Risk discourses constitute a certain historical continuity in the construction of particular Youth(ful) populations in terms of deviancy, delinquency, and deficit. At-Risk discourses, however, provide a technique, and a narrative, for attempts to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of young people which is potentially 'endless'. As Tait (1995) argues, 'nothing', in at-Risk discourses, 'remains beyond governmental intervention. Since "risk" can be legitimately found anywhere, there is therefore no one who is not at risk of something' (p.128, original emphasis). I have argued against seeing these governmental projects as necessarily bad. I have indicated the positive potentialities provoked by Risk discourses; potentialities which are foregrounded by thinking these attempts to regulate Youth(ful) identities form within governmentality frameworks. This form of intellectual practice renders
problematic those theoretical and political positions which find it easy and self evident 'to be for or against the present (Rose 1996 a).

I have, however, also stressed the dangerousness of Risk discourses; a dangerousness which can be understood in the context of intellectual, political and popular concerns about the uncertainty of our times, and in the intellectual hubris of various forms of expertise which construct Youth at-Risk in relation to certain preferred futures. Risk discourses are dangerous in the sense that these discourses promise that the Risks, the uncertainties and the contingencies of human behaviours, dispositions and interactions in complex settings can be objectively or scientifically or critically identified. Once identified various programs and interventions can then be mobilised to regulate these Risks; the dangers, the uncertainties, the contingencies of an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty. For Castel (1991) the 'modern ideologies of prevention are overarched by a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as the irruption of the unpredictable' (p.289).

Risk discourses are also dangerous in so far as they produce truths grounded in a narrative of Youth as becoming; as being a space of transition from Childhood to Adulthood. The truth of Youth at-Risk is, thus, principally concerned with the manner in which present behaviours and dispositions place desirable future outcomes at-Risk. These possible futures are fundamentally normative. There is a strong sense here that there are preferred futures awaiting these populations in transition. These preferred futures, whatever they might be, are placed at-Risk through the present behaviours and dispositions of certain populations of Youth and their Families. Risk discourses seek, then, to colonise the unruly, unknowable future via the practices and activities of expertise. Preferred futures, and the practices deemed necessary to secure these futures, are also, in this sense, artefacts of the activities of expertise. These forms of expertise claims to know better what constitutes desirable futures. Further, these expert systems know what Youth, and experts who take Youth as the object of their expertise, should do to 'effect a secure transition' to these futures (Freeland 1996).

In order to problematise the truth of Youth at-Risk it has been necessary, also, to problematise the processes of truth production mobilised from the Left in an engagement with the material and discursive realities which enable Youth at-Risk to function as a truth. I have foregrounded the problematic nature of the relationships between new class, Left intellectuals and those Youth at-Risk that they construct in particular Self/Other relations; this is a particular concern when much of this Left intellectual practice positions those at-Risk in terms of lack and deficit. Constructing Youth at-Risk in terms of deficit provokes the mobilisation of interventionist and
transformative logics in diverse attempts to educate these Subjects. While Education cannot be other than interventionist and transformative, my intent has been to make problematic the grounds from which these processes of intervention and transformation are mobilised, and the ends to which these processes are targeted.

Left intellectual and political practice has no choice but to be open to the uncertain nature of truth telling which characterises processes of reflexive modernization. The tensions generated within these processes are not resolvable. Nor should the 'return of uncertainty' be seen as immobilising in the context of political and intellectual practice. A certain intellectual arrogance underpins a concern that a lack of intellectual certainty or prescription undermines the very chance of political action in uncertain times. As Popkewitz and Brennan (1997) argue: 'People do continue to act; they have no option but to act in their daily lives' (p.313). 'Living with ambivalence' (Bauman 1990 a) most often provokes anxiety. The 'discomfort' of learning to live with an awareness that there is 'no certain exit from uncertainty' is, for Bauman (1990 a), the 'source of specifically postmodern discontents: discontent against the condition fraught with ambivalence, against the contingency that refuses to go away, and against the messengers of the news - those who attempt to spell out and articulate what is new and what is unlikely ever to return to the old' (p.37). If this space is a non redemptive space, what do we do? Where do we go? How do we go forward? What do we do after we pose these problems? In a number of discussions with friends and colleagues about the problematisations which have structured this thesis, a frequent (emotional and intellectual) response has been an anxiousness about taking seriously the consequences of acknowledging the 'return of uncertainty' which is provoked by processes of reflexive modernization.

In the institutional, intellectual and interactional spaces of a Faculty of Education, logics of change, transformation, intervention and redemptive progress towards the ultimate perfectibility of relations between the Self, Itself and Others, structure the intellectual (and in some cases, the personal) projects of Educational experts. A problematisation of these logics often provokes the anxiety which Bauman (1990 a) argues is characteristic of ambivalence. It is 'because of the anxiety that accompanies it and the indecision which follows that we experience ambivalence as a disorder' (p.1).

Ambivalence, as the 'failure' of the 'naming/classifying' function of language is, in effect, 'the alter ego of language, and its permanent companion - indeed, its normal condition'. In generating structures of the world, language situates itself (provisionally, partially) between 'a solidly founded, orderly world fit for human habitation, and a contingent world of randomness, in which human survival weapons - memory, the capacity for learning - would be useless' (p.1, original emphasis). The ordering functions of language promise to 'sustain order and to deny or suppress randomness and
contingency'; for in an 'orderly world' we know 'how to go on' (p.1). The ability to construct this order via the constitutive capacities of language is elemental to an ability to 'go on'. Giddens' (1991) foregrounding of the significance of ontological security and trust for 'going on' is important in understanding the ways in which 'manufactured uncertainty' and 'radical doubt' can be disturbing ('existentially troubling') for individuals under the conditions of reflexive modernization. Ontological security, which must be continually 'secured', forms the basis by which we are able to, more or less successfully, and at different times, bracket out 'questions about ourselves, others and the object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity'. This bracketing presents the means by which existential questions 'about the frameworks of existence' are able to be 'answered' (p.37).

There is a sense, then, that problematising the logics that underpin the projects of Education, and taking seriously the consequences for truth production of a 'return of uncertainty', is unsettling. In this context it becomes possible to think the practices and activities, and the self understandings of (critical, socially just) expertise as symptomatically generative of modernity's attempts to 'exterminate ambivalence' (Bauman 1990 b). For Beck (1994 b) these attempts both underpin and energise the 'optimism' of the 'cognitive theory of reflexive modernization'. The optimism of a cognitive theory of reflection on modernity suggests that more must mean better. More 'reflection, more experts, more science, more public sphere, more self-awareness and self-criticism' must result in more certainty, more control, 'better possibilities for a world that has got out of joint' (Beck 1994 b, p.177). I have argued throughout this thesis that processes of reflexive modernization render modernity's 'Quest for Order' (and the possibilities of Order) both problematic and dangerous (Bauman 1990 a).

It can be further argued that we have no choice but to learn to live with contingency, indeterminacy and uncertainty. Bauman (1990 b) argues that the 'history of modernity' is a history of attempts to 'exterminate ambivalence: to define precisely - and to suppress or eliminate everything that could or would not be precisely defined' (p.165). The costs of attempting to exterminate ambivalence are (have been) too high. Indeed, the historical legacy of past attempts to impose order on disorder, to pursue, rationally and scientifically, the Quest for Order indicate that countless millions of humans have paid these costs with their lives, their liberty and their diverse potentialities. Throughout this discussion I have foregrounded the dangerousness of the practices and activities of expertise (grounded in narratives of scholarship, science and reason) which promise certainty in an Age of Manufactured Uncertainty; an Age where widespread anxieties, uncertainties and tensions enable the articulation of Youth at-Risk to function as a powerful truth. This is not a resort, at the end, to a view of the ideological as a masking
of the truth of the construction of Youth at-Risk. Rather, it is an attempt to foreground the dangers in these processes of truth production which seek, and secure, some scholarly authority via claims to certainty in the telling of the truths of Youth (at-Risk).

At the stage of preparing the final draft of this conclusion I came across a small article on page 7 of The Age (17.3.98) newspaper in Melbourne. The article is headlined 'Liberties may go, says Carr'. In this small news item (no author is acknowledged) the Labour Party Premier of the Australian state of New South Wales, Mr Bob Carr, is quoted as saying that he 'was prepared to sacrifice civil liberties to make the streets safe from knife wielding hooligans'. These sacrifices would be made by giving police the power to 'search people at will, to demand names and addresses and to order groups of people to move on'. 'Knife wielding hooligans' are dangerous. What is also dangerous is the construction of a populations such as 'knife wielding hooligans' as an unproblematic, truthful representation of somebody. Dangerous also is the relative ease in moving from this construction, and the dangers and Risks invoked as a consequence of this truth, to efforts to regulate these risks via the mobilisation of changed policing practices. Dangerous too is the sense that such a mobilisation is itself unspectacular, common place, unproblematic. 115 words on page 7, 1 picture of the Premier, 12 column centimetres, only one article in many that would point to similar sentiments and practices; You have nothing to worry about if you are not doing anything wrong.

Bauman (1990 a) identifies similar dangers, in a similar context, in citing a review, by Norman Stone in The Guardian (14.12.89) newspaper, of Paul Wilding's Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945. Bauman cites Stone as arguing that 'in his horrible way, Hitler was pointing to a problem that is constant and, in today's "underclass", very serious. How do you stop single teenage mothers from breeding up tomorrow's football hooligans?' (p.44 emphasis added). This question could so easily be framed in terms of Risk, those at-Risk, and what should be done in order to facilitate the identification of Risk factors and populations at-Risk to enable the intervention into, and transformation of the behaviours and dispositions of the members of this population; the underclass, single mothers of football hooligans. The dangerousness of these visions of Order, and of the attempts to exterminate the ambivalence provoked by Disorder, together with the location of these visions in Left/Liberal discourses in the Liberal Democracies, is powerfully captured by Bauman (1990 a):

A sentence dropped just 'by the way' pushes aside the sad knowledge that history forced upon reluctant scientists. In few words (all the more horrifying for being seen as trivially obvious), Norman Stone restates the whole philosophy that virtually invited Nazi political
practices: he *knows* that the 'underclass' (of course, who else?) is a 'problem' (whose problem?); he *knows* that hooligans are born of single mothers (of and into the underclass, of course); and so he *knows* that the would-be single underclass mothers should be stopped from fornication. How? Here, one would suppose, 'Hitler was pointing to a problem that is constant'. (p.44 original emphasis)

Bauman (1990 a) from a position *better* able to judge than many of us, is particularly wary of modernity's attempts to 'exterminate ambivalence', and the dangers (even horrors) of the means mobilised to achieve this *end* (of Uncertainty, of History).¹ A Polish Jew and a former Communist *academician* Bauman was exiled from Communist Poland in 1968. He experienced 'actually existing' Communism as the 'Kingdom of Reason'. For Bauman (1990 a) modern Communism, with its philosophical and political indebtedness to the late 19th century 'eruption of social engineering hopes', demonstrates the 'genocidal potency that the grand vision of perfect and rationalized society reveals when conjoined with the awesome powers of the modern state' (p.36). Bauman's (1990 a) investigations of the Holocaust, and histories of the Holocaust, provoke, further, a sense of being 'struck by the evidence that the theoretical consequences which would follow from the scrupulous investigation of the case, are seldom followed to the end and hardly ever accepted without resistance: too drastic and far reaching seems the revision which they force upon the self consciousness of our civilization' (p.18).

Bauman (1990 a) identifies in histories of the Holocaust a number of strategies which work to construct this genocide as a 'one-off historical episode' which was the 'culmination of the long history of Judeophobia'; as a 'German affair' which was the culmination of a particular set of historical contingencies centred on the German Nation State; or as a 'singular eruption of pre-modern (barbaric, irrational) forces as yet insufficiently tamed or ineffectively suppressed by (presumably weak or faulty) German modernization' (p.19 original emphasis). What is resisted by these histories is the recognition that in modernity's war on ambivalence (made so murderously concrete in the practices of National Socialism), there has been a profound convergence between the 'practical tasks posited by the modern state', and the 'legislative reason of modern philosophy and of the modern scientific mentality in general' (p.26). As Bauman (1990 a) argues: 'Modern rulers and modern philosophers were first and foremost *legislators*; they found chaos and set out to tame it and replace it with order' (p.24 original

emphasis). The modern project of the Enlightenment was, argues Bauman (1990 a), motivated 'by the dream of a masterful humanity'; a humanity which was 'collectively free from constraints' and thus able to 'respect' and 'preserve' human 'dignity'. The realisation of this dream was to be facilitated via the elevation of; 'Reason to the office of supreme legislator' (p.26 original emphasis). Notwithstanding this attachment to the narrative of human sovereignty there was, Bauman (1990 a) suggests, a certain 'elective affinity' between the 'strategy of legislative reason and the practice of the state power bent on imposition of designed order upon obstreperous reality' (p.26).

The lessons of history ought to force us to confront 'the end of innocence' (Flax 1993) with respect to the uncertain consequences (the dangerousness) associated with the production and appropriation of intellectually grounded knowledge; knowledge which secures legitimacy through its objective, scientific, reasoned characteristics. History ought also to alert us to the dangerousness of the mobilisation of scholarly work in modernity's attempts to 'exterminate ambivalence'. Between 1907 and 1928, for instance, twenty states in the US enacted sterilization laws grounded in the Science (Truth) of Race and Eugenics. These technologies of government targeted bodies (populations) rendered knowable as 'criminals, rapists, idiots, feeble-minded, imbeciles, lunatics, drunkards, drug fiends, epileptics, syphilitics, moral and sexual perverts and diseased and degenerate persons' (cited in Bauman 1990 a, p.36). In Australia the indigenous population, constructed as Other, as less than White (as the measure of Normality), as living 'lives devoid of value' (Bauman 1990 a), were systematically, rationally, and on the basis of sound scientific, ethical and moral principles subjected to governmental practices which removed them from their lands, isolated and restricted them (discursively and materially) to the margins of mainstream (White) society, and dismantled their family and cultural traditions via practices such as the forced removal of children from their parents; a practice of salvation grounded in the sciences of Eugenics and Social Biology, and the morality of Christian redemption. Indeed, in the practices and activities, the dreams and ambitions of intellectuals and the 'educated classes' can be found traces of the promise of Order to be delivered by interventionist and transformative logics and practices; logics which promise perfectibility in human interactions, behaviours and dispositions if only we could produce more and better knowledge of these processes. This promise of the practice of social engineering (Education) is;

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perfectly reflected in the imagery of the social ideal standing ahead of social reality and pulling it forward; in the vision of society as pliable raw material to be moulded and brought into proper shape by architects armed with a proper design; in the image of society incapable, if left to its own course, of either improving itself or even comprehending what the improvement would look like; in the concept of knowledge as power, reason as the judge of reality and an authority entitled to dictate and enforce the ought over the is. (Bauman 1990 a, p.37, original emphasis)

Bauman's critique is not unique. Postmodern and Feminist critiques of modern 'legislative reason' rehearse similar arguments. These critiques have informed the structure of this thesis and my engagement with theories of reflexive modernization and governmentality. Bauman's (1990 a) contribution at the end of this thesis is useful, however, in foregrounding the dangerousness, in the last instance, of holding out the promise of redemptive progress if only we knew more, or better, the things which provoke uncertainty and anxiety; the unruhy bodies, relations and practices which escape the ordering processes of our (limited) understandings. More understanding, better truths could structure the mobilisation of progressive, enlightened, emancipatory processes of Education (social engineering) which promise a better, less dangerous, more certain world. This promise of legislated reason, a promise to be delivered via the activities and practices of expertise, is not the sole province of the Police States of history. The same hopes and visions structure the identification of future research objects in countless reports, by various centres of expertise; reports such as the one prepared by the Panel on High Risk Youth. In these sorts of reports can be found the 'normative, engineering ambitions that are inherent in all scientific enterprise...and that may lend themselves easily and joyously to political uses - anytime and everywhere' (Bauman 1990 a, pp.40-41, original emphasis).

Theories of reflexive modernization and of governmentality enable a focus on the largely autonomous, restless and uncertain nature of these processes of intellectually grounded knowledge production. These theoretical and political positions also suggest that 'to live in a society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible - and in fact ongoing' (Foucault 1983, p.222). There can, in this sense, be no promise of an end to history. In settings, therefore, where the practices and activities of expertise have so thoroughly penetrated the natural and the social; where these processes of colonisation have resulted in the 'return of uncertainty'; where, paradoxically, the practices and activities of expertise promise to 'exterminate ambivalence' by telling the truths of Youth at-Risk, then there emerges a theoretical and political imperative to take seriously Foucault's admonition: 'My point is not that everything is bad, but that
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is
dangerous then we always have something to do' (Foucault 1983, pp.231-232).
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