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9 Administration, Education, and the Question of Trust

Richard Bates

A complete absence of trust would prevent [us] from getting up in the morning.

(Luhmann 1979: 4)

Trust is ubiquitous. Our world is saturated with trust. Our everyday existence exhibits our trust almost every minute. We trust that the alarm clock will go off at the appropriate time; that the light will work; that the shower will be warm; that our breakfast will be safe to eat; that public transport will get our children safely to school; that other drivers will act predictably as we drive to work; that our colleagues will treat us with respect; that the organization we work for will be stable and secure; that the professionals who look after our health and well-being will be skilled and committed; and so on and on. Not that all trust is unconditional or always warranted, but overwhelmingly for most of us most of the time our trust is indeed warranted, which is why we are upset, hurt, angry, and disillusioned when that trust turns out to be misplaced.

Trust, of course, takes many different forms. In the most general sense, we trust the society to which we belong to provide security, prosperity, well-being, and opportunity. Societies that do not or cannot be trusted to provide such assurances are regarded as failed states. At another level, we trust the agencies of government to use their resources efficiently and to our advantage, and to be fair and equitable in their dealings with us. At a third level, we expect private businesses to deliver the goods and services that they say they will deliver in an honest and dependable way. Again, we trust institutions such as hospitals and schools to operate in our best interests. And, of course, we expect to be able to trust the professionals who staff such institutions to have the required skills, motivations, and commitments that will support us. Finally, at the interpersonal level, we expect that our trust in those with whom we deal on a personal level be warranted, respected, and reciprocated. More than this, we also expect there to be mechanisms through which breaches of trust can be redressed, be they the result of political malpractice, organizational incompetence, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or, indeed, physical or emotional violence.
There has been, however, over recent years, considerable concern over whether all this trust is indeed warranted. Onora O’Neill, in her 2002 BBC Reith Lectures, asked: ‘Is it true that we have stopped trusting? Has untrustworthy action made trust too risky? Is trust obsolete? (2002: vii). Her answer is that the evidence is pretty mixed. While we continue routinely to trust most of the individuals and organizations we come into contact with, there does seem to be poll-based evidence of increasing levels of mistrust in government, business, office-holders, and professionals. Moreover, mass media constantly report cases of misplaced trust where trust is breached by some doctors, some scientists, some companies, some politicians, some teachers, some colleagues. The response, O’Neill suggests, has been to try to eliminate untrustworthy acts by increasing levels of accountability, especially in government, public institutions, and the professions. Such accountability is directed towards the elimination of untrustworthy behaviour through detailed specification of required behaviour coupled with heightened levels of reward and sanction. This is particularly true of the public sector: ‘For those of us in the public sector the new accountability takes the form of detailed control. An unending stream of new legislation and regulation, memoranda and instructions, guidance and advice floods public sector institutions’ (O’Neill 2002: 46). Moreover:

The new legislation, regulation and controls are more than fine rhetoric. They require detailed conformity to procedures and protocols, detailed record-keeping and provision of information in specific formats and success in reaching targets. Detailed instructions regulate and prescribe the work and performance of health trusts and schools, of universities and research councils, of the police force and of social workers. And beyond the public sector, increasingly detailed and regulatory requirements also bear on companies and the voluntary sector, on self-employed professionals and tradesmen. All institutions face new standards of recommended accounting practice, more detailed health and safety requirements, increasingly complex employment and pensions legislation, more exacting provisions for ensuring non-discrimination and, of course, proliferating complaint procedures. (2002: 46–47)

Along with these specifications comes an explosion of audit procedures where the idea of audit has spilled over from its original context of finance into detailed scrutiny of non-financial processes and systems. Indeed, we seem to now be living in what Michael Power (1997) calls ‘The Audit Society’. The role of government in particular seems to have changed in its emphasis on increased steering capacity. The idea of an independent public service devoted to the long-term public interest has been replaced by a politicized public service directed towards the delivery of short-term objectives that follow from the ‘mandates’ of governments despite low turnouts and the relative brevity of electoral cycles. Such demands for increased
steering capacity are made clear by the development of strict line management coupled with heavy sanctions such as that instituted by Michael Barber through his imposition of ‘deliverology’ in education as elsewhere during the Blair government in the UK (Barber 2007: 70ff.).

The result is that in order to control the untrustworthy behaviour of some departments, institutions, professionals, businesses, and administrators, and to ensure compliance with government policy, systems are set up that implicitly regard all such departments, institutions, professionals, businesses, and administrators as potentially untrustworthy and likely to subvert or ignore government policy through the exercise of independent professional judgment. But such rules, no matter how elaborate, cannot account for all possible occurrences and may result in frequent constraints on the exercise of appropriate professional judgment in particular situations. Again, rules devised by differing agencies with mandates directed towards differing objectives may require inconsistent behaviours or collectively result in overload and what Art Wise (1979) called ‘hyper-rationalisation’, where individual requirements may be rational but collectively produce huge cognitive dissonance and exhaustion among practitioners and clients alike.

Such demands for ‘performativity’ (Ball 1990; Marshall 1999) also serve to reorient professional practice away from responding to the needs of clients towards satisfying administrative demands and targets and the reduction of ‘risk’. This reorientation is experienced by professionals and clients alike as both ‘distorting the proper aims of professional practice’ and as ‘damaging professional pride and integrity’ (O’Neill 2002: 50). Moreover, the imposition of strict targets and indicators coupled with the sticks and carrots of incentive systems may have quite perverse effects:

Even those who devise the indicators know that they are at very best surrogates for the real objectives. Nobody after all seriously thinks that numbers of exam passes are the only evidence of good teaching, or crime clear-up rates are the only evidence of good policing. Some exams are easier, others are harder; some crimes easy to clean up, others are harder. However, the performance indicators have a deep effect on professional and institutional behaviour. If a certain A-level [examinations] board offers easier examinations in a subject, schools have reason to choose that syllabus even if it is educationally inferior. If waiting lists can be reduced faster by concentrating on certain medical procedures, hospitals have reason to do so, even if medical priorities differ. Perverse incentives are real incentives. (O’Neill 2002: 55)

Such systems, directed as they are towards guarantees of trustworthiness and performance, can become sources of decreased trust as professionals redirect their attention to ‘incentives to which they have been required to respond rather than pursuing the intrinsic requirements for being good
nurses and teachers, good doctors and police officers, good lecturers and social workers' (O'Neill 2002: 56). Much of current mistrust of institutions, systems, organizations, and professionals arises from just such requirements and the concomitant displacement of attention away from individual needs and professional judgment. Indeed, attempts to ensure the administration of trust seem, frequently and perversely, to result in the diminution of trust.

EDUCATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST

The humanist tradition in education saw education as the pursuit of ideals such as personal autonomy and emancipation. From Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Montessori, Hume, Mill, Smith, Arnold, Marx, and Dewey onwards, the avowed purpose of education was to be liberation: personal, social, economic. While governments justified the expansion of public systems in terms of education's civilizing mission, the moral education of the poor, or the provision of basic functional literacy, the great educational reformers of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries proclaimed the purpose of education as the meeting of individual needs. The orientation of schools was, therefore (and despite Mr. Gradgrind), towards concern with the needs of individual pupils and to the extent that they fulfilled this objective, they could be trusted.

Pedagogy developed in ways that served this objective. It mediated the world of knowledge, of science, of art, and of the social virtues in ways that provided access to, or at least a toehold in, the wider world. It provided a more or less trustworthy account of that world and prepared pupils through appropriate knowledge and behaviour to join 'the conversation of mankind' (Oakeshott 1962). This broad pedagogy was administered through the codification of knowledge (curriculum), the rules of engagement (classroom processes), and the assessment of performance (classification). To the extent that such pedagogy was appropriately managed in ways that pupils, parents, and the wider public respected, it is possible to regard it as a mechanism for the administration of trust. Such trust inhered in the links between such pedagogy and the everyday experience, social relations, and personal realization that formed what Habermas (1984) called the 'life-world' of individuals.

However, as Lyotard (1984) and Habermas (1975) point out, such an orientation becomes subverted in the modern world by mechanisms that subordinate such ideals to the demands of social efficiency and the 'system'. These demands, demands for 'performativity', require schools to implement an alternative pedagogy directed, not towards individual development and emancipation, or what Nussbaum (2003) and Sen (1999) call 'capabilities', but towards the development of specific skills. These are of two kinds: (a) those that contribute to the ability of a country to compete in competitive
world markets; and (b) those that contribute to internal social cohesion and political legitimation.

Thus, education is not to pursue or to produce ideals, or to provide an elite capable of guiding a society or nation towards emancipation but, instead, to ‘supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions’ (Lyotard 1984: 5–7). (Marshall 1999: 310)

The issue of trust also becomes transformed from its administration through curricular, classroom, and classification processes directed towards the life-world and individual and collective emancipation into its replacement by an administration of official requirements directed towards market position and political control. Such transformation produces what Habermas (following Luhmann 1979) calls a ‘legitimation crisis’. This crisis is essentially one of trust.

In education this currently takes the form of conflict between what Bernstein (2000) calls the pedagogical recontextualizing field (PRF) and the official recontextualizing field (ORF). The PRF takes knowledge from activities such as physics and, through the selection of specialized knowledge, the specification of its relation to other forms of knowledge, and the sequence and pace of its presentation, recontextualizes such knowledge pedagogically. Carpentry becomes woodwork, for instance. For the first half of the twentieth century the PRF was heavily influenced by the humanistic ideals of the Progressive Education movement. Teachers and schools were allowed considerable autonomy in their practices while government was mainly concerned with expanding the provision of education in response to political demands for access to secondary and then tertiary education. From the middle of the century, however, as government expenditures rose, governments of all persuasions took an increasing interest in what James Callaghan in his Ruskin College speech called ‘the secret garden of the curriculum’ (Lawton 1980). In this speech, Callaghan declared that schools were being run by ‘unaccountable teachers’ teaching an irrelevant curriculum to young workers who were poorly motivated, illiterate and innumerate’ and that ‘there is no virtue in producing socially well-adjusted members of society who are unemployed because they do not have the skills’ (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 107).

The thesis here is essentially that professionals, specifically teachers, cannot be trusted. The resulting ‘discourse of derision’ (Wallace 1993) became widespread in political circles during the last three decades of the twentieth century, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US (under Reagan and Bush), the United Kingdom (under Thatcher), and Australia (under Howard). But such a discourse not only attacked the trustworthiness of teachers, it also paved the way for the imposition of strict specification and accountability mechanisms designed to reduce the relative autonomy
of teachers and replace it with an official pedagogy that demanded compliance with a centrally determined curriculum, high-stakes testing, devolved responsibility for performance, and a quasi-competitive market in educational provision where increased ‘private’ competition was supported with public funds (Ball 2007; Berliner and Biddle 1995; Bonnor and Caro 2007; Glass 2008).

The educational market created through privatization and competition, coupled with the accountability movement and high-stakes testing, both reduced trust in the capacity of many schools to deliver either a broad education . . . destroying the richness of a curriculum that has taken decades to develop . . . obliterating the professional autonomy of teachers and . . . dimming the personal hopes and dreams of hundreds of thousands of children’ (Glass 2008: 18).

The new official discourse restructured the functions of school management (Ball 1990; Berliner and Biddle 1995; Grace 1995), turning it away from internal concerns with pedagogy, instructional leadership, and professional development towards external concerns with league tables, reputation, competition, and prestige, that is, with comparative performance on mandated tests. As Bernstein observes:

The management structure’s major focus is upon the school’s performance, with regard to attracting and retaining students, their conduct and their attainments . . . The management structure has become the device for creating an entrepreneurial competitive culture. The latter is responsible for criteria informing senior appointments and the engaging or hiring of specialised staff to promote the effectiveness of its culture. Thus there is a dislocation between the culture of the pedagogic discourse and management culture. (2000: 61)

The result is:

a culture and a context to facilitate the survival of the fittest as judged by market demands. The focus is on the short term rather than the long term, upon the exploration of vocational applications rather than upon exploration of knowledge. The transmission here views knowledge as money. And like money it should flow easily to where demand calls. There must be no impediments to flow. Personal commitment and particular dedication of staff and students are regarded as resistances, as oppositions to the free circulation of knowledge. And so personal commitments, inner dedications, not only are not encouraged, but are also regarded as equivalent to monopolies in the market, and like such monopolies, should be dissolved. The . . . position constructs an outwardly responsive identity rather than one driven by inner dedication. Contract replaces covenant. (2000: 69)
This transformation of curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment, and the concomitant imposition of a managerialism that establishes centralized control over objectives while devolving responsibility for success or failure, has led to a narrowing of both objectives and opportunity and an exclusion of concerns with promoting social justice. As Bernstein suggests, the new official pedagogy is based:

... on a new concept of ‘work’ and ‘life’ which might be called ‘short-termism’. This is where a skill, task or area of work, undergoes continuous development, disappearance or replacement; where life experience cannot be based on stable expectations of the future and one’s location in it. Under these circumstances it is considered that a vital new ability must be developed: ‘trainability’, the ability to profit from continuous pedagogic re-formations and so cope with the new requirements of ‘work’ and ‘life’. (2000: 58)

Trainability is, however, central to a conception of individuals as workers whose skills are more vital than their identities. Indeed, identity is transitory as successive skill sets are mastered and discarded, leaving no permanent core. As Bernstein suggests, ‘There seems to be an emptiness in the concept of trainability, an emptiness which makes the concept self-referential and thus excluding’ (2000: 59).

The transitory and ‘empty’ nature of identity in such circumstances is argued by some to be the result of conditions of modernity. Touraine summarizes this view:

We are now faced with the task of understanding a society in which change seems to be the primary factor, and in which there seem to be no limits to change. Accelerated technological change, together with the globalization of production, consumption and communications has finally convinced us that nothing is settled anymore. Social life is no longer constructed around any central principle. Social utility, rationalization and even the class struggle are things of the past. If change is everything, how can there be norms, laws or a social definition of good and evil? (2000: 141)

Touraine’s answer to this problem is to emphasize the importance of agency within the context of a universal principle of equal respect as a foundation for social justice.

Sen (1999) takes a similar position in response to this situation in his insistence on the intimate connection between individual agency (freedom) and social commitment:

... individual agency is, ultimately, central to addressing ... deprivations. On the other hand, the freedom of agency that we individually have
is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us. There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face, we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment. (xi-xii)

Social justice is, then, in Sen's view, a matter of arranging our social commitments in ways that enhance individual freedom to live a valued life:

in analysing social justice, there is a strong case for judging individual advantage in terms of the capabilities that a person has, that is, the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life that he or she has reason to value. (1999: 87)

Capabilities, and the enhancement of individual capabilities through social arrangements, are at the heart of the issue of social justice. Sen offers five ‘types of freedom’ or capabilities as being fundamental. These include: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (1999: 10). It follows that an education directed towards the development of individual agency supported by such capabilities would not be constrained by an official pedagogy solely directed towards the production of transitory skills suitable for particular market conditions. It might also be an education that could be trusted.

LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AGENCY, AND TRUST

Since the 1980s there has been a growing attempt in the literature to reconnect educational ideals with educational leadership and to recover from the almost complete separation of educational and administrative theory (Bates 1980). Moreover, some of the literature has taken up the challenge to see educational leadership as the management of knowledge and to explore the nature of the power relations that structure the selection of knowledge (curriculum), the means of transmission (pedagogy), and the evaluative systems (examinations) present in schools (Bates 1980). The issue of power, the power to control the message systems of schools and the opportunities that they resent or deny, is central to the exercise of leadership and the issue of trust.

For instance, where management is exercised through manipulation or coercion it is unlikely that teachers will trust the principal or the wider management of the school or school system. Such manipulation may, of course, be visible and systematic in terms of the award of incentives or punishments, praise or blame. Or it may be invisible or exploitative as in
the current emphasis on the role of the principal in ‘establishing’ a school culture that conforms to his or her ‘vision’ (Hargreaves 1994; Bates 2006, forthcoming). Trust is unlikely in such circumstances.

For trust to be established, it is suggested that two fundamental conditions must be met: ‘people must find one another highly predictable and share substantially the same aims’ (Nias et al. 1989: 78). This is more likely where schools serve relatively homogeneous communities where there is a consonance of culture, values, and objectives between management, teachers, pupils, and parents. In such circumstances ‘schools of virtue’ may emerge where there is a ‘shared covenant’ (Sergiovanni 1992). Such schools are interesting in that while they may well consolidate trust among their members, such trust may well be gained at the price of distrust of those who are not members of their virtuous community. As Peshkin remarked in his study of a religious school that clearly met Sergiovanni’s definition of a school of virtue with a shared covenant:

The academy ... serves an internally integrative or community-maintenance function. That is, it simultaneously links believers together and separates them from non-believers. In its defensive capacity, the academy shields its students from competitors by promoting dichotomies not only of we and they, but also of right and wrong. We follow God’s truth in God’s preferred institution: they are the unfortunates of Satan’s dark, unrighteous world. (1986: 282)

Moreover, in the case of many religious schools there is a problematic conflation of trust in exclusive beliefs with an authoritarian insistence on the rightness of those particular beliefs. Such authoritarian approaches are clearly incompatible with a conception of education as emancipation and, in a narrower sense, incompatible with the notion of religious freedom. Ironically, the claim of such schools to pursue their authoritarian and exclusive education freely is based upon a denial of religious freedom, for such religious schools:

constitute an impediment to student’s enjoyment of freedom of religion insofar as they stifle any inclination students have to question the religious beliefs of their parents’ community or to discuss or act on beliefs relating to religion that are different from the schools’ sponsors. (Dwyer 1998: 163)

The question arises then as to how much trust could be placed in such schools by the wider community or whether such schools might indeed serve to encourage mistrust—particularly mistrust of communities of difference, be they religious, political, cultural, or racial. Moreover, such mistrust might well be encouraged by authoritarian practices that would not be tolerated in other circumstances.
Stephen Law illustrates this point by his imagining of the establishment of ‘political’ schools that would be open only to children of parents with particular political persuasions (neo-conservative, Trotskyist, socialist, Stalinist, communitarian, etc.). Such schools, he argues, would increase ‘choice’ for parents and would presumably meet Sergiovanni’s criteria for ‘schools of virtue’ where parents and schools enter into a specific covenant based on shared beliefs. Law describes the practices of such schools:

Political education at these schools largely takes the form of indoctrination. Portraits of their political leaders beam beatifically down from classroom walls. Each day begins with the collective singing of a political anthem. Pupils are never encouraged to think critically and independently about political questions. They are expected to defer more-or-less unquestioningly to their school’s Authority and its revered political texts. Only ideas approved by the school’s political Authority are taught. Children are never exposed to alternative political points of view (except, perhaps, in a rather caricatured form, so that they can be all the more sweepingly dismissed). (2006: 169-70)

As Law suggests, were such partisan ‘political’ schools to be established there would be public outrage and demands that the government ensure that schools expose children to a range of political views and encourage children to think critically and freely about them. Parental ‘freedom’ to choose would be overridden on the basis that no one could trust those schools to teach more broadly appropriate values that would support both the political freedoms of the broader community and its political cohesion.

Why, asks Law, if this is our attitude to the imaginary ‘political’ schools, do we not take the same attitude to religious schools? But the issue is surely even broader than this and involves the question of how we can trust schools that seem to incorporate certain interests and exclude others—schools that are partisan and exclusive in their practices rather than democratic and inclusive.

This is a question that is becoming more urgent as the complexity of contemporary societies increases, for ‘trust is especially important for organizations that operate in turbulent external environments, that depend heavily on information sharing for success, and whose work processes demand effective decentralized decision-making’ (Bryk and Schneider 2002: 33). Such are the conditions of schools and school systems.

One official response to the issue of trust has been to increase accountability and, as indicated earlier, this may well have had results that have diminished trust—especially between teachers and systems. The second key official response has been to endorse and encourage ‘choice’ in the belief that competition would increase school diversity and performance as well as better match parental values with school character. In England, for instance, the official policy acknowledged that:
We know that not all schools are the same. They have different strengths and serve different communities. We must encourage and celebrate this diversity. All schools need to develop their own ethos and sense of mission. (Department for Education and Skills 2002: 13)

Moreover, in England official policy encouraged this diversity by increased funding for ‘faith’ schools (Gardner, Cairns, and Lawton 2005) as well as the establishment of Academies (Beckett 2007), despite evidence that parents are less than enthusiastic: fewer than 1 per cent support the idea of faith groups running schools and fewer than 5 per cent private companies and charities (‘What Do Parents Want?’ 2009: 52).

Here, again there is also a divergence between intention and effect, for:

Despite the grand promises issued by those promoting market-based reform of social institutions—that we will witness increased levels of diversity, participation and equality—what has happened in the practice of market reform is a heightening of the inequitable hierarchical relationships that are characteristic of capitalist systems. (Forsey 2007: 158–59)

The result for teachers, pupils, and parents alike is not trust, but alienation from a situation where they are ‘being forced to surrender their agency to a reified system that many feel powerless to change’ (Forsey 2007: 163).

The issue of power and control is central to the issue of trust. Where education systems and their schools deny agency on the part of teachers, pupils, and parents, trust is likely to be in short supply. This is especially so where such agency is proclaimed through ‘local parental control’, for instance, but denied by the accountability mechanisms enforced by central agencies through complaisant managers (Forsey 2007). Trust is similarly threatened where promises of ‘choice’ are made but where significant numbers of parents do not get their first choice or are prohibited by cost or distance from accessing the school of their choice. Again, the promise of the replacement of ‘failing schools’ under such initiatives as the ‘Fresh Start’ programme in England, by new schools centred on a ‘culture of success’ produced through strong leadership may, in reality, both meet the official criteria and fail significant groups of students. Araujo, for instance, in a study of transition from the ‘failing’ Millhaven High to the ‘Fresh Start’ Greenfield School, shows how the pursuit of official standards worked against the interests of refugee children:

According to several OFSTED reports, there had been ‘very good results’ amongst refugee children due to the quality of the work being carried out at Millhaven High, a school committed to raising the aspirations of a community where attainment was traditionally low. This past experience was erased in the transition to the Fresh Started school,
Despite the significant proportion of such pupils... Greenfield was creating an identity based on 'traditional' approaches, through the policing of teachers' work, strict discipline and increased selection within the school, favouring the 'more able'. (2009: 613)

Similar problems arose in the establishment of the lavishly funded (and privatized) City Academy programme. Such academies were supposed to be beacons of hope built in the most depressed districts of English cities and, through strong leadership and a culture of success, to revolutionize the educational attainments of disadvantaged youth. Despite lavish financial support, cutting-edge design, and specialized recruitment practices, such schools in fact showed little improvement in attainment of their pupils despite their advantages. They did, however, through selective entry and the exclusion of unsatisfactory pupils (for both disciplinary and 'performance' issues—an option not open to public schools), have a significantly depressing effect on adjacent non-selective and inadequately funded public schools (Beckett 2007). Parents find it difficult to trust systems and schools that impose such illusory managerial solutions (Beckett 2007). As Araujo observes, 'managerial solutions are not sufficient to deal with problems that are both educational and social' (2009: 612).

**DIVERSITY, A CULTURE OF COMMITMENT, AND SCHOOLS OF HOPE**

Educational and social problems are inextricably linked. Moreover, as societies become more complex and differentiated, the social issue of how we live together becomes the most pressing social and educational problem (Bates 2005; Touraine 2000). The 'market' solution to this problem seems likely to hierarchize differences, thereby increasing the economic, cultural, social, and geographical distance between such groups. A competitive marketized education system that hierarchizes schools, pupils, teachers, and managers in ways that confer various levels of distinction (or the lack of it) may more or less efficiently allocate its graduates into 'appropriate' locations in various hierarchies, but is unlikely to provide much assistance in reconciling different groups to the task of living together (Bourdieu 1984; Touraine 2000).

Such a system can only be maintained by the exercise of coercive power, through administration by control (Rowan 1990).

Administration by control implies the imposition by a hierarchical structure of authority, of a means-end rationality that not only assumes uniform agreement on goals, but also uniform methodologies to achieve these goals. Administration by control represents a simplistic application of the factory metaphor to schooling. (Starratt 2003: 197–98)
approach that takes account of difference.

Rowan (1990) suggested that there may be a more effective strategy for administering a school, which he called administration through commitment. In schools that are run by commitment rather than control, there is an entirely different dynamic at work. In these schools there is still a concern with schoolwide goals as well as learning outcomes. However, the assumptions and beliefs behind administration by commitment are quite different. Within the teaching faculty there is a much greater awareness of diversity and difference among the student body. Teachers assume the need for flexibility in teaching protocols, pacing, and the performance of the learning that will be accepted as indicators of mastery. There is the belief that one can teach many things simultaneously, that on any given day students may be more disposed to learn than on others; that cultural pluralism in the classroom requires sensitivity to a variety of meanings generated by classroom activities; and that along with academic learning there are many social lessons to be learned such as how to respect racial, ethnic and sexual differences; how to negotiate disagreements; learning how to control antisocial impulses; learning how to listen to and appreciate another point of view and enrich one's understanding with those other perspectives. (Starratt 2003: 198)

Schools built on such administrative principles would look very different from those demanded by market accountability. Their ideal would be a cosmopolitanism built on the recognition and valuing of difference within the context of a critical pedagogy which opened up differences to examination and negotiation and allowed students the freedom to argue for and adopt a way of life possibly different from that which they inherited but which they can defend as a valuable and valued choice (Touraine 2000). Moreover, as Bottery (2004) argues, the education provided by such schools needs to be framed within the context of a concern with global ecological, social, and cultural issues. Such an education would not only connect individuals and cultural groups, and encourage their reformation in a contemporary context, but would also connect students with the forces shaping their future world and allow them to actively pursue their place within it. Such an education would provide for both respect and agency that could form the foundation for a broader trust in schools, teachers as professionals, and the management of schools and school systems. It would, however, demand that expectations and practices of schools be 'reframed in terms of a cultural struggle for the meaning of school learning and for personal and collective futures' (Wrigley 2003: 183).

Such principles might well provide the foundation for what Wrigley (2003) calls 'Schools of Hope'. The resultant agenda would look markedly
different from the administration by control that pervades the current competitive market structures of schooling. It would be an agenda informed by a new sense of leadership through which trust might be renewed:

We need a sense of leadership as *direction finding*, not just capacity building. We need a fuller sense of the transformative leadership which connects up with dynamic *social transformation*. We need to *turn around* our schools until they engage with the contradictions, hopes and fears of local communities. We need a sense of *achievement* which looks beyond the accumulation of factual knowledge, which links hand, heart and mind and involves moral engagement with the whole of humanity. We need new concepts of *intelligence*—distributed, emotional, cultural, political—which involves our engagement in shaping the future of our planet... We will have to *rethink education*, and not simply ‘improve’ schools. (Wrigley 2003: 182–83)

An educational leadership based upon such cosmopolitan principles; respectful of equity in diversity; committed to cultural negotiation, to ecological awareness, to fairness in educational and social arrangements, to the development of broadly based capabilities; and conscious of our collective future might well be a leadership that would be deserving of the trust of teachers, parents, pupils, and citizens.

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