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A celebrity chef goes global: the business of eating

The Authors

Marc T. Jones, Professor at the Ashridge Business School, Hertfordshire, UK and the Maastricht School of Management, The Netherlands

Abstract

Purpose – This paper examines the internationalization strategy of Gordon Ramsay Holdings Ltd (GRH) from its base in London. While a substantial body of research on the strategic prerequisites for successful internationalization already exists, little attention has been given within this literature to the international growth of small, informally organized and entrepreneurially-driven firms. The discussion also identifies the challenges facing GRH as it strives to continue its international expansion.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilizes various published sources from the general press, business press and trade journals to examine the international expansion of GRH on the back of the personal brand the charismatic Gordon Ramsay has achieved in culinary and media circles. The growth of the GRH organization is interpreted through a theoretical framework of strategic capabilities and relationships.

Findings – The analysis illustrates how critical resources and capabilities, branded reputation, and strategic relationships established in GRH’s home market have been leveraged effectively overseas. The most fundamental challenge facing GRH going forward is balancing the opportunities and pressures for growth against the need to maintain the highest levels of quality in existing establishments. This “balancing act” has to unfold within an empire in which the entrepreneur-emperor (Ramsay) has less and less time to devote to any particular activity or establishment.

Originality/value – The case illustrates the importance of developing and leveraging strategic capabilities and relationships in support of successful international expansion. Some of the unique challenges associated with the internationalization of small, informally organized and entrepreneurially-driven (and branded) firms are addressed in terms of both problems and solutions.

Introduction

Gordon Ramsay is a leading celebrity chef, restaurateur and television personality. He has been awarded a total of 14 Michelin stars, ranking him third in the world behind Joel Robuchon and Alain Ducasse. He is widely known in the UK through television programs such as Hell’s Kitchen and The F-Word; in the US the counterparts of these shows are Fox's Hell's Kitchen (premiered May 2005) and Kitchen Nightmares (premiered September 2007). Hell's Kitchen, under the amended title Hell's Kitchen USA, has been sold to more than 100 territories worldwide, including Brazil, Finland, Benelux and across Asia and the Middle East (Pursell, 2007). Ramsay can thus claim celebrity chef status at the global level.

This paper examines the internationalization strategy of Gordon Ramsay Holdings Ltd (GRH) from its base in London. The analysis illustrates how critical resources and
capabilities, branded reputation, and strategic relationships established in an organisation's home market can be leveraged effectively overseas. While a substantial body of research on this general topic exists (see Ghemawat, 2007), relatively little attention has been given to the internationalization of small, informally organized entrepreneurially-driven firms. The discussion also identifies the challenges facing GRH as it strives to continue its international expansion in the face of the current global economic downturn as well as substantial negative publicity regarding Ramsay's personal affairs.

GRH owns and operates 15 restaurants in London (including fine dining establishments, American-style grills and three pubs) and 13 others around the world in cities such as New York, Paris and Tokyo (see the Appendix for a comprehensive list of GRH establishments). The first restaurant opened its doors in 1998, the latest in June 2008. GRH has pursued an aggressive internationalization program, gaining 12 Michelin stars overseas.

The fine-dining segment of the restaurant industry is highly competitive, with a total of 45 Michelin-starred establishments in London alone. A decade of economic prosperity has greatly expanded this segment of the market. The “clients” of fine-dining houses are not purchasing simply food and drink; nor are they buying primarily service. Instead, the “need” or “benefit” that is sold and consumed is the “experience”, which incorporates many tangibles and intangibles delivered with consistency, quality and creativity (Surlemont and Johnson, 2005). Very good experiences are forcefully distinguished from very poor ones, yet both are embedded in the customer's memory and subsequently transmitted to the customer's personal networks through “word of mouth”.

The haute cuisine niche is now under pressure as a result of the economic downturn which began in 2007 and is expected to cost tens of thousands of finance jobs in London alone. But the downturn will likely benefit eating establishments at the middle and lower ends of the market (e.g. KFC's recent announcement of multi-year expansion plans for the UK market). Nevertheless, few top chefs are admitting to suffering a slowdown, although Alan Yau of Hkkasan fame believes the real crunch will be in 2009, as the premium end of the industry typically experiences a lagged effect of economic downturns. In anticipation of the cyclic nature of the premium segment, GRH has thus far opened three pubs along with several mid-priced Maze grills to diversify risk and secure income streams that have come under increased pressure from rising food prices and staffing expenses.

Expanding to counter risk

The other element of GRH's risk mitigation strategy – which links directly to its growth strategy – has been to expand the business overseas. Two factors conceptualize the GRH internationalization strategy. The first is the spectacular emergence of Blackstone as the dominant force in the global hotel industry, spending some $40 billion in recent years to acquire brands including La Quinta, Boca Raton, Boulders and Hilton. Blackstone and GRH have been partners since 2001, when the former hired Ramsay to (re-)open Claridge's restaurant. Blackstone paid for the full refit in return for 11 percent of the revenue stream (Afiya, 2005).

The second critical element of the internationalization strategy is Ramsay's television career, which has been expanding since 2004. In that year, he appeared in Ramsay's Kitchen Nightmares and Hells Kitchen. The F-Word appeared in 2005, together with a US version of Hells Kitchen (Pursell, 2007). More recently, Ramsay has appeared in popular shows such as
The Tonight Show in the US and Top Gear in the UK (where the ex-professional footballer drove a car round a test track very quickly). The mass exposure generated by these shows has made Ramsay – and the Gordon Ramsay brand – one of the most famous and recognized names in the culinary world. Clearly, Ramsay means to leverage the brand for all it is worth. In addition to the restaurants, there are Gordon Ramsay cookbooks, DVDs, and a cookery school (see www.GordonRamsay.com).

Key questions for GRH's internationalization strategy therefore include: to what extent has “globalization” impacted the fine-dining segment of the restaurant industry and how do GRH's ambitions and capabilities intersect with key global trends? An analysis based on Yip's (2003) “globalization drivers” model highlights the “market” and “efficiency” elements of the model as moving towards increasing levels of globalization/integration. On the efficiency side, increasing opportunities exist for leveraging centralized logistics (though perhaps at the regional rather than the global level), staffing policies, and core capabilities linked to activities such as restaurant openings, refits, and turnarounds. On the market side, the Ramsay brand is internationally recognized as the (Western) concept of fine-dining spreads to emerging markets such as China through tourism, business travel, and the efforts of global hospitality organizations such as Intercontinental Hotels Group, Starwood, Marriott and Hilton to expand their operations in these countries and regions (Jones, 2007).

**Sources of competitive advantage**

Any discussion of the competitive advantage of GRH must begin with Ramsay himself, for his passionate, aggressive and demanding leadership and management style clearly defines the overall DNA of the organization. Ramsay's reputation is built upon his goal of culinary perfection.

Since the airing of Boiling Point, which followed Ramsay's quest of earning three Michelin stars, the chef has become infamous for his fiery temperament and use of expletives. Ramsay's ferocious temper has contributed to his media appeal in both the UK and the US, where his television programs are currently produced. His fierce personality ensured that he was voted television's most terrifying celebrity in a Radio Times poll consisting of 3,000 people. Ramsay attributes his pugnacious management style to the influence of previous mentors, notably chefs Marc Pierre-White and Guy Savoy, father-in-law and business partner Chris Hutcheson, and Jock Wallace, his manager while a footballer at Rangers Football Club (Wikipedia, 2009).

GRH's core strengths were developed in the competitive cauldron of the London haute cuisine scene during the 1990s. Importantly, at least some of these strengths were separable from Ramsay himself, including the organizational capacity to generate consistent levels of service, maintain standards of excellence, and cultivate talent internally. Once established, these capabilities provided the organization a solid foundation upon which to internationalize. GRH, though miniscule in size compared to global giants in financial services or manufacturing, exhibits a level of value-creation through “strategic” human resources management that many of its gargantuan counterparts would strive to equal.

Finding and nurturing talent has proven a core capability of the organization, which clearly aligns with a key success factor for this most labor-intensive of industries. A persistent focus on team-building and recruiting from within has fostered a high level of loyalty, with 85 percent of staff from 1993 still employed by the business (Huddart, 2006). This indicates that
Ramsay has been able to inspire and engage people with his passion, high standards and “tough love” approach to leadership and management.

This loyalty benefits the organization in two ways. First, it enables GRH to rotate experienced staff around the world to manage restaurant openings. Secondly, it facilitates the development of a cadre of Ramsay-trained Head Chefs to whom the running of new establishments can be entrusted. These Head Chefs are in turn tasked with developing their successors, allowing them to participate in subsequent openings in GRH’s expanding global operations. Significantly, as of this writing all Head and Executive-level chefs are from in-house, which would suggest that a very strong cultural “glue” binds the organization. As Yip (2003) argues, such “glue” can be particularly useful as an organization expands internationally. It constitutes the foundation of a global identity which supports consistency in brand representation as well as information-sharing and learning across both formal and informal networks.

GRH recognizes that the ultimate dream of any ambitious professional chef is to open an establishment of his/her own (perhaps even bearing one's name!). Therefore, rather than try to hold such people back, or allow them to leave and establish themselves as competitors, GRH helps ambitious chefs set up their own restaurants as subsidiaries of GRH. Angela Hartnett's Cielo in Boca Raton, Florida is an example of this successful strategy (Sims, 2008; see also Caterer & Hotelkeeper, 2008c).

Another source of the competitive advantage enjoyed by GRH is relational, specifically its longstanding (since 2001) strategic relationship with Blackstone. The initial overseas market entry method pursued by GRH (in Dubai and Tokyo) was through consultancy arrangements where client (hotelier) resources were accessed to underwrite the opening of a new restaurant in return for a “consultancy fee”. Since those openings, GRH has taken full or partial ownership of each new restaurant venture with its partner, Blackstone. GRH and Blackstone are now partners in all but two GHR restaurants, with GRH paying Blackstone rent but retaining all profits from the management of the businesses (Huddart, 2006). This relationship constitutes the financial backbone of the GRH internationalization strategy. While GRH may now have the financial capacity and overseas experience to “go it alone”, the mitigation of downside risk achieved by the successful business model combining a (trusted) top hotelier and a GRH fine-dining establishment has proven robust.

The GRH-Blackstone partnership is thus an effective example of relationally-based competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The GRH-Blackstone partnership heavily influences the trajectory of the former's overseas growth, which tends to follow in the wake of the latter's hotel expansion strategy. A case in point relates to the opening of a GRH restaurant in Prague in 2006. Ramsay himself recently wondered “… why Nobu or Ducasse hadn't opened in Prague … and why not Eastern Europe?” The answer in the case of Prague is provided by the multi-million dollar refurbishment of a Blackstone-owned hotel which then provided a “host” for a GRH operation (Caterer & Hotelkeeper, 2008a).

An additional synergistic aspect of this relationship for GRH is that it allows the organization to economize in search costs for suitable locations for new overseas establishments. These costs are instead borne by the Blackstone hotelier, which makes locational decisions based upon more rigorous fact-based analysis of current and forecasted market conditions than GRH is capable of undertaking. Clearly, a munificent niche for a Hilton Hotel would also nourish a GRH restaurant. Blackstone hotel brands can thus be conceptualized as
complementors (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995) to GRH. Growth in the upscale hotel sector generates increased demand for fine-dining establishments nested within those hospitality facilities.

**Balancing global and local pressures**

Ghemawat (2007), building on earlier work by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991), notes that international firms need to make informed decisions regarding the configuration of their strategic architecture (systems, structures, processes) that lies along a continuum ranging from highly centralized (i.e. “aggregation”) to highly decentralized (i.e. “adaptation”). These vectors are defined primarily in terms of the locus of decision-making and responsibility, but also normally correspond to some degree to the physical location of assets and activities.

The benefits of aggregation include efficiency through scale, increased control over vital activities, and a greater potential for learning; effective adaptation can create value by being close to customers, promote fast response and entrepreneurialism, and achieve “insiderisation” with respect to the political economy of the host country. Basically, the two postures effectively mirror each other in that (for the most part) an attribute constituting a strength in one posture becomes a weakness in the other (e.g. efficiency through scale also undermines fast response and entrepreneurialism in field organizations). Ghemawat argues that the firm’s architecture must “fit” or align with an industry’s globalization drivers (Yip, 2003) to enable the organization to achieve optimum competitiveness.

For GRH, the core of the organization is in London, where all booking and logistics functions are located. This centralization is epitomized by a webcam in Restaurant Gordon Ramsay that can monitor GRH facilities around the world. The centralization of operational responsibilities results in the necessary level of consistent, high quality service demanded by customers while also generating economies of scale in procurement, human resources, facilities planning and related activities. These economies have enabled GRH to maintain lower overhead, achieve higher margins and pass on (some) savings to customers in the form of reduced menu prices. This pricing advantage gives GRH restaurants an edge over their competitors in each segment where they compete, as well as encouraging customers to spend more on wine (the highest margin product for any dining establishment) (Cross, 2008). Not surprisingly, the other aspect of GRH operations that is centralized is branding, which is focused on the use of the Gordon Ramsay name as a single, co- or sub-brand in all GRH establishments.

At the other end of the spectrum, the chef “on the ground” is responsible for the menu itself, ensuring that each restaurant retains its unique identity and character. Local tastes are catered to, typically by offering specialized dishes along with more standard fare. Local produce is also used whenever possible, subject to quality and logistical considerations. Finally, pricing is also done locally, with the strategy of undercutting competition enabled by the economies of scale discussed above.

**Losing focus?**

The GRH story so far is one of overall success. In financial terms the organisation is on solid ground, with total earnings of approximately £80 million in 2008. Despite the recession, earnings are expected to rise to £100 million by 2010. Gordon Ramsay’s personal wealth is estimated at around £60 million, including up to £15 million earned in 2008 (Stewart-
Robertson, 2008). This success, however, does not imply that failures have not occurred. They have, and the manner in which the organization has responded to them indicates its resiliency and ability to learn but has also raised concerns on GRH's ability to “keep its eyes on the prize”.

For example, in 2005 the organization had to close down its Pengelley's restaurant in London's Knightsbridge after only seven months in operation with losses of £850,000. This failure was attributed by Ramsay to the fact that, for the first time, the Executive Chef had not come through the in-house GRH talent development process (Gunn, 2006). GRH has not since repeated this divergence from a core element of their success formula.

Perhaps the organization's most notable “failure” was the November 2006 opening of Gordon Ramsay at the London in New York. Initially, the hotel refurbishment was delayed, causing the restaurant opening to be delayed. Upon opening, the reviews were poor, the sommelier was fired for theft, and the Head Chef had to be replaced (Kuhn, 2007a, b). Within a year, however, the turnaround was complete. The restaurant now holds two Michelin stars and was named Best Newcomer in the prestigious Zegat 2008 guide (Korn, 2008). Moreover, GRH transferred its New York lessons to make the openings in Prague and Versailles more successful – with the increased participation of Ramsay himself a significant factor in the latter opening (Meeting News, 2008).

Yet this expanded effort on the part of Ramsay in Versailles exposed the central conundrum of this or any founder-led organization: the limits of the leader to be everywhere all the time and the consequent need to create an organizational “backbone” and cadre of senior managers to “keep the ship afloat”. GRH has indeed put a layer in place to support Ramsay's efforts across the range of the organization's activities. As noted by Ramsay in 2006:Q Every angle in my business: my restaurants, my TV shows, the editorial and publishing, is covered with a Mini-me. It's phenomenal … That's why I'm comfortable going forward at this rate (Huddart, 2006). Despite the existence of these “mini-me” lieutenants, however, the increased attention Ramsay devoted to the Versailles opening coincided with a dip in standards elsewhere, specifically at Foxtrot Oscar and Petrus in London. Further, 2007 marked the first time in seven years that a GRH restaurant failed to garner any of the top three accolades in the Harden Restaurant Guide. The guide described Ramsay's reputation as “very shaky”, noting that “Failing some major redirection of Ramsay's energies back to his London restaurants – and away from America, TV studios and pubs – this is beginning to look like the end of the era of Ramsay's unchallenged dominance of the high-end culinary scene” (Caterer & Hotelkeeper, 2008b). This statement forcefully reflects received wisdom in the field of strategic management, where the importance of establishing clear strategic intent, understanding and making trade-offs, focusing resources for maximum impact, and clearly articulating “no-go” areas are all held as fundamental elements of successful realised strategies (see Porter, 1996)[1].

**Future challenges**

The fundamental challenge facing GRH going forward is balancing the opportunities and pressures (e.g. from Blackstone) for international growth against the need to maintain the highest levels of quality, consistency and creativity in the delivery of “experiences” to existing GRH customers – within an empire in which the entrepreneur-emperor (Ramsay) has less and less time to devote to any particular activity or establishment. In this sense, Ramsay's situation is perhaps somewhat similar to that faced by the Roman Emperor Hadrian, whose
20-year reign featured very little time spent in Rome due to the requirements of overseeing border conflicts ranging from Britain to the Promised Land. Hadrian, however, had a cadre of trusted generals and bureaucrats throughout the Empire to see that his directives were implemented and that relative peace and stability were maintained.

Benchmarking Hadrian, it is not clear that GRH has an adequate supply of “generals” and “bureaucrats” to enable the difficult balancing act noted above. It is also apparent that GRH, while exhibiting some embedded activities that generate value independent of Gordon Ramsay (such at talent development), has yet to institutionalize other functions or activities that could lower uncertainty, improve operational efficiency, and mitigate risk.

For instance, GRH lacks a dedicated function or task force to handle restaurant openings on a global basis. Rather, teams are assembled in an ad hoc fashion depending on needs and personnel availability. Key personnel are permanently “on call” to assist with openings, perform reviews, provide feedback and contribute to talent development (Cross, 2008). As the planned rate of international expansion increases, it is questionable whether continued reliance on an organic approach to staffing this key activity will suffice or if a formalized solution is needed. Systematizing this activity should serve to reduce lead-times in openings, provide greater assurance of top performance from day 1, and reduce the amount of (increasingly scarce) time and energy Gordon Ramsay would personally have to dedicate to each new establishment.

Another organizational routine lacking at GRH is an internal auditing function to perform quality reviews of each establishment on a periodic basis. Instead, weaknesses or lapses in service or product quality are only dealt with after they have manifested at the point of customer contact – meaning that the damage has been done (Huddart, 2006). The implementation of an early warning system would serve to identify areas requiring additional resources and management attention. This strategic shift from a reactive to a proactive posture would need to be strongly driven from the center against potential resistance from field management, which might look unkindly on increased reporting requirements. It would also require adopting a more coherent and formalized approach to “parenting” (Alexander, 2003) an increasingly internationalized organization than currently exists at GRH.

The relationship GRH has with Blackstone has unquestionably been a key source of competitive advantage with respect to the former's internationalization strategy. However, there are some prospects for strain in the partnership going forward. Any prolonged dip in the quality of GRH establishments would undoubtedly generate pressure from Blackstone, as well as open the door for other fine-dining brands (e.g. Ducasse) to make a play for new restaurant openings in Blackstone-owned hotels. Additionally, the current economic environment has negatively impacted private equity. Recessionary pressures might encourage Blackstone to review the (for GRH) generous terms of the partnership and result in some renegotiation of the revenue split in order to more equitably “share the pain”. The fact that Blackstone lost $89.5 million in the first quarter of 2009 (finance.aol.com) following a disastrous 2008 should certainly raise concerns in GRH that some erosion of what has been a rather comfortable status quo may well occur as the economic crisis deepens.

The continuing evolution of the GRH organization will require strategic foresight to match the needs of the growing and increasingly internationalized network of dining establishments with the appropriate underlying architecture to support excellence at the point of customer interface. What may have been an effective solution to the logistical challenge when the
center of gravity of GRH was in London may not be the correct solution if and when that center of gravity shifts to the US or, eventually, Asia. Can functions based in London provide the same level of service to client establishments in New York or Tokyo as they can to those in the UK and Europe?

A strong strategic argument can be made for creating a parallel support organization in the US to facilitate expansion in that geographic zone. If the ambitious growth strategy lives up to its expectations, there may eventually be an opportunity to float the North American branch of GRH on local capital markets. Having a fully functional support organization already in place (including talent development, procurement, etc.) would smooth the listing process and enable any such decision to be made quickly with maximum transparency. Similar approaches might eventually apply to Asia and the Middle East, depending on which regions emerge as key growth drivers of the global economy in coming years.

Finally, the ultimate strategic question facing GRH may center on the future role of Ramsay himself. Should he continue the broad portfolio of activities he currently undertakes, or is it time to rethink how and where he can add the greatest value to the organization going forward? He is unquestionably the face of the company, and his actions on television, in his restaurants and even in his private affairs all impact the brand. Does Gordon Ramsay need to better manage himself – or be managed – for the greater good of the various stakeholders of GRH? This issue of maintaining the alignment of interests between entrepreneur-founders and key stakeholders is a challenge that all founder-managed organizations must eventually confront, and GRH is no exception.

The risk of having such a total perceptual alignment between charismatic founder-entrepreneur and brand was recently evidenced by the negative publicity (especially in the UK) surrounding widely reported allegations of longstanding extramarital activities on the part of Ramsay. After initially ignoring the allegations, Ramsay later denied them on a BBC television cooking program, *Good Food Show*. Some observers have pointed out that the chef's restaurant empire could be damaged by the allegations. For example, Richard Harden (co-publisher of the *Harden's Restaurant Guide*) noted “It must damage the package”. Conversely, although not surprisingly, Ramsay publicist Max Clifford argued the allegations would not impact Ramsay's image and popularity “at all” (Wikipedia, 2009).

As of this writing, it would appear that the British media has largely tired of the “Ramsay affair”, and that GRH's primary focus will be on survival and, where possible, selective growth in a context of the global economic crisis. The apparent delay of the opening of Gordon Ramsay at the Pulitzer Hotel in Amsterdam, originally scheduled for 2008, is indicative that survival concerns will likely trump growth, at least in the short term.

**Conclusion**

As noted by Gibbert *et al.* (2008), “Case studies as tools for generating and testing theory have provided the strategic management field with ground-breaking insights”. The fundamental purpose of any case study is to generate insights from which scholars, practitioners and students can benefit by studying the articulation – or collision – of theory and practice. In this spirit we conclude with some potential “lessons” from our examination of GRH that might be transferrable to other businesses:
The case illustrates the vital importance of having a cadre of highly qualified, experienced and loyal employees to draw upon in support of international expansion, particularly in (relatively) small organizations. These people lead the teams which spread the “GRH way” of doing things across internationally dispersed establishments.

Clarity must exist with respect to which activities to manage centrally (e.g. booking and logistics), and which to leave to local restaurant managers (e.g. menu design, pricing). Organizational architecture must evolve apace with internationalization, lest legacy structures impede growth (e.g. the issue of developing a US support organization).

The case also highlights the limits to growth in founder-driven organizations where the personality and behaviors of the founder are inseparable from the market's perception of the brand. Ramsay himself is the embodiment of the GRH brand, and everything he does which enters the public domain impacts the fortunes of the organization. While this has been fundamental to the success of GRH, it also creates risks, not the least of which is what happens to the organization should Ramsay himself exit the scene for some reason?

Following from the previous point is the need to foster a level of separation between founder and organization through formalizing structures and processes. For example, developing a central function to handle restaurant openings could replace the existing ad hoc approach, making direct intervention by Ramsay less critical. The wider issue of the role of the parent organization in driving knowledge transfer, learning, and talent development across GRH is a challenge common to any firm with international operations or aspirations.

The growth of Blackstone-owned hotels has clearly complemented the international expansion of GRH. This effectively illustrates the vital role that strategic partnering can play in supporting internationalization, particularly for small organizations short of critical resources (e.g. capital) or capabilities (e.g. international site search and selection).

Notes

1. Keeping with this theme of strategic clarity, it is instructive to briefly review the very different choices made by another famous British chef, Rick Stein. Along with his ex-wife, Stein owns four restaurants, a delicatessen, a patisserie, a seafood cookery school and forty guest bedrooms in the small Cornish fishing port of Padstow. He has developed his business over the past 33 years with a clear product focus on premium fresh seafood and a geographic focus on Padstow. The proximity of his establishments to one another has allowed him to be a visible presence to his employees and customers on an almost daily basis. In a long career as a chef, Stein has cooked twice for Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street, once for the French President Jacques Chirac, and also for the Queen and Prince Philip in celebration of the Golden Jubilee. He was awarded an OBE in 2003 for services to West Country Tourism (www.rickstein.com). Clearly, Stein's strategic choices have led to a different level of success compared to Gordon Ramsay in terms of global profile and wealth accumulation. Yet, given that Stein's three sons currently all work in the business, it might well be the case that the Stein “brand” outlives the younger and higher flying GRH.

References


Stewart-Robertson, T. (2008), "Ramsey has the recipe for £100m global earnings by 2010", *The Scotsman*, 25 October,  .


**Appendix: list of GRH establishments as of February 2009**

**UK**

- The Boxwood Café, Berkeley Hotel.
- The Devonshire.
- Foxtr̃t Oscar.
- Gordon Ramsay at Claridge's.
- Maze.
- Maze Grill, Marriot Hotel.
- Murano.
- Nonna's Deli.
- Petrus, Berkeley Hotel.
- Restaurant Gordon Ramsay.
- Sloane Street by Gordon Ramsay.
- The Narrow.
- The Warrington.
- York and Albany.

**International**

- Cerise by Gordon Ramsay, Tokyo.
- Cielo by Angela Hartnett, Boca Raton, Florida.
- Gordon Ramsay at Conrad Tokyo, Tokyo.
- Gordon Ramsay at the London, West Hollywood, California.
- Gordon Ramsay at Powerscourt, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, County Wicklow, Ireland.
- Gordon Ramsay au Trianon Palace, Versailles.
- La Veranda, Versailles.
- Maze by Gordon Ramsay, Hilton Hotel, Prague Old Town, Prague.
- Maze, Cape Town.
- The London Bar, New York City, New York.
- Verre by Ramsay, Hilton Dubai Creek, Dubai.
About the author

Marc T. Jones joined the Ashridge Business School in 2006. He has a PhD in strategic management from the University of California, Irvine. His research interests focus on globalization, the multinational corporation, and corporate social responsibility. He has published approximately 50 research articles and two textbooks on these and related topics. Marc T. Jones can be contacted at: marc.jones@ashridge.org.uk