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The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

Paper submitted to the refereed stream of the Our Media Conference
Australia, 2007

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Abstract:
The toppling of Saddam in 2003 has seen Iraq shift from only a handful of state organs that served as propaganda machines, to a wealth of over 200 Iraqi-owned newspapers which are being fervently produced and avidly read on the streets of the nation. This paper traces the introduction of the printing press to Iraq by the Ottomans and details both the periods where Iraq’s press was truly free and fostered the emergence of a civil society and democratic reforms and those where the Iraqi media was most restricted and did little else than praise the regime at hand. Following on, this paper reviews the developments since the fall of Saddam Hussein and, despite the extensive interference in Iraq’s media sector from the occupying forces, it concludes by arguing that these papers have been central to the re-emergence of an Iraqi public sphere which has openly debated and discussed the issues surrounding the nation’s shift from despotism to democracy.
Introduction:

In Habermasian terms the public sphere can be defined as that which “...connects society with the state and thus has a function in the political realm...” (Habermas, 1996 [1989]: 28). Essentially, it is constituted by those social institutions which engender a culture of open and rational debate amongst the citizenry in order to form public opinion (Edgar, 2006: 124). Central to the formation of such a public sphere, or what we might otherwise term a civil society, is the people’s autonomy, their access to information and their willingness to engage in such debates (Rutherford, 2004: 141-142). Habermas also noted that one of the vehicles for both providing information to the populace and propagating debate were the early merchant newsletters of the sixteenth century (1989 [1962]: 16) which “…transformed into instruments of political debate under the pressures of the American and French revolutions and the organisation of political groups to revolutionise society” (Kellner & Durham, 2001: 10-11). With the admission of journalists to the British House of Commons in 1803, political journalism began (Edgar, 2006: 125) and the media has since been understood as crucial to the formation of a public sphere and civil society, which in turn underpin the media’s role as the Fourth Estate of a functioning democracy (Calhoun, 1992; Dahlgren, 1995).

More recently, the role of Middle Eastern media in serving as the platform of the region’s emerging public sphere and its role in promoting democracy has become the centre of much scholarly investigation. Starting with the Western radio stations beamed into the Middle East, such as the BBC, the Voice of America and Radio Monte Carlo, many Arabs were able to quench their “...thirst for objective information and diverse analyses and viewpoints on the issues facing their societies...” (Ghareeb, 2000: 400). Similarly, the pan-Arab press, many of which have been published in London for more than 30 years, continue to enjoy strong readership across the region. Although at times they can be seen to support the interests and agendas of their owners (for example, many are financially backed by the Saudi Government), when compared to the tightly controlled domestic media of most Arab nations they offer their readers a refreshing voice of objectivity and critique (Ghareeb, 2000: 412-414; Rugh, 2004: 167-180). Other technologies, such as the audio-cassette, have proven effective in spreading messages of dissent. For example, during the late 1970s in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers effectively utilised this technology by recording sermons over the phone from his exile in Paris and then distributing the contraband audio tapes across the nation (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994). More recent scholarship has illustrated the ways in which new media technologies such as fax and photocopy machines, desktop publishing software, advertising, romance novels (see the contributions in: Eickelman & Anderson, 2003b), recoded music, cinema, and ‘postmodern’ literature (see the contributions in: Armbrust, 2000) have allowed the people of the Muslim world to evade and subvert the state controlled media and create an autonomous ‘public sphere’ by disseminating information through non-official organs.

Today, the satellite dishes that are ubiquitous across the rooftops of most of the Arab region have brought the world into the living rooms of the Middle East. The general Middle Eastern dissatisfaction with Western and government controlled satellite stations has led to Arab based channels such as the Arab News Network, Abu Dhabi TV and, of course, Al-Jazeera. Indeed, so popular are these satellite channels that they...
have begun to have an impact on both the political elite of the region and their state-funded media, “…thus helping to broaden the limitations on debate and to enhance the level of authentic democratic exchange” (Ghareeb, 2000: 417) (see also: Ayish, 1970). The Al-Jazeera “phenomenon” (Miladi, 2003) has received a superfluity of academic attention in recent years, ranging from its adaptation of Western media techniques (Auter, Arafa, & Al-Jaber, 2005), questioning its status as ‘alternative media’ (Iskandar, 2006) and detailing its challenge to the hegemony of the Western medias monopoly on global news (Seib, 2005). What is common throughout this research is an understanding that – in the words of Qatari media scholar Ali Al-Hail - media outlets such as Al-Jazeera “…are the best way to reinvigorate a sense of freedom, democratization, and liberty throughout the Arab world, in addition to fostering a vibrant civil society” (Al-Hail as cited in: El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002: 28). Similarly, the issue of whether or not Reality TV is the best hope for democratisation in the Middle East is the theme of a recent issue of ‘Translational Broadcasting Studies’ (especially: Kraidy, 2005). What is certain is that while Western media scholars lament the ‘dumbing down’ of the media and an erosion of its role in serving the ‘public interest’ and as the ‘watch-dog’ of democracy due to commercial interests, these same commercial interests may, ironically, be bringing more news, information and debate into the Middle East (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1998: 195).

Likewise the Internet and its impacts on the Middle East have been investigated by a surfeit of academics from a number of different disciplines. Like much of the developing world, the vast majority of the Middle East sadly lies on the wrong side of the ‘Digital Divide’: the technological infrastructure is limited, few can afford a computer let alone regular access to the internet, few are able to read the now global language of English, and in many countries the government continues to tightly monitor access to certain sites (Friedlander, 2000: 152-155; Ghareeb, 2000: 415). However, with the development of software that has enabled standard computers to produce Arabic script (Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003: 62), the Internet has begun to serve as a forum whereby pertinent issues facing the Arab world – such as questions of religion (J. W. Anderson, 2003) and women’s role in society (Skalli, 2006) - can be re-examined and re-defined. Others have used the internet to critique their respective nation state or, at the very least as a locus for debate surrounding domestic issues of public concern and calls for democratisation (Cunningham, 2002; Teitelbaum, 2002; Wheeler, 2001). The net effect of these on-line developments has altered “…the nature of the decision-making process in each country, weakening hierarchical systems, reducing the power of the state, and redistributing power downward” (Ghareeb, 2000: 398).

Collectively, this spectrum of media outlets and technologies – from the Pan-Arab Press to the Internet and from the audio-cassette to Reality TV – has had tremendous impact on the societies of the Middle East. Firstly, as Ghareeb points out, they have led to a cross-border, pan-Arab discourse where citizens, from Marrakech to Muscat, are imbued with a sense of collective cultural unity and the notion of a common Arab agenda (2000: 416-418). This, combined with the exposure to the rest of the world has led to a more informed, and arguably more critical, Middle Easterner who is interested in partaking in the machinations of egalitarian governance. Although it is clear that many governments across the region are continuing their battle to keep the media on a tight leash, if the current technological and social trends continue, the
media is likely to increase in diversity and openness, thereby spurring “…greater debate in Middle East societies, with further pressures for both cultural and political democratisation” (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1998: 197).

However, despite this wealth of research, there has been little investigation into the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam in 2003 and the corresponding end to his tight control over the nation’s media sector. This has seen Iraq shift from only a handful of state papers that served as propaganda machines, to a wealth of over 200 Iraqi-owned newspapers which are being fervently produced and avidly read on the streets of the nation. This article therefore begins by reviewing Iraq’s long relationship with the written word and its corresponding public sphere. It traces the introduction of the printing press to Iraq by the Ottomans and details those periods where Iraq’s press was truly free and fostered the emergence of a civil society and democratic reforms (such as under the Young Turks, the early Hashemite era of 1921-1938, and following the Second World War). It also examines those periods where the Iraqi media was most restricted and did little else than praise the regime at hand (such as the early Ottoman period and most recently under the Ba’ath Regime, especially under Saddam Hussein). Following on, this paper reviews the developments since the fall of Saddam Hussein and, despite the extensive interference in Iraq’s media sector from the governmental entities both outside and inside Iraq, it concludes by arguing that these papers have been central to the re-emergence of an Iraqi public sphere which has openly debated and discussed the issues surrounding the nation’s shift from despotism to democracy.
From Cuneiform to Propaganda: Iraq’s long relationship with the written word

It is only in relatively recent times that we have come to understand the historical importance and influence of the region known as Mesopotamia in the Ancient World and currently known as Iraq. In fact, it was the early city-states that developed across this ‘cradle of civilization’ around 3200 BC, which fostered the development of early farming practices including sophisticated irrigation and animal domestication, monumental arts and architecture, mass-produced goods such as pottery and a complex, urbane and cosmopolitan society (Frankfort, 1968: 49; Seymour, 2004: 351; Van de Mieroop, 1997: 36). The need to organise and administer the complexities of such large agricultural projects and a sophisticated temple and city economy, prompted the development of the world’s first written language (Frankfort, 1968: 49-50; Jacobsen, 1977 [1951]-a: 129; Van de Mieroop, 1997: 36). This involved using a split reed to create the distinctive wedge-shaped marks known as cuneiform on clay tablets (Greaves, Zaller, Cannistrano, & Murphey, 1997: 18) which evolved from early markings concerning systems of weight and measurement through to a rich body of literary texts (for translations of a number of early cuneiform texts, see: Pritchard, 1968).

In addition, the major excavations of the 20th century across the Middle East have also revealed much about the political machinations employed in the ancient Near East. Of foremost relevance here is the governance of Mesopotamia’s early city-states by a political system that Jacobsen has termed ‘Primitive Democracy’ (1970 [1943]) where “…ultimate political power rested with a general assembly of all adult freemen” (Jacobsen, 1977 [1951]-b: 128) (for more on 'Primitive Democracy', see: Isakhan, 2006b). This system of governance encouraged all citizens of the state – men and women (Saggs, 2004: 30) – to exercise their right to express their opinion in a public forum regarding affairs that threatened the security of the state as a whole. In this situation, discussion continued until a virtual unanimity was reached and consensus emerged over the appropriate action (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 138; Oppenheim, 1964: 114). Beyond the deliberations of the assembly was a civic culture that extended into the day to day lives of the ancient Mesopotamian where citizens further discussed and debated social issues, often forming loose political alliances (Larsen, 1976: 161-170).

However, examples of the centrality of the written word to the Middle East’s civic culture are not limited to the annals of ancient history. In fact the written word was critical to the expansion of Islam and went on to play a central role in the bureaucracy and thriving literary scene of both the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-1258) Caliphates (Rosenthal, 1975). Under the Abbasid’s for example, the capital of the empire shifted from Damascus to Baghdad (Gutas, 1998: 17), where reading and writing underpinned the establishment of an active religious public sphere of “…learned scholars, schools of jurisprudence, and their supporters…” who were “…often autonomous from the official sphere of [their] rulers” (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003a: 2). Emerging out of this ninth century public sphere was the work of an enormously popular social commentator and essayist by the name of Jahiz. After moving north from Basra, Jahiz spent much of his time embroiled in the lively civic culture that played out in the various bourgeoisie salons of Baghdad, where lengthy debate and lively conversation thrived as the people engaged with issues such as politics, social controversies, the conflict between faith and reason as well as sectarian
and ethnic tensions (Braude, 2003: 114). But it was his unique ability to comment on and contribute to these debates in his elaborate and scholarly essays that ultimately won Jahiz wide acclaim.

This lively civic culture can be seen to have continued right through to the Ottoman sultans who generally believed that a strong, civilized state was a cosmopolitan one (Mostyn & Hourani, 1988: 192). In fact, it was the Ottomans who first brought the wonders of press technology to Baghdad in the 19th century. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that a local news bulletin, *The Journal of Iraq*, existed in Baghdad as early as 1816 and was published in both Arabic and Turkish. It is thought that this paper mostly praised the local Ottoman governor (the paper’s publisher), and was distributed to his army officials and other dignitaries. Although there is no surviving copies of *The Journal of Iraq*, if the reports are true it would have been the first time that news was reported in Arabic anywhere in the world (Ayalon, 1995: 13). What is certain is that the Turkish press had been growing since as early as the appearance of *Takvim-I Vekayi* (the Turkish version of the French newspaper *Le Spectateur Oriental*) in 1831 (Lewis, 1961: 93, 143-147) and when a progressive Ottoman Vali (governor) by the name of Midhat Pasha took the post of Baghdad in 1869, he brought with him the latest technology in the form of the printing press and the zeal for modernisation, both of which he had acquired during his previous post in Paris. Among his many achievements was the founding of the weekly newspaper, *Al-Zawra* (“the Curved [city]” – Baghdad), a four-paged Arabic-Turkish paper that preferred to extol the virtues of the sultan and the efficiency of the government than to report ‘real’ news (Ayalon, 1995: 25). In the 1880s the Vali’s of both Mosul and Basra followed Midhat’s example, launching similar pro-Ottoman papers which have been noted for their primitive news collecting methods and their poor Arabic translations (Ayalon, 1995: 25-26).

The arrival of technologies such as the printing press – as well as other developments born out of the Industrial Revolution including river steam navigation and the electric telegraph – heralded a fundamental shift in Iraq’s political sphere. Over time these technological developments led to a steady erosion of various elements of traditional Iraq, including the break up of many of the old loyalties and allegiances of the tribal order as well as the decline of the traditional economic structures of farming and other trades and the subsequent, if gradual, urbanisation of the Iraqi population. These changes to the political, economic and social stratification of traditional Iraq witnessed the development of an urbane, middle-class intelligentsia who, in turn, provided the breeding ground for the myriad of Iraqi oppositional parties and revolutionary movements (such as the Communists, the Ba’athists and the National Party) that would go on to have enormous impact on the political landscape of 20th century Iraq (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 22-24, 1113-1114). However, despite the development of an elite public sphere, Iraq did not see the immediate birth of a free and critical press during the late 19th century. Apart from two literary-religious journals published by the Carmelites in Baghdad and the Dominican missionaries of Mosul, any other attempts at establishing an independent press was “…strictly and narrowly circumscribed by suspicious authorities” (Ayalon, 1995: 62). This is not true of the entire region, as significant and critical journalistic movements arose in both Lebanon and Cairo at this time. However, when the Young Turks were able to successfully challenge the empire (Lewis, 1994: 52), they set about establishing a constitutional government and restoring measures of autonomy to the various
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

national-cultural entities within their governance (Shmuelevitz, 2004: 28). They also went on to establish secular schools and liberalised the publications sector (Zubaida, 2002: 209), effectively ushering in a series of rapid developments in the free press of the Middle East. By the time of Iraq’s first parliamentary election in 1908, there were, “…no less than 44 new Arabic papers…in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, as well as in Istanbul” (Ayalon, 1995: 65). In subsequent years, press freedom was rife across Iraq, with the publication of not only papers in support of the ruling party in Istanbul, such as Al-Zawra, but also opposition papers including Bayn Al-Nahrayn (“Mesopotamia”, or more literally “Between the Two Rivers”) (Ayalon, 1995: 66). In addition, Iraqi’s also had access to newspapers from Syria and Lebanon (Braude, 2003: 144) as well as those from Istanbul, including anti-Young Turk papers like Volkan (“Volcano”) (Lewis, 1994: 110) and Zionist papers published by the Jewish community such as the weekly Hamevasser (“Herald”) (Shmuelevitz, 2004). Many of these newspapers and magazines of the Young Turk period were filled with long editorials praising the new era of tolerance and press freedom (Ayalon, 1995: 65-66). Collectively, they have been described by one author as combining …a large measure of freedom with a high level of scholarship, contain[ing] what are probably the best-informed and best-argued discussions that have yet occurred between conservatives and modernists and between the different groups within each camp. (Lewis, 1994: 111)

This brought with it a strong augmentation of Iraq’s culture of public debate and criticism as is best evidenced by the atmosphere surrounding Iraq’s 1912 election, where “Iraqis witnessed for the first time [the phenomenon] of party competition among the candidates” (Al-Wardi as cited in: Dawisha, 2005: 12). During this period, even those too poor to afford newspapers would line up at street-side newsvendors to rent a paper or share with others. In total, this period led to the founding of 355 newspaper and journals across the Ottoman Empire, including 70 independent newspapers in Iraq alone (Ayalon, 1995: 65). However, this period was relatively short-lived and was plagued by newspapers which were published sporadically, shifted location and focus often, and varied immensely in their quality. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottomans began to impose strict censorship on all print media throughout the empire. Save for two sporadic and privately owned papers (one in Baghdad, the other in Mosul), this ultimately lead to the closure of every newspaper in Iraq (Ayalon, 1995: 67, 70-71).

Modern Iraq – the nation that we know today – resulted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. In the clandestine Sykes-Picot agreement, Britain and France moved into much of what are now Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Israel, and carved up the region into two zones of influence (L. Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 14; Diamond, 2005: 31; Keeble, 1997: 86). The era of British occupation – which began with their control of Basra from the start of the war and spread to the entire nation of Iraq by the end of 1918 – also brought with it an unprecedented sense of Iraqi nationalism. The presence of a common enemy meant that groups such as the Shi’ites and the Sunnis banded together for the first time in centuries, holding joint religio-political meetings which culminated “…in patriotic oratory and poetic thundering against the English” (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 23). Later, when the League of Nations accorded the British a mandate over Iraq in 1920-1921 (L. Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 14), these sentiments were echoed in the dramatic upsurge of budding wordsmiths who produced independent papers such as Al-Istiqlal (“The
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

Independence” of Najaf), *Al-Furat* (“The Euphrates”) and *Al-Istiqal* (“The Independence” of Baghdad), which openly criticised the occupation. Following this initial uproar, a number of papers – some the unapologetic mouthpiece for a particular political faction, others claiming to be independent – emerged for the sole purpose of addressing Iraq’s future and discussing the pros and cons of a republican vs. a monarchical government (Ayalon, 1995: 92).

Without too much concern for the opinions and attitudes expressed in these organs, the British set about hastily designing the nation-states of the modern Middle East (Jordan was famously drawn by Winston Churchill in the back of a taxi). In 1921 the British united the three previously autonomous *Vilayets* (“regions”) of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul (Cordesman & Hashim, 1997: 59-60, 71) and appointed Faisal I – the third son of the Sharif of Mecca - the first modern king of Iraq (L. Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 14; Zubaida, 2002: 211). After already having appointed Faisal, the British staged the first of modern Iraq’s falsified experiments with democracy, a national referendum which garnered an impossible 96% endorsement of his rule (L. Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 14-15). The local authorities of the various provinces were infuriated and clerics who had so adamantly called on Faisal to implement a parliament and a national constitution, now delivered fatwa’s banning their religious minions from partaking in the elections for the Constituent Assembly until such a time as the monarch yielded to the people’s call for democratisation, civil liberties and the freedom of the press (Dawisha, 2005: 13). Heeding these calls, Faisal did go on to establish a number of quasi-democratic reforms including nation-building exercises such as the development of a highly patriotic national school curriculum (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 25), a new Constitution, Electoral Law (L. Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 16-18) and a Parliament consisting of both a *Majlis al-Nuwab* (“Chamber of Deputies”) and a *Majlis al-A’yan* (“Senate”) in 1924 which lasted until 1958 (Dawisha, 2005: 18).

Those who did ascend to positions of power under the new monarchy, failed to garner any real public support and seem to have been perpetually concerned with those who sought to undermine them (Kedourie, 1994: 33). Indeed this dissatisfaction with authority in Iraq led to the emergence of several opposition parties during these early days of political struggle in the fledgling nation. These opposition parties quickly set up their own newspapers which were instrumental in mobilising more than ten thousand people as they demonstrated in front of the King’s palace on the one year anniversary of his ascension to the throne, demanding a representational government and an end to British interference in domestic issues. By the late 1920s, Iraq saw the emergence of a varied, if partisan press, which included *Al-Alam Al-Arabi* (“The Arabic World”), *Al-Liwa* (“The Standard”) and *Al-Taqaddum* (“The Priority”), all of which supported the The Progressive Party (*Hizb Al-Taqaddum*); *Sada Al-Ahd* (“The New Echo”) published by The Commitment Party (*Hizb al-‘Ahd*); *Al-Iraq* (“The Iraq”) from the oppositional People’s Party (*Hizb Al-Sha’b*); and the highly esteemed *Al-Bilad* (“The Country”) newspaper, published by Christians in Baghdad who were members of the Nationalist Fraternity Party (*Hizb Al-Ikha’ Al-Watani*) (for further details on the newspapers published by these various political parties see: Ayalon, 1995: 93-94; for an exhaustive chronicle on Iraq's political groups and their respective histories, see: Batatu, 1982 [1978]; and for specific information on this era in Iraqi politics, see: Dawisha, 2005: 14-15).
What is clear here is that Iraqi politics of the 1920s was a complex matrix constituted by a myriad of tribal, political, religious and ethnic factions each of who vied for influence and authority under the newly established monarchy. Although there is evidence of an egalitarian and democratic culture emerging during this period, it is dangerous to assume that this was always the case. Indeed Iraq’s political climate of this era was often violent, with one commentator describing it as “…a wretched political architecture and constitutional jerry-building of the flimsiest and most dangerous kind” (Kedourie, 1970: 239). Nonetheless, this era also witnessed an unprecedented diversity in Iraq’s print sector, with the establishment of sixty-one papers between 1919 and 1933 (Dawisha, 2005: 21). Sadly many of these papers, like the political parties they belonged to, folded within a couple of years. Even in their short life-span, these highly partisan papers were able to invigorate the Iraqi ‘public sphere’, enabling ‘rational-critical’ debate in both the parliament and the streets of the nation.

With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1930, Iraq finally emerged as an independent nation although the British presence continued for some years. Sadly, the democratic and egalitarian steps taken during the 1920s were reneged and, in the 1930s, Iraqi politics were based on personal, family, and tribal loyalties. Hastily created political parties that disbanded just as quickly, and even parliament itself, were forums of secondary consequence, for it was clan alliances that were of primary importance, whether forged in or out of parliament or the parties…Old-style plotting involving local Shi’ite religious leaders, tribal chiefs, and the military proved infinitely more effective than the modern modes of political activity, including elections and the press. (Ayalon, 1995: 93)

This situation paved the way for a series of political coups between 1936 and 1941, most of which were violent and few cared for installing any semblance of legitimate democratic rule. Concurrently, this period was also marred by a poor Iraqi press. There were increases in censorship of those organs which openly criticised the government, while the general standard of the reporting and technical standard of the papers was particularly low, the literacy rate was also below average for the region and the circulation of many papers was down (Ayalon, 1995: 94-95). Despite this, there were several newspapers that emerged during the 1930s that warrant a mention, Sada Al-Istiqlal (“Echo of Independence”), and Al-Ahali (“The People”), both published by the Iraqi Nationalist Party (Jama’at Al-Ahali), Habezbooz (a term from Iraqi folklore), a Baghdad paper rife with political satire (Daragahi, 2003: 50) and perhaps Iraq’s most successful, professional and well-respected paper of this era, Al-Zaman (“Time”), published by an Iraqi Christian.

Although the Second World War did see actual, if limited, fighting in Iraq, this war did not have anywhere near the impact on the Arab Middle East as the first. When the fighting began, the government of Iraq placed the newspapers and magazines of the nation under tight censorship laws in an attempt to curtail anti-British sentiment (Dawisha, 2005: 22). This, coupled with the severe economic conditions throughout the war, had implications for Iraqi civil society and it’s free press, with many of the smaller papers across the region folding accordingly. However, with the cessation of the war, the Regent of Iraq, Prince 'Abd al-Ilah announced a return to the political life...
of the 1920s and the lifting of the restrictions on the freedom of the press (Dawisha, 2005: 15). This brought with it an immediate upsurge in both the number and variety of political parties in Iraq, from pro-government, pro-British parties, to centrist, right- and left-leaning parties and even two Marxist parties (Dawisha, 2005: 15-16). Once again, many of these parties spawned their own publications. The Independence Party’s (Hizb al-Istiqlal) produced “The Independent Standard” (Liwa al-Istiqlal), while The National Democratic Party (Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati) published “The Voice of the People” (Sawt al-Ahali – a reincarnation of Al-Ahali after it had been banned from publishing under its original name) (Dawisha, 2005: 15-16, 22-23). It appears that, on the whole, the newspapers were relatively free to express diverse opinions, particularly when compared to the press in those regions still controlled by the British and the French.

One commentator goes on to compare the Arab press of this era to that of the press which followed the American Revolution in so far as it was dominated by “…the numerous, tiny enterprise, highly partisan, political party press” (McFadden, 1953: 36-37). Despite the fact that only 11 percent of Iraqi’s over the age of 5 were literate as late as 1947 (Ayalon, 1995: 95), McFadden was optimistic regarding not only the gradual increase in the journalistic standard of the Middle Eastern press but its role in future political developments. To a large extent this optimism was justified given the happenings of the years that immediately followed. In 1948, when the Iraqi government was about to sign a revision to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 which appeared to bring Iraq further into line with British interests in the nation, the Iraqi opposition were virulent in their dissent, using their newspapers to encourage massive demonstrations on the streets of Baghdad. Sadly however, the power of the press proved too much for the ruling elite and they therefore implemented a ban on a “…number of these papers, and to increase the censorship on what they were able to write” (Dawisha, 2005: 22).

The tide turned somewhat with the introduction of new media technologies to the region throughout the 1950s. Indeed, the radio, television and further developments in the print media seemed to bring with them unprecedented media pervasiveness in the Middle East, if not always media freedoms. In Iraq, the nations first television station went to air in 1956 (the same year as Sweden, see: Daragahi, 2003: 47), ushering in a new interest in the media, if only for the novel pleasures that such a visual medium provided. In 1958 Abdal Karim Qasim – a senior military officer and friend to many of Iraq’s opposition groups – co-ordinated the bloody coup d’etat which saw him dispose of the monarchy and become Iraq’s Prime Minister. Despite the fact that Iraq of this time had an illiteracy rate of approximately 85% (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 34), under Qasim’s authority the heavily partisan newspapers of Iraq continued to enjoy considerable autonomy and popularity. However, Qasim did offer particular support to the rising ranks of the Communist Party (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 35) and, by 1962, there were 20 newspapers in Baghdad, approximately one-third of which had pro-Communist tendencies (Rugh, 2004: 46-47). Qasim’s leadership was, however, short-lived as three brothers, the nephews of the deposed King Faisal co-ordinated another coup d’etat which saw the establishment of the Arif regime. Each of the Arif brothers served as Iraq’s leader in quick succession between 1963 and 1968 and the first – Colonel Abdul Salam Arif - is credited with beginning the Arab Socialist Union (for more on the Arif regime, see: Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 1027-1072). Ironically, it was elements of this party which were to go on and form the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party
(ABSP) and usurp the Arif brothers reign. In addition the Arif period also saw the passing of Press Law No. 53 which enabled heavy censorship of the press and the tight control of media licenses (Rugh, 2004: 50). Despite the authoritarian leadership of the Arif regime, Iraqis were still surprisingly politically active throughout this period. Once again, the political, religious, ethnic and tribal lines that maladroitly divided the nation were overtly political, with each group striving to ascend the hierarchy and establish themselves at the fulcrum of state authority in Baghdad. Even so, there were some minor developments in the media sector, including the launch of an Iraqi English-language paper to serve the growing expatriate community, *The Baghdad Observer* (Hurrat & Leidig, 1994: 98-99).
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

The Media under the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party and the rule of Saddam Hussein

Unfortunately, the political climate fostered under the Arif Regime did little to encourage the establishment of moderate and legitimate political movements and arguably paved the way for the violent military coup d’etat in which the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party (ABSP) ascended to authority in 1968 (Daragahi, 2003: 46; Seymour, 2004: 355). During this time there was a brief struggle for power between the two allies in the coup, the military and the Ba’ath, with each of these bodies controlling one of the two major newspapers in Iraq at that time, Al-Tharwa (“The Revolution”) and Al-Jumhuriyya (“The Republic”), respectively (Bengio, 2004: 110). This struggle for power was promptly decided in favour of the Ba’ath, and served as a valuable lesson for the party regarding the power of the press.

They acted quickly. One of the Ba’ath Party’s first acts was to jail, charge and then execute Aziz Abdel Barakat who was both the head of the Journalist’s Union and the publisher of Al-Manar (“The Beacon” or “The Lighthouse” – not to be confused with today’s Hezbollah controlled TV station of the same name), one of the most professionally run and widely distributed dailies in Iraq at the time (Daragahi, 2003: 46, 50). Following this, in 1969 the Ba’ath Party established a publications law which effectively made the media the fourth branch of the newly established government (Braude, 2003: 146). This saw the Iraqi media industry quickly transform into one that was “…more controlled, monolithic, mobilised and almost completely stripped of any critical approach” (Bengio, 2004: 110). By 1974-1975 this meant that although Iraq had a literacy rate of 30% (Rugh, 1979: 3), it had only five daily newspapers, each of which was heavily influenced, if not completely controlled by, the state. These papers were Al-Jumhuriyah, Al-Tharwa, The Baghdad Observer, the state-sanctioned paper of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Al-Ta’akhi (“The Brotherhood”) and the Communist party organ, Tariq Al-Sha’ab (“The Path of the People”) (Rugh, 1979: 32).

However, if the lack of an egalitarian political culture and a free press had been evident since the Ba’ath ascension to power, it was to deteriorate further following the “self-election” of the late Saddam Hussein to the presidency of Iraq in 1979. It is now well known that Saddam’s rise to power “…was marked by terror, coercion and purges of Ba’ath party members” (Seymour, 2004: 355), that he went on to commit grievous crimes against his own citizens, especially the many religious and ethnic minorities of Iraq (Cordesman & Hashim, 1997: 111-118) and that he was one of the cruellest and most tyrannical despots of modern times. What is perhaps less well known is that Saddam was also a powerful and charismatic politician, a master of a rhetoric that appealed directly to the “every day Iraqi” and an expert at image management (for more on this, see: Bengio, 1998). Indeed, having witnessed first hand the role of the media during the ascension of the Ba’ath Party to power a little over a decade earlier, Saddam was all too aware of the power of the press and quickly set about modelling them after other 20th century totalitarian examples, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the nation retained its 5 daily newspapers under Saddam’s rule, he was quick to quash any lingering notions of freedom of the press by making sure that the entire media industry was folded under the authority of the government (Hurrat & Leidig, 1994: 107). This meant that each of Iraq’s papers soon became state-run propaganda instruments, dutifully reciting official policy and
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

praising governmental action (Dawisha, 2004: 14). He ensured that this occurred through rigorous and clandestine monitoring of the media as well as more banal and overt practices such as insisting that his photograph be featured daily on the front page and that each of his speeches were printed in full (Braude, 2003: 139-140). Saddam was also careful to minimise Iraqi’s exposure to outside media by periodically jamming news broadcasts from outside Iraq (Cordesman & Hashim, 1997: 120) and imposing a 5 year prison sentence for owning a satellite dish (Braude, 2003: 150).

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Saddam made further inroads in limiting press freedom across Iraq. In 1986 he passed both Press Act 206 and Decree Number 804. The first of these prohibited Iraqi journalists from writing articles on 12 specific subjects, including any criticism of the President and his policies (Cordesman & Hashim, 1997: 120), while the second made such criticisms punishable by death (Daragahi, 2003: 46). It appears that Saddam made concerted efforts to point out the tremendous role that the media played during times of war. Indeed, he appears to have seen the media as an essential part of Iraq’s military machine, dubbing them the ‘information corps’ (Bengio, 2004: 110). Immediately after the war, however, Saddam was faced with thousands of men returning from the frontline to an Iraq that had no employment opportunities awaiting them. Many of these citizens – particularly the already disenfranchised Shi’as and Kurds living in a Sunni controlled state – began to revolt against Saddam’s authority and called for democratic reforms (Keeble, 1997: 12). Surprisingly, Saddam endorsed this movement, seemingly because he believed that some form of public debate over democracy would enable his citizens to voice their grievances without subverting his authority. In line with other authoritarian leaders (Dahl, 1998: 10) Saddam set about labelling himself “the engineer of democracy” or “the shepherd of democracy” although he failed to clearly detail what his actual approach to democracy was and how this would be implemented (Bengio, 1998: 60-62). This had a parallel impact on the journalistic profession where those tired of toeing the official party line began - albeit subtly - to call for democratic reform and to challenge and criticize various aspects of public life under Saddam (Bengio, 2004: 117-118).

However, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the 2nd August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War, these meagre efforts at democratising Iraq’s media were quashed. Although much has been written about the Western coverage of this war – particularly its status as a “clean” war of spectacle, propaganda and illusion, little is known about the Iraqi press of this period. It can be assumed however that Saddam continued to maintain a tight control over his ‘information corps’, using it to promote his actions and damn those of his enemies. What is known for sure is that immediately following the Gulf War, Iraq was placed under heavy sanctions from the international community (Herring, 2004; Simons, 1998) as well as internal pressure to democratise. This led Saddam to conduct mock elections in the hope of placating a public that had now endured 23 years of Ba’ath rule and two wars. Firstly, Saddam’s eldest son, Uday Hussein was “unanimously elected” to the position of the Head of the Journalist’s Union in 1992, leaving him in charge of several newspapers, a radio station and responsible for the censorship and management of the rest of the nation’s media (Daragahi, 2003: 47). Specifically, there were six official daily newspapers which all came under the jurisdiction of the newly appointed Uday. There was Al-Tharwa, Al-Jumhuriya and The Baghdad Observer, all of which had survived since
the early days of the Ba’ath regime. In addition, Iraq’s media landscape was also constituted by the presence of Al-Iraq, the official state-run Kurdish newspaper, Udday Hussein’s own personal paper Babil (“Babel” - established in 1990 and has occasionally featured opinion editorials critical of “incompetent” government officials) and Al-Qadissiya (a military paper which hit the news-stands during the Iran-Iraq War and was shrewdly named after a battle in 637 AD in which the Arabs defeated the Persians) (Hurrat & Leidig, 1994: 98-99).

The result of having his son in such a prestigious position was that Saddam could continue to manipulate the media at will. Indeed, one of the ongoing traits of the Ba’athist press was its role in tarnishing the image of an ongoing succession of ‘others’. At times, this meant turning the media against factions of the citizenry, especially the Kurds or the Shi’ites, or against regional enemies such as Iran and Kuwait, global superpowers such as the United States or the West in general and, almost without interruption, against Israel (Bengio, 2004: 111-112). Udday’s appointment also allowed Saddam to reward sycophantic journalists who were prepared to sacrifice their journalistic integrity for a career that rapidly ascended the Ba’athist ladder. Although Saddam received much criticism in the expatriate Iraqi press after he was unsurprisingly “re-elected” as President of Iraq in the 1992 sham election (Rugh, 2004: 64), the domestic press was understandably much more supportive with one commentator even receiving $2500 and a Honda after having called for Saddam’s continuation in office (Daragahi, 2003: 47). Other examples of upwardly mobile journalists who toed the Ba’athist line include a Chaldean Christian by the name of Tariq Aziz, who began his political career as the editor of Al-Tharwa, later receiving the post of Iraq’s Foreign Minister during the 1991 Gulf War and then served as Deputy Prime Minister until Saddam’s overthrow in 2003 (for details on this and other examples, see: Braude, 2003: 146-147; Rugh, 2004: 8).

But if the rewards were high for those whose journalism adhered tightly to Ba’athist doctrine and the leadership of Saddam, the punishment for those who did not was extreme. In 1991 a political commentator by the name of Aziz al Sayed Jassem was arrested and later disappeared after refusing to write books that praised the President’s leadership while a prominent Al-Tharwa journalist disappeared after criticizing articles in his own paper (Daragahi, 2003: 46). In 1999 Uday went as far as personally sacking 1000 writers for not praising the President with the required enthusiasm. In total, over 500 journalists, writers and intellectuals went missing or were executed during the rule of the Ba’ath Party according to one French Human Rights organisation, the International Alliance for Justice (as cited in: Daragahi, 2003: 46). In fact, Uday is said to have set up special prisons expressly designed for torturing and detaining Iraq’s journalists and political dissidents (see for example the story of an Iraqi journalist by the name of Yunis, as retold in: Epperlein & Tucker, 2006). Even those journalists who attempted to bring humour to the autocracy of Saddam faced heavy penalties with one writer arrested and then tortured for having written that Saddam cared about every last detail in Iraq, even the toilets (Whitaker, 2003). On top of this, media audiences were also targeted, particularly in the autonomous Kurdish north where despite the fact that it had developed something of a free press since its establishment in 1991, one man was reportedly sentenced to 21 years imprisonment after being found with a copy of a non-state Kurdish paper by the name of Al-Itihad (“The United”) (Daragahi, 2003: 46-48).
With such extreme punishment handed out to the journalists who were even remotely critical of the central authority in Baghdad, it is little wonder that Bengio describes the Iraqi media of this era as “…an omnipotent propaganda machine…” which “…played the role of the Ba’ath regime’s watchdog, thus contributing significantly to its survival and longevity” (2004: 109-110). However, the Iraqi state’s abolishment of freedom of the press did not completely destroy the journalistic movement in Iraq. Many of those who desired to criticise Saddam and the Ba’ath Party left the country and joined the growing ranks of the expatriate opposition press while those who stayed were free to channel their talents and creativity into the means of conveying the official news to the populus (Braude, 2003: 146). Others pushed the envelope even further. Journalism educators at Baghdad’s College of Mass Media (which taught courses in print, photo and TV journalism and was the only school of journalism in the country, see: Hurrat & Leidig, 1994: 97) were renowned for teaching their students the fundamentals of good reporting: accuracy, objectivity and the quest for truth. Journalists at Nab Al-Shabab (“The Youth”), the weekly Udday-controlled newspaper of the Youth Union, got away with candidly criticizing the government and its strict control of the people, the actions of Tariq Aziz (the Deputy Prime Minister) and promoting opposition figures such as Ahmad Chalabi before Saddam cracked down and the newspapers staff were pushed out (Daragahi, 2003: 47-48).

However, not even Saddam Hussein could’ve predicted the cataclysmic attacks on the twin spires of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on the 11th of September 2001. These events ushered in a seismic shift in global politics, perhaps best illustrated by US President George W. Bush’s declaration of a “War on Terror” that started first in Afghanistan and then moved in to Iraq. Despite the wealth of scholarship on both the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars and their coverage in the Western media, there appears to be very little research which details the coverage that appeared in the Iraqi press from 11 September 2001 to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. We do know that in 2002 Saddam conducted another of Iraq’s sham elections, this time winning by 100% of the vote (Rugh, 2004: 34). It is also fairly safe to assume that, up until at least the beginning of the war, the official Iraqi press continued in its unwavering support for Saddam and its critique of those who might threaten his authority (there is no doubt that President Bush came under heavy fire for his stance against the “Axis of Evil” and his “War on Terror”, while the “Coalition of the Willing” would have been critiqued for their involvement). What we do know for sure is that the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, continued to broadcast his versions of events throughout the war (Mirzoeff, 2005: 77). Although he lost much of his credibility over the insistence that the coalition troops were meeting fierce resistance (which incidentally made him something of an internet cult hero), he was credited with having provided much information on civilian deaths in Iraq to the media, which fuelled further resentment towards the war, particularly in the Arab world (Ravi, 2005: 59, 61).
The rise of the print media in post-Saddam Iraq

With the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, Iraq’s media environment was changed forever. Almost overnight it transformed from Saddam’s tightly controlled propaganda machine to one of the freest media environments on earth (Zanger, 2005: 106). By the end of the month, the Iraqi Ministry of Information had been abolished and its 7,000 employees suddenly found themselves without regular income (Zanger, 2005: 107). These former state media pundits carried with them their years of experience communicating – albeit under tight controls – with the Iraqi people. In addition Iraq also witnessed an influx of expatriates, refugees and newcomers, who brought with them an invaluable and divergent knowledge base gained from living in liberal democracies where they had no doubt witnessed first hand the function of the Fourth Estate. The evidence of their fervent labour and newfound freedom was soon to be seen on the streets of Baghdad where, by the end of May 2003, approximately 100 new publications and a few new broadcast outlets were available, while others were launched concurrently in Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul (Daragahi, 2003: 46). Come the end of 2003, this number had grown to around 200 Iraqi-owned news publications and between 15 and 17 Iraqi-owned television stations (Gerth, 2005; Zanger, 2005: 107).

Given Iraq’s long and complex political history, it is not at all surprising that these new media formats quickly became the forum for much of Iraq’s political jousting and debate as the nation navigated its way from despotism to democracy. Indeed, most of the newspapers were started by political parties and are partisan organs, geared towards their stated policies and agendas. However, the domestic politics of Iraq are convoluted by the myriad of religious and ethnic divides that do not neatly dissect the nation into a series of mutually exclusive groups. There are, as is now commonly known, three large ethno-religious groups in Iraq, the Shi’a Arabs, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as well as a number of smaller “…racial and religious minorities… (including) Turkomans, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidihs, Sabeans, and others” (Batatu, 1982 [1978]: 13) ((for details on the plight of Iraq’s minorities today, see: Isakhan, 2005b). Within each of these broad categories are more intricate differences, with each sector capable of being further broken down into religious, ethnic and political sub-categories.

For example, it is often forgotten that the Kurds are largely Sunni’s, but that there are also many Kurdish Christians and Kurdish Shi’ites. Beyond this, the Kurds can be further divided according to their allegiance to the two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP, founded by legendary Kurd Mustafa Barzani in 1945 and now lead by his son, Massoud Barzani) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, formed in 1975 and now led by the current President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani). However, Kurdish politics is complicated further by the presence of a number of other parties, including the Communist Party of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Solutions Party, and the Islamic Group of Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly, the Shi’ites (who have always been the majority in modern Iraq, but have long been marginalised by the central Sunni-led government) can be understood according to their allegiance to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (which had been in staunch opposition of Saddam’s rule from the safety of Iran) and the Islamic Da’wah Party (led by former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari). There is also the highly influential Grand Ayatollah Sistani and a number of other pro-Shi’a political and
religious groups who hold significant clout. Iraq’s smaller minority groups have also been active with the formation of Iraqi National Movement, which represents the Sunni Arabs (who ruled Iraq since its creation in the 1920s until the fall of Saddam, but only ever constituted approximately 20% of Iraq’s diverse population) and The Turkoman Brotherhood Party. Beyond these parties are those that explicitly support singular political or religious ideologies. These include various Islamic political groups, several nationalistic parties, a number of Iraqi parties that claim to be liberal-democratic, and other political parties such as the Arab Socialists, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Royal Constitutional Movement, the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Iraq and the Pan-Arab Movement.

What is particularly interesting about these ethnic, religious and political groups is that each of them has produced their own newspaper since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Not surprisingly, these publications have been joined by those who claim to be free of such allegiances, including several liberal–democratic organs, those produced by collectives of journalists, independent publishing houses and others which promote peace and tolerance amongst the ongoing violence. In addition, Iraq has also seen the production of several sports bulletins, arts and culture magazines, a few industry related bulletins, several children’s and student magazines, comedic publications containing sharp political satire and still others which resemble the tawdry British tabloids, detailing local and international gossip and entertainment news as well as featuring pictures of scantily clad women (for comprehensive lists, see: Iraqi Media, 2003; The New Iraq Press, 2003). Indeed the demand for undoctored news in Iraq has been so strong and the publication of all manner of papers so pervasive, that it has been increasingly difficult to keep track of many of them. It can be assumed that there are enormous variances in quality, life-span and readership between them, ranging from the highly sophisticated and professional organs read by a wide audience across the spectrum of the Iraqi population, to the short-lived hackneyed efforts of clearly biased individuals pandering to a sympathetic few. There are however, several that are worthy of more detailed analysis.

Amongst Iraq’s burgeoning press scene are several pro-American daily newspaper that are run by associates of Ahmad Chalabi, including Al-Mutamar (“The Congress”) (Mazzetti & Daragahi, 2005), Al-Jamahir (“The Masses”) and Al-Mazwsil (“Mosul”) (Rugh, 2004: 116-117). In the 1990s Chalabi had formed part of the Iraqi National Congress, which had worked unsuccessfully with the US government to overthrow Saddam. In the lead up to the 2003 War, Chalabi supplied suspect information to the Bush administration regarding Iraq’s alleged stockpile of WMD and later served as Iraq’s interim Deputy Prime Minister. At one point, Chalabi was the favourite of the Pentagon and it was assumed that he had popular support within Iraq and would easily ascend the political hierarchy to lead the nation (Facts behind the smears, 2004). However, Chalabi failed to win a single seat following Iraq’s December 2005 elections and today he is under investigation by several United States departments and remains wanted by the Jordanian authorities on allegations of bank fraud.

In addition to Chalabi, other expatriates also have a vested interest in Iraq’s new media environment. During the 1980s and early 1990s there were few journalists more adept at ascending the media hierarchy of Iraq that Saad Bazzaz. He held a succession of senior positions including the editorship of Al-Jumhuriyya, the paper that had supported the Ba’ath from as far back as 1968 and continued to extol its
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

virtues throughout the reign of Saddam Hussein. In addition, his career also included managing the Iraqi National News Agency and the Ministry of Information, overseeing the production and broadcasting of all Iraqi radio and TV (Zengerle, 2002). However, his disagreements with Saddam over quality control and his objection to the invasion of Kuwait, led Bazzaz to defect to the United Kingdom in 1992. From London in 1997 Bazzaz began Iraq’s only independent pan-Arab daily, *Azzaman* (“The Times”) which quickly grew to include international editions issued from Bahrain and North Africa. With the success of Azzaman, Bazzaz was able to expand his growing media empire to include “…a monthly current-affairs magazine, a semi-annual culture magazine…and a number of books - ranging from Arabic translations of Jean-Paul Sartre to reportage on Afghanistan,” (Zengerle, 2002) all of which were highly esteemed as professional in both their content and production. However, this was not enough for Bazzaz as he had long dreamed of returning to his homeland and distributing his publications throughout the media impoverished landscape of Iraq. With the fall of Saddam in 2003, Bazzaz saw his opportunity and he started to distribute from Baghdad. The years in exile and the commitment to quality meant that *Azzaman* was an instant hit on the streets of Iraq where it was the only full-colour 24-page daily which reported global, regional and local stories with a mildly Arab-nationalist tendency (Daragahi, 2003: 48). It quickly became Iraq’s most widely read newspaper, printing about 60,000 issues in Baghdad and was able to support another office in Basra (*Iraq: Closure of Al-Arabiya News Channel*, 2003). Not stopping here, Bazzaz – nick-named the Rupert Murdoch of Iraq - has since ventured into television, developing *Al-Shariqiya* (“The Eastern One”) into Iraq’s most watched TV channel, hosting comedy programs and Reality TV (Ciezadlo, 2004).

In Iraqi Kurdistan, a well-educated and articulate man by the name of Ahmad Shawkat, who had once been imprisoned by Saddam, returned to Iraq before the war in the hope of finding work as a translator for the influx of foreign journalists entering the country (*Two Notable Books on Journalists in Iraq*, 2005). Luckily Shawkat found Michael Goldfarb, a journalist for London’s National Public Radio and the two worked together in detailing the early stages of the war from the perspective of Kurdistan. Later, Shawkat was able to start his own non-partisan newspaper, *Bilattijah* (“Without Direction” or perhaps “Without Bias”) which had the stated goal of fighting “…for the building of a new Iraq and a civil society and a transparent democracy in a time of freedom” (Shawkat as cited in: Zanger, 2005: 108). Sadly, the damning editorials he wrote regarding the deadly union that had formed between Islamic fascists and former Ba’athists led to his assassination and prompted Goldfarb to document his friend’s eventful life and tragic death in ‘Ahmad's War, Ahmad's Peace: Surviving Under Saddam, Dying in the New Iraq’ (Goldfarb, 2005).

As well as expatriates and exiled Iraqi’s, others were keen to harness Iraq’s newfound media freedom and the people’s thirst for undoctored news. Among them was the crew assembled by two twenty-something college students at the American University of Beirut, Ralph Hassall (British) and David Enders (American). On a brave whim and a shoe-string budget they made it into Iraq and set up the *Baghdad Bulletin*, the nation’s only non-partisan English-language paper whose first edition appeared in June 2003 (*Baghdad Bulletin*, 2004: 124). What differentiated the *Baghdad Bulletin* from other Iraqi papers of the time was not only that it was published in English, but that it was most probably the only publication that was both read by and featured articles...
submitted from both sides: members of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the (English-reading / writing) Iraqi population. In the first issue, Enders editorialised that “Inevitably, a civil society will be born out of the [current] uncertainty [in post-war Iraq]. A necessary part of such a society is a free press” (Enders as cited in: Thomsen, 2004: 125). To achieve this lofty goal, the young crew of the Baghdad Bulletin employed and trained as many willing Iraqi’s as they could find (Enders, 2003). Unfortunately, however, the papers slim budget quickly vanished and, due to Iraq’s weak domestic advertising market, the Baghdad Bulletin’s publication was suspended in September 2003 after only 7 issues. Many of the staff have since gone on to work for some of the world’s leading media organisations, while Enders has documented his experiences in his book, ‘Baghdad Bulletin: Dispatches on the American Occupation’ (Enders, 2005).

Perhaps the most telling sign of the end of Saddam’s brutal monopoly over the nation of Iraq and its media has been the re-launch of Al-Manar. In the coup of 1968, when the Ba’ath Party seized control of Iraq, Al-Manar was promptly shut down and its publisher, Aziz Abdel Barakat (who was also the head of Iraq’s journalist’s union) was arrested and later executed. Prior to this, Al-Manar had an exceptional reputation and was widely considered Iraq’s most professional and objective paper. In the new Iraqi media landscape one of Barakat’s former pupils, the seventy year old Taha Arif Muhammad musteredit together a crew of forty journalists from across Iraq, setting up bureaus in Hilla, Karbala, Najaf, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul. Due to the fact that the telecommunications infrastructure is still poor in today’s Iraq, these journalists send their stories to Baghdad via courier and, when printed, Al-Manar has a circulation of approximately 15,000 (Daragahi, 2003: 50).

In addition to the successful re-emergence of Al-Manar has been that of Habebooz, an organ rife with political satire and which was last published in Iraq in 1932. After having graduated from Baghdad’s College of Mass Media, Ashtar Ali Yasseri worked for one of Udday’s tightly controlled papers, Al-Zawra where she honed her skills toeing the line of the Ba’athist regime. Seeing the lighter side of post-Saddam Iraq, Yasseri decided to revive the organ which had best satirized the British occupation of the 1920s and 30s, Habebooz. Commenting on her illustrated weekly which frequently takes pot-shots at the United States occupation Yasseri has stated “This is the best time for this kind of newspaper…It's good to make fun of things. It feels good to laugh” (Yasseri as cited in: Daragahi, 2003: 50).

Other newspapers that have emerged include Al-Mada (“The View” or “The Orbit”), which is commonly considered to be Iraq’s highbrow newspaper, publishing both investigative reports of an international standard and cultivating Iraqi’s fondness for literature by publishing Arabic poetry (Mazzetti & Daragahi, 2005). However, the ownership of Al-Mada is unclear with competing claims that it is another of Chalabi’s US-backed papers (Facts behind the smears, 2004) versus those that claim it is the mouthpiece of Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of the Shi’ite leader, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who was executed by Saddam’s agents in 1999 (Rosen, 2004). There is also Al-Saa (“The Hour”), a twice-weekly published by Udday Hussein’s former personal assistant, Abeer Shabaan, who was imprisoned during the final days of Saddam’s regime for his disagreements with Udday (Daragahi, 2003: 49). Finally, as has already been mentioned, Iraq’s media sector extends out from these examples to include those papers which speak for all manner of religious, ethnic
and political persuasions, covering the diverse and nuanced interests of this complex nation.

As is to be expected, there are many problems that go along with such a divergent, ad-hoc and highly volatile media landscape. First and foremost the media in Iraq is operating outside of an appropriate legal framework. Despite some early attempts to establish the parameters of a free and independent press in post-Saddam Iraq, such as a conference attended by various figures from Iraq’s media sector in Athens in 2003 (Daragahi, 2003: 50), these have proven relatively unsuccessful. The issue of the legal framework for Iraq’s emerging media sector aside, employment as a journalist is still an extremely dangerous profession in Iraq as US occupation, foreign insurgents and sectarian strife continue to ravage the country. Recently, the Iraqi Journalists Association (IJA) and the Arab Press Freedom Watch (APFW) have called on the newly appointed government in Baghdad to take greater security measures in the protection of journalists. As part of its request, the IJA cited that 112 Iraqi journalists and media workers had been killed since March 2003 (Iraq: Local journalists call for increased protection, 2006), let alone the countless others who have been harassed, wounded, imprisoned and tortured.

Beyond the impact that these dangers continue to have on the day to day lives of the citizens of Iraq and their media sector is the influences of the many foreign powers – particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Great Britain. Each of these has their own vested interest in the situation and evolving politics of Iraq, largely due to its vast reservoirs of oil but also because of its geographical location and the myriad of religious and ethnic sects that are vying for power. This has meant that, in addition to the above, some of Iraq’s recent media developments have openly served as a mouthpiece for these foreign powers. The religio-political papers, Al-Adala (“The Justice”) and Nahrayn (“Two Rivers”) are a case-in-point as they are Shi’ite papers openly published and distributed by the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Daragahi, 2003: 49; Rugh, 2004: 117). More discreetly, the Saudi Arabian government – who have invested many of their oil-dollars in the various pan-Arab organs across the region – are believed to be bankrolling Saad Bazzaz’s Azzaman franchise, including Iraq’s highest rating TV channel, Al-Shariqiya (Iraqi Independent Media Mogul Accused of Running Saudi-funded covert Propaganda Operation, 2005).

However, the efforts of the Iranians and the Saudis pale in comparison to those of the United States. In fact, shortly after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the Bush administration poured millions into the development of the Iraqi media (Gerth, 2005). While this money has certainly helped in developing papers that range from explicitly pro-US to non-partisan (such as Al-Mutamar and Bilattijah respectively) it has also been used to shut down those papers which directly challenged the strategic interests of the CPA. Under the leadership of Lewis Paul Bremmer III the CPA, on behalf of the United States government, issued “Order Number 14: Prohibited Media Activity” which deemed any publication that “…incites violence…incites civil disorder…incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel…advocates alterations to Iraq’s borders” or “…advocates the return of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party” as illegal (Bremmer, 2003: 1-2). The penalties for breaking such prohibitions were severe, including detainment, arrest and prosecution with the sentence of up to one year in prison, while in “emergencies” the Coalition Forces were permitted to “…take
direct action to prevent or defeat the threat” (Bremmer, 2003: 2). Indeed, the US forces do not seem to have been reluctant to take such “direct action”. In 2003, Al-Mustaqilla (“The Independent”) was shut down by the CPA and the managing editor, Dhari Al-Duleimi, was arrested after publishing an article that claimed the killing of those who co-operate with the CPA was a religious duty (Brahimi, 2003). This was followed in 2004 by the closure of Al-Hawza (the name of a particular Shi’a seminary), another newspaper accused of being the mouthpiece of Muqtada al-Sadr and terminated for the publication of articles such as “America Hates Islam and Muslims” (Al-Sheikh, 2004; Gettleman, 2004; Rosen, 2004). The Baghdad office of the popular pan-Arab TV station Al-Arabiya (“The Arab”) was also closed down and its journalists banned from working in Iraq for an indefinite period following the screening of a tape that saw Saddam urge Iraqi’s to resist the US occupation (Iraq: Closure of Al-Arabiya News Channel, 2003).

Well before the CPA seized control of Iraq, the US and UK had inaugurated a new Iraqi satellite TV station named Nahwa Al-Hurrieh (“Towards Freedom”) (Rutherford, 2004: 60). Launched by personal messages from both US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the station was beamed into Iraq from a purpose built Commando Solo aeroplane (Towards Freedom TV: A Channel Targeting the Iraqis, launched by Messages from Blair and Bush, 2003). On the ground, the United States spent much of its money and efforts on resurrecting both Saddam’s Ministry of Information and his International News Agency (INA) which were all but destroyed by both the bombing of Baghdad and the ensuing looting that ravaged many public institutions (Coalition Forces Bombard Iraqi State TV, 2003). The Ministry of Information was renamed the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) by the CPA (Rugh, 2004: 116) and it now consists of Al-Iraqiya (“The Iraqi”), a national TV station modelled on the BBC, both the Al-Sabah (“The Morning”) and Al-Sumer (“The Sumerian” – published in Kuwait for distribution in Iraq) newspapers and at least one radio station. Around 90% of IMN’s staff are former Ministry of Information employees (McCaul, 2003) who seem to be revelling in the opportunity to report the news without the menacing auspices of Saddam and his son, Udday. However, despite this, there are a number of concerns about the IMN and its clear prejudice towards the US occupation (Gourevitch, 2003), with the independent Iraqi Media Assessment Report (IMAR) recommending that, due to its ties to the CPA, the IMN should be “…dismantled and the constituent parts all located within independent institutions” (McCaul, 2003). The INA on the other hand, was resurrected and renamed the National Iraqi News Agency (NINA) by Dr Farid Ayar who had been an INA journalist before leaving Iraq in the 1990s. Today, Ayar is a member of the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission and despite claims that NINA “…does not have any links with any official or unofficial party, it will be self-financing to ensure its independence and it does not rely on any foreign financing sources” (NINA: A New Iraqi News Agency, 2005), it was originally established by the US funded International Research and Exchange Board (IREX).

Other US involvement in Iraq’s fledgling media environment has been more sinister and clandestine. It has long been known that the United States conducted its extensive Psychological Operations (“PsyOps”) campaign throughout the 1990s under the Clinton administration (Myers, 1999; Sussman, 2005) and that it was extended well in advance of the Coalition invasion of 2003 (Clark & Christie, 2005; Rutherford, 2004: 55-60; Taylor, 2003). However, it has only recently come to light that this same
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

operation has since been responsible for covertly planting pro-US news stories in the Iraqi press. In mid 2004 a company by the name of the Lincoln Group formed a partnership with the Rendon Group (which had earlier been hired by Washington to help counter Taliban propaganda in the Afghanistan War) (Gerth, 2005). Together they were awarded a $100 million dollar contract by the Pentagon to continue “strategic communications” in Iraq (Mazzetti & Daragahi, 2005; U.S. war propaganda carries on, 2006). Part of this operation entailed covertly running more than 1000 news articles in 12 to 15 of Iraq’s newspapers at a cost of between $40 and $2000 per item (Gerth, 2005). Mostly, these stories were written by US soldiers who were part of the “Information Operations” program and then translated into Arabic by the Lincoln Group’s Iraqi staff who later posed as wealthy freelancers, offering the shoestring Iraqi press money in exchange for publication (Mazzetti & Daragahi, 2005; U.S. war propaganda carries on, 2006). It was never disclosed to the papers that these articles - which were typically written from an Iraqi perspective and purposefully designed to cater to specific ethnic or religious groups (such as Shi’ites or Kurds) and to address key issues (including terrorism or democracy) - were actually the cleverly disguised propaganda of the occupying force. Although papers such as the pro-American Al-Mutamar did not seem too concerned about their publication of such articles others, such as the editor of the well respected Al-Mada has understandably expressed his outrage (Mazzetti & Daragahi, 2005), while an editorial in Azzaman deemed such actions a blatant attempt “…to humiliate the independent national press” of Iraq (Gerth, 2005).

The irony here barely needs to be stated. The Bush administration has been adamant that the proliferation of democracy around the globe, and particularly across the Middle East, is central to its broader geo-political agenda (see the first State of the Union Address of Bush's second term in 2005). Yet, at the same time, they are undermining one of the hallmarks of Iraq’s emergent democracy – its free and independent press - by both developing state media services such as the IMN that openly serve US purposes, and by undermining the independence of those media organs who do not via more clandestine methods.

Unfortunately, the interference in Iraq’s media sector is not limited to those governments which exist outside its borders. Despite the fact that the Iraqi Constitution – finalised by the Iraqi National Assembly in August 2005 and ratified by the people of Iraq in October of that same year – guarantees “Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and publication” (The Iraqi Constitution, 2005), the Iraqi media industry has continued to suffer since the establishment of the Iraqi Government. These have included prison sentences of one and a half years for criticising senior figures such as the Kurdish Governor, Massoud al-Barzani (APFW Alert: APFW Condemns the Verdict Against Kamal Sayed Qader, 2006), the arrest and detention of other Iraqi journalists (APFW Calls for the Release of Iraqi Journalist, 2006) as well as bashings and harassment by Iraqi police (APFW Denounces the Aggression on Al Hurra Reported by Iraqi Police, 2006). These situations have led some papers, such as Al-Shahid Al-Mustaqel (“The Independent Martyr”) to a self-imposed temporary cessation in publication (Iraq: Al Shahid al Mustaqel Stops publishing in Response to Governmental Practices, 2006), while others have been forced to close, including the Baghdad office of Al-Jazeera which was closed for one month for allegedly inciting violence and hatred amongst the Iraqi people (IFJ Accuses Iraq of "Unacceptable and Illogical Censorship" Over Ban on
The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform

Al-Jazeera, 2004; Iraq Shuts Al-Jazeera Baghdad Office for a Month, 2004). More recently, the Iraqi Parliament has urged Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to close down Saad Bazzaz’s media empire – including both the Azzaman newspaper and the Al-Sharqiya TV station - under allegations that they were too critical of a recent draft law that proposed turning Iraq into a federal state (Parliament asks government to close Azzaman, 2006).

In addition to these problems are reports that the quality and professionalism of the Iraqi press is highly dubious. As Zanger has pointed out, “…nearly all [Iraqi] papers trade in street rumour, conspiracy theories, and endless editorial comment, often based not on fact but bias, misconceptions and wild innuendo” (2005: 107). These papers have also been criticised for the quality of their written Arabic which is said to be below professional standard, while the articles themselves often fail to meet the basic journalistic criteria of objectivity and accuracy (Whitaker, 2003). There are also parallels being drawn to examples such as Algeria of the 1980s and Yemen of the 1990s where political changes led to an eruption of political parties and a thriving media sector. Unfortunately, in both of these cases, the progress was short lived and within a few years the number, diversity and critical approach of these papers dwindled considerably (Whitaker, 2003). The same is expected of Iraq, particularly if the domestic economy – which was already significantly eroded due to 12 years of sanctions prior to the war – does not escalate to levels where considerable advertising revenue can be generated (Daragahi, 2003: 50).

However, despite all of this, there is reason to be optimistic. Thirty-five years of Ba’athist rule and its tight restrictions on the media has left in its wake an Iraqi population that has developed an “…abysmal distrust of official news…” (Bengio, 2004: 109) and is skilled in navigating carefully crafted propaganda (Braude, 2003: 141-142). This can be seen in the fact that most Iraq’s have exercised their right to eschew the United States backed media in favour of the local, independent press. As Mirzoeff notes, the people of Iraq have “…steadfastly refused to watch Iraqi Media Network, the US official television station, seeing it as simply more propaganda…” (2005: 76). Beyond this, even former employees of the Lincoln Group have noted that the broader ‘PsyOps’ program, despite its enormous cost, was largely ineffective due to the fact that Iraqi’s knew the content was American (Gerth, 2005; U.S. war propaganda carries on, 2006). Even the uncovering of the Lincoln Group’s association with the Pentagon and their collective strategy of planting pro-US news items in the independent Iraqi press was “…met mostly with shrugs in Baghdad, where readers tend to be sceptical about the media” (Gerth, 2005).
Conclusion

Iraq’s relationship with the written word can therefore be seen to go back as far as writing itself. It began when the complex societies of the Bronze Age prompted the development of a written language known as cuneiform. At first this language was used to document the mechanisms of trade and commerce but it evolved to include a rich literary catalogue and to detail an egalitarian and collective political structure. Later, following the introduction of Islam, cities such as Baghdad became known for their burgeoning public sphere constituted by a myriad of talented poets, writers and scholars who frequented the bourgeoisie salons that dotted the capital. This lively civic culture was later fostered by the Ottomans and, at least as far back as 1869, Iraq witnessed the mass communication opportunities afforded by the modern printing press. This new technology, coupled with the liberties granted by the Young Turks, ushered in a new era of unprecedented press freedom in the region which served to augment Iraq’s culture of public debate and criticism.

With the advent of modern Iraq under the auspices of the British following the end of the First World War, came a thriving debate over the future of this fledgling nation. Here, Iraq’s many newspapers were central to propagating this discussion, providing a voice to the myriad of political, religious and ethnic factions competing for influence under the newly installed monarchy. As Iraq emerged as an independent nation in 1930 it unfortunately witnessed its own political climate descend into a succession of coup d’état’s that led to a highly censored and controlled media sector. Following the Second World War and through much of the 1950s, however, Iraq witnessed a return to a vigorous public sphere constituted by a number of organs that were unprecedented in their professionalism and popularity. Unfortunately, this era was short lived and another series of coup d’état’s in the 1960s eventually led to the ascension of the Ba’ath Party in 1968 and the subsequent “self-elected” presidency of Saddam Hussein beginning in 1979, where Iraq’s political culture and free press deteriorated substantially. Saddam’s brutal grip over what he termed the ‘information corps’ meant that any lingering notions of press freedom and objectivity held by idealistic journalists was soon quashed.

Despite the fact that the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. led “Coalition of the Willing” was an erroneous, egregious and illegitimate act, it did see the toppling and later execution of one of the twentieth centuries most brutal tyrants, Saddam Hussein. This afforded an unrivalled upsurge in media freedoms across the nation, resulting in a shift from five tightly controlled propaganda organs to around 200 Iraqi-owned news publications by the end of that year. Once again, Iraq’s complex matrix of political, religious and ethnic allegiances unfolded across the pages of the nations press. Many of these newly formed papers were understandably biased to particular segments of Iraq’s population, toeing certain agendas and proliferating particular ideologies. Others maintained a high level of objectivity and journalistic integrity, revelling in their newfound freedom to practise their profession and their chance to connect with a population thirsty for undoctored news. More recently, reports have surfaced regarding the extensive interference that foreign entities have caused upon Iraq’s developing media sector. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States and even the newly established Iraqi Government all stand accursed of having used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress the freedom of the Iraqi press.
However, there is still reason to be optimistic about the role that Iraq’s thriving media environ can play as the Fourth Estate in the resurrection of Iraq’s public sphere. Firstly, Saddam’s tight control over the media sector has left a population that is savvy to the intricacies of propaganda and capable of navigating suspicious content. This media literacy, coupled with the many independent Iraqi papers publishing freely across the nation are not only crucial in re-establishing a participatory and engaged public sphere, but can also help to abate the many conflicts across Iraq and thereby aid the shift towards a free, egalitarian and democratic nation. Secondly, Iraq’s media can be seen to have played a central role in promoting the succession of Iraqi elections and referendums held throughout 2005 (for more details on the Iraqi elections of 2005, see: Isakhan, 2005a, 2006a). This is evidenced by the millions of Iraqi citizens who, despite threats of further violence, lined the streets of the nation for their chance to take part in the first truly democratic elections held in the nation for many decades. Specifically, the many partisan and non-partisan organs that littered Iraq in the lead up to these elections fulfilled their duty of informing the populus as to the central issues facing the nation and the stance taken by the myriad of political parties emerging across Iraq. This resurgence of the Iraqi citizenship playing an active role in their own governance as well as their engagement with a free press is crucial to the development of an informed and active public sphere.

A lot therefore rests on the shoulders of Iraq’s fledgling media sector. The ability of Iraq’s press to both accurately report on the events and struggles of modern Iraq as well as to serve as the locus of varied deliberation, debate and discourse is critical to the survival of its infantile public sphere. In turn, this public sphere is central to the mobilisation of an informed and politically active Iraqi population. As history has shown, when the people of Iraq become exposed to a critical and genuine debate over their future as a nation they are more than capable of navigating the thorny issues of foreign occupation, sectarian disagreements and horrific violence. Specifically, a free and independent Iraqi press is not only crucial in re-establishing a participatory and engaged public sphere, but it can also help to abate the many conflicts across Iraq and thereby aid the shift towards a free, egalitarian and democratic future.
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The role of the press in Iraq’s long struggle for democratic reform


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The role of the press in Iraq's long struggle for democratic reform


