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4 Naming and locating Asia

Australian dilemmas in its regional identity

David Walker

Continental ambitions

In 2005, a Singapore website (ExpatSingapore) posed the question: ‘Oz – part of Asia or not?’ An early respondent considered this a ‘challenging question’, adding: ‘Bet the Aussies are not too sure either’. If there is a common theme running through the responses it may well be uncertainty about the criteria one might use in determining whether Australia was ‘part of Asia’ or not. Was it primarily a matter of geography or was it more a question of perceptions, of how Australians saw themselves and how they wanted to be seen by others? It was also conceded that those looking at Australia from Singapore might well produce a different response from those who looked outwards from Australia.

A United States respondent thought the geographical question was both fundamental and easily resolved. Australia was a continent and therefore a separate entity. It was no more part of Asia than Asia was part of Africa. This was quickly dismissed as a ‘stupid’ response on the grounds that what constituted a continent was somewhat arbitrary. This correspondent expanded the original question to read: ‘given the current economic and political climate... do Aussies feel compelled to be part of Asia. If an analogy had to be drawn, it’d be more akin to asking the Brits if they feel they are part of Europe or not.’ This shifted the emphasis from geography to questions of national identification.

At the very end of the exchange a participant raised a question that had not yet been considered and which he believed required an answer before the original question could be properly addressed: ‘What is “Asia”? Who defines it? Is the concept cultural, and if so, whose culture? Political? If so, whose politics? Is it ethnic? Which ethnicities? Or is the whole thing, “Asia” that is, an orientalist construction – an echo from an earlier colonial era, something defined “in opposition” to the occidental?’

These questions certainly problematized the categories that informed the discussion of whether Australia could be considered part of Asia. For another participant in the discussion, the question ‘What is “Asia”?’, raised a host of reflections upon the medley of languages, cultures, religions and ethnicities that constituted Asia. Some of these were very mixed cultures, the product of centuries of intermingling, and others (he specified Korea, Bhutan and Japan) were rather more isolated and monocultural; yet all tended to be grouped as ‘Asian’.

The idea that Australia might be thought of as ‘part of Asia’ has a long history. While there is a powerful geographical dimension to the question, much more is at stake than geographical borders and boundaries. Alongside geography, there is a host of often fraught questions about race, identity and international awareness. However inflexible the geography may have seemed, there was always an element of choice about whether to get closer to Asia or to remain distant. When Australians referred to themselves, as they often did before the Second World War, as 98 per cent British, they sought to distance themselves from Asia by claiming to be more British than the British themselves. Slogans about Britishness gave support to claims that Australians belonged in the old world and were part of Europe. In their turn, these questions were shaped, as the ‘ExpatSingapore’ discussion acknowledged, both by changing representations of Asia and by the political, economic and cultural changes transforming the region. Since ‘Australia’ and ‘Asia’ are both shifting and cognitively unstable entities, it should be apparent that a historical review of whether Australia might be considered ‘part of Asia’ must inevitably encounter contradictory claims and counter-claims along with a degree of uncertainty and sheer muddle.

The election of Kevin Rudd as prime minister in November 2007 and his proposal to create a new Asia Pacific Community expressed both the possibilities and contradictions of Australia’s regional location. Rudd is the product of a post-Second World War consciousness that Australia’s future would be shaped, economically, diplomatically and culturally by events in Asia. The idea that Australia was ‘part of Asia’ was encouraged through the 1950s by the Australian Department of External Affairs in the belief that it would harm Australia’s influence and interests in the region to be characterized as a nation apart from Asia. When Kevin Rudd became a Mandarin-speaking diplomat in the 1980s it was no longer sufficient for Australia to be ‘part of Asia’. The times called for a more dynamic language of active ‘engagement with Asia’ backed by a new commitment to ‘Asia-literacy’. While Rudd’s call for a new Asia Pacific Community might seem paradoxical for a predominantly European society, his visionary language is consistent with a longer history of ambitious claims about the future of the Australian nation and the expansive possibilities that flowed from Australia’s special status as a continent. The logic of space and expansive territory appeared to demand visionary aspirations and new beginnings, especially so perhaps in a society with a modest history. Australia seemed destined to re-imagine and re-shape the future.

Australia’s historical perspectives on Asia

The belief that Australia could be thought of as an extension of the Asian landmass found clear expression in Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s Letter from Sydney, published in 1829. Wakefield did not set foot in Australia or New Zealand, but he saw that as no impediment to lively speculation about the role of new colonies and how best to develop them in a systematic way. He noted how common it was for people to suppose that the Australasian settlements were lonely and terribly remote outposts of empire. Taking a contrary view, Wakefield pointed to the vast populations that lay to Australia’s north, not to raise the spectre of invasion and vulnerability, but to point to potential markets and the availability of a valuable source of labour. He particularly admired the Chinese, commending their industry, honesty and adaptability. With Chinese help, Wakefield believed that the Australian colonists could turn a ‘wilderness’ into a flourishing ‘garden’. This was perhaps the earliest expression of the belief that Asian ingenuity and skill when combined with Australian possibilities could shape a new future.

In the 1830s the Chinese could appear as a relatively docile population that presented no particular threat to Britain’s Australasian colonies. Fifty years later there were darker musings about the rising power of the East, stimulated by the spectacular emergence of Japan from obscurity to a position of some prominence on the world stage. Whereas Wakefield had seen Eastern energies and enterprise serving European ends, by the 1880s it seemed possible that a newly assertive Asia might choose to force Australia to become part of Asia. It is hard to know what weight to give the stories of Asian invasion and conquest that emerged in Australia in the 1880s, but such narratives have been persistent enough to suggest an ongoing apprehension about hostile Asian invasion – of forced incorporation into Asia.

The complexities of Australia’s position were comprehensively addressed by the Oxford-educated historian, former Victorian cabinet minister and educator, Charles H. Pearson, in National Life and Character: A Forecast, first published in 1894. Pearson’s book belongs squarely within the visionary trope although the future he envisaged was a decidedly clouded one. Pearson was persuaded that China was a rising power and well-positioned to alter the balance of global politics. He feared that the boundaries which had once separated the races would collapse. As Pearson’s new Asia grew ever closer to Australia, Europe appeared to recede and grow smaller. Pearson maintained that the rise of Asia also dictated a new role for Australia as the last continent available for the regeneration and renewal of the white races. While proximity to Asia made it more important than ever for Australia to remain white, there was in Pearson’s view a measure of unease about the feasibility of this project. Pearson subscribed to the climatic orthodoxies of his day, which dictated that it was impossible for Europeans to establish permanent settlements in tropical climates. The tropics constituted a non-European zone, yet large parts of northern Australia lay within the tropics. According to this view, much of Australia was climatically Asian and therefore unsuited for the development of a robust European community.

The racial health of white Australia was central to the discussion of climate and to considerations of Australia’s place in the region. From the late nineteenth century it was common to regard Asia as a source of disease. The Chinese were routinely blamed for outbreaks of smallpox and leprosy. Keeping Australia white and quarantined, literally and metaphorically, from disease was regarded as a necessary condition of Australian health and racial vitality. The writer and entrepreneur Randolph Bedford urged Australians to develop their continent as racially ‘clean’, which meant the total exclusion of non-Europeans and a clear separation between the Australian continent and Asia. Bedford wanted Australia to be treated as a continent that had no affinities, climatic or otherwise, with the region. Bedford based his expansive vision of Australian possibilities on the view that, as a sunny,
continental people, Australians would inevitably have a larger imaginary range than the small-minded, fog-bound, island-dwelling English. For Dr Raphael Cilento, one of Australia’s foremost authorities on tropical medicine and author of The White Man in the Tropics, keeping Australia separate from the nations to its north was imperative for the racial health of white Australia. In 1930 Cilento wrote: ‘If the health of Australia is to be conserved, she must be surrounded by healthy nations.’

Cilento was convinced that Australia was a healthy nation compromised by the diseased nations and races to its north.

The question of where Australia was located and what that location meant could never be a simple matter of geography and lines on the map. Dominance and sub-servience, conquest and enslavement, racial vitality and degeneration were all at play in attempts to define Australia’s relationship with Asia. As Australia achieved nationhood on 1 January 1901 a note of anxiety intruded upon the celebrations that attended the creation of the first new nation of the twentieth century. There was certainly expansive talk of the sunlit plains and vast potential of the continent, of a land flowing with milk and honey, but there was also an uneasy sense that this was still an invitingly ‘empty’ continent – that it was a tempting prize for the crowded nations to Australia’s north. And in that emptiness lay an uncertainty about Australia’s future.

Creating white Australia

It was by far the majority view that Australia should become a ‘new Britannia’, displaying all the pluck, energy and confidence that had made Britain the world’s pre-eminent empire builder. Australian cities were compared with their British models, while British practices and precedents shaped the political, legal and administrative institutions of the new Commonwealth. Yet, there could be no escaping the fact that all of this nation-building took place a world away from Britain in a vast continent as different as it was possible to be from the mother country in climate, landscape and geo-political setting. It was assumed that the British race would change as it adapted to these new circumstances. This was also the line adopted for over twenty years in the early twentieth century by the Australian Official Year Book, for which the Australian population was ‘fundamentally British, and thus furnishes an example of the transplanting of a race into conditions greatly differing from those in which it had been developed’. From 1908 to 1929 this summation of the Australian population was recycled in the sub-section entitled ‘Race and Nationality’ of the Year Book’s section on ‘Population’. Its assertion was that ‘At present the characteristics of the Australian population ... are only in the making’ and that an Australian is, consequently, ‘little other than a transplanted Briton’. The biological and social significance of this transplanting was yet to be seen, it argued, and would ‘ultimately appear in the effects on the physical and moral constitution produced by the complete change of climatic and social environment’. The people of Australia would emerge changed, it said, as a consequence of these ‘new conditions’, which ‘are likely to considerably modify both the physical characteristics and the social instincts of the constituents of the population’.

Among other modifications was the possibility that over time Australians might lose a number of their British characteristics. At the same time it was thought that they might also avoid the Asianizing influences commonly attributed to tropicality. Exponents of the middle way, such as Randolph Bedford, celebrated sunny Australia as a land with a Mediterranean future. Here, warmth was not only a climatic state but a desirable emotional state as well, a new and better condition of being. In the 1890s the prolific Dr Philip Musckett wrote eloquently on the subject of climate, diet and health in Australia, pointing out the benefits of a Mediterranean way of life and a diet that substituted fish, vegetables and wine for a relentless regimen of meat, stodge, tea and beer. In his celebration of the new race he saw emerging in Australia, the writer and man of letters Arthur Adams declared: ‘The sun gets into your blood and this is the first white race that has had that experience since the world began. Australia is the largest-sized and the most tremendous experiment ever tried in race-building, and Australia knows it.’ As profoundly different as their visions of Australia were, Arthur Adams and Kevin Rudd find some common ground in their belief that Australia would help forge a new future.

In these speculations, geography was primarily a matter of climatic affinity rather than geographical proximity; sun and soil were held to be the great architects of Australia’s future. Climate was destiny. As important as climate could seem in the process of making and unmaking civilizations, it was difficult to ignore the ceaseless battle for power and supremacy in shaping the world’s future. Through the inter-war years there was a growing conviction that the struggle for power in the Pacific would determine Australia’s future and, that being so, it seemed imperative for Australians to develop a closer knowledge of the region they inhabited. They were enjoined to look to Asia if they were to understand and influence their future. The accumulated warnings about the East and injunctions to know the Orient acted as a link, however unwelcome, to the region. Events in the East, it was argued, would inevitably resonate powerfully in Australia, requiring Australians to be constantly mindful of Asia.

It might also be argued that this enforced ‘mindfulness’ generated some resistance and resentment among a people who wanted to enjoy and develop an egalitarian, racially homogenous community. To be reminded that Asia was on the doorstep, allegedly watching developments in Australia, could seem distracting and intrusive; it was a reversal of the natural order, which permitted ‘whites’ to scrutinize ‘coloured’ people but not the other way round. This was just the kind of unwelcome change that Pearson had foretold. It was one thing to impose severe restrictions upon the entry of non-Europeans into Australia, but quite another to keep the idea of threatening or invasive Asia at bay. According to the Australian writer and diplomat, Walter Crocker, Asia had definitely invaded the imagination of white Australia: it was ‘the very apparition indeed’, he said, ‘that has haunted the fancy of many an Australian and has invigorated the immigration Code of his country’.

Competing understandings of the region

To suggest too sharp a distinction between ‘region’ as a known geography and ‘region’ as a psychological state is hardly adequate. Before the Second World War
there was no agreed description of the region. There were frequent references to the 'East' and the 'Eastern question', but the inclusions and exclusions encompassed by these terms were extremely fluid. Charles Pearson, for example, barely acknowledged the presence of Japan or the nations that now form part of Southeast Asia. He was almost entirely focused on China as a growing power and India as a vital British possession.

By the 1920s the 'Pacific' had emerged as the preferred collective term for a shared geography. In 1917, the Australian government established a 'Pacific Branch' to focus on questions of security and defence. Japan was at the forefront of this concern. By the mid 1920s the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) had emerged as the first international forum to focus on the region. Australian delegates attended biennial IPR conferences from 1925. Japan and China, the United States and Canada were among the major participants but Australia and New Zealand were also strongly represented. An IPR journal began publication in 1928 with the title, Pacific Affairs.

From an Australian point of view the 'Pacific' had distinct advantages as a regional descriptor. It included Asian nations, but it also ranged Australia alongside the 'white' nations of the Pacific. It diminished the sense that Australia faced a hostile coloured world on its own. The weighty presence of the United States was particularly reassuring in this respect. While the 'Pacific' emerged as the dominant term, it did not displace other usages. The first systematic study of Australia's place in the region, published in 1935, is titled Australia and the Far East. Even when the book was published there was a growing realization that Britain's 'Far East' was Australia's 'Near North'. The year before, in 1934, the Australian government acknowledged the importance of Asia to Australia's future when it sent what was termed a 'Goodwill Mission to the East' led by the attorney-general, John Latham. Latham visited Batavia, Tokyo and Shanghai, but Japan was the focus of his mission.

Down to the Second World War, China and Japan dominated Australian thinking about what constituted Asia. India can hardly be overlooked in this context, but so long as it appeared to be firmly under British rule it posed no particular threat to Australia's future and generated less attention accordingly. British India was primarily a nineteenth-century enthusiasm that reached a peak in Australia with the publication in 1893 of Alfred Deakin's Temple and Tomb in India and Irrigated India. There were no invasion novels featuring Indian adversaries acting singly or in collaboration with others. A similar point could be made about the Netherlands East Indies. Despite its proximity to Australia, there were no sustained concerns about these numerous and populous islands posing a threat to Australia for it was understood that the 'natives' were firmly under Dutch control. There also remained a considerable prejudice against the supposedly indolent 'natives' of tropical climes, who were believed incapable of mounting a serious challenge to the white races. China and Japan received the most attention in Australia largely because they appeared to pose the greatest threat to Australia's security. Moreover, theories of degeneration based on climate hardly applied to countries which experienced winters more severe than Australia's.

When the Australian writer and public intellectual Donald Horne reflected upon how the world looked to an Australian schoolboy growing up in the 1930s, he recalled maps of the world showing the vast sweep of the British Empire coloured in red. So long as substantial parts of Asia were coloured red, not least India, the dominant note was British and imperial. This was a global empire that resisted specific regional identifications. Young Donald was very aware of the empire and its stories of heroic endeavour, but unaware of how Australia related to Asia. That world was largely unknown and had no place in the school curriculum.13

Knowing the region was not helped by confusion in the naming of it. The uncertain terminologies used to describe the region are apparent in the first Australian journal devoted to an examination both of 'Pacific affairs' and Australia's relations with Asia. The journal emerged from the growing interest among intellectuals in Asian affairs. Both Latham's Goodwill Mission and the appointment in 1935 of trade commissioners to Batavia, Tokyo and Shanghai pointed to a closer and, some believed more independent Australian approach to developments in Asia. Yet, there remained the problem of what to call such a journal. In the event, it appeared as the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, an awkward title for a still awkward and poorly defined relationship and region.

One of the key figures in this publishing initiative was William Macmahon Ball, the Melbourne academic and writer. Ball would emerge as a leading advocate of closer ties with the region and urged greater knowledge of the countries and cultures of Asia. In similar vein, the first textbook that sought to locate Australia in a regional context was edited by R.M. Crawford, another Melbourne academic. Crawford's Himself and the Pacific was first published in 1941 and included, along with an historical overview of Australia and New Zealand as Pacific nations, chapters on the history of Japan and China, reinforcing the view that these two countries dominated Australian thinking about Asia. Crawford wrote: 'Today, Australians and New Zealanders have no doubt that their destiny is to be influenced by the fact that they border the same ocean as China, Japan, the United States and Russia. But our knowledge of the Pacific environment lags behind a sense of its importance to us.'14 While New Zealand is considered vital to this account of the region, smaller Pacific nations are not; also, Russia joins China, Japan and the United States as a key regional presence.

Crawford's appeal for a greater knowledge of the Pacific was a polite rephrasing of a persistent complaint, namely that the Australian population was stubbornly insular and worryingly ignorant of the turbulent world they inhabited. These were 'lotus eaters' occupying a 'fool's paradise', complacently unaware, so critics maintained, of the dangers they faced. From the 1880s one of the purposes of the invasion novel was to awaken slumbering Australia to a keener sense of patriotism and national purpose. The popular novelist Herbert Strang wrote The Air Scout, his story of an attempted Chinese invasion of Australia, which he subtitled A Story of National Defence.15 The story was fervently patriotic. A cartoon published in 1923 depicts Australia as an empty continent where a lanky fellow lay asleep under a tree. The crowded nations of Asia looked on, distinctly unimpressed by this show of uncaring indolence.16 According to this view, the surrounding nations were much more
aware of Australia than it was of them. The dominant theme of the invasion narrative was that these were dangerous people to antagonize, dangerously numerous, and resentful at being excluded and looked down upon by white Australia.

The examination of Australia's place in the region was an attempt to understand and overcome what critics considered Australian ignorance and insularity. It was also a project designed to define and clarify what was understood by 'Asia' and the 'Pacific'. The growing demand for more knowledge of Asia from the 1930s was frequently accompanied by a warning that a radical change of attitude towards the peoples and cultures of Asia was imperative. There were few critics of the White Australia policy in the 1930s, but there were those who warned that hostility towards coloured people would have to change. From the late 1930s there were increasing references to Australia's 'neighbours', a designation that acknowledged proximity, albeit in a rather vague way, while also creating an impression of Australian friendliness and hospitality.

Summarizing Australia's position in 1936, Macmahon Ball found a depth of Australian ignorance and apathy about Pacific affairs which was, he said, more appropriate to 'desert tribesmen' with 'a lowly state of mental growth' than to citizens of a modern democracy. It is an interesting passage explicitly designed, it would seem, to puncture the self-esteem of a comfortably British people, whose opinion of themselves was, in Ball's view, altogether too high. It was a deadly insult to suggest they were no better prepared and no wiser than the Aboriginal people they had supplanted. Ball's remarks are also a reminder that in any society an understanding of the geo-political landscape is a minority interest. In the 1930s, Australia had few groups with a formal interest in international affairs. At the outbreak of the Second World War no Australian newspaper had a foreign correspondent stationed in Asia, nor did the Australian Broadcasting Commission. Political scientists accept that foreign policy issues rarely determine the outcome of Australian elections.

The state of knowledge about the region on the eve of the Pacific war is nicely summarized by the publication of two books on Australia and Asia. The first, Jack Shepherd's *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East*, was published by the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1940. Shepherd retained the old terminology of the 'Far East' but noted how rapid change in the region had been, which made it impossible to predict with any confidence what might occur in the near future. It was one thing to know the region, but almost impossible to know what might emerge from one month to the next.

Paul McGuire's *Westward the Course: the New World of Oceania* carried a similar lament. The book was written in 1941 and went to press two days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As is the case with Shepherd, McGuire's book is a product of the intellectual awakening to Asia in the 1930s and, like Crawford's *Ourselves and the Pacific*, was presented as an urgent reminder of the need to know more about the region. However, McGuire's use of the term 'Oceania' underlines the fluidity that still surrounded attempts to describe where Australia was located in the world. The confusion is emphasized in the publisher's note to the New York edition of the book, where the object of McGuire's inquiry is referred to as the 'southwestern Pacific'. There is a familiar admission of ignorance followed by an injunction to know more: 'Interest has been developing slowly, and it took the Japanese attack on Honolulu to shake us into the general realization that Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya are in one sense very close and in every sense vital'. This was a view of the region premised on European interests and the continuation of Western dominance. Nonetheless, McGuire's book marked by a recognition that knowledge of Asia was in desperately short supply. It was equally a book about the need to understand the peoples and cultures of the region and the necessity of living on amicable terms with them. What also stands out in McGuire's account and which is of particular importance here is the conviction that in playing a larger role in Asia, Australia would not only provide leadership in the region but in doing so would discover a new and reinvigorated sense of national purpose. In discovering Asia, McGuire maintained, Australians would renew themselves.

**Australia as part of Asia**

If the intellectual foundations of the idea that Australia was part of Asia were laid in the 1930s, the Second World War, particularly the war in the Pacific, not only underlined and dramatized Australia's proximity to Asia; it also drew attention to Australia's distance from Europe. If Australia was inseparably a Pacific nation, it appeared necessary to consolidate ties with the United States and strengthen links to the region. One of the most trenchant critics of Australian policies and mentalities at this time was the novelist and newspaper editor, Brian Penton, author of a pugnacious book entitled *Advance Australia - Where?*, published in 1943, at the height of the war. Penton was scathing about Australia's failure through the inter-war years to recognize that its future lay in Asia, tracing this failing to a psychological dependence on Britain and a slavish attachment to English standards in all things. For Penton, 'it was clear as the sun at noon that Australia, sitting on a tough spot at the bottom of the Pacific, on the fringe of Asia, had one hope for the future: to find friends close at hand among her neighbours...' in the course of the war George Johnston, one of Australia's best known war correspondents, captured the mood with a racy little book entitled *Pacific Partners*, which sought to connect pioneering histories and shared values of Australians and Americans. American terminology also began to influence the way the major regions of the world were described. The term 'Southeast Asia' first came into use during or right after the Second World War when the United States of America and its allies imposed directional designations upon all quadrants of the globe, which had previously had more exotic and evocative but less precise terms. In this way, the undifferentiated 'Orient' (from the United Kingdom perspective) and 'Pacific' (from the United States perspective) soon became East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East (the latter being an inexact, colonially hold-over.) Hence, during the Second World War MacArthur's command was the 'South West Pacific Area', or SWPA (which did not enter the language), and Mountbatten's was the 'South East Asia Command', or SEAC (which did).
Soon after the war Johnston updated and affirmed another of the familiar tropes about Asia in a book entitled, *Journey Through Tomorrow*. Asia was not so much a defined region as a destiny. It was the future, but Johnston also suggested it was a return to the past: “There are many who believe we stand at the very beginning of another great cycle of civilisation; a cycle that some day will push the centre of gravity of civilisation back to the Orient . . . the soil from which our earliest civilisations sprang.” The ‘Orient’ was a hard term to relinquish, and especially so when the alternative was the dry terminology of military commanders.

In Johnston’s account ‘Asia’ was more a continent and a civilization, than a region. His focus was India, China, Tibet, Burma and Japan, with Tibet and its spiritual traditions taking centre stage. Burma is the only country in Southeast Asia to enter Johnston’s story, but more for its connection with China than on account of any specifically regional logic. In 1948, *Near North: Australia and a thousand million neighbours* brought together three of the great post-war themes: proximity, population pressure and the need to cultivate a neighbourly approach to the people of Asia. In his preface H.V. Evatt, minister for External Affairs in the Labor government, noted that following the war ‘it is now obvious to most Australians that we must continue to develop a policy of our own in relation to the Western Pacific and South Asian countries’. Less obvious perhaps was the continuing uncertainty of how to name and categorize the countries deemed to be of special interest to Australia. ‘Western Pacific’ echoed American terminology while ‘South Asia’ had a stronger northern hemisphere logic than an Australian one.

Neighbourly rhetoric reached a highpoint in the 1950s, but the neighbours had to be chosen with some care. The People’s Republic of China was considered ominously close, but it was impossible to regard a communist regime as a neighbour. Indonesia was a more suitable object of neighbourly emotion: it was close and the presence of a strong communist movement meant that it needed to be wooed and won over. The Colombo Plan, initiated in 1951, was the most ambitious attempt to win the goodwill of what Australia’s minister for External Affairs in the 1950s, Richard Casey, referred to as ‘free Asia’. The Colombo Plan provided an ideological overlay to the mapping of the region, targeting the nations that might be saved from communism, while avoiding those already lost, as source countries for Australia’s Colombo Plan students (an indication of what the major source countries were can be gauged from the 1956 figures in Table 4.1, Australia’s Colombo Plan students). There was no particular regional logic in this distribution, however.

Through the 1950s Richard Casey was Australia’s foreign affairs spokesman and the Menzies government’s most senior and articulate exponent of closer ties with Asia. He deployed the use of the term ‘white Australia’ and admonished journalists for using it, though without much effect. Casey was attached to the term ‘neighbours’ as a description of Australia’s relationship with Asia, bringing it into almost everything he wrote on the subject, including his book, *Friends and Neighbours: Australia in the World*. While neighbourly relations with the region were important to Casey, relations with Britain and the United States were absolutely vital in maintaining democracy: ‘Australia is a link in the world-wide chain of democratic countries that comprise the grand alliance against international communism. Our survival depends on all the links in the chain’.

In explaining ‘Australia’s Outlook’, Casey uses a phrase that leaps out at the modern reader. ‘Australia’, Casey writes in a quite unconscious way, ‘is geographically a remote country’. Europe encompassed what seemed important in the world and the distance from Australia to Europe was considerable. While there were countries in the space between Australia and Europe, they were evidently not countries to which Australia could feel closely related. Casey went on to note that in a rapidly ‘shrinking’ world the region had drawn much closer and become more inter-related. For Casey, the Colombo Plan was an impressive example of the cooperative demands of the new post-war order and, in making this point, he named ‘South and Southeast Asia’ as regions of particular importance to Australia. While the shifting array of terms to describe the region would continue, by the early 1950s South and Southeast Asia had replaced the ‘Pacific’ as preferred terminology. That said, it was clear that the United States was understood to be Australia’s senior partner in the region.

Casey went on to comment on the divide in Australia between its history as a community of British origin (no mention here of Aboriginal Australia) and its geographical location in Asia. An awareness of this paradox had been evident for some time. In 1910 the British writer, John Foster Fraser, had referred to Australia as an Asian landmass accidentally occupied by British settlers. Casey’s immediate predecessor as minister for External Affairs and one of the architects of the Colombo Plan, Percy Spender, was attracted to this account of Australia’s position: arguing that ‘No nation can escape its geography’, he continued:

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Table 4.1  Australia’s Colombo Plan students, 1956, by number and place of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of origin</th>
<th>No. of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Borneo</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sazawak</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Australia in Facts and Figures*, no. 52 (Canberra: Australian News and Information Bureau, Department of the Interior, 1956), 66.
 Even though our cultural ties have been and will remain preponderantly with Europe, there is nothing we can do to alter our geographical position. We live side by side with the countries of South and South-East Asia, and we desire to be on good-neighbour terms with them. 28

Casey summed it up more simply: 'we are a European community living alongside and working with Asia'. 29 But it was MacMahon Ball, writing in the 1930s, who most clearly drew attention to the natural outcome of this paradox, which led to Australia being given 'a picture of the world as seen through British eyes'. 30 He continually warned of the dangers of Australia's being too tied to British interests and policy, pointing out that 'in certain areas of the world, especially in the Pacific, Australia is likely to have special interests which are different from, even though not antagonistic to, the dominant British interests', before going on to cite Japan as a particular case in point. 31

It was clear that 'working with Asia' implied a good deal of practical assistance in helping raise living standards. Referring to Australia's new sense of obligation, Casey wrote: 'To London and Washington the problems of Asia may still be distant problems. To Australia they are part of our immediate environmental problem - almost a metropolitan problem'. 32 Asia had become Australia's unavoidable 'problem' and, in doing so, the region had become associated with instability, weakness and chronic disadvantage. One way or another, the region was understood to be troubled and, unless Australia stepped in, it might become much worse. While the region was an unavoidable commitment, other links and associations were more willingly embraced. Casey wrote warmly of the Commonwealth and of the English-speaking peoples:

We sincerely believe that the survival and progress of our present civilisation depends substantially on the English-speaking peoples and that British-American relations must be intimate and confident not only between Great Britain and the United States but also between Australia and the United States. Our intimacy with America means no weakening of our ties with Britain - it is in fact one aspect of Anglo-American co-operation. 33

The conviction that the world to Australia's north was dangerously unstable only added to the dilemma of knowing how to describe it. Writing for the Observer in 1958, the poet and academic James McAuley observed that 'the belt of protective powers which once safeguarded Australia has become a volcanic zone of incoherent nationalism, which can be brought to co-operate only with difficulty, or not at all...'. 34 This was not so much a region, in McAuley's view, an area that could be defined and comprehended, but an unpredictable tangle of primal forces. While McAuley's language is much more apocalyptic than Casey's, both named Southeast Asia as a dangerous power vacuum. For Denis Warner, then one of Australia's most experienced Asian correspondents, there was no much evidence, despite loud protestations to the contrary, that the Australian people had an interest in their Asian neighbours. 'The fact is', he declared, 'we don't know Asia and its people and we don't want to know them'. 35 As far as Warner could judge, mainstream Australia knew only that Asia was too close for comfort; otherwise, it was largely consigned to the dangerous unknown. Leaving aside whether Warner was right or wrong, his regular articles on Asian affairs in the Observer acknowledge that developments in Asia were of immediate importance to Australia, whether the population at large recognized the point or not.

Donald Horne, the editor of the Observer, and a trainee diplomat in the 1940s, was instrumental in having both foreign affairs and Australia's place in Asia included as regular topics in the paper. He titled an essay, in March 1959, 'Living with Asia' and was perhaps the first to use the phrase that others would adopt, among them the Labor politician Jim Cairns, who used it for the title of a book on Asia published in 1965. 36 Horne began his striking essay by noting that the term 'Asian' had unfortunate consequences when applied to the nations to Australia's north. He maintained that the term induced 'emotional responses' and created an impression that the region was not only mired in problems, but problems beyond the reach of diplomacy. Horne dismissed the view that Asia constituted a particularly intractable and dangerous world, noting that European diplomacy had long dealt with similar problems now designated as uniquely 'Asian'. He added that the business of seeing diplomatic relations with Asian countries as normal was made harder by the 'quite widespread feeling that we are finished anyway and that it does not matter much what we do...'. 37

Horne felt that Australia's foreign policy was caught somewhere between 'panic and sentimentality' with 'Asia' contributing disproportionately to the panic. While Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the West Papua dispute loomed large in Horne's discussion, the 'Asia' to which he referred was an inclusive category in which China was a central consideration. Horne's key point was not directed to an understanding of the region; he was attempting to address the manner in which accumulated and often unexamined speculation about dangerous Asia and vulnerable Australia made it appreciably harder to formulate an Australian foreign policy. He attributed the regular appeals to neighbourliness and expressions of friendliness towards Asia as rather hollow attempts to placate and soothe. For Horne, 'living with Asia' was imperative, but it was also a relationship troubled by distorted thinking that made it hard to find a measured, emotionally stable pattern of interaction.

The politics of Asian engagement

Australia's relationship with Asia has always been steeped in politics. It was the conservative United Australia Party that made the first tentative moves towards engagement in the 1930s with the Goodwill Mission followed by the appointment of trade commissioners to key Asian locations. It was the Menzies government that made the first diplomatic appointments to the region, sending John Latham to Japan, Frederic Eggleston to China and Richard Casey to Washington. This didn't stop Brian Penton, in his review of Australia's inter-war policies, accusing the conservative side of politics of being so attached to Britain that no independent Australia policy towards Asia could emerge. 38
The Labor tradition has even fewer claims to an independent policy in the interwar years, choosing to rest its case on the policies of H.V. Evatt, minister for External Affairs from 1941 to 1949 and those of Dr John Burton, the secretary of his department (1947-50). Evatt and Burton drew upon the arguments of geographical proximity which had emerged during the 1930s and added, over the following decade, a measure of support for Asian decolonization and the resolution of international disputes through the United Nations. Both Evatt and Burton made sizeable claims for the leadership Australia was able to provide in determining the future of the region. While Labor sought to show a friendlier face to Asia, its case was weakened by a commitment that bordered on zealotry to maintain a white Australia.

By the 1990s, the Labor government led by Paul Keating insisted that Labor was the only party with the policies and vision to engage Asia. Keating placed a particular emphasis on Indonesia, but his comments related to Asia as a whole. In making this claim, Keating insisted that it was the Whitlam Labor government that took the historically important initiatives that redefined Australia's place in the region: it was the first government to commit to a non-discriminatory immigration policy, thereby removing a long-standing source of resentment; secondly, in recognizing China, Whitlam laid the basis for an independent Australian foreign policy. Between 1983 and 1996 the Hawke and Keating Labor governments urged closer ties with the region and a deeper knowledge of Asian societies, cultures and languages. Where Bob Hawke spoke of the need for 'Asia-literacy', Paul Keating insisted on closer 'engagement' with Asia. In each case the enthusiasm for Asia was underscored by the economic benefits that Australia derived from the boom economies of Asia. Asia had been progressively redefined as a region of possibilities rather than a zone of entangling 'problems'. Moreover, the case for engaging Asia was closely linked to a domestic political agenda designed to modernize and internationalize Australian thinking and build a more competitive, export-oriented economy.

Just ahead of his election as prime minister in 1996, John Howard delivered a speech to ASIALINK, a Melbourne-based non-academic organization promoting public knowledge of Asia, in which he pointed out the Coalition's credentials in linking Australia more closely to the region: 'I am proud to address you tonight as Leader of a Party which has always been committed to developing the range and depth of Australia's relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. A Party with a long and proud record not only in policy achievement but also in leading the debate within the Australian community on Asia-Pacific issues'. It was an audience that wanted to be reassured that engagement would remain a priority under a Howard government. Where Keating invoked a Labor tradition of engagement, Howard saw the need to make a counter-claim. Accordingly, Howard emphasized the Coalition's role in creating a stable security environment through the Anzus Treaty and the Five Power Defence Agreement. He went on to cite the Colombo Plan and the 1957 trade agreement with Japan as Coalition initiatives. Howard ended more controversially with the claim that it was a Coalition government that finally put an end to the White Australia policy. The content of these competing party political claims is less important in this context than the fact that engaging Asia was sufficiently important to both sides of politics for speeches to be made on the superior leadership the respective parties had shown on this topic. Even so, it can be noted that whereas Keating was more inclined to refer to 'Asian engagement', Howard's preferred term was 'Asia-Pacific'.

Among the many 'Asians' invoked by politicians and commentators was the rhetorical Asia - that generalized collective of races, nations, cultures and religions that had traditionally given rise to a good deal of anxiety among the settler population of white Australia. This was the Asia that appeared to look critically upon Australia, resenting the space, freedom and opportunities its citizens enjoyed and criticizing their exclusivity. Donald Horne was one of the first to suggest that it might become a sign of Australian leadership to move beyond the view of 'Asia' as constituting a series of intractable problems and disabling threats to reach a point where dealing with Asia was part of the normal business of government. Paul Keating was convinced that Labor had shown itself to be the party that had moved beyond the old anxieties to a new and easy accommodation with Asia, reflected in his close relationship with Indonesia's President Suharto. The relationship with the Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed posed some difficulties but those continued after Howard came to power. Keating maintained that the Coalition in general, and John Howard in particular, were still locked into an older and more suspicious frame of mind about dangerous Asia, which effectively precluded both closer ties with the region and a significant role in shaping regional outcomes and institutions.

Keating's taunt that John Howard was incapable of showing real leadership on Asian engagement was not forgotten, and certainly not by Howard himself. He returned to the subject on his first official visit to Vietnam for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2006. The prime minister was reported to have said that Australia was 'now a natural, comfortable and permanent part of Asia'. In making this claim at a press conference, Howard reminded his audience that it was once alleged that he was not equipped to deal with Asia. He now felt that simply reminding his audience of this suggestion was sufficient for it to be dismissed as false. As prime minister, John Howard cultivated the 'aspirational' middle-class voter and it may afford some insight into his newly found sense of ease and familiarity with Asia that, too, was rapidly becoming middle class: 'The most amazing transformation is occurring. The centre of gravity of the world's middle-class is shifting to this part of the world and will remain here'.

It was clearly a comforting thought that a middle-class Asia would have a lot in common with Australia, the world's first suburban nation with a middle-class that had provided powerful, though not uninterrupted, electoral support for the Coalition parties from the 1950s onwards.

The return of Asia-literacy

Howard might have been content to imagine that he was speaking to like-minded friends across the region, but his primary concern remained to strengthen local
values rather than reinforce regional ones. This he did through urging a focus on Australian history and its narrative of a traditional Australian ethos. I have suggested elsewhere that this became the Howard government’s means of neutralizing the Hawke–Keating government’s emphasis on Asia-literacy and its engagement with the region.\(^4\) For the Rudd Labor government, however, picking up the baton of Asia-literacy that had been allowed to drop by the Coalition under Howard seemed the natural move to make, given Rudd’s own involvement in the genesis of the strategy, his diplomatic background and his knowledge of China. Just as it had formerly been under Hawke and Keating, the importance of a mutual ability to understand and effectively communicate between Australia and its Asian neighbours was once more elevated to a position of significance in the government’s thinking on foreign relations. The return to Asia-literacy was accompanied by a domestic agenda of engagement with indigenous Australia and the formal acknowledgement of the injustices they had suffered at the hands of successive Australian governments.

Much interest was engendered, in the region as well as at home, over the extent of Kevin Rudd’s personal connection with China, where he had studied and served as a diplomat; his grasp of Mandarin even gave him an unrivalled opportunity to upstage Howard at the APEC meeting in Sydney in September 2007. China was woven into Rudd’s personal narrative in a way that caused some to wonder what it might mean for Australia’s relations with other Asian nations, some of whom were already uncomfortable about China’s dominance of the region as an emerging great power economically, politically and militarily. Asked during ABC television’s Q&A programme, in May 2008, why he had studied Mandarin, Rudd replied: ‘I was always interested in China and interested because, as a kid growing up, I thought it would have a big impact on us in the future, and it’s kinda turned out that way’\(^;\). Ruddy’s personal engagement with China led some to suggest the possibility of its over-weighting Chinese foreign policy with an unhealthy closeness to China. This is to overlook the nature of the relationship under Howard, which saw a great expansion in economic inter-dependence with China, something that was touted as giving Australia an advantage in the current global economic hard times. So long as the Chinese economy continued to expand, both the previous and the current governments were happy to find virtue in the strength of the relationship.

There was no doubting the conviction behind the Rudd government’s engagement with Asia, even if for some there still remained a question over which ‘Asia’. From the start, however, while acknowledging the immense influence China through its size alone has on the region we inhabit, Rudd continually sought to identify the region much more broadly, arguing that ‘we are at the beginning of an Asia-Pacific century’. In an address to the Asia Society just seven months after being elected Rudd indicated that Asia-Pacific relations were being placed at the forefront of government policy, as what he described as ‘the third pillar of the Government’s foreign policy – our policy of comprehensive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region’.\(^;\) A key element of this fresh engagement was the government’s determination to turn Australia into the ‘most Asia-literate country in the collective West’.\(^4\) Rudd has consistently argued since the 1990s that we need to build our relationships across the whole Asia-Pacific region by becoming much more educated about our neighbours and their languages and cultures. As he pointed out to his television audience during the Q&A programme:

the rise of China, the rise of India, and the continuing role of Japan and our nearest neighbour Indonesia, are going to so fundamentally shape this country’s future . . . in all its dimensions – security policy, strategic policy, economic policy, social policy, language, culture, the rest. Frankly, if I’ve got a hope it’s that we become not just the most Asia-literate country in the collective West but also the most Chinese-literate country, because it’s going to be such a huge impacting factor for Australia’s future\(^4\).

The importance of ‘Asia-literacy’ to the government’s strategy for preparing Australia for the ‘Asia-Pacific century’ was also signalled by Julia Gillard, then deputy prime minister and minister for Education, only a month after the election, when raising the issue of Asian language education with State and Territory leaders at the December 2007 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting. She pointed out that Australia had a lot of catching up to do in this regard:

We’re a long way behind where we need to be. Obviously, speaking the languages of our region is vital for this nation’s future. The former government, the Liberal Party, ended Australia’s Asian languages and studies program in Australian schools in 2002. That was the wrong decision.\(^4\)

Some might see an irony in the Rudd ‘Asia-literacy’ agenda once again being brought up at COAG. This was the same venue at which 13 years previously the whole process had been originally set in motion following the presentation of a report on Asian languages and the economic future of Australia from a specially constituted COAG working party chaired by a Queensland public service minister who was then little-known (nationally), Kevin Rudd.\(^4\) While this report was not the first to recommend boosting the learning of Asian languages, it did set out a detailed, costed national programme aimed at enabling school students to graduate from Year 12 in 2006 having completed a 10-year study of an Asian language.\(^4\) As a consequence, the programme was set in motion in September 1994 when the Keating Labor government set up the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSSAS) taskforce charged with coordinating and overseeing the strategy (actual implementation being the responsibility of States and Territories) – the very taskforce that the Howard government axed in 2002, thus cutting short the projected study-time for the students who had already commenced the programme.\(^4\)

The difference was that, whereas in 1994 the effectiveness of the programme was compromised by reluctance on the part of the Commonwealth to fully share in its funding, after 2007 Rudd was now in a position to enforce his vision. In the May 2008 Budget, the Rudd–Gillard commitment was cemented by new funding provisions setting aside $62.4 million to establish a new National Asian Languages and Studies Program (NALSSP), with Julia Gillard this time placing
the programme within the context of ‘global challenges such as climate change and regional security’, arguing that ‘Familiarity with the languages and cultures of Asian neighbours will make it easier to work with regional neighbours to positively address these challenges’.56

India: part of Asia?

One regional neighbour, whose national languages have not so far been part of an Asian languages programme in Australian schools, had been watching the Rudd government’s moves with particular interest. India, with a new aspiring and prosperous middle-class currently estimated to reach about 583 million people by 2025, has a presence in the region that cannot be ignored. It has obvious strategic concerns over Chinese expansion and views Rudd’s apparent closeness to China with some suspicion. The Indian commentator B. Raman, a retired member of the Indian Cabinet secretariat, and now with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, has drawn attention to what he sees as Rudd’s China-focus. Writing in April 2008 of Rudd’s recent overseas tour, Raman observed that ‘China, China, China, China and more of China was the recurring theme of his speeches in the countries visited by Mr. Rudd’ and that ‘His indifference to India was apparent . . . Wherever he spoke, his preoccupation was with Australia’s relations with the US and China. Hardly any reference to India’.55

India has not been as central to Australian foreign policy considerations in recent times as its size and growing economic power might suggest: there has been no Indian prime ministerial visit for 20 years and relations over this period have been troubled by what the Lowy Institute commentator Rory Medcalf characterized as ‘frustrating bilateral differences, not to mention patches of sheer indifference’.55 Yet, it might strike one as odd that some of the things India and Australia have in common have not made for a closer relationship: both countries are federalized democracies; they also have a shared heritage as part of the British imperial and have been long-standing trading partners, since the nineteenth century. And more recently, as Medcalf points out, India has emerged as a major export market for Australia, and ‘People of Indian origin are changing Australia’s society and economy overwhelmingly for the better, as a major source of overseas students and desperately-needed skilled migrants’.55 Through 2009 and into 2010 Australia’s relationship with India has sustained serious and possibly long-lasting damage as attacks on Indian students continue in Melbourne, drawing accusations of racism in the Indian media. These episodes have re-awakened many of the ghosts from Australia’s past as a white nation opposed to Asian immigration.

Some have argued that attacks on students are not all that is impeding the future progress of the relationship; there is also the unresolved question of uranium sales. According to the journalist and Asia-watcher Greg Sheridan, ‘the enormous damage Australia has suffered in India as a result of the attacks is not so much with the policy class . . . but with the great Indian public’. While Rudd, on his visit to India in November 2009, was attempting to engage with that ‘policy class’, he had to acknowledge that the export of uranium was ‘the one “unresolved” part of the energy relationship’. In Sheridan’s judgement, so long as that remained the case the Rudd government’s effort to raise the status of the relationship would fail.56

It can also be argued that Australia in the past has taken India, as a former imperial colony, too much for granted. Never regarded in the popular consciousness as a threat, historically, in the way other Asian countries have been, India shares some things in common with Australia, one being language, which also makes it less straightforward to fit India into the ‘Asia-literacy’ paradigm. The fact that Indian politicians and officials, and its educated classes, speak English so readily has led Australians to believe that we are always talking the same language. The study of Indian sub-continental languages and India’s history and culture in Australian universities has been sporadic and is weaker now than in the 1960s–70s. Equally, Australian diplomatic representation in India has been minimal, especially compared to Australian representation in China. As Rory Medcalf points out:

DFAT has not cultivated a single Hindi-speaker in a decade . . . to consider it not to be worth schooling a single Australian diplomat in that language is a false economy, not to mention an insult to a major world civilization.57

An Asia Pacific community

Rudd had been careful to include India in his public pronouncements, naming it early on as one of the other equally significant emergent powers in the region apart from China that Australia needed to engage. Reinforcing the Labor government’s commitment to building Australia’s relations with the countries to its north was Rudd’s desire to move beyond the current regional architecture of bilateral arrangements and structures such as APEC and ASEAN, to build a new structure which would embrace India as much as other states in a broader re-defined region stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean:

We need to have a vision for an Asia Pacific Community, a vision that embraces:

- A regional institution which spans the entire Asia–Pacific region – including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region.
- A regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security.58

While it is yet to be seen whether Rudd’s proposal for a new ‘regional institution’ will garner support at home or in the region, a number of commentators have pointed to the more intangible advantages of becoming a more Asia-literate nation: it goes to the heart of Australia’s new relationship with Asia and the terms of engagement that allow the relationship to flourish politically, culturally and
By the end of the nineteenth century a narrative had already been established for Australia's relationship with the region to its north. There was certainly anxiety at being taken over or submerged by populous Asia, but also a persistent belief that as an advanced democracy Australia might emerge to play a leadership role in the region. With the growth of Asia's influence after the Second World War there were those who argued that Australia's security and future prosperity would depend on how well we understood 'Asia'. The sense of urgency over Asian engagement and Asia-literacy grew, fuelled particularly by the growing economic strengths of our northern neighbours. By the late twentieth century it seemed more important than ever for Australia to be accepted as part of Asia. While a more powerful Asia generated some unease about the shifting balance of power in the region, it also played to a long-standing search for a leadership role for Australia in regional affairs, a presence, commensurate with her status as a free-standing continent. In this search for regional influence the way Australia has been viewed and received in the region is crucial. Kevin Rudd’s ambition to create a new Asia-Pacific community encountered many barriers not least, perhaps, the ongoing suspicion that Australia has no deep affinity for the region or, worse, harbours racist hostilities to non-Europeans. As the recent and relentlessly bad press that Australia has received in India demonstrates, seeing Australia as outside Asia has by no means been consigned to the past.

Notes

4. Randolph Bedford, 'White, Yellow and Brown', Lone Hand, 1 July 1911.

55 Medcalf.


57 Medcalf. He also asks, if Canberra deploys diplomats in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, why not also in Mumbai, Chennai or Kolkata?

58 Rudd, ‘It’s Time to Build an Asia Pacific Community’.
