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‘Peaceful and Secure’: Reading Nazi Germany through Reason and Emotion

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‘Peaceful and Secure’: Reading Nazi Germany through Reason and Emotion

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on Hitler’s own description of his early membership in the Nazi Party, this paper argues for the usefulness of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ as conceptual tools in understanding how ‘ordinary’ Germans responded to the rise of Nazi Germany. Using specific case-studies of existing religious communities, it focuses on delineating methods of connection to the new state out of the complexity of the ‘experience’ of 1933. These groups form particularly useful examples given they held their own local and regional loyalties, as well as holding loyalties to the nation, their faith and the community of their faith. The paper concludes that the ‘new Germany’ (the Nazi state) was supported on the basis of what were seen as ‘rational’ grounds, but that the stronger attraction was the abstract and emotional connection of the local nation, whereby the supposed cohesive national community was represented at a local level as united, ‘peaceful and secure.’
‘Peaceful and Secure’: Reading Nazi Germany through Reason and Emotion

In his work Inside Nazi Germany Detlev Peukert argued the necessity of understanding how ‘ordinary people’ responded to life under the National Socialists.1 Given that (as he noted) the ‘experiences of “ordinary people” are “contradictory and complex,”’ the means by which they connected to the Nazi state were similarly complex. This paper is primarily an argument in favour of the concepts of ‘reason’ (Vernunft) and ‘emotion’ (Gefühl) as useful tools in analysing and categorising such interactions. To move this from a purely theoretical consideration, concrete examples are provided through brief and specific considerations of two small Christian communities. These have been chosen as case-studies largely because they possessed their own strong points of self-identification, and clearly depict the necessity for such conceptual tools.

The two groups considered are both Protestant, and are from the southern German region of Württemberg: the Korntal Brethren and the Temple-Society, established by father and son (Gottlieb Hoffmann and Christoph Hoffmann).2 The Brethren were theologically conservative, arising out of Württemberg Pietism, and continuing to adhere to an orthodox faith that stood on the grounds of the Augsburg Confession. They accepted the concepts of the triune God, of sin, of Christ as the son of God, and of salvation by God’s grace through Christ. They aimed for an active Christianity in their community, accepted that the Bible was divinely revealed truth, and accepted the means of grace through the sacraments of baptism and communion.

By contrast, the Templers were theologically liberal, and by 1877 had moved to a position that is akin to Unitarianism. They viewed Jesus as an inspirational model, but did not accept his divinity. They rejected the concept of the ‘holy trinity’ and did not accept the necessity of sacramental rites like baptism or holy communion.3 They held a firm belief in the perfectibility of humankind, if the world followed the example of Jesus, arguing for ‘the spiritual and physical perfecting of man.’4

These communities were both universalist (due to their Christian religion) and particularist—having been founded with the notion that they would draw together Christians of a ‘truth faith’ to live in communities which practiced an active or lived Christianity. The Brethren itself was established under royal privilege in 1819 in Korntal (outside Stuttgart) as a conjoined ‘political-religious’ community, and in 1926 the leader of the Brethren described it as a ‘theocratic commonwealth.’5

3 Christoph Hoffmann, Sendschreiben über den Tempel und die Sakramente, das Dogma von der Dreieinigkeit und von der Gottheit Christi, sowie über die Versöhnung der Menschen mit Gott (Stuttgart: J.D.Bock, 1878), Christoph Hoffmann, Viertes und fünftes Sendschreiben über Wesen und Einrichtung der christlichen Gemeinde, ed. Dr. J.H. (Canstatt: Wolfgang Druck, 1905). These are the published versions of the series of circular letters that Hoffmann sent to his followers. See also Sauer, Holy Land, 56. They had connections to Unitarians and Quakers, as well as ‘Universalists’ and other British and American organisations, and participated in international gatherings like the 1910 ‘Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Advancement’. Die Warte des Tempels Jahrgang-78 (1922) : 21, Jahrgang-88 (1931): 65-66. This is the ‘Templer Sentinel Yearbook’ (Warte JG).
The Temple-Society (founded in 1854 as the ‘Society for bringing together God’s people in Jerusalem’) moved even further in this direction, as they had both a community in Stuttgart (Degerloch) and established a series of colonies after the model of Korntal in what was then Palestine under Ottoman rule.6 These ethno-religious communities were developed between 1868 and 1908.7 Communities such as the Korntal Brethren and Temple-Society formed fixed points of reference for their members. As micro-societies that were already self-defined and focused inward, they constitute particularly interesting subjects in their responses to wider changes, especially as spheres of the public and private became blurred in the ‘Third Reich.’ Yet it should also be noted that by the late nineteenth century they already had a conflated national-religious identity, a point that they held in common with other German Protestants.

Such intersections between German Protestantism and nationalism, including the concept that Germans were a ‘chosen people’ has been considered at length by Hartmut Lehmann.8 As Thomas Nipperdey has argued, from 1871 (the foundation of the German Reich) many Protestants accepted a national German identity and began to conflate religious and national agendas such that the ‘foundation of the Reich’ became the ‘completion of the Reformation.’9 The year 1870 represented not simply a victory over France (in the Franco-Prussian war), but of Wittenberg over the ‘Babylon of Paris, over atheism, Ultramontanism, and revolution.’

This is applicable to both the Brethren and Templers, who remained politically conservative, adhering not only to a local identity, but also to a regional and national identity. They were staunchly ‘Swabian’ and proudly German.10 Their identity might perhaps be best conceived through the image of expanding concentric circles, with identity and loyalty located first in the smaller community of the religious group, then the regional ‘national’ identity of Swabia, often referred to as

(Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic, 2010), 329-50.
7 The Temple Society: An Overview, (Melbourne: Temple Society Australia, 1986), Appendix 2, Templar Handbook, (Melbourne: Temple Society Australia, 1992), 119-22. The colonies were Haifa (1869), Jaffa (1869), Sarona (1871), Rehphaim-Jerusalem (1873), Wilhelma (1902), Betlehem in Galilee (1906) and Waldheim (1908). They maintained a presence there until 1948. Walhalla and Neuhardthof became branch settlements of existing colonies. Waldheim was a Protestant group related to the Templers, which formed when a religious split occurred. There were also Templers at Nazareth and Tiberias. Jaffa and Sarona joined in 1929 (Jaffa-Sarona), see Letter, Wilhelm Aberle to German Consul, 24 June 1929, in ‘Unterlagen des Deutschen Konsulats in Jerusalem,’ in Abschriften aus dem Staatsarchiv des Staates Israel; Abteilung 67 (Jerusalem: 1886–1939), 366-67. This is held in the Temple-Society Archive in Germany. Jaffa had previously been colonised by two American enterprises, a ‘missionary farmer-colony’ in 1854 that ended in 1858 and the millenialist Adams colony (1866-1868). Harold Davis, ‘The Jaffa Colonists from Downeast,’ American Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1951): 344-56.
9 Thomas Nipperdey, Religion im Umbruch: Deutschland, 1870–1918 (München: C.H. Beck, 1988), 94. He contrasts this to 1866, when ‘the majority of the official churches (Amtskirchen), the positive orthodox and pietistic pastors and lay-people were *reserved* about nationalism, preferring to preserve regional versions of ‘throne and altar’ (93). On the hope for ‘religious, moral, and social revival’ in 1871: Lehmann, Pietismus in Württemberg, 355.
the homeland (Heimat) or the ‘closer fatherland,’ and then the nation as represented by the German state created in 1871.

Fittingly, in describing the impact that the rise of the Nazis had on Korntal, the mayor worked his way back through these circles to the individual: ‘our Reich, our closer fatherland, our community and ourselves.’ These layers of identity were not separate. Part of the loyalty to the larger ‘nation’ derived precisely from the emphasis placed on such in the local religious community, and this requires some consideration of nationalism and religion.

**Nationalism and Religion**

In intellectual history, there are a variety of issues that arise from the question of interactions between nationalism and religion. In modernity concerns certainly arise when there is too close an interrelationship between the modern secular state and religion. In a contemporary sense this is clearly a point of major interest in the context of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011.

Yet one can also look back to the responses to George Bush and his support from the ‘religious right’ (or to current ‘Tea Party’ candidates) to see such concerns as they arise in a democratic state, and the conceptual assumptions that underlie them—principally that matters of faith should be separate from matters of state. Perhaps more accurately, it is believed that a dividing line must be drawn between matters that are viewed as irrational and those that are viewed as rational.

In this construct, belief is seen as individual, rather than collective, and the necessity of keeping the nebulous views that exist in a democracy somehow cohesive is held as paramount, superseding beliefs held by leaders of the state or by either powerful minority or majority groups. In notions of the democratic-liberal nation, which often forms the basis for such discussions, tolerance is seen as a paramount principle. The fact that the vast majority of a population may adhere to one form of religious faith by no means leads to the conclusion that all citizens should be forced to adhere to this same faith, or to any religion whatsoever. This aspect existed already in the period of the French Revolution, when rights were granted to religious minorities (Protestants and Jews).

Of course, parties seeking to gain power in a democracy are based on political beliefs, but these are seen as falling into the category of the rational, and are designed to appeal (as much as possible) to all segments of society. This is well and good for the political perspective, but historically many states have operated on the assumption of what might be termed a collective irrational belief. That is, that citizens of the state hold the same belief, whether this be political, a belief in the state itself (and its ‘manifest destiny’), the state as represented by a monarch, the nation represented by the state, or a religion. It has been argued that pre-1918 Germany was such a state, with many political

11 File KA9, Stadtarchiv Korntal-Münchingen.
12 These considerations draw on discussions at the Alfred Deakin Research Institute workshop ‘Religion and the Nation,’ held 22 September 2011.
14 Protestants gained these rights from the National Assembly in 1789, but Jews gained such rights only by 1791. Relevant documents are accessible via the George Mason University project on the French Revolution: ‘Speech on Religious Minorities and Questionable Professions’ http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/284/ and ‘Admission of the Jews to Rights of Citizenship’ http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/287/
15 This list is clearly not a definitive one. Anecdotal evidence of such a belief can be found in the *British Dominions Yearbook* series. Produced by an insurance company, and aimed at businessmen, the yearbooks still contain sentiments such as faith in [Britain’s] mission as an instrument of destiny: *The British Dominions Year Book 1920*, ed. Edward Salmon and James Worsfold (Melbourne: Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Company, Limited, 1920). An example of general political belief is an assumption that a belief
parties in the Weimar Republic wishing to return to an idea of the 'collective,' viewing democracy as far too individualistic, divisive and chaotic.16

The modern conjoining of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ into the term ‘nation-state’ is a pertinent example of such a belief, representing the view (rising during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) that states should be formed around nations, communities which, it was assumed, held values in common. In turn, this indicates a belief that national groups have characteristics peculiar only to them and common to all members of the group, creating the possibility of defining the ‘nation.’

As described in a Nazi publication on ‘German Law,’ ‘their own understanding of the ‘national community’ or ‘community of the people’ (Volksgemeinschaft) was such a notion: ‘This idea of the people is based on the fact that their members have a homogenous national character.’17 Hitler himself subscribed to a belief in the ‘nation-state,’ stating: ‘The State and the People are one and the same body.’18 Of course, he drew borders around a nation (or Volk) on the grounds of race, so that during the period of Nazi rule, legal and territorial boundaries were created to exclude from the state those who were viewed as outside the nation (Jews), and include those who were viewed as part of it (the annexation of Austria in the Anschluß).

A useful separation between the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ can be made by using Friedrich Meinecke’s terms Kulturnation and Staatsnation.19 A Kulturnation signifies a ‘nation of culture,’ an identification of the self with others based on similarity of language, customs, understandings: in many ways the ‘imagined community’ of Benedict Anderson’s formulation.20 Karl Deutsch points out that members of such a nation can ‘communicate quickly and effectively with each other over long distances and about a variety of themes and matters.’21 This form of nation can exist without requiring a state—though the desire for statehood is often strongly connected to such cultural identification.22 A Staatsnation is the ‘state nation,’ or the ‘political nation,’ a political community with the apparatus of a state forming a collective based on statehood. This is different to a ‘nation-state’ because states can also be multi-national.

The Kulturnation is that of a cohesive community, based on recognition of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’: our culture and their culture. It is a jealous form of association. It is also ‘latent’ as a collective identity and multi-faceted, represented by everything from language to food or dance.23 It is slippery as a concept, and the assumed group cohesion may be challenged. For example, from within members of the political nation (citizens of state) might assert local or regional differences against the wider cultural nation, or they might refuse to accept other Kulturnation members, although these latter

in democracy is held by the citizenry within democracies.

21 Karl Deutsch quoted in Peter Alter, Nationalism (Great Britain: Edward Arnold, 1994), 29.
22 Witnessed, for instance, in the Basque separatist movement.
23 Giesen argues that if the construction of the collective were not latent, ‘the foundation, which secures identity, would itself fall prey to the suspicion of being contingent’: Berghard Giesen, Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12-13.
see themselves as being (for example) German—as they define it and believe it to be defined by the entire group ‘Germans.’

Of pertinence here is the critique made by Emil Lehmann in the late nineteenth century, responding to the rise of antisemitism in Germany, especially the concept that to be Jewish meant disloyalty, a dual nationality. Lehmann argued that this was an attempt to split and separate Jews from their own identity: ‘we who are Germans, who think in German ways and feel German, will not allow these attacks to sway us from loving our German fatherland and our homeland.’ In the Nazi period, a very self-aware account of such a process can be found in Edwin Landau’s memoir, where he described the ‘burial’ of his German identity due to Nazi persecution.

It is useful to add to these terms the Rassenation (racial nation) of the Nazis, and the Christlichnation (Christian nation) that was advocated by both Catholics and Protestants in Germany. Technically, both of these fit within Meinecke’s Kulturnation, but their specific characterisation is useful, as they indicate the boundaries being drawn around the ‘nation.’

In Nazism, the nation was always racially defined, and I have used the term ‘nation-race’ to clarify this very particular definition. Undoubtedly National Socialism also defined the nation-race by cultural practices and physical characteristics, but both were attributed to race, as can be seen in Hitler’s comment that ‘everyone who is a German at all has the same blood, has the same eyes and speaks the same language.’ What Nazism offered was a salvational nationalism, the core of which was ‘redemptive antisemitism,’ and Hitler saw the state itself purely as a means of ‘preservation and advancement’ for the nation-race.

In terms of the Christlichnation, belief became integral to the foundation of any state construction. The ‘cultural nation’ of such a state was Christian, and it was believed the state apparatus should support, protect and promote this Christian nation. The Templers and Brethren certainly had established their smaller communities precisely on the grounds of religious belief, and along the line that such religious communities offered the possibility of a Christian state, were their ideals to be adopted on a larger scale. In the minds of the founders of the groups, and in the minds of many community members, there was no difference between their faith and their state. During the Weimar period, similar notions could also be found in broader arguments around secularisation.

In comparing responses to the Nazi regime within such constructs of identity, it is crucial to have conceptual tools that can help to clarify positions taken towards the ‘Third Reich,’ such those of Gefühl (feeling or emotion) and Vernunft (reason or rationality). One very good reason for this choice is provided by Hitler, who himself wrote of joining the ‘German Workers’ Party’ in exactly these terms. As he put it in Mein Kampf, it was principally emotion (Gefühl) and intuition, not reason


30 This group, the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or DAP became the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP in February of 1920. One pamphlet advertising the party at this point in time contained both
discovery
application
excellence

(\textit{Vernunft}), that led him to join this small group.\footnote{Fritz Maier-Hartmann, \textit{Dokumente der Zeitgeschichte}, 4th ed., vol. 1 (München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP/F. Eher Nachf., 1942), 100-101.} While this was propaganda and self-promotion, it consciously privileged emotion and advocated its role in drawing support for the party.

The question of connection to the National Socialists, then, lies roughly along two lines. One is in regard to the Weimar Republic, in that many people seem to have been attracted to the Nazis because they offered a way out of the ‘disgrace’ of Germany, or because the Nazi Party and its ideology had nothing to do with the current government, or even with the current system of government. This was something the Nazis themselves certainly emphasised. The failed 1923 Putsch was a clear indication of their intent to overthrow the republican system, and even later, when the Nazis were succeeding in elections (having won 107 seats in the national parliament), Hitler publicly proclaimed to the Party faithful:

Parliament is not the goal, but the means to an end. We are not a parliamentary party out of conviction, that would be a misinterpretation. We are a party out of compulsion and out of necessity….The Constitution forces us to employ these tactics.\footnote{A\textsuperscript{d}olf Hitler, \textit{Mein Kampf} (München: Franz Eher/Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1936), 242-43.}

This line of attraction was connected to the perceived social and political achievements of the Nazis, of the possibility that they could remove the ‘shame of Versailles’ and improve economic conditions within Germany. Hitler’s actual achievements in regards to foreign policy fit within this framework. The connection is what might be termed an attraction of the rational, based on the offer of a strong government solving societal problems. By denoting this ‘rational’ I do not intend to imply that the actual reasons for support were rational, or that there is not also an emotional aspect to the process.

To describe this another way, Nazi promises to solve unemployment or take a tougher approach to crime could be seen as ‘reasonable’ policies. Of course, to focus only on these aspects in Nazi politicking meant avoiding the violent, revolutionary-radical and antisemitic aspects of the Nazi Party.\footnote{See Pierre Ayçoberry, \textit{The Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945}, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 1999), 17-25 (SA), 26-37 (SS), Richard Bessel, \textit{Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925–1934} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).} These were perfectly clear, to the extent that even a statistical yearbook in Württemberg noted that the Communists and Nazis were both ‘decided opponents of the current state.’\footnote{Statistisches Landesamt, \textit{Jahrgang 1930/31}, Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932), 81.}

A parallel term to \textit{Vernunft} is the attraction of the political. Both are intended to signify support for either the proposed social and political changes of the Nazis, or in their actual actions after 1933. This form of support did not, however, involve belief in Nazi ideology \textit{per se}, but a belief in Nazism as a political ideology \textit{because} of its stated practical purposes or impact on German life.

Into this category then fits the perceived ‘positive’ effects of a Nazi regime, such as lower crime rates, a stronger nation, a powerful leader and communitarian ideas—exemplified by the Winter Relief Programme (\textit{Winterhilfswerk} or WHW). Not least of these ‘positive efforts’ was the Nazis’ ultra-conservative vision for family life, an idea still occasionally making headlines in Germany—as for instance in the controversy surrounding Eva Herman’s public statement that ‘high regard for the mother’ had been an aspect of the Nazi era and that ‘family, children and motherhood’ were ‘supported in the Third Reich, [but] were subsequently done away with by the 68ers.’\footnote{The \textit{Australian} newspaper, 19 October 2007.}

A second line of attraction to the Nazi Party was to Nazism itself. This led people to support the Nazis on grounds of the ‘irrational’, of an emotional belief in Nazism (\textit{Gefühl}). It is this method of support founded in faith that has attracted literature on Nazism as a ‘political religion,’ and much of
the focus of such emotional attachment was Nazi ideology. This is not to imply that every aspect of Nazi ideology was accepted by all of those who supported the Party on ideological grounds, but the method of interaction with the state was through feeling. As with Vernunft, it led to faith in the regime, but in an attachment based on Gefühl the social and political achievements of the Nazis were viewed as secondary to belief.

George Mosse has argued that this attraction of the irrational is also the means by which the Nazis could achieve success.36 He argued that it was the essentially religious character of much of the Nazi celebrations and methods (particularly their similarity to religious liturgical forms) that helped them to become a ‘mass movement.’37 Using existing nationalism and religious sentiment meant that people could accept a Party that was, at its core, selling salvation.

Though interrelated, the difference between the two methods of connection can be seen in their standard locations. The locale for Gefühl was the Nuremberg rally grounds, or the memorial services for fallen heroes, where individuals could be swept up in fervour as part of something larger than themselves.38 It was also at such celebrations that the mystical elements of Nazism were most prominent, such as the ‘blood flag’ ceremony, where Nazi banners were consecrated through contact with the flag from the failed Munich Putsch (November 1923). In line with this, the memorial day at the Feldherrnhalle in Munich and the corresponding mythology surrounding those Nazis killed during the Putsch was prominent in the Korntal school journal, particularly in articles from students who attended such events. Consistently, the primary point of attribution to these events was feeling, of ‘an experience one will never forget.’

On occasion, Nazis openly admitted the power of such events. A Blaubeuren district leader spoke on ‘The New Cult’ in 1935 at an ‘educational evening.’ He described Nazism as consciously experiential: ‘As the church itself gradually developed its cultic structure, so National Socialism achieves in its festivals its visible and emotionally active form of cult.’ Nuremberg festivals gathered ‘the faithful’ together, and 9 November celebrations were ‘not a matter of cool understanding (Verstand), but an experience that one will never forget.’40

In the realm of Vernunft, the Nazis relied on the media, especially newspapers. Reports on the actions of the Nazi government and the effects of their policies (even if fabricated) allowed people to believe that the Nazis could ‘rationally’ be supported, as they were saving the German state.41 Even the forms indicate the methods at work. In one, the aim was emotion, using the immediacy of a large crowd and the power of the voice. In the other, supposedly scientific or objective means were used to demonstrate the benefits of the Nazi Government, produced as solid ‘evidence’ of a strong government’s effect (as compared to the temporary nature of the rallies, though made less so by film and radio).

38 On these rites see especially Sabine Behrenbeck, Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923 bis 1945 (Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1996).
The Nazis used both. However, this is the methodology for the Nazis' support. Its epistemology was the same, but was seen differently depending by which path one approached National Socialism.

On a rational connection, the ends of the Party appeared to be social and political, and possibly achievable. On an irrational connection, the ends of the Party were, in many ways, of no concern. It was more important to feel that Germany was moving forward, or that one was a part of something greater, than to argue about actual gains made by the new government. The two are not easily separated, and most Germans who supported the regime did so partly on both grounds.

The ‘Experience’ of 1933 and the Local Nation

The connection on the grounds of Vernunft were most powerfully witnessed in the belief that the Nazis were ‘doing something’ about unemployment, crime, the decadence of the nation—concepts that Hitler spoke to early and often, as for instance on 1 February in his first speech as Chancellor, where he eschewed open antisemitism in favour of an attack on Communism, and promised:

The National Government will regard it as their first and foremost duty to revive in the nation the spirit of unity and cooperation. They will preserve and defend those basic principles on which our nation has been built up. They regard Christianity as the foundation of our national morality, and the family as the basis of national life. They are determined, without regard for class and social status, to restore the nation to a consciousness of its political and national unity and of the duties consequent upon this realisation.

In this speech, Hitler emphasized a variety of points that would not raise eyebrows in a political speech of today: nation, community, family values, a tough stance on crime. Nazi propaganda publications certainly continued to emphasise this last, particularly as compared to the Republic.

Hitler’s promises regarding support for families certainly matched conservative beliefs, and the apparent reintroduction of traditional family values appealed to both conservatives and Christians. Articles appeared at the time in Christian journals on the ‘tasks of the German Protestant housewife in the new period,’ which emphasized that the role of women was to be a ‘wife and mother’ and gave them an oath that re-wrote Matthew 22:39: ‘I will serve my neighbour, my husband, my children and hence also my Volk as myself, as a part of my own life.’ Another article promoted the education of women as mothers so that they could raise their children with Christian morals. Both pieces were written by women, though this was not uncommon.

42 Speech, 1 February 1933, in the official Nazi Party translation: Adolf Hitler, The New Germany desires Work and Peace (Berlin: Liebheit & Thiesen, 1933), 5–9, here 6. His attack on Communism and its ‘negative, destroying spirit’ could still be read as an attack on the Jews, given many Nazis connected both Communism and capitalism to Jews, on the basis that these were fundamentally materialist constructions, indicative of the ‘Jewish-materialist spirit’ (Point 24, Nazi Programme).


45 EGK (October 1934): 2. Christian education was a major concern for Protestant women’s organisations. Nazi support for the ‘German mother’ continued to be viewed positively: EGK (May 1935): 3.

46 As Harvey succinctly states, ‘Conservative, (usually) Protestant women built powerful associations which gave a public voice to women’ while simultaneously arguing that ‘women’s highest duty to the nation lay...
In the Temple-Society, one of the major bases of faith in the new regime was on the grounds of **Vernunft**, in that it appeared to be a regime that was on the way to solving unemployment. The despair at Germany’s economic situation had been clearly expressed by Christmas of 1931 in the Templers’ newspaper, which depicted a politically divided and despairing German nation, with an ‘army’ of unemployed and millions going hungry while ‘political battles poison the spirits.’ After all of these were perceived as having been solved by the Nazis in one year of power, as reported on 30 January 1934. Because it was viewed as stabilising the state, the most important action was the Nazis’ ‘large employment programme, that…teaches young people how to work again through the Labour Service, awakens in them a joy in work, and furthermore brings to millions of others employment and earnings.’

After the Nazis came to power, public festivals came to directly symbolise the supposed national cohesion of the ‘new Germany’ at a local level. They were a powerful means to make the national revival seem concrete, though operating principally in the realm of **Gefühl**. A contemporary article stated as much, claiming that one had to visit the ‘mass gatherings of National Socialists’ in order to ‘experience’ the actuality of the ‘community of the people,’ joining everyone equally as ‘Volk-comrades’—noting particularly that the SA and SS meant that all Germany could march together: ‘the Baron next to the farmer’s son, the factory owner next to the worker.’ Noting that plebiscites such as that of 12 November 1933 allowed all Germans to participate in the national revival, the author missed the point that local festivities provided a similar point of connection.

For instance, all Korntal celebrations were a localised form of mass rally, connecting those in the small village to the nation through rows of hundreds of people marching with torches, through nationalistic poems recited at bonfires. While these festivals were not an everyday event, and hence were **außeralltäglich** (‘out of the ordinary’), they were not extraordinary. Such events had precedents in Korntal, and the fact that these older forms were now used for Nazi holidays assisted in giving credence to the idea that the Nazi Party represented ‘nationalist’ Germany.

They included new elements like the ‘Hitler salute,’ but otherwise were virtually identical to festivals that had been held since 1913. Twenty years before the Nazis came to power, a local festival in celebration of the centenary of the ‘Battle of the Nations’ against Napoleon had involved a ‘candle’ procession through the streets of Korntal to a bonfire, to commemorate nationalist events and eulogise the German nation, and such events had continued through the Weimar years.

Similar emotional connections existed in the Templers’ colonies in Palestine, who had their own pre-war traditions of celebrating the Kaiser’s birthday. The Templers had retained German citizenship and were obliged to do military service. As a result, the **Kaiserfeste** had involved young men who had served their army service and older war-veterans marching in military uniform through streets bedecked with Imperial flags into the church for a special ceremony. As one account put it: ‘It is highly doubtful whether anyone in the Homeland celebrated [the Kaiser’s] birthday in the manner of the roller-coaster ride to the church of the Templers and the festival in the church.’

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53 Many memoirs contain accounts: *Memories of Palestine: Narratives about life in the Templar communities 1869–1948*, (Melbourne: TSA Heritage Group, 2005), 47, 80, 174-76, 244.
we did….Dressed in smart uniforms, the young men who had already served in the German army marched in, flag flying, at the beginning of the Divine Service.53

In Templer ceremonies after the First World War, either Bismarck or Hindenburg had formed the focus, though the baton passed from the nationalist hero-figure of Hindenburg to Hitler on 2 October 1933 at celebrations for Hindenburg’s 86th birthday. While concentrating on Hindenburg as the ‘hero of the German Volk’, the main speaker argued that in Hitler, ‘Hindenburg had put the right man in the right place’.54 A lecture was given which claimed that Hindenburg, who had ‘remained faithful to his fatherland’, had been allowed ‘to see the dawn of a better German future’ in 1933.

The 250 people present gave the ‘Hitler salute’ and sang both the German national anthem and the Horst Wessel song. A direct connection to Germany was attributed to this gathering, and those present were described as becoming aware that ‘at the same hour millions upon millions of Germans all over the world’ were gathered together as they were, ‘in the same love and thankfulness,’ in order to honour Hindenburg.55 Two weeks later, the Jaffa-Sarona Sports Club dedicated their meeting to the ‘new Germany’.56 This revival of a connection to the rulers of Germany was complete when the Templers began to celebrate Hitler’s birthday in 1934, continuing the tradition from the Kaiser and Hindenburg.57

In addition, the local communities of these groups were connected to national events through radio broadcasts, and Hitler’s speeches were often heard over loudspeakers in public gatherings.58 The role of radio cannot be underestimated, as it meant Nazi leaders became immediately present. It was one of the two principal means of bringing Nazi Germany to the Templers in Palestine, the other being festivals. Both allowed Palestine Templers to feel that they were directly experiencing the Third Reich, through instantaneous participation. The German radio service (available in Palestine) broadcast Hitler’s speeches from 1933, and the ‘rousing speeches of the Führer’ drew ‘invited and uninvited guests’ to ‘local radio users’.59 In 1935, the Templers gathered collectively to listen to the result of the Saarland Plebiscite over the radio, and some had even listened to the seizure of power (Machtergreifung) in 1933.60 As recorded in one Templer’s memoirs, hearing Hitler speak after he took office on 30 January 1933 meant that the listeners ‘experienced one of the greatest moments of the Volk’.61

In both groups, this was a form of interaction with Nazism as an ideal through Gefühl. The AdJ reported that hearing Hitler speak was an ‘impressive experience’ and the Warte called Hitler’s broadcasts ‘striking, enthralling experiences’.62 The other method of interaction—Nazi-initiated festivals—were well established by the end of 1934. Gathering en masse to listen to broadcasts provided a sense of community akin to the marches and rallies that took place on festival days. People were literally marching in step with the movement (at least its local representation) and were being swept along with the new regime in such sentiment. It was a means of creating the kind of ‘perpetual motion’ described by Peukert.63

53 Nelly Marcinkowski, Ibid., 96-97.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 180.
57 Warte JG-91 (1934): 77ff. By the time of Hindenburg’s death, festivals were organised by the Hitler Youth: (113-14).
59 Warte JG-90 (1933): 180, citing particularly the plebiscite of 12 November.
63 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, 72, 236.
At a 1934 Hitler Youth event involving the Templer communities it was openly admitted that emotion formed a central part of faith in the Nazis, with the 'significance of the period' described as needing to be grasped 'not with cool, deliberative knowledge' but emotionally and enthusiastically. Thanks to radio, the 'experience' of Nazi Germany was just as powerful in Palestine as in Stuttgart, enabling Templers 'to instantly witness the important events and moments in the life of our Volk.'

Celebrations and political events gave them a grand sense of belonging to the German nation, and provided powerful emotional experiences that drew them to the Nazi state. This was often due to Hitler's broadcasts, as evidenced in 1933:

Nobody among us who on the evening of 14 October with very good radio reception listened in to the report on Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and Adolf Hitler's masterful justification will ever be able to forget these hours; one was shaken to the innermost by the awesome consciousness that one was an 'ear-witness' to a deed of world-historical significance.

Such connections can be seen in the first celebrations in Korntal for the new government, which was admittedly praised as a coalition of the 'nationalist' movement, consisting of the German National People's Party (Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei, DNVP), the Nazi Party and the paramilitary veterans' group of the Steel Helmet (Stahlhelm). Hence, a torch-procession was held in Korntal on 21 March (the Day of Potsdam) to celebrate along with the 'first sitting of the recently elected national parliament.'

This was a well-planned event, as evidenced by handwritten material and a printed notice in the archives. The material includes plans for what streets a torch-procession should march through, and the public notice 'To the inhabitants of Korntal' stated that they were responding directly to Nazi propaganda, to Goebbels' call for the German population to celebrate. As quoted, he called for the German Volk to 'beflag your houses and dwellings in the proud black-white-red and swastika-flags' as a 'confession for the rebirth of the German nation.' Clearly Korntal was participating at Goebbels' prompting, especially as he declared all cities and villages of the entire Reich should hold torch-processions of the 'nationalist parties and associations, of the students and school-youth,' with 'freedom-fires blazing out' from every mountain and lookout (a direct reference to 1913).

They met Goebbels' instructions, and accepted the propaganda that this would demonstrate the German Volk was 'united in its classes and tribes,' saved from disgrace. Although there was no procession in the end (due to inclement weather), there was a bonfire in the evening. It was held in much the same way and in much the same spirit as past commemorations. The 'spirit of Potsdam' was even held to be invigorating the youth much like the supposedly cohesive 'spirit of 1914.'

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64 Warte JG-91 (1934): 107, quoting from Ernst Bohle, head of the Auslandsorganisation.
66 Ibid. In addition, Hitler's speeches were reported regularly in the Warte.
67 AdJ JG-21 (1933): 33-34.
69 The information used here can be found in File KA47, Stadtarchiv Korntal-Münchingen (SAKM).
70 A church-service was also held. Jantzen notes similar events for 21 March, but does not discuss whether these responded to Goebbels’ call or whether they continued older, existing nationalist celebrations: see for instance Kyle Jantzen, ‘National Socialism as a Force for German Protestant Renewal? Pastors and Parishioners respond to Adolf Hitler’s “National Renewal,”’ in Christian Responses to the Holocaust: Moral and Ethical Issues, ed. Donald J. Dietrich (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 58-59.
Such emotion also meant (to some extent) ignoring the Nazi agenda. The Nazi notion of *Gleichschaltung* (or co-ordination) clearly indicated that the new state was not simply seeking a united Germany, but a Germany that was united in Nazism. Yet such experiences and sensations allowed people to read what they wanted into local events. This could be seen already by June 1933, when the entire population of Korntal participated in a ‘Youth Day.’

They could hardly have ignored it, as the day began with youth marching through Korntal’s streets at 6.45am, playing drums. It included groups from the schools and boarding-houses, the Boy Scouts, as well as Christian groups like the Girls’ Bible-Circle, (*Mädchen-Bibelkreis*, MBK). It still included nationalist organisations like the right-wing association *Stahlhelm* and two groups from the DNVP: the girls’ group *Luisenbund* (*‘Queen-Louise-Society*’) and the *Scharnhorst Youth*. The Hitler Youth (HJ)—including the younger children’s group *Jungvolk*—the League of German Girls (*Bund deutscher Mädel*, BdM) and Storm Division (*Sturmbatailung*, SA) were all present.

All of these various groups met in the town-square, where they were addressed by the mayor, before marching through Korntal. Because the rest of Korntal had also gathered to celebrate along with the youth, it was described as a point where ‘one had the feeling...this is not the festival of youth and not the celebration of adults, but rather in this mighty square of people [at the bonfire] there stood, undifferentiated and constant, truly a celebrating community.’ The report on this festival tried to capture the mystical feeling of the event, writing of songs and poems expressive of ‘the best and highest in the German Volk’ delivered by the light of the bonfire, ringing out through the trees into the dark.

The celebration took place on 24 June, and a summer solstice celebration had already been held on 21 June. As the youth marched back through the night to the village in rows of three, each of the outer two holding a burning torch, the school-teacher writing the report recorded a moment that had clearly affected him and others: ‘a procession of many hundreds of lights flowing down into the valley, of SA, Stahlhelm, Hitler Youth, Jungvolk, students…the BdM, those of the Luisenbund, the MBK, the Boy Scouts.’ Having reached Korntal there were more songs, and those present once again gave the Nazi salute, raising their arms in the ‘German greeting.’

Above all, the festival was intended to express unity and connection. The Hitler Youth, *Stahlhelm* and Christian groups marched to Korntal as an expression of Germany under the Nazi government: militaristic, nationalistic, Christian and united. It had joined all members of Korntal, and it bound them together with the Brethren in the church-service held for the day. Such celebrations reflected a belief that within the united *Volksgemeinschaft* there was room for various organisations, nationalistic and Christian. Yet by the end of 1933, the Protestant youth groups no longer existed, with an agreement having been made by 19 December to dissolve such youth groups in favour of the Hitler Youth. This totalitarian claim of the Nazis came up against the desire for a united Christlichnation.

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73 *AdJG*-21 (1933): 46-49.
74 Ibid, 46. Queen Louise was Emperor Wilhelm’s mother. The Society fitted well with concerns in Korntal, its main aims being ‘to promote the virtues of Christian motherhood and morality…to campaign against “filth,” socialism and the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty’: Stephenson, *Nazi Organisation of Women*, 27.
75 *AdJG*-21 (1933): 47.
76 Ibid., 47-49.
77 Ibid., 49. For the programmes of such youth events, see File KA49, SAKM.
78 *AdJG*-21 (1933): 49. The Horst Wessel song was also sung.
79 Ibid., 46.
Conclusion

What we can initially conclude is that the terms under consideration, *Vernunft* and *Gefühl*, can indeed help to clarify the connections made to the Nazi regime, which combined ‘reasonable’ and ‘emotional’ grounds in drawing support—particularly through participation.

The Nazis in 1933 were partly supported on what were viewed as ‘rational’ grounds and achievable aims: solving unemployment, support for families, building a strong community. This last aspect was the most abstract, yet also where the Nazis succeeded to the greatest extent in creating belief in their own regime through the use of emotional ‘experiences’ of the united German Volksgemeinschaft, like local rallies or communal gatherings to hear radio broadcasts.

What this meant for participants was both that they ‘read’ Nazi Germany as meeting their own particular desires (such as the unity of Germans in Christian faith, the *Christlichnation*) and that they simultaneously had to ignore those who were being excluded from the ‘New Germany’: the political opponents of the Nazis, and Jews. This was not that hard to do in Korntal, where there was no Jewish presence, a point that was true of ‘most of Württemberg’s communes.’ This is a major emphasis in Ian Kershaw’s work, who noted of sections of the Bavarian population that such lack of contact with Jews meant a general indifference to the ‘Jewish Question.’

One of those living in ‘nationalist Korntal’ recorded ‘everything was peaceful here’—largely because they were not Jewish or Communist and so were not yet affected by the new regime. He argued ‘no-one [from Korntal] was called for the Heuberg,’ referring to a Württemberg concentration camp for political opponents of the Nazi regime, and that in their community there were ‘no Jewish un-German writings to burn.’

In the Temple-Society, there was a good deal more concern expressed about antisemitism, given that the majority of Templers were living in Palestine and *did* have direct contact with Jews. The major fear was a growing ‘anti-German disposition among the Palestine Jews’ and the possibility of a Jewish boycott of German goods. This seemed to have already begun by May, ‘though completely unorganised.’

At the same time, the leader of the German Templers examined the 1 April boycott of Jewish businesses and attempted to justify this action as ‘orderly’ and a response to an already existing ‘overseas boycott’ of German goods ‘brought about by Jewry.’ He reached a similar conclusion to the teacher in Korntal, holding it ‘to be our duty, to state emphatically, that peace and order reign in Germany and that everyone without exception lives peaceful and secure.’ The terms peaceful and secure are not those we generally associate with Nazi Germany. Yet for those able or permitted to participate in the ‘experience’ of 1933 and this racially-defined ‘national community,’ it was described in exactly this way, and could be read as having achieved a long-sought idyll.

81 Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution*, 4, 152-54. Nazi ‘racial-völkisch’ form of antisemitism could exist ‘independent of direct contact with Jews,’ since it did not deal with individuals but ‘Jewry itself’ (155).
82 *Adj.JG*-21 (1933): 27. This had certainly changed by 1939.
85 Ibid., 79, reporting Templer businesses were losing Jewish customers. See also 79-80, 87.
86 *Warte JG*-90 (1933): 55-56.
87 *Warte JG*-90 (1933): 55.
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