The Influence of Cultural Orientations on Cross-Cultural Negotiation

By

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Arabic-speaking background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATNA</td>
<td>best alternative to negotiated agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSV</td>
<td>Chinese Value Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>English-speaking background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>first pair part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE</td>
<td>Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness Research Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>natural semantic metalanguage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>second pair part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Abstract

Negotiation across cultures is an activity of growing importance as communication technologies, improved transportations and globalisation of workplaces require people to be equipped to live and work effectively in an interconnected world (Metcalf et al. 2007; Cohen 2007; House 2004). Cultural differences are key factors that need to be considered during intercultural negotiations, even if the extent to which culture impacts on the outcomes of negotiation is not always clear (Metcalf et al. 2007; Brett 2000; Carnevale & Choi 2000; Adair et al. 2001). While previous studies (e.g. Adair et al. 2001) have established that different cultures favour different tactics and patterns of behaviour during negotiations, there are arguments that most of the research into intercultural negotiation is too descriptive and more focused on providing lists of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ as opposed to providing in-depth and in-principled understanding of why cultural differences exist and how such differences influence negotiations (Metcalf et al. 2007; Dahl 2004).

This doctoral study specifically analyses the processes and behaviours of negotiations across and between English-speaking background Australians and Arabic-speaking background interlocutors from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The validity of three prevalent cross-cultural communication models is tested in the context of a series of intra-cultural and intercultural negotiation simulations. In addition, this study aims to examine how thought processes and cultural behaviours change during intercultural negotiations especially when different cultural orientations meet and affect communication processes.
Introduction

Background

Negotiation across cultures is an activity of growing importance as communication technologies increasing the ease of travel and globalisation of workplaces requires more people, from diplomats to businesspeople, scientists to students, to partake in negotiations with international partners. There is also a wide acknowledgement that these people need to be equipped with intercultural skills to effectively communicate, collaborate and negotiate in an interconnected world (Metcalf et al. 2007; Cohen 2007; House 2004) as cultural differences can effect international negotiations. However, the extent to which culture impacts on the outcomes of negotiation is not always clear (Metcalf et al. 2007; Brett 2000; Carnevale & Choi 2000; Adair et al. 2001). While studies have provided empirical evidence that different cultures favour different tactics and patterns of behaviour during negotiations (Brett 2000; Adair et al. 2001), there are arguments that most of the research into intercultural negotiation is descriptive and more focused on providing lists of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ rather than understanding why these differences exist and how they influence negotiations (Metcalf et al. 2007; Dahl 2004).


This study will specifically analyse the processes of intra-cultural and intercultural negotiations between English-speaking background (ESB) Australians and Arabic-speaking background (ASB) Arabs from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). These processes will be considered in terms of prevalent cross-cultural communication models that can indicate empirical evidence of any behavioural differences that may exist between the two sociolinguistic groups.
Rationale and Significance

Communication behaviour in negotiation is an important area of study, as negotiation is regularly used to establish and maintain relationships, exchange information and trade goods and services (Neu 1998). The majority of research in international negotiation is descriptive and based on individual behaviour, lacking true empirical observations of cultural variation. Many of these descriptive studies are based on stereotypes, providing descriptions for expected behaviours but often failing to provide adequate analyses for contradictions that exist (Metcalf et al. 2007; Dahl 2004). This research project takes an integrated theoretical approach to exploring the effect of culture on intercultural negotiations using three widely disseminated cross-cultural communication models. The project is both significant and innovative in that it will study processes of intercultural negotiation from the perspective of the three cross-cultural communication models, and hence a number of theory-driven findings are expected to result from the data analysis.

The research is also significant in that it aims to fill certain gaps that currently exist in the literature on intercultural negotiation and cross-cultural communication in specific and complex situations. This study not only provides an opportunity to assess how appropriately major cross-cultural communication theories classify the Australian and Arab cultures in a specific interaction, but it also provides empirical evidence regarding how negotiation as an interaction can be influenced by cultural orientations.

The approach being taken in this study is to look at intercultural negotiations as a continuum, commencing on the macro level with the theoretical cross-cultural communication models, moving across to the micro level where we examine the communication processes that people undertake to achieve common ground.
Study Objectives

This study aims to investigate how cultural orientations may influence the processes and outcomes of intercultural negotiations. The literature review begins with descriptions of prominently disseminated cross-cultural communication models that will be used to examine the prominence of various orientations as they relate to power and information sharing. Processes of negotiation will be described and linked with the process of finding common ground.

Most cultural orientations that exist are not easily recognised, even by the participants of that culture (Hall 1966, 1973; Al-Omari 2003). Cross-cultural communication models provide a basis for understanding the values and norms of speech communities. While not all values and norms relate to intercultural negotiation, they do allow for behaviours during specific interactions to be interpreted according to what is generally considered appropriate and inappropriate behaviour within that cultural group (Brett 2000). This study will examine how negotiation can be considered a specific communication event, whereby we can test the validity of prevalent cross-cultural communication models in intra-cultural and intercultural situations.

This study aims to examine how people negotiate within their own culture and whether their cultural values and norms remain consistent in an intercultural negotiation context. The empirical data will be used to critically assess the validity of the predictions outlined in three major cross-cultural communication models. Two speech community groups studied will be English-speaking background (ESB) Australians and Arabic-speaking background (ASB) nationals from the Arabian Gulf countries using negotiation simulations and questionnaires. Conversation analysis will be used to analyse data from role simulations.

The study will specifically explore the following key research question and sub-questions. The key research question is as follows:
To what extent do cultural orientations influence intercultural negotiations between ESB Australians and Arabic-speaking nationals of Arabian Gulf countries?

The following two research sub-questions are the means for assessing the key research question:

1. To what extent do negotiators' communication patterns reflect their cultures' typological tendencies in the manner of Hall's (1976), high-context/low-context communication continuum, the Monochronic/Polychronic time system and Hofstede's (1980, 2001, 2010) four dimensions of culture indices?

2. To what extent does the behaviour of each negotiator change during the negotiation scenarios? Does this assist the process of achieving common ground?

Scope

This project will involve the collection of data from intra-cultural (participants from a single cultural group) and intercultural (participants from different cultural groups) negotiation simulations and will base the results upon observations from the data. The specific focus of the observations will be on the processes through which negotiators reach common ground and whether cultural values and norms (as described in the three prevalent models) have any effect on this process of finding common ground. This project will not make any assumptions about other sociolinguistic groups outside the two included in the study.

Thesis Structure

The thesis will be structured in the following way:

Chapter One: Literature Review is a review of the related theory and previous research. This chapter provides the operational definitions relevant to this study, outlines and critically reviews prevalent cross-cultural communication theories, explores relationships and commonalities between these theories,
introduces negotiation and reviews interaction models which can be applied to negotiation.

Chapter Two: Research Methodology is a detailed description of how the research and analysis is to be conducted, including the analysis tools to be applied during the data analysis. The various tools reviewed primarily relate to discourse analysis and include conversation analysis, pragmatics, speech act theory and interactional sociolinguistics.

Chapter Three: Simulations Data Analysis provides the samples of data collected from the negotiation simulations with an analysis of the data. Observations of the data are made and discussed in detail.

Chapter Four: Questionnaire Data Analysis is the analysis of the data collected from the questionnaire.

Chapter Five: Discussion links observations from the two data analysis chapters and considers their relevance according to the theory outlined in the literature review. This chapter also reviews the actions of the research participants during the intercultural interactions and considers the relevance of these actions to the theory.

Chapter Six: Conclusion provides observations and conclusions and identifies areas for potential future research.
Defining Culture and Cultural Orientations

This thesis aims to explore the process of negotiation across two distinct cultures. The initial challenge is to define exactly what culture and cultural orientations mean in the context of this thesis. As a term, ‘culture’ has no one definition, yet many writers have formed their own definitions (Hall 1966; Kluckhohn 1951; Meyer 2006; Brett 2000; Ting-Toomey & Chung 2005; House & Javidan 2004; Dahl 2004; Cohen 2007). Commonly, the term ‘culture’ is used to describe managerial and artistic concepts such as ‘organisational culture’ or ‘arts and culture’ (Hall 1973, 1990a; Dahl 2004). Of more relevance to this thesis is the anthropological perspective. Two prominent anthropologists whose definitions are frequently cited (Dahl 2004; Cohen 2007) are Kluckhohn and Hall. Kluckhohn (1951:86), who described culture as:

‘Patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values.’

One of Hall’s attempts to define culture resulted in an explanation not of what culture is, but what culture does: ‘It is a mould in which we are all cast, and controls our lives in so many unsuspecting ways ... Culture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough what it hides, it hides effectively from its own participants’ (Hall 1990a: 29).

In general, Kluckhohn’s (1951) and Hall’s (1973, 1990a) definitions implicate culture as being a phenomenon existing at a tangible (items and artefacts) and an intangible (values and behaviours) level, which influences how people act. Meyer’s (2006) research described culture as being influenced by the way people behave and the meanings that are embedded in behaviour as opposed to
the instrument that influences behaviour. Other definitions emphasise the fact that culture describes the modus operandi of a group of people (Dahl 2004), which encompasses the values and norms shared by a social group (Brett 2000), and again indicate that people influence culture not vice versa. Another approach utilised (Cohen 2007) is to identify a series of key concepts that are generally acknowledged to exist across most attempts to define culture. These concepts included identifying that any definition of culture should consider that culture exists at a collective level, with individuals undergoing socialisation to learn the attributes of their respective collective; the collective imparts its attributes on its members through both formal and informal methods of socialisation; culture can be reflected in both tangible items and intangible behaviours (Cohen 2007). Cohen (2007) related his conceptual definition to Kluckhohn’s definition by declaring that ‘culture is fundamentally a property of information, a grammar for organising reality, for imparting meaning on the world....Humankind can be thought of as displaying a rich selection of physical “hardware”’ (2007:12).

For the purpose of this study, culture is operationally defined according to Ting-Toomey and Chung (2005), House and Javidan (2004) and Cohen’s (2007) definitions as consisting of shared traditions, beliefs, values, norms, meanings and symbols that are passed on from one generation to the next and are shared to varying degrees by interacting members of a community that permits members of a community to perceive, interpret, evaluate and act in an appropriate and accepted manner within the community. Culture is dynamic and self-renewing because it will change as people’s shared traditions, beliefs, values, norms, meanings and symbols change. If change is not shared, culture does not change. These shared factors are relevant to the norms of appropriate behaviour and strategies in negotiation (Brett 2000; Cohen 2007). It is also relevant that different cultural groups share different values and norms and cannot simply alter these values and norms because they are communicating with other cultural groups (Triandis 2000). Therefore, in this study, culture will be operationally defined as the shared values (what is important) and norms (what is appropriate) of behaviour and strategies for interaction, which are common among members of shared sociolinguistic groups, but may not be shared across different sociolinguistic groups (Brett & Okumura 1998).
Operationalising Cultural Orientations

In the previous section, culture was characterised as operating on a tangible and intangible level (Kluckhohn 1951; Hall 1990a; Ting-Toomey & Chung 2005; Cohen 2007). The tangible levels of culture are clearly visible and may take the form of a ritual or artefact, while the intangible level is more difficult to identify because it is not readily visible (Al-Omari 2003, Dahl 2004). The levels of culture extend beyond tangible and intangible, as argued by Geert Hofstede (2001) who identified four distinct levels of culture. He described culture as an onion with three visible layers of ‘symbols, heroes and rituals’ surrounding ‘values’ at the core that are invisible from the outside, but become evident in behaviour in the outer layers. Symbols are ‘words, gestures, pictures and objects that carry often complex meanings recognised as such by those who share the culture … New symbols are easily developed and old ones disappear; symbols from one cultural group are regularly copied by others’ (Hofstede 2001:10). The next layer down consists of ‘heroes’, the people or characters who are highly praised within a culture and serve as models for behaviour, be they real or fictional (Hofstede 2001). ‘Rituals’ form the final layer and are ‘collective activities that are technically unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity’ (Hofstede 2001:10).

The key conceptual idea here is that the cultural meaning behind the three layers is more superficial on the outer layer and more difficult to identify as you move through the layers heading to the core. As such, the ‘symbols’ layer, being the most superficial, is the easiest to identify and interpret by ‘outsiders’. The ‘rituals’ layer is the least superficial and requires the highest level of culture-specific knowledge to understand the cultural meanings. The three visible layers are considered by Hofstede (2001) to be ‘practices’ of a culture. Values become evident in the process of executing them into practice.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) illustrated similar views to Hofstede about culture having more than two layers. They purported that there are three layers existing in culture, in a model similar to Hofstede’s onion, whereby the
outer layer consists of superficial and explicit artefacts and products of culture that are clearly visible to all. Similar to Hofstede’s symbols, explicit artefacts and products of culture manifest themselves as clothing, buildings, monuments, language, food etc. Yet, to understand the cultural meaning of artefacts and products requires an observer to peel the layers of the onion further. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) differ from Hofstede in that they professed ‘values’ as existing with ‘norms’ in a middle layer of culture. The description of ‘norms and values’ is rather narrow in that they consider the role of the middle layer to be where individuals belonging to a group understand what is acceptable and what is unacceptable within their social collective and essentially ask ‘how should I behave?’ (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998:22). The core of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1998) culture onion is that all cultures have highly implicit assumptions about existence that essentially stem from the need to survive and problem solve within the environment in which they live. These assumptions have become so integrated into people’s lives that they usually do not even consider them:

‘The problems of daily life are solved in such obvious ways that the solutions disappear from our consciousness. If they do not we would go crazy. Imagine having to concentrate on your need for oxygen every 30 seconds. The solutions disappear from our awareness, and become part of our system of absolute assumptions’ (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998:23).

In comparing the two models, Hofstede (2001) essentially expands the tangible level of culture into three layers of ‘practice’, while Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner expand the intangible level into two layers that deal with ‘norms and values’ and ‘basic assumptions’. In both cases, these models have been cited as ‘confusing’ (Dahl 2004:6) because Hofstede’s concept of ‘practices’ can be similar but also separate to symbols and rituals, while in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s model, the separation of values from basic assumptions can be ambiguous. Another issue that arises from both models relates to how we account for changes in cultures. According to both models, cultural change is either superficial or must involve a change in the
values of a culture, which is a problematic assumption (Spencer-Oatey 2000; Dahl 2004).

A third model developed by Spencer-Oatey (2000) contends that ‘values and basic assumptions’ should both be considered at the core of culture, but there should be an initial inner layer of ‘beliefs, attitudes and conventions’, which accounts for changes in the beliefs of a culture without necessarily requiring a change in the values system. The next layer of Spencer-Oatey’s (2000) culture onion enters the tangible level, being ‘systems and institutions’, while the superficial layer is divided into two halves that differentiate behavioural and non-behavioural manifestations of culture, the first half being ‘artefacts and products’ and the second half ‘rituals and behaviours’.

A common theme across the models is that behaviours within a cultural are related to shared values and basic assumptions which are not always recognisable to outsiders. For the purposes of this study, these values and basic assumptions will be referred to as ‘cultural orientations’. The aim of this study is to investigate how cultural orientations influence the process of negotiations between Gulf ASB Arabs and ESB Australians.

The Importance of Understanding Cultural Orientations

In order to identify cultural orientations, generalisations and assumptions need to be made. However, the assumption is not made in the definition that all people behave according to the values and norms of behaviour of their common unit at all times. It is assumed in this study that human behaviour, although unpredictable, is subject to the norms, trends and patterns of their culture (Al-Omari 2003).

While the superficial manifestations of cultural orientations exist in visible forms such as clothing and architecture, most cultural orientations are exhibited in more subtle forms and are not obvious to those who are not previously aware of their existence (Hall 1973, 1990a; Al-Omari 2003). People tend not to understand the orientations of their own culture until they spend an extended time observing people from other cultures. Yet, upon observing other cultures,
people tend to be influenced by the years of programming that they have undergone within their own culture and subconsciously consider their own cultural orientations as the norms leading to ethnocentrism (Hofstede 2001; Said 1978). As cultures interact, some orientations converge and others diverge into idiosyncrasies. The effect of ethnocentrism is that the idiosyncrasies of the other culture will be more readily identifiable for a person who considers his or her own cultural orientations to be the norm for all interaction between people (Hofstede 2001; House & Javidan 2004).

As cultures increasingly interact, more people need to deal with the idiosyncrasies of multiple cultures and most importantly, understand the idiosyncrasies of their own culture. In essence, in communication, they must be able to ‘release the right response’ as opposed to ‘sending the right message’ (Hall 1987:4). Cultural orientations are the manifestations of these idiosyncrasies, and their importance is in that they create, send, store and process the information that is more complex and deep than spoken or written messages.

Hall (1976, 1989) highlighted the importance of understanding the cultural orientations of other people from the perspective of trying to understand how to influence and to reliably predict the actions of people from other cultures. Using examples of his experiences in Japan, Hall (1976, 1989) admitted to not always understanding Japanese culture and at times asking himself if he was being mistreated by Japanese people or whether they were treating him in an acceptable manner according to their own orientations. Hall (1976, 1989) emphasised that the struggle to understand this environment was caused by his own American/Western cultural orientations clouding his judgement and ability to understand. He continued further to describe how fellow Americans would often comment that the Japanese are essentially just like Americans. Hall’s (1976, 1989) belief is that such comparisons are shallow and reflect an understanding of culture as being a single context namely the context where they come from. He also stated that simply talking about cultural differences is a ‘hollow cliché’ (Hall 1989:63) and that to properly understand another culture and its orientations, one must understand the entire system of that culture and how such orientations are formed.
Analysing Nations as Cultures

As a word, ‘culture’ can be applied to most human collectivities, be they a nation, a region, a common linguistic group or even an ethnic group within a nation. However, it is a common approach to focus on ‘culture’ at a national level (Hofstede 2001; Dahl 2004). Within a nation, there will be different human collectives, and the degree that they differ varies from country to country, but it is considered that there are enough common traits within most nations to analyse cultures at a national level (Hofstede 2001; Dahl 2004).

In the case of this study, ESB culture could encompass individuals from any population of native English speakers in the world. Likewise, ‘Arabic-speaking background’ could encompass individuals from the Gulf States to Morocco and even children of Arab migrants living in non-Arab countries. One of the advantages of considering culture at the national level is that a person’s membership of the culture can easily be established (Dahl 2004). As such, and in terms of nationality, the cultural groups selected for this study consist of Australia and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

Culture, Language and Communication

Communication is a function of culture and language as the tool used to communicate culture (Hall 1966, 1990b). Language, while considered as occurring at a superficial level of culture (behaviour), can also be ambiguous, as deeper layers of culture (values and basic assumptions) must be accessed to understand the meaning conveyed in language (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998; Hofstede 2001). Ambiguity in language exists at the word, sentence and discourse levels where context plays a vital role in making the communication function effectively. Communication through language is more efficient when the interlocutors share knowledge and assumptions, which provide context during the interaction. In the case in which context is lacking, interlocutors risk misunderstanding as message recipients. This is particularly relevant when interlocutors are from different cultural groups (Scollon & Scollon 2001).
Overview of Cross-Cultural Models

Numerous cross-cultural communication models and theories have been developed at the superficial/behavioural level of culture, yet their application to wider research is limited by an absence of empirical data testing and supporting their core claims (Dahl 2004). The theoretical approach underpinning this research project is based on a critical examination of three cross-cultural communication models: high-context/low-context continuum (Hall 1976), monochronic/polychronic time and space systems (Hall 1976) and the four dimensions of culture (Hofstede 2001). These models have been selected as they are three of the more prevalent cross-cultural communication models available and are commonly used in different types of cross-cultural research (Zaharna 1995; George 2003; House & Javidan 2004; Meyer 2006; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005; Harrison & McKinnon 1999; Dahl 2004). However prevalent these models may be, there is also evidence from more recent research to suggest that the models need to be further refined to consider complexities within culture, such as the individual or specific activities and interactions (House & Javidan, 2004; Smith & Hume 2005; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005).

Distinguishing Intra-cultural, Cross-cultural and Intercultural Communication

Various studies use the terms ‘cross-cultural communication’ and ‘intercultural communication’ almost interchangeably. Distinctions between the two are not always clear and at times blurred (Scollon & Scollon 2001). Intercultural communication is defined as occurring when people from different cultural units interact. Cross-cultural communication compares how different cultures communicate using intra-cultural communication within their own cultural group (Scollon & Scollon 2001, Gudykunst 2003). Further, the study of communication in the creation and negotiation of shared cultural identities is also a related area of study known as ‘cultural communication’ (Gudykunst 2003). In order to avoid confusion between the definitions, this study refers to intra-cultural communication as an interaction between people from the same cultural group and intercultural communication as an interaction between
people from different cultural groups. The testing of the validity of prevalent cross-cultural communication models specifically compares similarities and difference in how cultures communicate during intra-cultural communication.

Table 1: Summary of Interaction Types and Communication Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultures participating in interaction</th>
<th>Interaction type</th>
<th>Communication model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two participants from culture ‘A’</td>
<td>Intra-cultural</td>
<td>Cross-cultural communication compares similarities and differences in how different cultures communicate during intra-cultural interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two participants from culture ‘B’</td>
<td>Intra-cultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One participant from culture ‘A’ and one participant from culture ‘B’</td>
<td>Intercultural</td>
<td>Intercultural communication observes interactions between people from different cultural groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The High-context/Low-context Cultural Continuum**

Arguably, the most disseminated model for comparing communication across cultures is Hall’s high-context/low-context culture continuum (Zaharna 1995; Samovar & Porter 2004). Hall’s (1976) continuum supposes that cultures can be compared according to the level of information stored within each culture and analyses the communication patterns of different cultures according to the amount of context embedded in communication. High-context communication internalises most of the information, relying upon the listener to identify meaning from the context, not from using the language code. Alternatively, low-context communication conveys information explicitly in the language code placing more responsibility on the speaker to clearly describe the information being conveyed (Hall 1976).

As such, context is described as the information surrounding an event that provides the event its meaning. While cultures contain elements of high and
low variables for individual events, at a macro level, it is considered that each
culture can be ranked on this continuum according to their overall propensity
for either high-context or low-context communication (Zaharna 1995; Samovar
& Porter 2004).

Hall (1976) described high-context communication as economical, fast,
efficient and satisfying; however, time must be devoted to ‘programming’ the
recipient of the communication for the meaning to be completely understood.
This level of programming also makes high-context cultures unifying, long-
lived and slow to change. Conversely, low-context cultures, do not require
such levels of ‘programming’, but it is still essential that the interlocutor
conveys the code as clearly and explicitly as possible for it to be properly
understood. Therefore, low-context communication lacks the speed and
efficiency of high-context communication because more information must be
included in the language code. Since low-context cultures contain less hidden
meaning, they are not unifying, which allows outsiders to quickly familiarise
themselves with the culture’s context. Low-context cultures can undergo
change easily and quickly.

A practical example that Hall (1976) provided of high-context/low-context
communication is comparing the communication styles of twin siblings who
have lived together all their lives, with that of two courtroom lawyers. The
twins (high-context) would have very efficient communication patterns,
whereby they will understand one another reliably through having similar
personalities and shared interests and experiences that provide them with a
high level of shared context and they will not need to rely so often on explicit
explanations. The courtroom lawyers (low-context) need to convey explicitly
information in front of a judge and jury who are supposed to have no
familiarity or preconceived views with the case at hand.

Hall (1976) also believed that any cultural group can be classed somewhere on
his continuum. China, Korea and Japan are considered high-context cultures,
whereas German-Swiss, Germans and Scandinavians are considered to require
the least context of any cultures.
In general, Arab cultures are considered to be high-context, comparable with the Chinese and Japanese on Hall’s continuum (Kanso et al. 2001; Al-Omari 2003). Communication within the Arab cultures of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is considered to be complex and multi-layered, relying upon several means of communication including non-verbal signs, hidden meanings and anecdotes in addition to the spoken word to convey context (as opposed to language code), which contains the communication’s meaning (Al-Omari 2003).

Conversely, Australian, New Zealand and American cultures are regarded to be low-context because communication patterns in these cultures is characterised by overt messages, whereas the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese communication patterns are based on shared context and covert messages (Yunxia 2000).

Differences in high-context and low-context communication can create ambiguities in cross-cultural communication. For the Arab, Asian or African speaker, much of the context embedded in communication will stem from their environments, societies, settings and relationships, which will be understood by a communication recipient from the same or similar culture (George 2003; Hall 1976). During a cross-cultural communication exchange, an Australian or American from an ESB will not be able to draw on the collective experiences and knowledge of the high-context culture from which an Arab, Asian or African interlocutor originates. Another such a problem existing between high-context and low-context cultures is that low-context communication can be perceived as ‘less credible’ by people from high-context cultures because the communication relies so heavily upon more and precise verbal messages (George 2003; Hall 1976). In conflict situations, high-context cultures prefer to act in a ‘discreet and subtle manner’, whereas low-context cultures ‘prefer open confrontation’. People from high-context cultures will also be more attentive to non-verbal communication, via body language or behaviour (George 2003). Hence, it is imperative that people who communicate across high-context and low-context cultures learn more about communication than just the sending and receiving of messages, as they need to understand that the message with be received as intended and not misinterpreted. It is important to understand one’s own cultural values and assumptions about other cultures, to
develop competence in social relationships, business protocols and in understanding non-verbal clues and cultural context (George 2003).

Monochronic and Polychronic Time and Space Systems

In addition to the high-context/low-context model, Hall (1976) also considered how cultures undertake thought and decision-making processes. He contended that there are many different ways of thinking, though since the time of Socrates, Western culture has modified its societies to think in predominantly a linear way commonly known as ‘logic’, where logic is inextricably linked to truth (Hall 1976:9). Such thought processes affect essential concepts in culture such as time and space.

Hall (1976) contended that cultures perceive time and space as systems that are either predominantly ‘monochronic’ (focused on scheduling and concentrating on a single task at one time) or predominantly ‘polychronic’ (focused on events, people and undertaking multiple tasks at one time). He stressed that time and space are interrelated and that not all people within a culture are actually monochronic or polychronic, but their culture will invariably draw them back into its time system. People from monochronic cultures (or monochronics as they are also known) follow linear logic and compartmentalise their activities and relationships according to schedules, plans, tasks and objectives. For them, time carries more importance than relationships and tasks are prioritised over personal feelings. Polychronics (people from polychronic cultures) are event-driven, whereby tasks are not completed according to a pre-set schedule, but determined by circumstance and context. Polychronic time cultures are very focused on relationships and will often have traditions of hospitality and common courtesy that are rather time consuming (Hall 1976; Al-Omari 2003; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005). Monochronics focus on single tasks as they regard time as a never-ending line that can be divided into units where they can speak of time as being ‘saved, wasted, spent, lost, running out, budgeted for and made up’ (Hall 1976:19). Polychronics are able to focus on multiple tasks at one time as they regard time as naturally reoccurring where the same events occur in cycles, where the event is sacred and how they reach that event is of less importance (Hall 1976;
Kaufman-Scarborough 2003; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998). Monochoronic time (M-time) is an unconscious frame around which all else is built, whereby people schedule the activities in life according to priorities, with activities of higher priority receiving more dedicated time (Hall 1976). People from polychronic cultures are adept at undertaking several tasks at the one time, they can easily contend with interruptions and digressions, and place a higher priority on relationships, emotions and circumstances in comparison to time (Al-Omari 2003).

Without an M-time type of system, the industrial civilisation may have never developed. However, while monochrons may be excellent time managers and productive, committed employees, they often fail in human relationships and forget other important parts of their lives including family, friends and even themselves (Hall 1976; Kaufman-Scarborough 2003). Monochoronic time is not inherent in human beings; it is very much a learned system, so deeply ingrained in monochromic cultures that it is believed to be the only ‘logical’ system for organising time and space (Hall 1976). The rigid departmentalisation of time in a monochronic system will often cut short events due to a predetermined schedule, not mindful of the benefits of continuing the event. Research and creative pursuits are often cut short just as the desired outcomes are starting to be reached (Hall 1976). In much the same way, Hall (1976) argues that monochronic departmentalisation of time decreases people’s exposure to context because it narrows the perception of information and purpose surrounding an event (Hall 1976). In relation to negotiation, monochronic negotiators may also apply linear logic, whereby they set a defined number of prioritised objectives to be achieved one by one in a set period. Alternatively, it is more likely that the polychronic negotiator will not compartmentalise the objectives of the negotiation and will pursue a number of objectives at any one time. It is also likely that the polychronic negotiator will reopen discussions about objectives already discussed and will expect the negotiation opponent to try to align at least some of his or her objectives with the objectives of the polychronic negotiator.

Anglophonic cultures in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and Canada are considered typically monochronic and
Arabic speaking cultures are typically polychronic (Hall 1976; Al-Omari 2003; Poon, Evangelista & Albaum 2005; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005). White Americans are regarded as typically monochronic as they are ‘captives of their own time and space’ (Hall, 1976) and will usually face stress when exposed to systems that do not compartmentalise time and activities according to linear logic (Hall 1976). Other cultures to be identified as typically monochronic include the Swiss, German and Scandinavian cultures (Hall 1976; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005).

In a polychronic time system (such as in the Arab World), circumstances and relationships will be regarded as a higher priority than time and scheduling. People from polychronic cultures will undertake multiple tasks at the one time, and as such, will appear to the monochronic negotiator as disorganised (Al-Omari 2003; Williams 1998).

Another important polychronic orientation that Hall (1976), Williams (1998) and Al-Omari (2003) noted was that Gulf Arabs, while not driven by schedules, are influenced by events. Therefore, they prefer to wait for the ‘right time’, ‘right place’ and ‘right mood’ to discuss issues of importance with people, opposed to following an agenda set by time. Many Gulf Arabs see the idea of discussing a topic with somebody who is not in the right mood just because an agenda has been set as odd, and that it is more advantageous to wait for the ‘right time’, which may take several meetings if constant interruptions occur. This may also be interpreted a norm for avoiding conflict, in that issues should be given time to be amicably resolved as opposed to directly addressing them.

Hofstede’s Four Dimensions of Culture

Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) described social systems as being workable only through human behaviour being patterned and predictable with most members of a social system acting in a similar way in any similar situation. The process of human beings learning to act predictably within a social system was labelled by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) as ‘mental programming’. Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) contended that not all predictions of human behaviour within a social system prove to be true; however, the more
accurately a person understands another person’s mental programming for a particular situation, the more accurately their behaviour can be predicted. Mental programming is considered to be formed on three levels. On the universal level, mental programming is shared across humankind. The second level describes collective mental programming as common to particular groups or categories of people but different to people from other groups or categories. Finally, mental programming is considered to be formed on an individual level that is unique from person to person (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). Mental programs can be inherited or learned, with most universal programming and at least a part of individual programming being inherited. However, most collective programming is learned by people who have shared similar learning experiences and situations even though they may have inherited a different genetic makeup (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010).

Hofstede (2001) operationalised mental programming as being observable through values and culture. Values can be held by individuals or collectives and can be considered ‘a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others’ (2001:5). There is a strong distinction between ‘desired’ values (what people actually desire) and ‘desirable’ values (what people think they ought to desire) (Hofstede 2001). Hofstede (2001) viewed people as carrying mental programming across a number of layers of culture, including culture at a national level (e.g. the country that a person is from), at a regional, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation level, at a gender level, at a generation level, at a social class level and/or at a work organisational level.

Between 1967 and 1973, Hofstede tested the effects of mental programming by surveying the attitudes and values of IBM employees in 72 countries across four dimensions of culture: power distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity/femininity. The results produced a scale by nationality that provides a unique perspective on how actions relating to the four cultural dimensions may be perceived during a cross-cultural negotiation. While lecturing at Management Development Institute (IMEDE) in Lausanne, Switzerland from 1971 to 1973, Hofstede also conducted a survey program of 362 managers from approximately 30 countries that displayed similar results to the IBM surveys. Analyses of the IBM surveys were conducted across
individuals, countries, occupations, gender and age; however, the most crucial correlation was based on matched employees sampled across countries. The initial analysis was limited to 40 countries that each had more than 50 respondents, but in the coming years, ten more countries and three regions were added to the analysis. Data on Australian respondents was captured in the first round of analysis, but while seven Arab countries were originally surveyed, the only data that were kept following the initial analysis pertaining to the total region with data on individual countries being inadvertently wiped (Hofstede 2001). The following provides an overview of the four dimensions of culture analysed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010).

**Power Distance**

The power distance dimension essentially analyses power, wealth and prestige in society and how that affects equality. Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) created a Power Distance Index using the average score for each country taken from responses to three questions that asked how the respondent would act if wanting to disagree with a superior, what actual decision-making styles are used by their superiors, and what their preferred decision-making styles were for their superiors to use.

Elements of inequality are related to animal and human inequality (such as a tendency to dominate or establish a pecking order), inequality in society, and inequality in organisations. Human beings are naturally dominant, but the level of dominance depends on the society in which he or she lives, as some societies emphasise dominance, while others de-emphasise dominance. Inequality in society is measured by physical and mental characteristics; social status and prestige; wealth; power and legal rights and rules (including privileges) (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) argued that it is rare for people to benefit from all of these inequalities as they often counterbalance each other, for example, successful people such as entertainers may attain status, possibly wealth, but will rarely achieve power. Likewise, politicians in many countries may achieve status, power but not always wealth. In traditional societies, a counter balance occurs although the strong (people in society) tend to enjoy status, wealth, power and privileges, as
the society will often hold some element of these benefits in disregard (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010).

Hofstede (2001) prescribed that no society is equal, but there are two types of society: ‘elitist’, in which a person’s position in society is clearly defined; and ‘pluralist’, in which elite groups in society will seemingly accept people from middle and lower socio-economic backgrounds. Inequality in organisations relates to the system of hierarchy of capabilities and power. As such, Hofstede (2001:83) defined power distance as the measure of the interpersonal power or influence between a more powerful individual and a less powerful individual as perceived by the less powerful of the two. In analysing power and interpersonal relationships, Hofstede (2001) hypothesised that people take pleasure from exercising power over others, and the more powerful one individual is over another, the more likely the powerful individual is to try to increase the power distance. Conversely, less powerful individuals will try to decrease the power distance between themselves and more powerful individuals, as the smaller the power distance, the greater the tendency is to reduce the power distance further. In a society, power distance occurs within groups (e.g. manager and subordinate) and between groups (e.g. wealthy class and poor class) (2001).

Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) Power Distance Index showed that Arab countries have the seventh highest power distance societies in the world, while Australia was quite low being ranked as 41st out of 53 countries. The significance here is that according to this index, Arabs perceive there to be a large distance between those with power and those subordinate to that power (e.g. manager and employee), while Australians do not see such a power gap and may be willing to challenge authority in particular situations.

The Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness Research Program (GLOBE) study of society’s practice of power distance (Carl et al. 2004) positively correlated with Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) Power Distance Index, with Australia again being ranked as one of the lowest power distance cultures (54 out of 62) and collectively the mean ranking for the Arab countries included in the study (Morocco, Kuwait, Egypt and Qatar) as higher than Australia. However, there is a broad difference in the findings between the Arab countries with Qatar recording the seventh lowest power distance
orientation (56 out of 62) and Morocco recording the equal highest power distance orientation. Kuwait ranked 38 out of 62 and Egypt ranked 45 out of 62 (Carl et al. 2004).

**Individualism and Collectivism**

The individualism/collectivism dimension of culture is concerned with an individual person’s relationship with the larger unit or society in which they live. Humanity tends to be a collective species, but the degree that a culture is collective differs significantly. One such example is the family unit, whereby in some cultures the family unit is only the nuclear family made up of the mother, father and siblings, whereas in other cultures, the family unit includes extended family such as aunts, uncles and cousins. Alternatively, there is also a tribal family unit, which extends the boundary of the family unit further to include all linked by the same line of kinship (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). An individual’s relationship to the collective group encompasses more than just living together, it exists through common values that often have moral overtones and provide members of the culture with guidelines as to what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. People are mentally programmed by their culture to structure their relationship to family, education, politics and utilitarian institutions in a particular way that is consistent with that culture’s concept of self as an individualist or a collectivist (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). Collectivism implicitly assumes that an individual’s interests are tied in with the wellbeing of the greater group, while individualism implies that an individual will be expected to pursue his or her own interests (2001).

Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) compared individualism in the American culture with collectivism in the Chinese culture, as both being seen by many Americans and Chinese to be very important and beneficial parts of the cultures. Many Americans believe that being able to behave and make decisions as individuals has helped to make the US a superpower nation. Conversely, when Mao Zedong took power in China, he purged individualism from the Chinese culture as he (and many others) regarded individualism as evil, because it involved individuals acting in their own interests before acting in the interests of the greater good (2001). Hence, those from collectivist cultures may perceive individualist cultures as selfish and lacking morality,
which people from individualistic cultures may perceive collectivist cultures as overly traditional and restrictive for the rights of the individual. Further expanding on this, Hofstede (2001) believes that there is a correlation between individualism in culture and modernity and economic development in societies.

Individualism and collectivism in culture influences organisations through social pressures. In a collectivist society, employees hold an emotional dependence on the organisations that they work for, which in return the organisation is expected to assume a level of moral responsibility for its employees. In an individualist culture, employees will have less dependence on their employer, and organisations will be more ‘calculative’ than moral in making decisions that affect employees. If an organisation in a collectivist culture does not provide the expected level of moral responsibility, employees will have their values and social orders challenged, and will be forced to become individualistic and/or pressure the organisation to move back towards collectivist values (Hofstede 2001).

Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) Individualism Index rated Australia as the second most individualistic culture with the Arab countries rating equal 26 (with Brazil). While the ranking for the Arab countries indicates them to be right in the middle of the Individualism Index, the mean survey score of 38 is 15 points below the mean overall survey score of 53, and Australia’s mean survey score is 90. The high value of the overall mean score (compared to the middle rankings on the index) indicates that there are a number of cultures that are highly individualistic, and that the number of countries that are regarded as collectivist outnumber the number of individualistic countries. The Anglophonic countries were prominent at the top of the index with the US (1) averaging one point higher than Australia and Great Britain (3) averaging one point less. Following this was Canada (4) and the Netherlands (5) averaging 80 points and New Zealand (6) averaging one point less. Averaging three points above and below the average response by the Arab countries on the index were Iran (24), Jamaica (25), Brazil (26), Turkey (28), Uruguay (29) and Greece (30) (Hofstede, 2001). The results indicate that Australian culture is almost purely individualistic while the Arab countries have collectivist societies.
The GLOBE societal in-group collectivism practices study (Gelfand et al. 2004) ranked three of the four Arab countries as highly collectivist (Morocco 6, Kuwait 10, Egypt 16); however, Qatar (43 out of 62) was considered to have a significantly lower orientation to collectivism in comparison. Australia (53) ranked as one of the least collectivist cultures (Gelfand et al. 2004).

**Uncertainty Avoidance**

Uncertainty avoidance deals with how people cope with not knowing what the future may hold for them. People live with uncertainties in many parts of life and societies and cultures have established mechanisms such as technology, law and religion to help live with this (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). Humans invest their hopes and fears in the future and are conscious of uncertainties that lay ahead. Uncertainty creates anxiety, with the more extreme the uncertainty faced, the more extreme the anxiety suffered. Uncertainty avoidance considers the extent to which cultures are made nervous by not knowing the future or situations that contain ambiguity and therefore maintain strict behavioural expectations and beliefs in absolute truths (Samovar & Porter 2004).

Humans use technology (which includes all human made artefacts) to defend against the uncertainty of nature, law (all formal and informal rules that guide social behaviour) to defend against the uncertainty of the behaviour of other humans, and religion (all revealed knowledge of the unknown) to accept uncertainties that humans cannot defend themselves against (Hofstede 2001). The distinction between defending against uncertainty and accepting uncertainty is not always clear, and often defending against uncertainty may appear to have little effect on the future, but will mainly serve to bring a person temporary peace of mind.

Societies have different ways of dealing with uncertainty, which is manifested by cultures having traditions and practices embedded in them that avoid uncertainty. These traditions and practices are reflected in shared values taught by families, schools and the state that may seem incomprehensible to people from other cultures, as these values have roots that are considered non-rational (not logically linked to an end) (Hofstede 2001; Samovar & Porter 2004).
Organisations also deal with uncertainty by using technology to bring predictability to short-term outcomes, set rules that create bureaucracy which is supposed to lead to desired outcomes, and rituals such as business meetings, accounting, report writing, planning and control systems are all designed to keep people together and control the future (Hofstede 2001).

Hofstede (2001:146) summarised the definition of uncertainty avoidance as ‘a norm for intolerance of ambiguity’ and described tendencies of a culture towards prejudice, rigidity and dogmatism, intolerance of different opinions, traditionalism, superstition, racism and ethnocentrism are all elements of a norm for intolerance of ambiguity, which is reflected in the Uncertainty Avoidance Index. Hofstede (2001) commented that risk avoidance and uncertainty avoidance are separate concepts that are sometimes mistakenly confused in that uncertainty’s relationship to risk is similar to anxiety’s relationship with fear (2001). Risk is always focused on a specific event and usually involves a calculation of the probability of that event happening, whereas uncertainty has no specific event attached and is unpredictable (Hofstede 2001). Cultures high in uncertainty avoidance do not so much focus on avoiding risk, as much as they focus on avoiding ambiguity; however, people from such cultures will establish structures in their lives, institutions, families and social networks to reduce ambiguity. Yet, people from high uncertainty avoidance cultures will ironically take risks to reduce ambiguity such as acting hastily in a situation as opposed to waiting and seeing what is likely to happen. Conversely, cultures that are low in uncertainty avoidance are less hasty to reduce ambiguity and are more likely to take on unfamiliar risks akin to changing jobs (Hofstede 2001).

In developing the Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) surveyed IBM employees globally with questions relating to rule orientation, employment stability and stress to measure the level of tendency for cultures to avoid uncertainty. Responses that indicated a willingness to ‘break company rules if it serves the interests of the company’ and to frequently change employers or jobs indicated a tolerance for uncertainty, while an emphasis on ‘playing by the rules’ no matter the situation and remaining in the same job for more than five years indicated a lack of tolerance
for uncertainty and a preference to avoid it. In examining stress, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) found that in countries that demonstrated higher stress levels, there tended to be a stronger rule orientation (within the organisation) and staff looking for greater employment stability.

The Uncertainty Avoidance Index shows the Arab countries to be ranked at 27 (out of 50 countries and three regions), which is just above the mean response. Countries to rank in positions close to the Arab countries were Italy (23), Pakistan (24) and Austria (25), Taiwan (26), Ecuador (28), Germany (West Germany) (29), Thailand (30), Iran (31) and Finland (32). The majority of Latin American countries showed a lower tolerance for uncertainty and most were ranked in positions ranging from ten to 22. Australia ranked at number 37 on the index and scored 14 points below the mean score of 65. This demonstrated Australian culture to be tolerant of uncertainty but not highly tolerant of uncertainty. Other countries and regions to be rated similar to Australia were West Africa (34), Netherlands (35), East Africa (36), Norway (38), South Africa (39) and New Zealand (40). Anglophonic countries tended to rank below Australia (indicating a higher tolerance to uncertainty), including Canada (41), the United States (43), Great Britain (47) and Ireland (48).

The GLOBE study of society practices of uncertainty avoidance (Sully de Luque 2004) considered its methodology for measuring uncertainty avoidance to be considerably different to the methodology employed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) and that a comparison of the rankings may not be reliable. According to the GLOBE rankings, Australian culture has a high uncertainty avoidance orientation (ranking 19 from 62 societies) and the Arab cultures have a low uncertainty avoidance orientation. All four Arab countries involved in the GLOBE study ranked highly, with Kuwait ranking 24th (out of 62 societies), Egypt 34th, Qatar 36th and Morocco ranking 47th (Sully de Luque 2004). There is a closer correlation between GLOBE’s study of society values (what should be the practices) of uncertainty avoidance and Hofstede’s IBM study (2004).
Masculinity and Femininity

As his fourth dimension of national culture, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) created a Masculinity Index that compared 50 countries and three regions of the world, based on the influence of gender trends in social and work objectives. In looking at the gender trends, Hofstede (2001) argued that every society regards particular roles and behaviours as more appropriate for each gender, for example:

*Men must be more concerned with economic and other achievements and women must be more concerned with taking care of people in general and children in particular... Men, in short, are supposed to be assertive, competitive and tough. Women are supposed to be more concerned with taking care of the home, the children, and people in general—to take tender roles* (Hofstede 2001:280).

As such, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) supposed that males who usually try to take the dominant role will act as the decision maker in political and economic matters; however, different societies display differences in the distribution of power between genders.

Previous research in the areas of anthropology, psychology and political science has proven that males in most societies are socialised towards assertiveness, whereas females are socialised towards nurturance. Family, peer groups, school, media, films, television and even children’s literature teach and re-confirm gender roles in societies (Hofstede 2001).

The Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) surveys of work goals for males and females working in the same occupations within IBM demonstrated a significant difference in the trends. Across nine occupations, the following findings were uncovered:

- More important for men:
  - Advancement
  - Earnings
  - Training
  - Up-to-dateness.
More important for women:
- Friendly atmosphere
- Position security
- Physical conditions
- Manager
- Cooperation.

No significant gender differences:
- Job content goals (challenge, use of skills)
- Private life goals (personal time, desirable area) (Hofstede 2001:281).

The Hofstede (1980, 2001) results confirmed observations from a number of gender comparison studies conducted outside IBM including a study a similar study conducted in 1957 (Herberg et al. 1957). However, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) also discovered that at senior management level, the attitude trends of females tended to differ in that their goals were often more focused on advancement and were more assertive than the average male senior manager (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010).

Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) also found that by clustering work goals on the basis of differences between occupations, female and male preferences correlate to social and ego preference factors. People undertaking ‘social’ occupations (such as unskilled labour and clerical positions) tended to follow female preference factors (friendly atmosphere and security), while people undertaking ‘ego’ occupations (such as a systems engineer) tended to follow male preference factors (challenge and advancement) (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010). On the basis of differences between countries, goals related to individual or collective factors did not demonstrate any systematic differentiation between genders, but the results demonstrated that social factors (management and cooperation) were more important to women and ego factors (earnings and advancement) were more important to men (Hofstede 1980, 2001, 2003, 2010).
The main result of these surveys demonstrated that no matter where they are located in the world, men and women working in the same occupation have significant differences in social and egotistical interests; however, it was also discovered that the levels where these differences occurred varied. Out of this, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) was able to construct a Masculinity Index for countries, which would compare the preferences for ‘masculine’ factors to the preferences for ‘feminine’ factors in a society. In doing so, Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) references to ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ refer to the dominant gender role patterns in traditional and modern societies, which tend to emphasise male assertiveness and female nurturance. The references are not intended to claim that men and women will always act according to those gender roles; just that statistically more men will act in a ‘masculine’ manner and more females will demonstrate ‘feminine’ behaviour (2001). However, the variances in results raised the dilemma of how different societies value ‘feminine’ nurturance interests over ‘masculine’ assertiveness interest. Although the vast majority of respondents in the IBM surveys were men, there was clear evidence that men in different societies place different values on the importance of interpersonal relations as opposed to ego-related goals. Hence, Hofstede (2001) developed the Masculinity Index to measure the distribution of gender roles across societies, whereby societies high in masculinity would be characterised by distinct gender roles, with men characterised as tough, assertive and focused on material success and women characterised as modest, tender and concerned about quality of life, and conversely societies low in masculinity where gender roles overlap and both men and women are characterised by modesty, tenderness and a concern for quality of life (2001). Unlike the other three dimensions of culture, the results for the masculinity–femininity dimension demonstrated that there is no link whatsoever between this cultural dimension and the wealth of a country, whereas other cultural dimensions are at least partially dependent on wealth (2001).

According to the Masculinity Index, Australia ranked 16th and 12 points above the mean of 49, while the Arab countries were ranked at number 23 (out of 53 countries and regions) and were four points above the mean, indicating that the balance between masculine and feminine values is greater in the Arab countries. Countries positioned close by Australia were mainly Anglophonic
such as the US (15) and New Zealand (17) with South Africa and Ecuador (equal 13th position) and Greece and Hong Kong (equal 18) also producing similar results to Australia. Argentina and India (equal 20th position), Belgium (22), Canada (24), Malaysia and Pakistan (equal 25) and Brazil (27) recorded response rates most similar to those of the Arab countries region.

The GLOBE study of society practices of assertiveness (Den Hartog 2004:413) significantly correlates to Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) IBM findings for the dimension of masculinity. In the GLOBE study Australia ranks at 22 (out of 62 societies), while three of the four Arab countries rank significantly further down the scale (Qatar 31, Egypt 44 and Kuwait 57) with Morocco ranked as the 13th most assertive society (2004).

**Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation**

The four previous cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) formed his original model as published in 1980. However, in the second edition of ‘Culture’s Consequences’, Hofstede (2001) added a fifth dimension, which is the long-term versus short-term orientation that specifically refers to the extent to which a culture programs its members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social and emotional needs (2001). This fifth dimension had been created because the original four dimensions were largely ethnocentric (2001, 2003, 2010) and had limited the ability for non-Western respondents to fully express their values (Hofstede 2001, 2003, 2010, Harrison et al. 1994, Smith et al. 1996). As such, a questionnaire was developed in Hong Kong that was designed according to a Chinese cultural bias and known as the Chinese Value Survey (CSV) (Hofstede 2001, 2003, 2010). The CSV was then administered in 23 countries in ten languages (all versions were translated from the original Chinese version).

The results suggested that orientations such as power distance, collectivism and masculinity were relevant to Chinese values; however, uncertainty avoidance was not as relevant (2001, 2003, 2010). From these results emerged a new dimension that was termed ‘Confucian dynamism’ as cultures are polarised according to the extent to which they hold importance for orientations that are consistent with the teachings of Confucius (Hofstede 2001, 2003, 2010,

Across the 23 countries surveyed, the Confusion countries displayed the strongest long-term orientation, with Brazil, India, Thailand and Singapore also rating high on the scale. Most of the Western countries were ranked higher than African countries and Asian countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan (Hofstede 2001, 2003, 2010). Australia was ranked 15 out of the 23 countries demonstrating a short-term orientation (Hofstede 2001, 2003, 2010). No Arab country was represented in the study, but the GLOBE study concurred with Hofstede’s (2001, 2003, 2010) study in that Australian cultural values support a short-term orientation, while the cultural values of a number of Arab countries in the study support a long-term orientation (Askanasy, N, Gupta, V et al. 2004).

**Criticisms of Hofstede’s Model**

As indicated above, Hofstede (2001) identified the ethnocentric nature of the original IBM surveys as a weakness in his model and tried to address this through the surveying sample groups in 23 countries using questionnaires based on Chinese values. Likewise, there have been a number of academics that have criticised the validity and reliability of Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) model and indices (Baskerville 2003; Smith & Hume 2005; Gernon & Wallace 1995; Smith et al. 1996). Problems identified with Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) research include ethnocentric use of values (Gernon & Wallace 1995; Smith et al. 1996), the assumption that nations equate to cultures (Baskerville 2003; Gernon & Wallace 1995), difficulties and limitations to quantifying cultures according to dimensions and matrices (Baskerville 2003), the status of the observer outside the culture (Baskerville 2003), and the assumption of the stability of cultural differences over time (Baskerville 2003; Smith & Hume 2005).
Baskerville (2003) considered Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) original theoretical basis as weak and suggested that Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) discussions about the dimensions link to socio-economic factors instead of culture. To support this suggestion, Baskerville (2003) utilised the Social Sciences Citation Index from 1981 to 1998 to demonstrate that Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) model has mainly been cited in management and psychology research and not in sociology and anthropology (2003). Apart from highlighting the ethnocentric bias in the original study, Hofstede’s (2001) Chinese Values Survey served to demonstrate that the Uncertainty Avoidance Index was not universal and is not a dimension applicable to comparisons between Eastern and Western societies (Harrison et al. 1994).

The original questionnaires were administered within the IBM corporation (Hofstede 1980), which has also been the source of criticism from academics (Gernon & Wallace 1995; Smith & Hume 2005; Smith et al. 1996) who believe that the corporate culture within IBM or the narrow demographic of people sampled may have impacted on the reliability of the results of the study. Hofstede (1980) employed specific formulae to calculate each of the indices used in the model. These formulae have been criticised (Gernon & Wallace 1995; Smith & Hume 2005) from the viewpoint that they may well have suited the original study for IBM’s purposes, but predicting the cultural orientations of professionals working outside IBM is limited according to how well IBM’s employees typify the general population of the nation, and how the organisation correlates to the formulae specific to the IBM study.

Following the original publication of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions surveys in 1980, there have been many attempts to replicate Hofstede’s findings (Hofstede 2001:463). Harrison et al. (1994) replicated Hofstede’s (1980) study across four countries and calculated results for power distance and individualism, which were consistent with Hofstede’s indices; however, there was a slight discrepancy with the Hofstede’s (1980) Masculinity Index and a significant discrepancy with Hofstede’s (1980) Uncertainty Avoidance Index (Harrison et al. 1994).

Smith and Hume (2005) conducted a study entitled ‘Linking Culture and Ethics’ in which the authors calculated new Individualism Index and Power
Distance Index values for six countries. While the individualism and collectivism distinctions remained consistent with Hofstede’s (1980) original survey, the attitudes to power distance did not reflect Hofstede’s (1980) original study. The researchers suggested that the various corporations that participated in the Smith and Hume (2005) study were heavily influenced by American culture and hierarchy; therefore, participants may have responded according to company culture instead of their societal values.

Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars (1996) replicated the Hofstede (1980) study, but they also included in the surveys a number of former communist nations that Hofstede was unable to include in his IBM surveys (Smith et al. 1996). The results of the latter study demonstrated a correlation with the individualism and power distance dimensions in the original Hofstede (1980) study and the long-term dimension in Hofstede’s (2001) Confucian dynamism study; however, they (Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars 1996) were unable to confirm a relation with the uncertainty avoidance and masculinity dimensions from Hofstede’s 1980 study. Smith et al. (1996) argued that the divergences in the countries sampled led to at least some differences between their study and those of Hofstede (1980). Likewise, Harrison and McKinnon (1999) reviewed a number of different replication studies demonstrating a number of different outcomes from replications.

Hofstede (2001) described replication as problematic because most researchers do not ensure that the research methodology is what Hofstede considers valid and reliable. To ensure validity in replicating the surveys, Hofstede (2001) argued that five pitfalls must be avoided. These pitfalls include poorly matching sample groups; confusing national level culture with other levels of (sub)culture such as gender, education and class; analysing issues through an ethnocentric viewpoint and therefore overlooking issues that are important to other cultures; and using survey questions that are not correlated to questions used in the original IBM surveys. However, the most significant pitfall identified by Hofstede (2001) was that many researchers had not distinguished between surveying cultures and individuals. Hofstede (2001:464) considered that too many replication studies were in fact analysing the personalities of individuals and considering these individuals to be reflective of their cultural
group. While the current project does not replicate Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) survey, these pitfalls will need to be considered in the data analysis, as it may be possible that the actions of negotiators will reflect their personalities as much as it reflects their cultural group. The collection of data from intra-cultural negotiations within each of the two groups in the study will be important for understanding and identifying if observations are related to culture or personality. It is expected that within each cultural group, there will be enough consistent behaviour to observe patterns of cultural orientations as opposed to individual personality-based patterns.

Another issue raised by Hofstede (2001) was that several studies have been completed that propose inconsistencies in the various indices that were produced during Hofstede’s IBM surveys. He contended that many of these surveys only compared two or three cultural groups, whereas there needs to be a minimum of ten cultural groups compared to produce reliable and valid conclusions about any of the cultural dimension indices (Hofstede 2001:463). Likewise, these comments must be considered for the current study, in that testing the validity of these dimensions will be concerned with whether observations of the cultural groups are consistent with the observations made during Hofstede’s (1980,2001) studies, not with commenting on the validity of the indices.

While Hofstede (1980, 2001) considered the sampling and matching of participants as a strength of his approach, Smith et al. (1996) were critical of the matching design because they did not believe that Hofstede (1980) considered how the status and wealth of IBM staff in similar positions would differ between industrialised countries and third world countries. However, Smith et al. (1996) did also state that they value the Hofstede (1980) study highly as one of the only comprehensive studies of cultural values.
Mental Programming: How Cultural Orientations Become ‘Mental’ Orientations

A common concept from the models previously discussed is the concept of mental programming. Hall (1966, 1973, 1976, 1989, 1990a, 1990b), Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010), Kluckhohn and Strodtback (1961) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) all describe a process of mental programming or learning, whereby members of a culture throughout their lifetimes assume patterns of thinking, feeling and potential acting, which are common with other members of their culture, but possibly not all shared by members of other cultures (Hofstede 2003). Hall’s (1976) perception of programming was that people would internalise information from everyday communication transactions with other people, and this internalised information would become context that would make future transactions of the same nature fast, efficient and not require large amounts of explicit information. Hall (1976) also contended that monochronic time and space systems were learned systems within cultures that assert the values of linear thought. Hofstede (2001, 2003) described mental programming as being predominantly learned from social environments and life experiences, and as a common reflection of values shared or partially shared by collections of people living in the same social environment (2003). Mental programs are the organisation of values within a culture according to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), with the behaviour of people being the manifestation of mental programming. The process of mental programming is described as phenomenological, whereby people undergo a process of learning so that the behaviours of a culture become understood and perceived as normal by members of the same culture (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1997).

However, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961:3) discussed mental programming as variations in values from culture to culture. In each cultural system, there are ‘required’ and ‘permitted’ variations in values that direct behaviour among groups of people. While describing what value orientations are, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) explanation does not directly address how cultural orientations are acquired by people. This is most likely a result of their work

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being published several years ahead of the other models discussed. However, it is also evident that the models developed later drew on the ideas of Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961), particularly in the areas of man-nature orientation, time orientation, activity orientation and relational orientation. Likewise, Hall (1966, 1973, 1976, 1989, 1990a, 1990b), Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) all have a number of interrelated concepts that will be discussed further in this section. Importantly, Hall (1966, 1973, 1976, 1989, 1990a, 1990b), Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) have a consensus that cultural orientations are largely learned, and that it is essential for people to learn these cultural orientations if they are to function efficiently within a culture. These cultural orientations provide meaning and cognitive methods, which are relevant to solving problems that people face in communication. These problems are most pronounced when people who have undertaken the learning of different cultural orientations interact. In the following section, this doctoral study will compare parts of each of these models and discuss how they interrelate. From this, a framework of cultural orientations will emerge that can be applied to cross-cultural negotiation.

**Cultural Orientations and Context**

Hall (1976) developed a continuum for comparing cultures based on the level that they internalise the information that provides meaning to events. This information was described as context (Hall 1976; Zaharna 1995; Samovar & Porter 2004). There are a number of similarities between Hall’s (1976:92) high-context and low-context model and the ‘elaborated and restricted’ codes model developed by Bernstein. Bernstein (1964) analysed the relationships between social structures, forms of speech and behaviour and similarly considered context to be integral to how people relate with their environment. It was supposed that there were two types of language code that are predominantly used, which demonstrate social relationships, planning procedures and relationships to the environment during communication. The first type of code is known as ‘elaborated’ and exists when a message recipient will face difficulties in predicting which syntactic option will be used by the speaker to organise his or her message, thereby forcing the speaker to select
from a wide range of syntactic options. In elaborated code, the speaker must ensure that it is the code that carries the meaning in an explicit form. The alternative code was coined as ‘restricted’ as it relies upon the communication having few syntactic options for the speaker to organise his or her message, hence making the syntactic option more predictable for the message recipient. The advantage of restricted code is that message can be conveyed in an implicit form and still be clearly understood by the recipient (Bernstein 1964). Hall (1976) correlated his model to Bernstein’s (1964) by labelling restricted code as high-context and elaborated code as low-context.

One of the significant points of comparison between Hall’s (1976) model and that of Bernstein (1964), is in their descriptions of high-context and restricted code communication as fitting the definition of a collectivist orientation and low-context, with elaborated code as fitting the definition of an individualist orientation. High-context and restricted code communication will only work if the participants have undertaken the required mental programming through inclusive relationships. Just as Hall (1976) compared the efficiency of communication between two twin siblings, Bernstein (1964) described how an outsider eavesdropping on a conversation between two people who share an inclusive relationship may face difficulty in following the conversation. The two people are likely to communicate in a manner that for one another is very efficient, fast and understandable, but from the perspective of the outsider, a number of contextual clues would have been removed, most likely leaving him or her excluded from much of the true meaning of the conversation.

Hofstede (2001) contended that Hall’s (1976) high-context/low-context cultural continuum is consistent with the notion of individualism and collectivism in societies, as high-context communication places the onus on the listener to interpret the meaning of the communication, and the message code must be explicit in low-context communication:

*High-context communication fits the collectivist society, and low-context communication is typical for individualistic cultures. Many things that in collectivist cultures are self-evident must be said explicitly in individualist cultures. American business contracts are much longer than Japanese business contracts. Unwritten rules*
represented bones of contention in the negotiations between Western countries and Japan about the opening of Japanese markets for Western products. The Japanese rightly argued that there were no formal rules preventing the import of foreign products, but the Western would-be importers collided with the implicit rules of the Japanese distribution system, which they did not understand (Hofstede, 2001:212).

Adding further relevance to the high-context/low-context continuum is Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1998) model of universalism versus particularism. Universalist cultures are usually low-context in that they emphasise explicit agreements and rules. Particularist cultures are relationship focused and they will draw on context from each situation at hand and will expect flexibility to alter agreements. Application of rules will also depend upon the people involved in an event and their relationship to society, which once again, is reliant upon context and not possible for an outsider to decipher without a degree of mental programming.

Also related to the high-context and low-context continuum is the concept of logic versus emotion in communication. Neutral cultures will focus on communicating with well-structured, explicit arguments, while affective cultures tend to use emotion to express feelings and rely upon the message recipient to interpret the reasoning from context.

**Cultural Orientations towards Time and Space**

The use of time and space is common across all cultures, but there are differences in how individuals and cultures perceive time and space (Kaufman-Scarborough 2003). There is a clear commonality between two of the theoretical models reviewed where time is either considered linear or cyclical (Hall 1976; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998), and they agree that certain cultures (monochronic/sequential) departmentalise time, emphasise scheduling and focus on one task at a time and other cultures (polychronic/synchronous) will be event-focused, emphasising relationships and undertake multiple tasks at once. However, it was the Trompamaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) model that drew an obvious relationship between the
P-time/M-time model, the sequential/sychronic model and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) past, present or future orientation model.

According to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998), a future-oriented culture will be concerned about advancement and will actually try to control the future from the present through goal setting and scheduling. As such, the authors have drawn a connection between future orientation and monochronicity, monochronicity and a short-term orientation and monochronicity and an orientation to control nature. Conversely, polychronic cultures are more likely to be past-oriented as they value long-term existing relationships and traditions and therefore are more likely to be collectivist. A future-oriented culture will also accord status according to achievement, while a past-oriented cultured will tend to ascribe status (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998).

The compartmentalisation of space and relationships that a monochronic person undertakes is also central to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1998) specific-orientation versus diffuse-orientation model. A monochronic person compartmentalises their space to optimise their ability to complete the task in according to the schedule. There will be a clear separation between work space and personal space. They also compartmentalise their relationships according to the function. They will know many people, but the interaction with most of these people is limited to the environment of the initial interaction. For example, a monochronic person may have many work colleagues, but only a few of these colleagues are considered friends rather than acquaintances.

**Cultural Orientations towards Power**

Hofstede (1980, 2001) dealt with the issue of power directly through introducing the power distance dimension, which analyses how power impacts on equality in a society. Hall (1976) did not address power in either the high-context and low-context continuum or the P-time and M-time model, but the other authors did address power in different ways. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) considered societies to accord power through authoritarianism (or lineage), collectivist ideals and consensus or through individual determination.
The problem with these orientations is that they do not discuss orientations towards equality and are more relevant to be considered just from the individualism versus collectivism orientation. Authoritarianism is relevant to how certain societies bestow power and is better considered as a power orientation for the purpose of this study.

Also relevant are Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1998) achievement versus ascription and specific versus diffuse orientations. Ascription-oriented cultures will have particular barriers to power. While certain ascriptions such as education and profession will be achievement based, other ascriptions may be age, race or gender specific; they may be related to a person’s genetic make-up or what their family’s relationship to society is. Such ascriptions provide greater power distances between the people who meet those ascriptions, people who meet some of the ascriptions and those who do not meet any of the ascriptions. In an achievement-oriented culture, power and status are more attainable for people who are able to achieve at a high level in a particular domain. The power or status may be limited to that domain or it may transcend the domain depending upon their level of achievement.

**Cultures and Individualism and Collectivism**

The orientation of different cultures according to how their members perceive their right to pursue their own goals and interests (individualism) or link their own interests to the welfare of the greater group (collectivism) (Hofstede 2001) is widely considered by cross-cultural communication researchers. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) model characterised cultures as having a third orientation to individualism and collectivism being ‘authoritarianism’, which deals with the degree to which cultures are oriented to bestowing power and privilege on members according to their lineage. Examples of authoritarian-oriented societies include a number of African and Arab states that bestow power and privilege according to lineage (Samovar & Porter 2004). African and Arab cultures are typically considered collectivist cultures, while the UK, which also bestows privilege upon its Royal family according to lineage, is considered an individualistic culture (Samovar & Porter 2004). This indicates that there are varying degrees of authoritarianism in cultures and that it would
be better treated as its own orientation, or a degree of a culture’s orientation to power.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998:52) defined a prime orientation to the common good and common objectives as ‘communalism’ as opposed to ‘collectivism’ but also defined a prime orientation to self as ‘individualism’. The authors did not make a clear operational distinction between ‘communalism’ and ‘collectivism’; however, there are subtle distinctions in the actual meanings of the words. The eleventh edition of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defined communalism as ‘allegiance to one’s own ethnic group rather than to the wider society’ and collectivism as ‘the practice or principal of giving the group priority over each individual in it’. By applying these definitions to the orientations, a communalist considers the ‘group’ that they belong to be well defined, whereas a collectivist does not have such a clear definition of where their ‘group’ begins and ends. While the authors’ description of communalism is consistent with Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) descriptions of collectivism, the difference between the definitions of the words themselves raises a number of questions including what is the ‘group’ that a person is a member of; where does membership of the group begin and end; and is a collectivist person a member of multiple groups (e.g. family group, occupation group, local community group or national group) or is the concept of ‘group’ one all-encompassing body of people?

While there is a consistency between each of the authors’ individualism versus collectivism/communalism models, the work of Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) is of most relevance to this study as he also provides empirical evidence of how cultures differ in their orientations. Through his surveys, Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) was able to create an index of how different nations are oriented towards individualism. The index has provided a valuable comparative tool for future studies such as this one.

In previous sections, a connection was drawn between the individualism and collectivism orientations, the high-context and low-context cultural continuum and the polychronic and monochronic time and space systems. Smith et al. (1996) considered a high correlation to exist between collectivism and a high
power distance. Likewise, high-context communication requires a degree of collective programming (Hall 1976), but it is not clearly understood from the literature what will happen when low-context communication is used in a collectivist society. Will that person be considered or identified instantly as an outsider from the collectivist group? Will the message recipient respond with a low-context message? Similarly, referring to the relationship with time and space from the literature, there is a strong connection between monochronic time and space and individualism and polychronic time and space and collectivism. While this is so, it raises additional questions. A relationship and event-oriented polychronic will face difficulties in developing polychronic relationships in an individualistic environment, thus is it not possible for a monochronic person to still compartmentalise relationships in a collectivist culture?

A similar linkage exists between individualism and collectivism and orientations to nature. The inner-directed orientation depicts a person as having the individualistic trait of following their own interests while outer-directed people will be more focused on the situation of others (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998). While this is relevant, it could be contended that since the orientations to nature are more about orientations towards the control of versus the coexistence with one’s environment, it is more closely aligned with Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) masculinity and femininity orientations.

The final two orientations to be considered as related to individualism and collectivism are the universalist and particularist orientations. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) considered universalist cultures to be those that are rule-based and emphasise explicit information, standards and agreements, and particularist cultures emphasise relationships and the consideration of situations. Particularism is consistent with collectivism in that it requires the individual placing the society’s interests in front of their own interests by considering other people’s relationship to the society. In an individualist culture, a person will place their own interests ahead of other people’s interests and will regard any contravention of rules or agreements as their right to pursue restitution of some kind. While the universalist and particularist
orientations are relevant to this study, I will consider them to be orientations of individualist and collectivist cultures.

**Cultural Orientations towards Uncertainty**

Uncertainty is an important factor of how and when considering why cultures differ. As per Hofstede’s (2001:146) definition, uncertainty is an ambiguous situation, where the future is not clear. Hofstede (2001:146) described how humanity uses ‘technology’ (all things made by humans) to deal with uncertainty, but cultures still vary in their willingness to deal with uncertainty. Cultures that prefer to avoid ambiguity tend to do so through traditions and practices that may invoke risk and will often be regarded by outsiders as being illogical (Hofstede 2001). Yet, cultures oriented to high uncertainty avoidance will be strong in traditions and rules that are the result of mental programming.

A focus on traditions indicates that cultures with a low tolerance to uncertainty are oriented to the past, believing that answers to the problem of ambiguity have existed long before the current situation. Yet, with the relationship between past orientation and polychronic time and space systems, can we assume that high uncertainty avoidance is also a trait of polychronic people? If we consider a polychronic person’s emphasis on relationships and contact with people, and the emphasis on events as a point in time with multiple ways of arriving to that point (e.g. the opposite of detailed planning and scheduling) then there is a strong link between the polychronic orientation and a low tolerance to uncertainty.

If considering how people deal with ambiguity in nature, there is a strong link between Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) uncertainty avoidance orientation and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) orientations towards nature. Cultures that are inner-directed and focus on controlling their environment, stress the importance of the development and use of technology to bring predictability to short-term outcomes and decrease anxiety created by uncertainty. Outer-directed cultures try to employ traditions and rules that will maintain harmony with the environment by avoiding uncertainties that could force a change in the environment.
Cultural Orientations towards Femininity and Masculinity

Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) Masculinity Index demonstrated differences in how societies value nurturance (feminine) over assertiveness (masculine). It is evident from Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) and Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) that there are a number of other cultural orientations that contribute to this difference.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) and Kluckhohn and Strodbeck’s (1961) cultural orientations which deal with perceptions of the future, to doing versus being and to achievement all emphasise Hofstede’s (1980) ‘masculine’ preference factors of assertiveness, competitiveness and advancement. ‘Feminine’ preference factors such as nurturance, seeking security and harmony are more closely linked to the past orientation, the being orientation and the ascription orientation. However, the masculinity and femininity orientations particularly relate to a culture’s orientation to nature. Cultures that try to control nature and external forces demonstrate a high degree of assertiveness, competitiveness and a need for advancement. Alternatively, cultures are oriented to seeking harmony with nature and external forces through demonstrating a strong desire for cooperation, nurturance and security (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998).

Summary of How These Models Relate to One Another

The literature has demonstrated that the three prevalent cross-cultural communication models are in some cases interrelated with each other and are interconnected with a number of other orientations that have been described by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) and Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961). The comparisons of the literature have demonstrated a number of important themes in cultural orientations. There were common features in the approaches proposed by Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) especially at the level of concepts of time and space orientation, but Hall’s (1976) description of polychronic and monochronic time and space systems went into greater depth than the other authors and will, therefore, be used as the most appropriate model for this study. Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) four dimensions analyse how cultures are oriented to power and equality, the concept of the individual versus
the collective, tolerance to ambiguity and the preference for assertiveness over nurturance. The models proposed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) described orientations that relate to these dimensions, but possibly the most significant relationship was between individualism/collectivism and Hall’s (1980) high-context and low-context continuum and the polychronic/monochronic time and space systems. While individualist can be considered typically low-context cultures and monochronic cultures, there is no evidence from the literature that there is a direct relationship between monochronic time and space and low-context communication. Likewise, a similar issue can be raised about the relationship between power distance and individualism/collectivism whereby there is no indication if either an individualist or collectivist society will be more prone to have a preference for a higher power distance or greater equality. Not all of the orientations mentioned are expected to be relevant to cross-cultural negotiation; however, they have all been considered to provide a broader scope for analysis.

Negotiation

Negotiation is a process of social interaction whereby parties seek to resolve contradictory aims and interests through discussion that leads to common points that serve their interests and meet certain objectives (Drake 2001; Lewthwaite 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt 1992). There is no limit to the number of parties that can participate in a negotiation; however, the two party model is the most frequently studied (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992). Negotiation is considered one of four main methods for resolving contradictory aims and interests, the other three methods being mediation (a variation on negotiation whereby outside parties assist in brokering a resolution), struggle (which can take the form of physical combat, verbal altercation, political rallying or taking unilateral advantages such as theft, which out of attrition may lead to a resolution of sorts) and arbitration (where a third party makes a binding decision about the form of resolution) (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992). Generally, negotiation is the preferred method for resolving contradictory interests and as such, is employed before any of the other methods are used. Mediation,
struggle and arbitration are often employed as methods if mutually agreeable resolutions cannot be found through negotiation (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992).

**Mental Models of Negotiations**

Shared mental modelling is considered a useful method for studying the processes of intercultural negotiation (Brett 2000; Bazerman et al. 2000). In the case of negotiation, a mental model is the cognitive representation of how the negotiator perceives his or her self, how they perceive relationships and their negotiation partner, what they consider to be a positive outcome, what would be a negative outcome, how they expect their partner to negotiate, and what they consider acceptable behaviour; the mental model encompasses any preconceived idea about the negotiation (Brett 2000; Bazerman et al. 2000; Gentner & Stevens 1983). In understanding a mental model, we need to be aware that there are four parts. The first one is the ‘target system’, which in this case is a negotiation because it is the system that the negotiator is using. The second part is the ‘conceptual model’ of the target system, which in the case of negotiation is usually invented by negotiation teachers, business people, authors and people who advise others on how to negotiate effectively. Then, there is the negotiators ‘mental model’ of that target system and conceptual model, followed by the ‘scientist’s conceptualisation’, which is an outsider’s understanding of the negotiator’s mental model (Gentner & Stevens 1983:7). Thus far, this section has established a definition of the target system and provided two conceptual models (distributive and integrative) for negotiation.

Through interaction with the target system, mental models naturally evolve in that new experiences and learning drives changes in mental models. They are also unstable in that people will often forget details of target systems particularly those that have not been used for some time. There are often no clear boundaries between target systems, which influence people to use the same or similar mental models for different target systems. Mental models are also unscientific, in that people will not always apply ‘logic’ to their mental models but introduce other patterns that have a particular purpose (Gentner & Stevens 1983:8).
Mental models can be considered individually held concepts or shared concepts (Bazerman et al. 2000). They are often studied as individually held concepts (Thompson & Hastie 1990; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996; Larrick & Blount 1997; Ross & Ward 1995) to understand the processes of decision making by people or to understand interpersonal perceptions. While these are of importance to the current study, mental models when considered a shared concept are of even more relevance to the study of negotiation (Brett 2000; Bazerman et al. 2000). When two negotiators meet, it cannot be expected that they will share the same mental model; however, since mental models are dynamic, throughout the interaction, negotiators will be forced to adapt their mental model and eventually develop a mutually shared mental model of the target system (Gentner & Stevens 1983; Bazerman et al. 2000). It is contended that presuppositions related to the mental model will actively guide a person’s social interaction, but a person changing their suppositions (through internalising new information) may lead to a remapping of the mental model of the target system (Bazerman et al. 2000).

There are two distinct ways that negotiation mental models can be applied in the study of intercultural negotiations. The first is through starting with a known mental model and observing similarities and contrasts in the processes used by negotiators, and the second is through comparing similarities and contrasts between multiple known mental models (Brett 2000). The second method relies completely on understanding the negotiation mental model of each culture participating in the negotiation, while the first method may overlook culturally unique aspects as it is based on a single mental model that may not be shared by the parties in the study. However, Brett (2000) argued the virtues of the first method as a strong mental model of negotiation has evolved through Western theory and research, which although it may not be completely applicable to all cultures, serves as a good starting point for intercultural negotiation research.

The first part of the Western mental model relates to how negotiations are conducted and the types of negotiations that take place. The Western mental model regards negotiation as a direct interaction between parties and that the
negotiation should be based either on a trading transaction or on resolving a dispute (Brett 2000).

The next part of the Western mental model involves the tactical approached to negotiation (Brett 2000). According to the Western mental model, negotiations are often based on conflict, whereby negotiators expect that the outcome will produce a winner and a loser (Elahee & Brooks 2004; Lewthwaite 2000). However, it is also possible not to base negotiations on conflict, and to seek outcomes where all parties ‘win’ and achieve a satisfactory outcome. These two approaches are known as distributive or competitive negotiation tactics as opposed to integrative or collaborative negotiation tactics (Elahee & Brooks 2004; Drake 2001; Lewthwaite 2000; Brett 2000).

Distributive negotiations tactics are generally conducted in an unfriendly atmosphere and negotiators are aiming to maximise their benefit at the cost of the other party (Drake 2001; Lewthwaite 2000). Skilled competitive negotiators will use tactics such as the following:

- Avoid presenting information that may be useful to the opponent but will seek to obtain useful information from an opponent
- Avoid making the opening offer for a concession, as this provides the opposing party with important information such as what counter offers may be acceptable but will try to induce an opponent into making an opening offer for a concession
- Will regard conceding concessions to the other party as a sign of weakness and therefore will:
  - Be slow to concede concessions
  - Will concede few concessions
- Will put an opponent under pressure to concede concessions
- Will deal with conflict by being assertive and maintaining position by:
  - Putting together strong arguments and challenging the arguments of an opponent
  - Avoiding attacking or threatening the opponent (as this may also be regarded as a sign of weakness, in that the negotiator cannot put together a strong argument)
Focusing on what the opponent needs as opposed to what the opponent is asking for.

Distributive negotiations lead to distributive agreements, which are based on the division of a set number of resources between the parties with the division being either equal (win–win) or unequal (win–lose) (Brett 2000).

Integrative negotiations rely upon parties approaching the negotiation with the belief that an outcome of benefit to both sides can be reached through prioritising issues differently. Due to enhanced and more open communication between parties, this approach is also considered to produce the better results in comparison to the distributive approach (Drake 2001; Lewthwaite 2000). A key element of this study is to identify the use of integrative negotiation tactics during an intercultural negotiation. Skilled integrative negotiators will use tactics such as the following:

- Prioritising issues
- Willing to openly share information
- Asking open ended questions that provide more comprehensive information than just a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
- Discussing possible solutions to issues and be able to provide the other party with possible solutions that they may not have considered
- Be willing to make concessions when necessary through identifying issues that may be of low value to oneself, but considered of a high priority to an opponent.

Likewise, integrative negotiations lead to integrative agreements, which are a distribution between parties of resources that have been improved through collaboration (Brett 2000).

Of most importance to this study are the processes that lead to agreements in intercultural negotiations. As contended by Brett (2000), the description of the Western mental model is a good starting point; however, it may not be applicable to the cultural groups in this study. Therefore, an alternative method
for considering shared cognitive representations of negotiations in different cultures must also be considered.

**Negotiation as a Joint Activity**

Another way of considering shared cognitive representations of negotiations is by looking at their interactional properties. Negotiations are an interaction between two or more parties. Each party must consist of one or more people and must have goals and objectives that they are seeking to achieve from the interaction. These interactions also involve significant exchanges of information. The interactional properties of negotiations are consistent with Clark’s (1996) description of the properties of a joint activity. Joint activities are interactions between people that will lead to language use (Clark 1996). Discourse is just one possible type of joint activity; however, a joint activity cannot exist without the use of language. Activity types encompass any culturally recognised activity that may involve or not involve an act of speech, can be time bound or ongoing, and can have individual or multiple participants (Levinson 1992; Clark 1996). Broadly speaking, activities involving multiple participants are considered joint activities; however, joint activities vary across a range of dimensions based on whether the activity is scripted or unscripted, formal or informal, verbal or non-verbal, cooperative or competitive and egalitarian or autocratic (Clark 1996). Most joint activities are unscripted and based on two or more individuals engaging to achieve an objective; it is also common for one joint activity to be embedded within another.

Clark (1996) identified a structure of a joint activity. The first part of the structure is ‘participants and roles’, as each participant will initially take on a role that will grow or emerge into another role. Roles can be defined by what the participant does during the activity (e.g. vendor or buyer), the position or situation of the participant (e.g. teacher or student, narrator or audience) and the personal identity of the participant.

Clark’s (1996) description of a joint activity must also be structured by goals, in that participants come together and participate in the joint activity based on their intent to achieve particular objectives. Be it a business transaction or a string quartet performance, all participants enter the joint activity with goals,
and often these goals will help to define the role of each of the participants. The goals of participants were further separated into categories by Clark (1996:34) who described the ‘domain goal’ as the dominant goal of all participants, such as to complete a business transaction or complete a concert performance, etc. The participants will also have ‘procedural goals’ whereby participants will have intentions as to how they will achieve the domain goal. They will also have ‘interpersonal goals’ that set objectives for how they would like to act and be considered by fellow participants. Finally, participants may also have ‘personal agendas’ that reflect objectives of a personal benefit, which could include deceiving a fellow participant, excluding a fellow participant or supporting a conflict of interest.

Joint activities are structured by goals that are of a public or private nature. Public goals in a joint activity involve the exchange of information being openly recognised by all participants, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, Clark (1996) mentioned that when he purchases items from a pharmacy, although implicit, the goals are of a public nature as both he and the pharmacist assume that Clark has entered the store to purchase items. However, when one person invites another to play a game of chess, the goals are explicitly public. Private goals are described by Clark as ‘self-defeating’ if they should be made public and are therefore hidden from other participants. Competitive activities rely upon participants keeping private goals unknown from other participants and often the private goals directly conflict with public goals. This may lead participants to deceive other participants about their goals, hence making public goals misleading in such cases.

**Joint Activity and Coordination between Participants**

Methods of coordination include the use of conventional language phrases, tools and instruments, nonconventional procedures and verbal and non-verbal communication. The way in which people coordinate was described by Clark (1996) as one of the fundamental issues of language use.

Clark (1996) identified that joint activities consist of a hierarchy of joint actions. In unscripted joint activities, the joint actions often have their own specific goal. Participants in a joint activity must mutually agree to participate
in the same joint activity. Hence, a joint activity has an entry point where all participants identify that they are participating in the joint activity and every joint activity has an exit point, where participants identify that the joint activity has concluded. Joint actions that make up the hierarchy of the joint activity likewise have entry and exit boundaries. Boundaries of joint activities and joint actions are not always clear and can be complicated by two joint activities taking place simultaneously.

Clark (1996) summarised his general claims about joint activities in the following:

**Table 2: Joint Activities (Clark 1996:37)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>A joint activity is carried out by two or more participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity roles</td>
<td>The participants in a joint activity assume public roles that help determine their division of labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public goals</td>
<td>The participants in a joint activity try to establish and achieve joint public goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private goals</td>
<td>The participants in a joint activity may try individually to achieve private goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchies</td>
<td>A joint activity ordinarily emerges as a hierarchy of joint actions or joint activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>The participants in a joint activity may exploit both conventional and nonconventional procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>A successful joint activity has an entry and exit jointly engineered by the participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td>Joint activities may be simultaneous or intermittent, and may expand, contract, or divide in their personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referring to Clark’s (1996) definition of a joint activity, negotiation can be considered an unscripted joint activity, which ranges from being a formal multilateral negotiation between countries to an informal bargaining activity in a market place, usually verbal but sometimes taking place as an exchange of written dialogue, either cooperative or competitive and either egalitarian or
autocratic. The roles of participants in a negotiation are defined by what the person does (e.g. the participant negotiates the purchase of a product or the terms and conditions of a contract), the person’s situation (e.g. a service provider, a customer, a diplomat) and their personal identity (e.g. their personal beliefs and values).

Importantly, a negotiation is also structured by goals as the participants come together and participate in the negotiation based on their intent to achieve particular objectives, which also helps to define the role of each participant. Again fitting into Clark’s (1996) definition of a joint activity, the participants’ goals in a negotiation consist of a domain goal to reach a satisfactory agreement with the other party, and procedural goals for how each participant intends to achieve the domain goal. Negotiators will have interpersonal goals for how they would like to be considered by fellow participants. Negotiation participants may also have personal agendas that reflect objectives of a personal benefit, which could include deceiving a fellow participant.

Negotiations also have goals that are of a public and private nature. According to Clark’s (1996) definitions, a negotiation is a joint activity that follows the ways in which people coordinate. The introduction and completion of different ideas, tactics and the granting of specific concessions in a negotiation is consistent with Clark’s (1996) concept of joint activities being made up of smaller joint actions that have an entry point and an exit point.

**Common Ground and Negotiations**

Joint activities produce an accumulation of mutually shared knowledge and beliefs between participants. This mutually shared knowledge i.e. beliefs, assumptions and information between participants was defined by Clark (1996) as ‘common ground’. At the beginning of any joint activity, there are particular presuppositions that participants share. This may be as simple as the mutual understanding of what the joint activity is. It may include how the joint activity should be conducted. If both participants are from the same or similar cultures, there will be presuppositions from the shared beliefs of that culture. If the participants know one another, they are likely to share personal presuppositions. Each participant is also likely to assume that other participants
share most of, or possibly all of, his or her own presuppositions, but if this proves to be incorrect, participants in joint activities introduce tactics that try to increment the amount of common ground between participants. The most common way for participants to increment common ground is through using assertions, as assertions explicitly deliver information that then becomes common ground between participants (Clark 1996). Other communicative acts such as promises, questions, apologies, requests and declarations are all used to increment common ground. While common ground accumulates in all joint activities, common ground is considered one of the following three types at any one time (Clark 1996:43):

- Initial common ground
- Current state of joint activity
- Public events so far.

Initial common ground (Clark 1996:44) is made up of the presuppositions initially shared by the participants. These may include the shared beliefs of a culture or society that specify procedures for standard situations within a culture. Clark (1996) referred to these procedures as ‘scripts’ or ‘frames’ and stated that people entering joint activities make many presuppositions about how a joint activity should be conducted. While formal joint activities will have rules, upon entering informal joint activities, the participant will rely upon inherent script and frames.

The current state of the activity is the part of common ground that has an ‘external representation’ of the current situation (Clark 1996). External representations have a number of properties that signify the current state of activity. The first property is the ‘physical model’ (Clark 1996), which is the physical scene and contents of the joint activity, which according to Clark (1996) can be viewed, touched and manipulated. Examples of the physical model include a chessboard in a game of chess, a courtroom in a trial, and a store in a retail transaction. The second property is the ‘markers’ used to represent elements in the joint activity, examples of which in a game of chess include the squares on a chessboard that signify location and the pieces that represent kings, queens, bishops etc. During a retail transaction, money and receipts are markers that represent the exchange of wealth for a product or
service. Likewise, a witness stand in a courtroom is a marker for where somebody can be questioned. The third property is the ‘locational interpretation’ (1996) of the joint activity. The locational interpretation considers the effect of the location of a marker in relation to other markers, examples of which include how a chess piece is threatened and threatens the opponent’s pieces on a chessboard, and the removal of a product from the shelves and location next to a cash register, which indicates that this product is the subject of purchase. Clark named ‘manipulability’ (1996) as the fourth property of the current state of activity, whereby markers in a joint activity are interpreted according to how they can be moved or altered, and how the participants interpret the new location or form. In a game of chess, the participants will interpret how a change in location of a piece will change how the piece is threatened and which of the opponent’s pieces it threatens, while in a retail transaction, money can change hands, which symbolises a change in who possesses the money. The final property identified by Clark (1996) is ‘simultaneous and parallel accessibility’, which suggests that external representations are accessible to all participants in the same way at the same time.

Public events so far are the kind of common ground that interprets the public events since the beginning of the joint activity. Clark (1996) argued that participants in a joint activity build an understanding of events as they occur and what they mean, and that they will make presuppositions based on a sequence of previous events. The way in which participants interpret events will also be determined by their expectations of the joint activity according to the joint activity’s rules, scripts or frames.

The role of common ground in negotiations was not directly addressed by Clark (1996); however, when considering negotiation as a joint activity, a connection can be made between the processes of common ground and negotiations. Integrative negotiation tactics rely upon parties sharing information and establishing common ground about one another’s priorities (Drake 2001). Yet, due to judgement errors by negotiators, the opportunity to reach common ground about priorities is often unrecognised (Bazerman & Neal 1983), as most negotiators have the presupposition that their negotiation
opponent has identical priorities to their own (Drake 2001). During negotiations, negotiators also frequently make judgement errors based on what they believe the level of benefit that their opponent is seeking in comparison to the level of benefit available to all parties. Judgement errors need to be corrected through the exchange of information, which creates a common ground about each party’s priorities (Drake 2001:319). However, direct information exchange in negotiations is rare (Kemp & Smith 1994), which means that negotiators will generally try to achieve common ground through ‘heuristic trial and error’, which is an indirect way of extracting information based on making offers and revising the offers until common ground can be achieved (Tutzauer & Roloff 1988).

Limitations of the Common Ground Approach

During a joint activity, participants will in one way or another, make a record of how common ground accumulates and participants will also assume that their representations of common ground will fairly accurately match the other participants’ representations of common ground. However, Clark (1996:49) stated that despite the best efforts of the participants, discrepancies occur between individual participants’ representations of common ground. Some discrepancies may be undetected by all participants, detected by only one participant or detected by all participants. When a discrepancy is detected by a participant, the participant must decide whether to raise and correct the discrepancy or whether to avoid raising the discrepancy. Some discrepancies are so minor that they are not worth raising, but if a participant chooses not to correct a discrepancy, the participant must keep track of the discrepancy and any other discrepancy for the remainder of the joint activity. In general conversation, it is far more efficient to raise the discrepancy immediately, but in joint activities such as negotiation, there are circumstances where participants will choose not to raise discrepancies as they have private goals that they wish to achieve during the joint activity.

Research indicates that there is a link between the use of tactics that increment common ground and the importance of building trust with negotiation opponents. Elahee and Brooks (2004:399) supposed that those tactics lead to the building of trust between negotiators, which is exemplified through high
amounts of information sharing between parties and less use of elaborate tactics designed to pressure the negotiating partners into making concessions. This greater collaboration decreases the complexity of negotiations and produces more efficient outcomes.

However, distributive negotiations should be considered joint activities where participants are aiming to serve personal agendas and achieve private goals that would become self-defeating if they were to become common ground. Volkema and Fleury (2002) discussed a range of distributive negotiation tactics that may be considered to distort common ground such as exaggerating demands, pretending not to be in a hurry, and hiding one’s bottom line. The previous tactics are considered generally accepted by parties during a distributive negotiation, but other competitive tactics that aim to distort common ground (such as misrepresenting information, bluffing or influencing an opponent’s professional network by encouraging colleagues to defect or by paying for information) may be considered dishonest (Volkema & Fleury 2002).

When considering the interpersonal goals of the participants of a negotiation, in fact a negotiator takes on a negative interpersonal view of his or her opponent, this may also influence the negotiator to use tactics that will distort common ground. Volkema and Fleury (2002) highlighted that when challenged by opponents, or subjected to questionable behaviour by opponents, a negotiator will often provide less or misleading information to try to ‘even up’ the situation, especially if the negotiator does not believe he or she will have any further contact with their opponent following the negotiation. Conversely, a negotiator will be less inclined to purposely distort common ground if they believe that their tactics may be made known during or following the negotiation (Volkema & Fleury 2002). It has also been considered that if a negotiator is pressured by time (and especially if his or her opponent has created or is responsible for that time pressure), then the negotiator may try to distort common ground by being less likely to share information or by supplying information that may not reflect the truth (Volkema & Fleury 2002).
Summary of Negotiation Processes

The previous sections have provided a definition of negotiation; described the concept of the mental model, its application to negotiation and provided an example of a widely disseminated Western mental model of negotiation; and considered how negotiation can be regarded as a joint activity and related the process of negotiation to finding common ground. The models of negotiation put forward are grounded in dominant theories (Brett 2000; Hofstede 2001) and while a good starting point, it cannot be assumed that they will also be applicable models for both the Australian and Arab cultural groups, which are being investigated in this study. Therefore, the focus on negotiation has very much been on the cognitive and interactional processes of negotiation. One of the aims of this study is to identify if the process of reaching common ground is different for each culture. During the final analysis, these processes may or may not be consistent with the commonly disseminated negotiation models of distributive and integrative negotiations.

When considering mental modelling and joint activities, there are consistencies in that as a part of a person’s mental model, they will have predicted the role that they would play and have beliefs that accord the dominant goal that they should pursue. Their belief system would also support certain procedural goals, interpersonal goals and personal agendas. The person’s mental model would also be mapped to decide between which goals should be of a public nature and which goals should be of a private nature. A part of the mental model would include the mapping of a number of smaller joint actions that would each carry a specific goal. As such, a joint activity can also be considered a ‘target system’.

When entering the negotiation, it must be considered how much of each person’s mental model is shared as common ground. The concept of the shared mental model is effectively a cognitive representation of common ground. This is a useful connection, as Clark (1996) did not directly address common ground in negotiations. However, what Clark (1996) did address was a process for understanding how increments and discrepancies in common ground are formed during an interaction. Both negotiators will have mental models that assume that there are at least some shared presuppositions. Any shared
presuppositions are initial common ground. Yet, unless both negotiators have mental models that are identical, discrepancies in common ground will emerge. As discrepancies in common ground are realised by both negotiators, new mental models are established. However, according to Clark (1996:49), it may occur that discrepancies are not realised by either negotiator or that only one negotiator realises a discrepancy but decides not to raise it. In this case, it is not possible for the negotiators to establish a shared mental model. The influence of cultural orientations on this process is the interest of this study.

This Study’s Theoretical Approach to Culture and Negotiation

This section considers how the previous discussion sections have helped formulate the approach for this study. Commencing with the connection between culture and negotiation, Hall (1976), Hofstede (2001), Brett (2000), Bazerman et al. (2000), Metcalf et al. (2006), and Brett, Adair et al. (1998) all contended that culture has an influence on the way that information is exchanged during negotiations, the processes in dealing with issues, the role of power, and how objectives are regarded and pursued in negotiations. The remainder of this section further explores the relationships between the cross-cultural communication theories and models of negotiation.

One of the most important cultural models that affect negotiations is the high-context and low-context continuum, as it specifically deals with how information is shared (Brett 2000; Bazerman et al. 2000; Brett, Adair et al. 1998). When considering the dominant models of negotiation, the exchange of information is central to whether negotiations become integrative or distributive. If the negotiation partners are to achieve integrative potential, it is necessary that they exchange information regarding their priorities and goals (Drake 2001, Lewthwaite 2000, Brett 2000).

A low-context approach to integrative information sharing by negotiation partners is through asking direct questions and providing explicit answers to these questions. Throughout this process, each side will develop an understanding of what the other party’s priorities and objectives are, and which
issues will be purely distributive (Brett 2000; Brett, Adair et al. 1998). The high-context approach is to use trial and error, where negotiation partners will frequently exchange proposals. Each proposal will act as a response to the other party’s pervious proposal, implicitly raising issues and concerns relating to the previous proposal (Brett 2000; Brett, Adair et al. 1998). Examples of previous research demonstrate that both the low-context approach and the high-context approach can be used to achieve integrative agreements (Brett & Okumura 1998; Brett 2000). Yet, it is also considered that at points of conflict during a negotiation, low-context cultures will be more likely to confront and directly exchange information, and high-context cultures will be more likely to try to avoid confrontation, conceal ill feelings and even involve a third party to broker the information exchanges (Brett 2000:101).

According to Hall’s (1976) model, we may observe distinct differences in the negotiation strategies of monochronic and polychronic negotiators. Firstly, it is more likely that a monochronic negotiator will try to compartmentalise the negotiation according to priorities and objectives. The monochronic negotiator will want to focus on achieving their most important goals through discussing them one by one and exploring what concessions they will need to make to realise these goals. Alternatively, we may witness the polychronic negotiator to be decompartmentalised and wanting to discuss multiple priorities and goals at the same time.

These views are supported by Bazerman et al. (2000) who suggested that negotiators from monochronic cultures generally demonstrate preferences for well-organised negotiations whereby parties sequentially deal with issues and speak in turn, while polychronic cultures prefer to simultaneously deal with issues and interrupt the other party to commence discussing issues of importance. Connections have also been made between polychronicity and the ability to achieve integrative agreements, whereby simultaneously dealing with issues more readily supports the process of combination in which parties exchange concessions or connect issues (in a way that serves each other’s interests and objectives), in comparison to the monochronic process of dealing with issues sequentially (Brett, Adair et al. 1998:64).
Hofstede (2001:35) described the power distance dimension as influencing the degree of centralisation of decision making and the structure of negotiations, as well as the perceived status of negotiators. Power may be also observed during negotiations in two ways: firstly, through how each party deals with conflict; and secondly, is how power is regarded during negotiations (Brett 2000; Arunachalem et al. 2001). According to the literature reviewed, the low power distance cultures will emphasise dealing with conflict issues directly, while the high power distance cultures may be less willing to resolve conflict issues directly as they will be more used to having conflict issues resolved through the mediation of somebody of higher status.

The way in which power is viewed during negotiations may be demonstrated according to the negotiation position of each party. Each negotiator is likely to consider their best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) in comparison to their opponent’s best alternative (Brett 2000; Arunachalem et al. 2001). It is also possible that each party will try to extract information from their opponent that will divulge information about the strength of the opponent’s BATNA. Likewise, we may observe instances in negotiations whereby each party tries to create a power distance over their opponent and where the opponent tries to close the power distance. According to the literature, it is surmised that the BATNA tactic will be used by both negotiators from low power distance cultures and high power distance cultures, but negotiators from high power distance cultures will also be inclined to use status and persuasion when possible to establish or increase a power distance (Brett 2000).

Specifically related to this study is how individualist and collectivist negotiators pursue objectives in negotiations. The individualistic negotiator is likely to pursue his or her own goals and consider the goals of his or her negotiation partner as a lesser priority, while the collectivist negotiator is likely to perceive his or her goals as having an alignment with his or her negotiation partner’s goals and will look to work cooperatively with the negotiation partner to realise these goals (Brett & Okumura 1998). According to the theory (Brett 2000), when a collectivist negotiator has a negotiation partner from outside his
or her in-group, competitive negotiation tactics will often ensue due to a lack alignment of objectives.

Arunachalem et al. (2001:972) found that collectivist negotiators from Hong Kong achieved better joint outcomes in negotiations with individualist Americans by using the assistance of a mediator. It was hypothesised that this occurred either as the presence of the mediator obligated the collectivist negotiator to seek high joint outcomes for the group benefit or that the negotiators in the non-mediated study (Brett, Adair et al. 1998) were more inclined to use distributive negotiation tactics, as these were considered as out-group (outside the collectivist's group) negotiations. Hofstede (2001:436) emphasised the importance of stable relationships in collectivist cultures, in that efficient negotiations rely upon the opposing negotiators having taken the time to build and maintain a relationship.

Regarding the influence of uncertainty avoidance in negotiations, Hofstede (2001:436) described cultures with a low tolerance to ambiguity as requiring familiar structure and ritual in negotiations, such cultures are likely to distrust opposing negotiators who do not follow the familiar structure and ritual. Closely related to uncertainty avoidance is the concept of risk-averse and risk-tolerant. A risk-averse negotiator will be concerned with avoiding ambiguity by ensuring that outcomes are reached during the negotiation, even if it requires him or her to make additional concessions. The risk-tolerant negotiator is less concerned by ambiguity and is less willing to make concessions, as they are more accepting that the negotiation may not have an outcome (Bazerman & Neal 1992; Metcalf et al. 2008).

Negotiators from high-masculinity-oriented cultures are considered to value ego-boosting behaviour and showing force in during disputes, whereas low-masculinity-oriented cultures are considered to value compromise and seek consensus during negotiations (Hofstede 2001:436). High-masculinity cultures in comparison to low-masculinity cultures have higher expectations about the types of outcomes to be achieved from negotiation and maintain higher reservation levels. Conversely, low-masculinity cultures seek a more friendly atmosphere for the negotiation than high-masculinity cultures (Kersten et al. 2002).
The final cultural orientation discussed is the long-term/short-term orientation. Hofstede (2001:436) described this orientation as the long-term orientation valuing persistence in negotiations and demonstrating a willingness to make sacrifices in order to achieve the overall goal. In negotiation, the long-term/short-term orientation is not to be confused with the negotiators’ priorities towards the period of the agreement.

Summary of Anticipated Orientations

According to the theoretical models reviewed in this chapter, there are many cultural orientations expected to be demonstrated by each cultural group during this study. These anticipated orientations are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model/Dimension</th>
<th>Anticipated Arabic Preference</th>
<th>Anticipated Australian Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-context versus low-context communication</td>
<td>High-context</td>
<td>Low-context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hall 1976; Zaharna 1995; Yunxia 2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polychronic versus Monochronic Time</td>
<td>Polychronic</td>
<td>Monochronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hall 1976; Trompenaars &amp; Hampden-Turner 1998; Poon et al. 2005; Payne 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>High power distance</td>
<td>Low power distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hofstede 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism versus collectivism</td>
<td>Collectivist</td>
<td>Individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hofstede 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity versus femininity (Hofstede 2001)</td>
<td>Moderate masculinity</td>
<td>High masculinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 2001)</td>
<td>Moderate uncertainty avoidance</td>
<td>Low uncertainty avoidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term and short-term orientation (Hofstede 2001; Ashkanasy et al. 2004)</td>
<td>Long-term orientation</td>
<td>Short-term orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study will assess the validity of these anticipated orientations using data obtained from intra-cultural and intercultural negotiation simulations. Specifically, the study will consider how participants share information, organise the structure of the negotiations and turn taking, discussing issues and problems, demonstrate concern for their partners’ objectives, assert their negotiation position, and use potential alternatives to a negotiated agreement.

The next chapter will discuss the process of data collection and the analytical methodologies that will be used to interpret the data. Most importantly, it will detect patterns in negotiation processes that may be related to cultural orientations.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

Approaches to Data Collection

The two main tasks in this chapter are to provide an account of the research design for this study and review alternative research methods. Research design includes data collection instruments, participants and controls. Alternative research methods particularly focus on the data analysis and a variety of discourse analysis models.

Various studies involving culture and negotiation have taken different approaches to collecting and analysing data, demonstrating different outcomes (Brett & Okumura 1998; Karakitapoglu-Aygun 2004). Cross-cultural studies rely upon non-equivalent control group design or static group comparison as true experimental conditions of random sampling and independent variables as cultures and people cannot be randomly assigned to one another. The validity of data from cross-cultural studies can also be threatened if the design does not identify and isolate external factors that may skew results such as economic conditions and levels of education (Gudykunst 2003:151). Three possible methods for selecting cross-cultural samples groups include convenience sampling, systematic sampling and random sampling. Cross-cultural studies frequently use convenience sampling as researchers usually utilise cultures within which they have the opportunity to interact. Convenience sampling provides access to data; however, the culture or cultures being studied may actually not ideally reflect certain cultural dimensions being studied. Systematic sampling selects cultures that are theorised to strongly reflect certain cultural dimensions. In the case of systematic sampling of two cultures, it is usual that both cultures will have very different orientations to the cultural dimensions being studied. Random sampling of cultures tends to be used more for collecting data on pan-cultural theories (Gudykunst 2003:151).

Reliability of data collected during cross-cultural comparisons relies upon certain conditions of equivalency being achieved in the data collection methodology. ‘Functional equivalence’ requires that the activity or function utilised to collect the data must be a familiar and valid function to each of the cultures participating in the study (Gudykunst 2003:153). Similarly,
‘conceptual equivalence’ necessitates each culture sharing the same or a similar understanding of the meaning of concepts being employed in the study (Gudykunst 2003:153). Linguistic equivalence suggests that the administration of data collection instruments should be provided in the native language of the culture under study. Metric equivalence suggests that some cultures will avoid responding to data collection tools using extreme scores or responses, while other cultures will readily emphasise extreme responses over moderate responses (Gudykunst 2003:154). It is therefore important for quantitative research and in particular questionnaires that a standardised score is used as well as a raw score. Finally, it is also essential that sample equivalence be maintained using participants who meet a similar demographic profile in each culture (Gudykunst 2003:155).

Interviews are a commonly used approach intended to reveal different peoples’ experiences in a particular situation and tend to involve samples of people from different cultures who deal with similar situations. This has proven to be an effective approach for understanding how different cultures utilise context, order issues, utilise power and consider individual versus group goals; however, it is difficult to apply this specifically to negotiation, as interviews are not a joint activity or interaction between people as a whole (Brannen & Salk 2000).

The data collection approach for this project created and utilised a series of negotiation simulations supported by a questionnaire. This approach was successfully implemented by previous intercultural negotiations studies that assessed the influence of culture on negotiations between North Americans and Japanese (Brett & Okumura 1998, Brett, Adair et al. 1998). Utilising multiple methods of data collection also strengthens the validity of the study as similarities in results help to confirm conclusions while differences in results help to indicate issues with the data collection tools (Gudykunst 2003:159).

Simulating common situations through role play allows the researcher to analyse similarities and differences between participant groups (Brett & Okumura 1998; Neu 1998; van Hasselt et al. 2005). This also approach has the advantage of producing data on the language content and structures of negotiations (Neu, Graham & Gilly 1988; Neu 1998), which is directly relevant...
to the study and that should provide an insight into how cultural orientations influence negotiations. Simulations and role play are widely used as behavioural assessments and for training, particularly in the area of crisis negotiations (van Hasselt 2005).

While naturalistic observation of real-life events is regularly regarded as the most valid form of data, researchers are often unable to access enough real-life situations to obtain reliable data and therefore consider simulations the next best option (van Hasselt 2005). Simulations require scenarios with prompts to be designed, sample participants to be recruited, and the recording of simulations and interactions to be analysed (Neu 1998; van Hasselt 2005). Well-designed negotiation simulations will utilise scenarios and prompts that will induce face-to-face interaction eliciting unscripted and natural conversation from the participants (Neu 1998). Simulations are often accompanied by other forms of assessment such as questionnaires or interviews that record relevant information such demographic data and the attitudes and values of participants (Neu, Graham & Gilly 1988; van Hesselt 2005).

Studies that are used to identify cultural values and attitudes often utilise questionnaires that are distributed to samples of people who are intended to represent a cultural group (Hofstede 2001; House & Javidan 2004; Karakitatapoglu-Aygun 2004). Often, these cultural groups are designated according to national culture, which operates under the assumption that national cultures are homogenous (Hofstede 2001; House & Javidan 2004). This premise has been criticised by academics that highlight that nations are seldom culturally homogenous (Baskerville 2003; Gernon & Wallace 1995). While questionnaires have been considered useful in identifying cultural orientations, it has been debated about the validity of questionnaire-based studies that are involve less than ten separate cultural groups and cannot establish true diversity within the data (Hofstede 2001). In the case of this study which only analyses two distinct cultural groups, questionnaires will be designed as a device for extracting more information from the simulations data.

The construction of questionnaire items is pivotal to the success of the data collection and as such, items are often based on previous studies and the items
must undergo peer reviews prior to implementation (Hofstede 2001; House & Javidan 2004; Karakitapoglu-Aygun 2004). To ensure reliability, items will often produce a scale of answers that are designed to describe the various attitudes of the respondents. Some researchers prefer to make this scale based on an even number to reduce a neutrality bias that may exist when there is a definitive neutral answer in a three-, five- or seven-point scale (Karakitapoglu-Aygun 2004). Five-point Likert scales that measure attitude from strongly disagree to strongly agree were favoured for this study as they have been used effectively in the two previously cited simulation and questionnaire studies (Brett & Okumura 1998; Brett, Adair et al. 1998).

**Data Collection Instruments (Negotiation Simulations)**

The data collection was designed to implement a series of simulated negotiation scenarios that will examine areas of the negotiation process including bargaining, the presentation of information, achievement of joint gains, conflict and relationships. The issue of gender in intercultural negotiations was also considered by conducting a balanced number of negotiation scenarios between two male negotiation partners, two female negotiation partners and mixed-gender negotiation partners. However, the balance did not necessarily represent an equal proportion of gender participation as access to female Arab participants did prove to be problematic. This study collected data by conducting a number of negotiation simulations among university students divided in the following three groups:

- Control groups consisting of male and female ESB Australian students (intra-cultural negotiations)
- Experimental groups consisting of male and female ASB students from Arabian Gulf countries such as Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (intra-cultural negotiations)
- Mixed groups consisting of male and female participants from both cultural groups, so that in each simulation, one negotiation partner is an ESB participant and the other negotiation partner is an ASB participant (intercultural negotiations).
Participants’ Roles (Procedures)
For each scenario, two participants were required to partner one another during the negotiation simulation. Each participant was presented with an information sheet about the negotiation, containing explicit information about the negotiation task and what their objectives were. In the first two simulations, the negotiation partners were provided with an information sheet that explicitly outlines a different set of objectives and a conflicting role. Prior to the third simulation, the participants received the same set of objectives and role description. The participants were then asked to negotiate however they felt appropriate and in either the English language (control groups and mixed groups) or Arabic language (experimental groups). The negotiation simulations were recorded using an audio recorder placed between the participants (and therefore known to the participants) and transcribed in full for analysis.

Time Factor
Time limitations and the requirement for negotiators to manage negotiations according these limitations must be considered in the design of negotiation simulations (Neu, Graham & Gilly 1998). Each simulation was limited to 15 minutes negotiation time to allow for consistent amounts of data across simulations. This also provided conditions to test the monochronic and polychronic time system theories, whereby negotiators may try to achieve outcomes or avoid points of conflict during the specified time. A clock was in full view of the participants during the simulations.

Additional Data
Prior to the negotiation simulations, each participant was asked to complete a questionnaire relating to their familiarity and understanding of collaborative and competitive negotiation tactics. Following each of the scenarios, the participants undertook another short questionnaire in which they were asked about their attitudes towards the outcome of the simulation, how satisfied they believe their partner to have been, and their level of comfort with their partner.

Selection of Participants
Previous studies involving negotiation simulations demonstrate the need to carefully consider the selection of participants based on variables such as
gender, age, education level, and location and exposure to other cultures (Brett & Okumura 1998; Neu, Graham & Gilly 1988). In this study, the following parameters were set for each of these variables.

Gender: Although previous studies (Brett & Okumura 1998) have indicated that gender is not a factor in American and Japanese cross-cultural negotiations, other studies (Neu, Graham & Gilly 1988) have found distinct differences in how men and women communicate and negotiate. As demonstrated below in the study design summary, this study aimed to take into account gender as a key variable that may skew the results of the study by including an even number of male and female participants in the negotiation simulations.

Age and education level: Negotiation simulation studies emphasise the importance of ensuring sample groups are of similar negotiation experience and education levels (Brett & Okumura 1998; Neu 1998). In this study, all participants were in the 18–24 years of age bracket. Participants from this age bracket had significant experience at informal negotiation without being professional negotiators. Likewise, all participants were university students, either at undergraduate level or postgraduate coursework level and had not held professional employment positions for 12 months or more.

Location and exposure to other cultures: Negotiation simulation studies also tend to maintain some consistency in the geographic location of where participants reside (Neu 1998). The ESB Australian participants were all selected from the one city in Australia (Melbourne), and participants were all born in Australia, native speakers of English and had not lived overseas for more than two years. Due to regional cultural differences between Arab societies and nationalities, the ASB Arab students were all selected from the Arabian Gulf countries, mainly Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which share a close tribal heritage (Heard-Bey 1982), Saudi Arabia and one participant from Iraq.

Simulation Instruments
Scenario One was a role play based on renting a house. One participant was asked to play the role of a landlord and the other participant played the role of
a renter. The focus of this simulation was to analyse how the participants share information while bargaining. In order to facilitate this, both participants were provided contextual information directly related to bargaining and information sharing. The participant playing the role of the landlord was provided with information regarding the state of the house, financial commitments and risks and a summary of what would make bad, good and great outcomes. Likewise, the participant playing the role of the tenant was also provided with contextual information about the house, market rental rates and budget limitations.

Both participants were told that the tenant is under pressure to locate accommodation as the academic year was to commence the following week and there was a shortage of alternative rental options. The landlord was made aware that he or she was incurring financial losses as there has not been a tenant for ten weeks, but the renter was not made aware of this. Both participants also had an 'alternative offer' highlighted that is designed to create a BATNA whereby each participant had to consider what their best alternative outcome is in case they do not reach agreement with one another (Brett 2000; Arunachalam et al. 2001). According to the contextual information provided to both parties, the participant playing the role of the landlord had a slightly stronger BATNA than the participant playing the role of the renter.

Apart from the BATNA, the exchange of information in Scenario One was critical. If both parties openly shared information, they should identify the objectives of both parties can be satisfied. However, if they chose not to collaboratively share information, then the negotiation would be more likely to become distributive and they would not achieve joint gains (Brett 2000).

Scenario Two specifically dealt with how negotiators shared information during conflict. The simulation role played the dissolution of a partnership contract between two parties, whereby one participant played the role of a manufacturer that was seeking to dissolve a partnership and the other participant was playing the role of a distributor that was seeking to continue the partnership with the manufacturer. The conflict was contextualised as having originated from an order that the distributor claimed was faulty and refused to pay for.
There was a disparity between the BATNAs of each party, as the manufacturer had another potential distributor that was offering better financial returns than the current distributor, and the BATNA of the distributor was weaker as the alternative relationship with another manufacturer would not yield the same financial returns.

In a conflict-based negotiation, both parties had a basic knowledge of their negotiation partner’s grievance or demands from previous discussion or correspondence. Without trying to overload the participants with information, this simulation was attempted to create a realistic conflict scenario by also providing each of the participants some basic information on their negotiation partner’s situation and possible outcomes if the contract was dissolved or not dissolved during the negotiation. The background information positioned the dissolution of contract as a more difficult resolution than the continuation of contract by suggesting that the distributor could legally block the manufacturer’s market access. Conversely, there was a financial incentive for the manufacturer to dissolve the contract or renegotiate the terms of the current contract.

The third scenario was based on establishing a project team that specifically deals with how negotiators deal with collaboration and commitment. As a part of the role play, participants needed to work together to complete a list of tasks for an initial meeting. These tasks included planning and division of roles for the project.

Both participants in Scenario Three were provided with the same information about the project and its objectives. Personal benefit was used as the motivation for committing to the project; however, there were no negative repercussions for not committing to the project. Non-commitment was also intended to form the BATNA for this simulation. The background information for this simulation was purposely brief and simple. Participants were first required to agree upon which of the three project options they would pursue together. The three project options were of a different nature and dealt with different required outcomes. The first option was a buying and selling project where participants needed to agree upon a set of tasks required for raising $1,000 for charity through purchasing and selling products. Participants who
favoured the second option needed to agree on a set of tasks for obtaining donations of children’s books and then ensuring that these books were read by at least 30 children. The final option was a marketing campaign where the participants needed to agree upon the methods they would use to spread their marketing messages to at least 1,000 people. Through keeping the background information brief and simple, it was anticipated that patterns would emerge in how the participants deal with exchanging information, realising joint gains and sharing the same BATNA during this simulation.

**Method of Transcription**

While transcribing the negotiation simulations may seem straightforward, it is crucial to the validity of the conversation analysis that ‘what’ is said and ‘how’ it is said is captured in the transcriptions (Silverman 1998; ten Have 2007). This project faced some challenges in transcribing colloquial Gulf Arabic and in dealing with differences in accents and articulation abilities during both the Arabic language and English language recordings. To assist with this, the initial transcription work was completed by a first language speaker and then verified by another first language speaker. Ten Have (2007:97) cited the following elements as critical to the quality of a transcription:

- Time, date and place of the original recording
- Identification of the participants
- Words as spoken
- Sounds as uttered
- Inaudible or incomprehensible sounds or words
- Spaces/silences
- Overlapping speech and sounds
- Pace, stretches, stresses, volume, etc.

In the case of this project, it was critical to maintain the anonymity of the participants. Hence, stating time, date and place of recording on the transcript could potentially assist in the identification of participants and was not provided. Participants’ identities or any remarks that may assist in identifying the participants were removed. However, the participants’ roles were identified throughout the transcripts, whereby the role of renter is identified as speaker
‘R’ and the role of landlords as speaker ‘L’. Words as spoken and sounds as uttered were captured according to the language of the negotiation. For example, if the negotiation simulation was conducted predominantly in Arabic language, the transcription was written in Arabic. However, if during an Arabic language negotiation a participant used an English word, the word was transliterated into Arabic.

A system of symbols was used for capturing the inaudible sounds, silences, overlapping, pace, stretches, stresses and volume. Various sets of conventions have been established for these transcription symbols (see Jefferson 1979, 1983, 1985, 1996, 2004; Du Bois 1991; Schiffrin 1994; ten Have 2007); however, the conventions followed in this project were based on Silverman’s (1998) ‘Simplified Transcription Symbols’, as described in the following table.

Table 4: Simplified Transcription Symbols (Silverman 1998:264)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>that (0.5) is odd?</td>
<td>Length of silence measured in tenths of a second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(. )</td>
<td>Right (. ) okay</td>
<td>Micro-pause, less than two-tenths of a second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>::::</td>
<td>I:::: I don’t know</td>
<td>Colons indicate sound-stretching of the immediately prior sound. The number of rows indicates the length of prolonged sound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>______</td>
<td>I know that</td>
<td>Underline indicates speaker’s emphasis stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>T: [Well ‘at’s</td>
<td>Left brackets indicate the point at which one speaker overlaps another’s talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R: [I mean really</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>you know=that’s fine</td>
<td>Equal signs indicates that there is no hearable gap between the words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD</td>
<td>About a</td>
<td>Capitals, except at beginnings indicate a marked rise in volume compared to the surrounding talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILLION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Oh really?</td>
<td>Question mark indicates rising intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Yeah.</td>
<td>Full stop indicates falling intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hhh</td>
<td>I know how .hhh you</td>
<td>A row of h’s prefixed by a dot indicates an in-breath, without dot, an out-breath. The number of h’s indicates the length of the in- or out-breath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>What a () thing</td>
<td>Empty brackets indicate inability to hear what was said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(word)</td>
<td>What are you (doing)</td>
<td>Word in brackets indicates the best possible hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(( ))</td>
<td>I don’t know ((shrugs))</td>
<td>Words in double brackets contain author’s descriptions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each speech turn was allocated a number for referencing purposes. The speech turn number was placed between the role identity marker and the dialogue. English language transcriptions were oriented across the page from left to right, while the Arabic transcriptions followed the Arabic language convention of right to left.

**Questionnaire**

Negotiation simulation participants were all requested to complete a questionnaire that aimed to provide further information on their attitudes towards negotiation. At the completion of each simulation, they were asked reflective questions that aimed to capture attitudes directly following a negotiation simulation.

The attitudes section of the questionnaire contained 30 items that related to actions conducted during processes of negotiation. In addition to relating to an action, each item was also underpinned by one of the cross-cultural communication theories. For example, an item that is related to the action of exchanging information may be assessing a participants attitude towards high-context communication.

**Summary of Study Design**

The table below demonstrates the intended participation and actual participation as per the original study design of the simulations.
### Table 5: Study Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>SIMULATIONS</th>
<th>INTENDED PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>ACTUAL PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Control Group 1| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ESB Male           | 2 x ESB Male         |
| Control Group 2| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ESB Male           | 2 x ESB Male         |
| Control Group 3| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ESB Female         | 2 x ESB Female       |
| Control Group 4| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ESB Female         | 2 x ESB Female       |
| Control Group 5| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 1 x ESB Female  
1 x ESB Male | 1 x ESB Female  
1 x ESB Male |
| Control Group 6| 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 1 x ESB Female  
1 x ESB Male | 1 x ESB Female  
1 x ESB Male |
| Experimental Group 1 | 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ASB Male | 2 x ASB Male |
| Experimental Group 2 | 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement  
3. Forming a Project Team | 2 x ASB Male | 2 x ASB Male |
| Experimental Group 3 | 1. Leasing a House  
2. Dissolving an Agreement | 2 x ASB Female | 2 x ASB Female |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Group 4</th>
<th>3. Forming a Project Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
<td>2 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
<td>2 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Group 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Group 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Group 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ESB Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Group 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ESB Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Group 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ESB Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Group 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ESB Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Group 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leasing a House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissolving an Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Forming a Project Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ASB Male*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ESB Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Due to lack of access to ASB Female.
| Mixed Group 6 | 1. Leasing a House | 1 x ESB Female | 1 x ESB Female |
|              | 2. Dissolving an Agreement | 1 x ASB Male | 1 x ASB Male |
|              | 3. Forming a Project Team |                  |               |
| 18 groups    | 54 simulations | 9 Female ESB | 17 groups |
|              |                   | 9 Male ESB | 51 simulations |
|              |                   | 9 Female ASB | 9 Female ESB |
|              |                   | 9 Male ASB | 9 Male ESB |
|              |                   | 7 Female ASB | 7 Female ASB |
|              |                   | 9 Male ASB | 9 Male ASB |

The discrepancies between intended participation and actual participation reflect adjustments made to the optimum study design during implementation. The study design was dependent on the availability of participants who met the participation requirements. It was expected that female ASB participants would be difficult to recruit as participants, particularly for mixed-gender negotiations. Specifically, during implementation it proved difficult to recruit appropriate female ASB participants who were willing to undertake negotiation simulations with male partners. However, all efforts were made to follow the optimum study design. The only two adjustments that needed to be made were not conducting experimental group 6 and substituting an ASB female participant for an ASB male participant in mixed group 5.

**Data Analysis of Negotiation Scenarios**

Proper inquiry of the data contained within the negotiation simulations requires extensive consideration of the possible methods of analysis. By considering the simulations as a form of discourse, several prospective options become available. Discourse is a phenomenon used to accomplish actions and interactions using conversations and dialogue that are embedded with social and cultural context (van Dijk 1997). The analysis of discourse often focuses on the order and organisation of the dialogue as sequences of mutually related acts (van Dijk 1997). People interact in social situations with roles, identities,
social and culture knowledge, aims and purposes that are constructed from a range of possibilities and constitute the context of the discourse (van Dijk 1997; Wooffitt 2005). The analysis of discourse is an important resource for researchers of culture and society (Wooffitt 2005). While discourse analysis is used to describe different forms of sociolinguistic analysis specific to context, grammar or content, it has become a generic term that encompasses all forms of language analysis including sociolinguistics, pragmatics, speech act theory and conversation analysis (Wooffitt 2005:40). More widely, the study of discourse has been applied to a wide range of disciplines including linguistics, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, communication, social psychology and artificial intelligence (Schiffrin 1994).

A reason for the broad application of discourse across disciplines is that discourse itself has a broad definition in that it is often defined in according to two paradigms (Schiffrin 1994). Discourse is considered to have a formalist (structural) paradigm that focuses on units of language code as a mental phenomenon, and a functionalist paradigm that focuses on the act of language code as a social phenomenon (Schiffrin 1994). The functionalist paradigm advocates that code has functions that are external to the language system and that these external functions influence the internal organisation of the language system, while the formalist paradigm argues that structure prevents external functions from influencing the internal organisation of language (Schiffrin 1994). However, these two paradigms are considered problematic as alone neither definition considers the possibility of interaction in language of form and function (Schiffrin 1994). Another such definition of discourse is that it is ‘a collection of inherently contextuatised units of language’ that are also known as utterances (Schiffrin 1994:39). An advantage of considering discourse as an utterance is that it takes into account both the context function and the extended structure of language as utterances can be considered made up of syntactic characteristics and pragmatic goals (Schiffrin 1994).

The following sections discuss seven methods of discourse analysis which have been considered and in cases, applied to this study. These methods have been considered for application to the analysis of data from the negotiation
simulations, therefore must be applicable to both intra-cultural discourse and intercultural discourse.

**Speech Act Theory**

A number of approaches to discourse analysis have been widely disseminated (Schiffrin 1994; van Dijk 1997; Woolfitt 2005). The first of these approaches considered for this study is speech act theory. Speech act theory was originally conceptualised by Austin (1955) and Searle (1969) as a form of linguistic pragmatics that proposed that language is used to perform actions. While not initially considered as a method of discourse analysis, speech act theory’s classification of language is considered important as it can be used as a form of qualitative analysis (Austin 1962; Schiffrin 1994; Holzinger 2004).

Austin (1962) initially believed that utterances were essentially ‘constatives’ (declarations that have a truth value) or ‘performatives’ (statements that are part of an action) and an utterance would become a performative when particular contextual and textual conditions are met, which include the realisation of an appropriate action according to the circumstance and the appropriate use of language to express that action (Austin 1962).

Speech act theory focuses upon the action made by a speaker during an utterance that is classified as a ‘locutionary act’ (production of sounds and words with meanings, also described as a ‘propositional act’), an ‘illocutionary act’ (an utterance that includes acts such as stating, questioning, commanding and promising) and a ‘perlocutionary act’ (the result or understanding of the illocutionary act by the recipient) (Searle 1969; Schiffrin 1994; Holzinger 2004; Allwood 1977). An illocutionary act is identifiable by the use of a performative verb (to claim, to demand or to suggest) or by the use of an expression that describes a performative verb (e.g. ‘give me’ used to represent ‘I demand’) (Searle 1969; Schiffrin 1994; Holzinger 2004; Allwood 1977). Illocutionary acts are formed by rules (e.g. for making a statement, a promise, a request or a greeting) drawn from contextual and textual conditions that surround the communication. Speakers utilise speech acts and their rules in order to communicate, while identifying speech acts is crucial to the listener being able to interpret the communication’s meaning (Schiffrin 1994). Searle
(1979) established an explicit taxonomy that classified the conditions that underpinned illocutionary acts. As a part of this taxonomy, five classes of speech acts were created being representatives/assertives (e.g. to ‘state’, to ‘predict’), directives (e.g. to ‘order’, to ‘request’), commissives (e.g. to ‘promise’, to ‘vow’), expressive (e.g. to ‘thank’, to ‘apologise’) and declarations (e.g. to ‘appoint’) (Seale 1979:21).

The five classes of speech acts are differentiated according to a set of taxonomic principles that set rules for the conditions of speech acts. The first of these principles deals with illocutionary purpose of the act that, for example, may be the speaker attempting to make the hearer commit to a form of future action. Another principle considers the relationship between the words of the utterance and situation (words to world). For example, in making a directive, the speaker will use words to describe the situation that he or she would like the hearer to create, whereas in the case of making a statement, the speaker will use words to convince the hearer that a current situation exists. The third principle deals with sincerity, where it must be considered if the speaker believes his or her utterance as true or whether they want a false utterance to be considered true by the hearer (Schiffrin 1994:58).

In actually analysing an illocutionary act, four questions need to be asked, each of which relate to a different illocutionary rule. The first step is to assess the rule of propositional content by asking ‘what can be said?’, the second is an introductory rule that asks ‘what social preconditions must apply?’, the third is the rule of sincerity that asks ‘what is the speaker’s motivation?’ and the final principle is the essential rule that asks ‘what does the action consist of?’ (Searle 1969, Schiffrin 1994, Holzinger 2004).

Discourse analysis using speech act theory as an approach is essentially a qualitative method; however, by counting the frequency of individual speech acts, speech act theory can also be applied quantitatively (Holzinger 2004).

Speech act theory was originally regarded as a useful method of studying language from a social practice point of view, either to complement or even replace the previous approach of studying language as an autonomous grammatical system (Pratt 1986). However, criticisms have been levelled at
speech act theory because it depends on undeveloped assumptions about social interaction. That these assumptions cannot be satisfactorily developed as the aspects of actions are not always clear and can be complex, as they make judgements about behaviour and intention relying on contextual knowledge (Heritage 1990; Pratt 1986; Allwood 1977).

An important characteristic of speech act theory is the question of the truth value of the utterance and what the speaker intends the hearer to believe from the utterance. Judgements and assumptions need to be made about the speaker’s intentions and what the hearer understood the utterance to mean. Research has indicated that speech act theory can be ethnocentric when applied to non-English-speaking cultures as judgements are made about the speaker’s intentions relying upon a backdrop of contextual knowledge that is often culturally specific (Heritage 1990; Pratt 1986; Duranti 1988; Wierzbicka 1985). As such, in cross-cultural communication, speech acts must be approached with caution as illocution in one culture could in fact be perlocution in another culture, and different speech acts may require different acts in response from culture to culture (Jaszczolt 2002).

Analysis of interrogative speech acts in Polish and Australian English provides another example of ethnocentric bias in the application of speech act theory. Interrogative directives in Polish are described as sounding formal and elaborately polite and as a speech act will often be used when the speaker is uncertain of what the response of the recipient will be. They cannot be used in anger or in conjunction with swear words. However, Australian English can utilise interrogative directives in speech acts that order, command and tell and are compatible with verbal abuse and verbal violence (e.g. ‘why don’t you shut up?’ or ‘will you bloody well hurry up?’) and can even use swear words to express positive feelings (e.g. ‘it’s a bloody beauty!’) (Wierzbicka 1985:153).

Another criticism of speech act theory is that it adopts one-to-one interaction as the norm, such that each act only involves a speaker and a hearer. It is argued that interaction in society is often more complex, involving more than two participants in an interaction who have multiple intentions (Pratt 1986).
In the case of this study, the application of speech act theory has the potential to identify and monitor the intentions and actions of the participants. The one-to-one interaction criticism does not impact on the analysis of data; however the potential for ethnocentricity is very relevant. For this reason alternative methods of discourse analysis are also considered in the following sections.

**Interactional Sociolinguistics**

Interactional sociolinguistics considers how individuals perform in dialogue through inferring the intended meaning of their speech partner and monitor how the meaning of their own dialogue is interpreted by speech partners. Context is the focus of interactional sociolinguistics, and diversity in the cultural predispositions that upon the context is based can trigger communication difficulties when the speakers are from different cultural and linguistic groups (Schiffrin 1994; Henderson 2005).

The interactional sociolinguistics approach to discourse analysis is based on the work of Gumperz (1982) in identifying how people differ in their contextualisation of language code and Goffman (1967) in identifying how the organisation of society shapes context for which conduct and communication can be interpreted. Gumperz (1982) regarded language as a culturally based system of symbols that reflect meaning. He demonstrated that any linguistic act when coupled with specific verbal and non-verbal signals may act as ‘contextualisation cues’, which connect contextual presuppositions (the background knowledge that the speaker assumes the listener to possess) to the inferred meaning during communication (Gumperz 1982; Schiffrin 1994; Drew & Heritage 1992). The contextual presuppositions work on two levels. On one level the actual type of communication activity (e.g. chatting, joking or giving orders) conveys information about the context of the situation, and on a second level, the illocutionary act should allow the recipient to interpret the speaker’s intention (Gumperz 1982). Contextualisation cues can include ‘*marginal features of language such as intonation of speech, rhythm of speech and lexical, phonetic and syntactic options*’ and code-switching (Gumperz 1982:16).
When speakers share contextualisation cues, it is probable that the interaction will demonstrate a smooth communication flow; however, such an exchange is the product of long periods of interaction with the same contextualisation cues. For effective conversational interaction to be followed, the required linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge must be specified (Gumperz 1982).

The forms and meanings of socio-cultural contexts were further explained by Goffman (1967). Goffman (1967:12) considered a person’s image of ‘self’ as an outcome of interaction and ‘face’ as the effort of presenting and maintaining a positive public construction of self during interaction. Maintenance of face is based on rituals and through resources such as institutions and organisation in society that help to define roles and character during interactions and forms specific cultural knowledge that unpins contextual presuppositions (Goffman 1967; Schiffrin 1994; Drew & Heritage 1992).

The underlying issues of interactional sociolinguistics are how people interact with others and context and can demonstrate ‘sociolinguistic competence’ in addition to language competence to successfully communicate with other people (Schiffrin 1994; Henderson 2005).

A key contribution of interactional sociolinguistics is that it moves sociolinguistics away from focusing on language variation to situational accomplishment of social identity whereby the identity of the speaker is acknowledged according to the context of the interaction (Drew & Sorjonen 1997). Analysis using interactional sociolinguistics frequently involves interaction of people from different linguistic or cultural backgrounds (Schiffrin 1994). Clark’s (1996) work in identifying speech acts in terms of joint activities and common ground, demonstrates a number of similarities with interactional sociolinguistics. While these aspects are positive and applicable to part of this study’s data, it was decided to pursue other methods of discourse analysis that are equally applicable to the intra-cultural data as to the intercultural data.

**The Ethnography of Communication**

The ethnography of communication seeks to use cultural knowledge to analyse communication through identifying patterns of diversity and commonality in
discourse (Hymes 1974). This approach was developed in the 1960s and 1970s by Hymes (1974) and is based on anthropology and linguistics' common interest in communication (Hymes 1974). Language is a system of rules for the conduct and interpretation of communication that realises cultural norms. As culture evolves through interaction, language reveals and sustains culture. It is through the analysis of these language patterns that the ethnography of communication contributes to people's understanding of culture and its institutions (Hymes 1974; Schiffrin 1994; Duff 2002).

Similar to anthropology, this approach utilises participant observation and consultation with native speakers, specifically focusing on learning the natural behaviours of groups of people through their communicative actions (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997; Suter 2000). The ethnography of communication extends linguistic theory on language competence to consider if people are 'communicatively competent' by demonstrating a knowledge of how to communicate appropriately in a range of situations with different people, not just by demonstrating a knowledge of grammar and structure of a language (Hymes 1974; Schiffrin 1994; Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997; Duff 2002). Analysis seeks to identify diversity and similarities between cultures in communication competency by discovering 'speech events' crucial to interpreting messages and conveying meaning in different cultures (Hymes 1974; Schiffrin 1994; Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997; Duff 2002). Examples of speech events include anything from an informal gossip session to a very formal courtroom cross-examination, and while most speech events are not solely reliant on speech, they do require a speaker to speak with an appropriate audience in a culturally appropriate manner at an appropriate time (Goddard & Wierzbicka; 1997). As such, the ethnography of communication stresses context as having a dual role in providing meaning to the overall action of the event in which communication is embedded and in providing meaning to individual speech acts within the communication (Blum-Kulka 1997).

Hymes (1972) devised the 'SPEAKING' classification grid for analysing components of the ethnography of communication. The grid intends to break communication into integral units of context. The order of the components on the grid is based on each letter in the word 'speaking' serving as the
abbreviation of a separate component; it is not based on an order of importance for the components (Hymes 1972; Schiffrin 1994; Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997).

Table 6: SPEAKING Classification Grid (Hymes 1972:56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>Setting and scene</th>
<th>Where and when does it happen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Who is taking part?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Ends</td>
<td>What do the participants want to achieve?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Act sequence</td>
<td>What is said and done?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Key</td>
<td>What is the emotional tone? E.g. is it sorrowful, happy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Instrumentalities</td>
<td>What are the ‘channels’ (verbal, non-verbal, physical)/forms of speech drawn from community repertoire?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Norms of interaction and interpretation</td>
<td>Why should people act like this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Genre</td>
<td>What kind of speech event is it?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the ethnography of communication is an approach that assumes and investigates diversity and gives acts and events priority over language structure (Hymes 1972, 1974). It is more integrated than other approaches to discourse mentioned in this section because it combines elements of approaches such as speech act theory, interactional sociolinguistics and discourse pragmatics within a larger framework (Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997). Yet, most studies of the ethnography of communication do not utilise the SPEAKING framework, instead concentrating on the norms of interaction component. This introduces a weakness of the approach as it lacks a principled approach to identifying and describing cultural norms, instead relying upon the method and approach of the ethnographer (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997). Since ethnography of communication relies upon participant observation, the
approach becomes problematic when there is a lack of opportunity to observe natural behaviour in interactions. Possible solutions to this problem include the use of simulated interactions such as focus groups (Suter 2000), however for the approach to be reliably applied to this study, the negotiations would need to be based on live and authentic interactions. While this is desirable, it was not practical or possible to observe live and authentic negotiations as per the requirements of this study.

**Pragmatics**

Pragmatics is a broad approach to discourse analysis that deals with the study of signs indicating meaning, context and communication (Schiffrin 1994; Jaszczolt 2002). Just as the same word can have different meanings in different situations, and the same intention can be expressed in a number of different ways, pragmatics studies the use of language in relation to its users (Blum-Kulka 1997). The broadness of pragmatics is underpinned by the breadth and variety of definitions that have been proposed for the approach by different scholars (Schiffrin 1994). Work by Morris (1938) considered pragmatics as a branch of semiotics that studies how the recipient of the sign interprets the meaning that the sign is referring to. The concept of the relationship of signs to their users is integral to all other contemporary definitions of pragmatics (Schiffrin 1994). Traditional pragmatics research focused on isolated utterances; however, contemporary research goes beyond this by focusing on analysing discourse through extended sequences and drawing on other theories related to human communication (Blum-Kulka 1997). Pragmatics is often associated with semantics as methods for analysing meaning, but while semantics primarily focuses on the linguistic meanings of words and sentences, pragmatics focuses on the interlocutors and speaker meaning (Jaszczolt 2002).

One branch of pragmatic theory known as Gricean pragmatics is particularly well disseminated and followed (Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997). Gricean pragmatics focuses on the speaker's intentions through the concepts of 'speaker meaning versus sentence meaning' and the 'cooperative principle' (Grice 1957, 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997; Jaszczolt 2002). The concept of speaker meaning separates 'natural meaning' from 'non-natural meaning'. Natural meaning is what words mean and refer to; natural meaning
has no human intentionality other than the logical meaning that can be derived directly from the language code. Non-natural meaning is what people mean; it is a process in which the intentions of the speaker must be interpreted and recognised by the listener to become ‘mutual knowledge’ and to successfully complete the communication (Grice 1957, 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997; Jaszczołt 2002). This definition of non-natural meaning can be taken as having three intentions in the formulation of an utterance. First is the intention of the speaker to make an utterance that will solicit a response from the hearer. Second, it is intended for the hearer to recognise the speaker's intention. The third intention is that the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention will be at least part of the reason for the hearer responding to the speaker (Grice 1957, 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Jaszczołt 2002). Similar to the relationship between perlocutionary acts and illocutionary acts in speech act theory, in pragmatics the third intention is dependent on the second intention being realised, while the second intention is dependent on the realisation of the first intention. The completeness of the communication is dependent on the three intentions being realised (Grice 1957, 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Jaszczołt 2002). The Gricean theory emphasises the fact that people often do not communicate using conventional or literal sentence meaning, but by considering the context and pragmatic knowledge the speaker meaning can be interpreted by the listener.

Pragmatic theory focuses on utterances and explaining ways that speakers convey their intentions so that speaker meaning is interpreted by the recipient as opposed to sentence meaning (Grice 1957, 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997). This process of conveying intentions requires inferencing. In Gricean pragmatics, the process of inferencing is based on a set of principles and sub-principles known as the ‘cooperative principle’ (Grice 1975). The cooperative principle assumes that the communication participants will contribute as necessary to ensure that the communication is successful. The sub-principles are in the form of the four maxims, which it is assumed that the participants will follow to allow the speaker to lead the recipient's interpretations of their intent beyond the literal or conventional meanings of the utterance (Grice 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997). These maxims are as follows:
Table 7: Four Maxims (Grice 1975:46)

| Quantity                  | Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do not make your contribution more informative than is required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Quality                   | Try to make your contribution one that is true  
|                          | Do not say what you believe to be false  
|                          | Do not say that for which you lack evidence |
| Relation                  | Be relevant |
| Manner                    | Be perspicuous:  
|                          | Avoid obscurity of expression  
|                          | Avoid ambiguity  
|                          | Be Brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)  
|                          | Be orderly |

Gricean pragmatics does not assume that these maxims are always followed; however, they do serve as a guide to how interlocutors cooperate to make communication successful (Grice 1975; Blum-Kulka 1997). In addition to the four maxims above, Grice (1975) also described a set of conditions as critical to the success of the communication.

The recipient will rely on the literal meanings of the words used and the identity of any references that may also be included in the utterance

- The recipient will rely upon the cooperative principle and its maxims being present in the utterance
- The recipient will rely on the context of the utterance
- The recipient will rely upon any other form of background knowledge relevant to the utterance
- The recipient will rely upon the above conditions being available, known or assumed by each of the communication participants (Grice 1975:50).
However, during exchanges, there are often discrepancies between what is meant and what is said where the speaker implies the meaning as opposed to explicitly conveying it in the language code. Such actions are considered ‘implicatures’ (Blum-Kulka 1997:40). A conversational implicature will arise when a recipient is following the above conditions yet suspect that the speaker is implying a further meaning as he or she has blatantly or accidently breached the cooperative principal by violating or flouting a maxim (Grice 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997). A violation will also occur when the recipient identified a clash between maxims, for example, the quantity maxim may be violated when the speaker cannot meet the quality maxim, as they have no evidence to support conveying enough information to satisfy the quantity maxim (Grice 1975). Maxims can be flouted though implying a meaning different to what is said in the language code and providing information that works against one or more maxims. Providing false information flouts the quality maxim or presenting less information than required flouts the quantity maxim. Flouting a maxim often requires the recipient to draw on conventional meanings and draw on the semantic properties of words to identify and interpret the true intention of the speaker (Grice 1975; Schiffrin 1994; Blum-Kulka 1997).

Gricean pragmatics provides a method for analysing how message recipients interpret the intentions of speakers in an utterance; however, it is not a method for analysing sequences of utterances as it does not consider turn-taking and therefore cannot be considered a method of discourse analysis (Schiffrin 1994). Yet, the analysis of the referential process in discourse is widely regarded as pragmatic, as it is a process based on speakers and their intentions, actions and knowledge (Schiffrin 1994).

Pragmatic analysis of the referential process is also used to distinguish distributional and functional differences between ‘definite’ forms (containing noun phrases such as the, possessives, pronouns, names and titles) and ‘indefinite’ forms (noun phrases with the indefinite article ‘a’, with quantifiers and with numerals), and between ‘explicit’ forms and ‘inexplicit’ forms (Schiffrin 1994:198). Differences in definiteness and explicitness are also relevant to Gricean maxims such as quantity, quality and relevance (Grice
1975; Schiffrin 1994). The same meaning can be conveyed by a speaker several ways depending on how definite and explicit the utterance is. If the information contained in the utterance is accurate but not explicit, then the utterance is likely to conform to the maxim of quality but violate the maxim of quantity (Schiffrin 1994). It is also the case in the referential process that the maxims of quantity and relevance may link ongoing discourse, whereby the violation of the quantity maxim in an utterance may require the speaker to provide additional referring expressions in following utterances to convey the intended meaning to the recipient (Schiffrin 1994). The study of reference as a sequential problem is important because it is more consistent with the various forms of discourse analysis, which often analyse sequential patterns (Schiffrin 1994).

Analysis of referential sequences will generally commence with the identification of a ‘first-mentions’ of a referent, which are often explicit indefinite noun phrases, with the following referents being identified as ‘next-mentions’, which will often be definite noun phrases and more implicit than first-mentions (Schiffrin 1994). The first-mention will often consist of information that the speaker cannot assume the recipient to be conscious of or have access to; however, the next-mention will usually refer to information that the speaker can assume the recipient to have access to (Schiffrin 1994). Pragmatic analysis of referentials will separately focus on the first-mentioned and the next-mentioned utterances and how effective they were in conveying the intentions of the speaker to the recipient (Schiffrin 1994).

Grice's maxims are susceptible to both ‘contextual variation’ and ‘cultural variation’ (Blum-Kulka 1997:41). Contextual variation applies to situations in which interactions are influenced by the social setting and the role each participant takes within that setting. In situations in which Interlocutor A holds a power distance over Interlocutor B, Interlocutor A will decide whether Interlocutor B has provided an appropriate amount and quality of information to meet the requirements of the context. Interlocutor A may also be in a position to disadvantage Interlocutor B if Interlocutor B’s communication fails to meet the expectations of Interlocutor A (Blum-Kulka 1997:41).
Cultural variation surmises that different cultures will hold different expectations of observance to the maxims in similar situations. For example, in situations in which sensitive information is being imparted, one culture may expect that the information is explicit and meets the quality and quantity maxims; however, another culture may not expect the speaker to meet both maxims and prefer more implicit communication (Blum-Kulka 1997:41).

Politeness is also an area of study in pragmatics that aims to explain contextual and cultural variation the violation of Gricean maxims in order to preserve social norms and adhere to social expectations. As per Goffman’s view mentioned in the interactional sociolinguistics section, an individual’s regard for maintaining a public image during an interaction is commonly referred to as ‘face’ (Goffman 1967; Jaszczolt 2002; Blum-Kulka 1997). One dimension of face is ‘positive face’, which concerns the individual’s desire to be well regarded by those he or she interacts with. The other common dimension is ‘negative face’ where an individual reserves the right not to be imposed upon. Criticism poses a threat to an individual’s positive face, while a directive will pose a threat to an individual’s negative face (Blum-Kulka 1997). If the risk to face is minimal, interlocutors undertake politeness strategies that are defined as ‘bald on-record’ and are very explicit communications such as making clear directives or criticisms. A ‘positive politeness’ strategy will augment the positive face requirements of the hearer, while a ‘negative politeness’ strategy will focus on catering to the hearer’s need to be free from imposition. In cases in which risks to face are high; interlocutors may choose to utilise ‘off-the-record’ strategies whereby communication is indirect and leaves the option of deniability. An interlocutor may also decide to use the ‘opting out’ strategy, which avoids discussion about the issue in question (Blum-Kulka 1997). The choice of strategy and the extent to which the strategy is utilised is dependent on the level of face loss at risk as determined by the three further variables of ‘social distance or familiarity between speaker and hearer’, ‘relative power between the speaker and hearer’ and ‘absolute ranking of various impositions in the given culture’ and the level of social and cultural variation (Blum-Kulka 1997:52). Pragmatics in cross-cultural communication has been widely researched, but remains an ambiguous area; however, face relationships are considered one of the most important areas of study within cross-cultural
pragmatics and also indicate a culture’s orientations towards power distance and collectivism (Jaszczyk 2002; Scollon & Scollon 1995).

While some researchers advocate the use of Gricean pragmatics for conducting comparative studies of different social and cultural groups (Blum-Kulka 1997), there are other opinions that consider traditional pragmatics as solely being an area of semiotics that deals with issues that could not be resolved by the study of syntax and semantics, and therefore does not properly take language use into consideration as its own area of study (Rajagopalan 2005). Pragmatics has also been criticised for analysing utterances in context but ignoring the non-verbal signals that are also a part of the communication and interaction (Clark 1996).

Aspects of pragmatics such as the quality and quantity maxims were useful for this study. However the issue of different cultures (and people) preferring implicit communication suggested that the preferred discourse analysis method needed to be able to deal with implicit communication more effectively than pragmatics.

**The Natural Semantic Metalanguage**

Related to pragmatics and speech acts is the concept of the universal metalanguage (Jaszczyk 2002). A metalanguage is a non-natural language system that is based on semantic primatives which are theorised to exist in all languages; however, the universal metalanguage is utilised as an objective and universal tool for studying meaning in various natural languages (Jaszczyk 2002). This approach has been applied by Wierzbicka (1985) whose original studies into speech acts and pragmatics demonstrated that speech act theory is largely ethnocentric to English-speaking cultures and fails to identify that speech acts and intentions will differ according to cultural orientations (Wierzbicka 1985; Wierzbicka 1999; Wierzbicka 2006; Goddard & Wierzbicka 1997).

The universality of the semantic primitives is an often discussed subject by critics of NSM, yet supporters of the approach reinforce that the NSM adheres to the ‘empirical goals of linguistics’ through ‘universal testability and susceptibility of direct verification or disconfirmation’ (Riener 2003:283).
Advocates emphasise the ‘naturalness’ of NSM as an approach free from technical and artificial elements. Equally, critics dispute NSM’s universality and cite that empirical and testable approaches in linguistics benefit from technical and artificial elements that provide theoretical terms that surpass natural descriptions (Riemer 2003; Matthewson 2003).

Critics claim that unlike non-natural semantic theories, the NSM demonstrates an incompleteness as it is only possible if the semantic primitives are placed beyond theoretical analysis, where concepts that provide the semantic primitives meaning cannot be commented on and are effectively indefinable (Riemer 2003; Matthewson 2003). Behind the claimed ‘incompleteness’ of definition of the semantic primitives lies the concept that the primitives are ‘intuitively comprehensible and self-explanatory’ (Durst 2003:158), which again draws criticism for assuming that certain terms can possess ‘an invariant property of an expression’ that will be universally understood in the same way (Riemer 2003:286) particularly in relation to semantic primitives such as ‘I, YOU, SOMEONE, THIS, THINK and WANT’ (Matthews 2003:263).

Wierzbicka (2006) asserted that approaches by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003) (which focus in individualism/collectivism) and Hall (1976) (high-context/low-context) rely upon making observations from ‘outside’ of cultures and form generalisations that are of little use for teaching language or culture. Yet, as a tool for teaching language and culture, NSM is criticised for assuming a universal prior knowledge, which can explain the meaning and systems of different languages and cultures (Riemer 2003). While the NSM was considered for application to this study, the concerns about the true universality of the NSM have resonated and the NSM was not adopted.

**Variation Analysis**

Variation analysis in discourse is an approach that seeks to identify alternative discourse units that communicate the same meaning. The approach was developed by Labov (1972a, 1972b) and is said to be one of the few approaches to discourse analysis that solely originate from linguistics. Labov (1972a, 1972b) established a framework of variation analysis based on phonological and syntactic variation. The process isolates variants within units
of text or discourse that are tied through their common phonetic, syntactic or semantic structure, and relies upon an exhaustive dataset to reliably identify occurrences and non-occurrences of variants (Labov 1972a, 1972b; Dines 1980; Schiffrin 1994).

It is the role of the variation analyst to identify these alternative patterns and discover their environmental constraints. Constraints may be linguistic or extra-linguistic in nature and favour the use of one variant over another variant (Dines 1980; Schiffrin 1994).

Once identifying constraints to the alternative patterns, variation analysts hypothesise explanations for the purposes of these constraints and then search for data that either confirm or dispel the hypothesis. This is achieved through a quantitative approach, whereby variants are defined and constraining factors are classified and the frequency of each constraining factor is recorded against each of the variants (Labov 1972a; Dines 1980; Schiffrin 1994).

A point of difficulty with the application of this approach to discourse exists in the identification of semantic variants because alternative patterns for conveying the same meaning can originate from multiple words referring to the same meaning, differing pronunciations of the same word and differing syntactic structure (Schiffrin 1994). Likewise, the semantic linkages between variables may also be phonological or syntactic more than they are semantic (Dines 1980). Labov (1972a) suggested that units must have semantic equivalence through a shared truth value to be recognised as variants; however, some variation analysts consider that the functional equivalence is a more sound approach because it caters for referential meaning and utterances in specific contexts by removing the necessity of a semantic tie between variants. The functional equivalence approach will also help identify the differential distribution of variants used by different social groups within a single speech community where the variant forms differ in semantic meaning (Dines 1980; Schiffrin 1994). Another condition for identifying variants in discourse is the degree of salience that a discourse unit holds within a speech community. Awareness by an interlocutor of stigma or prestige being associated with a discourse unit or utterance indicates the manifestation of a socially conditioned variant (Dines 1980).
Variation analysis approaches discourse with a particular focus on the influence of the social context on speech. The preferred approach is to analyse vernacular speech data. Vernacular speech is informal, whereby the speaker is conversing naturally and not paying any particular attention to the ‘correctness’ or ‘appropriateness’ of their speech. Sociolinguistic interviews that use group interactions, frequent topic shifts and narratives of personal experience are often employed to collect data (Schiffrin 1994).

Variation analysis of discourse purposes to identify units of speech and define them according to their linguistic properties and these units are largely treated as autonomous from their interactional context. The approach seeks to analyse vernacular speech and use quantitative methods to test hypotheses; however, while a speech unit is analysed for its social context, the social context pertains to the unit and may not consider additional social contexts of the complete discourse (Schiffrin 1994).

In the case of this study, variation analysis was not considered to be flexible enough to be applied to both intercultural and intra-cultural interaction data. Likewise the study needed to analyse intentions and the understanding of listeners, as opposed to variation patterns.

**Conversation Analysis**

Conversation analysis aims to describe the social organisation of everyday conduct through talk-in-interaction from the perspective of the participants themselves by studying how implicit contextualisation cues relate to each other (Ohara & Saft 2003). Conversation analysis takes into account turn taking, topic shifts, verbal and paralinguistic features of talk (e.g. sound quality, pauses, gaps, restarts, arm gestures and posture) and can be applied to both informal and institutional (including negotiations) discourse (Cutting 2000). The models of discourse analysis previously discussed in this chapter were considered for use in this study; however, conversation analysis will be used as the basis of the analysis methodology as it focuses on typification and not idealisation in analysis, by continuously adjusting categories according to whether anticipated behaviours agree with actual behaviours. Therefore, conversation analysis is both context-shaped and context renewing, as it does
not analyse the context of utterances in isolation from the context of the previous utterance or the following utterance. This allows the researcher to avoid premature generalisations caused through idealisation and to develop interaction rules for that speech event and social setting (Schiffrin 1994; Cutting 2000; Drew & Heritage 1992).

However, it has been suggested that conversation analysis has weaknesses when being treated as a self-sufficient approach to studying the social world. Hammersley (2003) criticised conversation analysis for not viewing actors as controlled or guided in their behaviour by mental characteristics such as attitudes, personalities, perspectives or strategic orientations, and for not treating what the people (in the study) say about the social world as a source of useable information. Wetherell (1998) also argued that conversation analysis should be integrated with ideas from other analytical approaches that are more critically based. As summarised by Billig (1999:545), theoretical debates have criticised approaches to conversation analysis that rely upon 'studying participants talk in its own terms' and then categorising data according to technical conversation analysis terminologies imposed by the researcher, the 'rhetoric of an ordinary conversation' where it is argued that a vague distinction exists between what is defined as a conversation and a non-conversation (Billig 1999:549), 'participatory rhetoric' where it is claimed that conversation analysis may not always be ideologically neutral as it implicitly uses socially uncritical concepts (Billig 1999:551), 'textual identification of speakers' whereby the use of first names or interchangeable letter codes to identify speakers may convey that social and gender distinctions are irrelevant (Billig 1999:553) and 'the limitations of the participatory rhetoric', which argues that conversation analysis cannot be applied to situations such as rape, bullying or racial abuse (Billig 1999:554). However, in response to Wetherell (1998) and Billig's (1999) arguments, Ohara and Saft (2003) demonstrated how conversation analysis can be successfully used to track gender ideologies in social interaction through paying particular attention to the structure of the interaction and how participants initially introduce gender and further gender as an issue in the conversation.
Conversation Analysis as Applied in This Study

To better understand negotiation, we need to analyse the content and the structure of the communication behaviours (Neu 1998:23). This study intended to concentrate on the structure of interactions and how the participants use and attend to silence gaps, make and respond to requests for concessions, use emphasis in dialogue, present information, communicate directly or indirectly, attempt to influence or are influenced by relationships and demonstrate or seek to establish common ground with their negotiation opponent. Initially developed by Sacks (1971) and colleagues including Jefferson and Schegloff (1974), other authors such as Schiffrin (1994), Heritage (1984), Drew and Heritage (1992), and Silverman (1998) have outlined different methods for applying conversation analysis to data. For the purpose of this study, I followed the ‘tool for analysis’ demonstrated by Pomerantz and Fehr (1997), which breaks conversation analysis into five tools consisting of questions to ask and areas to think about. The Pomerantz and Fehr approach has been selected as the approach overcomes several of the shortcomings of other approaches to discourse analysis. This approach is integrated, focuses on turn-taking, considers the actions and intentions of interlocutors and allows researchers to classify actions and intentions without being ethnocentric. Initially, the data will be recorded and transcribed according to the conventions described by Silverman (1998).

The first of the five tools relates to identifying appropriate sequences for the conversation analysis. Pomerantz and Fehr (1997:71) recommended that the researcher locates ‘identifiable boundaries’ whereby one of the participants instigates an action or topic that is responded to by the other participant. The action or topic can then be followed until the participants are no longer specifically responding to this action or topic.

The second tool characterises the actions in the sequence. The authors suggested that actions are identified by asking ‘What is this participant doing in this turn?’ from which actions such as ‘greeting, announcing news, acknowledging news, complaining, disagreeing, correcting, telling a joke and telling a story’ may be identified (Pomerantz & Fehr 1997:72). More than one
action may be identified in a turn, and the relationship between actions identified in a sequence can then be analysed.

The third tool considers how speakers 'package' (form and deliver) actions, as speakers have multiple ways of 'packaging' an action. Pomerantz and Fehr recommended that consideration be given to the speaker's selection of reference terms, how the speaker provides the listener with certain understandings of actions performed or topics discussed, and to consider the options for the recipient that are constructed by that packaging. The authors provide the example where a speaker says 'Let's grab a bite' whereby he or she is referencing having lunch and also a time constraint, the listener will understand that this places limitations on where they can eat or what type of food they can choose and the packaging has provided the listener with options of whereby he or she can agree to 'grab a bite' or hesitate or decline to 'go for lunch' due to time constraints (Pomerantz & Fehr 1997:73).

The fourth tool considers how the timing and taking of turns provides for certain understandings of the actions and topics discussed. For each turn in a sequence, the authors recommended describing how the speaker obtained a turn and how it fits with the actions performed, how the timing of the turn was commenced relative to the completion of the other speaker's turn and if this has any connection to the participants' understandings, and how the turn was terminated (Pomerantz & Fehr 1997:73).

The final tool considers how the ways the actions were accomplished implicate certain identities, roles and/or relationships for the participants. Pomerantz and Fehr (1997:74) suggested looking at issues such as the rights, obligations, expectations and implication of relationship, role, status or identity that have arisen from the actions identified in the data.

It was anticipated that patterns will emerge from the analysis that when applied to the theory, will provide answers to the key research question and sub-questions.
Summary

The methodology chapter has described this project’s approach to collecting and analysing data that will be used to answer the research questions stated during the introduction. The data collection process was underpinned by a series of recorded and transcribed negotiation simulations, using the three distinct participant groups of ESB Australians, Gulf ASB Arabs and then a series of mixed groups aimed to provide intercultural and intra-cultural negotiation data. The simulations data are supported by the questionnaire.

The data analysis of the simulations employed conversation analysis as it focuses on the structure of interactions and context and considers the implicit cues, turn taking, topic shifts and other discourse features. Another advantage of conversation analysis is that it focuses on typification and therefore allows for the adjusting of categories of actions, roles and intentions, whereas other approaches such as pragmatics are less flexible relying up idealisation (Schiffrin 1994; Cutting 2000; Drew & Heritage 1992; Ohara & Saft 2003).

The way conversation analysis is used in this study will be discussed further in the next chapter, which presents the analysis of role simulation data. Findings from the questionnaire will then be outlined in the fourth chapter.
 CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION SIMULATIONS

This chapter is the first of two analysis chapters that are tied together in the ensuing ‘Discussion’ chapter. The current chapter analyses the data collected during the negotiation simulations with the next chapter analysing data collected in the questionnaire completed by the simulation participants.

In all, 51 negotiation simulations were conducted, with 18 simulations conducted between ESB Australian students, 15 simulations conducted between ASB Gulf Arab students, and 18 mixed group simulations conducted with one participant in each belonging to the ESB cultural group and the other participant belonging to the ASB cultural group. Each participant participated in three simulations, with each simulation based on a different scenario. The first two scenarios were of a transactional nature; Scenario One dealt with forming a rental agreement and Scenario Two dealt with the resolution of a commercial dispute, with participants being issued competing roles and objectives. Scenario Three was a collaborative negotiation in which the participants had common known objectives and were requested to form a project team, negotiating roles and responsibilities.

The negotiation simulations were all audio recorded, transcribed and were analysed using the method of conversation analysis described in the methodology chapter. This chapter will discuss key turn-taking actions and roles identified during the conversation analysis and outline trends that occurred for each of the cultural groups across the three scenarios.

Summary of Simulations

Scenario One Summaries

Scenario One deals with a transactional situation, where one negotiator plays the role of a landlord and their partner plays the role of a renter. The objective of the scenario is that both negotiators reach an agreement about the rental of the property. Each negotiator has a set of priorities to pursue, and in some cases these priorities conflict with their partner’s priorities. Each negotiator is only presented with their own priorities; their partner’s priorities are unknown
unless they are revealed during the negotiation. The scenario stimulus does contain contextual information that is shared between both parties. This allows for a certain amount of presuppositions to be taken into the scenario by each participant.

The Scenario One summary demonstrates that the control groups tended to have the longest negotiations in terms of time, with the mixed groups generally taking the shortest amount of time. The control groups tended to have balanced outcomes, whereas the outcomes tended to favour the landlord during the experimental groups’ scenarios. Outcomes for the mixed groups tended to emphasise the priorities of the ESB participants, and there was no tendency for either the landlord role or the renter role to achieve better outcomes. Control group one did not achieve an outcome because they passed the time limit of 15 minutes without achieving a negotiation outcome, while experimental group three did not achieve an outcome because the participant playing the renter role concluded the simulation prematurely after being dissatisfied with the lack of progress they were making with their partner.

Table 8: Scenario One Timing, Number of Turns and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group ID</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Timing (Mins:Secs)</th>
<th>Total Number of Turns</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control One</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Female</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>No outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Two</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Male</td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Three</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Male</td>
<td>3:50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Four</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Female</td>
<td>4:40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Five</td>
<td>ESB Male, ESB Male</td>
<td>9:50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Six</td>
<td>ESB Male, ESB Male</td>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental One</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Female</td>
<td>6:20</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Favours Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Two</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Female</td>
<td>7:30</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Favours Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Three</td>
<td>ASB Male, ASB Male</td>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>No Outcome (Renter Withdrew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Four</td>
<td>ASB Male, ASB Male</td>
<td>9:30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Balanced outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Five</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Male</td>
<td>4:25</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Favours Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed One</td>
<td>ESB Male (R), ASB Male (L)</td>
<td>2:51</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Favours Renter (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Two</td>
<td>ESB Female (L), ASB Male (R)</td>
<td>6:21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Favours Landlord (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Three</td>
<td>ASB Male (R), ESB Male (L)</td>
<td>3:10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Four</td>
<td>ASB Male (L), ESB Male (R)</td>
<td>2:55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Favours Renter (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Five</td>
<td>ASB Female (L), ESB Female (R)</td>
<td>3:32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Favours Renter (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Six</td>
<td>ESB Female (L), ASB Female (R)</td>
<td>3:20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Favours Landlord (ESB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESB = English-speaking background Australian, ASB = Gulf Arabic–speaking background Gulf National

R = Renter, L = Landlord
Scenario Two Summaries

Scenario Two is also a transactional-based scenario; however, where Scenario One mainly deals with the concept of establishing a partnership, Scenario Two deals with resolving a dispute or ending a partnership if a resolution cannot be found. Similarly, each negotiator has their own set of priorities that are not known to their partner, and some of these priorities conflict. Both participants receive the same contextual information.

Similar to Scenario One, the control groups tended to have the longest negotiations, while the mixed groups again were the shortest. The control groups’ outcomes mostly favoured the manufacturer role, but two groups did not achieve an outcome in the allotted 15 minutes. The experimental groups were more balanced; however, experimental group two did not achieve an outcome as both negotiators ‘walked out’ of the negotiation without achieving an outcome. Four of the six mixed groups favoured the priorities of the ESB participants. The ESB participant in three of these four groups played the role of the distributor, while the remaining two groups had balanced outcomes.

Table 9: Scenario Two Timing, Number of Turns and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group ID</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Timing (Mins:Secs)</th>
<th>Total Number of Turns</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control One</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Female</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>No Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Two</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Male</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>No Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Three</td>
<td>ESB Female (D), ESB Male (M)</td>
<td>10:44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Favours Distributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Four</td>
<td>ESB Female,</td>
<td>9:05</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Favours Manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Five</td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>8:26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Favours Manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Six</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12:46</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Favours Manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental One</td>
<td>ASB Female</td>
<td>13:51</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Favours Manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Two</td>
<td>ASB Female</td>
<td>4:13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>No Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Three</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>2:29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Favours Distributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Four</td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td>14:50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Five</td>
<td>ASB Female</td>
<td>7:58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed One</td>
<td>ESB Male (D)</td>
<td>5:23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Favours Distributor (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Two</td>
<td>ESB Female (D)</td>
<td>4:59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Favours Distributor (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Three</td>
<td>ASB Male (D)</td>
<td>6:17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Favours Manufacturer (ESB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Four</td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td>3:35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(L)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Five</td>
<td>ASB Female (M)</td>
<td>9:44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESB Female (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Favours Distributor (ESB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Six</td>
<td>ESB Female (L)</td>
<td>3:29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASB Female (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESB = English-speaking background Australian, ASB = Gulf Arabic-speaking background Gulf National

M = Manufacturer, D = Distributor

**Scenario Three Summaries**

Scenario Three was a collaborative negotiation in which the participants sought to establish a project team and define a plan of action. All participants received the same stimulus information and objectives.

In comparison to Scenario One and Scenario Two, Scenario Three had less discrepancy in the length of time taken by each of the groups. However, on average the control groups still required the most time to complete negotiation Scenario Three, with the experimental groups on average being able to compete the scenario in the shortest period of time. Each of the control groups achieved balanced outcomes, while three of the five experimental groups achieved balanced outcomes. Four of the six mixed groups saw the ESB partners achieve more favourable outcomes than their ASB partners. The remaining two mixed groups saw the participants achieve balanced outcomes.
## Table 10: Scenario Three Timing, Number of Turns and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group ID</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Timing (Mins:Secs)</th>
<th>Total Number of Turns</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control One</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Female</td>
<td>7:29</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Two</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Male</td>
<td>14:22</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Three</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Male</td>
<td>9:09</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Four</td>
<td>ESB Female, ESB Female</td>
<td>4:41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Five</td>
<td>ESB Male, ESB Male</td>
<td>5:55</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Six</td>
<td>ESB Male, ESB Male</td>
<td>9:18</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental One</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Female</td>
<td>8:13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Outcome favours Speaker 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Two</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Female</td>
<td>8:04</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Outcome favours Speaker 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Three</td>
<td>ASB Male, ASB Male</td>
<td>03:47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Four</td>
<td>ASB Male, ASB Male</td>
<td>04:38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Five</td>
<td>ASB Female, ASB Female</td>
<td>05:40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed One</td>
<td>ESB Male</td>
<td>6:07</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Two</td>
<td>ESB Female</td>
<td>6:00</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>ESB’s Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Three</td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td>7:11</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>ESB’s Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESB Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Four</td>
<td>ASB Male</td>
<td>7:37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>ESB’s Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESB Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Five</td>
<td>ASB Female</td>
<td>7:12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Balanced Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESB Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Six</td>
<td>ESB Female</td>
<td>5:20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>ESB’s Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASB Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESB = English-speaking background Australian, ASB = Gulf Arabic-speaking background Gulf National

**Overview of Actions**

The following section discusses the results of the conversation analysis of the negotiation simulations. Features of conversation actions were identified during the initial stages of the conversation analysis, with each feature being broken into multiple sub-features. In each of the simulation scenarios, the frequency of the occurrence of each sub-feature was counted during the conversation analysis and then divided by the number of total speech turns taken by each participant. This therefore provided a frequency percentage of each participant’s use of the sub-features. The mean percentages of sub-feature frequencies for each negotiation group were calculated and reported in the tables in the following sections. The negotiation groups are:

- Control groups: ESB only
- Experimental groups: ASB only
- ASB mixed groups: ASB participants in the mixed groups
- ESB mixed groups: ESB participants in the mixed groups
Following the calculation of the means, the data of all negotiation groups were checked to identify any irregular response patterns. While some simulations displayed different orientations to specific sub-features in comparison with other simulations in the same negotiation group, there was no indication of any group skewing data or purposely behaving in a manner inconsistent with the behaviour of other negotiators in their group. Examples of these irregularities include:

- **ESB Control Group Three:**
  - The negotiators in this simulation demonstrated a number of actions that were inconsistent with the other five control group rental simulations. These inconsistencies included:
    - All participants exhibiting a very low use of assertiveness actions
    - The Renter has the highest frequency (63% of turns) of seeking information from their partner (the next highest is 37% and the average is 29%), while the Landlord has the lowest frequency (11%) of seeking information (the next lowest is 26% and the average is 39%)
    - The participants have the lowest frequency (16% of turns) of sharing priorities (the average is 44% of turns)
    - The Renter is the only participant that frequently (16% of turns) invites an offer of concession, both the Renter and Landlord (11% of turns for both participants) are the only two participants who frequently request that their partner revises their own terms
    - The Landlord had a low frequency (6% of turns) of proposing ‘detriment’ as a negotiation tactic, whereas the average for the other Landlords was 21% of turns.
  - The negotiation was conducted between a male (Landlord) participant and a female (Renter) participant, during the post-negotiation questionnaire the female participant stated that she was very uncomfortable in dealing with her partner.

- **Control Group Six:**
  - The participants from this simulation displayed actions that were inconsistent with the other simulation groups in relation to:
    - Dealing with trust issues
    - Challenging and not challenging their partner’s negotiation position
  - Differences in their frequency statistics suggest that the simulation was more distributive in parts than the other five negotiation simulations.
## Assertiveness

The assertiveness feature considers strategies used by participants to maintain or shift their negotiation position. Three sub-features of the negotiator’s tactics have been considered in this study in terms of when he/she:

- Asserts position vis-à-vis partner: where a negotiator describes a term as unchangeable, tries to pressure partner to shift their position but is unwilling to shift their own position on a term
- Does not assert position vis-à-vis partner: where a negotiator describes a term as changeable, does not try to pressure partner to shift their position but may be willing to shift their own position on a term
- Uses emphatic tone: where a negotiator speaks louder or faster in an effort to emphasise their position.

### Table 11: Comparison of ‘Assertiveness Actions’: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario One (Renting a House)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertiveness</td>
<td>1.1 Asserts position with partner</td>
<td>32.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Does not assert position with partner</td>
<td>6.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Uses emphatic tone</td>
<td>18.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12: Comparison of ‘Assertiveness’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertiveness</td>
<td>1.1 Asserts position with partner</td>
<td>71.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Does not assert position with partner</td>
<td>10.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Uses emphatic tone</td>
<td>44.81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: Comparison of ‘Assertiveness’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertiveness</td>
<td>1.1 Asserts position with partner</td>
<td>14.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Does not assert position with partner</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Uses emphatic tone</td>
<td>8.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both cultural groups displayed a willingness to assert their negotiation position frequently, particularly in Scenario Two, which was based on a dispute. The ASB participants in the experimental groups demonstrated that they more frequently asserted their position than the ESB participants taking part in the control group simulations. However, during the interactions of the mixed groups, this is reversed where the ESB participants more frequently assert their positions than the ASB participants. Most significantly, in each of the three scenarios, there were noticeable decreases when comparing the average percentage of turns in the experimental groups with the ASB participants in the mixed groups. Conversely, the frequency of not asserting their position was higher for the ASD mixed group participants when compared to the experimental group participants. Discrepancies between the frequencies of assertiveness among the ESB participants were inconsistent; however, they did demonstrate that the ESB participants’ preference to use assertiveness actions increased during the mixed group simulations.

Observations of assertiveness actions in summary are:

- Both cultural groups are willing to frequently use assertiveness actions within their own culture
- ESB negotiators are willing to become more assertive when partnered with negotiators from outside their cultural group
- ASB negotiators are willing to be less assertive when partnered with negotiators from outside their cultural group.
Dealing with Information

Dealing with information analyses strategies used by a participant to achieve, main or repair common ground with their partner. This study has identified and tested eight sub-features of dealing with information:

- **Negotiator seeks information or clarification**: The speaker is seeking to illicit a response to their question or statement that will provide them with information about their partner’s objectives
- **Negotiator does not seek information or clarification**: The speaker is making a statement about own objectives as opposed to seeking to illicit a response that will provide them with information about their partner’s objectives
- **Negotiator provides contextually apparent information**: The meaning or intent of the information provided is self-contained
- **Negotiator does not provide contextually apparent information**: The meaning or intent of the information provided requires interpretation by the listener
- **Negotiator shares priorities or objectives**: The speaker reveals a private goal of the negotiation
- **Negotiator avoids sharing priorities and objectives**: The speaker avoids revealing a private goal of the negotiation
- **Negotiator discusses a single issue**: a single term or item of concern is separated from other issues
- **Negotiator discusses multiple issues**: Speaker does not separate single terms or items from one another
Table 14: Comparison of ‘Dealing with Information’ Actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Control Groups</th>
<th>Experimental Groups</th>
<th>Mixed Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Information</td>
<td>2.1 Seeks Information/clarification</td>
<td>34.62%</td>
<td>38.14%</td>
<td>31.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Does not seek Information/clarification</td>
<td>14.35%</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
<td>4.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Provides contextually apparent information</td>
<td>62.07%</td>
<td>60.71%</td>
<td>66.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Does not provide contextually apparent information</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td>8.79%</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 Shares Priorities/objectives</td>
<td>39.43%</td>
<td>49.98%</td>
<td>51.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Avoids sharing priorities/objectives</td>
<td>6.09%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>16.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7 Discusses a single issue</td>
<td>63.62%</td>
<td>71.25%</td>
<td>76.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8 Discusses multiple issues</td>
<td>21.96%</td>
<td>18.34%</td>
<td>14.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15: Comparison of ‘Dealing with Information’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Information</td>
<td>2.1 Seeks Information/clarification</td>
<td>24.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Does not seek Information/clarification</td>
<td>21.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Provides contextually apparent information</td>
<td>75.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Does not provide contextually apparent information</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 Shares Priorities/objectives</td>
<td>42.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Avoids sharing Priorities/objectives</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7 Discusses a single issue</td>
<td>77.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8 Discusses multiple issues</td>
<td>17.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16: Comparison of ‘Dealing with Information’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2.1 Seeks Information/clarification</td>
<td>23.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Does not seek Information/clarification</td>
<td>29.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Provides contextually apparent information</td>
<td>56.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Does not provide contextually apparent information</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 Shares Priorities/objectives</td>
<td>44.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Avoids sharing priorities/objectives</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7 Discusses a single issue</td>
<td>84.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8 Discusses multiple issues</td>
<td>8.23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As tables 14, 15 and 16 demonstrate, both cultural groups consistently demonstrated willingness to provide clear and apparent information and request information when required. The ESB control group participants did demonstrate a consistent willingness not to request information during turns where they had an opportunity to do so. This willingness decreased during the mixed groups with the ESB participants opting to more frequently request information from their ASB partners. The simulations’ data also demonstrated that both cultural groups were more likely to avoid sharing priorities or objectives during the mixed negotiations. Both cultural groups demonstrated a clear preference for discussing a single issue during a single turn.
Observations of dealing with information actions are:

- ESB negotiators seek clarification or information more frequently when their negotiation partner is not from their cultural group.
- Both ASB and ESB negotiators avoid sharing their priorities and objectives more frequently when their negotiation partner is not from their cultural group.

**Concessional**

The concessional feature analyses strategies used by a participant to reach agreement with their negotiation partner on issues. Eight sub-features have been considered for this study:

- Invites an offer: The negotiator attempts to lead their partner to request a concession.
- Requests a concession: The negotiator proposes a concessional term.
- Rejects partner’s terms: The negotiator refuses to grant partner a concession.
- Accepts partner’s terms: The negotiator grants partner a concession.
- Wants partner to revise terms: The negotiator wants better terms from partner.
- Wants own revised terms (makes counter offer): The negotiator defines acceptable terms in response to partner requesting a concession.
- Willing to allow a term to remain unresolved: The negotiator avoids responding to a concessional action made by their partner or proposes that a concessional issue does not require resolution during the negotiation.
- Unwilling to allow a term to remain unresolved: The negotiator insists that a concessional issue is to be fully resolved during negotiation.
# Table 17: Comparison of ‘Concessional’ Actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Control Groups</th>
<th>Experimental Groups</th>
<th>Mixed Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Concessional</td>
<td>3.1 Invites an offer</td>
<td>3.94%</td>
<td>4.86%</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Requests a concession</td>
<td>16.99%</td>
<td>23.79%</td>
<td>22.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Rejects partner’s terms</td>
<td>13.03%</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4 Accepts partner’s terms</td>
<td>5.50%</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
<td>13.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 Wants partner to revise terms</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
<td>7.02%</td>
<td>3.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.6 Wants own revised terms (Makes counter offer)</td>
<td>7.67%</td>
<td>6.09%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7 Willing to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
<td>6.14%</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8 Unwilling to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 18: Comparison of ‘Concessional’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Concessional</td>
<td>3.1 Invites an offer</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Requests a concession</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Rejects partner’s terms</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4 Accepts partner’s terms</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 Wants partner to revise terms</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.6 Wants own revised terms (Makes counter offer)</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7 Willing to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8 Unwilling to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19: Comparison of ‘Concessional’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Concessional</td>
<td>3.1 Invites an offer</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Requests a concession</td>
<td>12.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Rejects partner’s terms</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4 Accepts partner’s terms</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 Wants partner to revise terms</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.6 Wants own revised terms (Makes counter offer)</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7 Willing to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8 Unwilling to allow a term to remain unresolved</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for Scenario Two (mixed groups), the ASB participants in both the experimental and mixed groups more frequently made requests for a concession than their ESB counterparts. The differences in frequency of requesting concessions between the experimental groups (ASB only) and the control groups (ESB only) were noticeable, particularly in Scenario Three, in which the ASB negotiators averaged more than twice as many concession requests than the ESB negotiators, and even more noticeable in Scenario Three, in which the ASB negotiators averaged more than three times as many requests than the ESB negotiators. Scenario One and Scenario Three witnessed the ESB negotiators in the mixed groups average higher frequencies of requests for concession in comparison with the ESB negotiators participating in the control groups. The ASB negotiators in the mixed groups remained relatively consistent with the experimental group averages for Scenario One and Three;
however, in Scenario Two, they demonstrated a rapid decrease in the number of concessions requested. It is likely that the negotiation topic impacted on this behaviour, with the nature of Scenario Two driving more efforts to challenge the position of partners as opposed to make concessional requests as in Scenario One and Scenario Three.

One of the most noticeable outcomes of the study was the relationship between rejecting and accepting requests for concession and the mixed groups. The experimental groups more frequently would reject their partners’ requests for concession in comparison to the control group participants. This was particularly apparent in Scenario Two, where the experimental group participants averaged a frequency almost ten times that of the control group participants. While the differences were less distinct in scenarios one and three, they did indicate a trend that the ASB negotiators would reject requests for concession more willingly than the ESB negotiators. Yet, during the mixed group negotiations, there was also a trend where the ASB negotiators rejected their ESB negotiation partners’ requests for concession far fewer times. In Scenario One, the experimental group average for rejecting requests for concession was 17.46% of turns; however, the ASB mixed group participants registered an average of 6.67% of turns. Scenario Two registered 22.24% of experimental group turns but only 2.08% of ASB mixed group turns and Scenario Three 9.29% (experimental group) versus 4.36% (ASB mixed group). Conversely, in scenarios two and three, the ESB mixed group participants average a significantly higher average of rejecting requests than the control group ESB participants. In Scenario Two, the control groups averaged rejecting requests for concession in only 2.32% of turns, but in the mixed group simulations, the ESB average was 8.60% of turns. Likewise, in Scenario Three, the control group average was 2.24% while the ESB mixed group average was 7.46%.

Closely related to the frequency of rejections were the frequencies of accepting requests for concession. In simulations one and two, there was a noticeable increase (5.71% of turns in Scenario One and 5.51% of turns in Scenario Two) in the ASB negotiator means for accepting requests for concessions from ESB partners as opposed to other ASB partners. Scenario Two displayed a small
increase in the mean (0.9% of turns), which mainly reflects a higher mean for the experimental groups driven by an increased frequency of ASB negotiators accepting requests for concession from their ASB partners, whereas in simulations one and two, the ASB negotiations displayed a greater reluctance to grant concessions to their ASB partners. In comparison to the ESB negotiators, the ASB negotiators in general had a higher frequency for granting concessions, yet this is also a reflection on the greater frequency of requests for a concession that occurred during the experimental and mixed group negotiations. When paired with an ASB negotiator in the mixed groups, only in negotiation three did the frequency of granting concessions differ significantly between the ESB mixed group participants and the ESB control group participants. Negotiation three recorded the control group mean for granting concession as 8.14% of turns, whereas during the mixed groups, the ESB mean was recorded as 13.52% of turns. However, again, this is a little inaccurate as the mixed group ASB partners requested concessions at twice the frequency (25.52% of turns) as compared with the ESB control group participants (12.04% of turns). More significantly, simulations one and two demonstrated that the ESB negotiators more frequently avoided responding to a request for a concession made by their ASB partners than they were willing to accept a request for a concession from their partner. In Scenario One, the ESB control group mean for leaving a term (or concession request) unresolved was 4.35% of turns; however, during the mixed groups, the ESB mean jumped to 18.40% of turns, whereas the ASB mixed group average was 2.21% of turns, falling from the ASB experimental group mean of 6.14% of turns.

The ASB experimental group negotiations displayed an orientation towards making counter offers in all three simulations; however, the ASB mixed group negotiators demonstrated in scenarios two and three that they were less willing to make counter offers with their ESB partners. It is possible that the frequency of counter offers declined in scenarios two and three because some ASB negotiators have changed their approach to using counter offers following Scenario One. If so, it is likely due to the differing nature of the negotiation topics; the ASB negotiators identifying that counter offers are as effective with an ESB partner in comparison to an ASB partner or a mix of both reasons. The ESB control group negotiators made counter offers at a mean frequency of
7.67% of turns during Scenario One, but this rate dropped to 1.00% of turns for Scenario Two and 1.68% of turns for Scenario Two, which supports the theory of the negotiation topic impacting on the frequency of this sub-feature. Conversely, we also see that the ESB mixed group negotiators gradually increase their use of the counter offer with their ASB partners throughout the simulations. In Scenario One, the mean for ESB mixed group counter offers is 2.50% of turns, in Scenario Two, it is 3.06% of turns but in Scenario Three, the mean jumps to 8.24% of turns. This observation supports the second theory that the negotiation participants may have been adjusting their natural negotiation styles throughout the simulations according to the negotiation styles of their partners.

Some of the key observations of concessional actions relate to the fact that:

- ASB negotiators rely upon making frequent requests for concession as a negotiation tactic
- ESB negotiators are more likely to use requests for concession as a tactic against ASB negotiators as opposed to ESB negotiation partners
- ASB negotiators are more willing to reject requests for concession from other ASB negotiators but less willing to reject requests from ESB negotiation partners
- ESB negotiators are more willing to reject requests for concession from other ASB negotiators but less willing to reject requests from ESB negotiation partners
- ASB negotiators are more likely to grant concessions for their ESB partners as opposed to their ASB negotiation partners
- ESB negotiators regularly used the tactic of avoiding responding to requests for concession from ASB partners as opposed to accepting or rejecting requests
- ASB negotiators would use counter-offer tactics against ASB partners but stopped using them frequently with ESB partners after Scenario One
- ESB negotiators would not use counter-offer tactics against ESB partners but started using them more frequently with ASB partners after Scenario One
- The concessional actions indicated that the negotiation topic affected the process of dealing with concessions, and indicated that both the ESB and ASB mixed group negotiators adopted negotiation tactics of their partner’s during simulations two and three.
Benefits and Detriments

‘Benefits and detriments’ is a feature that monitors strategies used by a participant to strengthen their negotiation position by identifying a (negative) consequence of their own or their partner’s negotiation position. Four sub-features have been considered in this study:

- Proposes benefit to self or partner: where a negotiator supports their position by identifying a potential advantage to either party
- Proposes disadvantage to self or partner: where a negotiator supports their position by identifying their partner’s position as having a potential disadvantage to either party
- Accepts benefit or disadvantage previously proposed by partner: where a negotiation partner concurs with the potential advantage or disadvantage identified by partner
- Rejects benefit or disadvantage previously proposed by partner: where a negotiation partner does not concur with the potential advantage or disadvantage identified by partner.

Table 20: Comparison of ‘Benefit and Detriment’ actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Control Groups</th>
<th>Experimental Groups</th>
<th>Mixed Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Benefits and Detriments</td>
<td>4.1 Proposes benefit to self or partner</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
<td>5.18%</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Proposes detriment to self or partner</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Accepts benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>6.43%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4 Rejects benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>5.46%</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21: Comparison of ‘Benefit and Detriment’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Benefits and Detriments</td>
<td>4.1 Proposes benefit to self or partner</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Proposes detriment to self or partner</td>
<td>13.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Accepts benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>4.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4 Rejects benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Comparison of ‘Benefit and Detriment’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Benefits and Detriments</td>
<td>4.1 Proposes benefit to self or partner</td>
<td>13.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Proposes detriment to self or partner</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Accepts benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>13.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4 Rejects benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner</td>
<td>2.57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both cultural groups demonstrated that they will propose benefits in order to strengthen their negotiation position. Further to the proposing benefits sub-feature, there was no major difference between the ASB experimental groups and ESB control groups. However, there was a clear increase in the frequency of ESB mixed group participants proposing benefits to ASB mixed group participants as opposed to ESB control group participants. This was particularly evident in Scenario One, where the ESB mixed groups averaged proposing benefits during 23.18% of turns as opposed to 3.97% of turns throughout the ESB control groups.

The other sub-feature of significance is ‘accepts benefit or detriment previously proposed by partner’. Throughout the three scenarios, there is a trend for ASB mixed group participants to accept benefits and detriments proposed by their ESB partners, whereas the trend is for ASB experimental group participants to reject benefits and detriments proposed by ASB partners. In Scenario One, the ASB mixed group averaged accepting benefits and detriments in 10.80% of turns, whereas the ASB experimental group averaged only 0.29% of turns. In Scenario Two, the ASB mixed group averaged 12.60% of turns compared to 2.07% of turns in experimental groups and in Scenario Three, the ASB mixed group participants averaged 12.21% of turns as opposed to 4.44% of turns. The ASB mixed group participant rejection of benefit or detriment rate for Scenario One was 4.03%, Scenario Two 8.04% and Scenario Three 2.91%. In each of the scenarios, the ASB experimental groups more frequently rejected proposed benefits and detriment more frequently than accepting them. While one explanation for the increase in the average of accepting benefits and detriments is that it correlates to the increase in ESB mixed group participants proposing benefits, the data also indicate that the ASB participants were more willing to accept the proposed benefit than reject it when proposed by an ESB participant.

Observations of benefits and detriment actions are:

- ESB participants proposed benefits more frequently when negotiating with ASB partners
- ASB participants are more willing to accept benefits and detriments from ESB negotiation partners than from ASB partners.
Credibility

The credibility feature consists of actions that try to strengthen a negotiator’s position by building trust or demonstrating reliability. There are four sub-features identified:

- Tries to win trust of partner: an action where a negotiator tries to demonstrate reliability to their partner
- Does not try to win trust of partner: an action where a negotiator does not try to demonstrate reliability to their partner although an opportunity presents itself
- Demonstrates trust in partner: a negotiator perceives their partner’s action/s as reliable
- Does not demonstrate trust in partner: a negotiator does not perceive partner’s action/s as reliable.

**Table 23: Comparison of ‘Credibility’ Actions: Scenario One**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario One (Renting a House)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Credibility</td>
<td>5.1 Tries to win trust of partner</td>
<td>11.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Does not try to win trust of partner</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 Demonstrates trust in partner</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 Does not demonstrate trust in partner</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 24: Comparison of ‘Credibility’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Credibility</td>
<td>5.1 Tries to win trust of partner</td>
<td>19.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Does not try to win trust of partner</td>
<td>10.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 Demonstrates trust in partner</td>
<td>16.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 Does not demonstrate trust in partner</td>
<td>44.15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Comparison of ‘Credibility’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Credibility</td>
<td>5.1 Tries to win trust of partner</td>
<td>4.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Does not try to win trust of partner</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 Demonstrates trust in partner</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 Does not demonstrate trust in partner</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A noteworthy trend with the tries to win trust of partner sub-feature is that the ESB negotiators demonstrated a trend towards trying to win the trust of their partners, whereas the ASB negotiators seldom pursued the trust of their
partners. There was little discrepancy between the frequencies of the ASB experimental groups and the ASB mixed group participants. While there were discrepancies between the ESB control groups and the ESB mixed group participants, their frequencies were at each point clearly higher than the ASB frequency means. For example, in Scenario One, the ESB control group frequency mean was 11.66% of turns with the ESB mixed group mean recorded at 22.22% of turns. This compares as a significantly higher frequency than the ASB experimental groups’ mean of 4.18% of turns and the ASB mixed groups’ mean of 6.21% of turns. In simulation three, the frequency of the ESB mixed group negotiators also increased in comparison to the ESB control groups; however, in Scenario Two, the frequency of the ESB mixed group negotiators decreased in comparison to the ESB control groups.

Trends in the frequency counts indicate that the ESB negotiators are more inclined to demonstrate trust in an ESB negotiation partner than an ASB partner, conversely the ASB negotiators exhibited that they are more inclined to demonstrate trust in an ESB partner than an ASB negotiation partner. In Scenario Two, the ESB control groups averaged demonstrating trust in their partners during 16.51% of turns, whereas the ESB mixed group negotiators averaged 2.08% of turns. A possible explanation for this behaviour is that the ESB negotiators may have altered their negotiation tactics relating to trust when the ASB negotiators were not trying to win the trust of their partner as frequently as the ESB negotiators. Likewise, the increase in frequency of ASB negotiators demonstrating trust in their ESB negotiation partners (in comparison to their ASB partners) may be attributed to a reaction to the higher frequency of attempts by ESB participants to win their partners’ trust.

The ESB control group and ASB experimental group data from the first two scenarios both demonstrated that the ESB negotiators were more inclined to use the tactic of not demonstrating trust in their partner than the ASB negotiators. There is no clear difference in the Scenario Two data, which also may reflect the nature of the negotiation topic. The mixed groups demonstrated that in the first two scenarios the ASB negotiators were more inclined not to demonstrate trust in their ESB partners as opposed to demonstrating trust.
Observations of the credibility actions are:

- Trust issues are of more importance to the ESB negotiators than the ASB negotiators
- ASB mixed group negotiators were driven to deal with trust issues by the ESB mixed group negotiators introducing trust issues
- ASB negotiators would both display trust in their partners and not demonstrate trust in their partners suggesting that trust was built through the negotiation process.

**Challenge**

The challenge feature considers actions where a negotiator attempts strengthen their own position by confronting their partner about the strength of their position. Four sub-features identified in this study relate to a negotiator who:

- Challenges partner’s position: where a negotiator attempts to strengthen own position by confronting partner about the strength of their position
- Does not challenge partner’s position: where a negotiator declines an opportunity to strengthen own position by confronting partner about the strength of their position
- Refutes challenge by partner: where the partner responds to a challenge by reaffirming the strength of their position
- Does not refute challenge by partner: where the partner does not respond to a challenge by reaffirming the strength of their position.
### Table 26: Comparison of ‘Challenge’ Actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Control Groups</th>
<th>Experimental Groups</th>
<th>Mixed Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Challenge</td>
<td>6.1 Challenges partner’s position</td>
<td>9.05%</td>
<td>9.02%</td>
<td>4.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2 Does not challenge partner’s position</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
<td>15.73%</td>
<td>32.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3 Refutes challenge by partner</td>
<td>7.76%</td>
<td>3.55%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4 Does not refute challenge by partner</td>
<td>5.81%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
<td>3.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 27: Comparison of ‘Challenge’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Control Groups</th>
<th>Experimental Groups</th>
<th>Mixed Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Challenge</td>
<td>6.1 Challenges partner’s position</td>
<td>37.26%</td>
<td>34.05%</td>
<td>21.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2 Does not challenge partner’s position</td>
<td>7.23%</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>26.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3 Refutes challenge by partner</td>
<td>54.04%</td>
<td>18.29%</td>
<td>12.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4 Does not refute challenge by partner</td>
<td>7.83%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>7.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 28: Comparison of ‘Challenge’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Challenge</td>
<td>6.1 Challenges partner’s position</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2 Does not challenge partner’s position</td>
<td>8.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3 Refutes challenge by partner</td>
<td>3.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4 Does not refute challenge by partner</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both cultural groups demonstrated a willingness to challenge their negotiation partners’ positions, even during the mixed groups. Yet, the ASB participants from both the experimental groups and the mixed groups exhibited a preference for not challenging their partners’ position when an opportunity was presented to challenge. Only during Scenario Two did the ASB experimental group participants challenge their partner more frequently than they avoided challenging a partner’s position. Judging by the frequencies of the other groups, the ASB experimental groups’ frequencies are likely to be a reflection on the nature of the simulation more than an indication of a cultural orientation. One trend that was noticeable was that the ASB negotiators from the mixed groups more frequently avoided challenging their ESB partners’ position than the ASB negotiators from the experimental groups would avoid challenging their fellow ASB negotiation partners’ position.

Another trend that the data displayed was that both the ESB and ASB participants from each group would more frequently refute a challenge from their partner than accept the challenge. The trend also showed that the mixed group participants were less inclined to refute challenges from their mixed
group partners in comparison to the ESB control group and ASB experimental group participants.

The trend of the ASB negotiators to frequently not challenge their partners suggests that the ASB negotiators had an orientation towards maintaining consensus when possible. However, like the ESB negotiators, the ASB negotiators were willing to defend their negotiation position and challenge their partners when consensus could not be maintained.

Observations from the challenge feature include:

- ASB negotiators having a preference for not challenging their negotiation partner but will challenge their partner’s position when consensus cannot be maintained
- ESB negotiators preferring to challenge their partner’s position when an opportunity arises
- Both ASB and ESB negotiators preferring to refute a challenge by their partner, as opposed to accepting the challenge.

Alternatives

The alternatives feature monitors the use of the BATNA tactic by a negotiator, where one negotiator tries to establish power over their partner by establishing that they have a stronger alternative outside of the negotiation. The four sub-features monitored are:

- Claims/reaffirms to have strong BATNA: where a negotiator believes that they can obtain a better outcome with an alternative partner
- Cannot claim/reaffirm to have strong BATNA: where a negotiator does not believe that they can obtain a better deal with an alternate partner
- Disregards strength of partner’s BATNA: where a negotiator challenges or dismisses the strength of their partner’s alternative
- Cannot disregard strength of partner’s BATNA: where a negotiator cannot challenge or dismiss the strength of their partner’s alternative.
Table 29: Comparison of ‘Alternatives’ Actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario One (Renting a House)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Alternatives</td>
<td>7.1 Claims/reaffirms to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 Cannot claim/reaffirm to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3 Disregards strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4 Cannot disregard strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30: Comparison of ‘Alternatives’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Alternatives</td>
<td>7.1 Claims/reaffirms to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 Cannot claim/reaffirm to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3 Disregards strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>4.97%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4 Cannot disregard strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 31: Comparison of ‘Alternatives’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups ASB</td>
<td>Experimental Groups ESB</td>
<td>Mixed Groups ESB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Alternatives</td>
<td>7.1 Claims/reaffirms to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 Cannot claim/reaffirm to have strong BATNA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3 Disregards strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4 Cannot disregard strength of partner’s BATNA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were not any major differences between the different groups; however, the ESB negotiators did demonstrate more willingness than the ASB negotiators to either claim to have a strong alternative or to disregard the strength of their partner’s alternative. It was more frequent for the ESB negotiators to dismiss the strength of their partner’s alternative as opposed to affirming the strength of their own alternative.

The ASB negotiators did not demonstrate an orientation towards using BATNA as a negotiation tactic.

Observations from the alternatives feature:

- Neither cultural group frequently used this feature as a negotiation tactic, but the ESB negotiators did demonstrate a willingness to use the tactic infrequently.
Roles

The roles feature considers the way that the negotiator acts according to goals that they want to achieve during the negotiation. There are four sub-features that have been considered in this study:

- Seeking alignment of objectives: the negotiator wants to work with partner to prioritise each other’s goals
- Is not seeking alignment of objectives: the negotiator does not give priority to partner’s goals
- Acts according to private goals: the negotiator shares goals that are unknown to partner before the negotiation
- Does not act according to private goals: the negotiator refers only to goals that are apparent to the partner before the negotiation (public goals).

Table 32: Comparison of ‘Roles’ Actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario One (Renting a House)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Roles</td>
<td>8.1 Seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>36.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.2 Is not seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>29.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3 Acts according to private goals</td>
<td>74.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.4 Does not act according to private goals</td>
<td>10.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 33: Comparison of ‘Roles’ Actions: Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups ESB</td>
<td>Experimental Groups ASB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Roles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>33.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Is not seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>42.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Acts according to private goals</td>
<td>94.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Does not act according to private goals</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34: Comparison of ‘Roles’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups ESB</td>
<td>Experimental Groups ASB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Roles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>49.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Is not seeking alignment of objectives</td>
<td>14.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Acts according to private goals</td>
<td>50.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Does not act according to private goals</td>
<td>34.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout each of the scenarios, the ASB negotiators demonstrated a preference to seek an alignment of objectives with their partners. Aside from the ASB experimental group participants in Scenario Two, the mean frequencies were clearly oriented towards seeking alignment. In Scenario One, the ASB experimental groups averaged seeking alignment in 65.93% of turns opposed to not seeking alignment of objectives in 12.16% of turns. In comparison, the ASB mixed group negotiators in Scenario One sought an alignment of objectives in an average of 79.44% of turns but only averaged not seeking alignment in 2.36% of turns.
The ESB negotiators did not make evident a clear preference to seek an alignment of objectives with their partners. Scenario Two ESB control groups recorded a higher mean frequency of not seeking an alignment of objectives in comparison to seeking alignment. Scenario One ESB control groups recorded comparable mean frequencies and the Scenario Three ESB control groups sought an alignment of objectives during an average of 49.91% of turns as opposed to not seeking alignment during an average of 14.15% of turns.

Mean frequencies recorded for the mixed groups revealed that both the ASB and the ESB negotiators tended to seek an alignment of more frequently when negotiating in the mixed groups in comparison to the control groups and experimental groups. The actions of the ASB mixed group negotiators were consistent with the actions of the ASB experimental group negotiators, which indicate a preference towards seeking consensus. Conversely, the ESB negotiators were more actively seeking consensus when negotiating in the mixed groups. One possible explanation for this is that ESB mixed group negotiators changed their regular negotiation tactics in response to the ASB mixed group negotiators seeking consensus.

The further two sub-features consider whether negotiators’ roles are driven by goals that are either disclosed or publicly apparent, or whether they act according to their own undisclosed private goals. Mean frequencies exhibited that ESB negotiators will act according to private goals more than public goals, whereas the ASB negotiators prefer to act according to public goals than private goals. The ESB control group negotiators registered significant frequency differences between acting according to private goals and acting according to public goals. For example, in Scenario One, the ESB control groups mean for acting according to private goals was 74.86% of turns, whereas the mean for not acting according to private goals was only 10.77% of turns. The ESB mixed group negotiators were consistent with the actions of the ESB control group negotiators in Scenario One; however, in Scenario Two and Three, the ESB mixed group negotiators broke the trend by more frequently acting according to public goals.

The ASB experimental groups’ means in Scenario One and Scenario Two were clearly favouring the acting according to public goals; however, Scenario Two
was clearly favouring acting according to private goals. ASB mixed group means all significantly favoured acting according to public goals. The data again suggested that the ASB negotiators were more actively seeking to maintain consensus with their partners by seeking integrative or collaborative agreements, whereas the ESB negotiators were more focused on seeking agreements based on their own objectives. Yet, the data indicated that the ESB mixed groups negotiators shifted away from this tactic in the last two simulations and became more integrative in their approach. This is likely to be a reaction to the integrative approach of the ASB mixed group negotiators.

Observations from the roles feature are:

- ASB negotiators preferred to seek an alignment of objectives with their negotiation partners
- ESB negotiators did not have a clear preference for either seeking or not seeking an alignment of objectives with their negotiation partners
- Both the ASB and ESB mixed groups negotiators sought an alignment of objectives with their negotiation partners more frequently than the control groups and experimental groups’ participants
- ESB negotiators preferred to act according to private goals, whereas the ASB negotiators preferred to act according to public goals
- ASB negotiators sought consensus and collaborative agreements
- ESB negotiators on the most part sought agreement for their own objectives but became more collaborative during negotiations with ASB partners.

**Turn Taking**

‘Turn-taking actions’ is the feature that monitors the events that occur during each speech turn. Five events have been identified with each event consisting of a number of sub-features identified below:

1. Turn selection—The event monitoring how the turn is initiated:
   I. Self-selected (Turn Relevance Place)—Negotiator initiated turn at a natural point for a turn to be initiated
   II. Self-selected (Non-Turn Relevance Place)—Negotiator initiated turn by interrupting or speaking over partner, which causes partner to cut turn short, but does not necessarily do so in order to strengthen their negotiation position
   III. Previous speaker selected—Negotiator initiated turn in response to partner
2. Turn type—The types of actions achieved by during a pair of turns or an exchange of turns:
   I. Pre-expansion (foregrounding)—An exchange of turns that form preparatory actions that help the interlocutors build to a pivotal pair or exchange. Actions predominantly involve the sharing of information and do not impact on the outcomes of the negotiation.
   II. Pivotal pair or exchange—An exchange of turns that address part or all of the intended outcomes of the negotiation. All actions potentially impact on the outcomes of the negotiation.
   III. Post-expansion (follow-up)—Exchanges that occur following a pivotal exchange that are used to bring a negotiation to closure. This may also include exchanging information that does not impact on the outcomes of the negotiation.
   IV. Insert-Expansion—A pair that occurs in a larger exchange when a negotiator defers making a second pair part (SPP) by issuing another first pair part (FPP) for their partner to respond to. Often, the negotiator will be seeking a clarification and will provide the SPP following their partner’s response.
   V. Topic-Proffering—A pair where a negotiator proposes a new topic of discussion and the partner responds by also discussing the new topic.

3. Turn order—Function of each turn in the pair or exchange
   I. FPP—An utterance that initiates an exchange.
   II. SPP—An utterance that responds to an FPP or its equivalent.

4. Contiguity—Positioning of silence gaps
   I. Contiguous—No unnatural delays or hesitation during turn.
   II. Non-contiguous (Prior to turn)—An unnatural delay or hesitation occurs before the commencement of the speech turn.
   III. Non-contiguous (During turn)—Unnatural delays or hesitation occur during the speech turn.

5. Response characteristics—Function or action of the SPP
   I. Counter—Purposely avoids responding to a partner by providing another FPP instead of a SPP.
   II. Repair (disagreement implicated)—Response indicates dissatisfaction with the FPP and wants partner to present revised FPP.
   III. Repair (reworking previous FPP)—Response indicates dissatisfaction with partner’s FPP by presenting their own FPP.
   IV. Go-ahead response—Negotiator accepts partner’s FPP in its entirety.
   V. Blocking Response—Negotiator rejects partner’s FPP in its entirety.
   VI. Hedging Response—Negotiator partially accepts partner’s FPP.
VII. Topic/sequence closing—Negotiator attempts to close an issue or the negotiation

VIII. Interrupts partner—Negotiator attempts to strengthen own position by speaking over partner and cutting their speech turn short

Table 35: Comparison of ‘Turn-taking’ actions: Scenario One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario One (Renting a House)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Turn Selection</td>
<td>9.1.1 Self-selected Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>48.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.2 Self-selected—Non-Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>12.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.3 Previous Speaker Selected</td>
<td>39.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Turn Type</td>
<td>9.2.1 Pre-Expansion (Foregrounding)</td>
<td>24.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.2 Pivotal Adjacency Pair</td>
<td>27.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.3 Post-Expansion (Follow-up)</td>
<td>13.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.4 Insert-Expansion</td>
<td>29.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.5 Topic-Proffering</td>
<td>29.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Turn Order</td>
<td>9.3.1 FPP</td>
<td>49.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.3.2 SPP</td>
<td>34.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4 Positioning of Silence Gaps</td>
<td>9.4.1 Contiguous</td>
<td>42.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.2 Non-Contiguous—Prior to Turn</td>
<td>11.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.3 Non-Contiguous—During Turn</td>
<td>26.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5 Response Characteristics</td>
<td>9.5.1 Counter</td>
<td>5.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.2 Repair—Disagreement Implicated</td>
<td>22.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.3 Repair—Reworking Previous FPP</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.4 Go-Ahead Response</td>
<td>12.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.5 Blocking Response</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.6 Hedging Response</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.7 Topic/Sequence Closing</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.8 Interrupts partner</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

142
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Two (Contract Dispute)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Turn Selection</td>
<td>9.1.1 Self-selected—Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>50.38%</td>
<td>35.64%</td>
<td>49.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.2 Self-selected—Non-Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>24.62%</td>
<td>18.03%</td>
<td>7.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.3 Previous Speaker Selected</td>
<td>36.99%</td>
<td>46.55%</td>
<td>43.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Turn Type</td>
<td>9.2.1 Pre-Expansion (Foregrounding)</td>
<td>29.60%</td>
<td>14.38%</td>
<td>43.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.2 Pivotal Adjacency Pair</td>
<td>16.88%</td>
<td>80.25%</td>
<td>30.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.3 Post-Expansion (Follow-up)</td>
<td>13.53%</td>
<td>4.14%</td>
<td>14.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.4 Insert-Expansion</td>
<td>25.96%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>7.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.5 Topic-Proffering</td>
<td>32.68%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>3.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Turn Order</td>
<td>9.3.1 FPP</td>
<td>39.89%</td>
<td>40.35%</td>
<td>54.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.3.2 SPP</td>
<td>29.77%</td>
<td>59.65%</td>
<td>44.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4 Positioning of Silence Gaps</td>
<td>9.4.1 Contiguous</td>
<td>58.11%</td>
<td>61.07%</td>
<td>53.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.2 Non-Contiguous—Prior to turn</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>6.82%</td>
<td>13.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.3 Non-Contiguous—During Turn</td>
<td>35.36%</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>42.64%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.5 Response Characteristics</td>
<td>9.5.1 Counter</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
<td>6.58%</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.2 Repair—Disagreement Implicated</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
<td>21.34%</td>
<td>17.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.3 Repair—Reworking Previous FPP</td>
<td>21.59%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.4 Go-Ahead Response</td>
<td>10.65%</td>
<td>14.08%</td>
<td>19.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.5 Blocking Response</td>
<td>14.50%</td>
<td>32.98%</td>
<td>13.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.6 Hedging Response</td>
<td>5.72%</td>
<td>3.19%</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.7 Topic/Sequence Closing</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>3.34%</td>
<td>8.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.8 Intermits partner</td>
<td>3.83%</td>
<td>18.03%</td>
<td>5.76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 37: Comparison of ‘Turn-taking’ Actions: Scenario Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Sub-Feature/Participant</th>
<th>Scenario Three (Community Service Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Turn Selection</td>
<td>9.1.1 Self-selected—Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>40.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.2 Self-selected—Non-Turn Relevance Place</td>
<td>8.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.3 Previous Speaker Selected</td>
<td>54.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Turn Type</td>
<td>9.2.1 Pre-Expansion (Foregrounding)</td>
<td>17.55%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.2 Pivotal Adjacency Pair</td>
<td>15.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.3 Post-Expansion (Follow-up)</td>
<td>39.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.4 Insert-Expansion</td>
<td>18.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2.5 Topic-Proffering</td>
<td>21.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Turn Order</td>
<td>9.3.1 FPP</td>
<td>41.31%</td>
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<td>9.3.2 SPP</td>
<td>45.48%</td>
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<td>9.4 Positioning of Silence Gaps</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.1 Contiguous</td>
<td>56.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.2 Non-Contiguous—Prior to turn</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.3 Non-Contiguous—During Turn</td>
<td>24.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5 Response Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.1 Counter</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.2 Repair—Disagreement Implicated</td>
<td>13.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.3 Repair—Reworking Previous FPP</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.4 Go-Ahead Response</td>
<td>40.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.5 Blocking Response</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.6 Hedging Response</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.7 Topic/Sequence Closing</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.8 Interrupts partner</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from the turn selection sub-features (tables 35, 36 and 37) indicated that both the ASB and ESB mixed groups’ participants were less willing to initiate taking speech turns in non-turn relevance places than the ESB control groups’ participants and the ASB experimental groups’ participants. This was particularly evident in scenarios one and two, in which the negotiation topics gave the participants conflicting objectives, but less evident in Scenario Three.
where the participants shared the same goals. These differences suggest that both cultural groups are more comfortable speaking out of turn with partners from their own cultural group.

One of the most critical findings in the data relates to turn types. The data revealed a key difference in the tactics used by the ESB control groups and the ASB experimental groups. The ESB control groups relied heavily upon using foregrounding and follow-up turn types in addition to the pivotal turn types; however, the ASB experimental groups seldom used any turn type other than the pivotal turn type. This indicates that the ESB control group negotiators spent more turns building context and confirming common ground, whereas the ASB experimental group negotiators did not require context building or confirming activities, as context was either explicitly or implicitly developed throughout the pivotal turns. However, the mixed groups witnessed a strong trend to use foregrounding and follow-up turn types, demonstrating that the ASB negotiators had to participate in context building and reaffirming activities similar to trends that occurred with the ESB control groups. For example, in Scenario Two, the ASB mixed group participants used foregrounding turn types on an average of 43.70 turns in comparison to the ASB experimental groups who used foregrounding in an average of 14.38% of turns. The ASB mixed groups’ participants also only used pivotal exchanges across an average of 30.95% of turns in Scenario Two. Likewise, the ASB mixed groups negotiators (in comparison to the ASB experimental groups negotiators) had a sharp increase in their average use of foregrounding turns in Scenario One, but the pivotal turn type was still the most frequently used. In Scenario Three, the pivotal turn type was also the most frequently used turn type, but there was a noticeable increase in the frequency that the ASB mixed groups’ participants used on follow-up turn types in comparison to the ASB experimental groups’ participants.

In all three scenarios, the ESB mixed groups also saw a noticeable increase in the frequency of using pivotal turn types in comparison to the ESB control groups. These observations indicate that during the mixed groups’ negotiations, both the ASB participants and the ESB participants were required to follow a different communication process to their ASB experimental groups/ESB
control groups’ counterparts. Effectively, the ASB experimental groups’ participants needed to conduct more building and affirmation of context for their ESB partners. Conversely, the ESB experimental groups’ participants needed to adjust to more building and affirmation of context during pivotal turns. Similarly, the ESB control groups’ participants recorded clearly higher frequencies for using insert-expansion turn types and topic-proffering turn types than the ASB experimental groups’ participants. The ASB experimental groups were negligible in their use of these turn types. During the mixed groups, the average frequencies of insert-expansion and topic-proffering turn types suggest that the approaches of the ASB negotiators are more influential than the ESB negotiators.

The positioning of silence gaps demonstrated that there was more hesitation and delay during the mixed group negotiations in comparison to the control groups and the experimental groups. There were not any noticeable differences across the groups in the sub-feature of ‘contiguous’ or ‘non-contiguous—prior to turn’.

The repair—disagreement implicated sub-feature in Scenario One and Scenario Two showed a tendency for the ESB control groups’ participants to clearly use these sub-features more than the ASB experimental groups’ participants. In comparison, the mixed groups demonstrated a trend to use the ‘repair—disagreement implicated’ action far less than the ESB control groups’ participants and the ASB experimental groups’ participants. This suggests that both cultural groups are more willing to directly express to a partner from their own culture that they want their partner to revise their negotiation position.

According to the ‘go-ahead’ responses data, the ASB negotiators tended to have a higher frequency of providing ‘go-ahead’ responses than the ESB negotiators, with the ASB mixed groups’ participants providing go-ahead responses clearly more frequently than the ASB experimental groups’ participants. In Scenario One and Scenario Two, the ESB mixed group participants also provided go-ahead responses more frequently than the ESB control group participants. From the ‘blocking’ responses, the data also showed that the ASB experimental groups’ participants more frequently made blocking responses than the ESB control groups’ participants. By combining the
frequency of the go-ahead responses and blocking responses, the data contain further evidence that the ASB experimental groups more frequently dealt with concession requests that the ESB control groups’ participants. The blocking responses also reveal that the ASB mixed groups negotiators less frequently used blocking responses than the ASB experimental groups, while the ESB mixed group negotiators tended to use blocking responses more frequently in comparison to both the ASB mixed groups and the ESB control groups.

An additional observation from the responses of the mixed groups’ participants’ was that both the ASB and ESB participants more frequently used topic/sequence closing responses in comparison to the ASB experimental groups and the ESB control groups. Likely reasons for this includes an increase in the number of follow-up turn types, were each party was trying to affirm that they shared common ground about the outcomes from the topic or the negotiation, whereas the ESB control groups and ASB experimental groups did not feel the need to seek affirmation from their partners.

The participants from the ASB experimental groups demonstrated that they would more frequently interrupt their negotiation partners than the ESB control groups’ participants. This indicates that the ASB experimental groups’ negotiations tended to have faster paced negotiations with shorter turns as the partners were less willing to listen to lengthy turns full of multiple points of information. However, the data do indicate that the ASB mixed groups negotiators interrupted their ESB partners less frequently than the ASB experimental groups. Conversely, in Scenario Two, the ESB mixed groups mean frequency for interrupting partner was nearly twice the mean frequency of the ASB mixed groups. When comparing the interrupts partner sub-feature with the self-selected—non-turn relevance place turn selection sub-feature, we see that ASB negotiators very much use speaking out of turn to strengthen their negotiation position, whereas the ESB negotiators do not. For example, in Scenario One, the ESB control groups’ participants initiated speech turns in non-turn relevance places at a mean frequency of 12.47% of turns, but they sought to strengthen their position (interrupts partner sub-feature) at a mean of 1.99% of turns. Scenario Two had a larger differential in means where self-selection in non-turn relevant places averaged 24.62% of turns and partner
interruptions averaged 3.83% of turns. One explanation for this difference is that the ESB negotiators would speak out of turn to bring more fluency to the negotiation, where possibly their partner has delivered more information than required in the turn and is continuing to deliver further information.

Observations from the turn-taking feature are:

- Both ESB and ASB negotiators are more willing to speak out of turn with partners from their own cultural group and less willing to speak out of turn with partners from another cultural group
- ASB negotiators will interrupt the speech turn of another ASB negotiator to strengthen their negotiation position more willingly than they will interrupt an ESB negotiation partner
- ESB negotiators will frequently speak out of turn without attempting to strengthen their own negotiation position
- ESB negotiators prefer to use foregrounding turn types to build context and follow-up turn types to affirm common ground
- ASB negotiators prefer to build context and affirm common ground during the pivotal turn types
- ASB and ESB mixed negotiations produce a hybrid of ESB negotiators seeking a use of foregrounding and follow-up turn types, and ASB negotiators seeking the use of pivotal turn types
- ESB negotiators are more likely to defer making relevant responses when selected for a speech turn by their partner than an ASB negotiator
- ESB negotiators are more likely to try to affect a topic change than ASB negotiators
- Both ASB and ESB mixed groups negotiators demonstrated more hesitation than participants from the ASB experimental groups and the ESB control groups
- ESB negotiators are more willing to directly express dissatisfaction with their partner’s negotiation position and request them to revise it in comparison to ASB negotiators
- Both ASB and ESB negotiators are more willing to directly express dissatisfaction with their partner’s negotiation position and request them to revise it when their partner is from their cultural group
- Both ASB and ESB negotiators are more willing to provide ‘go-ahead’ responses when their partner is from a different cultural group
- ASB negotiators are less willing to provide ‘blocking’ responses when their partner is from the ESB cultural group
- ESB negotiators are more willing to provide ‘blocking’ responses when their partner is from the ASB cultural group
• ASB and ESB mixed groups' participants sought more affirmation of common ground than participants from the ASB experimental groups and the ESB control groups.

Relationships between Actions

There are a number of relationships between the sub-features of different actions. In the following section, three examples of these relationships are identified with and possible explanations are provided.

Information Sharing and Concessional Actions

The ESB negotiators have a trend to seek information more frequently when negotiating with an ASB partner in comparison to another ESB partner. The control groups also tend not to seek clarification or additional information from ESB partners. Yet, there is also a visible increase in the frequency of ESB negotiators requesting concessions when negotiating with ASB partners as opposed to ESB partners. Hence, if they are making more frequent requests for concessions, it may be considered natural that there will be more requests for information embedded in the requests or in the speech turns surrounding the requests for concession.

L: 3 So I know you're interested in:: a:: (1.0) renting a small house (0.5) [
R: 4 [Yeah
L: 5 [which I have (0.5) It is pretty much a two bedroom house (0.5) and the other room you can use as a study or an extra bedroom (0.5) Ah:mm (0.5) it has recently been renovated as well
R: 6 Okay::
L: 7 Yep
R: 8 We::ll I'm looking for something near uni:: around the academic year:: I'm not too certain (0.5) ah:mm (0.5) how long:: I'll be
staying in between (. ) I plan on um (3.0) ah:: (1.0) studying for three years (1.0) How long? (. ) is the rent for?

L: 9 = Well you rent it for a year (. ) you can rent it for longer (. ) this house is near university:: (. ) but because you are a university student (. ) and in the past (1.0) the kids who stayed here have damaged (1.0) [

R: 10 [Mm hm::

L: 11 [My house (. ) and it cost me around a $1,000 (. ) so I would have to ask you for that bond? (2.0)

R: 12 Okay well:: (2.0) uh::m I (3.0) hhh hhh ((laughs nervously)) that's good ah::m (2.0)

L: 13 Being it is the best way to prevent (0.5) this problem.

(Control Group 4: Scenario One)

The above extract is an example of how ESB negotiators frequently used the not seeking additional information sub-feature and avoided making requests for concessions. In turns 6, 7, 10, 12 and 13, the negotiators do not seek additional information, when in fact it would have been textually apparent to do so. For example, in turn 6, the participant may have alternatively chosen to request more information about the detail from turn 5, or even requested information on the terms for renting the house. In turn 7, the negotiator may have alternatively asked their partner for their opinion on the house. The renter in turn 8 avoided requesting a concession by inviting an offer, but their partner in turn 9 avoided requesting a concession. Turn 10 again saw an opportunity for the negotiator to request information about the terms of the rental, but again the negotiator avoided doing so. The landlord makes a concessional request in turn 11, but the renter avoids responding to that request in turn 12 and also avoids requesting any additional information about the request. The landlord also fails to seek any information about the renter’s willingness to accept the terms of the request.
L = Landlord (ESB Male), R = Renter (ASB Male)

L: 1 I understand you’re looking for a house? (2.0)
R: 2 I’m just looking for the room (1.0) what do you have? (1.0) and at
                              (1.0) the rent I pay per week (.) can I ask you how much is it?
L: 3 Yeah okay well we’ve got a room nice and close to uni so (.) I
                              understand that would benefit you quite a bit (1.0) Well I’ve just
                              renovated it so spent quite a bit of money there (.) so I was hoping
                              sort of to rent it around $230 a week.
R: 4 $230 (.) I will be honest actually (2.0) that’s too much for me but
                              I’ll just look for (.) if it’s $200 per month or $210 (2.0) So what
                              about the bond (.) can I ask you?
L: 5 Okay well first how long are you wanting to stay at the house?
R: 6 Probably:: till the end of this year
L: 7 Okay so just for the school year?
R: 8 Yeah.
L: 9 Okay (.) well ideally I’d be after a bond sort of (.) around $1,000 to
                              $1,500 (1.0) I mean in the past we’ve had damage done and I’ve
                              had to (.) lost a bit of (.) money there so how do you feel about
                              that?

(Experimental Group Three: Scenario One)

The extract above demonstrates a different approach to information sharing
and requesting concessions by an ESB negotiator. The ESB landlord
commences the negotiation by seeking information and the ASB renter
responds with a rich response that provides information, seeks additional
information and invites an offer to which the ESB landlord responds with
contextualisation information but also a request for a concession. In turn 4, the
ASB renter again provides a rich response very much aimed at the
concessional request of the previous turn as opposed to the contextualisation
information and invites an offer. The ESB landlord requests clarification about
the invitation for an offer in both turns 5 and 7 aiming to address
contextualisation information more than the concessional issue. In turns 6 and
8, the ASB renter provides the information requested and the ESB negotiator
finally makes a request for a concession in turn 9. Turn 9 also features contextual information. This extract demonstrates two approaches to sharing information and concessions where the ASB negotiator is more concerned about addressing concessional actions and the ESB negotiator is more concerned about addressing the information exchanged. The ASB renter’s approach forced the ESB landlord to deal more regularly with concessional actions.

Sharing Information and Establishing Credibility

A relationship was observed between participants, particularly the ESB participants, in methods of sharing information and establishing credibility. When information sharing was intended to establish credibility, sharing objectives, proposing benefits and seeking trust were all sub-features that would be employed by the ESB participants. The ASB participants were less inclined to use benefit and seeking trust sub-features. Yet, we did witness this in the mixed groups, where an approach of one negotiator would influence the tactics of the other in the area of sharing information and establishing credibility.

R = Renter (ESB Male), L = Landlord (ASB Male)

R: 3 So I’m looking for a house to rent (.) going to be a student so I need somewhere fairly affordable (.) but I’m happy to live by myself (.) I’m not from here (1.0) I’m from the country area so I’ve got good values and I’ll keep the place nice for you and things (.) I’m not going to have parties in it or anything like that (1.0) I hear you’ve got an apartment for rent?

L: 4 Yes (2.0) First of all I have to (1.0) have an idea about your profile on your situation here (1.0) And then I will tell you about the commitment to rent a house.

R: 5 Sure.

L: 6 So can you give me a brief idea about your situation as a student?

R: 7 Yep so I’m just about to start a new university degree (1.0) in teaching so my degree will run for three years (.) so I anticipate
that I’ll be there I’ll be here for that span of time (1.0) and as long as these plans are current (.) need a place for that amount of time so I need a place for a period of up to three years.

L: 8  Okay can you give me an idea about financial situation?

R: 9  Yep so I have current finances sourced (.) at the moment so there’s money sitting there so paying the rent won’t be an issue I’ve got that all budgeted out and the money is already there so (.) you’ll definitely always get the rent on time.

L: 10  Okay (1.0) I have a lot of things I have (2.0) I want to tell you about (5.0) well I have (1.0) I can rent you a properly less than $170 per week (.) No commitment to stay for 12 months (1.0) and bond less than $1,000.

R: 11  So $170 a week?

L: 12  Yep per week (1.0) and you have no commitments to stay for 12 months.

R: 13  No commitments (.) so I can move after 12 months?

L: 14  Yeah you can leave.

(Mixed Group Four: Scenario One)

The ESB renter began the extract above by sharing information about his objectives, but also sought to win his partner’s trust and proposed that his position is beneficial to his partner. This turn very much focused on building context by providing a high amount of information that served a number of purposes. In turn 4, the ASB landlord did not acknowledge the benefits proposed or effort to build trust made by the ESB renter in turn 3. The ASB landlord also avoided sharing any of his objectives. Likewise, in turn 5, the ESB renter avoided sharing any of his objectives, but this may have been more as a result of a breakdown in common ground as the ESB renter may not have completely understood the intention of turn 4. A breakdown in common ground seems to have been suspected by the ASB landlord, who sought to repair the breakdown in turn 6, but also avoided sharing any of his own objectives.
In turn 7, similar to turn 3, the ESB renter shared a high amount of information that was intended to serve a number of purposes. The participant shared information and his objectives. He again sought to win his partner’s trust and proposed that his negotiation position was beneficial to his partner. In turn 8, the ASB landlord again avoided making any acknowledgement of the ESB’s contextualisation or requests for credibility. The ASB landlord avoided sharing any of his objectives and simply made a request for information.

In turn 9, the ESB renter again used a high amount of information to seek the trust of his partner and again proposed benefits to his partner. However, in this turn the participant did not share any further information about his objectives. The ASB landlord responded in turn 10 by sharing information on multiple issues, and while the information shared objectives and proposed benefits, the information is very much concession based in comparison to the ESB negotiator who mainly presented information as foregrounding context. In turn 10, for the third time in a row, the ASB landlord avoided acknowledging his partner’s attempts to seek trust.

From turn 11, the actions of each participant began to reverse. In turn 11 and turn 13, the ESB renter effectively delayed responding to the concession requests of his ASB partner and also avoided sharing any information about how his objectives compare with those of the ASB landlord. The ASB landlord in turn 12 and turn 14 shared his objectives and proposed that his negotiation position contained benefits to the ESB renter.

This transcription extract demonstrates a relationship between sharing information, sharing objectives, proposing benefits and seeking trust, but it also demonstrates a process in which the ESB negotiator was focused on building context and common ground through providing foregrounding information and the ASB negotiator mainly used pivotal/concession-based information. During the foregrounding stage, the ASB negotiator avoided sharing information and his objectives, but once the discussion became more pivotal or concession based, the ESB negotiator avoided sharing information and their objectives.
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Assertiveness, Challenge and Speaking Out of Turn

Another relationship observed among the ASB participants was between assertiveness actions, challenging actions and speaking out of turn. Essentially, when ASB participants were more willing to assert their negotiation position, they were also more willing to challenge their partner’s negotiation position and would more frequently speak out of turn, usually as an interruption intended to strengthen their own position. Conversely, when the ASB participants were inclined to avoid asserting their position, they would also avoid challenging their partners more frequently and speak out of turn less. The most common occurrence of decrease assertiveness was when the ASB mixed group participants were negotiating with ESB mixed group partners. In the following transcription extracts, we have examples of how these actions related to one another during the negotiations.

R = Renter (Female ASB), L = Landlord (Female ASB)

(37) R

زيد وعلى الضمان؟ (0.1)

(Good and about the bond?)

(38) L

الضمان أقدر أخليه 2700 (3.0)

(I can keep the bond it at 2700)

(39) R

يعني أعطيك ضمان | 2700؟

(You mean I’ll give you 2700?)

(40) L

إيه خالصهم عندي رهنتي إذا أنني ما سويتي شي في الشقة أنا بارتك

[إيه وفي حالة نثق لا وافق خصتي [ واللا سويتي شي

(Yes I’ll keep it as a deposit if you don’t do anything in the apartment I’ll return it to you if there is a situation God forbid where you damaged or did something)

(41) R

بض عشر آلاف ما تحسين وادي غالى وايش السبب وادي بعد

[But ten thousand is very expensive what’s the reason for this?)

(42) L

أنا كنت حاطه 3000 خاليتني صار 2500 (2.1) ما تحصلين شقة أغلى من هذا السعر في

ذا المكان (1.0) انت الصف الأول النراشي؟
(I had it at 3000 but made it 2500, you will not get an apartment cheaper than this price in this place, are you in your first year of study?)

(No but I’m in a hurry, and my friend offered me this house and said its good)

(This is the lowest price its clean and liveable and we arranged it very nicely it is comfortable it is better and it is modern, a new style, what’s your opinion for two thousand five hundred? Ten thousand I believe is a convincing price per month.)

(Experimental Group 2: Scenario One)

The above extract began with turn 37 inviting a request for a concession and turn 38 requesting a concession. In turn 39, the renter indirectly rejected the concession request of the landlord, queried the landlord’s position but avoided challenging it. From turn 40, the negotiators began to be more assertive with the landlord trying to assert her position but in doing so, did speak out of turn. Turn 40 was not considered an interruption as the previous speaker did manage to convey her message, which means that point of speaking would not strengthen the negotiation position of the landlord. Following this, in turn 41, the renter interrupted the landlord’s speech turn, assertively rejected another concessional request and challenged her partner’s negotiation position.

In turn 42, the landlord has again assertively refuted her partner’s challenge and challenged her partner’s position, but then asks a question that appears to have had the intent of neutralising the frustration of her partner. However, in turn 43, the renter asserted her position and was possibly in the process of challenging her partner when the landlord interrupted and commenced turn 44. Turn 44 was commenced out of turn specifically to strengthen the speaker’s
position (therefore was also considered an interruption), contained a request for a concession, and challenged the negotiation position of the renter.

From these few exchanges, we see a clear example of how ASB participants used turn taking, assertiveness and challenge to try to strengthen their negotiation positions and at the same time weaken the negotiation positions of their partners. It is also noteworthy that this sequence consists purely of pivotal turn types and consists of concessional actions throughout.

R = Renter (Male ESB), L = Landlord (Male ASB)

L: 6 And ah:: (2.0) I will the bond (1.0) should be $1,000
R: 7 Okay yeah (1.0) that’s quite (1.0) that’s quite expensive (.) but that’s alright ah::m (2.0) okay so bond $1,000 and what did you say the price was for rent? (0.5) do you think?
L: 8 For rent I think (1.0) between $170 to (1.0) $230.
R: 9 Okay ah:: (.) so what do you think? (.) what (.) so about $200 do you think? (1.0)
L: 10 Will (3.0) if ah::m (.) it depend for your situation
R: 11 Well okay yeah (1.0) ah::m (1.0) well yeah I’m not really sure about (.) what I’m going to do with uni (.) so it’s good that the contracts only for a year or so (.) that’s good (1.0) that definitely (2.0) that brings the price up a bit ah::m (1.0) but its only one bedroom (1.0) see that’s the problem
L: 12 Yeah one bedroom.

(Mixed Group One: Scenario One)

The ‘Overview of Actions’ data demonstrated that ASB participants would avoid asserting their position and avoid challenging their partner’s position more frequently when negotiating with an ESB partner as opposed to another ASB partner. A relationship between these two actions is apparent in the above transcription extract.

In turn 6, the ASB landlord made a concession request but while he stated his negotiation position, the breaks in the speech turn indicate hesitation and that
the participant did not assert his position. The response in turn 7 by the ESB renter was assertive and challenged the ASB landlord’s negotiation position, but he did not clearly reject or accept the concession request made in turn 6. This action was effectively used by the ESB renter to delay making a commitment to the ASB landlord while also trying to make the ASB landlord reconsider their negotiation position. In turn 8, the ASB landlord had an opportunity to refute the challenge of the ESB renter and even challenge the ESB renter about his own position, but the ASB landlord again presented a request for a concession without asserting his own negotiation position or challenging the negotiation position of his partner. In turn 9, the ESB renter was also less assertive, making a counter offer that was in the mid-point of the range nominated by the ASB landlord in turn 8. The landlord again avoided asserting his position in turn 10, and the ESB renter also avoided asserting his position in turn 11, but importantly delayed having to commit to any requests for concession by shifting the negotiation out of a pivotal turn type back to a foregrounding turn type. The ASB landlord in turn 12 again did not assert his negotiation position or challenge his partner’s tactic of delaying any commitment to the requested concessions, but does allow for the continuation of the foregrounding speech turn type.

The two transcription extracts provided examples of the relationship between the use of assertiveness and challenge actions by the ASB participants. They also provided an example of how ASB participants preferred to negotiate using concession discussions and sought for their negotiation partner to respond with either a positive or negative response to the concession request. The ESB participant’s preference to delay presenting a clear position to the concession requests eventually led to the ESB renter being able to change the topic and move the discussion away from being pivotal and concession based to foregrounding and context building.

**Tracking Context and Common Ground**

**Control Groups**

In analysing Scenario One across the control groups, there is consistent evidence that the negotiation participants frequently shared context-building
information that discussed the objectives and environment of the negotiation and negotiators. Common ground was consistent throughout the ESB control group scenarios. All groups demonstrated a preference for exchanging high amounts of context-building information that helped to create and maintain common ground throughout the negotiations. There were infrequent occurrences in which common ground did break down where the resolution would be to discuss issues in detail until common ground was re-established. Examples of common ground were provided in the control group one analysis. Another such example is provided in the following extract from control group five.

L: 13 =This doesn’t talk about bills (1.0) I’m just wondering who’s paying the gas and electricity? (1.0) I’d assume from this cost that it’s probably included. (2.0)

R: 14 I definitely thought it was included ((laughs))

L: 15 ((Laughs)) Which means (1.0) I don’t know (1.0) so let’s see (.). You’ve got a potential room there (1.0) that if we could get two people in (.). I would go with: what (3.0) let’s say $300 a week (1.0) for the two?

R: 16 For both of us?

L: 17 Both.

R: 18 It’s probably (1.0) a little bit steep (2.0)

L: 19 But then you get to split the bond.

R: 20 That’s true (.). but then we’re paying a lot more rent (2.0) Well how much would I be paying for the rent (1.0) if I didn’t have a person in there?

L: 21 Well I would hope that you could agree to pay the $210.

R: 22 The $210?

L: 23 Yeah that would be best.
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R: 24 See because if we go up all the way to $300 (1.0) I wouldn't be saving that much in having the actual person move in (3.0)

L: 25 You're saving a bit.

R: 26 You're saving some (3.0) but I'd probably rather (1.0) bring it down if we could (2.0) Maybe we could work something out?

There are multiple topics of discussion including the introduction of utilities payments. Throughout the turns, both participants required the assistance of their partner to help them achieve and increase common ground. However, these discrepancies in common ground were minor and easily repaired. Control group four demonstrated a more critical discrepancy in common ground. An agreement had been reached between the two partners, but following the discussion below, both partners believed that there may have been a discrepancy in common ground.

R: 38 = Oh (0.5) I wasn't agreeing on that sorry

L: 39 Oh (.) so what did you say?

R: 40 So no commitment to stay between March and (.) I'm staying between March and November (.) no commitment to stay [

L: 41 [But you will pay the bond $1,500

R: 42 =Yes [

L: 43 [ Okay

R: 44 [ I'll pay the bond (2.0) so is that a deal?

L: 45 $170 per week (.)

R: 46 Yep

L: 47 And the bond will be $1,500 (.)

R: 48 Okay
L: 49  = Instead of $1,000 (1.0) but if you do stay for 12 months (_) the bond will be $1,000

R: 50  No (_) I don’t want to commit [  

L: 51  [ Okay

R: 52  [ Right now (2.0)

L: 53  Okay thank you.

The eventual outcome demonstrated that there were no discrepancies in (reaching) common ground, but it did take 20 turns of exchanges for the interlocutors to identify this. These examples are infrequent and the trend across the scenarios was for the participants to have a clear understanding of their partner’s objectives and concessional requests. This was mainly achieved through the participants providing context-building information, particularly in early turns.

**Experimental Groups**

The turn type data demonstrate that the experimental groups did not rely upon building context through foregrounding. Likewise, while information was freely exchanged back and forth, the negotiators relied upon requesting concessions, and asserting and reasserting their requests for concessions to establish and maintain common ground. Other actions such as proposing benefits and detriments, challenging their partner’s position, establishing credibility and assessing best alternatives were not relied upon. Collectively, the ASB experimental groups were inclined to make a request and assume that they and their partner will maintain common ground as the partner responded to the request. An example of this is the opening four turns in experimental group one.

(I want to rent a house, close to my brother’s university, I’ll move there next year)
(Good I have a house that I can rent to you, but what specifications do you want in the house?)

(I want a room and a study)

(My house has one bedroom but you can use it as a study also. The House is very close to the university)

The participants above immediately commenced the negotiation by making specific requests. They also continued the following turns in the same style by moving directly into exchanging terms for concessions. The discussion then moved into more context exchanging terms; however, they are directly linked to the discussion about the requests for concession.

(How much is it?)

(Look I have a number of offers but, I mean approximately the rent will be per week 230)

(230?)

(But on the basis that you want to rent it for a period, for how long is your period of study?)
(Period of study)

طول الفترة الدراسية والا سنه كاملة؟

(Period of study isn’t it a full year?)

طول الفترة الدراسية

(Full period of study)

زيدا

(Good!)

Throughout the analysis of the actions from the simulation data, there have been examples of how the ASB negotiators preferred this type of pivotal turn type, using concessional discussion as the basis for building context and common ground. While turns 9 to 12 from the above extract are moving outside of direct concessional discussion, turn 8 demonstrated an example of the pivotal turn types identifying a gap in common ground, whereby the landlord realised that she may have a different presupposition to her partner regarding the period of the renter’s study and tenancy.

Mixed Groups

The control groups have demonstrated a preference for explicit context-building exchanges using foregrounding turn types to develop common ground, whereas the experimental groups have demonstrated a preference for exchanging concession-related discussion and correcting any absence of common ground as it is identified. Previous data featured in this chapter have demonstrated that the mixed groups tend to use the influence of both approaches. The following extract provides an example of how the influence of both approaches manifested itself during the negotiation simulations.

R= Renter (ASB Male), L= Landlord (ESB Female)

R: 5 I am #### and I am looking for a room here (1.0) I am a new student here and I’m looking for a room (1.0) and (1.0)
Are you studying at the university?

Yes I am studying at RMIT and I’m looking for a (1.0) good room with a good price (1.0) nearby my university (1.0) do you have any offers?

I have the perfect thing for you (1.0) I’ve got a house (1.0) with one bedroom and a study (.) which you could also turn the study into another bedroom if you needed (.) which could also help you cut in costs (1.0) It’s very close to the university which would be handy for yourself (.) and I’ve recently renovated this house so it’s in beautiful condition (1.0) Which a lot of the places around here are quite run down (.) and especially to uni students you don’t get offerings for very nice places (1.0) ah::m (2.0) ah::m (1.0) would you be just moving in by yourself would you?

(Mixed Group Two, Scenario One)

The ASB renter from turn 5 was tentatively seeking an offer from the ESB landlord; however, in turn 6, the ESB landlord chose to ask her partner a question that is distinctively foregrounding in nature. In turn 7, the ASB renter responded to the foregrounding question again appropriately but proceeded to invite an offer from his partner for the second time. The ESB landlord does not make an offer or request any concessions from her partner, but during a long speech turn, provides comprehensive foregrounding information about her house and its benefits.

R= Renter (ASB Male), L= Landlord (ESB Female)

I think this one is okay, but how about the price? (1.0) I think it’s (.) is it expensive?

Well considering the prices of houses around my house (.) they’re all marked above market price at the moment (.) and because it’s so close to the ah::m start of uni (.) you’ll be lucky to even find a place [ 

[ No
L: 12  [But my house I think is at a very reasonable price (1.0) I'm hoping for: (2.0) something around the $200 mark per week (1.0)

R: 13  Okay [(Its ah::m )

L: 14  [Are you working at the moment?

R: 15  No I just arrived (.)

L: 16  Ah:: okay

(Mixed Group Two, Scenario One)

During turn 9, the ASB renter made his third attempt in a row to solicit an offer about the rental terms, but on the third attempt, he became more explicit about the type of information he wanted to receive. This action indicates that the ASB renter suspected that there is a breakdown in common ground between him and his ESB partner, as his partner had not provided the quality of information that he had been seeking. The ESB landlord in turn 10 again declined her partner’s efforts to make the discussion pivotal or concession based, and she again provided detailed foregrounding information about the house until the ASB renter unsuccessfully tried to interrupt her turn and prompts the ESB participant to make a request for a concession in turn 12. The ASB renter tried to respond to the request for a concession in turn 13 but is interrupted by the ESB participant who instigated a topic change and draws the discussion back into foregrounding in turn 14.

R= Renter (ASB Male), L= Landlord (ESB Female)

R: 17  =And I think this price is still quite expensive for me maybe (1.0) do you have maybe ah:: a room quite far away from the:: (1.0) the university (1.0) maybe it’s cheaper than this room? (2.0)

L: 18  Ah::m (3.0) I could look into that for you (. but then if you think about the travel costs (. of going to university (. of travelling to university then it’s probably cheaper for you to stay close to your uni:: [in the long run.

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R: 19 [Okay (1.0) Don’t you have any offer? for maybe for:: (.) for the rooms (.) I just want to know the prices (.) the

L: 20 = What price are you looking at paying?

R: 21 Maybe less than $200 (.) per week.

L: 22 Less than $200?

R: 23 Yeah.

L: 24Ah::m (.) It’s very hard to under $200 just because (.) I’ve just renovated this house (.) so it is quite (.) quite new and modern (.) I think you’d be very comfortable there (1.0) and considering that (.) most other places are going way above and beyond market price at the moment (1.0) it’s difficult for me to compete with that

R: 25Okay (1.0) actually I:::(.) as I searched a lot for enrolment (.)I couldn’t find maybe this the best price I found nearby my university (1.0) so maybe:: (1.0)

(Mixed Group Two, Scenario One)

From turn 17 to turn 25, the ASB participant had more success at using pivotal turn types; however, it is noticeable that although the ASB renter was focusing on concessional issues, he embedded more explicit information that could help build context and realise common ground. During turn 17, the ASB renter rejected the original request for concession made by the ESB landlord in turn 12 and invited another offer, but he also provided more information about what his objectives are. The ESB landlord again avoided making a financial concession request but did indicate implicitly that the previous offer was the best available. The ASB renter explicitly requested that his partner make a financial concession request but in turn 20, the ESB landlord again avoided making a financial request by redirecting the request at her partner to make an offer. The ASB renter made an implicit financial concession request, which was not for a particular figure, but less than the original price requested by the ESB landlord. In turn 22, the ESB landlord queried this request, possibly to delay making a response or also possibly as a way of confirming that both
parties had maintained common ground. The ESB landlord rejected the ASB renter’s request in turn 24 and provided substantial reasoning for this. In turn 25, the ASB renter demonstrated that he was willing to relent on his own request and accept the terms of the ESB landlord.

The building of context and realisation and repair of common ground occurred in different ways throughout the mixed groups’ simulations. The previous extract is indicative of how both orientations towards building context and establishing common ground interacted.

**Concluding Note**

The analysis of the simulations has revealed a series of trends across the three scenarios and the cultural groups of the participants.

**Table 38: Summary of Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASB negotiators are focused on:</th>
<th>ESB negotiators are focused on:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achieving and maintaining consensus</td>
<td>Directly resolving issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common objectives</td>
<td>Personal objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanging concessions through trial and error</td>
<td>Exchanging concessions through a detailed understanding issues and situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining momentum of discussion and turn taking</td>
<td>Maintaining organisation of discussion and turn taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous discussion of topics</td>
<td>Sequential discussion of topics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends highlighted above reflect clear differences in the approach to the processes of negotiation. Typically, the Australian negotiators would be willing to challenge the negotiation position of a negotiation partner and would try to deal with problems as they arise. This approach seemingly would cause discomfort to the Arab negotiators who sought less direct methods for dealing
with problems. There was a clear expectation from the Australian negotiators that each partner would assert their own priorities and re-evaluate the importance of each priority based on what they believed they could achieve. Exchanges of detailed context-building discussion were paramount to two Australian negotiators reaching balanced outcomes that addressed one another's key priorities. However, the Arab participants used the trial and error approach to help one another evaluate the most critical priorities for both parties. When both negotiators had the same disposition to common or personal objectives, there was always potential for balanced negotiation outcomes. However, when one partner was following their own personal objectives and the other partner pursuing a common approach, invariably the outcomes favoured the personal objectives negotiator.

Another trend revealed that the Arab participants were in favour of maintaining momentum in turn taking and were very willing to interrupt their negotiation partner's speech turn to strengthen their own negotiation position. Arab participants would also simultaneous deal with different issues and topics. Conversely, the Australian participants seldom interjected to further their own negotiation position, preferring to maintain a turn relevance place (see 'Turn Taking' section in this chapter) structure to the interaction. The Australian participants also maintained clearer topic boundaries, where they would clearly introduce and change the topic of discussion.

The discussion chapter will further discuss these (and other) observations and consider their relevance to the theoretic models outlined in the literature review chapter. However, the next chapter is an analysis of the questionnaire that captured attitudes to negotiation, and obtained some reflective data following the conclusion of each negotiation simulation.
CHAPTER FOUR: QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS

This chapter reports on the findings of the questionnaires issued to the simulation participants. Observations from the simulation analysis chapter and the questionnaire analysis chapter are re-examined in the discussion chapter.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to capture each participant’s attitudes towards negotiations in general and towards each of the simulations that they partook. Each questionnaire was broken into four sections, with Section A consisting of 30 items that assess the attitudes of participants prior to the negotiation. Sections B, C and D were all completed following each of the scenarios, with each section asking five questions about the participant’s attitudes to the previous negotiation scenario.

Questionnaire Part A

Part A of the questionnaire consisted of items that explored the following communication actions conducted during negotiations:

- Concession-related actions
- Information-sharing-related actions
- Challenge-related actions
- Alternative to agreement
- Benefit to self

Each item, in addition to exploring a communication action, was also underpinned by an existing cross-cultural communication theory or dimension. For example, Item 8, ‘Negotiation discussions should be straight to the point’ explores an ‘information-sharing-related action’ but has specifically been written to assess the respondents’ attitudes to low-context communication.

Concession-related Actions

The following nine items were presented to each participant to seek their attitudes towards actions that are related to the discussion of concessions.
Table 39: Concession-related Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ASB Average</th>
<th>ESB Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I believe that the outcome of every negotiation has one side which benefits more than the other side</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>During a negotiation it is important to make good progress on the issues being discussed otherwise the negotiation becomes a waste of time</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>It is important to push your negotiation partner to grant concessions quickly</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>I try to help my negotiation partner achieve some of his interests and priorities</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I am always prepared to concede some concessions if it will help my negotiation partner and I to reach an agreement</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>I do not like ending a negotiation unless an agreement has been reached</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Good negotiators are slow in granting their negotiation partners concessions</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>It is not good practice to make quick decisions during a negotiation</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Negotiation partners should concentrate on building a relationship before making concessions</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 1 assesses the attitudes of the participants towards how integrative the negotiation outcomes can be. Responses closer to 5 deem that there must be a winner and a loser to every negotiation. The ASB mean response suggests that they are mostly neutral but lean towards negotiations having potential to have win/win outcomes. Conversely, the ESB mean denotes that most ESB participants were neutral or believed that there has to be a winner and a loser.
Item 4 strongly indicated that ESB participants want to feel that negotiations are moving towards an outcome and not sitting in stalemate until one party begrudgingly grants a concession. The ASB participants are more neutral with this issue and are more likely to work through a stalemate. Item 12 assessed the attitudes of the participants towards ending a negotiation without achieving an outcome. Both the ASB and ESB groups demonstrated that they do not like ending a negotiation without an outcome. Item 16 considered attitudes towards negotiators who are reluctant to grant concessions to their partner. The data demonstrated that the ESB partners more readily considered stubborn negotiators as good negotiators, whereas the ASB negotiators were neutral to disagreeing with this view.

Item 5 considers attitudes to trying to make their partners concede concessions quickly. The data suggest that neither participant group believed that forcing partners to grant concessions quickly was productive. Item 23 contended that quick decision making is not good practice during negotiations. The ASB and ESB participants were neutral to this view.

Items 10 and 11 surveyed how willing the participants believed that they are to assisting their partners to achieve some of their priorities. The mean responses for each participant group from both questions were close, and indicated that both groups will try to assist their partners in achieving some of their priorities.

Item 24 looked at the role of getting to know a negotiation partner before granting concessions. Both of the ASB and ESB participant groups indicated that they agree with this statement.

**Information-Sharing-related Actions**

The following group of items consider the attitudes of the participants to actions used for sharing information.
Table 40: Information-sharing-related Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ASB Average</th>
<th>ESB Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Negotiations are best conducted to an agenda and dealing with one issue at a time</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Negotiation discussions should be straight to the point</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I always tell my negotiation partner what I want to achieve from the negotiation</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Good negotiators know how to negotiate several issues at once</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>A good negotiator clearly discusses his or her interests</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>A good negotiator tells his or her negotiation partner what their priorities and interests are</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>A good negotiator always tries to find out what the interests and priorities are of his or her negotiation partner</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>It is better to be tactful by conveying clues and insinuations to my negotiation partner as opposed to rejecting his or her offers and opinions</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>A negotiator should be aware that the non-verbal expressions of his or her negotiation partner say more than the verbal expressions</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>I believe that it is very important to have detailed written agreements for each party to understand their obligations</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from Item 3 demonstrate that the ESB participants are more concerned with ensuring that negotiations have a clear agenda and deal with one issue at a time in comparison to the ASB participants. However, the ASB participants did also mostly agree that agendas and linear dealing with issues is
important. In item 13, the ESB and ASB participants indicated a belief that a
good negotiator will be able to discuss multiple issues at once. Item 8 indicates
that the ESB negotiators will want the sharing of information to be more direct
and concise than the ASB negotiators.

Item 9 indicated that the ASB participants were neutral in the importance that
they placed on sharing their objectives with their partner, but the ESB
participants mostly believed that it is a better approach to discuss their
objectives with their partner. Conversely, the means for Item 14 stated that the
ASB participants regarded a good negotiator as somebody who clearly
discusses his or her interests, while the ESB participants only registered a
neutral response. Items 17 and 18 similarly deal with issues about the sharing
of priorities and seeking learn the priorities of a negotiation partner. In both
instances, the means for each group were close and in both items, each group
demonstrated that they support negotiation partners sharing their priories.

Items 25, 27 and 28 deal with attitudes to alternative ways in which
information can be exchanged. Both the ASB and ESB participants believed it
was better to be tactful when disagreeing with a partner’s negotiation position;
however, when comparing the ASB and ESB groups, more ASB participants
believed that non-verbal expressions are more powerful than verbal
expressions and more ESB participants believed that written agreements were
crucial to each party understanding their obligations.

Challenge-related Actions

The following five items were presented to each participant to seek their
attitudes towards actions that are related to challenging the negotiation position
of a negotiation partner, or asserting their own negotiation position.
Table 41: Challenge-related Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ASB Average</th>
<th>ESB Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>It is important to develop a friendly atmosphere during a negotiation</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>If I am not happy with my negotiation partner I prefer to tell them immediately</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The best negotiators can establish dominance over their negotiation partner during the initial stages of the negotiation</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>I believe people of high social status have an advantage when negotiating with people of a lower social status</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Low-level managers can negotiate with clients just as well as senior-level managers</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 6 discusses the nature of the negotiation environment. Both the ASB and ESB groups’ means specified that they believe it is important to develop a friendly atmosphere during a negotiation. The mean of the ESB group is nearly 5, indicating that the ESB group is strongly oriented towards achieving a friendly environment. Yet, in Item 7, the ESB group’s mean indicated that the majority of ESB participants also had a neutral attitude or agreed that it is better to immediately tell their negotiation partner when they are not happy with their negotiation position. However, the ASB mean for Item 7 indicated that the majority of ASB participants were either neutral or disagreed that it is better immediately tell their negotiation partner that they are not happy with their negotiation position. Also related to the environment of the negotiation is whether a good negotiator should be seeking to dominate the negotiation position of their partner from early in the negotiation. Both groups registered a mean below the neutral level indicating that neither group is oriented towards establishing dominance over their partner from the initial stages of the negotiation.
Items 21 and 22 observed attitudes towards the advantages of having a higher social status in a negotiation and whether somebody is disadvantaged by holding a lower social status in a negotiation. While the ASB group is neutral in regards to items 21 and 22, the ESB group clearly did not believe that a higher social status is an advantage in a negotiation and did not consider a lower social status as a disadvantage in a negotiation.

**Alternative to Agreement-Related Actions**

The following two items were presented to each participant to seek their attitudes towards actions that are related to the discussion of alternatives to reaching agreement.

**Table 42: Alternative to Agreement-related Actions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ASB Average</th>
<th>ESB Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>During a negotiation I frequently think about how strong my position in comparison to my negotiation partner’s position</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>It is good practice to focus on the current negotiation and not consider what options I have with other potential partners</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 2 considers how conscious participants believe that they are of their negotiation position in relation to their partner’s position. The response data denote that there was no significant difference between the ASB and ESB participants, with both groups indicating that they are relatively neutral. Item 26 considered the attitudes of participants towards monitoring their BATNA. Both the ASB and ESB participants had a neutral attitude towards monitoring their BATNA.
Benefit to Self-related Actions

The following four items were presented to each participant to seek their attitudes towards actions that are related to the discussion of personal benefits to the negotiator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ASB Average</th>
<th>ESB Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>It is important for my negotiation opponent to regard me as a good negotiator</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>It is important that my employer regards me a good negotiator</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>If my employer asks me to negotiate on his or her behalf they should expect me to perform as well or better than what they would perform</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>It is important that the company benefits from the negotiation skills of its staff</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questionnaire items 19, 20, 29 and 30 all assess how participants regard an action as beneficial to themselves. Responses closer to 1 indicate that the participant’s attitude is more towards the action being of a low benefit while responses closer to 5 indicate an attitude that the action is of greater benefit. Item 19 specifically addressed the participants’ concern for how their partner regards them. The data indicate that the ASB participants did not consider maintaining a good perception with their partner as beneficial as the ESB participants did.

Item 20 considers the participants’ concern for how their employers perceive their negotiation abilities. The employer represents a third party, not necessarily participating in the same negotiation, who holds a greater position of power in their relationship with the negotiation partner. Both the ASB and ESB groups considered that it is very important for their employers to regard them as a good negotiator.
Item 29 considers the participants’ perception of responsibility when they are tasked with negotiating on their employer’s behalf. Again, the employer represents a third party who holds a greater degree of power in their relationship with the participant. The questionnaire data indicated that the ESB participants deemed that it was more beneficial to perform well on behalf of a third party in comparison to the ASB participants.

Item 30 was similar to Item 29 in that it assessed the participants’ attitudes towards representing a third party in a negotiation. The main difference being that the third party was described as ‘company’ as opposed to ‘employer’. ‘Company’ was used in this item as it was intended to be understood as a more collective and dehumanised than ‘employer’, which is often understood to mean a specific person or group of managers. In the case of this item, both groups demonstrated that they gave more importance to negotiating well for the benefit of their company.

The questionnaire data demonstrated that the ESB negotiators consider that there are more actions that pertain to personal benefit. The ASB participants were more attune to self-benefit when it involved their employer and company’s perception of their efforts and abilities.

**Questionnaire Part B**

Part B of the questionnaire was completed immediately following Scenario One, the rental agreement and asked participants to rate their attitudes to the following questions according to a five-point Likert scale:

1. I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario One
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
2. I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcomes from negotiation Scenario One
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
3. I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario One
4. I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario One
5. If I was to repeat the negotiation I may consider doing the following different next time (provides written response).

The first item asked participants if they were satisfied with the outcome from the negotiation and why they formed this opinion. Eleven of the ASB participants expressed that they were satisfied with the outcome of Scenario One and an additional three were very satisfied with the outcome. Two ASB participants were undecided if they were satisfied with the outcome, one participant stated that they wanted more options from their partner, the other participant would have liked more information to be shared by their partner. The latter participant participated in a mixed group simulation while the former took part in an experimental group. All but two ESB participants were happy with the outcome from their negotiation, one mixed group participant was undecided, stating that they believed that they had an unfair advantage negotiating in English, and another mixed group participant was dissatisfied as they believed that the negotiation outcomes were unclear.

Item 2 asked the participants if they believed that their partner was satisfied with the outcome and to provide a reason for this opinion. Eleven of the ASB participants believed that their partners were pleased with the outcome, while three other ASB participants were very satisfied with the outcome. One of the ASB mixed group participants was undecided, stating that they believed that their partner lacked relevant experience to deal with the topic. The final ASB participant, also from a mixed group, did not believe that their partner would have been satisfied with the outcome because the ASB participant was hesitant and did not all them to reach a satisfactory solution. Thirteen ESB participants stated that they believed their partners were satisfied with the outcome; however, there were not any participants who strongly believed that their partners were happy with the outcomes. Two ESB participants were undecided, the one was a control group participant and the other an experimental group participant, both did not believe that their partner had achieved their objectives. Two ESB mixed group participants did not believe that their partners were pleased with the outcomes from the negotiations, with both participants believing that the outcome was too far in their favour for it to be satisfactory for their partners.
The third item asked participants if they were satisfied with the sharing of information during the simulation. Five ASB participants were very satisfied, ten participants were satisfied, and one ASB mixed group participant was undecided. One ESB participant was very satisfied, 13 were satisfied, and two were undecided, and two participants were not satisfied. One of the undecided participants was from a mixed group and one of the dissatisfied participants was from a mixed group.

The fourth item asked the participants if they felt comfortable in dealing with their partner. Six of the ASB participants stated that they were very comfortable with their partner and ten were comfortable. No ASB participant stated that he or she was undecided or uncomfortable with their negotiation partner. Six of the ESB participants stated that they were very comfortable, 11 participants were comfortable; however, one ESB control group participant was very uncomfortable.

**Questionnaire Part C**

Participants completed Part C of the questionnaire following Scenario Two, the contractual dispute. The participants rated their attitudes to the following questions according to a five-point Likert scale:

1. I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
2. I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcomes from negotiation Scenario Two
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
3. I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two
4. I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two
5. If I was to repeat the negotiation I may consider doing the following different next time (provides written response).
Table 44: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 1: I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The undecided mixed group participant was pleased to keep the contract in place but did not feel that they had not accomplished other priorities. Reasons provided by the dissatisfied participants included their partner not addressing their priorities and not reaching a proper agreement.

Table 45: English-speaking Background- Item 1: I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the ESB mixed group participants were satisfied; however, the participants who were not satisfied all stated that they did not have enough of their priorities addressed.
Table 46: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 2: I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only one ASB experimental group participant believed that their partner might be dissatisfied with the outcome. They stated that they believed that their partner wanted a compensation payment but the ASB participant refused to provide this payment. The ASB experimental groups’ participants who did not believe that their partners were satisfied similarly stated that their partners did not achieve all of their priorities.

Table 47: English-speaking Background - Item 2: I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the ESB mixed groups’ participants believed that their partners were dissatisfied with the outcome; however, there were two undecided participants
as they were not sure that their partners had achieved their objectives. Two of the ESB control group participants stated that they did not believe that their partners were happy with the outcomes, both citing that that resolutions to the dispute were not reached. Their partners indicated that they were satisfied with the negotiations although issues were not resolved.

Table 48: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 3: I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All but two of the ASB participants were satisfied with the level of information sharing. Only one of the two participants was dissatisfied with the other participant being undecided.

Table 49: English-speaking Background - Item 3: I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
None of the ESB participants were dissatisfied with the level of information sharing during their negotiation simulation.

**Table 50: Arabic-speaking Background - Item Four: I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five of the 16 ASB participants expressed that they were either undecided or uncomfortable with their negotiation partners.

**Table 51: English-speaking Background- Item Four: I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only three of the 18 ESB participants were uncomfortable with their negotiation partners.
Questionnaire Part D

Participants completed Part D of the questionnaire following Scenario Three, the community service project. The participants rated their attitudes to the following questions according to a five-point Likert scale:

1. I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
2. I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcomes from negotiation Scenario Two
   a. Please provide a reason for this selection
3. I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two
4. I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two
5. If I was to repeat the negotiation I may consider doing the following different next time (provides written response).

Table 52: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 1: I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the ASB participants were satisfied with the outcomes that they achieved during the simulations, with the vast majority of participants being very satisfied with the outcomes that they achieved.
Table 53: English-speaking Background- Item 1: I was satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the ESB participants were satisfied with the outcomes achieved with most participants being very satisfied.

Table 54: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 2: I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the ASB participants believed that their partners were satisfied or very satisfied with the negotiation outcomes.
Table 55: English-speaking Background - Item 2: I believe that my negotiation partner would have been satisfied with the outcome from negotiation Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All ESB participants believed that their partner was with satisfied or very satisfied with the outcome except for one ESB mixed group participant who was undecided. The undecided participant did not state a reason for being undecided.

Item 3: I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two

Table 56: Arabic-speaking Background - Item 3: I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All ASB participants were satisfied or very satisfied with the level of information shared during the negotiation simulations.
Table 57: English-speaking Background - Item 3: I was satisfied with the sharing of information during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only one ESB participant was undecided about whether they were pleased with the quality of information shared during the negotiation simulation. All other participants were satisfied with the sharing of information.

Table 58: Arabic-speaking Background - Item Four: I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASB</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All ASB participants expressed that they were comfortable or very comfortable with their negotiation partners.
Table 59: English-speaking Background - Item Four: I felt comfortable in dealing with my negotiation partner during Scenario Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ESB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One ESB participant was very dissatisfied with their partner; however, all other ESB participants expressed that they were comfortable or very comfortable with their negotiation partners.

Concluding Note

Part A of the questionnaire demonstrated that there are a number of similarities in the attitudes of the Arab and Australian participants towards negotiations. The two cultural groups demonstrated that they would pursue outcomes without forcing quick decisions from their partners or making quick decisions themselves.

They were all willing to support the priorities of their partners and placed importance on building relationships with the other party. The sharing of priorities was important, but there were discrepancies when it came to personal interest, with the Australian negotiators demonstrating that they were less enthusiastic about sharing person interests, and Arab participants were less willing to explicitly state their public and private goals. Also of interest was that Australian participants believed that most negotiations would lead to a distributive (win/lose) agreement, whereas the Arab participants generally believed that most negotiations have an integrative (win/win) outcome.

Both cultural groups considered that a good negotiator can deal with multiple issues at once, can create a friendly atmosphere, should be tactful when expressing opinions or rejecting a proposal from their partner and not try to
establish dominance over their partner. However, the Australian participants were more oriented towards explicit sharing of information, clear negotiation agendas and adherence to the structure of agendas in comparison to the Arab respondents. However, the Arab negotiators did hold a higher regard for the impact of status in a negotiation.

In general, the Arab and Australian participants believed it was good to compare their negotiation positions to their partner’s throughout the negotiation and indicated that they would consider their BATNA. When it came to how the participants are regarded by third parties (negotiation partner, employer, manager, company), the Australian participants demonstrated that they had a stronger orientation towards seeking recognition than the Arab negotiators.

Parts B, C and D of the questionnaire demonstrated that Scenario Two did not have any participants expressing that they were dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiation. Scenario Two was the least satisfactory with seven dissatisfied participants, yet only one of these was from a mixed group. Similarly, of the two Australians dissatisfied with the Scenario One outcome, only one participant was from a mixed group. This suggests that the outcomes reached during the mixed negotiations tended to bring consensus.

Similarly, for Item 2, none of the participants believed that their partner would have been dissatisfied in Scenario Two, but there were five participants in Scenario Two who believed that their partner would have been dissatisfied and three participants who believed the same in Scenario One. Four of the eight participants (believing that their partner was dissatisfied with the outcome) participated in mixed groups.

The only conclusion that could be drawn from Item 3 was that nearly all participants were satisfied across each of the scenarios with how information was shared. We did learn from item four that it was more likely for an Australian negotiator to feel uncomfortable with a partner than it was for an Arab negotiator. In each of the three simulations, there was at least one Australian who stated that they were not comfortable with their partner.
Interestingly, across the simulations, both cultures were just as likely, if not more likely to feel uncomfortable with a partner from their own cultural group.

The questionnaire observations will be further explored and re-examined with the simulation analysis in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

This chapter connects the empirical findings of the analysis of negotiation simulations chapter and the questionnaire analysis chapter and maps them with the theoretical framework described in the literature review chapter. The first task of this chapter is to reflect on the study’s major research questions in light of the empirical findings and in connection to its theoretical approach.

The key research question is ‘to what extent do cultural orientations influence intercultural negotiations between English-speaking-background Australians and Arabic-speaking nationals of the Arabian Gulf countries?’ Two sub-questions became the means for assessing the key research question:

1. To what extent do negotiators’ communicative patterns reflect their cultures’ typological tendencies à la Hall’s high-context/low-context communication continuum, monochronic/polychronic time system and Hofstede’s dimensions of culture indices?

2. To what extent does the behaviour of each negotiator change during the negotiations? Does this assist the process of realising common ground?

A number of empirical observations were identified in the previous two analysis chapters that have qualified the cultural orientations and provided some information on the extent of their influence on negotiations. These observations included preferences for maintaining consensus, exchange of concessions, organisation of topics and turn taking. While these indicate that the cultural orientations do influence negotiations, the preliminary data require further explanation to understand the extent that culture influences negotiation. In the following sections, the theories described in the literature review chapter will be used to interpret the findings in the analysis chapters and answer the research question and sub-questions.
Reflection of Cross-Cultural Communication Models

The following section aims to answer the first research sub-question through explaining the findings solely from the intra-cultural communication point of view and relating these explanations to Hall’s (1976) cultural frameworks and Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions. An intra-cultural viewpoint compares how different cultures communicate within their own context, whereas the intercultural viewpoint considers an interaction between two or more cultural groups (Scollon & Scollon 2001; Gudykunst 2003). Therefore, the most relevant data to this section is taken from the control groups (Australian–Australian) and the experimental groups (Arab–Arab) negotiation simulations and the questionnaire, comparing how the Australian and Arab cultural groups communicate within their own intra-cultural contexts.

High-Context/Low-Context Continuum

One of the most important cultural models that affect negotiations is the high-context and low-context continuum, as it specifically deals with how information is shared (Brett 2000:101; Bazerman et al. 2000:298; Brett, Adair et al. 1998:64). As described in the literature review chapter, high-context communication uses implicit information with the listener needing to derive meaning from context, whereas low-context communication explicitly requires the speaker to convey meaning in the language code (Hall 1976). Hall (1976) contended that cultures are comparable in their propensity to use high-context or low-context communication, with high-context cultures relying upon ‘programming’ of its members in order to effectively interpret meaning and low-context cultures emphasising clear and self-contained information during communication (Zaharna 1995; Samovar & Porter 2004).

In the models of negotiation discussed in Chapter One, the exchange of information is central to whether negotiations become integrative or distributive, and whether contradictory desires can be resolved. If the negotiation partners are to achieve integrative potential, it is necessary that they exchange information regarding their priorities and goals (Drake
2001:319; Lewthwaite 2000:30–31; Brett 2000:101). Similarly, in the joint activity approach to negotiation (see ‘Negotiation as a Joint Activity’ section in Chapter One) the exchange of information is crucial to the structure of the joint activity, the sharing of goals and maintenance of common ground (Clark 1996). A low-context approach to information sharing in negotiations is through asking explicit questions and providing explicit answers to these questions. It is intended that throughout this process, each side will develop an understanding of what the other party’s priorities and objectives are, and the negotiation partners can decide which issues to pursue and which issues will be pursued by their partner (Brett 2000:101; Brett, Adair et al. 1998:64). The high-context approach is to use ‘trial and error’ by frequently exchanging proposals. As proposals are exchanged, it is intimated that negotiators will deduce which issues are a priority for their partners (Brett 2000:101; Brett, Adair et al. 1998:64). In addition, where competing interests arise with issues, low-context cultures will be more likely to confront and directly express concern or displeasure, and high-context cultures will be more likely to try to avoid confrontation, conceal ill feelings and even involve a third party to broker the information exchanges (Brett 2000).

The assertiveness data indicate that the Australian culture is more willing to accept individuals to confront their partners; however, the Arab culture participants were reluctant to confront negotiation partners and preferred to maintain consensus. Similarly, the Australian participants demonstrate a low-context orientation in which they will readily challenge the negotiation positions of their partners, and the Arab negotiators will avoid challenging the negotiation positions of their partners is consistent with high-context orientation. Yet, it is also clear from the data that both cultures are willing to assert their negotiation positions and will refute partners’ challenges when placed under pressure by their negotiation partners.

Of the actions relevant to high-context/low-context communication, there was very little difference in how frequently the Australian and Arab participants would share information with their negotiation partners. Both cultural groups were consistent in seeking information and providing contextually apparent
information when negotiating within their own cultures. However, there was one point of difference that is explainable by the high-context/low-context framework. The does not seek information/clarification sub-feature indicates that the Australian participants appeared to have a better understanding of issues articulated by other Australian students but Arab participants needed to seek clarification from other Arab participants. This is likely to have occurred through the explicit nature of the communication shared between the Australians, whereas the Arab participants would need to request additional information as their partner’s communication has been too implicit. As such, the Australian participants could afford to move the discussion forward to other issues, whereas the Arab negotiators needed to seek clarification.

The concessional actions revealed that the Arab participants were oriented towards high-context communication. One of the main indicators was that the negotiators relied upon making frequent requests for concession, rejecting their partners’ requests and making counter offers as negotiation tactics. This trial and error process is considered the high-context approach to collaborative information sharing in negotiations (Brett 2000; Brett, Adair et al. 1998). The Australian negotiators did not demonstrate use of trial and error, making fewer concessional actions in comparison to the Arab negotiator groups. When linking the theory and the data to this observation and the frequency of information sharing, the Australian negotiators’ orientation towards making concessional actions is more consistent with low-context negotiation. They exhibited a direct question and response approach to understanding one another’s priorities, which is consistent with low-context communication (Brett 2000; Brett, Adair et al. 1998). The low-context approach of direct questions and responses enabled the Australian negotiator groups to request concessions with an understanding of their partners’ priorities and therefore what their partner is likely to agree to. Since the high-context approach relies upon the exchange of the concessions as opposed to questions and answers, the participants more frequently need to execute concession actions to understand their partners’ priorities.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

The benefit/detriment actions and credibility actions demonstrated that the
Australian negotiators were more explicit than the Arab participants in
expressing benefits and detriments and dealing with trust and credibility
building issues. Arab participants seldom used these actions, which indicate
that the agreement of benefits and building of trust was implicit during the
negotiations. These actions again support the validation of the high-
context/low-context theory when applied to the Australian and Arab cultures.

As demonstrated in the simulation analysis, the primary roles pursued by the
Arab negotiators sought to align their objectives with their partners’ objectives
and to build and maintain consensus. The Australian participants demonstrated
a trend of acting according to private goals more so than public goals but did
not clearly favour seeking an alignment of objectives with their partner. The
most relevant explanation for this emanates from Hofstede’s (1980, 2001,
2003, 2010) cultural dimension of ‘collectivism versus individualism’, as there
is a clear concern from the Arab negotiators for the collective benefit, whereas
the Australian negotiators are more concerned about individual benefit.
However, later in this chapter, a relationship between high-context and
collectivist cultures and low-context and individualist cultures will be made
based on the theoretical insights and observations made by Hall (1976) and
Hofstede (2010).

The data from several of the turn-taking actions highlighted in the simulation
analysis chapter are also explainable through application of the high-
context/low-context theory. Significantly, the turn-type actions demonstrated
that the Australian negotiation participants frequently used foregrounding and
follow-up turn types to build context and affirm common ground. These
foregrounding and follow-up turn types explicitly shared and reaffirmed
information, which is very typical of low-context communication. Consistent
with a high-context communication orientation, the Arab negotiation
participants focused predominantly on pivotal turn types that mainly built
context through trial and error approached to discussing concessions. The Arab
negotiators used the pivotal turn types to implicitly share information that the
Australian negotiators explicitly shared during the foregrounding and follow-
up turn types. The simulations analysis also show that the Australian negotiators were willing to use ‘repair’ turn-taking actions that directly express dissatisfaction with their partner’s negotiation position and request that their partner revises their position, while the Arab negotiation participants were far less willing to be direct and use ‘repair’ turn-taking actions. To this end, Hall (1976) contended that low-context cultures are more willing to explicitly raise and deal with points of contention, whereas high-context cultures are driven to maintain consensus through avoiding explicit conflict. The theory indicates that this is the expected behaviour of the Arab and Australian cultural groups during negotiation (Brett & Okumura 1998; Brett 2000).

Other turn-taking actions such as ‘go-ahead response’ and ‘blocking response’ did not reveal specific cultural orientations when negotiations took place with both participants from the same culture. However, there were observable high-context/low-context cultural orientations during the intercultural negotiations. These will be discussed later in the chapter.

Of the questionnaire data, there were six questions that were directly related to the theory contained in Hall’s (1976) high-context/low-context continuum. Five of the questions (question numbers 8, 14, 25, 27 and 28) were discussed in the ‘information sharing actions’ section of the questionnaire analysis chapter, with the sixth question (question number 7) being analysed in the ‘challenging actions’ section of the same chapter. Three of the five information-sharing-related questions demonstrated that the Australian respondents preferred ‘lower-context’ communication than the Arab respondents; however, the separation of attitudes, while consistent, was not as significant as the simulation data. For example, in question 8, which asked the respondents’ attitudes to ‘Negotiation discussions should be straight to the point’, demonstrated that the Australian respondents agreed strongly (low-context). However, the Arab respondents on average also agreed (low-context) with the statement. Conversely, in question 27, which stated ‘A negotiator should be aware that the non-verbal expressions of his or her negotiation partner say more than the verbal expressions’, the average Arab response was to agree strongly (high-context), while on average the Australian participants agreed
(high-context). Further, the Arab and Australian respondents all averaged the ‘agree’ response (high-context) to question 25 (‘it is better to be tactful by conveying clues and insinuations to my negotiation partner as opposed to rejecting his or her offers and opinions’). Finally, the response to question 14 revealed that the Arab respondents were more concerned about clearly discussing their interests with their partner than were the Australian respondents. The results for question 14 were particularly interesting as the question was originally intended to seek attitudes to low-context communication. However, following the analysis of the simulations and the differences in sharing priorities, the responses to this question may well greater reflect orientations to collectivism, whereby Arab negotiators had a greater concern for the priorities of their negotiation partners than the Australian negotiators.

The ‘challenging actions’ questionnaire item that is relevant to the high-context/low-context continuum is question 7 ‘If I am not happy with my negotiation partner I prefer to tell them immediately’. This question revealed a more straightforward response with the Australian respondents on average agreeing (low-context) and the Arab respondents generally disagreeing (high-context) with the statement.

While the questionnaire results are not necessarily conclusive, in general they do support Hall’s (1976) high-context/low-context theory. Yet, the results also raise some questions about the attitudes and self-perceptions of the participants. In particular, the question can be asked as to whether the participants are conscious of their orientations towards information sharing and achieving consensus. Similarly, another question that can be raised relates to whether each culture views the orientations of the other culture positively, negatively or somewhere in between. The data suggest that the Arab participants do not view low-context communication negatively; likewise, the Australian participants do not view high-context communication negatively.

In summary, this study demonstrates that Australians communicate using methods that are considered by Hall’s (1976) model to be low-context and
Arabs communicate using methods that are high-context. Arab negotiators exhibit high-context communication tendencies through using tactics that emphasise the building and maintaining of consensus, and making proposals and counter offers that are intended to convey information about priorities and objectives, implicit exchange of benefits, detriments and credibility issues. Australian negotiators, on the other hand, display low-context communication through confronting issues of disagreement, exchanging explicit questions and answers to exchange priorities and objectives, explicit exchange of benefits, detriments and credibility issues. However, the study also raised doubts about the awareness of negotiators that they follow certain communicative processes during negotiation that are influenced by their cultural orientations towards high-context/low-context communication.

Monochronic and Polychronic Orientations

Hall (1976) also developed a theory that considers the information-making processes of cultures according to concepts of time and space. As described in the literature review chapter, Hall (1976) contended that time and space concepts tend to follow linear or non-linear logic. The linear logic approach compartmentalises activities and relationships based on timing and schedules and was labelled by Hall (1976) as ‘monochronicity’. Polychronicity represented a non-linear logic, which perceives time as cyclical and event-driven, prioritising relationships and focusing on multiple tasks at the one time (Hall 1976; Kaufman-Scarborough 2003; Nonis, Teng & Ford 2005; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998).

Monochronic negotiators prefer to compartmentalise discussions according to topics, priorities and objectives. Typically, a monochronic negotiator will want well-organised negotiations in which interlocutors sequentially discuss issues and speak in turn (Bazerman et al. 2000). Polychronic negotiators prefer to simultaneously discuss issues and interrupt their negotiation partner to discuss issues of importance. Another aspect of polychronicity is that discussion of multiple issues and priorities will demonstrate a greater pursuit of aligning objectives in comparison to monochronicity, which creates less of a connection between different issues and priorities (Brett, Adair et al. 1998).
The most relevant simulation data to the monochronicity/polychronicity model are the role features and the turn-taking features. While some of the actions such as ‘information sharing—discussed multiple issues’ may appear to be relevant to monochronicity/polychronicity, they do not actually monitor organisational orientations. For example, it is possible for a negotiator to discuss two issues about a single priority in a turn, while another negotiator may discuss one issue per turn, but each turn in a sequence may discuss a different issue. The most important actions to consider belong to the turn-taking and roles feature groups.

Across the turn-taking features, the turn-type feature demonstrates that the Australian negotiation participants had a clear preference for a well-structured negotiation, with a comparable spread between foregrounding, pivotal and follow-up turn types. The control groups (Australian participants only) averaged over one in five turns using ‘insert-expansions’, which indicates that they frequently reorganised sequences to compartmentalise issues. Similarly, the control groups used ‘topic-proffering’ actions in 20% to 30% of turns, which signifies that the Australian participants did try to have clear sequence boundaries around specific topics of discussion. The experimental groups (Arab only) was very different in their orientations to turn taking. They primarily communicated using pivotal turn types and seldom used ‘insert-expansions’ or ‘topic-proffering’ turn types, which demonstrates that there was very little, if any, compartmentalisation of the discussion of issues and objectives.

The interrupts partner sub-feature also demonstrated that the Arab participants demonstrated a greater orientation to polychronicity than the Australian participants did. Arab experimental groups’ participants demonstrated that they would interrupt their partners during 10% to 20% of turns in order to try to further their negotiation position. This compares to interruptions during only 2% to 4% of turns in Australian control group negotiations, signifying that the Australian participants preferred monochronic organisation to speech sequences.
The roles feature demonstrated that the Arab experimental participants were oriented to seek alignment of objectives, which supports Brett, Adair et al.’s (1998) position that polychronic negotiators exhibit a greater pursuit of aligning objectives in comparison to monochronic negotiators.

The questionnaire asked six questions that were directly linked to the monochronicity/polychronicity framework. Three questions were concessional actions, two questions were information-sharing actions and one question was a challenging action. The concessional actions displayed that the Arab and Australian negotiators shared the same attitudes and dispositions to monochronicity and polychronicity. Question four assessed attitudes to monochronicity by asking ‘During a negotiation it is important to make good progress on the issues being discussed otherwise the negotiation becomes a waste of time’. Both cultural groups in general agreed with this statement. Question 23 asked ‘It is not good practice to make quick decisions during a negotiation’ with both cultural groups averaging a neutral response. Further, question 24 compared attitudes towards polychronicity by asking ‘Negotiation partners should concentrate on building a relationship before making concessions’, with both cultural groups again averaging the same response of ‘agree’.

The two information-sharing questions that were related to monochronicity and polychronicity enquired ‘Negotiations are best conducted to an agenda and dealing with one issue at a time’ (question three) and ‘Good negotiators know how to negotiate several issues at once’ (question 13). Question three assessed attitudes to compartmentalising discussion and found that the Arab respondents ‘agreed’ with the statement, while the Australian respondents ‘agreed strongly’. The respondents from both cultural groups in general agreed with question 13.

Finally, question six was a challenging action that considered the importance of relationships by stating ‘It is important to develop a friendly atmosphere during a negotiation’. Both cultural groups agreed in general with the statement.
While all six questions were inconclusive about orientations to monochronicity and polychronicity, when linked with the findings from the simulations, the data do tell us that being from a monochronic culture or a polychronic culture does not necessarily affect attitudes to negotiation tactics. Yet, the actions conducted during the simulations provide evidence that the Australian negotiators preferred to compartmentalise discussions and focus on their own priorities, which is consistent with monochronicity. Likewise, the actions demonstrated that the Arab negotiators were polychronic in their simultaneous discussion of topics and their pursuit of aligned objectives with their negotiation partners.

**Hofstede’s Dimensions of Culture**

**Power Distance**
The first of Hofstede’s (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) dimensions to be considered is power distance. Power distance examines the extent that status and elitism impact equality in a culture. Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) contended that societies differ on the role of status and authority, with high power distance cultures emphasising the position of people in society, which ensures that people of higher status remain at arm’s length from people of lower status. Conversely, a low power distance culture is egalitarian and allows for more acceptance and equal footing interaction between people of different degrees of status (Hofstede 2001, 2010).

Aside from issues of decision-making power and status of participants (Hofstede 2010), power distance manifests itself in negotiations through differences in how negotiators deal with conflict, and how power is regarded such as through the use of a BATNA (Brett 2000; Arunachalem et al. 2001). It is considered that in low power distance cultures, both negotiation partners will be willing to explicitly raise concerns or assert their position, whereas in a high power distance culture, negotiators will be more reluctant to directly deal with conflict issues. The use of BATNA enables the negotiator with the stronger BATNA to leverage their partner by threatening to walk away from the current negotiation (Brett 2000; Arunachalem et al. 2001). Actions and features
observed during the negotiation simulations study that assist in analysing orientations to power distance include ‘assertiveness’, ‘challenge’ and ‘alternatives’.

When the Australian and Arab participants negotiated with partners from the same culture, there were no noticeable differences in the trend of assertiveness actions. The trends in the challenging actions data do not demonstrate that either culture is less likely to challenge a partner’s negotiation position, but they do demonstrate that in general, Arab negotiators prefer to avoid challenging a partner’s negotiation position, whereas an Australian negotiator is much more likely to lay a challenge to their partner. An implication of these indicators is that the Australian participants reflected low power distance orientations to dealing with conflict (they will directly and frequently engage with their partner), whereas the Arab participants reflected high power distance orientations to the point where they preferred to maintain a consensus with their partners.

While the assertiveness actions and challenging actions presented strong trends, the alternative actions did not. Neither cultural group frequently used a BATNA as a negotiation tactic; however, in Scenario One and Two, it was more frequent for an Australian participant to use a BATNA than an Arab participant. This supports the theory that the Arab negotiators exhibited a high power distance orientation, and that the Australian participants were less concerned with power, but the data to support this contention were not as strong as that for the assertiveness and challenging actions.

Four questionnaire items assessed attitudes towards power and status. Two of the items were categorised as ‘challenging actions’ with the other two categorised as ‘alternative to agreement actions’. The first of the challenging actions questions (question 21) stated ‘I believe people of high social status have an advantage when negotiating with people of a lower social status’ with the Australian respondents in general disagreeing with the statement, but the Arab respondents were neutral. Question 22 stated ‘low-level managers can negotiate with clients just as well as senior-level managers’ to which the
Australian respondents agreed and the general Arab response was neutral. Significantly, both of these responses support the power distance orientation of the Australian participants observed in the simulations. However, these questionnaire items asked questions about attitudes to status that were not necessarily observable in the negotiation simulations. The Australians revealed that they do not regard status or position as bearing an advantage or disadvantage during negotiation, which demonstrates an orientation to low power distance. Concerning the Arab respondents, the data demonstrate that the Arab participants did have a higher power distance orientation than the Australians, but it did not indicate that the Arab respondents’ attitudes towards status and power was clearly high or low.

The two power distance items categorised as ‘alternative to agreement’ actions focused on attitudes towards monitoring the strength of a partner’s negotiation position. Question two stated ‘during a negotiation I frequently think about how strong my position is in comparison to my negotiation partner’s position’, with both cultural groups averaging the response of ‘agree’. Conversely, question 26 stated ‘it is good practice to focus on the current negotiation and not consider what options I have with other potential partners, and saw both cultural groups provide a neutral response. These items also support the observations from the simulations, in that the negotiators were concerned about the strength of their own negotiation position, but not necessarily threatening or pursuing any potential ‘walk away’ tactics.

The data from the simulations demonstrate that Australian negotiators have a lower power distance orientation than Arab negotiators. However, the data could not demonstrate the extent of the Arab high power distance orientation, as there were few opportunities to monitor the orientation. Apart from monitoring consensus and the use of a BATNA, not many power distance situations (e.g. having to negotiate with or on the behalf of an employer) could be created. This supports the observations from the simulations that the Australian participants are more focused on pursuing their own objectives and private goals.
Individualism and Collectivism

The collectivism/individualism dimension considers the relationship and priorities of the individual person within the society where they live. Hofstede’s (2001, 2010) theory contended that cultures differ in orientation towards either the individuals considering that their interests should be aligned with the common interests of their society (collectivist) or that individuals consider that the collective expects them to pursue their own individual interests (individualist). Members of a collectivist culture face social pressure to act in accordance with the common wellbeing of the society, while members of an individualist culture will pursue their own rights ahead of following social pressure.

Orientations to individualism and collectivism are demonstrated in negotiations by monitoring priorities and objectives. An individualist negotiator will be more concerned about achieving his or her own goals and priorities, while the collectivist will tend to consider that there is a degree of integration between both parties’ objectives and will seek an alignment. This theory does not suggest that a collectivist culture will always have balanced, integrative negotiations or an individualist will always have an unbalanced, distributive negotiation. It suggests that in a collectivist culture, it is presupposed that both negotiators will communicate in a way that explicitly or implicitly allows both partners to prioritise their objectives together. An individualist culture will presuppose that each partner will assert his or her priorities and eventually reach an agreement as each partner reprioritises his or her objectives. However, when a collectivist negotiator enters into a negotiation with a partner from outside their collective, it is expected that they will have less success in aligning objectives and a distributive negotiation is most likely to occur as his or her partner is less concern about working with them to prioritise objectives (Brett & Okumura 1998).

Specific to the monitoring of roles and objectives is the ‘roles’ data from the simulations. These simulations demonstrated that there were specific trends that relate to individualism and collectivism. The Arab experimental groups’ participants were almost exclusively seeking to align their objectives with their
partners’ objectives; however, the Australian control groups’ participants demonstrated a far greater tendency not to seek an alignment of objectives with their partners. The Australian participants also tended to act according to private goals, whereas the Arab preference was to act mostly according to publicly known goals. Further, the Arab experimental groups’ participants would more frequently share their priorities with their partners than would the Australian control groups’ participants. The data are consistent with the theory that suggests the Australian negotiators will be oriented to individualism and the Arab negotiators to collectivism.

There were four questionnaire items that relate to the collectivism and individualism orientations. Each of these items was categorised as ‘benefit and detriment’. In the case of the questionnaire items, ‘benefit and detriment’ actions seek the respondents’ attitudes and perceptions of what may support or oppose their negotiation situation. Questionnaire item number 19 stated ‘it is important for my negotiation partner to regard me as a good negotiator’. The Australian respondents agreed strongly with the statement, while the Arab respondents in general agreed. The next question (Item 20) ‘it is important that my employer regards me as a good negotiator’ received the same response of ‘agree strongly’ from both cultural groups. Question 29 stated ‘if my employer asks me to negotiate on his or her behalf they should expect me to perform as well or better than what they would perform’, the Arab respondents agreed; however, the Australian respondents agreed strongly. Similarly, question 30 stated ‘it is important that the company benefits from the negotiation skills of its staff’ with the Arab respondents again agreeing and the Australian respondents agreeing strongly.

The questionnaire data suggest that attitudes of the Australian and Arab negotiators did not differ greatly in respect to how other people regard them as negotiators, or what the benefits are of being regarded highly by colleagues and negotiation partners. What can be deduced from the questionnaire data is that the Australian respondents have a higher personal interest in achieving recognition from negotiation partners, colleagues and managers for their negotiation abilities and results than the Arab negotiators. When considering
the simulation data that demonstrated the Arab negotiators were oriented to collectivism, the questionnaire data from the Arab respondents suggest that collectivist negotiators are less concerned about their achieving personal benefits and recognition from negotiations, but still regard achieving good outcomes from a negotiation as a high priority. What does differ is the approach of the collectivist Arab negotiator in trying to ensure that both parties achieve good outcomes, whereas the individualist Australian negotiator’s tactics will reflect more concern for achieving his or her own objectives.

**Tolerance to Uncertainty**

Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2003, 2010) contended that cultures have different dispositions towards how they deal with ambiguity and uncertainty about the future. Some cultures will with varying degrees, accept uncertainty, while other cultures will embed traditions and practices that are intended to limit uncertainty (Hofstede 2001, 2010). The less a culture has created processes to protect its members against ambiguity and unknown events in the future, the more tolerant to uncertainty it is considered to be.

Regarding the effect of uncertainty avoidance in negotiations, Hofstede (2001) described cultures with a low tolerance to ambiguity as requiring familiar structure and ritual in negotiations and likely to distrust opposing negotiators who do not follow the familiar structure and ritual. Closely related to uncertainty avoidance is the concept of being risk-averse or risk-tolerant. A risk-averse negotiator will be concerned with avoiding ambiguity by ensuring that outcomes are reached during the negotiation, even if it requires him or her to make additional concessions. The risk-tolerant negotiator is less concerned by ambiguity and is less willing to make concessions, as they are more accepting that the negotiation may not have an outcome (Bazerman & Neal 1992; Metcalf et al. 2008).

The most conclusive set of actions monitored during this study that are pertinent for assessing tolerance to uncertainty are the turn-type actions, the sharing of priorities and whether a negotiator acts according to public or private goals. These features monitor the intention of the turn type, whether the
interlocutors are aiming to discuss foregrounding information, pivotal information, follow-up information, delay a response or change a topic of discussion. According to Hofstede (2001, 2010), Bazerman and Neal (1992) and Metcalfe et al (2008), cultures that have a low tolerance to uncertainty will focus on pivotal turn types to reach outcomes and avoid ambiguity, which may include not understanding the objectives of their partner and whether their partner is willing to concede concessions that affect their own objectives. They will more willingly share their priorities and try to discuss public goals, as these are less ambiguous than private goals. Conversely, a negotiator tolerant to uncertainty will not be concerned with using a variety of turn-type actions, be less concerned about explicitly sharing their priorities and be more willing to use private goals.

The turn-type actions demonstrate that there is a clear difference in how Arabs and Australians structure their negotiations. Arab negotiators primarily use pivotal turn-type actions, while the Australian negotiators use a variety of all types of turns. The Arab negotiators also share their priorities more frequently than do the Australian negotiators, but the Australian negotiators have a higher frequency of pursuing private goals and a low frequency of pursuing public goals in comparison to the Arab negotiators. With these findings in mind, the evidence indicates that the Arab culture is more oriented towards uncertainty avoidance, whereas the Australian culture is more tolerant of uncertainty.

Two of the questionnaire items related to concessional actions were also intended to investigate attitudes towards uncertainty. Item 11 stated ‘I am always prepared to concede some concessions if it will help my negotiation partner and I to reach an agreement’, while Item 12 stated ‘I do not like ending a negotiation unless an agreement has been reached’. The intention of both items was to assess whether either of the cultural groups really had a high tolerance to uncertainty, manifested by an attitude of little concern for achieving an outcome from a negotiation. In the case of both items, the Arab and Australian respondents averaged the response of ‘agree’. This indicates that despite the differences in orientations demonstrated during the simulations, both cultural groups make achieving an agreement a major priority in a
negotiation and neither cultural group is predisposed to ‘walking away’ from a negotiation in the case that they are not pleased with the progress of the negotiation.

It is an important finding that having a tolerance to uncertainty does not necessarily correlate to less focus on achieving outcomes in a negotiation. When we consider the simulations that did not achieve an agreement, there were also differing orientations towards the conclusion of these negotiations. In the case of the Australian negotiators, a ‘no agreement’ simulation tended to be triggered by the negotiators exceeding the time limit. In each case, the negotiators were still working towards an agreement; however, each party was dissatisfied with terms offered by their partners and they were trying to pursue their own personal objectives. In the case of the Arab negotiators, they would conclude a negotiation without an agreement by deferring the negotiation to a third party such as a lawyer or an insurance company. According to the discussion, the negotiation was to be continued via third party mediators. These findings strongly support the tolerance to uncertainty findings, as the Australian negotiators were willing to have the whole negotiation break down unless they achieved some key personal priorities (tolerant to uncertainty); however, when faced with a stalemate, the Arab negotiators sought to continue the negotiation in a less direct manner, which suggested a low tolerance to uncertainty.

When considering the individualist and collectivist findings with the tolerance to uncertainty findings, a possible description for the Australian negotiators is that they were highly concerned with achieving personal outcomes from the negotiations, but were less willing to proceed productively through a negotiation in which they perceived that their own priorities were not being attended to. However, the Arab negotiators were more willing to seek outcomes that supported priorities of their partner as well as themselves, and were more likely to defer a negotiation as opposed to ending it without conclusion.
Masculinity

The fourth cultural dimension surveyed by Hofstede was the ‘masculinity and femininity’ index. This dimension considered the orientation of cultures as being either towards assertiveness and recognition of achievement (masculine) or nurturance and environmental security (feminine) (Hofstede 2001, 2010).

Negotiators from high-masculinity-oriented cultures are considered to value ego-boosting behaviour and showing force during disputes, whereas low-masculinity-oriented cultures are considered to value compromise and seek consensus during negotiations (Hofstede 2001:436). High-masculinity cultures in comparison to low-masculinity cultures have higher expectations about the types of outcomes to be achieved from negotiation and maintain higher reservation levels. Conversely, low-masculinity cultures seek a friendly atmosphere for the negotiation compared with high-masculinity cultures (Kersten et al. 2002).

The assertiveness, concessional and challenge actions monitored during the study demonstrate orientations related to masculinity. The expectations are that a high-masculinity-oriented culture would concede very few concessions, frequently assert their negotiation position and challenge the negotiation position of their partner. A low-masculinity culture would be expected to frequently concede concessions, infrequently assert their negotiation position and prefer to avoid challenging the negotiation position of their partner.

The assertiveness actions demonstrated that both the Arab and Australian negotiators were willing to assert their negotiation position far more frequently than they would avoid asserting their negotiation position. During the transactional negotiations, both cultures demonstrated that they were willing to challenge their partners’ negotiation positions; however, during Scenario Two, the Arab negotiators were more willing to avoid challenging their partners, indicating a preference towards consensus. When opportunities to challenge partners’ negotiation positions were presented during the non-transactional negotiation (Scenario Three), both cultures preferred to avoid making challenges. The concessional actions displayed the Arab negotiators as being
clearly more frequent in making requests for concessions in comparison to the Australians; however, their frequency for accepting requests for concession was similar to the Australians. Both the Arab and Australian participants would more frequently reject requests for concessions than they would grant a concession, but the high frequency of concession requests made by the Arab participants provided for a much higher frequency of rejecting requests for concession than the Australian participants.

The Australian participants’ actions during the simulations were consistent with a masculinity-oriented culture; however, it is not conclusive whether the Arab participants were oriented towards masculinity or femininity. Likewise, it is not conclusive whether the Australian culture is high masculinity. What can be deduced from these findings is that Australian negotiators are oriented towards masculinity while Arab negotiators display a balanced tendency between masculinity and femininity orientations.

Eight of the questionnaire items were linked to the dimension of masculinity and femininity. Four of these items were considered to relate to concessional actions. Of these, item five, ‘it is important to push your negotiation partner to grant concessions quickly’, saw both cultural groups in general disagree and Item 10, ‘I try to help my negotiation partner achieve some of his interests and priorities’, registered the Australian and Arab respondents as agreeing. These responses suggest that the attitudes of neither culture is to ‘win at all costs’ or to completely assert themselves over their negotiation partners. Yet, items one and 16 did demonstrate a difference in attitudes towards assertiveness in using concession-related actions. Item 1 essentially considered the respondents’ dispositions to the integrative and distributive models of negotiation (see ‘Mental Models of Negotiation’ section in Chapter One), stating ‘I believe that the outcome of every negotiation has one side which benefits more than the other side’. The Arab participants disagreed; however, the Australian participants agreed with the statement. This indicates that the Australian negotiator is more likely to expect distributive (win/lose) negotiations in which each party must be willing to competitively bargain, while the Arab negotiators’ attitudes suggested that they are expecting negotiations to be more
consensus focused, with both parties actively seeking integrative (win/win) outcomes. Further to this difference, Item 16 demonstrated that Australians look upon the slow granting of concessions more favourably than do Arab negotiators. The item asked ‘good negotiators are slow in granting their negotiation partners concessions’ with the Australian participants in general agreeing while the Arab respondents registered a neutral response.

Of the information-sharing actions, three items concerned the Masculinity Index. Item 17 stated ‘a good negotiator tells his or her negotiation partner what their priorities and objectives are’, and Item 18 consisted of ‘a good negotiator always tries to find out what the interests and priorities are of his or her negotiation partner’. As stated in the questionnaire analysis chapter, the average response for both cultures to these two items was ‘agree’. This result is relevant to Hofstede’s Masculinity Index because it dispels any notion of orientation to competitiveness or collaboration as impacting on a negotiator’s attitude towards sharing information with his or her partner. While it is true that a more competitive negotiator is less likely to openly share information with his or her partner (Drake 2001; Lewthwaite 2000; Brett 2000), the questionnaire suggests that distributive negotiators still perceive that they do share information about their priorities and seek information from their partners; it is essentially the quality and quantity of information sharing that differs.

Furthermore, Item 9 sought to capture attitudes to how a negotiator asserts his or her personal objectives by asking ‘I always tell my negotiation partner what I want to achieve from the negotiation’. The Australian respondents agreed with this statement while the Arab respondents in general held a neutral disposition. This demonstrated that the attitude of the Australian negotiators supported more assertion of objectives (high masculinity) than the attitude of the Arab negotiators, yet the Arab negotiators were not exactly oriented to femininity. In the case of the negotiation simulations, we did witness that the Australian negotiators used a high frequency of foregrounding and follow-up turn types, but predominantly pursued private goals, whereas the Arab negotiators were using pivotal turn types and sharing public goals. Both
approaches shared information about objectives and sought information from the partner, but it was the Australian negotiators who shared information that was more focused on their own achievement (high masculinity) and the Arab negotiators who sought achievement balanced with consensus (masculinity and femininity neutral).

The final questionnaire item of relevance to the Masculinity Index was from the challenge actions category. Item 15 stated ‘the best negotiators can establish dominance over their negotiation partner during the initial stages of the negotiation’. As discussed in the questionnaire analysis chapter, there was no indication that either culture believed that creating an early dominance over a negotiation partner is a productive tactic.

The Masculinity Index has provided this study with an interesting measure of orientations towards achievement versus consensus. While the collectivism index suggests that the Arab negotiators will predominantly be focused on consensus, the Masculinity Index demonstrated a dimension in which it has been possible to show that the Arab negotiators managed to create a balance between a focus on consensus and achieving suitable outcomes, suggesting a masculinity–femininity neutrality. In comparison to the Australian negotiators, who were both found to be of a high masculinity and high individualism orientation, the main difference is that the Arab negotiators seek more public or common objectives with their negotiation partners, thereby achieving satisfactory negotiation outcomes and consensus.

**Short-Term/Long-Term Orientation**

The final cultural orientation discussed is the long-term/short-term orientation. Hofstede (2001) described this orientation as the long-term orientation valuing persistence in negotiations and demonstrating a willingness to make sacrifices to achieve the overall goal. In negotiation, the long-term/short-term orientation is not to be confused with the negotiators’ priorities towards the period of the agreement.
The short-term/long-term orientation was difficult to measure during this study, as the nature of the simulations meant that the agreement and outcomes reached had no actual term of effect. However, the most relevant indicators of the short-term/long-term orientation were with the roles and the granting of concessions. The roles pursued by the Arab participants were very different to those pursued by the Australian negotiators. Aligning objectives and tracking public goals were the objectives of the Arab negotiators, whereas the Australians placed more emphasis on their own personal objectives. From the negotiation summaries, we also saw that the Arab negotiations had more outcomes and these were invariably achieved in less time than the Australian negotiations, indicating that the Arab negotiators were more willing to reach a compromise sooner. When comparing the outcomes of the mixed negotiations, it was particularly relevant that the Arab negotiators were as a group more willing to grant their Australian partners concessions than they were to reject requests for concession. Conversely, the Australians were more willing to reject requests for concession made by their Arab partners. There were no questionnaire items that specifically related to this dimension of culture.

The evidence indicates that the Arab negotiators had a greater concern for how their negotiation partners regarded them beyond the negotiation than did the Australian participants. Whether conclusive or not, the evidence indicates that the Arab participants held a longer-term orientation than the Australian participants. This dimension of culture does appear to have a relationship with the high-context/low-context communication model and the individualism/collectivism dimension of culture, as the roles followed by negotiators tended to follow their disposition to the objectives of negotiation partners. One question that has arisen from this study is in which situation, if any, would the outcome of the long-term/short-term orientation differ from the high-context/low-context orientations and the individualism/collectivism orientations?

**Hofstede’s Dimensions of Culture and Negotiation**

The results of this study show that the categorisations of the Arab and Australian cultures on the basis of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are still
relevant; however, the study did also reveal that several of the cultural orientations are interrelated in negotiation and particularly demonstrates a relationship between Hall's high-context/low-context continuum and Hofstede's cultural dimensions of individualism/collectivism, tolerance to uncertainty and long-term/short-term orientation. These Hofstede cultural dimensions relied upon the analysis of actions and roles that were also used to analyse orientations to high-context/low-context communication. It may well be possible that Hofstede's cultural dimensions could help measure the placement of a culture (in relation to other cultures) on Hall's high-context/low-context continuum.

**Conclusion: Research Sub-question One**

The first of the research sub-questions asked:

‘To what extent do negotiators' communicative patterns reflect their cultures' typological tendencies à la Hall's high-context/low-context communication continuum, Monochronic/Polychronic time system and Hofstede's dimensions of culture indices?’

The data analysis and discussion of intra-cultural interactions have firstly demonstrated that the three prevalent cross-cultural communication models have been validated by this study. The Australian negotiators demonstrated orientations towards low-context communication, monochronicity, low power distance, individualism, a high tolerance to uncertainty, masculinity and short-termism. Conversely, the Arab negotiators were polar opposites in most dimensions and differed in all other dimensions. They demonstrated orientations towards high-context communication, polychronicity, medium to high power distance, collectivism, a moderate to low tolerance to uncertainty, masculinity–femininity neutrality and long-termism. Referring back to the literature review (see Chapter Two) suggests that these cross-cultural communication models have been validated to their full extent. However, the analysis and discussion have highlighted that there are relationships that may potentially exist between the high-context/low-context continuum and
Hofstede’s dimensions of individualism/collectivism, tolerance to uncertainty and long-termism/short-termism.

Behaviours During Intercultural Negotiations

The second research sub-question was concerned with how the behaviours of the cultural groups changed during the intercultural negotiation simulations between the ASB Gulf Nationals and the ESB Australians. A number of observations have been made in the following sections, which describe changes to the observations made in the previous section.

Observation One: Language of Discussion

The first and most obvious observation from the intercultural negotiations is that the Arab negotiators needed to conduct the negotiations in English as opposed to their native language of Arabic. Although this is likely to have placed the Arab participants at a communicative disadvantage, there was only one instance of an Arab mixed group participant reporting that he or she was uncomfortable with his or her Australian negotiation partner during a single simulation. Interestingly, two Australian negotiators stated that they were not comfortable with their Arab negotiation partners during a single simulation, which also indicates that there may be other reasons, apart from language, as to why the Arab participant was uncomfortable with his or her negotiation partner.

Observation Two: Shifts in High-context/Low-context Communication

The sharing of information demonstrated that the Australian participants would frequently seek and share information, and this was more frequent when negotiating with an ASB Arab partner, which is consistent with low-context communication. When working within their own cultural groups, the Australian participants would frequently bypass seeking additional information
about issues from their partners. Yet, this was not the case when partnered with Arab negotiators. It also suggests that the Arab participants remained high-context in their sharing of information, which in turn caused the Australian participants to request more explicit information. We also witnessed that the Arab participants and the Australian participants less frequently shared priorities and objectives when participating in mixed groups. This suggests that in general, the nature of the mixed negotiations was more distributive, as the sharing of priorities and objectives is central to realising an integrative negotiation.

The Arab negotiation participants were more willing to grant concessions to Australian negotiation partners than to other Arab negotiation partners, again suggesting that the Arab negotiators were concerned with avoiding confrontation with their Australian partners, but possibly were less concerned about confrontation arising with other Arab partners. However, there was a trend in which the Arab negotiators did alter their concessional actions tactics when negotiating with Australian partners. Arab negotiators used concession requests and counter offers less frequently, which suggested less reliance on trial and error and more reliance on low-context communication.

The Australian negotiation participants did not demonstrate a reliance on using concessional actions to build context with other Australian negotiators. Their low frequency of making concession requests and responses signified that the Australian negotiators preferred low-context communication. During the intercultural negotiations, the Australian negotiators demonstrated a shift towards using more high-context concessional actions such as making more requests for concession, rejecting partners’ requests and using counter-offer tactics. However, there was also evidence that the Australian negotiation participants would avoid responding to invitations to make a concession request and requests for concessions. In each case, the Australian negotiator would avoid high-context concessional actions and revert to low-context information sharing.
The use of benefit and detriment actions by participants was also consistent with the high-context/low-context model. The Australian negotiation participants were explicit with their descriptions of benefits and detriments, which became more frequent when partnered with an Arab participant. However, the Arab participants were implicit about the benefits of their negotiation positions and the detriments of their partners’ negotiation positions. Nevertheless, they were willing to accept the benefits and detriments proposed by their Australian negotiation partners, again indicating a high-context preference to avoid confrontation. In addition, the Australians who participated in a mixed group were more willing to align objectives and pursue an alignment of objectives than the Australians who participated in the control groups.

The turn-taking actions provide further proof that Arab negotiators are oriented towards high-context communication and Australian negotiators are oriented towards low-context communication. One such turn-taking action was interrupting a partner’s speech turn to strengthen one’s negotiation position. The Arab negotiation participants frequently interrupted their Arab negotiation partners, but were reluctant to interrupt Australian negotiation partners, which indicated that they were more concerned about avoiding conflict. Australian negotiators were also willing to speak out of turn, but it generally occurred in the process of sharing information, not seeking to improve their negotiation positions.

During the mixed negotiations, there was evidence that both cultures tried to negotiate according to their natural orientations. The Australian negotiators continued to try to use low-context turn types and the Arab negotiations consistently sought to use high-context turn types. This manifested itself with the Arab negotiators making pivotal turn types and being responded to by Australian negotiators using foregrounding turn types. Even when exchanging pivotal turn types, the Australian negotiators would also frequently avoid responding immediately to their partner’s concession actions by seeking information or by seeking to change topics of discussion. It was also evident from the increasing number of hesitations and delays during the mixed groups.
that both the Arab and Australian participants took more time to consider their responses when negotiating with a participant from another cultural group. Hence, whether it was conscious or not, the participants were considering the most appropriate way to initiate a sequence or respond to a turn and not necessarily speaking according to their natural styles. However, we also witnessed that both the Australian and the Arab participants would use ‘repair’ turn-taking actions less in the mixed groups. This is consistent with high-context communication and demonstrates another way that the Australian participants altered their negotiation tactics away from their natural orientations.

Another important turn-taking action concerns ‘go-ahead’ and ‘blocking’ responses. These actions monitor the willingness of participants to allow or prevent their negotiation partner being able to move the sequence forward according to their intentions. When working with participants from their own cultures, the Arab and Australian participants demonstrated that they would use both ‘go-ahead’ responses and ‘blocking’ responses. Yet, when participating in mixed groups, there were trends observed that were relevant to the high-context/low-context model. The Australian and Arab negotiators were more willing to make ‘go-ahead’ responses when they participated in mixed groups, suggesting that both cultures will be more focused on consensus, and that some of the tactics the Australian negotiators use are higher context than they would usually use. Conversely, in regard to the ‘blocking’ responses, the Arab participants demonstrated that they were oriented to a high-context approach of avoiding conflict with their Australian partners; however, the Australian participants were low-context in that they were willing to more frequently use blocking responses when partnered with Arab participants.

**Observation Three: Shifts in Monochronicity and Polychronicity**

The mixed groups demonstrated that the Arab participants became more monochronic during their interactions with Australian participants. Arab mixed group negotiators used higher frequencies of foregrounding, follow-up, insert-expansion and topic-proffering turn types, and there was a decrease in the use
of pivotal turn types. This reflects the initiation of monocentric turn types by the Australian participants. It must also be highlighted that while the mixed negotiations were more monocentric than the Arab-only negotiations, they were still less monocentric than the Australian-only simulations.

Observation Four: Shifts in Power Distance

During the intercultural negotiations, trends were demonstrated in which the Australian participants were clearly more willing to assert their negotiation position than the Arab participants, and the Arab negotiators were clearly more concerned with not asserting their negotiation position with their partner.

The assertiveness and challenging actions indicated that the Arab negotiators became more oriented to a high power distance during the mixed group negotiations while the Australian negotiators shifted to becoming even less concerned with power and status. Supporting this is the concessional data in which the mixed group Arab negotiators were clearly more willing to grant concessions to their Australian partners than the experimental-group Arab negotiators were willing to grant to other Arab participants.

Overview of Orientation Shifts

The study demonstrated that when the two cultural groups underwent an intercultural communication exchange, participants adapted some of their tactics away from their natural cultural orientations to facilitate better communication. As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the Australian negotiators demonstrated a stronger use of low-context communication to seek explicit information from their Arab negotiation partners; however, as each of the Australian negotiators worked through the three scenarios with their Arab partner, they increasingly used more high-context tactics such as increasing their use of trial and error exchanges of concession offers and requests and trying to align the objectives of both parties.

Conversely, the Arab negotiators showed a greater disposition to high-context communication through consensus-building actions and more specifically, not explicitly challenging the concessional offers or benefits proposed by their
Australian partners. Throughout the duration of the simulations, the Arab negotiators began to use more low-context turn types such as foregrounding and follow-up. This may be explainable by the fact that the Arab negotiators became more monochronic, or more likely, were forced to become more monochronic as the Australian negotiators seemingly dominated the structure of the negotiations by avoiding responding to issues and creating more question and answer turn types. These observations suggest that in the intercultural setting, the Australians used more low-context communication than normal to obtain information, but were prepared to structure the speech turns to be more in line with high-context communication. The Arab negotiators did quite the opposite, becoming even more implicit (high-context) with the information that they shared in each turn, but they were willing to use more low-context turn types. Interestingly, the shifts in turn types increased from simulation to simulation.

The shifts in turn types across the scenarios suggested that the negotiators were becoming more comfortable in working with their partners as they conducted each of the three scenarios. Yet, the shifts in power distance also suggest that the Arab negotiators found it difficult to reject the terms proposed by their Australian negotiation partners, but the Australians did not hold the same reservations. The findings are summarised in Table 60.

Table 60: Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Australian Participants</th>
<th>Arab Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharing information</td>
<td>Became more explicit</td>
<td>Continued to be implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn types</td>
<td>Progressively used more high-context turn types</td>
<td>Progressively used more low-context turn types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessional Discussion</td>
<td>More reluctant to grant concessions</td>
<td>More willing to grant concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and status</td>
<td>More willing to challenge</td>
<td>More concerned with achieving consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of negotiation</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Monochronic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 60 considers the changes in dispositions of the Arab and Australian mixed-negotiation participants in comparison to their cultural counterparts from the non-mixed groups. For example, a reference that Australian negotiators ‘became lower context’ means that they used communication that was lower context in comparison with the Australian control group participants.

Common Ground

The second part of the second research sub-question relates to whether the change in behaviour during the intercultural negotiations helps the process of realising common ground. It is in fact debatable whether true common ground was regularly realised in the mixed group simulations, as the implicit nature of actions committed by many of the Arab negotiators did not appear to have been understood by their Australian counterparts.

The data collected provided examples of false common ground that existed in the mixed group negotiations. On occasions where the Arab negotiators made concessional requests, it can be surmised that the Arab negotiator would be expecting their partner’s responses to also be of a concessional nature. However, the Australian negotiators’ actions were often more concerned with providing explicit foregrounding information that assists in building context about their own priorities. Often the negotiation partners would try to proceed with the belief that their partner understood their intentions, however through the exchange of speech turns one or both negotiators would regularly identify that they had not achieved true common ground.

The two cultures did struggle to achieve true common ground on understanding differences in dispositions towards partners’ priorities and objectives. The Australians were largely only concerned about their own objectives, while the Arab negotiators were expectant that in the name of consensus, if they assisted their partner to achieve some objectives, their partner would also assist them.

Throughout the mixed groups, the shifts in behaviour appeared to have more impact in aligning processes, which led to outcomes more so than ensuring that
common ground was achieved. A major issue is the shifts in power distance orientations, which led to the Australian participants pursuing their own priorities and the Arab participants agreeing to most of the Australians’ requests without necessarily receiving any reciprocal granting of their own priorities. In conclusion, the changes in behaviours led to the realisation of outcomes, but not necessarily to the realisation of common ground.

Response to the Key Research Question

The key research question of this project is ‘to what extent do cultural orientations influence intercultural negotiations between ESB Australians and Arabic-speaking nationals of Arabian Gulf countries?’ This discussion chapter has considered the influences of cultural orientations on communication during negotiations conducted between two Australian partners and between two Arab partners. Changes in processes and behaviours during Australian and Arab intercultural negotiations have also been discussed.

The data from the intra-cultural simulations demonstrated that cultural orientations are critical to the communicative processes used by Arabs and Australians during negotiation. Arab negotiators are driven by realising and maintaining consensus with partners, pursuing common objectives, exchanging concessions through trial and error, maintaining the momentum of turn taking and discussion and simultaneous discussion of topics. Conversely, Australian negotiators are focused on directly and explicitly addressing issues and problems, pursuing their own personal objectives, exchanging concessions based on a detailed understanding of issues and situations and prefer well-structured turn taking (e.g. non-interrupting speakers) with sequential discussion of topics.

Behavioural similarities that were apparent included asserting one’s own negotiation position with partners and concluding nearly all negotiations with an agreement. Attitudinal similarities suggested: neither cultural was willing to make hasty decisions or expect their negotiation partners to make hasty decisions during negotiations; that it is a sign of skill to deal with multiple
issues at once; negotiations should be conducted in a friendly environment; and negotiators should be tactful in expressing opinions or rejecting requests. While there were some similarities witnessed, the differences in cultural orientations were more significant, as they had a bearing on the processes of the negotiation including but not limited to:

- how explicitly information is exchanged
- the purposes and frequencies of concession requests
- the structure of negotiations and purpose of the discussion (e.g. foregrounding, pivotal or follow-up)
- the structure of discussion of different topics (sequential or simultaneous)
- the way issues and problems are dealt with.

The cross-cultural communication aspect to this study also demonstrated that the prevalent cross-cultural communication theories and models were valid when applied to Arabs and Australians during negotiations. These findings are summarised in Table 61.

**Table 61: Cross-cultural Communication Theories and Models, and their Relevance during Negotiations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorist</th>
<th>Model or Dimension</th>
<th>Arab Orientation During Negotiation Simulations</th>
<th>Australian Orientation During Negotiation Simulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hall (1976)</td>
<td>High-context/low-context continuum</td>
<td>High-context</td>
<td>Low-context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polychronic/Mono/chronic time and space</td>
<td>Polychronic</td>
<td>Mono/chronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede (1980, 2001)</td>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>Medium to high Power Distance</td>
<td>Low Power Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism/Individualism</td>
<td>Collectivist</td>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance to uncertainty</td>
<td>Medium to low tolerance to uncertainty</td>
<td>Medium to high tolerance to uncertainty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity/Femininity</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Masculinity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term/long-term</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter also identified how behaviours of Arab and Australian negotiators change when they are partnered in intercultural negotiations. The Arab negotiators generally continued to use implicit, high-context communication to share information, which caused the Australians to become more explicit by asking more questions than they would with other Australians. Consensus was still a major issue for the Arab negotiators. The Arab negotiators more frequently avoided challenging their Australian partners or rejecting concessional requests than they would with Arab partners. However, the Australians more frequently took to trying to resolve issues directly by challenging their Arab partners than they did with fellow Australians. The Australians became less willing to grant requests for concessions with Arab partners, whereas the Arab partners became more willing to grant concessions to Australian partners.

These points reflected the Australian individualist orientation of pursuing one’s own objectives and the Arab collectivist orientation of pursuing common objectives. During the mixed group simulations, the Arab partners were willing to support the objectives of the Australians; however, they received very little of the expected support for their own objectives. Another trend was that the Arab negotiators had to conform to a monochronic structure. Finally, as the intercultural partners moved through the three different simulations, a trend evolved whereby the Arab negotiators increasingly used more foregrounding and follow-up (context-building) turn types and the Australian negotiators used more trial and error concessional turns.
While these changes in behaviours are significant, it was also observed that they led more to reaching agreements than realising true common ground between parties. It is therefore the conclusion of this project that cultural orientations significantly affect the ability for Arab negotiators to achieve integrative or consensus-based outcomes in negotiations with Australian partners.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This study acknowledges that negotiation across cultures is an activity of increasing importance but the impacts of cultural orientations on negotiation are not always known to intercultural negotiation participants (Metcalf et al. 2007; Brett 2000; Carnevale & Choi 2000; Adair et al. 2001). In particular, it sought to identify the role of culture on intercultural negotiations between ESB Australians and ASB Gulf Arab nationals. The study utilised three prevalent cross-cultural communication models as a theoretical base and tested these theories against a series of negotiation simulations and questionnaires.

Summary of Findings

The Key Research Question

Most critical to the key research question is the word 'extent'. To understand the extent that cultural orientations influence intercultural negotiations, the impact of cultural orientations within each culture must first be identified. The cross-cultural communication aspect of the study has demonstrated that cultural orientations strongly influence the processes of negotiation in both the Arab and Australian cultures. Arab negotiators tend to seek consensus with partners, consistently yet implicitly pursue common objectives, exchange information and concessions through trial and error, will interrupt a partner's speech turn to maintain the pace of a negotiation and will discuss multiple topics at the same time. Australian negotiators tend to be focused on directly and explicitly addressing issues and problems, pursuing their own personal objectives and relying on their partner to pursue his or her own objectives before an agreement is reached, exchanging concessions based on a detailed understanding of issues and situations, and organising well-structured turn taking (e.g. not interrupting speakers) with sequential discussion of topics. One point that needs clarification is that of pursuing objectives. The findings do not suggest that Arab negotiators always seek integrative outcomes by pursuing common objectives, nor do Australian negotiators always seek distributive outcomes by pursuing their own objectives.
As discussed in the literature review, the approach of this study has been to consider negotiation as a joint activity, not according to traditional Western mental models of negotiation. What these findings suggest is that in the process of communication, Arab negotiators either explicitly or implicitly convey interest in their partner’s negotiation objectives, whereas the Australian process is for each negotiator to press for his or her own priorities. This could still lead to a distributive Arab negotiation in which the outcome favours more of one partner’s objectives in comparison with the other partner’s objectives. Likewise, an Australian negotiation may become integrative, as both negotiators have asserted their priorities and found a mutually agreeable way of attending to each of their objectives.

Behavioural similarities that were apparent included asserting one’s own negotiation position with partners and concluding nearly all negotiations with an agreement. Attitudinal similarities suggested: neither culture was willing to make hasty decisions or expect their negotiation partners to make hasty decisions during negotiations; that it is a sign of skill to deal with multiple issues at once; negotiations should be conducted in a friendly environment; and negotiators should be tactful in expressing opinions or rejecting requests. While there were some similarities witnessed, the differences in cultural orientations were more significant, as they had a bearing on the processes of the negotiation including but not limited to:

- how explicitly information is exchanged
- the purposes and frequencies of concession requests
- the structure of negotiations and purpose of the discussion (e.g. foregrounding, pivotal or follow-up)
- the structure of discussion of different topics (sequential or simultaneous)
- the way issues and problems are dealt with.

With these orientations and differing processes in mind, the study demonstrated that the influence of cultural orientations on intercultural negotiation between ESB Australians and ASB Arabs was significant. The extent that cultural orientations influenced the intercultural negotiations was
underpinned by difficulties faced by both sides in being able to understand one another’s communicative intentions through the mixed use of implicit and explicit communication, and a disconnect between how partners would understand each other’s priorities, consensus and challenging actions, which effectively saw the Arab negotiators disadvantaged and distributive negotiations occur in most cases.

In summary, the study demonstrated that the Arab participants, who were not experienced at negotiating in English with Australians, struggled to convey their priorities or prevent an imbalance in the outcomes of the negotiations. Conversely, the Australian participants, who also were not experienced negotiators and even less experienced at intercultural negotiations, faced difficulty in interpreting implicit messages and were often unaware when their partners were expecting to have objectives addressed or that the negotiation was distributive. The intercultural negotiations demonstrated that different information-sharing techniques, perspectives of power and priority sharing can have a negative bearing and divert the negotiation into a distributive process as opposed to a process that seeks integrative outcomes.

**The First Research Sub-Question**

The study demonstrated that the cross-cultural communication models being studied were reflected and consistent with the data captured during the simulations. Arab cultural orientations were consistent with Hall’s (1976) definition of a high-context culture and polychronic culture, while Australian cultural orientations were low context and monochronic, which reflects the previous research conducted by Hall and other researchers (see Chapter One). The findings of this study were also consistent with Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions indices. Arab cultural orientations were medium to high power distance, collectivist, medium to low tolerance to uncertainty, masculinity–femininity neutral and concerned with the long term. Australian cultural orientations were low power distance, individualist, medium to high tolerance to uncertainty, high masculinity and concerned with the short term.
They also demonstrated that each of these models held commonalities with one another. This was particularly relevant to Hall’s high-context/low-context continuum, which seemed to rely upon the same data that were relevant to Hofstede’s dimensions of individualism and collectivism, tolerance to uncertainty and long-termism/short-termism.

The Second Research Sub-Question

The intercultural negotiation participants all tended to break from their cultural norms; this was particularly exhibited through how they shared information, discussed concessions, developed context and tried to establish and maintain common ground. The most obvious change in behaviour was that the Arab negotiators were required to conduct the intercultural negotiations using English language, as opposed to using Arabic. Both cultural groups remained consistent with their orientations to high-context/low-context communication; however, there was evidence that in general, Australians used more explicit, low-context communication (particularly in the form of questions), while the Arab negotiators became more implicit or high-context in trying to avoid discussing difficult issues. Yet, across the three simulations, the trend was for the Arab participants to increasingly adopt low-context foregrounding and follow-up turn types, while the Australian negotiators tended to use more trial and error style pivotal turn types, which indicates a shift towards higher-context communication.

The usually polychronic orientation of Arab negotiators became monochronic as the Arab negotiators followed a structure and organisation more consistent with the Australian cultural orientation. Australian negotiators did not demonstrate any shifts towards polychronicity. More critically though, a clear power distance was generally established during the intercultural negotiations, with the Australians being comfortable in challenging the negotiation positions of their Arab partners, while the Arab negotiators tended to avoid challenging their Australian partners’ negotiation positions and often quickly conceded concessional requests.
While partners had to adopt different tactics to support the negotiation process, we often saw that the Arab negotiators were more willing to grant generous concessions than the Australians and thereby produce negotiation outcomes without breaking consensus. The outcomes of the negotiations tended to be distributive and very favourable to the Australian negotiators. Across the negotiation simulations and from reviewing the post-simulation questionnaires, it was not the intention of the either cultural group to instigate distributive negotiations or outcomes, but it was clear that in general, the Arab participants found it difficult to pursue their own objectives without the Australian negotiators actively working with them to prioritise objectives. Conversely, the Australian negotiators were asserting their own objectives and reassessing their own priorities with an expectation that their Arab negotiation partners would be doing the same. Therefore, the net result in most cases was a mismatch in the balance of objectives achieved during the negotiations.

The impact of the personal versus common objectives and context differences in sharing information are the best indicators that achieving and maintaining common ground became a challenge during the intercultural negotiation simulations. While common ground was achieved in parts of the negotiations, this study has demonstrated different ways that partners struggled to maintain common ground through to agreement. It is the conclusion of this study that the changes in behaviour that occurred during the intercultural negotiations aided the realisation of outcomes and agreements, but did not necessarily assist the realisation of common ground.

**Significance of the Study**

To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first of its kind to study the influence of cultural orientations on intercultural negotiations between ESB Australians and ASB Arabs using empirical data based on negotiation simulations. The project has used three prominent cross-cultural communication models to test empirically some of their key claims. It has considered and identified areas of correlation between these models and has specifically identified how they relate to negotiation. The data collected have
also tracked what happens to these cultural orientations during an intercultural exchange, which is a further contribution to theoretical claims made in an abstract manner.

Implications of the findings include increased awareness of the impact of cultural orientations on intercultural communication, which can be relevant to other cultural groups, not just the two highlighted in this study. Specific to the Australian and Arab cultures, the findings can be applied to interactions in daily life, business, the classroom and doctor’s surgery.

Opportunities for Further Research

There are a number of opportunities for further research using the same methodology of this project. These opportunities include:

- Repeating similar data collection processes with experienced intercultural negotiators from both cultural groups to track how professional negotiators are influenced by their cultural orientations
- Repeating similar data collection processes in different geographic locations to understand if there is a relationship between behaviours and location
- Broadening the research to include different linguistic communities from the Arab World such as those from a Levantine Arabic-speaking background, Egyptian Arabic-speaking background or North African Arabic-speaking background
- Broadening the research to include different ESB nationalities such as British, American, Canadian, New Zealand, Irish and other Anglophonic communities
- Broadening the research to include different cultures who are not from an ESB or ASB.

There are also opportunities to conduct further research into the cross-cultural communication models, particularly into testing the suitability of the masculinity and femininity dimension and the long-term/short-term orientation, which seemingly had less literature available than the other dimensions and
models. It would also be possible to undertake further studies into where cultures specifically fit in Hall’s high-context/low-context continuum, and how closely the continuum is correlated to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.
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