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An empirical world of cosmopolitan Asia

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Cosmopolitan theory claims that cosmopolitans transcend the borders of national societies and actively embrace diversity, differences, and an all-inclusive society of strangers (Ossewaarde 2007: 367–88; Pichler 2009: 3–26). Cosmopolitan theory offers normative arguments and visions about cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995), transnational discursive democracy (Dryzek 2006), and global governance on poverty (Pogge 2008). These normative theories of cosmopolitanism, despite vast differences, share the common features of what Delanty (2006a: 25–47) calls ‘critical cosmopolitanism’. Yet, as Pichler (2009: 3–26) argues, we know little about what cosmopolitans are like and what distinguishes them from non-cosmopolitans on empirical grounds. Moreover, normative cosmopolitan theories tend to be American or European-centric, suffering the problems of constituency, democratic scope, social prerequisites and practical institutionalization (Bray 2009: 683–719). These problems highlight the importance of a pragmatic cosmopolitanism which ought to be rooted in daily life. This calls for an empirical study of whether normative claims of cosmopolitan theory can be confirmed on empirical grounds not only in Europe (Pichler 2009: 3–26), but also in Asia. Moreover, cosmopolitanism has been developed in the disciplines of philosophy, international relations, political theory, and sociology. Today, area studies are increasingly becoming a testing ground in confirming or negating some claims made by cosmopolitan theorists. Asian studies are a valuable discipline for answering the following questions: Is cosmopolitanism merely a ‘Western’ product or a global one? Will the Asian story confirm the universal aspiration of cosmopolitanism?

There is some evidence that cosmopolitanism is becoming an important factor in economic, political and cultural life in Asia, and correspondingly there is an increasing literature on variants of Asian cosmopolitanism. However, there are different understandings of what constitutes cosmopolitanism. A number of debates exist over whether nationalism promotes or inhibits cosmopolitanism, whether lifestyle cosmopolitanism is compatible with critical cosmopolitanism, and whether religion and tourism promote cosmopolitanism. Many important questions arise. What are Asian patterns and variants of cosmopolitan development? Where does critical cosmopolitanism gain support in daily life (He 2002: 47–68)? Will critical cosmopolitanism be sustainable in Asia? Is it possible to further strengthen cosmopolitan trends across Asia?

This paper takes a quantitative study of Asian cosmopolitanism and addresses the above questions and debates in an Asian context. Utilizing the 2008 data of the Asia–Europe Survey
(ASES) of nine Asian countries, we aim to find out the variants and pattern of Asian cosmopolitanism, address several debates on empirical grounds, and find out whether and how the Asian region can support and contribute to the normative cause of cosmopolitanism.

This paper proposes that cosmopolitanism falls into a rubric of lifestyle cosmopolitanism and critical cosmopolitanism. Lifestyle cosmopolitanism reflects the daily life of people, encompassing the everyday attitudes, connections, and actions of Asian people in terms of their appropriation of other cultures (Hannerz 1996). Enjoying or celebrating the practices or products of other cultures such as food or music, however, does not necessarily reflect a shared or equal cultural value system. Critical cosmopolitanism is more or less based on equal values. It can be defined by the extent to which people engage with other cultures on a self-critical level, reflecting the limitations or shortcomings of their own cultures and nation-states. It exhibits the features of willingness to suspend narrow national interests in order to deal with global environmental degradation or global justice, respect for basic human rights, acknowledging the moral equality of all people and individuals, and willingness to come to the aid of those suffering from natural or man-made disasters including extreme poverty (van Hooft 2009). Given the available data, this paper focuses on multilateral cosmopolitanism, the view that urgent common regional and/or global issues need to be addressed by multilateral institutions beyond narrow national borders.

The paper consists of five sections. The first section discusses the manifestations of Asian cosmopolitanism. The second section examines several debates on cosmopolitanism in Asia. The third section introduces the data and measurement. The fourth section reports the empirical findings. Finally the fifth section addresses the four debates on cosmopolitanism through an empirical testing. The paper concludes with a summary of Asian cosmopolitanism.

The manifestations of Asian cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is rooted in Asian histories. In China's Tang period (618–907) the emperors had to rely on nomadic non-Han for military defence from north and a literary class drawn largely from the demilitarized south, creating a unique cosmopolitan empire (Lewis 2009). Various forms of South Asian cosmopolitanism existed in the era of anti-colonial agitation. Asian intellectuals spanned the Indian to the Pacific oceans, from Johannesburg to Tokyo, from Calcutta to New York, from Bombay to Rome within a global horizon (Man3apra and Bose 2010).

Asia's rich cultural heritage has often been regarded as the basis for Asian cosmopolitanism. The hybrid and dynamic societies of Asia are rooted in the deep traditions of Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Sanskrit, for instance, can be seen as the Asian cosmopolitan equivalent of Latin (Pollock 2002). The ethically plural nature of Asian civilization, where cultures and identities have overlapped and mixed over time, suggests a more pronounced popular cosmopolitanism, which might be seen as a precondition of a new kind of civic cosmopolitanism.

The Chinese doctrine and tradition of tianxia is one form of Asian cosmopolitanism that existed in ancient times (Dallmayr 1996; Delanty 2006b: Ch. 21). Throughout Asia's history leading figures spoke of values similar to the cosmopolitan outlook of today. Mo Tzu (480–390 bc) promoted universal love, an outwardly oriented disposition of mind which is completely devoted to acting for the benefit of others. His notion of 'love is defined almost in terms of Kant's principle of treating all men as ends in themselves' (Schwartz 1985: 146–47). The Chinese Confucian scholar Kang Youwei (K'ang Yu-wei, 1858–1927) advocated the elimination of national boundaries, class structure and racial discrimination in order to achieve his vision of universal peace and greater unity of mankind; Tan Shitou (T'an Ssu-tung, 1865–98) imagined the formation of global government in which only the world exists but nations dissolve (Fung
Yu-lan 1973: 689, 698). Today Zhao Tingyang (2005) reinterprets tianxia as a cosmopolitan philosophy and world institution and articulates a cosmopolitan version of how China should play its global role in the context of the rise of China.

Most Asian countries are now fully linked to the global economy, and Japan, China and India are major players. In meeting the western powers head-on, new models of modernity in Asia have come into play. These new expressions of modernity are the product of a unique constellation of forces that are shaping the world in ways that cannot be understood in terms of 'westernization'. The situation is perhaps better understood as one of invigorated Asianism (He 2004). It has brought with it an entirely new approach to culture and to politics in Asia. Post-modern culture, now an integral part of many major Asian cities, accentuates this Asianism and has given rise to a new kind of aesthetic cosmopolitanism. Arguably, developments in culture and aesthetics persist as one of the major expressions of Asian cosmopolitanism.

Inhabitants of Asian capital cities are increasingly oriented towards a cosmopolitan outlook. This is most evident in Singapore and Hong Kong. Both are models of cosmopolitan capitalism and the cosmopolitan city. The urban middle class in Asia may also identify, for example, with the cosmopolitan life, showing an attitude of openness to other cultural possibilities and a practice of thinking beyond the local (Rofel 2007: 111–34; Rohlen 2002: 26–31). It can be seen as a manifestation of the mentality of the global elite, and/or a way of life based on consumption. Thus, in the context of China, cosmopolitanism is rendered as 'desiring China' and is considered as a site for the production of knowledge about what it means to be human in a reconfigured world (Rofel 2007: 111–34).

Migration is one of the leading driving forces of cosmopolitanism. It is no less a significant fact in present day Asian cosmopolitanism. Just as Jewish migration was a carrier of cosmopolitanism in nineteenth-century Europe, Asian experiences with multiculturalism and citizenship are expressions of cosmopolitanism. Migrants returning from western countries are having a major impact on Asian countries. Aihwa Ong has commented on how intensified travel, consumption, and communication has led to a transnational Chinese public (Ong 1999). Throughout South and East Asia, countries are now debating, and sometimes adopting, new policies to accommodate minorities, from the recognition of indigenous rights in the Philippines to regional autonomy in Indonesia and China, and to multinational federalism in Sri Lanka and India (Kymlicka and He 2005: 1).

Largely due to migration, a 'diasporic consciousness' and cosmopolitan lifestyle characterize groups of people moving about temporarily. This is in stark contrast to traditional diasporas, which were a permanent situation brought about by accident rather than transnational intention. Hence, people are increasingly using several identities simultaneously in more than one nation. There is an enormous statistical increase in dual citizenship across Asia. In addition to migration, cosmopolitanism can be understood as 'virtual migration'. Cosmopolitanism, as virtual migration, moves independently of people through cultural exchanges of ideas, images, money, music, electronic messages, sport, fashion, religion, etc. (Cohen 2004: 134–39).

Empirical evidence of Asian transnational forms of collective identity is now emerging. The newly established AsiaBarometer (Inoguchi et al. 2005) documents some evidence of transnational identities. The 3,573 respondents constituting 39% of the sample population reported that they feel part of an Asian supranational group. Asian lifestyle is becoming more and more cosmopolitan, albeit with some limits. For example, 24.1% of the 9,160 respondents said that they have friends from other countries, 52.8% often watch foreign entertainment programmes, 44.9% often watch foreign news programmes, 10.5% use email to communicate with other countries, and 33.5% receive international satellite or cable TV.
One of the most important expressions of Asian cosmopolitanism is normative transnationalism or regionalism within Asia. One example is ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which was established in 1967 and has been influenced by the EU. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter in 2005 was a watershed in the history of Asian normative regionalism. The charter embodies the first written requirement for the promotion of democracy and human rights, for transparency and good governance and for strengthening democratic institutions. In addition, under the pressure of threats to boycott any regional meeting chaired by Myanmar, the military regime in Myanmar decided to relinquish its turn at ASEAN’s chairmanship in 2006. In December 2005, a group of Southeast Asian lawmakers also called for Myanmar to be expelled from ASEAN if the military regime did not improve its human rights record. NGOs such as the ASEAN People’s Assembly have taken the lead in recent years in taking seriously the values of democracy, human rights, participation and good governance in building an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies (He 2008: 63–80). Civil societies in Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan have mobilized peoples and organized collective actions to challenge and break down the monopoly of the national boundary issue by the respective governments. New emergent transnational civil society has played an increasing role in addressing the national boundary issue in East Asia (He 2004b). Transnational activism, its moral principles, beliefs, organization and behaviour demonstrate the existence of new emergent world citizenship in Asia. World citizenship provides a new code of conduct, a source of identity, and a new ethics for transnational activism. It challenges and erodes the idea of national citizenship. The idea of world citizenship constitutes a normative foundation for transnational activism and a source of ideological power against the ideologies of nationalism. World citizenship and transnational activities also constitute a material power against the nation-states and for good global governance (He 2004a).

**Debates on Asian cosmopolitanism**

The literature on cosmopolitanism in Asia is growing fast, together with different understandings and definitions of cosmopolitanism. Below we briefly review several understandings and debates. This list, however, should not be taken as exhaustive.

Hiebert uses the term ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’, referring to the phenomenon that ‘men and women from different origins create a society where diversity is accepted and is rendered ordinary’ (Hiebert 2002: 212). One dimension of this everyday cosmopolitanism is ‘functional cosmopolitanism’, which is now becoming a matter of everyday survival for many workers, labour migrants, and refugees. “There is a sense in which “globalisation from above”, driven by powerful countries and transnational corporations, is now being paralleled and to a degree subverted by “globalisation from below”, driven by the enhanced mobility of labour” (Hiebert 2002: 148).

Kirin Narayan distinguishes between political and cultural cosmopolitanism. In its political configuration, cosmopolitanism is fostered by a strong sense of responsibility beyond the nation-state. It comprises all the elements of compassion, human rights, solidarity and peacefulness. Culturally, cosmopolitanism raises awareness and develops an appreciation of diversity. Curiosity is mixed with a wider sense of civic responsibility in accommodating differential modes of thought or ways of life, but does not necessarily translate into a sense of political responsibility (Narayan 2007: 61).

While cosmopolitanism is understood in different ways in Asia, there are also several debates on the nature and features of cosmopolitanism.
**Do nationalism and cosmopolitanism conflict with or complement each other?**

In one debate over the nature of cosmopolitanism and its relationship to nationalism, one side holds the view that cosmopolitanism embraces nationalism, for example, as revealed by the concept of ‘cosmopolitan patriots’ (Appiah 1998). Historically, the idea of cosmopolitanism emerged in the context of liberal nationalism in the nineteenth century. Theoretically speaking, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are complementary and mutually implicated (Delanty 2006b: Ch. 30). Instead of being against nationalism per se, cosmopolitanism, as Rafel (2007: 113; see also Rafel in this volume) argues, constitutes the human in the context of neoliberal capitalism. While it poses as a universal category, it is dependent on concrete manifestations of cosmopolitanisms that are, for example, vernacular, rooted, plural, and religious in nature (Rafel 2007: 113).

The other side of this debate puts the ‘new’ cosmopolitanism against an aging nationalism. Cosmopolitanism (also referred to as transnationalism) is characterized by benign effects. Social actors knowingly transgress national frontiers as they grow in self-awareness and broaden their identity through diversity (Cohen 2004: 140). It is argued that cosmopolitanism transcends the nation-state model, mediates actions and ideals oriented towards the universal and particular, global and the local, and represents complexities of allegiance, identity and interest (Cohen 2004: 141). Thomas P. Rohlen (2002) points out the tension between the cosmopolitan city and state. The cosmopolitan city and its liberal inclinations, he says, are dwarfed by national governments and military forces. Cosmopolitanism provides alternative notions of ‘cultural’ identity and undermines nation-state, tribal or minority ethnic absolutisms. Social, cultural, economic, and religious resources go beyond the confines of localities of birth into ever-moving horizons that transcend the political boundaries of the nation-state (Robinson 2007).

**Does lifestyle cosmopolitanism promote or inhibit critical cosmopolitanism?**

Major cosmopolitan cities generate the majority of revenues, but whether or not the populations of successful cities will be willing to subsidize their fellow citizens in poorer regions begs the question (Rohlen 2002: 12). One view holds that lifestyle cosmopolitanism is likely to lead to or promote critical cosmopolitanism as the former extends one’s horizon and knowledge. It is found that ordinary cosmopolitanism has bridged racial boundaries in everyday life (Lamont and Aksartova 2002: 1–25).

However, others hold the opposite view that lifestyle cosmopolitanism is characterized by consumption and lacks a critical capacity. As Rafel points out, in the context of contemporary China, there is a need to make China appear cosmopolitan. While a desire for lifestyle cosmopolitanism is allowed and interpreted as non-political, other aspects such as socialist passion, critical thinking and an independent mentality are seen as dangerous in China. The creation of a consumer identity domesticates cosmopolitanism even as the goal of such a creation is to transcend place. Ironically, while China is in the process of transcending nationalism to become cosmopolitan, it is also domesticate cosmopolitanism within China (Rafel 2007: 119). In a similar vein, van Hooft (2009) makes a distinction between a genuine ethical cosmopolitan outlook and fak cosmopolitanism. For him, lifestyle cosmopolitanism, such as following international fashion trends in an urban café society, tourism and international travel, and consumer interest in exotic products, clothing and world music, is not genuine cosmopolitan.

**Is religion at variance with cosmopolitanism?**

Anthony Appiah poses a challenging question: ‘can a fundamentalist, say, Islamic or Pentecostal, be a cosmopolitan?’ (Appiah 2006). In the context of global securitization,
cosmopolitanism is sometimes seen as a non-religious phenomenon; and new religious globalists as counter-cosmopolitans.

In historical terms, religion, however, was a cosmopolitan practice. The global design and ambition of Christianity saw the endless campaigns of conversion, and the global flow of fundamentalist Christianity to the Asia-Pacific region. Even globalized Islam also wants to build a community open to all. In examining temple construction in the kingdom of Bishnupur in southwestern Bengal from the late sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Kumkum Chatterjee (2009) shows how the Mughal-Rajput court facilitated and developed a culture of cosmopolitanism. We cannot simply categorize cosmopolitans or counter-cosmopolitans along religious lines. It is a complex matter that requires empirical variation. We need to find out whether significant differences exist within or between different religious groups with regards to critical cosmopolitanism, to what extent religious believers are cosmopolitan, and whether a higher level of cosmopolitanism relates to a higher number of religious believers.

**Does tourism promote or inhibit cosmopolitanism?**

Robin Cohen argues that theories of contemporary cosmopolitanism have often overlooked the importance of tourism. Tourism, like migration, presents a major challenge to the monochromatic national identity of all societies. More and more people are drawn into tourism as 'participants, service agents, or objects of the tourist gaze' (Cohen 2004: 134–36). Molz (2006) asserts that travellers embody cosmopolitanism through their 'fitness', the ability of adapting to a variety of geographical and cultural environments. One may, however, argue that the cosmopolitan perspective does not necessarily apply to tourists, for they do not have to contend so much with alien systems of meaning. We will find out empirically the extent to which international travellers embody or lack the cosmopolitan spirit.

**Data and measurement**

We can begin to empirically explore aspects of the debates above through an analysis of data from the Asia–Europe Survey (ASES) 2001 for nine Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand). This cross-sectional design produced data on a range of demographic and attitudinal variables and provides a potentially useful comparative measure of cosmopolitanism-related measures. The analysis is necessarily limited by virtue of the fact that the survey did not set out to measure cosmopolitanism per se, and so the findings presented here are based on reconstructions of cosmopolitanism measures from the available survey items. In addition, the sampling was biased towards urban rather than rural respondents. Later iterations of ASES did not include the same set of countries and/or used differing sampling designs, making direct comparisons to the 2001 data problematic. Nevertheless, we argue that useful measures and initial comparisons can be made through the means of analysing this data set.

Five measures were developed using data from the ASES. Scales were constructed from groups of questions to measure aspects of respondents’:

- international connection (IC);
- attitudes towards multilateral political solutions (ML);
- attitudes towards economic internationalization (EI);
- national identity (NI);
- supranational identity (SI) (this relied on responses to a single question).
International connection (IC) was measured by a scale comprising nine questions about various kinds of connections that are international at base. Higher rates of connections are assumed to stand for increased ‘lifestyle cosmopolitanism’. Multilateralism (ML) was measured by seven questions about whether particular problems should be solved multilaterally. This is arguably one aspect of ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ that denotes a focus on issues beyond the respondent’s national boundaries and forms of solutions that are cross-national. Economic Internationalization (EI) was measured by answers to two questions relating to the import of foreign products and foreign ownership of land. National Identity (NI) was measured by four questions pertaining to nationalism. Supranational Identity (SI) was measured by one question that asked if respondents felt they had a transnational identity.

High scores on all measures indicated greater support. Reliability tests showed all measures achieved satisfactory scores. As previously stated, the measures were reconstructed within the process of the secondary analysis of the ASES data. As such, we attempted to find survey questions and groups of questions that related to the key concepts of cosmopolitanism set out in the discussion above. Inevitably, the measures are partial and provide results that are indicative rather than being in any way conclusive evidence for the general themes identified.

Results

General Pattern (by country comparisons)

Data were divided into three equal groups on each measure giving ordinal categories of ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ scores for each scale/measure. Table 35.1 presents a summary of the percentage of each country sample that comprised the ‘high’ category for each measure.

The countries with the largest proportions of their sample in the ‘high’ category for International Connection were Singapore (65%), South Korea (33%) and Taiwan (32%), while Japan (17%), Thailand (15%) and Indonesia (4%) had the lowest. The countries with the largest proportions of their sample in the ‘high’ category for Multilateralism were the Philippines (46%), Japan (34%) and South Korea (30%), while Malaysia (12%), Indonesia (8%) and Taiwan (4%) had the lowest. The countries with the largest proportions of their sample in the ‘high’ category for Economic Internationalization were Singapore (44%), Japan (35%) and Taiwan (27%), while

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC% (rank)</th>
<th>ML% (rank)</th>
<th>EI% (rank)</th>
<th>NI% (rank)</th>
<th>SI% (rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>65 (1)</td>
<td>28 (4)</td>
<td>44 (1)</td>
<td>45 (4)</td>
<td>35 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>33 (2)</td>
<td>30 (3)</td>
<td>14 (6)</td>
<td>44 (6)</td>
<td>24 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>32 (3)</td>
<td>4 (9)</td>
<td>27 (3)</td>
<td>23 (9)</td>
<td>33 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>29 (4)</td>
<td>12 (7)</td>
<td>10 (8)</td>
<td>72 (3)</td>
<td>69 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 9 countries</td>
<td>26 (4)</td>
<td>21 (7)</td>
<td>21 (7)</td>
<td>55 (7)</td>
<td>43 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>21 (5)</td>
<td>14 (6)</td>
<td>26 (4)</td>
<td>45 (4)</td>
<td>42 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>19 (6)</td>
<td>46 (1)</td>
<td>17 (5)</td>
<td>89 (1)</td>
<td>62 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>17 (7)</td>
<td>34 (2)</td>
<td>35 (2)</td>
<td>39 (8)</td>
<td>24 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>15 (8)</td>
<td>16 (5)</td>
<td>7 (9)</td>
<td>83 (2)</td>
<td>43 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 (9)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>11 (7)</td>
<td>44 (6)</td>
<td>41 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n=8420

Source: Asia–Europe Survey 2001
Indonesia (11%), Malaysia (10%) and Thailand (7%) had the lowest. The countries with the largest proportions of their sample in the 'high' category for National Identity were Philippines (89%), Thailand (83%) and Malaysia (72%), while Japan (39%) and Taiwan (23%) had the lowest. The countries with the largest proportions of their sample in the 'high' category for Supranational Identity were Malaysia (69%), the Philippines (62%) and Thailand (43%), while Taiwan (33%), Japan (24%) and South Korea (24%) had the lowest.

To provide further comparison between scale scores by country, all scores were standardised to a range -1.0 to 1.0 (mean = 0). Higher than average scores on International Connection and Multilateralism were found for Singapore and South Korea. Lower than average scores on International Connection and Multilateralism were found for Indonesia and Thailand. Higher scores on International Connection and Economic Internationalization were found for Singapore and Taiwan. Lower scores for International Connection and Economic Internationalization were found for the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.

Higher than average scores on Economic Internationalization and lower than average scores on National Identity were found for Japan, China, Taiwan and Singapore. Lower than average scores on Economic Internationalization and higher scores for National Identity were found for Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Higher National Identity and Supranational Identity scores were found for the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. Lower National Identity and Supranational Identity scores were found for Singapore and Japan. Lower National Identity and Higher Supranational Identity scores were found for South Korea, China and Taiwan.

'Cosmopolitans' (group comparisons)

Groups were created based on respondents' scores on International Connection and Supranational Identity. These measures together combined self-reported actual connections with a transnational outlook/identity. The combined measures formed a score on a new variable named Cosmopolitans measured ordinally in three categories: high, mid and low. The group of high-scoring Cosmopolitans comprised 9% of the total sample of nine countries. The mid-scoring group made up 35% of the sample and the modal group was the low scorers with 56% of the sample.

In terms of the distribution of cosmopolitan types across the nine countries, 24% of the sample's high cosmopolitan types were located in Singapore. This was followed by Malaysia (14%), the Philippines (13%) and China (12%). Japan had the largest single group of low cosmopolitans (16%) followed by the Philippines (12%) and Indonesia (11%).

The Singapore sample had one high-scoring cosmopolitan for every 2.6 low-scoring cosmopolitans. Countries above the average ratio of 1:6.2 were in addition to Singapore: Taiwan (1:4.8); Malaysia (1:5.2); South Korea (1:5.6) and China (1:5.9). Countries below the average ratio were: the Philippines (1:6.1); Thailand (1:8.1); Japan (1:13.6) and Indonesia (1:63.6). The distribution of cosmopolitan types across the sample was therefore uneven with a ratio range of 1:2.6 (Singapore) to 1:63.6 (Indonesia).

Predictors of International Connection and Multilateralism

A comparison of mean scores for Cosmopolitan types in the sample was made with four socio-demographic measures: age; years of schooling completed; English language proficiency (self-reported and measured on a six-point scale from 'none at all' (0) to 'native fluency' (6)) and household living standard (self-reported on a five-point scale from low (1) to high (5)). While only very small differences existed in scores for the mid and low Cosmopolitans on these
variables, larger differences were found between the high Cosmopolitans group and the mid and low groups. High cosmopolitans were younger (4.5 years younger than mid and 4.8 years younger than low), had completed more years of schooling (2.3 years and 2 years difference to the other groups), were more proficient in English (1.2 higher than other groups) and had a higher household living standard (0.3 higher than both other groups). Analysis of variance tests confirmed that the differences between the high and both the mid and low cosmopolitan groups were significant while the differences between the mid and low groups were not significant.

A multiple regression/path analysis was conducted to measure the predictive effects of socio-demographic variables on International Connection and Multilateralism scores. The final model tested the effect of a combined regression of predictor variables on the dependent variable pair of International Connection and Multilateralism. Economic Internationalization was included as a predictor variable though the direction of any possible link is not ascertainable from a cross-sectional design.

The final model was tested and fitted the data well (chi-square = 1.603, df = 3, p = .659). Effect size estimates are given by standardized (partial) regression coefficients next to their corresponding hypothesized path (line connecting two variables with arrow indicating direction). Beta weights are standardized total effects. The model did not include non-significant relationship-producing variables tested in earlier versions including gender and religion.

The model explained 31% of the variability in International Connection with English proficiency (beta weight = .42), household living standard (beta weight = .14), years of schooling (beta weight = .13) and Economic internationalization (beta weight = .011) being the main effects on International Connection. In contrast, only 3% of the variability in Multilateralism was explained by the model, with all significant effects being very small at beta weight = .10 (English language proficiency) or below.

**Discussion**

The results indicated that at the regional (nine countries) level, there appeared to be some support for arguments that both stronger lifestyle-based international connections and supranational identity are associated with multilateral forms of thinking and that stronger national identity is linked to a protective stance towards perceived national interests/borders. Considerable inter-country differences were measured in relation to the key measures of International Connection, Multilateralism, Economic Internationalization, National Identity and Supranational Identity.

High-scoring cosmopolitan types formed 9% of the overall sample but their distribution was uneven across the sample, with Singapore having a larger proportion than any other country and Indonesia the least. High-scoring cosmopolitans were younger (4.5 years younger than mid and 4.8 years younger than low), had completed more years of schooling (2.3 years and 2 years difference to the other groups), were more proficient in English (1.2 higher than other groups) and had a higher household living standard (0.3) higher than mid- and low-scoring cosmopolitans. However, high-scoring cosmopolitans were not associated with any particular religion nor did their scores on National and Supranational Identity differ much from mid- and low-scoring cosmopolitans. Scores on Multilateralism were significantly higher for the high-scoring cosmopolitans.

Model testing confirmed earlier analysis that higher scores on International Connection were associated with younger, more educated respondents who have higher than average English language proficiency and household living standards.

Turning again to the research questions raised by the discussion above:
Do nationalism and cosmopolitanism conflict with or complement each other?

Correlations between pairs of measures for all nine countries aggregated were calculated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a significant weak to moderate positive association between International Connection and Economic Internationalization \((r = .202, p = .01)\) and between International Connection and Multilateralism \((r = .169, p = .001)\). There was a weak to moderate significant negative association between National Identity and Economic Internationalization \((r = -.187, p = .01)\) and a significant weak association between Supranational Identity and Multilateralism \((r = .096, p = .01)\). At this aggregated level therefore there appeared to be some support for arguments that both stronger lifestyle-based international connections and supranational identity are associated with multilateral forms of thinking and that stronger national identity is linked to a protective stance towards perceived national interests/borders.

At the regional level the data did not indicate anything other than very weak associations between National Identity and both International Connection and Multilateralism. The data did suggest that higher scores on national identity were associated with lower scores on Economic Internationalization. At the group level (Cosmopolitan types) the data did not show any noteworthy differences between National Identity scores and Cosmopolitan types. From the present study our measures of aspects of nationalism and cosmopolitanism suggest that they are neither negatively nor positively associated.

Does lifestyle cosmopolitanism promote or inhibit critical cosmopolitanism?

International Connection was significantly positively associated with Multilateralism at both the regional level and the group level. A comparison of mean scores for Cosmopolitan types in the sample on three of the key measures (National Identity, Economic Internationalization, Multilateralism) was made. In each case the score for the high cosmopolitans group was greater than the mid and low groups: National Identity (14.48, SD = 2.05 compared to 13.84, SD = 2.23 for mid and 14.08, SD = 2.37 for low); Economic Internationalization (5.33, SD = 1.98 compared to 4.89, SD = 1.92 for mid and 5.01, SD = 1.98 for low) and Multilateralism (12.54, SD = 2.99 compared to 9.31, SD = 2.73 for mid and 11.33, SD = 3.97 for low). Analysis of variance confirmed the differences as significant, but in the case of National Identity and Economic Internationalization the differences were very small. The differences were larger for Multilateralism scores, which may support arguments that link extra-national lifestyle connection, supranational identity and belief in multilateral rather than unilateral solutions. The results suggest that this association was positive.

Is religion at variance with cosmopolitanism?

High scoring Cosmopolitans were found across all religious groups. When we compared Cosmopolitan types for the sample with self-reported religion the percentage differences for types between religious groups were small. Thirteen per cent of 'other' religion was classified as high Cosmopolitans compared to 11% for 'Christian', 9% for 'none' and 8% for 'Buddhist' and 'Muslim'. Overall there was little difference between Cosmopolitan types in terms of religion. The data indicated that at the group level, religious background was not a factor associated with either International Connection or Supranational Identity.

Does tourism promote or inhibit cosmopolitanism?

One of the nine items that comprised the International Connection (IC) scale asked respondents if they had travelled abroad for a holiday or for business in the last three years. For the entire
sample, 18.1% had travelled in the last three years (n = 1662) and 81.9% had not (n = 7497). To investigate possible associations between international travel and aspects of cosmopolitanism we constructed a modified IC scale that omitted the travel question and retained the other eight items. This allowed us to measure the association between travel and the modified IC scale as well as the other key measures through correlation tests.

Pearson product–moment correlation coefficients indicated: a strong positive association between travelling in the last three years and the modified International Connection scale (r = .438, p = <.01); a moderate positive association between travelling in the last three years and the Economic Internationalization scale (r = .190, p = <.01); and a weak positive association between travelling in the last three years and the Multilateralism scale (r = .095, p = <.01). The associations between travelling and both National and Supranational Identity were significant but very weak. The results therefore suggested that key aspects of cosmopolitanism as measured by this study were associated with international travel. In particular, international travel was strongly associated with other indicators of cross-national connections.

**Trend data**

Subsequent iterations of the ASES survey have not repeated the questions used in the creation of the scales outlined here except for a reduced number of questions (six rather than nine) in the International Connection scale in the 2004 survey for eight of the nine countries considered here (Taiwan was omitted in 2004). This allows a restricted comparison to be made using the reduced scale in charting possible changes over the 2001–4 time frame.

Table 35.2 shows the percentage of the samples in 2001 and 2004 that were in the positive category of the constituent questions of the International Connection scale. The 2004 sample scored lower on all questions with the exception of the foreign television viewing, where there was an increase to 62.6% in 2004 (compared to 52.8% in 2001). There were large falls in both reported travel abroad in three last three years (2004 = 9.9%; 2001 = 18.5%) and reported having friends from other countries (2004 = 14.3%; 2001 = 24.4%). Answers to the other questions remained relatively similar from 2001 to 2004.

Table 35.3 compares the eight countries common to the 2001 and 2004 samples on International Connection scores (calculated using the restricted set of six questions). With the exception of the Philippines (2004, M = 1.51; 2001, M = 1.42), all countries scored lower in the 2004 sample ranging from -0.7 for Thailand to -0.23 for Indonesia. Despite the drop in IC scores from 2001 to 2004, the relative differences between countries retained similarities, with Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines being the top three scorers in both periods (with

| Table 35.2 Common components of International Connection, 2001 and 2004 for eight Asian countries (percentage of sample agreeing with statement) |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                      | 2001, %         | 2004, %         |
| Family member/relative overseas | 28.9            | 23.9            |
| Travelled abroad last 3 years    | 18.5            | 9.9             |
| Have friends from other countries | 24.4            | 14.3            |
| Watch foreign TV often          | 52.8            | 62.6            |
| Often communicate with people in other countries | 11.0            | 7.9             |
| My job involves travel overseas  | 7.6             | 6.1             |

*Source: Asia–Europe Survey 2001; Asia–Europe Survey 2004.*
Malaysia and the Philippines swapping positions in the second sample) and Indonesia having the lowest score in each period.

While the differences in trend data results presented in Tables 35.2 and 35.3 are likely to be largely an artefact of changes made in the sampling techniques between the two surveys, the 2004 results appear to confirm the overall shape of the ordering of countries on the IC scale from the 2001 data.

Table 35.4 reports the association between English language proficiency (measured on a scale of 0 to 8 where 0 = no proficiency and 8 = fluency), education (measured on a scale of 0 to 8 where 0 = no formal schooling and 8 = university completion) to higher IC scores (measured in a scale of 0 to 6 where 0 = lowest connection and 6 = highest connection) for the 2004 sample. IC was strongly associated with English language proficiency IC ($r = .458$, $p = <0.001$) and moderately with Education level ($r = .234$, $p = <0.001$). These results support the findings from the 2001 sample reported above and underline the importance of English language proficiency as a predictor of higher IC scores in both samples.

**Conclusion**

This paper has demonstrated that some normative claims of cosmopolitan theory found empirical support using ASES data, and has provided evidence that suggests cosmopolitanism is an important factor in economic, political and cultural life in Asia. It reveals the complexity, diversity and variety of cosmopolitanism in Asia, with Singapore having the highest proportion of cosmopolitan types (24%), followed by Malaysia (14%), the Philippines (13%) and China (12%).

**Table 35.3** International Connection scores by eight countries, 2001 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001 M</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2004 M</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 35.4** Association between International Connection scores, Education and English Language proficiency, 2004, eight Asian countries (Pearson correlation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International Connection</th>
<th>English Language proficiency</th>
<th>Education level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Connection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.458**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language proficiency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>.234**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.540**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
N = 10482
Like sociology, political science and international studies, Asia studies can make a modest contribution to the cosmopolitan debates. This study found that our measures of nationalism and cosmopolitanism were neither negatively nor positively associated; this suggests a possible need for the revision of both positions in the debate on whether nationalism promotes or inhibits cosmopolitanism. While the stronger adherence to national sovereignty in Asia should not lead to the conclusion that Asian nationalisms have blocked the development of cosmopolitanism, it is equally difficult to conclude that nationalism in Asia has promoted cosmopolitanism. This paper found that multilateral cosmopolitanism gains support in lifestyle cosmopolitanism (International Connection), and that religious background is not a factor associated with cosmopolitanism. Finally it supports the claim that tourism and international travel are associated with aspects of both lifestyle and critical cosmopolitanism.

On the basis of the findings that English language proficiency, household living standard, years of schooling and economic internationalization were the strongest predictors of higher levels of cosmopolitanism in Asia, it is reasonable to assume that the continued development of modernization, globalization, and regionalization is likely to further strengthen cosmopolitan trends across Asia.

Further exploration of these themes would be possible through analysis of later ASES and related data sets. Within limits given by the study designs and sampling methods, change over time across the Asian region in relation to cosmopolitanism may be able to be charted. Additionally, common question sets in Euro- and Asia-barometer studies may provide a rich source of comparative data.

Notes on measures

- International Connection (IC) was measured by a scale comprising nine questions about various kinds of connections that are international at base. Higher rates of connections are assumed to stand for increased ‘lifestyle cosmopolitanism’.
- Multilateralism (ML) was measured by seven questions about whether particular problems should be solved multilaterally. This is arguably one aspect of ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ that denotes a focus on issues beyond the respondent’s national boundaries and forms of solutions that are cross-national.
- Economic Internationalization (IC) was measured by answers to two questions relating to the import of foreign products and foreign ownership of land.
- National Identity was measured by four questions pertaining to nationalism.
- Supranational Identity was measured by one question.

Measures were within acceptable limits of reliability using Cronbach Alpha and related tests (see below).

*International Connection (IC) (range: 9 [LO] – 18 [HI])*

Cronbach Alpha = .718, number items = 9.

Q305a Does this statement apply to you? … a) I have a family member or relatives living in other countries.
Q305b Does this statement apply to you? … b) I travelled abroad at least once in the past three years for business or holiday purposes.
Q305c Does this statement apply to you? … c) I use the Internet at home or school/work.
Q305d Does this statement apply to you? … d) I have friends from other countries.
Q305e Does this statement apply to you? ... e) I often watch foreign entertainment programs on TV.
Q305f Does this statement apply to you? ... f) I often watch foreign news programs on TV.
Q305g Does this statement apply to you? ... g) I use email to communicate with people in other countries.
Q305h Does this statement apply to you? ... h) My job involves contacts with organizations or people in other countries.
Q305i Does this statement apply to you? ... i) I receive an international satellite or cable TV service.

**Multilateralism (ML)**

Cronbach Alpha = .824, number items = 7.
Q304b Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... b) Environmental problems.
Q304c Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... c) The problem of women's rights.
Q304d Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... d) The problem of unemployment.
Q304e Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... e) The problem of developing countries.
Q304f Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... f) The problem of refugees and asylum seekers.
Q304g Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... g) The danger of military conflict in Asia.
Q304i Do you think this problem should be dealt with by each country or by all countries together? ... i) The danger of military conflict elsewhere in the world.

**Economic Internationalization (EI)**

Cronbach Alpha = .470, number items = 2. For scales with less than five items, the mean inter-item correlation is a more accurate test of reliability than Cronbach's Alpha (Briggs and Cheek 1986). Mean inter-item correlation for the Economic Internationalization scale = .307. Briggs and Cheek (1986) recommend the optimum range at .2-.4.
Q208a How much do you agree or disagree with the statement ... a) COUNTRY should limit the import of foreign products.
Q208d How much do you agree or disagree with the statement ... d) Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in COUNTRY.

**National Identity (NI)**

Cronbach Alpha = .752, number items = 4.
Q2 Overall, how important is it to you that you are NATIONALITY? (Ask, if 1 or 2 in Q1).
Q12a How important do you think it is ... a) To have NATIONALITY citizenship?
Q12c How important do you think it is ... c) To feel NATIONALITY?
Q13 Overall, how proud are you to be NATIONALITY?
Supranational Identity (SI)

Q9 Do you think of yourself as a supranational identity?

Notes

1 Some materials come from one section of Delany and He 2008.

References


