Practising Research, Researching Practice

Thinking through Contemporary Dance

SALLY GARDNER
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

I have always found the central drama in the activity of dance making to be the futility of solidifying something. It's like setting up a house of cards in a hurricane and then walking ten feet back to get a better look only to find it is gone.

Tere O'Connor

—INTRODUCTION

‘Practice-as-research’ is now an accepted mode of participation in university postgraduate culture but debate over the precise meaning of the term continues. So do questions around how it might challenge or confirm traditional academic, methodological, presentational and examination procedures. The concept of ‘practice-as-research’ does not necessarily suggest that practice is research. The term might point to approaches and activities potentially embraced by the academy, which are nevertheless heterogeneous to it and to conventional understandings of research. I take up the question of contemporary dance practice-as-research by
asking not ‘what or how is this research?’ but ‘what does it mean to really practise?’ My discussion may appear somewhat wandering at times, but it embodies values I am seeking to make tangible.

Dance is not your typical university discipline. It is one of those things that, historically, universities have been defined by excluding. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the twentieth century, concurrent with the invention of modern dance, dance gained a presence in tertiary education first in the United States, then in England (primarily when Rudolf Laban and his followers fled there from Germany) and subsequently in Australia. Dance in Anglophone institutions of higher learning has, however, been present as physical or vocational education (including teacher training) rather than as a ‘thought’ among the wider scope of the humanities. For dance artists, the outsider status of dance in the academy was not necessarily to be deplored. Elizabeth Dempster has argued, discussing her experience in Australian tertiary institutions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that there was ‘power and authority, however constrained and transient’, in this position. In some Australian universities during the 1970s and 1980s, interest in dance grew when cultural studies, philosophy and other scholars were involved in the poststructuralist ‘turn’ to the body. Then, in the late 1980s, following the Dawkins reforms, ‘many dance and performing arts programs and courses offered in Australian colleges and institutes of technology were propelled into new university environments’ and, as Dempster has noted, the ‘pressure was on to create a research culture, where perhaps none had existed before.’

I’m still not convinced that the university is where dancers belong. But I do sympathise with some dancers’ hopes that the university might provide them with the kind of critically oriented, process-friendly environment that is lacking in the now largely entertainment-oriented performing arts sector. Some dancers have turned to universities for intellectual validation and a form of patronage. Throughout the country at any one time there is a small but significant number of students studying for a higher degree in contemporary dance practice. The arrival of practice-as-research, not only in contemporary dance but in all the arts, seems, paradoxically, to have coincided with an era of increased instrumentalisation of university-based learning and research. With its audit culture and relentless demands for ever more narrowly defined research products, the contemporary,
expanded 'knowledge economy' now comprises an undisguised fusion of education with capitalism.⁹

Setting aside well-justified complaints about the current dominant models of higher learning, I return to the question of dance practices having a broader resonance and relevance than simply among dancers—though I certainly do not want to suggest that there is anything particularly or potentially redemptive about 'dance', dancing or contemporary dance culture. My discussion here is aspirational, as much for dance practices as for how any work is undertaken in universities more generally.

—Drill

Walter Benjamin made a distinction between 'drill' and practice. Quoting Marx, Benjamin observed, 'In working with machines, “workers learn to co-ordinate their own movements to the uniform and unceasing motion of an automaton”'.¹⁰ He goes on to argue:

Drill must be differentiated from practice. Practice, which was the sole determinant in craftsmanship, still had a function in manufacturing. With it as the basis, each particular area of production finds its appropriate technical form in experience and slowly perfects it.¹¹ [my italics]

We might ask, to what extent is the academic setting becoming the site of a kind of drill? In the present administratively ruled university the merely reactive condition suggested in the concept of drill is one felt by many academics as they confront their computer screens on which demands and decisions appear suddenly, endlessly and arbitrarily.¹² It may seem ironic to pose the question of drill as a dancer; that is, as one who figures in the popular imagination as the very product of drill. But modern dance was predicated on the possibility of discovering new, sometimes subversive, bodies, not on mimetically reproducing the dominant social body in any of its instituted 'styles', And, insofar as drill—which implies a lack of agency instituted at the level of gesture—concerns space, time and the body, a dance practice point of view can provide valuable perspectives on these basic ingredients of work.
Practising has to do with attention to how we go about things, in a bodily or aesthetic sense—where aesthetics refers to our lives as they are lived in a sensate way. In his book *Art as Experience*, John Dewey invoked practices when he argued that understanding art was made difficult by the fact that in ‘official’ or theoretical explanation, ‘the art work’, the created object, tended to become isolated from ‘the human conditions under which it was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in actual life experience’.

Susan Melrose echoes Dewey when she argues that, while an (expert-academic) spectator might regard a work as ‘the thing itself’, for a practitioner, the production or the work might be momentary, incomplete, and ‘non-identical with her own larger epistemic enquiry’. Dewey and Melrose allude here to the difficulty of making the actual practice of art count—and count in language. When practices defy wording they tend to disappear from view or get lost in translation to more stable and dominant symbolic systems.

Practices involve doing things, often without any intention of getting results, if results are evidence of things that already have a name. This openness inheres in ‘the live’, the corporeal, the somatic aspects of practices. Despite the notorious habituality of our bodies (and the industrial metaphors that are often applied to them) we tend to never do things the same way twice, which was why the ‘human machine’ on the assembly line was such an untoward phenomenon. The demand for validation through explanation and definition, the reduction of everything to (a) representation, is at odds with values in the not-yet-defined condition of practising.

One somatic practice which has been an important resource informing work in the field of contemporary dance is the Alexander Technique. Reading Frank Jones’s book on Alexander and his work recently, I was struck by the author’s observation that:

> the non-verbal aspect of [Alexander’s] technique has always been a stumbling block to readers [of Alexander’s books] who felt that he was holding something back from them and that there was more there than the books conveyed. [my italics]

Jones goes on to say that Dewey, Aldous Huxley and other early advocates of Alexander’s work ‘were frustrated in (their) attempts to describe the technique because they could not convey the sensory experiences it involved’.
words, it was difficult for professional thinkers and writers to convey their sensory experiences in language. The comments about 'holding something back', however, also suggest that readers had difficulty even in conceptualising that it might actually be necessary to do the Alexander work. Readers seemed to think that it might all be understood at the level of explanation alone.

Academic research, particularly in the humanities, is also dedicated to the language explanation of things. It is also meant to be 'applied' to effect positive change in the world beyond academia (if it is not the increasingly rare 'pure' variety). However, 'professional university-related research' (to use Chakrabarty's phrase) tends to come out of processes that are denigratory of bodily life—unless it can be made scientific or anthropological—and which thus deny an important kind of agency. Academics rarely undertake what might be called the 'extratextual work' or the 'aesthetic listening' that could prove critical to their practices of reading and writing. They can be appalled, for example, at the idea of 'rolling on a ball', as one colleague put it. What academics (including those in the health sciences) do in their jobs—'perceive, analyse, read and produce oral, written and silent discourses'—is not even considered to be a bodily activity. In universities, knowledge is defined and constituted through a selective inattention to bodily sensation and by apparently excluding aspects of experience that are, in consequence, deemed too private, personal or interpersonal. Going back to the dissatisfied readers of Alexander’s books, they seemed to want the perceived 'gap' in the book to be resolved by explanation. They wanted the language of the book to refer to body experiences and sensations or to have reference points that they had already excluded from their horizons of potential understanding. They reduced Alexander's work to a 'moral or textual problem'.

As a dancer and as someone involved in dance teaching and 'higher degree by research' supervision, I am interested in doing and experiencing as well as in the poetic, transformative potential in both of these. I am working in a tradition that dates back to Isadora Duncan at the turn of the twentieth century. Duncan was important because she found a way to move—and to present or stage that moving—that apparently encouraged watchers to feel something in their own bodies, something like shifts of weight. Duncan apparently made available or sensible the experience of incarnate 'initiative'. She conveyed both an authorship of and
authority in her own experience. Her’s and others’ interest in kinaesthetics was related to, but different from, a turn-of-the-century fascination with speed, mechanics and kinetics, and was a development concurrent with the rise of dehumanising ‘drill’.

Duncan’s approach to dance emerged in part from her reading of Nietzsche to whom she referred frequently in her talks and writings. She was interested in communicating via the doing aspect of her dance rather than through its conceptual meaning or in what it could represent in a literary or psychological way. Duncan saw her dancing as a means to enable an audience to connect with their own transformative, creative or destructive energies. She claimed to be always dancing the chorus, that component of Attic tragedy that enabled an audience to connect viscerally with the forces within themselves, not just with the moral of the story. For Duncan, dancing:

provides a visceral, visual link such that spectators are able to know and affirm for themselves that ‘it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified’. Such a link can only be forged by doing. Dancer Steve Paxton has pointed out how banal and attenuated a verbal instruction can be compared with the moving experiences to which it can give rise. ‘Walk in a straight line’, he says, seems like a simple invitation until some dancers begin to explore what it means for them in practice, when they discover in it a ‘goldmine’ or use it as a ‘juicy word-game to be resolved with action’. Language might be used to explain non-verbal phenomena, but dances do not explain or are not representations of the verbal statements and naming that might be used temporarily or provisionally in dance or other somatic practices. Instead dance can explode and animate terms and concepts because the corporeal context through which these are mobilised is a dynamic and unstable one, a house of cards in a gust of wind.

—SPACE OF PLAY

Clearly practice-as-researchers need to communicate in language across the broader constituency of the university. But, if there is a dearth of shared experiential, embodied reference points, there is also no ready-to-hand, widely accepted professional or disciplinary dance discourse. Verbalising about dance is by
definition interdisciplinary. But the question of the symbolics with which dance might be spoken is still critical. How is a dancer’s interest in our activity, in how we go about things, coping with gravity and so on, to be articulated? In the academy, each discipline has specialised and professionalised languages and canonical reference points. So, potentially, does the art of modern dance. But dance is always to some extent about the immediacy and intimacy of corporeal experiences and, as Tere O’Connor has put it, ‘what I know is in a state of flux—forever’. Here we run up against a problem of what can be admitted into professional thought and into research. In dance practice everything that ‘happens’, since it happens through and to our bodies, counts and is worthy of consideration. To give an example: I was recently a member of a committee of ‘stakeholders’ convened around the building of a new dance studio at Deakin University. The existing studio has what is called a ‘Tarkett’ floor, made from vinyl. Tarkett has made a difference to dance performance internationally. It provides consistency for dancers who often perform in a range of venues, potentially on different dancing surfaces. Tarketts are transportable, durable and easily washable and they make at least one part of the performing and rehearsal environment predictable for the dancers. A Tarkett is a rational and professional dance instrument supporting the circulation of dance products. But although an efficient technical solution, what might be its cost in terms of potential poetic transformations and not-yet-defined practising?

In initial discussions about the new studio I perceived that the Tarkett flooring option was very easily in danger of prevailing. I became interested in how the distinction between the sensations of touching one kind of surface or another—the dancers’ relationship with the dance surface—might be raised and discussed as having persuasive force, rather than be seen as just a personal preference or a kind of lifestyle issue. Given the rationality of the Tarkett solution in ‘performance’ terms, I wondered how the question of the dance floor surface might be kept open and alive. (The need for a ‘spring’ in the floor to prevent injury was not in question.) Initially, many statements were made about the new studio floor but they did not originate from the point of view of ‘experience and slowly’. From the institution’s point of view, a dance floor is a technical matter, taken as the passive context for dance, but for dancers it can be creatively active. It can be what Karin Knorr Cetina calls an ‘epistemic object’.28
I understand the dance floor as akin to a ‘transitional object’, as Winnicott conceives it: where the transitional object or phenomenon (for the emphasis is not on the object itself but on what it allows or makes possible) is the valuable site of a paradox. For Winnicott, the paradox of the transitional object must be allowed to exist and should not be explained away. We have Winnicott to thank for not taking for granted the minutiae of the way babies and children behave. His concept of transitional phenomena came out of his observations of the way an infant, while sucking its thumb or going to sleep, will also brush its own cheek or fiddle with a lock of hair. For the child, their own body, their blanket, tuft of felt or other soft material, or another person, is both a product of their imagination and exists in its own right: it is both ‘me and not me’. Winnicott observes that the woven, hairy or furry texture of the material or object—its sensuous qualities—play a role here as providing a kind of resistance to the child’s fantasy. When a child is using a transitional object and subjecting the object to its will, the object is not used up. It (frustratingly for the child) survives the child’s abuses and thus, Winnicott says, survives as the core of experience. This dynamic co-existence of different ‘realities’ in the object constitutes the very ground of experience for the child and becomes a place for ‘creatively living’. Explanation, or what Winnicott calls ‘split-off intellectual functioning’, can resolve the paradox of the transitional object but at the cost of the value of the paradox itself, which is the value of ‘the intermediate area of experiencing’. Socially and culturally speaking, the value of this paradox is the value of a ‘space of play’, a between-space of risk, resistance, survival and destruction/creation. The space of play is a relational space in which objects are, to use Knorr Cetina’s term again, ‘epistemic’ and ‘defined by their lack of completeness of being and their non-identity with themselves’.

Unlike the purpose-built or ready-made Tarkett, it could be said that a polished wooden floor is not just a surface for cultural projections of a dance already spoken for. A wooden floor can suggest possibilities through its texture or grain, its sheen, its evoked ‘carpentry’ qualities and so on. A wooden floor has an existence of its own in addition to and in excess of its being simply or explicitly for dance. A wooden surface is not ‘exactly right’ for dance because we do not yet know what that dance might be. In other words, the qualities or attributes of a wooden floor are not used up in use. The floor is not ‘consumed by the moment of action’. This is a phrase
Adorno used when he reflected upon the different experiences and techniques of opening and closing doors and windows with different kinds of handles and latches, showing how such minor, domestic activities and relationships with things could contain much that is political. A wooden floor, I propose, can ‘survive as the core of experience’: it can be an instrument or equipment for a dancer as well as possessing its own independent qualities that exceed or resist being merely an instrument. A wooden floor can provide resistance to a pre-constituted or institutionalised dance fantasy.

My attempt here to find concepts that link the here and now practicalities and ‘everything-ness’ of dance to wider concerns, and thus to theorise the relevance of having a discussion about the surface of the dance floor, is not the same as actually rolling or balancing on that floor. But rolling for a dancer is also a form of thinking and questioning that can lead to discovering and creating concepts. It is just that nothing stays still or the same long enough to solidify. The important thing is that there is not really a short cut to thinking relevant to dancing. You have to be implicated in it. A space of play needs to be created in which private sensations and shareable concepts are transformed through each other. The body is its own transitional object: the concept of ‘body-image’ as the factual and imaginary body’s relation to and use of itself testifies to this.37

—APPEARING

If the issue of the dance floor in the context of academia is broadly one of a space of play, there is also the question of time. Winnicott’s notion of ‘intensely living’ is a particular species of time. Dance practice—located within a dancer’s body—requires an apparently empty time, a time of the ‘pre-movement’ during which the as yet invisible movement-to-come can become poetically charged. This is the ‘gestural anacrusis’: a pause in which the deciding mind is emptied out and one’s body lets go.38 This kind of empty time zone is necessary more than just in the preparation of individual moves. Any creative process requires fallow times. Driving through Slovenia in mid-winter, the houses and fields are quite immobile except for the snow falling in its accentless way. Aside from a few passing cars, no one is visible in the countryside. I imagine that the local inhabitants know to wait patiently during
this time of invisible germination. It is the critical time of pause in which the spring is being prepared.

Dance provides, potentially at least, a structure for thinking temporally. Whereas linguistic and intellectual functions tend to 'operate on what might happen, or on what did happen', in dance the challenge is to bring the passage of time and of change through time into awareness as it is happening. The Greek concept of 'kairos' is useful here: 'kairos is the present moment as it unfolds during a stretch of awareness, or the passing moment in which something happens as the time unfolds'. The performer's presence comes at least in part from a practice of being present in the instant. But dance goes further than this to make time a matter or material that is worked. In practices that draw on the tradition of modern dance with its independence from music, time is 'compressed, dilated, produced by the deliberate choices of a subject who invents', but also by the body itself which 'is what it can do as it goes along ... defined by the constantly shifting and transforming capacities it carries with it from step to step'. This kind of working with time is not recognised in university regimes of increasingly instrumentalised or externally measured time, or in the time of drill.

The way we go about things practically, the way, when we are producing, we are also living, has little value in academic research paradigms. Questioning how we go about things in terms of the intimacy and potential creativity of everyday experiencing is not encouraged: it is deemed as belonging to the so-called private or personal realm, not to the official realm or to any research that might be publicly funded. This ideological separation of the so-called public and private aspects of existence, of micro-experiences, sensations and perceptions from publicly validated products, is a way of resolving a paradox that forecloses on creative and potentially subversive possibilities. Doings are tolerated for what they produce, not for their being the basis of experiencing or 'intensely living'.

To take this question about the place of practices in academia a step further towards the notion of 'praxis' I will turn to Hannah Arendt, who in her book The Human Condition (1958) proposes 'to think what we are doing'. She uses the concept of 'natality' to elaborate a particular kind of human 'appearing'; that is, how each individual, subsequent to her or his biological birth, comes to appear in public through acting. Individuals become agents, able, not just to repeat mechanically
what others have done before them but, among others, to begin something anew ‘on
our own initiative’. Action or acting in this sense is intransitive, not instrumental. It
is a ‘second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our
original physical appearance’. Acting can be related to the quasi-biological idea of
an ‘organism’s urge to make itself known’—an idea that the movement theorist
Rudolf Laban invoked in what has come to be known as ‘effort-shape theory’ and in
which our ‘inner attitudes’ to weight, space, time and flow are the dynamic paths
along which each person reveals her/himself. But Arendt is also concerned with
the social and political conditions that make ‘appearing’ possible and which a
condition of appearing might support. She writes:

a life spent entirely in public ... becomes, as we would say, shallow. While
(such a life) retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from
some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth
in a very real non-subjective sense.

In this passage Arendt uses the present participle to denote a movement or passage
and a paradox: is something that is rising into sight visible or not? Arendt invites us
to be comfortable with this paradox of visibility/invisibility and not try to resolve it
with ‘split-off intellectual functioning’. ‘Appearance’ or action is not an epiphany, nor
is it only ‘aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity. It is an enactment.’

But, paradoxically, in the objectual nature of our body-selves we also appear or
rise into sight as ‘responsive’; by being bodies we receive ‘jolts’ and are able to be
shifted or displaced. The responsiveness we have by being bodies is what the first
year of life teaches us as we are picked up, moved and carried about by others (and
which at an extreme enables us to be subjected to drill). These early experiences are
why dancers can feel that they are being gathered up and held by the floor at the
same time as using it and being able to make an imprint upon it; and why watchers
might feel themselves through me as I roll, along the indefinitely unfolding surface
that joins us, the shifting of my weight also perhaps felt as the shifting of theirs in
the mystery of being returned to their own bodies.

The question of practice as research is not a superficial one. It is a way of
helping us to ‘think what we are doing’ in the broadest sense—of questioning how
we are living our research and knowledge production processes and what benefit,
implications and vision this may contain for lives as they are actually lived. Arts
practices with their concern for experiential detail belong to that which is not ‘entirely in public’, to the more intimate, darker ground from which things can rise into sight while retaining their depth and real significance. Practices enormously expand the scope of the research question: how do we know what to look for?

Sally Gardner is a lecturer in the School of Communication and Creative Arts at Deakin University, Melbourne. She performs as an occasional guest artist with Russell Dumas’ Dance Exchange, is a co-editor of Writings on Dance journal and is a regular contributor to local and international arts’ and humanities’ forums and publications.

NOTES

3 In ‘Dance Studies in the International Academy: Genealogy of a Disciplinary Formation’ J.R. Giersdorf notes, ‘The histories of physical education, modern dance, women’s liberation, and the hygiene movement were important influences on the development of the three programs in dance studies’ which he discusses. Dance Research Journal, vol. 41, n.o. 1, Summer 2009, p. 27.
4 Alexandra Carter writes in her introduction to The Routledge Dance Studies Reader, Routledge, London and New York, 1998: ‘In the United States and Britain, dance found a home during the early part of the century within physical education departments, where it could be disguised as a form of exercise and made morally and educationally acceptable’ (p. 4). In Australia, dance was initially studied at tertiary level as part of teacher training programs, or in vocationally oriented performing arts colleges.
5 Dempster, ‘Undisciplined Subjects’.
6 Giersdorf argues that the use of such terms as ‘choreography’ in fields beyond dance (during the 1980s and 1990s) where they were ‘dereferentialized’ was a symptom of ‘shifts in the function of the university from a nationalizing institution to a transnational corporation’. The role in this
dereferralisation of the approach to dance studies taken at the University of California, Riverside, where ‘choreography’ became a (poststructuralist) theoretical term, he argues, was part of ‘the globalizing hegemony of North American capital’ (p. 38).


11 Benjamin, p.133.

12 In ‘How Far Will the “Management of Performance” Culture Go?’, Carolyn Allport writes that ‘the implementation of the Government’s vast reform agenda risks becoming a culture of performance management in which every aspect of the academic task ... is categorised, analysed and scrutinised’, Advocate: Journal of the National Tertiary Education Union, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2010, p. 2.

13 Terry Eagleton writes that, ‘Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the body. In its original formulation by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, the term refers not in the first place to art, but ... to the whole region of human perception and sensation, in contrast to the more rarefied domain of conceptual thought ... That territory is nothing less than the whole of our sensate life together—the business of affections and aversions, of how the world strikes the body on its sensory surfaces’, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Basil Blackwell, Oxford & Cambridge, 1990, p. 13.

14 John Dewey, Art as Experience, Capricorn Books, New York, 1958, p. 3. And Gayatri Spivak discusses explanation in ‘Explanation and Culture: Marginalia’ in In Other Worlds, Routledge, New York and London, 1988: ‘on the general level the possibility of explanation carries the presupposition of an explainable (even if not fully) universe and an explaining (even if imperfectly) subject. These presuppositions assure our being. Explaining, we exclude the possibility of the radically heterogenous’, p. 105.


17 Jones, p. 3.

18 Recently arrived in my inbox from the Research School of Humanities and the Arts, Australian National University, is a notice of a seminar proposed by Dipesh Chakrabarty where he intends to track ‘the use of the word “research” by historians and (attempt) to understand and contextualize the
practices that constituted “research” in history before “research” as an activity assumed its present, professional university-related form.’


20 She may validly have recoiled from the spectre of ‘flexiblised workers’.


22 LaMothe, p. 257.


24 LaMothe, p. 251, quoting Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.


27 O’Connor.


30 Winnicott, p. 89.

31 ‘Yet it must seem to the infant to give warmth, or to move, or to have texture, or to do something that seems to show it has vitality or reality of its own.’ Winnicott, p. 5.

32 Winnicott, p. 103.


34 Winnicott writes, ‘At this point my subject widens out into that of play, and of artistic creativity and appreciation, and of religious feeling, and of dreaming, and also of fetishism, lying and stealing’, Winnicott, p. 5.

35 Knorr Cetina, p. 176.


38 See Laurence Louppe, ‘Reading Time’ in Louppe, Poetics of Contemporary Dance, p. 107.
40 Stern, p. 140.
41 See Louppé, ‘Reading Time’.
44 Arendt, pp. 176–7
45 Arendt, p. 177.
49 See Laurence Louppe, ‘Choreographic Works: Forms of Appearance’ in Louppe, *Poetics of Contemporary Dance*, p. 215. Bruno Latour also writes ‘to have a body is to learn to be affected, meaning “effectuated”, moved, put into motion by other entities, humans or non-humans. If you are not engaged in this learning, you become insensitive, dumb, you drop dead’, ‘How to Talk About the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies’, *Body and Society*, vol. 10, nos 2–3, p. 205.