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According to Thomas Nagel, the requirements of morality “are not imposed from outside, but reflect our own disposition to view ourselves, and our need to accept ourselves, from outside. Without such acceptance we will be in a significant way alienated from our lives” (Nagel 1986: 138).

This quotation hints at a solution to what I will call “Smith’s problem” after Michael Smith who has most clearly articulated it (M. Smith 1994). This problem maps onto the debate between the Kantian and the Humean traditions in ethics. Kantians argue that moral norms are grounded in reason. By exploring the very concepts of morality and freedom we discover that we cannot but give ourselves the moral law autonomously and that it would be inconsistent and self-defeating on the norms of rationality to will to perform an immoral action. In this way, reason can establish certain “moral facts” such as that giving a false promise would be wrong. But the problem here is that this discovery does not provide us with a motivation to do right and avoid evil. We may acknowledge the rationality of doing right without being motivated to do so, just as I may acknowledge the rationality of taking an umbrella on a day when rain is expected but decide, in a devil-may-care mood, not to do so. If considerations of rational prudence can be ignored, how much more could the facts of morality be ignored? And besides, one does not act morally just in order to avoid being irrational.

From the Humean side, the problem is a mirror image of this. For Hume, reason does not motivate. Only desires do. An action is caused by a combination of a relevant belief with a suitable desire. So in order to do right and avoid evil we must desire to do so. Reason can only show us the means. Caring and sympathy for others may count among our desires and it is to be applauded when they do, since this will lead to welcome social and personal outcomes, but there is nothing normative or compelling about those or any other desires. There are no “moral facts” here: no rationally grounded beliefs about what is right or wrong. There are only feelings of sympathy and caring. But these are fleeting and contingent and, moreover, they are not linked to moral beliefs. The absence of relevant
and well-grounded beliefs here means that moral motivation appears not only fleeting but also arbitrary. We will act benevolently just to those people whom we happen to care about. Even a general and impartial point of view, while perhaps indicating what is right, may not guarantee the necessary motivation to do right.

What is needed to overcome the lack of inclination in the Kantian picture and the lack of rational warrant in the Humean conception is an internal relation between a rational belief that an action is right and an effective motivation to perform it. I will argue in this chapter that we need virtue in order to forge this required internal relation between reasons and motivations. I will argue that, in its most general sense, being virtuous involves being motivated to act in accordance with internalized identity-confirming norms in ways appropriate to one's situation so as to express and confirm one's identity as a socially formed, responsible agent. As Nagel might put it, virtue stems from a concern not to be alienated from one's life.

**SELF-CONSTITUTION**

There have been several recent attempts to solve Smith's problem. Christine Korsgaard, in her recent book, *Self-constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*, argues against "dogmatic rationalists" who “believe that norms exist outside of human reason – they arise from Objective Values or Moral Facts or some sort of rational structure that exists ‘out there’ in the universe” (Korsgaard 2009: 6). These views founder on Smith's problem because they do not explain why we feel we should adhere to these norms. The "necessitation", or feeling that an action *is to be done*, that we feel when acting morally does not take the form of obedience to an external reason or command. Instead, the moral life “is not the struggle to be rational or to be good. It is, instead, the ongoing struggle for integrity, the struggle for psychic unity, the struggle to be, in the face of psychic complexity, a single unified agent” (ibid.: 7).

Korsgaard begins her argument by making a distinction between an act and an action. What matters here is the description being given to the action. An event is described as an act when there is no consideration given to the agent's purpose, while a description of an action includes the purpose or end being sought. So when moral theorists talk about making promises, say, they are describing acts, whereas when they draw a scenario in which a person makes a promise in order to gain some advantage, they are describing an action. In this way an agent's reasons are built into the action description. The reason for an action is not a pre-existing mental state that gives the act a point or a moral quality and which could be thought separately from the act. It is inherent in the action as its purpose. The action description expresses the internal coherence of the agent's reasons and motivations.

It is because actions are described in this holistic way that they are so intimate to the identity of their agents. The purposes that give actions the moral quality that they have belong to the agents and express their identities – including their states of virtue and their practical rationality. As Korsgaard puts it, “there is no you prior to your choices and actions, because your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and actions” (ibid.: 19). Accordingly she adds, “We are each faced with the task of constructing a peculiar, individual kind of identity – personal or practical identity – that the other
animals lack” (*ibid.*: 19–20). Moreover, the identity that we construct for ourselves makes certain actions worthwhile. In acting as a mother or as a teacher I adopt the norms that these roles contain along with my identity. I will leave aside whether the individualist voluntarism inherent in this thesis is consistent with theories of social formation of the self beloved of more communitarian thinkers. Whatever the source of our identity – whether we acquire it through our socialization, or whether we construct it as an existential project, or whether both processes are at work dialectically – the link between it and the reasons that we think make an action worthwhile will be very close.

Given Smith’s problem, it would be difficult to understand how we could act *from* principles. Accordingly, Korsgaard interprets Kant as distinguishing between acting from incentives and acting in accordance with principles. The notion of an incentive here is that of an object in the world which, in my way of understanding the world, attracts me in some way so as to elicit a desire or motivation within me. “An incentive is a motivationally loaded representation of an object” (*ibid.*: 104–5). When I act on principle and help a friend at some cost to myself, what is my incentive for doing that? It is not Kant’s respect for the Law. Korsgaard suggests it is my desire to express and enhance my identity as a friend. It is my wish to fulfil my role as a friend that motivates my acting in accordance with the relevant principles of friendship. This solves Smith’s problem in relation to the norms inherent in the many forms of life and related identities that I occupy. There are norms inherent in being a mother, a teacher or a friend and I establish and preserve those identities in myself by acting in accordance with those norms or, as we can now say, *from* those norms. The link between those norms and my identity makes them motivational incentives for me.

But Korsgaard expands this view to suggest that, when we dig down beyond all our relatively transparent purposes and motivations, our deepest incentive is to create our identity as a unified and integrated agent. This identity is, at base, the identity of a rational agent willing and able to follow the dictates of practical reason. As Korsgaard puts it, “In valuing ourselves as the bearers of contingent practical identities, knowing, as we do, that these identities are contingent, we are also valuing ourselves as rational beings” (*ibid.*: 24). And she adds, “The necessity of conforming to the principles of practical reason comes down to the necessity of being a unified agent” (*ibid.*: 25).

But is this theory confirmed phenomenologically? Most often we would help a friend because we see that they are in need of help. It is my being their friend that allows me to see the need and that motivates me to respond to it. In such cases there may not be much explicit entertainment of reasons at all. On other occasions we may explicitly think that we should help a friend because that would be what my being a friend requires of me. But it is not often that I express the necessity I feel to help a friend by saying that I must do so in order to honour my identity as a rational agent. This would be a classic example of Bernard Williams’s “one thought too many” (B. Williams 1981b: 18). However, there is nothing in Korsgaard’s account that suggests that this incentive or motivation must be a conscious reason or a desire. We are less transparent to ourselves than that. What Korsgaard is pointing to is a level in our motivational sets of which we are not usually conscious. There are other more obvious and more “surface” matters that constitute my purposes and it is these that give my actions their moral quality. But the origin of the incentive or deep motivation with which I act is my existential concern to be a rational and unified agent.
However, Korsgaard’s notion of identity as a rational and unified agent seems remarkably thin.\(^3\) It has no phenomenology at all. Our constituting ourselves as unified rational agents by acting rationally is not a purpose that we entertain in any sense that is phenomenologically available to us. While there might be extreme circumstances such as acting under torture, when we question whether what we did when we surrendered vital information was truly done in a voluntary way or whether it was an act wrung from us under extreme duress, we do not normally seek to establish ourselves consciously as a rational agent of our actions. Being a rational agent does not contribute to my sense of identity. It is simply presupposed by it. It would seem then that my identity purely as a rational agent is a Kantian theoretical construct.

However, I do not think that this is a problem for the use that I am making of Korsgaard’s thesis. That it is not available phenomenologically prevents this quest from being a Humean desire and therefore escapes the charge of contingency levelled against such desires. Rather, it is what we might call a necessary condition for agency. All of our actions arise from a deep quest for rational unity in our motivational sets. This condition is now seen as a dynamic, existential quest which occurs below the level of self-consciousness but which we must posit as a real and effective element in our motivational sets in order to make sense of the phenomenon of necessitation. Beneath the many layers of our thick identity as a mother, teacher or friend there needs to be this primordial and usually unconscious quest for the realization of our very humanity as a rational and integrated agent. While Korsgaard uses both Kantian and Platonic concepts to explicate this quest, so that it is both a quest to be true to our rationality and a quest to be internally ordered, the key point is that it unites the rational perception of what we are called upon to do in the world with the existential motivation to order and unify ourselves by doing it.

What Korsgaard has achieved is the identification of an existential, primordial level of caring about one’s own identity as a rational agent. But, up to this point, this has no moral significance. It applies equally to all cases of practical necessitation. Someone may feel that they simply \textit{must} buy that vintage guitar on eBay. Gauguin felt that he \textit{had} to go to Polynesia to pursue his painterly vocation at the expense of his family.\(^4\) Indeed, if it is constitutive of the moral point of view to care about others, then Korsgaard’s quest would seem to be antithetical to virtue. While caring about one’s own identity is not selfish in the sense of being constituted by desires and motivations that seek the satisfaction of one’s own preferences at the expense of others, it is self-centred. Even as it seeks to fulfil the other-directed requirements of mothering, teaching or being a friend, it does so in order to establish and maintain the agent’s identity as a mother, teacher or friend and, through these social roles, that agent’s identity as a rational person.

Indeed, Charles Larmore has offered a critique of an earlier version of Korsgaard’s account that appeared in her book \textit{The Sources of Normativity} (Korsgaard 1996). In this text Korsgaard reiterates Kant’s claim that it is the self-legislation of pure reason that justifies the claims that morality makes on us. However, according to Larmore: “If principles of conduct draw their authority from reason’s legislating for itself, and not from its responding to the reasons there are, then the allegiance we owe to the claims of morality has to stem from a respect we feel for our own powers of rationality” (Larmore 2008: 115). But this does not reflect the authentic meaning of the moral point of view. This meaning is that we see another’s good as a reason for action on our part. It is not that the norms upon which we should act serve to confirm us as rational beings, but that we take the needs
and feelings of others into account in a direct and perceptual response to the real-world situations in which we find ourselves. According to Larmore,

Our moral identity consists not in valuing our own humanity and thereby determining that we ought to value that of others, but in recognizing directly the reason there is to value humanity in whatever person it may happen to appear. It is a reason to love our neighbour in no less an immediate fashion than we are naturally moved to care about ourselves.  

(Ibid.: 122)

In her later text Korsgaard responds to this critique and attempts to give virtue-ethical relevance to her thesis by using Plato’s doctrine that a morally bad action is one that stems from a disordered soul. Plato famously drew analogies between the way in which a state is governed and the way in which persons govern themselves. From this Korsgaard draws the lesson that rational action should be described using not the conflict model in which reason suppresses the other parts of the soul, but the constitutional model, in which reasons act as the ordering element so as to produce an ordered and unified self who can own the action as its rational agent. As she puts it, “necessitation does exist in the Platonic soul, but it does not take the form of active, forcible repression. It is simply the work of government – the constant and everyday fact of coercive constitutional rule” (Korsgaard 2009: 147). What this analogy suggests is that the goal of the self is the maintenance of its inner order and thus of its identity as a principle-led rational agent. Korsgaard uses the several kinds of bad constitution that Plato had described as models for what can go wrong in the constitutional model of action she proposes to suggest that doing bad things is often a case of not being in charge of oneself. The moral law is the law of the unified constitution. Accordingly, “Both Plato and Kant think that the principle, the one that really unifies us, and renders us autonomous, is also the principle of the morally good person. According to Plato and Kant, integrity in the metaphysical sense – the unity of agency – and in the moral sense – goodness – are one and the same property” (ibid.: 176).

As if realizing that this response is still too narcissistic, Korsgaard goes on to argue that an agent with integrity is one who can take the reasons and purposes of another as a reason for herself – as opposed to simply using the other’s reasons as a means to her own purposes. This articulates the Kantian prohibition against using another as a means. To have achieved my identity as an ordered rational agent is to live in a world in which the reasons of others – their needs and legitimate desires – are incentives for me, just as it is, as Larmore had argued, a world in which those needs and desires are reasons for me. Calling these reasons incentives solves Smith’s problem, and acknowledging the reasons of others as reasons for me solves the moral relevance problem. Korsgaard concludes that, “Responding to another’s reasons as normative is the default position – just like hearing another’s words as meaningful is the default position. It takes work to ignore someone else’s reasons; it’s nearly as hard to be bad as it is to be good. And that’s because reasons are public” (ibid.: 202). It is in this way that personal integrity in Korsgaard’s sense equates with moral goodness and virtue.

The problem with this account, however, is that it is still the wrong thing that seems to be at stake when we act morally. For Korsgaard, what is at stake is one’s identity as a rational agent and – which she says comes to the same thing – one’s integrity as a moral
agent. In Kantian terms this is my humanity as a self-legislator of the Law. However, Larmore is surely right when he says that this is not what morality is about. It is about not putting yourself first. Morality is an expression of our caring about others. It involves a deep level of caring directed upon others which comes to concrete expression in specific experiences of sympathy, specific acts of kindness and the avoidance of causing specific kinds of harm. Korsgaard's reply establishes only that it is acceptable to say that identity and integrity are all that morality is about because the concerns of other people are inextricably bound up with the agent's identity and integrity.

But I suspect that this would only be true for a virtuous agent. Gauguin seemed to be quite rational and integrated. Yet he was able to reject the call of his family upon him in order to pursue his integrity as an artist. So we need a better account of how the concern for others becomes an internal reason for virtuous agents. Perhaps Korsgaard's basis for necessitation is just too thin, abstract and primordial to provide a substantive conception of virtue. A substantive account would embrace the multitude of concerns and responsibilities – including those directed upon others – that a worldly agent has.

ETHICAL FORMATION

In her text *Ethical Formation*, Sabina Lovibond offers a different way of overcoming Smith's problem. She also calls for an “internal” relationship between one's rationally grounded moral beliefs and one's moral actions, “meaning that the condition of being motivated to act is (somehow) contained, or implicit, in that of sincerely believing the relevant action to be called for” (Lovibond 2002: 3). If Lovibond's internal relationship holds, a belief that is sincerely held would lead fairly readily – absent any form of *akrasia* – to its being acted upon. If such a belief were about reasons in the world it might provide the means of overcoming the apparent narcissism of Korsgaard's account. It would also convert subjective necessitation into genuine normativity. But notice that this sincere practical belief need not be true on the basis of a “view from nowhere”. A “truth” in this sense – obtained by an impartial or ideal observer – would heighten Smith's problem rather than solve it since it would disengage the practical belief from the motivational set of the agent.

Lovibond argues that a virtuous person is one who is sensitive to the reasons for acting morally which have a reality out there in the world in a form that allows them to be responded to.⁵ Not unlike Korsgaard, Lovibond rejects what she calls “the priority of psychology” (ibid.: 5), such as the Humean view that we need to feel sympathy or caring for others in order to be motivated to act well. Rather, moral motivation arises from “a certain species of rationality” (ibid.) which allows the virtuous person to see the reasons that are already there in the world: “a world in which the reasons why something is valued by one person are in principle, even if not immediately, accessible to another” (ibid.: 6). Lovibond suggests that this recognition of values and reasons in the world requires sensitivity on the agent's part and that this sensitivity is an aspect of that agent’s virtue. Whereas most virtue ethicists approach virtue as a character ideal understood as a set of dispositions or traits which are either expressed directly in action or less directly in emotions and ethical commitments, Lovibond gives the notion of virtue a more rationalist reading. As she puts it: “Virtue ethics, then, can be seen as aiming at the elucidation of the rationalist character ideal as it relates to practical rationality, and within practical rationality, to the
proper appreciation of those (potentially action-guiding) values that lie beyond the range of ordinary self-interest” (ibid.: 13).

This rationalist reading involves not just an ideal of virtuous character and practice, but also an epistemological ideal centred on correct judgement. Inspired by Aristotle, Lovibond stresses the role of *phronēsis* understood as sensitive and appropriate judgement as to the moral values and demands inherent in an agent’s situation. According to Lovibond, our world always already contains values: values which are there to be apprehended and responded to, rather than values we have created and then projected into the world. Because these values or reasons are always already there we are inserted into a space of reasons.

It is this thesis that overcomes Smith’s problem. Rather than there being an internal existential quest for rational unity which relates subjective reasons to motivations, the world already contains values and, as worldly beings, our responses to those values are always already motivated. Accordingly, Lovibond gives great attention to explaining how these values can be understood to exist objectively. She says we should not seek to step outside of our world and theorize it “sideways on” as if we could grasp the relation between mind and world as a separate object of enquiry. While the moral realities to which the virtuous person is sensitive are socially constructed, she does not appeal to sociology to account for this. Rather, she alludes to Aristotle’s account of the formation of virtue in which a person moves from being taught to act in accordance with virtue and then acquires the internal disposition to act for the sake of virtue. This process is not just dispositional but also cognitive. At some point the agent moves from reacting appropriately to morally salient stimuli to being able to understand what those stimuli are and what responses they require from her. Just as one is inserted into a linguistic space by one’s upbringing, so too one is inserted into the space of moral reasons that constitutes morality. Having been trained in the habit of acting virtuously one gradually comes to acquire the skill of picking out what is morally important. A fully formed moral subject “knows how to go on” in a morally salient situation. The fully developed moral agent is able to pick out morally relevant features in her world and act appropriately in response to them.

But will she be motivated to do so? Lovibond argues that a coherent motivational form is gradually given to the reactions and attitudes of those who are shaped by their societies. Following John McDowell (1994), she refers to this as our “second nature” built upon the unstructured impulses of our “first nature”. Our first nature consists of all our pre-moral drives, appetites and impulses, most of which will be self-seeking but some of which will also be instinctively sociable – including such impulses as arise from sexual relations, friendships and family ties – while our second nature is our socialized self. It is this socialized self which is the agent of virtuous action and the subject of our rational and moral judgements. Given our communitarian second nature, the moral forms that our moral communities impart to us allow us to affirm ourselves as the persons we are in the context of our societies, and to express our inclinations in forms acceptable to, and structured by, our surrounding culture.

The charge of cultural relativism which might arise in response to this account is addressed by Lovibond in her suggestion that, although there is relativism here, there is also objectivity. It is not voluntary agreement which establishes this objectivity. Rather, it is the pre-conscious processes of acculturation and, as a result, persons emerge into the social world finding norms and values which are always already there. Objectivity comes
about because the processes of social formation build rules which we then experience as binding: just as arithmetic rules are learnt in inchoate ways as part of a non-self-conscious learning process but nevertheless produce objectively valid standards for doing mathematics. As Lovibond puts it:

If we are going to point to *immersion in a culture* as the material basis of our sense of value and of its normative bearing on action, then it would seem that we remain committed to a character ideal inextricably linked with the concept of form – a concept that reappears in the setting of “relaxed” (nonreductive) naturalism in the guise of the ethically significant form to which the virtuous person is attuned.

(Lovibond 2002: 62)

Although she appeals to Plato to explicate the concept of “form” that she is using here, she is not alluding to a transcendent reality or to a view from nowhere. Rather, the judgments and ways of acting on the part of individuals in a community collectively participate in, and contribute to, the traditions and way of life of that community, including its moral norms. This way of life then constitutes the quasi-Platonic form of which those judgments and actions are an expression. While this degree of objectivity may not satisfy all moral realists, it will be sufficient for my argument and, indeed, may be as much objectivity as any virtue-ethical theory has available to it.

Pursuing her rejection of the priority of psychology in her account of practical rationality, Lovibond rejects any appeal to metaphysical entities such as free will or even self-conscious intentions housed in a mind. For her, to act morally is not to give oneself the moral law so as to constitute one’s freedom, or to be driven by benevolent sentiments such as caring. It is to express one’s socially formed values in action. While the cynical may see the existential quest which motivates such expression as a will to conformity, a more generous reading would see it as motivated by a desire for belonging. I should add that this account explains, in a way that Korsgaard’s could not, our adherence to norms which are not rationally based, such as those of aesthetics or of religious dietary rules.

Lovibond departs from the Kantian concept of “autonomy” in favour of her own concept of “authorship”. Given the social pressures towards dissolution of self and given the co-presence and effectiveness of a first nature and a second nature, our authorship is the creation of a unified self out of the myriad influences that constitute that self. In this way we attest to our acceptance of the norms of our culture and also to our integrity as a discrete individual. We do not give ourselves the law so as to constitute ourselves as autonomous apart from, or in defiance of, our socialization. Rather, we constitute our subjectivity by being the author of our actions from within the practical resources our culture gives us. Just as a writer can be an author even while using an established language which he has not given himself as a law, so a moral agent can use established community norms which she does not give herself as laws. Nevertheless, her authorship of her actions is genuine. Ethical training brings us to the point where we can do the right thing not just as imitators of others, but as authors of our own acts.

Lovibond sees authorship as an ethical notion in that it grounds accountability. We need to be able to represent ourselves to others as consistent and unified. For Lovibond, this is what makes social life predictable and allows others to rely on us. However, as this is a somewhat instrumental account of authorship, I would highlight its existential
significance. While it grounds our accountability to others, it also grounds our self-acceptance as unified selves and responsible virtuous agents.

**VIRTUE**

What concept of virtue can we derive from all this? It will not be a specific concept such as that of courage, generosity or honesty. It is as yet too primordial to have a name. It will acquire specific names as it is realized in specific situations. It will not be a concept tied to that of “character” – a passive concept tied to explanatory and causal ways of thinking. It will be an existential concept and it will lie so deeply in our motivational make-up as to normally escape the scrutiny of reflection. If it has a link to the concept of eudaimonia it will be through that of self-realization. And it will overcome the distinction between self-concern and concern for others which has been so crucial to identifying the moral point of view.

I have suggested in my commentary on Korsgaard’s thesis about identity and integrity and Lovibond’s thesis about authorship that there is an existential concern expressed in the ethical life. It is a concern to forge and express our unity as a moral agent and our integrity as a subject who is largely socially formed. This concern is not equivalent to a prudential concern in which we pursue our interests – possibly at the expense of those of others – but is a self-directed or agent-relative concern of a morally innocent kind. If our social formation turns the needs of others into incentives or into reasons for us to ameliorate their condition, we still need a basis from which to respond. We are not inert receptacles of morally loaded messages from the world. We are not cameras that can coldly record the suffering of others. We have a responsive second nature. Just as our world contains reasons that are always already there, so our subjectivity – our authorship – contains concerns that are always already there. One of these will be our concern to be who we are.

But what Korsgaard has faintly shown, and Lovibond more strongly, is that who we are is not distinct from what we are morally concerned about. It is not detached from the norms and values that exist in our societies. Our social upbringing has made us into beings who see our good not just in our own identity but also in doing good for others. Indeed, Emmanuel Lévinas (1969) has argued that our concern and responsibility for others ground our very ontology as existential beings. It is through the concern of others for me that I have come to be. Accordingly, I have learnt what it is to be in a context from which caring for others cannot be removed. The virtuous stance which lies in the hidden heart of our authorship is a self-project concerned to establish, at one and the same time, our being as a unified agent and our being as one concerned to meet the legitimate needs of others and to avoid doing them harm. I need those others in order for me to have the purposes that constitute my actions as mine and in order for them to constitute that meaningful world full of reasons for action in which I live.

This concept of virtue overcomes Smith’s problem. Virtue is an existential quest for self-realization that provides the internal link between reason and motivation so as to drive my practical engagement with the world. It grounds the necessitations out of which I act. It constitutes my motivated self and extends my concerns towards others. It is a necessary condition both for seeing moral facts and for being a moral agent. Seeing those facts is just as much an expression of my virtue as the motivated actions that would flow from it. In
this way, virtue is able to discriminate between practical necessitations which are of moral significance and those which are not. The virtuous person sees the necessity of acquiring a rare guitar as morally insignificant and the necessity of pursuing art at the expense of family as morally dubious. If she is a Muslim, she sees the necessity of not eating pork as of a different order of significance from the necessity of being honest. My virtue is not only crucial for my quest for integrity, identity and belonging as a rational, social agent, but also for seeing others as objects of my concern and for seeing their needs as reasons for responsive action – reasons that always already exist objectively in my world.

NOTES

1. It should be noted that in mentioning “integrity” Korsgaard is not alluding to the specific virtue that involves staying true to one’s commitments.
2. This echoes the “expression theory of action” theorized by philosophers like Charles Taylor (1979; 1985; 1989: ch. 21).
3. I am using the terms “thick” and “thin” in the sense that Michael Walzer (1994) uses them.
4. This example is discussed by Bernard Williams in his essay “Moral Luck” (1981a).
5. This is a view not unlike that presented by Christine Swanton (2003).
6. This may also provide a link to Nietzsche’s concept of will-to-power as explicated by Swanton, this volume, Chapter 9.