This is the published version:


Available from Deakin Research Online:

http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30061978

Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.

Copyright : 2013, Nova Science Publishers
Chapter IX

The Occupiers’ Burden: Tackling Food Shortage and Related Health Problems in Post-War Germany, 1945-47

Filip Slaveski*
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies,
University of Melbourne, Australia

Abstract

The end of the Second World War brought much relief to its combatants, but a range of problems remained that would plague post-war Europe for years to come. Chief among them was food shortage. The breakdown of agricultural systems, essential services, and the state itself laid fertile ground for food shortage to develop in parts of post-war Germany occupied by the victorious powers. There is much to be gained from comparing the occupiers’ responses to this Horsemanship of the Apocalypse. The most fruitful comparison lies between the Soviets and British. Unlike the Americans whose economic might in the post-war period allowed them to better feed and supply Germans living in their occupation zone, domestic economic weaknesses hamstring both Soviet and British responses to the more severe advent of food shortage which confronted them. Their responses were very different—some successful, others not—but all instructive for understanding the impacts of natural and policy factors on the development of food shortage and the consequences to the health of the population. The variety of these impacts have been obscured by the absence of this comparison in the literature, which is now made more feasible by the greater availability of the extensive resources that each

*SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. OLD QUAD, THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, PARKVILLE, VIC 3010, AUSTRALIA; E-MAIL: slaveski@unimelb.edu.au
occupier devoted to recording food and health data, particularly in the Soviet case. The data is not only relevant to the occupation period from 1945 to 1949, as it suggests long-term health impacts on those most exposed to the risk of food shortage then, and most at risk to the consequences of malnutrition decades later. In fact, as the available data defines regional differences in food rations and, accordingly, comparative food shortages in Soviet and British occupation zones, the situation in post-war Germany provides an excellent platform for future research linking differences in early nutrition to adult health outcomes.

**Background to the Comparison**

For the most part, wartime ration levels for German civilians were high compared to their European opponents [1]. Allied soldiers were even taken aback by the relatively ‘plump’ composition of many Germans as they raced to Berlin in 1945, none more so than those of the malnourished Red Army. The impressive wartime ration levels were supplemented by food pillaged from occupied Europe and particularly the Soviet Union, which served both German wartime aims of keeping the home front happy and starving to death millions of ‘excess population’ in the East [2]. Real ration levels decreased as defeated German forces retreated homeward and with the dissolution of the Nazi state at the end of the war in May 1945, months from the collection of local harvest, fears of mass starvation were rampant. At least initially, the Red Army averted mass starvation in Berlin by diverting food from their own military stocks to feed the city and then importing foodstuffs from home until the collection of the German harvest [3]. The harvest, however, was exceedingly poor and failed to compensate for the cessation of imports, let alone for the almost 1.5 million Red Army troops that, like the Germans, now had to feed exclusively from German crops. Food shortage thus became a systemic problem in the eastern part of Germany occupied by the Soviets from mid-1945, with significant consequences to the health of the population now also exposed to serious communicable diseases. These consequences were not uniform across eastern Germany, as the Soviet rationing system prioritised major cities at the expense of smaller ones, while the broader political system bled rural resources to feed urban needs. This ensured greater urban productivity in large cities, but concentrated shortages to specific areas, allowing us to better pinpoint the impact of policy on health outcomes. Until late 1947 when Soviet occupation authorities managed to stabilise the food situation, this impact was devastating for some.

In general, however, the Soviets managed the food situation much better than their British counterparts. The British rationing system encouraged food shortage in urban areas most important to the sustainability of the economy, which gave rise to work stoppages and even forms of violent protest which constricted economic growth and only compounded the food shortage problem which gave rise to them in the first place. This cycle developed in the midst of the world food crisis in 1946-47, which constricted food imports on which the area of north-western Germany occupied by the British was traditionally reliant to feed its population. To make matters worse, their inexperience in mass-managing agricultural affairs prepared them poorly to exploit domestic food sources to replace the lost imports. These problems plagued the British zone (BZ) in the immediate post-war period and was only gradually resolved with its unification with the US zone (UZ) from 1947. Until then,
rationing systems in the BZ and Soviet zone (SZ) shuddered under the weight of their obligations, with the Soviet managing to keep its feet better.

**Soviet-British Ration Levels**

Both occupiers quickly encountered significant food supply problems after establishing their rationing systems in mid-1945. Even official ration levels were injurious to the basic health of the majority of ration recipients in either zone, let alone the actual level which was considerably lower. Each occupier set ration entitlements and organised their populations into an entitlement hierarchy based on the simple principle that those who worked harder or closer to the regime should receive more food than those who did not. Heavy labourers thus received more than light labourers, who received more than office workers. In the Soviet case the unemployed, mostly women and the aged, received least, and were most at risk to hunger-relates disease [4]. The exception to this rule was that special classes of people such as expectant and nursing mothers received other entitlements in the BZ or special food supplements to their diets in the Soviet [5]. Also, different entitlement levels were set for various cities and regions in the SZ, just as it was in the Soviet Union [6]. The capitals, Berlin/Moscow, were classified as first-tier cities and afforded priority in food rations, while less populous and ‘important’ cities were classified as second, third, and fourth-tiered and afforded less priority. Similarly, more populous cities in the BZ were better supplied than smaller ones although not according to such a detailed system. The Soviet system is evident in Table 1 which compares entitlements in Berlin and Dresden, a second-tier city containing approximately half a million inhabitants.

**Table 1. [7] Differential Ration Entitlements for Berlin and Dresden, August 1945 (daily calories)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ration Category</th>
<th>Bread</th>
<th>Potatoes</th>
<th>Cereals/Grains</th>
<th>Meat</th>
<th>Fat</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
<th>Total Calories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category I: Heavy industry labourers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2597.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2025.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category II: Light industry labourers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>1435.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category III: Office workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>1419.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV: Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin, (0-15 years)</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>1391.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden, (0-16 years)</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>1294.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category V: Dependents, unemployed, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>1316.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>916.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. [10] Calorific Entitlements for Normal Consumers (NCs) and Very Heavy Workers (VHWs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ration period</th>
<th>NCs</th>
<th>VHWs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Feb. 1946</td>
<td>1671 (avg.)</td>
<td>2495 (avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-31 March</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>2265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-28 April</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>2325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April-26 May</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>2325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May - 23 June</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>2335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June - 21 July</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>2340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July - 18 August</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>2445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug.-15 Sept.</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>2645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. [18] Land Available per 100 People, 1946 (acres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Agricultural land</th>
<th>Arable land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British calorific entitlements in June 1945 were considerably lower for much its occupied population, particularly the majority who lived in the North Rhine, Westphalia, and Ruhr regions. Normal consumers, the ration category into which the 40 per cent of the population in the BZ fell (some 8 million), received from 1040 to 1150 calories [9]. By September the level had risen in most major cities to 1671 calories. If compared to Soviet category III ration entitlements of 1419 calories, to which the Normal Consumer category is most similar, then a similar level of entitlement is evident in major cities of both zones by September 1945 outside the privileged capital of Berlin. This remained so until the food crisis in March 1946 when British entitlements dropped to 1015 calories and remained below the 1671 level thereafter, evident in Table 2. Generally, then, Soviet entitlement levels were higher than the British from 1945 to 1947.

However, as William Moskoff observes in his analysis of the wartime rationing system in the Soviet Union, ‘a ration card was a set of possibilities, not a set of assurances’ [11]. Ration entitlements were hardly ever met in full in both zones and habitually less so in the British, especially after March 1946. Similarly, some foods were often unavailable and substituted for others, particularly fish for meat, and the quality of the food was often poor, reducing its nutritional value. Determining how many calories were supplied to consumers in both zones at specific times is thus most difficult, perhaps more so in the Soviet case where reporting on food supply was often influenced by a range of institutional interests. Determining consumers’ actual calorific consumption poses greater difficulties, given ‘unaccountable’ food available to some via home garden plots, the black market or trade with farmers [12]. These problems are alleviated somewhat by the availability of nutritional surveys conducted by the Americans to determine the actual amount of food consumed by Berliners. Unfortunately, however, surveys from those areas worst affected by shortages in the BZ are scarce [13]. The pressing question here is not only how much food each occupier provided its
population at specific times and how much people were able to scrounge, but how the occupiers managed to keep the rationing system functioning in the face of the severe crises which confronted them.

**The Food Supply Crises, 1945-1947**

The source of these crises for both occupiers was the same—the constriction of food imports and limited domestic supply to compensate them. Importing food from the Soviet Union became unfeasible when the summer 1945 Soviet harvest yielded only 47.3 million tonnes of grain, just less than half of the 1940 level and unwarranted once the collection of the German harvest began [14]. In the immediate wake of the Potsdam Conference, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the commander in-chief of the main organ charged with running the SZ, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG) [15], announced to his subordinates that the rationing systems for Germans and occupation forces alike would now be funded by the German harvest, making its full collection even more of a priority [16]. Early in the following year, the World Food Crisis sunk the international food trade, drying up the imports on which the British were so reliant. The reduction of American imports was especially problematic, as they were the greatest supplier of food to the BZ in the post-war period [17].

As the north-west of Germany was traditionally a food import area, it was more difficult for the British to exploit domestic food resources to compensate for the reduction of imports than the Soviets. To highlight this difference, Table 3 [18] cites J. P. Nettl’s agricultural land to population figures from his foundational study of the SZ.

With the agricultural sector producing food for an average daily intake of only four hundred calories ration recipient, the rationing system in the BZ needed to be supplemented by millions of tonnes of imported food for both locals and occupation forces [19]. The relative overpopulation of the BZ in comparison to the SZ did not help, so much so that even when the BZ fused with the American to form Bizonia in 1947 the output of principal agricultural products in proportion to population size still lagged behind the Soviets, giving continued impetus for even greater food imports. In fact, by the end of 1947 Bizonia could only produce a total of 134 kg of grain per head of population, while the SZ produced at least 193 kg [20]. If not for massive food imports provided largely by the Americans from 1945 to 1946, and thereafter in Bizonia, the British would have been unable to feed their urban centres.

The greater amount of arable land in the SZ, however, did not guarantee greater food supplies during 1945 and 1946. Much of the arable land in the SZ during this time could not be exploited for a number of reasons. The spring sowing in 1945 had been limited due to military operations, promising only a minimal harvest in the summer. Even this minimal harvest could not be collected fully. Many large agricultural producers in eastern Germany had fled ahead of the Soviet advance, and the liberation of the legions of slave labourers who had formed the backbone of the German wartime agriculture introduced severe labour shortages to a collapsing system [21]. However, administrative and labour shortages were not the only problems. When leaving the land, liberated labourers often took as much farm machinery and livestock as possible, making it most difficult for the new German labourers mobilised by the Soviets to collect the harvest. To make matters worse, the lack of fuel made
it difficult to transport whatever foodstuffs were harvested from rural to urban areas. This is to say nothing of the range of soil problems that beset the sector, and the fact that labourers’ requisitioning of machinery and livestock paled in comparison to that conducted by the Soviets as part of their reparations programme.

The Failed British Response to Food Crisis and Hunger Exposure in the Ruhr

Although similarities in the agricultural situation and food crises which developed in both zones from mid-1945 are clear, the occupiers’ responses to them could not have been more different. The essential distinction between the British and Soviet approach to agriculture was one of control. Unlike the British, the Soviets rebuilt the entire agricultural system in eastern Germany. The initial hopes of some British occupation officials of doing so were dashed as it soon became apparent that the occupation government simply lacked adequate personnel. As a result, it could not conduct a mass purge of corrupt agricultural managers, replace corrupt and inefficient agricultural practices with equitable and effective ones—essentially—establish a British monopoly over food supplies. In the absence of these measures, the British became reliant on an agricultural system inattentive to their orders and hostile to their rule.

One of the worst features of the old system was the corruption inherent in its rural collection networks, that is, groups of German agricultural managers who set product quotas for local farmers to fill based on what the area could produce, collected the product, and then sent it to urban areas for consumption. In the interest of decreasing farmer workloads and keeping food in rural areas, agricultural managers often set quotas much lower than what farmers were capable of producing. This form of ‘localism’ became such a widespread and pressing problem that even the head German food official in the BZ, Hans von Sch Lange-Schoeningen, was forced to concede in 1946 that these managers ‘had become mere instruments of self-supply for their own community’ [22]. But without the bureaucratic machinery to replace the corrupt managers or the policing apparatus to compel German farmers to produce more food, the British had little choice but to accept the status quo [23]. British threats to introduce heavy fines for such corrupt practices were undermined by their inability to enforce them on a large scale.

As a result, the British were forced to rely more heavily on food imports to sustain the zone, which became more difficult when food export markets constricted during the World Food Crisis in early 1946. The drop in nominal ration entitlements evident in Table 2 from March 1946 gave rise to work stoppages, riots outside bakeries and broader protests across the zone that destabilised the its economy and only exacerbated food shortage problems. The consistent failure of the authorities to provide even these meagre entitlements in full only encouraged further unrest. If in 1946 this cycle of food shortage and economic inefficiency was beginning to emerge as the basis for civil unrest, by 1947 it had crystallised into the most salient feature of the broader mismanagement of occupation affairs in the BZ.

This cycle was most severe in urban and industrial areas most important to the economy, particularly the Ruhr mining regions.
Table 4. [28] The 1947 Coal-Food Cycle (tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard coal production</td>
<td>6,119,000</td>
<td>5,094,000</td>
<td>5,192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid fuel exports</td>
<td>8,420,000</td>
<td>6,800,000</td>
<td>8,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from mines (hard, brown, bunker coal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour and grain imports</td>
<td>243,200</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>302,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. [30] Birth-Death Rates in the BZ, 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of births per 1000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. [31] Infant Mortality Rates in the BZ, 1946-47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of death per 1000 infants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 - 4th Quarter</td>
<td>105.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-1st Quarter</td>
<td>102.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-2nd Quarter</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coal miners, classed as VHWs, received much higher rations than NCs, yet only received ration supplements at their workplaces, which severely reduced their ability to provide food for their families. They too, in times of crisis, were forced to be absent from work to forage for food with their families. As John Farquharson notes in his groundbreaking work on food management in the western zones, the detrimental effect of coal miners’ absence on the economy was most pronounced because the occupation government mainly used the proceeds from coal exports to pay for food imports. Less coal meant less imported food and less fuel for agricultural machinery and industries producing agricultural goods, such as fertilisers, which, in turn, only exacerbated food shortage which gave rise to low coal production in the first place [24]. Food shortage thus became a self-exacerbating problem.

The coal-food cycle developed with greatest severity in the first and second quarters of 1947. Although nominal calorific entitlements for miners and NCs did not drop to anywhere near the same degree as in 1946, real ration levels dropped significantly. The consequences on mining in the Ruhr were significant. According to the calculations of British intelligence officials at the beginning of April, strikes and work stoppages in the Ruhr had already resulted in losses of about half a million tonnes of coal for the year to date [25]. The worst was still yet to come. By the end of the month, American Military Government (OMGUS) [26] officials estimated that production losses for April alone amounted to approximately 1 million tonnes for hard coal and 355,000 tonnes for brown coal [27]. Although seasonal drops in coal production from the first to second quarter in Germany were to be expected, the drop was steep in 1947. Low coal production and exports in April severely reduced food imports which exacerbated the coal-food cycle. As evident in Table 4, grain and flour imports for German civilians in April 1947 were the lowest for the calendar year.
Miners were not only missing work to forage for food, but also to join others in protest against both German food administrations and the British. British intelligence reporters often downplayed the anti-British tenor of the riots in the spring of 1947, but it was more difficult for them to so, at least convincingly, when reporting on a riot in Düsseldorf in the final week of March:

During a mass food demonstration of 30,000 people...unruly elements smashed windows of British offices and overturned into a lake a Volkswagen in the British service [29].

Riots continued throughout April and tension between the occupied population and the British remained high. The deteriorating health situation among Germans across the Ruhr may also have fuelled the riots, as an analysis of birth-death rates and particularly infant mortality rates gives some indication of the seriousness of food shortage, harsh weather, and disease during early 1947 (tables 5-6).

**Immediate Health Impacts Across the BZ and the Ruhr**

Detailed data suggests that infant mortality across the Ruhr was probably higher than the BZ average. During 1946 teams of allied scientists operating in Wuppertal, some 30 kilometres east of Düsseldorf, investigated the relationship between food shortage and health outcomes on local infants and children. Analysing German records from a women’s hospital in Wuppertal which recorded (meticulously) weight and nutritional data for 22,000 births between 1937 and 1945, they found that the average birth weight of newborns in the hospital in 1937 when food was plentiful was 185 grams heavier than in 1945. We can safely assume a similar or worse disparity at the beginning of 1947 [32].

The Wuppertal study and the German records on which it draws demonstrate several possibilities of determining specific impacts of food shortage on health outcomes in the worst hit areas of the BZ, as do a number of recent publications on food problems in post-war Germany [33]. These impacts may not be restricted to the immediate post-war era, as the consequences of malnutrition in the early years of a child’s development may also influence their physiology, health, and achievement in society as an adult. This is an area of much research today and several studies of possible long-term effects of food shortages early in life are reported elsewhere in this book [34]. Even in 1946 it was clear to the allied scientists that malnutrition suffered by orphans in Wuppertal had contributed to them, on average, being much lighter and shorter than their British and American counterparts [35]. What happened to them years later? Did they remain shorter and lighter than their western counterparts? Did malnutrition degrade their constitutions, making them more susceptible to diseases as adults? What of other children exposed to similar levels of malnutrition across occupied Germany? We can address these questions now because occupation governments devoted scarce time and their limited resources then to gauging the health of their populations and sought out local German data for this purpose. Gauging the health of the population was part of a broader exercise meant to provide a knowledge base for the occupiers to better govern Germany.
OMGUS prepared monthly statistical reports providing detailed data on agriculture, fuel and industrial resources, health, and social welfare in Bizonia which are available to researchers. Much of the data consist of broad averages, but local data from the worst-affected areas, especially hospital records as in the Wuppertal case, promise to fill this gap. Other research conducted by OMGUS officials is also relevant, including the large scale and relatively sophisticated street-weighing and school-weighing programs to determine changes over time in height and weight in defined populations according to sex and age. OMGUS also conducted nutritional surveys in areas "where they seemed to be the most needed" to assess weight and height in relation to available rations [36]. In Berlin, the actual amount of food consumed was evaluated as well, not just that afforded by rations [37]. Much of this work was carried out in relatively better-fed areas rather than the Ruhr, yet even in the aggregated Bizonia area broad changes can be seen in average body weight in men and women between 1946 and 1949, with the lowest values in mid-1947 [38]. Connections between policy measures, food shortages and immediate changes in health outcomes abound in these sources and need to be critically examined for future use in studies of possible long-term effects of adverse conditions in occupied Germany [39].

The ‘Successful’ Soviet Response to Food Crisis and Exposures to Food Shortage-Disease in the SZ

There was no need for the BZ to be over-reliant on food imports from abroad or for the coal-food cycle to be so severe. The extent to which the failure of the British to replace the collection networks on the local rural level was responsible for poor harvest collection and, thus, this over reliance, becomes most apparent when compared to the Soviet case. It is certainly tempting to contrast the heavy-handed collection tactics of the Soviets, such as fining and arresting recalcitrant farmers and, in extreme cases, executing them, to the less severe punishments meted out by the British to demonstrate this argument. But such an exercise would miss the point. The intelligence of the Soviet system lay not only in its punishment of farmers for failing to meet delivery quotas, but the manner in which it discouraged farmers and officials from underestimating the amount they were capable of delivering. A more valuable comparison between Soviet and British collection networks, thus, concerns the process by which quotas were set—a comparison sorely lacking in the literature.

If agricultural managers in the BZ ‘had become mere instruments of self-supply for their own community’ by setting low quotas, then many managers in the SZ had become instruments of supply for the occupation government by doing the opposite. Leading up to 1945 harvest, Soviet administrators established numerous special commissions in rural areas to inspect farmland and work with local German authorities, mostly local KPD or SPD [40] party members and experienced farmers to determine yield capacity and set production quotas. Despite staff shortages, the Soviets managed to set quotas for most farmers in the SZ [41]. In most cases where KPD/SED members were involved, quotas were set beyond realistic levels at their insistence. They were undoubtedly eager to please their Soviet bosses. Such an arrangement was only possible because, unlike the British, the Soviets had
overhauled the agricultural as well as the political system where they pushed party members into positions of local authority who understood their role as providing agricultural goods to feed urban centres, rather than hoarding goods for the sake of the locals.

In a common occurrence, a party mayor promised the Soviet authorities in Brandenburg a bumper 1946 harvest figure for his region, not taking into account the lack of horse and machine power which made the target incredibly difficult, perhaps impossible, for local farmers to attain [42]. Nonetheless, the farmers’ failure to do so attracted fines and, in some cases, imprisonment. On the one hand, setting unrealistic quotas was most problematic as it created a minefield of legal red tape and handfuls of jailed farmers that did not help fix the agricultural labour shortage problem. But on the other, by setting the higher quotas to which most farmers necessarily aspired, the Soviets ensured that even the lower level of product that was delivered was more commensurate with actual yield capacity [43]. Farquharson’s critique of the British system’s focus on collections, ‘that whatever percentage was surrendered, it was of a demand that was abnormally low in the first place’, cannot not be levelled at the Soviet [44].

The Soviets also focused the weight of their punishments on offences dealing with establishing yield capacity and setting quotas rather than collections, which were usually dealt with by fines. It was inevitable that some farmers and local officials would set lower quotas for local interests. In the haste to reconstruct local political and agricultural systems, sometimes officials were appointed by SVAG or local German administrations with little, if any investigation into their past. Some of those who possessed an anti-Soviet disposition and engaged in localism were rooted out gradually with sporadic purging. They could only engage in localism because commissions could not inspect all farmland during the 1945 harvest season and thus depended on many farmers and officials to do the work for them. This placed the Soviets in a similar position to the British who relied on local agricultural managers to do so. The Soviets, however, conducted systematic inspections of the farmland once manpower became available and found that some farmers, expectedly, were underestimating their yield capacity and local officials were setting much lower product quotas than those expected [45].

Perhaps the most extreme example of punishment was meted out to a Mecklenburg farmer who incorrectly reported the size of his farm to local authorities in August 1945. He was made an example of for failing to report an extra twenty-three hectares or arable farmland attached to his property, considerably reducing the amount of grain that the Soviets could demand of him. He failed to declare another four hectares of his farmland at the second registration as well. That he was a large landowner, a repeat offender, and, perhaps, committed the offence on the cusp of the implementation of the land reform programme, convinced the military tribunal of the Second Shock Army which tried the farmer not to sentence him to imprisonment, as would usually be the case, but to death [46]. In this case, the sentence was to be made known to the other farmers in the area as a sign that such misreporting would not be tolerated [47].

The British were never in a position to punish the majority of misreporting farmers or officials, either with extreme or mild sentences. They simply lacked an enforcement mechanism to do so. They were able to imprison and fine some farmers for failing to deliver their full quotas, but if they were to punish all offenders for misreporting, they would have had to arrest the majority of farmers and agricultural managers. British government commissions, similar to the Soviet, set up to investigate illegal livestock hoardings arrived at this conclusion in 1946, arguing that it was impossible to enforce punishments for
misreporting when most local officials were related to the farmers they were supposed to punish [48]. The Soviets allowed the military to try farmers for such offences, meaning that the powerful military tribunals of each army was able to investigate and try farmers for misreporting on a scale more commensurate with the actual number of offences committed. In this sense, it is not that the British were unwilling to be as brutal as the Soviets in dealing with misreporting farmers. If anything, the Soviets exercised much more restraint in punishing German farmers for misreporting than they ever did with their own, usually electing to fine, shortly incarcerate and/or sequester their property. The essential problem is that the British had allowed a system to develop in which misreporting was its dominant feature, so much so that it was impossible to extricate it without abandoning the entire system itself—something they were unwilling to do. This meant that more food stayed in the regional areas, hoarded, sold on the black market or used as fodder, while the urban centres were left malnourished.

That the Soviets averted this problem was perhaps to be expected. They had great experience in battling the localism which plagued the BZ, keeping foodstuffs surpluses in regional areas and leaving the urban centres malnourished. They had been battling this problem since the revolution. The situation in Germany, however, presented new opportunities to eliminate localism without the bloodshed which accompanied it in the Soviet Union. The political system had collapsed alongside the agricultural in eastern Germany with the advance of Soviet forces at the beginning of 1945. The Soviets were thus in an excellent position to appoint politically friendly German representatives in local areas, many of whom would work tirelessly to increase agricultural production and facilitate the transport of foodstuffs to urban areas. And in those cases where spontaneous and less cooperative local German governments emerged, the Soviets were able to remove them if they deemed necessary [49].

Much work has been done on the Soviet reconstruction of the entire agricultural system, particularly the introduction of land reform policies in September 1945 that broke up large agricultural holdings and allocated individual plots to landless and new farmers. There is little doubt that the shift from large to small scale farming stunted the recovery of agricultural production in the SZ for years to come. But less work has been done on how the Soviets exploited their close ties with local regional officials to ensure food supplies to urban areas in Germany in times of crisis. This was the real strength of the Soviet position in Germany.

However, the Soviet agricultural system and, indeed, the broader occupation machinery of which it was part, were not without severe, indeed, paralysing faults. Large urban areas were fed at the expense of others considered less important and easier to control, which further deteriorated the health of those populations. The food supply and disease situation in Dresden and nearby Chemnitz during the Soviet import crisis from mid-1945 demonstrates this disparity well. Even before food imports from the Soviet Union were severely reduced, the Red Army had already begun to supplement its food supply from local sources. From August 1945, it began to feed off the German harvest exclusively, which entailed a reduction in real ration levels for the occupied population. SVAG, which had worked so hard with remaining farmers to reconstruct the agricultural system in any such way that would promote the greatest production of foodstuffs, now saw that the military was bearing the fruits of its labour, not to mention creating havoc in the quota system. SVAG feared that the high level of military consumption would leave no food for it to supply to the occupied population.
This fear was almost realised in Dresden and its surrounding areas, although food shortage there during August remains largely unexplored in the literature. Donna Harsch argues that the Red Army stopped protecting food supplies to Dresden during the summer of 1945, resulting in significant food shortage and forcing many people to turn to the black market [50]. Transport problems were a serious issue, but there is little discussion of the Red Army’s failure to protect food deliveries in the Soviet sources. In fact, the major cause of continuing food shortage in Dresden was the military’s overconsumption. By the end of August, SVAG warned that at the current levels of consumption there would simply not be enough food to feed both the military forces situated in Dresden as well as the occupied population. SVAG pleaded with the Red Army to reduce its consumption levels until the next harvest season when food supplies would be replenished. These pleas went unheeded, even those made by high-ranking men such as the deputy head of SVAG in Land Saxony, Lieutenant General D. G. Dubrovskii:

If the Eighth Guards Army continues its requisitioning in Saxony, it will soon be necessary to begin importing the same amount of foodstuffs from Thuringia and Province Saxony... An official was sent especially to [the army] to warn against the inefficient use of food resources, only to be rejected by the army’s procurements office [51].

Much like the British in March 1946, SVAG was thrown into disarray by the shortage of food imports. It had no choice but to try and make good on its threat. There was simply not enough food in Dresden for both military and civilian consumption, even though SVAG had removed close to 2 million repatriates (Soviet citizens liberated from German bondage) from the SZ by the end of September and hundreds of thousands of soldiers were in the process of demobilisation. This significantly reduced SVAG expenditure and the level of military consumption respectively, but not by enough. Unlike the British, however, SVAG did not rely on food imports from other countries to supplement food shortage, but only from other areas of the zone. By December, SVAG had begun to organise the supply of grain and other foodstuffs to Dresden in line with maintaining ration levels indicated earlier in Table 1 and had made allowances for population growth in the city since August [52]. There were reports of hunger-related diseases in Dresden until then, but not as bad as in Chemnitz nearby, a lower-tier city of 200,000 inhabitants whose nominal ration levels were lower than Dresden’s, and whose real ration levels were even worse. In fact, less populated cities located lower on the tiered system like Chemnitz were often in the worst position, reliant on poor rations but unable to draw on extensive regional resources to supplement them. Reports of malnourishment in Chemnitz were prominent in August with one hospital complaining that its admissions had doubled in recent days to 360 patients, most of them children. According to Soviet estimates, 600 of the city’s approximately 200,000 inhabitants were dying every month due to malnourishment, with lowly populated areas of the city worst affected. There seems to have been some improvement by the end of autumn with hospital admission numbers beginning to recede [53]. Determining the impact on agriculturally rich and less populated province of Saxony and state of Thuringia which were bled to feed Dresden is more difficult given that food producers and many regional dwellers did not receive rations.
The impact of such over-requisitioning of food on the health of regional populations is clearer in those food producing areas in Mecklenburg and Saxony which bordered Poland/Czechoslovakia. These areas were also subject to the massive influx of ethnic German refugees who poured over the country’s eastern border. Refugees had been long subject to hunger and disease during their arduous treks from Eastern Europe, and were now exacerbating the former and spreading the latter among the Germans ‘proper’.

Table 7. [54] Monthly Infections Recorded in Mecklenburg, 1945-46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Typhus</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid</td>
<td>4796</td>
<td>5718</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diphtheria</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>2232</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The jump in typhus infections was traced to an outbreak from a refugee echelon received from Poland, which was not detained in a camp but immediately allowed to settle in a local village in an eastern Mecklenburg district. In two months the typhus had spread to eighteen nearby villages. This negligent practice only compounded existing strains on the essential services in this region and others. But keeping the refugees in the camps for longer would not have helped without providing them sufficient medial care, which was scarce. The overcrowded camps were breeding grounds for disease and, anyhow, other cases of typhus were traced to camp refugees as well. Soviet administrators were simply overwhelmed by the sheer number of them who swelled the small border camps that they had hastily established to house them. 142,854 refugees entered Mecklenburg from 1 November to 20 December 1945, and many were hastily directed by rail to areas further west without sufficient health checks or, indeed, checking if those areas had signalled their readiness to accept them. As a result, in some cases overcrowded areas experiencing food shortage received refugee trains, while those in need of refugee labour did not [55]. The disproportionate allocation of refugees thus further strained housing, food rationing, and medical services exactly in those areas where they were least developed [56]. This is to say nothing of the millions of repatriates who poured over the SZ’s western border requiring food and housing, and medical assistance for a range of health conditions. SVAG was inundated by waves of human misery from east and west as soon as it was established in June 1945.

SVAG got better at alleviating the misery as the occupation wore on, at least with regard to food supply. Over the winter of 1945-46, it began to develop long-term and intelligent zone-wide food supply strategies, focusing on the establishment of food reserves and improving food transport and storage facilities. SVAG’s ability to supply Dresden and, indeed, this shift was only possible because it had the capacity to increase foodstuff quotas on farmers in regional areas. As importantly, SVAG possessed a network of appointed local officials who could enforce the new quotas with the might of the Soviet occupation machine behind them.
Conclusion

Political considerations were as important as population numbers in determining where a city would be placed on the tier system in the SZ. And even then cities could be afforded greater priority without official reference to the system. Dresden, for instance, was a ‘red city’ where working-class support of Soviet sponsored political parties was supposed to be strongest. SVAG was thus most concerned with ensuring supplies food supplies to the city, even at the expense of Saxon and Thuringian farmers. Here food supply was central to establishing the legitimacy of the occupation regime and, indeed, its sponsored political parties [57]. Urban preferences, however, exacerbated existing urban-rural tensions and hardened pro and anti-Soviet positions among the population. But food protests which resulted in the SZ never became violent as in the BZ or responsible for serious economic downturns. To explain this discrepancy, many historians of the occupation would cite the more repressive atmosphere in the SZ and the greater fear felt by the population toward the Soviet rather than British occupier. These are certainly important reasons. But the above analysis suggests that also important was the structure of the agricultural and political systems established or inherited by each occupier.

The establishment of Bizonia in 1947 and the gradual enforcement of uniform calorific entitlements for the bizonal population narrow the room for comparison between Soviet and British food policies in post-war Germany. Nonetheless, during the initial and chaotic years of the occupation, the room for comparison is broad [58]. One of the most important areas is the comparative impact of occupation policy on the immediate and long-term health of the populations. This impact was by no means restricted to food crises in the immediate post-war period addressed in this chapter. This impact may have endured for decades in the poor health of the post-war generations. The extreme and well-documented changes in political and economic conditions in Germany during the Second World War and in the post-war period provide special opportunities to address such questions. Without further investigation, however, much of the relationship between food, governance, and health so important then and today, remains unclear.

What is clear is that British responses to food crises exposed the weakness of their food policies in Germany and, indeed, exacerbated them. The weakness of these polices had as much to do with the relatively unfavourable agricultural circumstances in the BZ as it did with the failure of the British to dissolve the agricultural system that they inherited from the Nazis and develop a new system more capable of dealing with the dramatically different realities of post-Nazi Germany. Developing such a system would have been most difficult for the understaffed occupation government, perhaps more difficult than it proved to be for the understaffed Soviet administration, yet maintaining the Nazi system was just as problematic. It bred its own particular form of inefficiency and, being resistant to reform, limited the British capacity to solve the food problems that confronted them. It is little wonder many British officials looked to the SZ with a qualified admiration, even envy at their Soviet counterparts. As one Whitehall official put it, ‘Soviet measures may not have been brilliant, but at least they gave conquerors and conquered a definite programme to carry out together’. [59] This remains a most apt evaluation, even if the official was less aware of the severe faults of the broader Soviet occupation machinery of which its food measures were part. We, now aware of German wartime plans to eliminate ‘excess population’ in the occupied Soviet
Union by mass starvation, may add that Soviet measures were indeed not brilliant, but at least aimed at achieving a balance between feeding soldiers and civilians—not forsaking the latter for the former. The humanity of both the Soviet and British occupiers thus should not be lost in the broader history of mass violence in the Soviet zone and dysfunction in the British. After all, although food shortages may have been common, large-scale starvation was averted.

References


[4] Urban women benefited least from the rationing system and were worst hit by food shortage. As most living in urban areas did not work for wages in 1945, or only worked part time, many of them received third and fifth-category ration cards (the third category included cleaners and washerwomen). Faced with the prospect of a low calorie diet, many housewives and mothers receiving the fifth-category ration card complained openly to the Soviets that the system discriminated against them because it failed to recognise that their domestic duties constituted a form of heavy labour, especially in light of the breakdown of essential services in Germany after the war. For a sample of the complaints, see State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) - f. r-7077, op. 1, d. 179, l. 67.

[5] When supplying Berlin immediately after the end of the war, the Soviets afforded hospital patients workers’ rations (Category II), while the British and the Americans offered supplements to those patients deemed 20 percent underweight. Both also afforded nursing and expectant mothers food supplements ranging from 698 to 806 calories per day in 1947. For Soviet data see Zakharov, ed. (2005), 300. For British/American, see Office of Military Government for Germany United States [OMGUS]. (April, 1948), Report of the Military Governor: Statistical Annex, 34, 17.


[7] For Berlin levels see, Zakharov, ed. (2005), 299-302. For Dresdner, GARF f. r-7212. op. 1. d. 13. l. 80-1. The five-category ration system operated in the larger cities in the zone such as Dresden, while the six-category system operated in all other areas. The six-category system included semi-heavy labour as the second category with a slightly smaller amount of rations allocated.

[8] Ration recipients were also issued with coffee and tea on a monthly basis as well as a range of supplements to special categories discussed above. Slightly different entitlement totals are given by historians such as Donna Harsh, yet the above totals are


[10] OMGUS (April, 1948), 18, 25. The VHWs average is calculated from Nettl (1951), 182.


[12] Trips to the countryside were most time consuming and difficult to make for urban dwellers seeking to supplement their rations due to the breakdown of transport services. Even when they reached the countryside, trade with farmers was generally made on unfair terms, especially for workers who had little to trade but the clothes on their backs. Some workers stole crops such as turnips and potatoes when they could not afford them, which only added to city-rural tensions. This happened in the BZ as well, where workers waited for farmers to harvest their crops and then stole them.


[14] This was the official figure for the 1945 barn harvest given by Soviet officials at the time, yet was revised later.

[15] SVAG was established in June 1945. Red Army forces situated therein were re-organised after the war into a separate organ called the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (GSOVG). Despite integrated command structures at the highest levels between these organs, none less than Zhukov’s position as commander-in-chief of both, significant and violent tensions arose between them which hampered SVAG’s ability to administer the zone.

[16] Zakharov, ed. (2005), 92. Exports to other countries actually increased from 339,600 tonnes in 1945 to 1,265,600 tonnes the following year. It was only in 1947 when the consequences of the Soviet famine became so extreme that exports began to decline considerably. Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) - f. 1562, op. 329, d. 1922, l. 2. For the link between this famine and Soviet mortality see, Bellinger, E. G., and Dronin, N. M. (2005). Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia 1900-1990: The Interaction of Climate and Agricultural Policy and Their Effect on Food Problems, New York: Central European University Press, 168.

[17] Marshall argues that the crisis was so serious that corn production in the United States stalled, with shipments to Germany stopped altogether early in 1946: ‘When they were resumed only a fraction of what Germany needed was sent.’ Marshall, B. (1980). German Attitudes to British Military Government 1945-47. Journal of Contemporary History, 15, 4, 659.


[20] Of these total per head figures, a substantial amount was lost to livestock and other requirements, thus reducing the amount available for civilian consumption. The calculations in the text are based on the agricultural production and population statistics in OMGUS (April, 1948), 7, 22. Soviet production figures are given in Nettl (1951), 179.

[21] Many of the producers who did not flee and were identified as Junkers, Nazis, and war profiteers, were expelled from their land by the Soviets who broke up large agricultural estates over 100 hectares and divided them up among new farmers as part of their land reform programme. New farmers, mostly German refugees from Eastern Europe without the agricultural experience of those expelled, struggled to sow new crops on their small parcels of land, which were simply not as productive as the large estates of which they were originally part. This was most problematic in the agricultural regions of the SZ, particularly Mecklenburg and Western Pomerania where over 60 percent of farmland in this region had been farmed in estates larger than 1000 hectares. Even though the Soviets allowed some of the more productive estates to remain intact, the implementation of this land reform programme decreased the short-term agricultural output of the entire agricultural sector. Norman Naimark discusses the land reform programme at length. Naimark, N. (1995). The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, 142-62.

[22] In January 1946, Schlange-Schoeningen was appointed chief of the German Inter­Regional Food Allocation Committee (Gifac), a body comprising of German food experts established by the British to advise them on agricultural policy. Farquharson (1985), 63.

[23] The same problem severely limited the de-nazification programme in the BZ.

[24] Farquharson also discusses the range of diplomatic issues that contributed to the coal-food cycle. Ibid., 121-22.


[26] Office of Military Government United States (Germany).


[28] Ibid., 19, 25, 28, 29.


[30] U.N. (July, 1948). Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, II. New York, 16, 22. February also saw the lowest conception rates for the year, further suggesting that it was the harshest month of the winter. The lowest birth rate for 1947 was recorded in November (14.3), nine months later.

[31] OMGUS (April, 1948), 71.


[34] See for instance the book chapters on long term outcomes in men and women exposed to the Siege of Leningrad in 1941-44, the Dutch Hunger Winter in 1944-45, or the Greek blockade in WWII.


[36] Street weighing programs were initiated by OMGUS and later transferred to German authorities. Initially some 100,000 persons aged 20 years or over were selected ‘at random’ to be weighed each month. From changes in the observed weights it was then possible to evaluate broad trends in cities within the US zone with populations of 10,000 or greater. Jones et al. (2006), 23; deForest, W. R. (1950). Public Health Practices in Germany under U.S. Occupation (1945-1949). American Journal of Public Health Nation Health, 40, 9, 1072-1076. School-weighing programs in schools within the U.S. zone recorded average weights and heights of children in selected schools. Jones et al. (2006), 23. In Stuttgart, the situation in the period 1938-1942 can be compared with post-war reports. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. (1945). The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany. Washington, D.C.: War Department, October 30. Reductions in body weight and height and a reduced rate of growth in Stuttgart school children 1938-1942, figures 162-165, 290c-290f. Emslie, M. J. (1987). The Harsh Discipline of Food Scarcity in Postwar Stuttgart, 1945-1948. German Studies Review, 10, 3, 481-502. Nutrition surveys to assess weight, height and diets in cities over 20-25,000 population were initially carried out by temporary teams of US military personnel in those areas where they seemed to be ‘the most needed’. Some surveys were based on individuals selected at random from ration card files. deForest (1950), 1073; OMGUS, Public Health and Medical Affairs, no. 18, Nov 1-Dec 31, 1946, 4-6, cited in Jones et al. (2006), 23. OMGUS. (November 1948). Nutritional Survey Throughout Bizonal Area of Germany. Information Bulletin, no. 147.

[37] Steege (2005), 45.

[38] According to one analysis, the German population experienced a notable decline in average body weight and an increase after the war because of the lack of food. OMGUS, Public Welfare, no. 9, April 20, 1946, p.2 cited in Jones et al. (2006), 22. Average body weight of men and women in Germany decreased between January 1946 and July 1947, and then steadily increased until July 1949. OMGUS Statistical Annex, no. 49, July 1949, 52, cited in Jones et al. (2006), Figure 2.4, 22.

[39] Food supplies varied over time and by region and occupation zone. Supplies also differed between urban and rural populations. These differences need specification. For follow-up studies of long-term outcomes, the severity of food shortages experienced by individuals in 1945-49 will need to be taken into account. Although food shortages may have been common, Allied medical reports did not confirm there was large scale starvation in post-war Germany. U.S.-British Bipartite Food and Agriculture Panel, Food and Agriculture: U.S. – U.K. Zones of Germany, (Berlin, 1947), 56, cited in:
Weinreb, A. A. (2009), 112. In the British zone, the Wuppertal study found no signs of large scale severe undernutrition or hunger deaths in Wuppertal or in the British zone. Department of Experimental Medicine, Cambridge. (1951), 15.

[40] German Communist party (KPD) and German Social-Democratic Party (SPD). These parties united in April 1946 to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED), except in Berlin where the SPD branch remained.

[41] For a good example of preparations made for setting of quotas and harvest collection, see a report on the Annberg region of Saxony at the beginning of August 1945, Zakharov, ed. (2005), 270-274.

[42] GARF - f. r-7077, op. 1, d. 199, l. 16-21.


[45] Both were underreporting livestock numbers as well. See a detailed report on the results of these inspections in Mecklenburg sent to the deputy head of the state, M. A. Skosyrev, in January 1946. Most of the offending farmers were fined. Zakharov, ed. (2005), 287-291.

[46] The military tribunal also sequestered his farm and property, which was a more common punishment meted out to repeat offenders. GARF f. r-7103, op. 1, d. 5, l. 275.

[47] The Soviets and the Germans operated from different agricultural traditions, used different measurement systems and terminologies. Confusion over measures and definitions of what constituted arable land were thus to be expected. In some cases where these misunderstandings prevailed, German farmers may have been unduly punished. But in general, such cases were avoided because the Soviets worked together with local German officials and farmers to inspect farmland and establish quotas. In the above case, it seems that confusion was not the problem.


[51] GARF - f. r-7212, op. 1, d. 13, l. 147.


[55] This problem is highlighted in a December 1945 report regarding the resettlement of German refugees in Mecklenburg. Ibid., 202.

[57] In fact, in the lead up to the October 1946 elections at the provincial level, the Soviets planned to restrict the supply of raw materials to areas administered by non-communist officials, hoping to encourage mass disaffection toward local authorities. At the same time, it was made clear to the occupied population that the best way to ensure a higher level of material supply and even food rations was for one’s area to be administered by a SED official, giving a clear impetus to people to vote for the Soviet-sponsored party at the elections. An exposition of this policy is found in the recently published stenographic record of the speech given by the chief of the SVAG Propaganda Administration, Colonel S. I. Tiul’panov, in September 1946 in See Bonvech, B., Bordiugov, G., Neimark, N., eds. (2006). Sovetskaia voennaia administratsiia v Germanii: Upravlenie propagandi (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul’panov. 1945-1949 gg. Shornik dokumentov. Moscow - St. Petersburg: AIRO - Pervaia Publikatsiia, 205-38.

[58] The food situation in the French zone was also dire and comparable to the British. Extensive studies of the French zone similar to the others are lacking, but the room for comparison is nonetheless promising.