ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an increased acceptance of social transfers as part of renewed efforts at poverty alleviation policies based on social risk management. There has been an instance in the use and promotion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) policies by multilateral development agencies (MDAs). One case is the Philippines. The ideational basis of CCTs can be traced to the influence of neostructuralism in Latin America. One facet of this was an attempt to reconcile neoliberal strategies of development with aspirations for guaranteed minimum incomes. The adoption of CCTs was mediated by MDAs that further reduced the modest concessions to poor people's rights implicit in Latin American programs. The Philippines demonstrates that MDAs have promoted a more heavily securitised and compliance-focused versions of CCTs that was derived the Colombian security state. Although small grants are welcomed by poor households, they have acted to further enforce state control while maintaining a neoliberal policy focus.
1. Introduction

There have been recent changes in development and poverty alleviation policy-making with renewed attempts to create frameworks for social protection. These attempts at policy consolidation were recently endorsed by the high-level meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) Development Committee in April 2012. One important aspect has been the de facto increased recognition of the role of direct social transfer payments.

Increasingly, social protection initiatives have taken the form of cash transfer and conditional cash transfer (CCT) projects. CCTs were pioneered by some middle-income countries (MICs) – especially in Latin America - in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They entail targeted cash grants for poor households in return for meeting mandatory requirements concerning children’s (and parental [mostly mother’s]) attendance at educational and health services. The most well-known and extensive CCT program is Brazil’s Bolsa Familia. The rise of CCTs reflected attempts by some Latin American governments to facilitate more effective social expenditures and meet political aspirations for guaranteed incomes.

More broadly, these initiatives arguably took place as part of a general shift towards implementing neostructuralist development policies. Neostructuralism emerged in the 1990s as a general trend away from a strict focus on predominantly market-based approaches to economic development contained in the Washington consensus (WC) in favour of a selective re-incorporation of older structuralist themes. While the scope of neostructuralism mostly concerns issues of economic growth and industrial policy, the paper argues in section x that the adoption of CCTs was a reflection of the same selective resurgence of themes of structuralism and its associated Latin American “welfare regime”.

---

1 Development Committee 2012.
2 Hall 2008.
3 Leiva 2008; ECLAC 1990.
There are now many other instances in which CCT programs have been developed. One of these is the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (PPPP) in the Philippines. It commenced operation in 2007 and is scheduled to cover up to three million households by the end of 2013. The Philippines provides a vantage point from which to assess why CCT programs have been adopted. It has been characterised by high-levels of poverty and inequality, despite its status as a MIC. PPPP was implemented as a means to redress these issues. In keeping with historical patterns, moreover, the form of CCT that was adopted was heavily supported and funded by multilateral development agencies (MDAs).

The increased use of CCTs suggests there has been a selective adoption of neostructuralist policy themes outside of Latin America, including acceptance of social transfers.\(^4\) However, the process has been mediated by the influence of MDAs. It would appear the recent marginal shift in income and production on a global scale in favour some MICs has enabled some policy space for innovative programs to emerge. Neostructuralism is one form of this, although the degree that it represented a shift from the WC is contested.\(^5\)

Indeed, much of the critical literature on social protection has tended to emphasise the ways that dominant approaches - such as social risk management with its focus on contributory social insurance-based strategies – represent continuity with the WC. Cammack, for instance, argues they represent the consolidation of “global liberalism” entailing the deeper integration of populations into market and risk-oriented relationships.\(^6\) Yet he recognises that there has been a more recent shift towards the acceptance of social transfer payments along-side contributory programs. What this paper argues is that the adoption of social transfers has tended to be accompanied by measures that focus on ensuring poor-people’s compliance and increasing the security of the state through the presence in and surveillance of the population. CCTs have tended to become components of the

\(^{4}\) Lin & Chang 2010.  
\(^{5}\) Webber 2000.  
\(^{6}\) Cammack 2012.
increased securitisation of development policy. The human-capital forming and poverty alleviation focus of CCTs has been blended with goals of the containment of the existential threats posed by poor populations towards the state and elites.

This paper analyses how the process of securitisation of social protection policy has marked the selective diffusion of neostructuralist approaches to social protection through the ideational influence of MDAs. It uses the case of PPPP in the Philippines as a case study. The diffusion of CCT programs by MDA institutions reflects an ideational shift in policy-making: there has been recognition of the need for social transfers to reduce poverty. Yet the hegemony of MDAs has meant that particular forms of CCTs have been adopted that emphasise high conditionality and reliance on external finance. This is especially the case in the Philippines. PPPP’s design and emergence is examined in the historical context of policy development from the initial emergence of CCTs in Latin America through to their adoption and promotion by MDAs. Section two presents the conceptual framework based on ideational analysis. The third section examines the historical experience of the emergence of select MICs. It then examines both the Latin American origins and international diffusion of CCTs by MDAs in section four. Finally, section five assesses the experience of the Philippines and the broader implications of MDA mediation of policy transfer for developing countries.

2 Ideational Analysis and Power

There is a strong association between the emergence of CCTs and important changes in international policy-making. The autonomous role of ideas in political and institutional change has become a considerable focus of recent research. The approach deployed by this paper employs three dimensions of analysis.

---

7 Buzan et al. 1998.
8 Carstensen 2011.
First, the relationship between policy-making, institutions and power conforms to certain patterns. As a Gramscian focus would suggest, the hegemony of class interests over both the state and civil society will inevitably define parameters of policy-making. The dominant classes - and fractions within them – legitimise their rule through institutions both at national and international scales. Yet, as Blyth argues the process of legitimisation and stabilisation of institutions means that the expressions of material class interests are “ideationally bound”. Ideas and systems of common “beliefs” emerge that act as the foundation for common action and understanding. These systems of shared ideas comprise “mental maps” that mediate material interests. When institutional actors make decisions, there is often uncertainty and contractions. Systems of ideas emerge as “narratives” in order to forestall uncertainty over decision-making. In the face of unknown conditions and situations institutional actors and the material class forces they represent will use their systems of belief – common “stories” or narratives. Institutions will usually function for long periods of time on the basis of an ideational consensus that provide “coalitional foundations” for institutions to operate.

Second, these ideational narratives develop their own autonomy and trajectories of change. Policies and their ideational bases do not reflect a simple “base-superstructure” model of causality. Changes in class relations will impact on policy making but in ways that are mediated by the operations of autonomous systems of ideas. Such ideational shifts usually occur when the contradictions that are present in shared ideational narratives become antagonistic. This threatens the feasibility of explanations and associated policy proposals may collapse. This can often occur in the context of social and economic crises. Agents within institutions will then – often reluctantly - undergo qualitative shifts in their views. There will be both a search for alternative explanations of events and

9 Gramsci 2000.
10 Blyth 2002.
11 Blyth 2002.
12 Blyth 2002.
attempts to consolidate these as a basis for future decision-making. For Blyth, these processes were expressed through both the emergence and then eventual abandonment of Keynesian-inspired policies in the 1930s and 1970s. Crises – the great depression in the 1930s and stagflation in the 1970s – led to changes in policy frameworks in macroeconomic management. The shifts of course the interests of fractions of classes – the shift away from Keynesian regulation being strongly supported by financial capital for instance. The ideas that underpinned these shifts, however, emerged according to their own processes of adaptation and change. There was both the formation of the neo-classical synthesis in the 1940s and eventual partial shift away from selective incorporation of Keynesian ideas in the 1970s. The occurrence of crises in the capital accumulation process entailed the need for policy change: the eventual new policy consensus that emerged was based developing fields of thought (monetarism and supply-side economics).

Third, there are political and spatial patterns that underpin which ideas are adopted and how they undergo alterations: ideas flow from centres of power towards peripheries. This can be expressed at the national-scale through the dominance of policy elites within state institutions. Similar relationships of power also operate internationally whereby developed states invariably dominate policy formation. International organisations – invariably hegemonised by developed-states - play a crucial role with ideational flows.\textsuperscript{13} They provide “cognitive legitimacy” in research and policy formation. These in turn affect the legitimacy of actions undertaken by nation-state level institutions.\textsuperscript{14} As section three discusses, while there has been a partial alteration in power within these institutions, the substance of their operation continues.

Fourth, the rate at which ideational and policy adaptations occur is more frequent than the kinds of large-scale changes that Blyth identified.\textsuperscript{15} The degree of ideational adaptation, however, invariably

\textsuperscript{13} Peet 2009.
\textsuperscript{14} Broome 2011.
\textsuperscript{15} Carstensen 2011.
follows a semi-autonomous logic of path dependency. The risks associated with rapid ideational change mean that agents within institutions overwhelmingly engage in incremental adaptations. Changes that do occur, moreover, follow a pattern of punctuated equilibrium. There are periods of the operation of ideational consensus with only incremental changes. It is usually when crises become so pronounced, however, that this pattern of equilibrium will be broken and more rapid changes occur. There is a resulting process of qualitative ideational change that tends to circumscribe the rate at which institutional actors will respond to crises, even if it contradicts their interests.

Ideational factors therefore play an important role within institutional change. Hegemonic processes entail that both international and state-based institutions will tend to be subject to and promote the interests of certain classes, fractions of classes and other elite policy-makers. The relationship between these interests and institutions is mediated by ideational constraints. These are shared logics and epistemologies that underpin and legitimise coalitions of power. One consequence is that ideational path dependence tends to temper the rate at which institutions respond to crises.

3 Late Development and the Balance of Ideational Power

The application of an ideational analysis to adaptations in poverty reduction policies suggests that some important changes have taken place. The main historical tendency in international development policy has been framed by the hegemonic ideas of developed-country policy elites. More recently, there have been modest changes in patterns of idea formation.

The various “fashions” in development policy were often articulated via MDAs. An ideational “endpoint” occurred in the late-1980s with the adoption of the WC, represented a high-point of developed-country and MDA hegemony. This was, in part, due to the economic crises that emerged in 1980s and the dismantling of the import-substituting approach to industrialisation.

---

16 Sydow 2009.
Overall, however, the ideational flow could be regarded as having followed a pattern of “core to periphery”. The “core” developed states diffused ideational constructions to the developing world. However, two factors partially altered these relationships after 2000. On the one hand, a marginal shift occurred in economic and political power in favour of some developing states, especially after 2000. China’s rapid economic growth had flow-on effects for other developing economies due to demand for raw materials, capital goods and intermediaries.\(^{18}\) A resource super-cycle commenced in the early 2000s, increasing the prices of developing-economy exports.\(^{19}\) As a consequence, there was higher per-capita income growth in some low and middle-income countries (LMICs) in comparison to high-income countries (HICs).\(^{20}\) These higher rates of economic growth provided greater space for social protection expenditures.

On the other hand, there were the effects within developing-states of class, gender and ethnic-based political mobilisation. Social-movement mobilisation produced either pressure upon or new governments committed to implementing more extensive social policies. There have been various expressions of these processes, ranging from the emergence of both left-of-centre and/or technocratic reforming governments in Latin America, through to current processes of regime change and political upheaval in the Middle-East and North Africa.\(^ {21}\) Governments were forced to engage in expanded social expenditures disrupting some facets of path dependency.

Yet, the extent of these alterations in ideational flows should not be over-stated as the hegemony of developed states remained high in international institutions. The recent shift in voting weights in favour of developing states in the IMF, for instance, was modest.\(^ {22}\) Smaller changes were more apparent at the WB which now rhetorically refers to itself as a “knowledge bank”. Robert Zoelick’s

\(^{18}\) McDonald 2008
\(^{19}\) Erten & Ocampo 2012.
\(^{20}\) World Bank 2012.
\(^{21}\) Petras 2011.
\(^{22}\) IMF 2010.
claimed this consisted of a move towards more “two-way” learning and dissemination of policy processes.²³ One way to interpret this is that is it largely rhetorical. Yet there have been changes in key personnel selection, for instance, with the appointment of Yustin Lin as chief economist and Korean Jim Yong Kim as the new WB president. Neither of these appointments, however, has made serious challenges to core-hegemony over policy-making. Developed economy donors, however, are willing to accept personnel and ideas from developing country contexts, as long as they do not stray outside ideational limits of Cammack’s global liberalism.²⁴ Moreover, particular experiences from developing economies tend to get greater influence and promotion.

Therefore, patterns of ideational change and flows have undergone some alterations. The “core to periphery” model has altered in important ways, while maintaining continuity with its main outcomes. The developed states continue to maintain hegemony in ideational flows through IFIs. The process has become more complex as some developing states have engaged in experimentation and made innovations.

4 Ideational Trends in Social Protection

The introduction of social protection policy over the past decade has conformed to these newer patterns of ideational flows. An interaction between national reforms and MDAs has been evident in the emergence of one key policy instrument; CCTs.

4.1 Latin American Origins

CCTs emerged on the basis of contradictory historical and ideational factors. On the one hand, there were the historical experiences of many existing Latin American welfare regimes. These regimes were often distributional components of various (notionally) structuralist and import-substituting policies of industrialisation and development as they emerged twentieth century. In global terms, this reflected an ideational reconciliation of nationalist political and development aspirations with

²³ Zoelick 2010.
²⁴ Cammack 2012.
insertion within the international division of labour and flows of capital. Elites within developing Latin American nation-states maintained power in part through strategic blocs with sections of middle and working classes. A key component of this was the predominant “conservative-informal” welfare regime policy-mix emphasised: health and education expenditures; employment protection; price controls; and contributory social insurance.\textsuperscript{25} Social transfer payments were, however, somewhat rare and high levels of labour-market informality effectively limited coverage of contributory schemes. However, even these measures were increasingly curtailed, especially in the aftermath of the crises of the 1980s and the resulting adoption of the WC. The ideational impact of neoliberalism meant that the existing welfare policy-mix was increasingly portrayed as having “distortionary” effects on markets.\textsuperscript{26} Yet simultaneously many of the governing regimes in Latin American states became faced increased political pressures for democratisation and social reforms.\textsuperscript{27} There were as a result conflicts between the fiscal constraints imposed during this period and demands for greater social protection. At the same time the process of path dependency meant These clashes led to ideational innovations and initiatives in social policy, such as the introduction of CCTs, broadly in line with the emergence of neostructuralism. Probably the most prominent case was in Brazil where labour and social movement mobilisation helped drive the process of democratisation and social policy reform. While the 1988 constitution had nominally guaranteed social rights to citizens, a predominant focus on fiscal consolidation and adjustment during the Cardoso government (1994-2002) prevented any significant implementation of new expenditures.\textsuperscript{28} The constitution’s decentralisation provisions also meant it was largely state and municipal-level bodies that experimented with policies. This was especially the case with administrations led by the

\textsuperscript{25} Barrientos 2004.  
\textsuperscript{26} Barrientos 2004.  
\textsuperscript{27} Morales 1995.  
\textsuperscript{28} Fenwick, 2009.  
\textsuperscript{28} There is debate about the “paternity” of CCTs. One account links them to a series of articles by economist José Márcio Camargo, that emphasised the human resource development component of conditional transfers (Lindert 2007). Others focus more on the role of leaders - such as Cristovam Buarque - from the PT.
centre-left Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The main phase of national consolidation, however, was after the election of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as Brazil’s president in 2002. Da Silva’s administration inherited a limited and fragmented set of payment programs. These were amalgamated into the Bolsa Familia program in 2003 and 2004 under the control of a new central Ministry of Social Development. Although it is difficult to assess how much is attributable to CCT, it is clear that poverty levels subsequently fell and there was a marginal decline in income inequality.

By 2012, Bolsa Familia covered 12 million households.

Bolsa Familia’s emergence reflected an aspect of neostructuralism’s influence in Brazil. While some critics have rightly emphasised the policy’s compatibility with the WC, it arguably constituted a case of endogenous policy development. It is a re-distributive income flow within an overall policy mix that emerged in the aftermath of the WC. Much like the overall neostructuralist framework, however, Bolsa Familia operated within constraints of accepted fiscal policy with a nominal degree of targeting of beneficiaries. Brazil, moreover, experienced higher levels of economic growth between 2002 and 2010 than in previous decades. The main implication was that government expenditures could expand without considerable redistributive flows having to be made away from capital and higher-income earners.

Therefore, Bolsa Familia’s coverage could increase without significant fiscal implications and with minimal financing from MDAs. Brazil’s overall public spending remained steady at around 20.3 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2010. The amounts consumed by Bolsa Familia were comparatively modest: its annual expenditure of $8 billion in 2010, for instance, was equivalent to

---

29 Britto 2008.
30 Fenwick 2009.
31 Ban 2012.
32 Leiva 2008.
33 Burton 2010.
34 World Bank 2012.
35 World Bank 2012.
0.6 percent of GDP. This could be financed by domestic taxation revenue. The World Bank’s total contribution was only $500 million in 2004.\textsuperscript{36} There was, therefore, a high-level of “country-ownership” of the program.

This had important implications for \textit{Bolsa Familia’s} operation as it had important differences to other CCT programs.\textsuperscript{37} There was both much lighter use of conditionalities (as Brazil used self-declared income rather than much-promoted proxy-means tests) and monitoring and evaluation was left to local municipal bodies. The tension within all CCT programs between the longer-term objectives of human resource development and the immediate issue of poverty alleviation was resolved in Brazil in favour the latter.\textsuperscript{38} Although it has had negative effects, such as purportedly reducing political mobilisation for land reform.\textsuperscript{39}

The comparatively unique feature of \textit{Bolsa Familia} become clearer when a comparison is made with Latin America’s other large-scale CCT programs. The next largest was Mexico’s \textit{Oportunidades} program which was more technocratic in design and imposed far-tighter conditionalities on poor households. \textit{Oportunidades} commenced in 1997 and covered five million households by 2009. As in Brazil, the program was the outcome of historical political and economic circumstances. One important difference was that Mexico’s policy changes were not directed by parties of the centre-left, such as the PT. \textit{Oportunidades} was an initiative of the long-ruling and clientelist \textit{Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s} (PRI) Zedillo administration. When the PRI was finally voted out of office at the federal level, it was replaced by Vincent Fox and the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in 2000. The PAN, however, retained and expanded \textit{Oportunidades}.\textsuperscript{40} It is broadly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} World Bank 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ferreira 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{38} This has been the focus of considerable political criticism, with \textit{Bolsa Familia} being represented as a mechanism for consolidating the PT’s electoral base. Other regression analyses suggests the correlation between volume CCT coverage and electoral support for the PT is quite weak (see Bohn 2011).
\item \textsuperscript{39} Lacerda 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Levy 2006.
\end{itemize}
recognised that *Oportunidades* was implemented during a period of the further marginalisation of the impoverished population from political institutions. 41

Mexico’s adoption of CCTs was also the historical product of specific economic and ideational factors. On the one hand, the crises in the early 1980s and mid-1990s and adoption of the WC resulted in a long process of economic restructuring. 42 The adoption of neostructuralist themes was even weaker than in Brazil. The evolution of social policy and protection measures was subject to even more constraints of fiscal policy. On the other hand, there were associated theoretical influences of explanations of poverty based on breaking inter-generational cycles of skill deficits. This influence, combined with demands to rationalise existing public subsidies inherited from the existing welfare mix, led to the emergence of *Oportunidades*. 43 The still existing payments and subsidies for consumption were generally regarded as poorly targeted and contributing to fiscal strains on the state. 44 The rationale for *Oportunidades* was explicitly linked with human-resource formation and comprehensive monitoring of such outcomes was built into the program. Broadly speaking, the emphasis of Mexican program was more on human resource goals, rather than immediate poverty alleviation as in Brazil.

There were also broader economic and political differences with Brazil. First, Mexico’s economic growth rate was lower than Brazil’s. There was an average annual per capita GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent between 1990 and 2001 and 0.9 percent between 2002 and 2010. Government expenditures were also much smaller, representing an average of just 11.3 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2010. 45 Second and accordingly, the program relied upon greater MDA financing and involvement. The total annual operating budget for the program rose gradually from $2.5 billion in

41 Holzner 2010.
42 Levy 2006.
43 Levy 2006.
44 Ferreira 2009.
45 World Bank 2012.
mid-2000s to $3.2 billion in 2010, representing 0.3 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{46} MDA involvement included World Bank loans of $1.5 billion 2009 and 2010.\textsuperscript{47} Just under half of funding for expenditures was, therefore, being provided by MDAs. There was a much bigger focus on monitoring and evaluation which focuses, for the most part, on the health and educational outcomes rather than the effects on household expenditure.\textsuperscript{48} Mexico’s program, therefore, has higher levels of external involvement and monitoring.

Moreover, Mexico’s CCT program was not the only one that has been supported by the MDAs: even higher levels of assistance were granted to Colombia. In many ways, Colombia’s \textit{Familias en Acción} emerged as the most “securitised” form of CCT.\textsuperscript{49} Poverty was represented as a key “existential” threat to the state and elites’ security and the resulting CCT program was heavily integrated into counter-insurgency measures. The broader political and economic historical context of Colombia had been characterised limited democratic reforms in the 1990s and fleeting attempts to end several decades of civil conflict. The inclusion of nominal social rights in the new 1991 constitution was intended to include guaranteed minimum income measures.\textsuperscript{50} Yet the new constitution’s emphasis on social reform and ending political violence clearly failed. The political system continued to be exclusionary and marked by endemic violence.\textsuperscript{51} There remained at least two major insurgencies and ongoing conflicts over narcotics production.\textsuperscript{52} The main implication was a political system dominated by elite-driven and ideologically conservative political parties.

These historical and political conditions meant important additional factors characterised \textit{Familias en Acción}’s implementation. First, Colombia’s rate of economic growth had been far lower than in either Brazil or Mexico. The average GDP per-capita growth rate was only one percent between 1990

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Gobierno Federal 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{47} IBRD 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Gobierno Federal 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Buzan et al. 1998.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Eslava 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Moreno 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Leech 2011.
\end{itemize}
and 2001 and 2.5 percent between 2002 and 2010. The average annual government expenditures represented 16 percent of GDP since the late 1990s. It was therefore a poorer country with limited fiscal capacity in comparison to Brazil or Mexico. It also had an even more limited adoption of any neostructuralist policies than either Brazil or Mexico.

Second, there were much larger-scale armed conflicts in Colombia. Colombia’s military expenditures averaged 17 percent of central government expenditures, compared to just 6.5 percent in Brazil and 4 percent in Mexico across the 2000s. Formal statistics on battle deaths averaged 737 per year between 1989 and 2009. Brazil, in contrast, had no deaths registered and Mexico only 182 in the 1990s. While the immediate pretext for the implementation of the program was an economic crisis in 1999, *Familias en Acción* was also clearly aimed at undermining the basis of armed insurgencies’ support amongst sections of the population. The CCT program was, therefore, initiated by Andrés Pastrana Arango’s conservative government as part of attempts to create a political settlement with rebel groups. Yet these conciliatory policies gave way to the heavily militarised approach of the Plan Colombia policy (adopted after 2000). The subsequent Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s administration extended Plan Colombia’s operation and *Familias en Acción* was integrated within it.

These features had three main implications for *Familias en Acción’s* operation. The program was almost entirely funded by MDAs. Colombia’s overall official development assistance reliance was higher in comparison to the other two countries, with net per capita inflows averaging $16 between 1990 and 2010, compared to just $1.45 in Mexico and Brazil. *Familias en Acción’s* total annual budget of approximately $1 billion had resulted in the program’s coverage extending to 1.7 million households by 2007. Yet this coverage comprises less than 20 percent of the population and external financing therefore consists of 85 percent of funding. The program involved even heavier

---

53 World Bank 2012.
54 Independent Evaluation Group 2011.
55 World Bank 2012.
intervention from MDAs that Mexico’s, with it being subject to intensive monitoring and evaluation. As the use of proxy means tests and similar punitive measures to Oportunidades, there was heavy intervention by program personnel in beneficiaries’ lives. The program relied upon a rigorous screening process for identifying beneficiaries which was integrated within Colombia’s identity card system. Then there was intensive intervention by program personnel in recipient households with community workers monitoring and implementing the program. On the whole, there was greater direct involvement by state personnel with beneficiaries which was clearly associated with securitisation of the program. The high-levels of militarisation in Colombia were, therefore, matched by a social component based on monitoring of poor households.

These cases in Latin America suggest the emergence of CCTs was associated with inter-linked processes. There was an ideational shift towards the adoption of forms of social protection that matched the broader neostructuralist policy turn. Just as the broader themes of structuralism were selectively re-incorporated into WC-based approaches to development, so the traditional Latin American welfare regime was adapted and changed to suit new conditions. The restructuring on many economies after the crises of the 1980s constrained the ability of states to expand social expenditures. The eventual way institutions placated demands for greater social protection was through the introduction of heavily targeted programs such as CCTs. There was, as with the broader neostructuralist turn, considerable variation in the way the process that occurred. In Brazil, CCTs were pioneered and expanded upon by a centre-left political party as a mass system of payments with light conditionalities. In Mexico, the CCT system more overtly linked to political aspirations of the PAN in conjunction with demands by technocratic reformers and MDAs to emphasise the human capital forming role of CCTs. Finally, the Colombian approach was implemented in conditions of an exclusionary polity and highly militarised civil conflict. Colombia’s program was more heavily

56 Inter-American Development Bank Undated; Overseas Development Institute 2006; World Bank undated.
57 Ferreira 2009.
58 Departamento para la Prosperidad Social 2012.
securitised and supported by MDAs. It also had high levels of conditionalities and monitoring of households. There was, therefore, considerable variation in policy design within the overall adoption of a welfare policy mix that reflected the hegemony of neostructuralism.

4.2 The Internationalisation of CCTs

MDAs – especially the World Bank (WB) – subsequently played a considerable role in promoting CCT programs further afield.

One major factor influencing the spread of CCTs was an ideational alteration that emerged in WB policy on social protection. This emerged around 2000 in the form of the Social Risk Management (SRM) approach. SRM reflected a broader reorientation of WB policy rhetoric towards “poverty reduction” while maintaining the main components of the WC framework.59 The accumulating evidence of failures to reduce poverty or insure against the impacts of economic shocks and crises had led to a search for suitable social “safety net” mechanisms in the 1990s.60 The WB subsequently adopted its SRM framework which was codified in the 2000-1 Attacking Poverty World Development Report.61 SRM placed primary emphasis on contributory social insurance with a largely residual role reserved for social transfer payments. The ideational boundaries of SRM, therefore, reflected continuity with the WC.

However, eventually a greater acceptance of social transfers emerged which help facilitate the promotion of CCTs. A small rupture occurred in the SRM framework as the WB and other donors became aware of shortfalls in meeting Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets in many countries. CCTs became particularly appealing as they notionally addressed the different “dimensions” of poverty such as income, education and health while retaining strict beneficiary targeting. The subsequent “Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers” - held in

60 Devereux 2007.
Istanbul in 2006 - brought policy makers from over 300 countries together. The focus became one of selectively incorporating experience of Latin American neostructuralism in ways that were even more compatible with the WC. Donors became willing to fund forms of social transfer payments, such as CCTs (and also some non-conditional cash transfer programs), providing they adhered to the ideational and policy boundaries. The WB’s increased endorsement of limited social transfers was reflected in policy documents such as the joint communiqué and document with the International Monetary Fund in 2012. It explicitly endorsed the Mexican program as a cost-effective way of achieving minimum social protection. The scale of social transfers the document endorsed was limited: expenditures should comprise no more than 0.5 percent of GDP.

This evolution in social protection policy suggests modest change in ideational adaptation and transfers have occurred. The simplified core to periphery model of diffusion has altered into four stages. First, the overall directionality of hegemony, power and interests remained similar: the WC continues to guide development strategy and policy. CCTs emerged in the context of increased constraints on Latin American welfare regimes due to MDA-sponsored measures. Second, these policy measures came into conflict, however, with social and political momentum for social protection the emergence of neostructuralism. The main outcome was targeted payments that took the form of Brazil’s low-conditionality based CCT system or Mexico’s more technocratic, higher-conditionality and MDA-supported approach. Third, these policy experiments fed back into MDAs which, in turn, assimilated aspects of the CCT experience and promoted their own versions. Fourth and finally, the MDAs have generalised upon these CCT experiences and sponsored similar programs in other national contexts since the mid-2000s on a basis similar to Mexico and Colombia’s programs.

---

63 World Bank 2012.
5 CCT in the Philippines

The Philippines is one place where the ideational diffusion of SRM by MDAs led to the adoption of CCTs as policy. The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (PPPP) was formulated in response to MDA promotion. The implementation of CCTs in the Philippines took place in a context of high-levels of MDA hegemony over development policy and persistent inequality, poverty and exclusionary politics.

5.1 Power and Poverty and the Philippines

There were four main historical factors that provided the context for the adoption of CCTs in the Philippines. First, its colonial history and the subsequent United States hegemony within the state ensured policies were predominantly framed by “Western-inspired” ideas about development.64 One implication was that the main trend in economic development policy after independence was an early abandonment of residual import-substitution and structuralist policy themes in favour of export production in the early-1960s. The oligopolistic structure of land ownership, however, resulted in low rates of accumulation and economic growth.65 Successive failures to implement substantive land reform measures resulted in the consolidation of a socially exclusionary pattern of development. MDA hegemony was also always strong in the Philippines. In the 1970s, in particular, there was an expansion of MDA-sanctioned borrowing. The subsequent domestic public debt defaults and political upheavals of the early 1980s did not alter this. Instead, all subsequent governments – beginning with the Corazon Aquino administration in 1987 - have complied with MDA imposed conditions and reliance on external funding.

Second and accordingly, these low levels of economic growth and exclusionary patterns of asset ownership had considerable impacts on poverty and inequality. The deep contraction in the economy in the early 1980s – associated with end of the boom in external financing - meant that per capita income did not recover to its 1982 level until 2004. The average annual per capita income

64 Montes & Lim 1996.
65 {Reid 2006; Bello, 2004; Abinales 2005.
growth has been consistently low, averaging 1.5 percent between 1960 and 2010. GINI index measures suggest inequality remained high, reaching a peak of 46.3 in 1997 and 43 in 2009. Income poverty fell during the 1990s from 40.6 percent in 1994 to a low point of 25 percent in 2003. It then increased again to 26.4 and 26.9 percent in 2006 and 2009. There were similar indicators for non-income poverty measures encompassed by the measures of non-income-based poverty. While the Philippines performed reasonably well against human development indicators, there were some notable shortfalls against targets in primary education and health.

Third, these trends in poverty and development were reflected in the Philippine polity and in the ideational bases of institutions. The Philippines had notionally democratic and republican institutions that were engineered by its former colonial power. These operated after the end of the Pacific war (with exception during Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship between 1972 and 1986). In some ways the Philippines, however, represented an important instance of an “electoral democracy”: particularist interests monopolised state institutional power. The operation of clan-based political mechanisms has been well-illustrated. There is, therefore, a combination of unequal income and asset distribution; a polity largely controlled by these wealth appropriating elites; and finally a long-term legacy of external financing and crises resulting in high levels of external debt servicing. One consequence is an ongoing dependence on external finance and permanent fiscal crisis in the Philippine state.

Fourth and finally, there have also been at least two long-running armed insurgencies. On the one hand, there is the Communist Party of the Philippines-aligned New People’s Army. This remains an

---

66 World Bank 2012.
67 NSCB 2011.
68 NEDA 2010.
69 Reid 2006.
70 North, Wallis & Weingast 2009; Quimpo 2010.
71 Quimpo 2010
72 Bello 2004.
ongoing source of conflict for the state despite declining in recent decades. On the other hand, there
are separatist movements in the country’s south (mostly in Mindanao). Added to this is ongoing
violence and disappearances in many localities that are clearly linked to elements in control of
state.\textsuperscript{73}

The historical conditions of the Philippines therefore consisted of failing development state with an
exclusionary polity and high levels of poverty and violence. Ideationally, the predominant interests
of landowning capital in the state utilised MDA sponsored policies as a “strategy” for development.

\textit{5.2 Program Character}

These patterns in the ideational construction of policy continued with the emergence of a renewed
social protection regime in the Philippines. MDA and bilateral sponsorship - combined with the role
of political actors within the Philippines - would ensure that the CCT program that was adopted was
close to Colombia’s heavily securitised approach.

The immediate origin of PPPP’s adoption was during the government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(2001-2010). Arroyo was initially brought into office as a result of a popular uprising against the
previous government. Her regime, however, became embroiled in various controversies over
electoral irregularities, corruption and violence.\textsuperscript{74} It nevertheless implemented some MDA-
sponsored social programs in the areas of poverty and participation, although not at a scale that
would make substantial inroads into these problems.\textsuperscript{75} The increased level of income poverty
recorded in the 2006 made it clear that additional poverty-alleviation measures were needed (Cabral,
2010, Keynote Speech’, Secretary Esperanza Cabral’, Department of Social Welfare and
Development’, Philippines). The Philippines’ performance in MDG target areas such as primary
education and maternal health was also failing. MDA influence resulted in leading staff from the

\textsuperscript{73} Reid 2006.
\textsuperscript{74} Reid 2006.
\textsuperscript{75} Reid 2011.
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) attending the Istanbul conference on CCTs in 2006. They then formulated a proposal that went to Arroyo’s cabinet in March 2007. Arroyo (trained as an economist) became enthusiastic about the program, especially its linkages to human resource development. The result was the implementation of a pilot program for 6000 beneficiary households in two provinces in 2007. This was expanded to 320,000 households in 2008. At this point bilateral and MDA donors increased support providing evaluation and technical feasibility assistance to expand PPPP to one million households starting from 2009.

In the meantime, Arroyo’s term as president ended and she was replaced by President Benigno Aquino. While he was the son of former president Corazon Aquino and part of an established political clan, his campaign nevertheless presented a mildly social-reformist program. An important section of non-government (NGO) organisation activists and Akbayan (a left-of-centre political party) supported his presidential campaign that was organised according to both conventional (LP) and non-conventional (non-LP) components. Aquino’s manifesto – the *Contract with the Filipino People* – primarily emphasised governance and anti-corruption measures. There was very brief mention of poverty and the need for “well-considered programs that build capacity and create opportunity among the poor and the marginalized...” Both Akbayan and some NGO activists were appointed to Aquino’s cabinet after the election, including Corazon Solomon as Secretary of the DSWD. Soliman had previously been head of DSWD in the early part of the Arroyo administration. There were therefore some parallels with the political environments that allowed for the emergence of neostructuralism in Latin America. More broadly, there was similar historical context with a post-authoritarian polity and a long period of MDA hegemony. The Aquino government was a moderately reforming government with some participation of a section of the political left was in power.

---

76 Cabral 2010.  
77 DSWD undated; Cabral 2010.  
78 Villacorta 2011; Bello, 2011.  
79 Aquino undated.  
80 Reid 2008.
The Aquino administration inherited Arroyo’s poverty alleviation policies. A process of path dependency came into effect whereby the establishment of the infrastructure of PPPP ensured its continuation under the new administration. The overall poverty-alleviation framework became *Tatsulo*: encompassing PPPP and two other livelihood and community-drive development programs. The largest component, however, was PPPP. It continued to expand the number of recipients to one million and subsequently established a third phase of expansion. It was the reformers within the government that would take on the implementation of the program with the support of MDA and bilateral donors.

Significantly, the Aquino government and the main PPPPs donors chose Colombia’s *Familias en Acción* program as the model for PPPP. Although the DSWD staff studied Mexico’s model as the main example of CCT operation - through the World Bank-sponsored National Sector Support for Social Welfare and Development Project – the PPPP program became modelled on Colombia’s. The main mechanism for the promotion of *Familias en Acción* was the recruitment of a Colombian consultant - Tarsicio Castañeda - as the DSWD’s main advisor. The consultancy was funded by the World Bank and the Australian Agency for International Development. One vector of ideational influence was, therefore, a reflection of the material interests of donors and the key personnel that they would favour.

The selection of a Colombian consultant and program as a model had three important implications for PPPP. First, it cemented the ideational hold of SRM on policy making in the Philippines. Castañeda has a longer intellectual lineage promoting Chile’s Pinochet-era contributory social insurance programs as a model for developing country safety-nets. These are themselves an

---

81 DSWD undated.
82 Paderanga 2012.
83 DSWD undated.
84 World Bank 2010; AusAID 2011.
expression of the broader Latin American liberal-clientelist welfare regime.\textsuperscript{85} In keeping with the evolution of SRM, however, there has been a greater acceptance of the role of social transfers. These remain strictly residual to contributory social insurance and this is the case with Mexico and Colombia’s programs.\textsuperscript{86} In the Philippines, both PPPP and the broader Tatsulo programs were indeed designed to be residual to contributory social insurance schemes. The latter mainly includes: the Social Security System; Government Service Insurance System; and PhilHealth. Their coverage, however, has been and remains limited, extended to only 22 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{87} Even with over one million households included in PPPP (this has also now included access to subsidised PhilHealth benefits since 2012), there remains a considerable gap in the population (over half) not covered by either a transfer payment or contributory based social insurance program.

Second and accordingly, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the targeting of payments and enforcement of conditions. There has been a considerable expansion in the numbers of DSWD staff and operations for administering the PPPP program.\textsuperscript{88} These DSWD field staff implement a complex procedure of targeting and identifying recipient households in the eligible areas. There is a complex process of targeting and administering the grants, despite the relatively small amounts being dispersed to each household. A household with three qualified children receives a subsidy of 1 400 pesos ($ 33) a month during the school year or 15000 pesos ($355) annually as long as they comply with the conditionalities. The process comprises eight-steps for appraising the potential beneficiaries. Again, Colombia’s proxy-means tests system was adapted as the model for the Philippines.\textsuperscript{89} The poorest households in the selected municipalities were identified through development of a National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction system. An elaborate set of processes is the undertaken by DSWD staff at the local scale that is aimed at eliminating any potentially ineligible

\textsuperscript{85} Castaneda 1992. 
\textsuperscript{86} Castaneda 2010. 
\textsuperscript{87} Manasan 2009. 
\textsuperscript{88} DSWD 2012. 
\textsuperscript{89} NEDA 2011.
village members. The culmination is a community assembly where “shame” is frequently used to discourage ineligible salaried households from pursuing payments. Following further identity checks, a recipient household representative agrees to sign a paternalistic “oath of commitment”. Amounts are dispersed every two months after around processing. The main conditionalities involve: ensuing school attendance; undergoing frequent maternal health checks; and attendance at “family” training sessions. The implementers concede that the bulk of responsibilities in these areas fall upon mothers and female household members. The sanctions for non-compliance are again similar to Colombia’s and in contrast with the lighter conditions imposed by Bolsa Familia.

The third and possibly most fundamental aspect of the influence of the Colombian approach is degree of everyday intervention in household’s lives. This is clearly a facet of securitisation via increasing the presence of the state – in the form of DSWD staff - in the everyday lives of the impoverished population. The Colombian model is quite unique in comparison to others in the way that social workers intervene within households to negotiate and enforce health and education targets. Although no association is explicitly made, it is clear that this is one facet of the Colombian security state. One of the implicit functions of Familias en Acción is therefore to play a de facto role of surveillance and provide services and funds to disincentive support or involvement in insurgencies.

There are similar facets in the Philippines. There is a strong focus on making the presence of state agencies apparent in marginal and poorer communities. The targeting of particular communities coincides with the presence and activity of the two main insurgencies, especially in Mindanao in the country’s south. There is an ongoing role for DSWD staff within communities where they conduct family-development seminars and other programs and monitoring tasks. All of these increase the presence of the state in affected communities.

One of the main factors underpinning the implementation of this particular form of CCT program was the extent of MDA support for and resulting influence over the design of PPPPs. As section three outlined, Colombia’s program was also heavily reliant on MDA support. The Philippine state
nominally had limited fiscal capacity to implement a social transfer payments system. There have been chronic problems of low taxation compliance and revenue collection. The main approach taken by various governments has been continual increases on a narrow base of indirect taxation. The main result was that taxation revenue averaged at just 12.6 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. Government expenditures (excluding interest payments) averaged 9.9 percent of GDP in the same period.

Therefore, the PPPP program had to rely on extensive donor contributions from MDAs over its initial five year period. The degree of this support was outlined by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The total cost of the program (including the targeting system and payments) was $1.2 billion of $737.8 million (63 percent) was sourced from the ADB and the World Bank. Overall social protection (including social insurance) grew significantly – between 2005 and 2010 – from a base of 1.6 to 2.6 percent of GDP. Within this social assistance grew rapidly from 0.2 to 1.2 percent of GDP. Some two-thirds of this expansion, however, was provided by external financing. The ADB argued the Philippine government would be able to sustain this level of expenditure at around 2.6 percent of GDP in the longer-term. Overall this level of social expenditure was still low comparison to other states – Vietnam’s spending is 4.3 percent and the average for Latin America is 5.1 percent of GDP. The program was still therefore based on a residual model of social protection that was based on low levels of public expenditure.

There was an awareness of these issues and their implications amongst some government figures within the Philippines. They gave an indication of the “thinking” within the government and the House of Representatives. The former Secretary of Economic and Social Planning - Cayetano

---

90 Social Watch Philippines 2010.
91 World Bank 2012b.
92 ADB 2010.
93 ADB 2010.
Paderanga suggested there were two views.\footnote{Paderanga 2012.} The predominant view was that the PPPP project had a strict five-year life-span in line with external funding. The less prevalent view – that Paderanga held – was that some level of social transfers would need to be ongoing in order for sustained reductions in income poverty to occur. There are therefore two barriers to establishing ongoing system of payments: one was the expiry of the “catalyst” external financing. The other was the apparent uncertain political commitment to – or even comprehension of the need for – an ongoing system of social transfer payments.

In sum, the Philippine government and its MDA and bilateral donors opted for an approach that derived from and was heavily influenced by Colombia’s CCT program. This was reflected in the residual nature of the transfer system that was adopted – consistent with SRM. It was also evident in the high-level of interventionism in local communities. While it is not explicit in program design documents, it was a reflection of its operation of the program by a security state. There was an attempt to replicate this in the Philippines. These patterns were both reflections of the high level of MDA influence and support for the PPPP program.

6 The Philippines, Neostucturalism and Ideational Trends in Social-Policy Making

In conclusion, the adoption of this form of CCT by the Philippines provides insight into the ways policy ideas are promoted and transferred in current global conditions. The emergence of social protection policy follows trends that deviate from established patterns of development.

First, there are contradictory trends within the spheres of power and interests on the global scale. On the one hand, the hegemony of the developed economies continued through the WC and MDAs. In the former case the predominant structuralist approach to development and associated liberal-informal welfare mix tended to be undermined after the 1980s. This circumscribed the policy space
for most developing economy governments and imposed constraints on fiscal expansion. This was evident in the Latin American cases and the Philippines.

On the other hand, these constraints came into contradiction with aspirations for poverty reduction and guaranteed minimum-income policies. One expression of this was the emergence of a general neostructuralist policy turn or sensibility in some Latin American economies. Neostructuralism selectively incorporated older structuralist themes within a development strategy based broadly on the WC. Arguably, one additional factor was the selective revival of welfare policies in more targeted forms.

Second and accordingly, one of the main outcomes of the conflict between WC and neostructuralist policy constraints and aspirations for minimum incomes was the adoption of targeted CCT programs. There was an autonomous ideational component to these programs. CCTs assumed a linkage between inter-generational human capital deficits and poverty levels as a source of market failure. They sought to address these failures by providing conditional payments for children’s school and health service attendance. A rationale was therefore provided for an expansion in social expenditures that did not fundamentally alter the overall policy framework of the WC. The payments would be heavily targeted and constrained by conditions ensuing compliance by poor households. There were differences between the extent of conditions and their enforcement with Brazil’s program being lower than Mexico’s or Colombia’s.

Third, the process of diffusion and adaption of CCTs became subject to a process of path dependence: MDAs such as the World Bank adapted their existing SRM framework to incorporate a greater role for social transfers. The fragmented attempts to create a safety net in the 1990s eventually coalesced into a loose international effort to create “national social protection floors”. The considerable shortfalls in many states in meeting poverty-reduction targets increased pressure for financing of social transfers. CCTs were attractive as they addressed three areas of income
poverty, education and health. They were increasingly promoted from the mid-2000s, although as a 
residual component subordinated to an emphasis on contributory social insurance mechanisms. The 
early examples of MDA supported and financed CCT programs tended to accentuate the higher 
levels of conditionality already contained in Mexico’s program. In the case of Colombia, the targeting 
and compliance regimes entailed high levels of intervention and surveillance of poor households. All 
CCT programs attempted to engender consent amongst and placate political demands from poor 
populations. The emphases of the CCT program in Colombia, however, were heavily integrated 
within the processes of the security state and counter-insurgency efforts.

The more punitive features implicit in the Colombian program, therefore, came to be emphasised in 
the forms of CCTs promoted in other national contexts. This was the case in the Philippines where 
the pattern of targeting and enforcement was modelled on Colombia’s approach. The Philippine 
program has expanded rapidly since 2009. However, the geographical and social targeting of the 
program was heavily centred on areas that generally viewed as security threats, especially the 
southern region of the Philippines. The targeting and administration of the program was strongly 
focused on increasing the presence of state agencies in poorer communities through village 
assemblies and family development programs.

Overall the Philippine example suggests, therefore, that the forms of social programs that have 
emerged in many developing countries are being adopted and promoted in particular ways by MDAs. 
They retain a focus on social transfers that is residual. There is a focus on targeting and enforcing 
conditions on poorer communities that is heavily focused on security concerns. Social reformers 
within the developing world concerned with implementation of social protection measures could 
perhaps be mindful of the negative features of MDA measures and the negative impacts they could 
have on poor populations and broader processes of political change.
References


Castaneda, T 1992, Combating poverty: innovative social reforms in Chile during the 1980s, ICS Press, San Francisco.

----- 2010, 'The Design and Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs)'.


Paderanga, CW 2012, Secretary, National Economic Development Agency, Interview with Author, February 7.


Reid, B 2006, 'Historical Blocs and Democratic Impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after 'people power'', Third World Q., vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 1003-20.


