Indonesia's National Parties and the Representation of a Diverse Society

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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CANDIDATE DECLARATION

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Previously published work

The theoretical framework presented in chapter three, along with some empirical sections of chapter six and seven, have been published in the following peer-reviewed journal article:


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Abstract

This study begins with a seeming contradiction – in regionally diverse Indonesia, political parties are required by law to be national in nature, and not based on a single regional or ethnic identity. How then do these national political parties represent the diverse society of Indonesia? This research points to the absence of theoretical consideration of political representation in this context, and thus argues for the importance of understanding representation as the making and assessment of representative claims, which collectively form repertoires. By understanding how institutional rules and norms can impact the adoption and manipulation of representative repertoires, we are in a better position to identify the challenges facing representative politics. Applying this theory, and based on both qualitative and quantitative data, this study contends that the mandating of national political parties hinders the capability of these political parties to adequately represent Indonesian society – but not for the reason that may be expected. Instead of restricting the ability of parties to make representative claims based on identity, the laws hinder the adoption of much more pressing representative repertoires based on notions of performance and democratic engagement. While the large national political parties have largely failed to engage with these representative repertoires, independent political leaders have bypassed the party system to develop their own unique and innovative claims. The findings presented here are important for our understanding of democratisation Indonesia, but also more broadly for our theoretical engagement with the idea of representative politics.
### Abbreviations and Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>Term used to describe nominal Muslims who follow a traditional blend of Islam and local culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>Traditional religious customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bersih</td>
<td>Clean (can be used to describe being clean from corruption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</em> (The Regional Representative Council), Indonesia’s upper house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</em> (The People’s Representative Council), Indonesia’s lower house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dwifungsi</td>
<td>Dual function (usually used to describe the military during Suharto Era)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td><em>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</em> (The Great Indonesia Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td><em>Partai Golongan Karya</em> (The Functional Groups Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td><em>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</em> (The People’s Conscience party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jilbab</td>
<td>The female headscarf worn by some Muslims in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td>Political district below the provincial level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kecamatan</td>
<td>Name of smaller districts below kota/kabupaten level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kiai</td>
<td>Islamic religious teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kinerja</td>
<td>Performance (noun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kota</td>
<td>City (also term for political districts based in central areas of cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td><em>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</em> (Anti-Corruption Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masyarakat</td>
<td>Community, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merakyat</td>
<td>To engage with the community (verb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td><em>Mahkamah Konstitusi</em> (The Constitutional Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td><em>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</em> (People’s Consultative Assembly), Combined parliament with both DPR and DPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muham-</td>
<td>Large modernist Muslim association</td>
</tr>
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madiyah

NU  *Nahdatul Ulama*, significant traditionalist Muslim organisation based in East Java

*pancasila* The five guiding principles of the Indonesian state provided in the constitution, also considered a political and social philosophy

PAN  *Partai Amanat Nasional* (The National Mandate Party)

PBB  *Partai Bulan Bintang* (The Crescent Star Party)

PDS  *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (Peace and Prosperity Party)

PDIP  *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)

PD  *Partai Demokrat* (The Democrat Party)

PKB  *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (The National Awakening Party)

PKI  *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian communist party)

PKS  *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (The Prosperous Justice Party)

PNI  *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (The Indonesian National Party)

PPP  *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (The United Development Party)

*propinsi* province

*putra daerah* Son of the region (used to describe politicians originating from a region in which they are campaigning)

*rakyat* The ‘people’

*reformasi* Reform (common term during post-Suharto era).

*santri* Term used to describe pious Muslims

*sederhana* Simple

*tegas* Assertive, firm.

*tim tujuh* The team of Seven, an ad hoc group formed to advise on institutional reform

*tokoh* Important leaders
CHAPTER ONE

Regulating Parties in a Diverse State

Introduction

This study begins with what appears to be a contradictory state of affairs: In Indonesia, one of the world’s most regionally diverse states, constitutional changes mean that political parties must fulfil a geographical branch requirement in order to demonstrate that they possess a national organisation. On one hand, regional identity is strong within Indonesia’s populous archipelago, where language, cultural, religious and ethnic difference often clearly separate one region from another. On the other hand, ethnic or regionally based political parties are heavily restricted through the use of branch requirements that favour broad national political organisation.

This seeming contradiction prompts a very important research question: what do attempts to form a national political party system mean for the political representation of society within such a diverse nation? This question is important for several reasons. Firstly, Indonesia’s political party system is a key site of power, and the way in which political parties connect with society is likely to have considerable implications for the nature and progress of democratisation. The party registration laws in question were not created, explicitly or implicitly, to promote better representation; instead, they were ostensibly a response to issues of separatism, while also representing a self-interested attempt by existing parties to restrict competition. Yet, as Indonesia’s party system is the primary vehicle through which representative government is currently organised, an understanding of the way in which parties represent a diverse society is central to engagement with key issues such as democratic legitimacy and stability.

Secondly, examining Indonesia’s party system regulation represents an important case study within an emerging literature that focuses on institutional engineering in diverse democratising states. As an extremely diverse state having recently undergone a transition to democracy, Indonesia already occupies a space at the forefront of the interest into democratisation and diversity. Furthermore, Indonesia’s transition also
involved large-scale institutional reforms between 1999 and 2004. This process of institutional engineering, driven by both experts and political operatives, provides not only a means of exploring the impact in Indonesia of different forms of institutional design, but also demonstrates the way in which theories regarding institutional design influence real-world outcomes.

This study applies a unique approach to this under-researched problem. While acknowledging the contribution of significant bodies of research on political parties and electoral institutions, I argue that this research problem requires a direct engagement with the dynamic nature of political representation. Scholars have considered in some depth the merits of regulating political parties and the effects of this regulation on political outcomes including the proliferation of political parties, the pattern of competition between parties and the nature of parties more broadly. Well developed research has, for instance, charted the transformation of political parties from mass parties, to catch all and finally cartel parties. In the context of Indonesia, studies of the party system have provided significant new detail about the structure, activities and institutionalisation of the existing political parties.

This significant body of research is immensely valuable and provides an important foundation for this study. The structure and activities of political parties are certainly highly relevant to the analysis of political representation – arguably the main function of political parties in the minds of scholars, and the main expectation of parties in the minds of the community. Yet what is largely missing, I claim, is a consideration of just why political parties can be said to represent ‘well’ or ‘poorly’. In other words: we have an immense body of knowledge regarding the nature of political parties and the potential effects of laws (such as nationalisation laws) on their activities. But the existing literature has thus far rarely considered in much detail how these findings are connected to an understanding of political representation. Arguably the main reason for this is that the notion of political representation is complex and contested – a substantial exploration of the concept requires depth that is not often available in studies focused more specifically on the nature of parties and party systems.
In Indonesia, the unpopular reputation of political parties and parliaments (Tan 2002; Hicken 2006, p. 2-3), the oligarchic nature of politics (Hadiz 2003; Hadiz & Robison 2013) and continued practices of corruption and collusion (Aspinall & Van Klinken 2011) would lead some observers to suggest that looking too deeply into notions of political representation is an exercise in futility. Yet, I argue that ideas about representation matter – the way in which notions of representation are developed, adopted and contested has very real political implications. This is clearly demonstrated by the rise of the Indonesian politician Joko Widodo (commonly known as Jokowi) from mayor of a small city in Java to the Presidency. There is little doubt that the Jokowi phenomenon has had very real implications for the legitimacy and nature of Indonesia’s political system. Yet the impact of Jokowi’s emergence is due much more to new ideas about representation and representative practices rather than any change to political institutions. Within the literature on Indonesia’s political parties, studies of party system institutionalisation and the contribution of particular parties and leaders are relatively common and nonetheless important; yet, it is time to supplement this scholarship by developing our understanding of the way in which the concept of political representation informs political practices. In this endeavour, the troubled nature of representative institutions does not preclude the existence of complex dynamics of representative politics – indeed it likely contributes to the complexity!

In order to interrogate the nature of political representation, I draw significantly on the conceptual foundations of Michael Saward (2010), who has introduced the concept known as the ‘representative claim’. In Indonesia, like in other societies, individuals and even organisations make various claims to be representative – to speak for, or about, a particular part of society. And members of society themselves process these claims – they discuss, debate and analyse the actions and statements of would-be representatives. Between claim makers and the audience of these claims, ideas and notions about what signifies ‘good’ and ‘bad’ representation are generated, continuously developed and contested. Representative claims in themselves carry meaning – they present and portray the represented in a particular way. These portrayals can be engaged with by the audience of claims, and accepted, rejected or even amended. Thus representation does not simply describe an instrumental
relationship between the represented and representative, but instead is tied to how ideas about representation are contested and shaped. As such, it is difficult to separate political representation from the use of language and culture. Introducing the representative claim as a concept is important as:

Looking through the lens of the representative claim leads us to question a range of institutions and factors normally taken as settled. We come, for example, to see the field of the representable as constantly expanding and contracting, rather than as fixed or stable. (Saward 2010, p. 2)

Engaging with the ontological foundations present in Saward’s representative claim allows this study to better understand the dynamic nature of representative practices. Yet it is important to build upon the representative claim concept to construct a theoretical framework that can operate beyond single incidences of representative claim making. For this purpose, I introduce the concept of representative repertoires (this concept has also been explored elsewhere: Hatherell 2014). Processes of representative claim-making, I observe, naturally lead to shared understandings regarding good or desirable representation. Repertoires: that is, established forms of representative claim-making develop through this experience, and are recognisable to both political actors and audiences. Yet political actors, including political parties and individual leaders, differ significantly in their selection of representative repertoires and their capability to draw on those repertoires. In adopting this approach, it is possible to analyse the way in which the characteristics of political parties and individual politicians (including the effects of party system nationalisation) impact upon the selection strategies and capabilities of political representative to engage with important repertoires.

Having employed this theoretical framework to explore the nationalisation of Indonesia’s party system and its impact on political representation, this study argues that electoral engineering in Indonesia has had a restrictive effect on the representative repertoires that political parties draw on, and on the capability of political parties to engage with specific repertoires. Significantly, however, despite the seeming

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1 The possibility of repertoires is very briefly noted in Saward’s conceptualisation of the representative claim (2010, p. 43), yet this study elaborates on the concept and develops a theoretical framework hypothesising the way in which repertoires may be influenced by variations in the institutional environment.
contradiction of national political parties operating within a regionally diverse society, the repertoires that are most problematic in this regard are not those based on identity. Instead, it is the emerging and increasingly important representative repertoires based on notions of performance and democratic engagement that have primarily been restricted by the nationalisation of the party system. As a result, political parties have increasingly been surpassed by individual political leaders with relatively minimal connections to the party system, who have emerged in contemporary Indonesia as the most successful adopters of these important repertoires.

Research Questions
As outlined in the previous section, this study is primarily focused on the following primary research question:

- How does party system nationalisation affect the political representation of a diverse society in Indonesia?

In addressing this primary research question, several key sub questions are also important:

- To what extent does Indonesia possess a nationalised party system?
- Which representative repertoires are employed by political parties and their candidates?
- How are representative repertoires assessed within Indonesian society?
- How has the development and dynamic of representative repertoires in Indonesia been influenced by party system nationalisation?

Diversity and Political Institutions

Diversity
Indonesia’s party registration requirements are not an isolated phenomenon – they broadly fit within the trend of designing democratic institutions in divided societies. The prevalence of divided societies – that is, societies featuring significant levels of ethnic, religious or regional diversity – undergoing democratic transitions means that
the challenge of establishing democracy in these contexts cannot be ignored. Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds (2002, p. 2), in introducing a book focused on the importance of institutional engineering in divided societies, declare that:

The challenge of further expanding democracy in the contemporary world rests significantly on divided societies. Therefore, the challenge of expanding democracy globally cannot be separated from that of managing conflict democratically in plural societies.

The potentially difficult relationship between diversity and democratisation is important in any consideration of development in Indonesia. By any account, Indonesia is one of the most diverse societies on earth. Spread out over 16,000 islands, the population of Indonesia is divided by ethnicity, language, culture, religion and political preference. The largest ethnic group, the Javanese, makes up approximately 40 percent of the population, but is further divided by religious and regional cleavages. Often cleavages are crosscutting, with various sources of identity informing how people see themselves (Aspinall 2011, p. 293). While the population of some identity groups is spread out all across the archipelago, many ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in particular regions, such as the Balinese Hindus. As Reilly (2006, p. 14) notes:

The result is something of an ethnic kaleidoscope: while most sources put the total number of ethnic communities in Indonesia at around 300, a national census conducted in 2000 identified a total of 1072 distinct ethnic groups – although most of these were located in the eastern province of Papua, which comprises less than 2 percent of Indonesia’s total population.

In measuring the diversity of different societies in the Asia Pacific, Reilly has found that Indonesia ranks as a 0.766 on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is a completely heterogeneous society where everyone speaks a different language and 0 is a completely homogenous society where everyone speaks the same language (Reilly 2006, p. 56-57). This ranking places Indonesia only behind East Timor (itself a former colony of Indonesia) in the states measured. Additionally, as Aspinall (2011, p. 292) observes, ‘Great swaths of the country are multiethnic, with no single ethnic group being in a majority in twenty-one of thirty-three\(^2\) provinces’.

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\(^2\) With the addition of the province of North Kalimantan in 2012, there are now 34 provinces.
This diversity has historically had significant implications for the construction of a national identity and a stable political system. While in the early 20th century nationalism and the struggle for independence provided a strong uniting force which brought together Indonesians from many different ethnic backgrounds, the early years of the newly independent state were fraught with conflict. Outlying provinces such as Ambon and Aceh, possessing a distinctive identity and history, revolted against the central government in Java. Ongoing tensions between Java and Indonesia’s first President Sukarno, on one hand, and political and military factions from Sumatra and Sulawesi, on the other, broke out into a full-scale coup in the late 1950s, with quite bloody results (Vickers 2005, p. 140-141). These differences have also had social and political implications in recent times. The fall of Suharto led to a wave of unrest throughout much of the archipelago, with Chinese citizens in Jakarta being targeted, conflict between different ethnic communities breaking out in Kalimantan and Ambon, and increased conflict between the Indonesian military and citizens in provinces such as Aceh, Papua and East Timor (Aspinall 2011, p. 293-295). East Timor’s long struggle for independence was finally rewarded at this time, while Aceh and Papua in particular remain as troubled regions. These are, of course, the more extreme examples of the impact of diversity in Indonesia – more subtle tensions and conflicts have played a significant role in the trajectory of political development throughout Indonesia’s short history as an independent state.

There have historically been those who have doubted the possibility of democracy in diverse conditions. John Stuart Mills (cited in Lijphart, 2002) argued that democracy is ‘next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’. Winston Churchill once suggested that democracy in India was

Preposterous...not because natives of India are inherently incapable of working modern democratic institutions, but because of the political, social, racial, and religious conditions of the country in which they live (cited in Keane 2009, p. 518).

This point of view does not find agreement in some more modern treatments of the topic, and a significant section of the literature now believes that democracy is indeed

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3 While ethnic and religious differences were important in the rebellion, it is also important to note other key factors, such as suspicions over Sukarno’s quest for power and the interference of America and the CIA (Vickers 2005, p. 14).
possible in diverse states. In fact, the management of diversity itself is one of the key roles of a democratic form of government. According to Rustow (1970, p. 362), ‘people who are not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters would have little need to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflict resolution’. Conflict of some nature is a reality in most, if not all, modern nation states. As Reilly (2001, p. 5) argues, ‘...within certain circumscribed boundaries, conflict is considered legitimate, is expected to occur, and is handled through established institutional means when it does occur’. These arguments suggest that the goal should not be to solve the conflict, but instead to manage the conflict through institutions, so that decisions can be made, and the conflict does not move outside the established boundaries (Reilly 2001, p. 5).

India in the 20th century, for example, is often held up as an example of how democracy can be quite successful in an incredibly diverse society.

But while democracy and diversity can coexist, a significant body of research emphasises the challenges posed by ethnic diversity in developing democracies. Kanchan Chandra (2005, p. 235) argues that, based on ‘empirical democratic theory and common sense understandings of politics’, ethnic divisions do ‘threaten democratic institutions. The debate is only over the degree of threat’. In his seminal work Polyarchy, Robert Dahl argues that:

[Pluralism] often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation ... a competitive political system is less likely in countries with a considerable measure of subcultural pluralism. (Dahl 1971, p. 108-111)

While Arend Lijphart argues that most experts on constitutional engineering:

Agree that deep ethnic and other societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy and that ceteris paribus it is more difficult to establish and maintain democracy in divided than in homogeneous societies. (Lijphart 2002, p. 38)

This view is supported by cross-national statistical analysis, which has found that ethnic or social fragmentation can have an impact on the stability of regimes (Reilly 2006, p. 61; Powell 1982, p. 44-45; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, p. 177-178).

**Institutional Engineering**

If diversity is one of the key challenges—or threats—to democratisation, then it is no surprise that significant attention has been reserved for how this challenge can be
addressed. One of the most common responses to managing diversity is in the design of institutions, or institutional engineering. While it was out of favour for some time within mainstream political science, the study of institutions has been pursued with new energy in the last twenty years (Forestiere 2008, p. 450). While ‘old’ institutionalism focused solely on the nature of formal legal rules and laws (March & Olsen 2006, p. 5), ‘new’ institutionalism has been influenced by the revolution in studies of behaviouralism (March & Olsen 2006, p. 5-7; Blondel 2006, p. 716). New institutionalism generally understands institutions more broadly as any organised form of accepted behaviour, rules or relationships that ‘guide human interaction’ (Forestiere 2008, p. 448). According to Carolyn Forestiere:

> The new institutionalist perspective reminds us that every political actor operates within a specific framework of opportunities and that the physical environment in which bargaining takes place is very important to understanding political outcomes. (2008, p. 448)

Certainly institutions are not the only explanatory devices available to political scientists, nor can they provide a complete picture about a particular political outcome. Institutions are also not a panacea for problems of politics, as there are limitations to their effects, and no single institution by itself will solve significant political problems (Belmont et al. 2002, p. 3). Yet it is clear that institutions do influence political behaviour and organisation, and it is difficult to understand these phenomena without some form of institutional analysis (March & Olsen 2006, 3-7). Additionally, the malleability of political institutions means that analysis of these institutions can also affect political change. As Belmont et al. argue (2002, p. 2): ‘to the extent that democrats can proactively take steps to improve the prospects for democracy, institutional design is one of their key tools.’

Arguably, political institutions are, if anything, even more crucial in diverse states. Reilly (2001, p. 5) argues that:

> Well-structured democratic institutions allow conflicts to formulate, find expression and be managed in a sustainable way, via institutional outlets such as political parties and representative parliaments, rather than being suppressed or ignored. Changing formal political institutions can result in changes to political behaviour and political practice, and the design of political institutions is thus of paramount importance to the management of conflict in any democracy.
Institutions provide some stability and predictability to political interactions (Reilly 2001, p. 5; North 1990, p. 3). This framework is crucial when interactions between political actors are likely to be affected by diversity, and often outright conflict. This belief in the power of institutions in diverse contexts is echoed in a broad segment of the literature. Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds (2002, p. 3) suggest that divided societies are perhaps the context where institutional changes can have the most impact. This is because:

[In states without] profound ethnic, religious, or national cleavages, institutional choices are probably less relevant for democratic stability because they do not readily skew the political system to favour or adversely affect different groups. (Belmont et al 2002, p. 3)

Yet the possibilities presented by institutional design do not mean that there is agreement on how those institutions should be designed. Indeed, Wolff (2010, p. 128) has argued that:

Few debates have engulfed the literatures of comparative politics and international relations for as long and as intensively as that between advocates of different schools of thought on how to build stable and democratic polities in divided societies.

Reilly (2006, p. 22) echoes this claim in stating that:

While there is today widespread agreement amongst political scientists that institutions matter to political development, there is profound disagreement as to which institutional prescriptions are most likely to promote sustainable democracy in diverse societies.

The debate in the literature has also informed, and been informed by, deliberations within developing states themselves between advocates of different institutional designs. Within these developing states, ‘some of the most fiercely fought political battles … are about how national politics should be organized’ (Macintyre 2003, p. 1). Within these debates, normative arguments about the most suitable institutional design frequently mix with self-interested motives of domestic political actors. This is certainly the case in Indonesia, as Chapter Five will demonstrate.

While institutional engineers face an array of choices, two coherent schools of thought have emerged in response to the challenges of democratisation in diverse societies. The consensus or consociational model is based around institutional designs that seek to incentivise political organisation by minority groups. Proponents of this model
would therefore oppose constraints on ethnic or regional parties, and favour variations of proportional representation electoral systems, as it is thought they give smaller communities a better chance at winning seats in legislative bodies. Supporters of the centripetal or majoritarian model, on the other hand, advocate ‘institutions which encourage inter-communal moderation by promoting multi-ethnic political parties, cross-cutting electoral incentives, and inter-group accommodation’ (Reilly 2006, p. 75-76). Thus, proponents of centripetalism favour electoral systems and formulas which constrain minor parties and promote broad-based political parties that move beyond narrow ethnic or regional appeals.

Lijphart (1999, p. 302) argues that the consociational model:

> Is the more attractive option for countries designing their first democratic constitutions or contemplating democratic reform. This recommendation is particularly pertinent, and even urgent, for societies that have deep cultural and ethnic cleavages, but it is also relevant for more homogeneous countries.

Supporters of the consociational model criticise centripetalism for its innate majoritarianism, that is, institutions which rely on power residing in the hands of majorities. For Lijphart, consociational approaches are fairer as they provide representation to the population on a more proportional basis. Lijphart (1999, p. 301) argues that:

> The consensus democracies do clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of democracy and democratic representation as well as with regard to what I have called the kindness and gentleness of their public policy orientations.

The overall idea of consociational institutions is the proportional sharing of power between all interested groups in society. In contrast, supporters of this model believe that the centripetal model can lead to tension, conflict and possibly violence. By providing some voice to all substantial groups in society, and promoting the sharing of power between these groups, scholars like Lijphart argued that consociational institutions can prevent serious conflict.

Proponents of the centripetal model, on the other hand, reject this claim. According to Reilly (2006, p. 90):
Critics of centripetalism have often identified the majoritarian nature of its institutional recommendations as a key weakness. Centripetalists respond that they favour a majoritarian democracy that will produce more fluid, shifting majorities that do not lock ascriptive minorities firmly out of power. In other words, while centripetalism is indeed a majoritarian model, it is a majoritarianism of broad-based parties and inclusive coalitions—not a majoritarianism of ‘in’ and ‘outs’, of ethnically defined majorities and minorities.

While this broader debate is informative, Reilly’s comments highlight the extent to which key concepts such as ‘representativeness’ and ‘inclusion’ are highly contested. For Reilly, (2006, p. 75) consociationalism maintains ‘inter-ethnic harmony … via mechanisms which collectively maximize the independence and influence of each main ethnic community’. Centripetalism, on the other hand, ‘advocates institutions which encourage inter-communal moderation by promoting multi-ethnic political parties, cross-cutting electoral incentives, and inter-group accommodation’ (Reilly 2006, p. 75-76). Consociational theory, according to these authors, runs the risk of crystallising conflicts between particular groups in society, by giving them specific rights to separate representation. As Reynolds (2011, p. 20) argues:

If consociational structures are entrenched in plural societies which do show potential for the withering away of ethnic voting, the very institutions designed to alleviate tensions may merely entrench the attitude that all politics must be ethnic politics. Consociationalism provides few incentives for political entrepreneurs to appeal for support beyond their own ethnic bases.

Following this argument, consociationalism provides few incentives for groups to attempt to bridge their differences.

Where political cleavages correspond to regional cleavages, aggregative political parties must have a national character and focus. A national party system, as defined by Hicken (2009, p. 6), described as system in which parties ‘have broad, national constituencies as opposed to constituencies that are primarily regional, local, or parochial in nature.’ As a result, it is expected that national political parties are not so narrowly interested in regional or local concerns, but instead are focused on issues of broader national importance. Janda (2005, p. 20) argues that:

Parties with broad social bases normally aggregate diverse interests rather than articulate specific ones. And parties normally differ from interest groups by aggregating rather than articulating interests. However, some parties … rate higher
than others in interest articulation and lower in interest aggregation. Ethnic parties in particular are thought to articulate their ethnic interests ahead of societal concerns.

Norris (2004) identifies a similar dichotomy, albeit with different terminology: narrowly defined parties, she argues, tend to pursue ‘bonding’ strategies, while broad aggregative parties pursue ‘bridging’ strategies.

Whichever terminology is used, the extent to which political parties pursue either aggregation or articulation can potentially have quite significant impacts on the political party system and the political system more broadly. Janda (2005, p. 20) argues that the notion ‘that ethnic parties promote domestic instability and threaten democratic institutions is the prevailing view in comparative politics’, while Reilly (2003) contends that:

Scholars and policy makers alike have frequently identified the need to build broad-based, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties if inter-ethnic violence is to be avoided and the routines of peaceful democratic politics consolidated in fragile multi-ethnic states.

While Ishiyama (2011, p. 147) argues that:

Ethnic parties do not seek integration into broader national identities. Rather, they limit their appeal to a particular ethnic or regional constituency, and ‘explicitly seek to draw boundaries’ between ethnic ‘friends’ and ‘foes’.

At the same time, however, he recognises that while ethnic parties can ‘serve to exacerbate conflict’, they can also ‘play a constructive role in promoting inter-group accommodation influence on the political system’. Ishimaya (2011, p. 169) further notes that:

Advocates of the consociational school … have long argued that by promoting the emergence of ethnic politics and then representing groups broadly, this will facilitate the integration of as many subcultures as possible into the political game, thus creating the conditions for inter-ethnic cooperation.

The debate between consociational and centripetalist scholars is directly relevant to the geographical branch requirement that is the focus of this research. In their objective of preventing the emergence of regionally based political parties, Indonesia’s branch requirements are, as Reilly (2009, p. 10) notes, ‘the exact opposite of what consociationalists would recommend, and are one of the most extreme versions of centripetal incentives to be found anywhere in the world’. Given the intense nature of
the debate in which Indonesia’s party registration laws are located, there is clearly no agreement in the literature on the normative status of promoting national political parties and preventing regional political organisations. This debate provides an important theoretical context for this study, even if the approach pursued here seeks to move beyond the usual parameters of this literature.

Indonesia’s party registration laws

The Laws
Efforts to nationalise Indonesia’s party system must be understood within the broader historical, societal and political context. It is important, for instance, to note the climate of change and instability in Indonesia in 1999. Barely 12 months after the fall of long-time authoritarian president Suharto, the country was entering a phase of reform, or reformasi as it was locally known. Important decisions about the structure of the post-Suharto political system were required—most crucially, it was important to consider how the abundant and centralised power that Suharto had previously held would be shared amongst new political players, and how these political actors would be selected. The division of decision-making power is, after all, one of the central questions engaged in by political theory, but this question is even more pressing in a state ostensibly undergoing a transition between drastically different means of organising political competition4.

At the same time, reformers were urgently aware of the precarious position of the Indonesian ‘nation-state’. As has been noted, Indonesia is a regionally diverse country, and in some regions the downfall of the Suharto regime had seemingly reopened old wounds. In Ambon, Aceh, Papua, Kalimantan and even parts of East Java there were significant outbreaks of violence, which at the time seemed to threaten the very future of the ‘Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’ (Negeri Kesatuan Republik

4 The extent to which reformasi led to real political change is contested. While for some observers the decentralisation of power and establishment of new institutions is an important step in a democratic direction (for example see: Webber 2007, p. 398; Davidson 2009, p. 294), other studies of Indonesia have noted the continuing oligarchic nature of the state and the capture of democratic institutions by both national and local elites (see, for example: Slater 2004; Hadiz & Robison 2013)
Indonesia\(^5\) (Freedman 2007, p. 207). Indonesia ‘went from being a highly centralized polity that repressed ethnonationalist mobilization to one that was both decentralized and affected by severe communal and separatist violence in several provinces’ (Aspinall 2011, p. 289). Even more significant was the situation in East Timor, in which growing dissent led to an internationally monitored independence vote, followed by military and pro-Jakarta violent outbreaks, and eventually the full independence of the province. Given East Timor’s independence, was it not possible that other regions may follow?\(^6\)

While this scenario did not occur, returning to this particular point in Indonesia’s history helps to understand the impetus behind some forms of institutional engineering—including the geographic branch requirement that is the focus of this study. Following the fall of Suharto, political parties were allowed to freely form, but regulations to prevent regional parties were enacted. Changes to Indonesia’s constitution made it clear that political parties should be national in nature, and these restrictions have gradually become more pronounced in amendments made since 1999. In the most recent form of the law governing political parties from 2011, political parties are defined in Article 1 as:

> Organisations which are national in nature and are formed by a group of Indonesian citizens voluntarily, based on their common desire and ambition to defend the political rights of their members, the community, the nation and the state, together with protecting the integrity of the united Indonesian state based on the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Indonesian state\(^7\).

The wording of this definition clearly emphasises the expectation that political parties are national in nature. This is evident in the first line of the definition, but also through the use of the terms masyarakat (community), bangsa (nation) and Negara (state) when outlining the groups that political parties will serve. While the term masyarakat could be used to describe a local community, the term is non-specific and could be used to describe the Indonesian community in general. The last part of the definition

\(^5\) This well known concept is invoked both in official documents (including the constitution) and in discussions about state integrity.

\(^6\) It should be noted that the significant decentralisation project that began in 1999 arguably addressed many of these emerging concerns regarding the political unity of Indonesia. Party system nationalisation was thus not the only response to this issue.

\(^7\) For Indonesian version see Appendix – Original Indonesian Language Quotations p. 270.
is also noteworthy: the use of the term *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, a concept which regularly emerges in discussions of national integrity in Indonesia, clearly also emphasises that political parties must be intent on protecting the integrity of the state.

Beyond this definition, practical restrictions are enforced to ensure that political parties that do not meet this definition are not only prevented from exercising political power, but also barred from even taking part in elections. Political parties (and candidates they support) are the only valid participants in all national, regional and local elections for legislative bodies (independent candidates can take part in regional and local executive elections, such as for governor or mayor, while the regional representative chamber—the *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, or *DPD*—is made up only of independent candidates)⁸. Additionally, all candidates for president must be nominated by a political party or coalition of parties with a sufficient share of parliament seats or votes in the legislative election. There is no option for local parties to take part solely in local or regional elections; parties wishing to compete in any level of government must pass the same national requirements.

To register to take part in an election, political parties must meet a range of requirements. These include: possessing vision and mission statements, a formal organisation, symbols, and an official bank account in the name of the party. Beyond these general requirements, political parties must meet the most significant barrier: that of national organisation (hereafter referred to as the ‘geographical branch requirement’ or simply ‘branch requirement’). In article 3, 1C of the party law, political parties are required to possess

> Organisation in each province and at least 75 percent of the city and country regions within each province, and at least 50 percent of the administrative districts within each of those city and country region⁹.

‘Possessing organisation’ here refers to a complex set of requirements, including the possession of a physical office, a leadership team, a minimum quota of women within

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⁸ Recent decisions within the national parliament over the laws governing local elections (UU Pilkada) have sought to remove the direct election of these regional heads, meaning the future of independent candidates is also now questionable.

⁹ For Indonesian version see Appendix – Original Indonesian Language Quotations p. 270.
the party leadership (30 percent), and a minimum number of members within the local community. While these requirements will be considered in more detail in Chapter Five, it is worth noting here that in their current form they are a very significant hurdle that even well-resourced political parties have struggled to overcome. While the regulation of political parties is increasingly common in developing democracies (Janda 2005; Van Biezen 2008), the current geographical branch requirement enacted in Indonesia is arguably the strictest form of party regulation in the democratic world. It is important, therefore, that we understand the impact this requirement has on the process of democratisation in Indonesia.

**Existing Research**

Despite the significance of Indonesia’s geographical branch requirement and its relevance to contemporary theoretical debates, the requirement has so far received little scholarly attention. Relevant studies on political parties and other democratic institutions in Indonesia regularly mention the branch requirement, but provide little direct consideration of their effects. The few exceptions to this have thus far tenuously linked the geographical branch requirement to outcomes such as a reduced number of parties and the lack of regional parties. Hicken (2008, p. 87), for example, observes that:

> In other words, only national parties are allowed to compete in Indonesian elections – period. The net effect of these reforms is fewer, more national parties than we would otherwise expect given Indonesia’s social diversity and very permissive electoral system.

Reilly has also considered the laws in the context of broader trends in institutional engineering throughout Asia. He (2008, p. 12) notes for example, that in regards to the requirement:

> The evidence to date is somewhat ambiguous, pointing to the utility of such mechanisms in achieving some goals – such as a more consolidated party system – but also to their propensity for unintended consequences.

The possible mixed outcomes produced by the branch requirement in Indonesia are also echoed in Hicken’s work. He suggests (2008, p. 89) that the laws ‘may have had the unintended consequence of retarding the development of strong links between
political parties and certain voters’. The restriction on the creation of regional parties in Indonesia:

may mean that a significant portion of the electorate—those with strong local or regional identities – are less likely to feel close to any political party and less likely to participate in elections and perhaps ultimately will be less satisfied with Indonesia’s developing democracy (Hicken 2008, p. 89).

These hypotheses are largely tentative due to the laws themselves not being the main focus of the research, but they identify some very important questions.

Sherlock similarly highlights the effects of the branch requirement in preventing regional parties from competing, but also argues that the geographical branch requirement may have reduced the ability for the party system to represent regional groups. According to Sherlock (2004, p. 7):

The effect of the rule, however, perpetuates the highly centralised structure of Indonesia’s political parties. Only parties based in Jakarta are able to contest elections at any level of government. The ban on provincial level parties runs counter to the decentralisation of power from Jakarta that has been under way since the end of the Suharto regime. It arguably exacerbates rather than assuages separatism in the case of provinces where there is indeed strong separatist feeling, especially Aceh and Papua. The major Jakarta-based parties are often distrusted by local people in these regions and such parties are unsuited to giving voice to the strong sense of regional identity or even suppressed nationhood.

Sherlock’s observation was made prior to arrangements in Aceh which created an exception for local Acehnese political parties competing in local elections; yet, his comments are still relevant to national elections in Aceh, as well as Papua and other provinces where there is a strong regional identity. The ‘Jakarta-centric’ nature of the party system is not only an issue in regions with separatist sentiments, but rather represents a more widespread cleavage between centre and periphery, which is one enduring element of Indonesian political system and society. Ghoshal (2004, p. 524) similarly raises concerns about the success of decentralisation without regional political parties, suggesting that:

Implementation of autonomy and decentralization plans will be meaningless unless provisions are made for the growth and emergence of regional parties, which, given recognition and respectability can contribute to greater integration and unity of the country.
These comments point to the existence of several different hypotheses regarding Indonesia’s geographical branch requirement, but so far there appear to be more questions than answers. A comprehensive study of party system nationalisation in this context is thus urgently required. Additionally, I contend that such a study should also focus on the central concept of political representation. By exploring the way in which political representation is claimed, assessed and understood within Indonesia, this study is better placed to understand the most important effects of the geographical branch requirement.

**Thesis Outline**

**Chapter Two** presents a review of the literature in order to contextualise this study. The chapter begins by examining the dominant approaches to studying Indonesia’s political party system. While this body of research provided a thorough understanding of the structure and activities of Indonesia’s political parties, this chapter argues that there is an urgent need to connect these findings to the way in which political representation is understood and claimed. The remainder of the chapter presents a typology of the four key notions of representation (identity, character, performative and democratic) provided by key works in political philosophy.

**Chapter Three** builds upon the foundation of the previous chapter to outline a conceptual and theoretical approach that can be applied to the research problem in this study. Saward’s representative claims concept allows for a consideration of different forms of claims within a given political community. The concept of ‘representative repertoires’ is introduced here as a new theoretical approach to understanding representation. Studying representative repertoires, it is argued, can allow us to understand the dynamic of representative claim-making in a given political community or society, and connect this process to political outcomes such as democratisation and legitimacy. This conceptual framework also allows for theoretical discussions regarding the way in which institutional factors (such as party system nationalisation) can influence representative repertoires.
Chapter Four provides a discussion of the research methods used within this study. The conceptual and theoretical framework elaborated in the previous chapter is considered here in terms of how it can be best operationalised. This chapter notes the way in which the institutional framework is studied, including the way in which party system nationalisation is explored in chapter five. This chapter then considers how the making and assessment of representative claims can be studied, in order to draw conclusions about the existence of specific repertoires of representation.

Chapter Five provides a detailed analysis of the geographical branch requirement and party system nationalisation in Indonesia. The nature of the requirement is detailed, including the increasing severity of the requirement over time. This chapter also argues that the requirement itself has been politicised. The second part of this chapter puts forward some additional factors that also influence the nationalisation of Indonesia’s party system. Finally, this chapter presents a quantitative analysis of voting data from elections in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014, demonstrating that Indonesia possesses an increasingly national political party system. Overall, this chapter contends that together with other key historical and institutional factors, the party registration laws are a central element in the nationalisation of Indonesia’s party system.

Chapter Six explores the way in which notions of identity and character representation inform the making of representative claims and the formation of repertoires. Based on an analysis of a wide range of potential claims, a number of key repertoires are identified. Overall, this chapter argues that both political parties and independent claim-makers have engaged in a wide range of claims based on the representative notions of identity and character.

Chapter Seven explores the way in which performative and democratic notions of representation have been used to make representative claims in Indonesia. While political parties and independent claim-makers have sought to engage with these notions of representation, it is clear that these claims are often more difficult to make than those based on identity and character. In particular, some of the most important cases of representatives drawing on repertoires of performance and democratic engagement appear to be independent claim-makers rather than political parties.
Chapter Eight Analyses the way in which representative claims and repertoires have been assessed within Indonesia. Based both on questionnaire and in country research data, this chapter argues that participants in the research clearly favour understandings of representation based on performance and democratic engagement. These notions are the most often invoked when participants made overall assessments about political parties. Overall, this chapter argues that relatively little attention is given to identity as a means of claiming representativeness, while character claims are closely connected to both performative and democratic claims. Based on these priorities, participants were clearly critical of the way in which political parties invoked these important repertoires.

Chapter Nine connects the findings from the previous four chapters. Having analysed the use of representative repertoires and their assessment, this chapter considers how the capability and selection processes of political parties are impacted by the geographical branch requirement. It is argued here that party system nationalisation has not, as may be expected, prevented political parties from successfully employing representative repertoires based on notions of identity. It has, however, had the unintended consequence of constraining creative repertoire development within political parties themselves to better meet the demands of contemporary Indonesian society.

Chapter Ten concludes the study. The overall findings of the study are summarised here together with their implications. This study, it is argued, presents an important contribution to the study of both political representation and constitutional engineering in Indonesia, but it is also one of the first empirical studies to test recently developed conceptual frameworks based on the dynamic nature of representative claim-making. As such, this study opens up many promising opportunities for future research, and these are outlined in this final chapter.
CHAPTER TWO

Political Parties, Institutions and Political Representation

Introduction
This chapter situates this study within the broader theoretical environment. It begins by examining the way in which political parties and their links to Indonesia’s diverse society have been understood post-reformasi. Here, it is argued that three forms of analysis have dominated this literature. While these three theses provide important contextual detail for the purposes of this study and inform several of the following chapters, they largely lack an examination of the concept of political representation. This gap in the literature is not isolated to the analysis of Indonesia’s political system, however; it is common in the scholarship on political parties and electoral institutions more broadly. Having noted this gap in the literature, this study suggests, with Van Biezen and Saward (2008), that it is important for empirical studies of political party systems to engage more closely with democratic theory. Following this advice, the second half of this chapter explores the notion of political representation as the core object of analysis in this research. This final section considers how representation has been studied within political philosophy, providing an important basis for the development of a suitable theoretical model in the following chapter.

Indonesia’s Political Party System
The central and often dramatic role played by political parties during reformasi in Indonesia has not escaped the attention of analysts and academics. Political parties, together with the parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR), are one of the most frequent objects of analysis within contemporary research on Indonesia’s political system. This section argues that three approaches to understanding Indonesia’s party system have been particularly dominant within the literature—the analysis of politik aliran, the oligarchy thesis, and approaches based on the measure of political party institutionalisation. This is an important starting point, as there is little value in developing new frameworks for analysis where existing theoretical
approaches offer a viable and effective method of engaging with the research question. While this literature is important and has provided a richer understanding of the dynamics of political competition in post-Suharto Indonesia\textsuperscript{10}, these three approaches ultimately leave an important gap that this research intends to fill.

**Indonesia’s Party System and Politik Aliran**

There are, I would argue, three broad approaches to the study of party politics in contemporary Indonesia that warrant attention. The first, and one of the first to emerge following the beginning of the period of *reformasi*, was the identification of the continued relevance of politics based on *aliran* identities. This body of research has noted the extent to which the political parties that emerged during the democratic election of 1955 were based on social streams, or *aliran*. The term *aliran* ‘is a rich and nuanced one in Indonesian political discourse’ and is based on the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz (Sherlock 2009, p. 16; also see Geertz 1964). *Aliran*, as Geertz outlined them, were cleavages in society based on cross-cutting religious, cultural and political cleavages. *Politik aliran* refers to the incorporation of these *aliran* into the political system, as occurred in 1955. The election result in that year was split between a number of large parties representing different streams of society—*Partai Nasional Indonesia* (*PNI*, National Party of Indonesia) representing more nationalist and secular *abangan* Muslims, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (*PKI*, Indonesian Communist Party) representing communists and socialists, *masyumi* representing modernist *santri* Muslims, and NU representing traditionalist *santri* Muslims.

Following the re-emergence of democracy after a long period of authoritarian government, there was interest to see whether this political landscape would resemble that of 1955. Following the election, there did seem to be some striking similarities. Sherlock (2004, p. 17) observed that:

Indonesia’s parties have deep historical and cultural roots which tap into the divisions inherent in Indonesian society. When the Suharto-era restrictions on freedoms of political association and organisation were thrown off in 1998, the country’s political parties quickly assumed forms that had would have been familiar to a political actor of the early 1950s, the last time when parties were able to operate freely. Indeed, the results of the 1999 election show some remarkable continuities with the results of the 1955 election.

\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, I am heavily indebted to this literature for assisting my own understanding of party politics in Indonesia.
A large body of research made similar observations during this period (see for example King 2003; Antlov 2004; Baswedan 2004; Tan 2006; Blondel 2006). King (2003, p. 216), for example, argued that the aliran foundations of Indonesia’s political parties at this time distinguished the party system of Indonesia to those of the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea.

There were signs, however, that this re-emergence of politik aliran was weakening as the process of reformasi continued. In summarising a large survey of Indonesian citizens, Liddle and Mulyani (2010, p. 39) find that:

Neither adherence to a particular world religion nor belonging to a certain aliran had a significant direct influence on voters ... Moreover, regional differences, specifically the oft-mentioned gulf between the residents of Java and those of other islands, did not greatly influence voting behavior. These conclusions contradicted previous scholarly claims that aliran and locality largely determine how Indonesians cast their ballots.

These authors instead focus on other factors, such as the economy and the reputation of individual leaders, as being more important in influencing votes in the 2010 election.

While this is the case, a number of researchers have argued that aliran are still relevant, even if their importance is diminishing. Ufen (2008, p. 6), for example, argues that there has been a process of ‘dealignment’ or dealiranisasi in Indonesia, particularly following the 1999 election. The Suharto government, which was in power for over 30 years, played a role in depoliticising society, ‘to centralize the administration and to streamline the political system’ (Ufen 2008, p. 12). During this time some of the aliran identities from the 1950s were weakened, or in the case of the communist party, almost completely annihilated (Ufen 2008, p. 11). Despite these efforts, as we have seen, the results of the 1999 election demonstrated that there still were considerable aliran within society and that they still influenced politics. Yet Ufen (2008, p. 17) argues that ‘aliran nowadays are different and—what is more important—parties are no longer social movements with their own tight network of organizations’. Ufen (2008, p. 17) observes that political parties today are more elitist with greater distance between politicians and voters; additionally, conflict within parties—where it was often based on ideological grounds in the 1950s—today is ‘more about leadership styles and positions’. Several other scholars have also acknowledged the existence of aliran in Indonesia, while also arguing for the increasing de-alignment of Indonesian
Indonesia’s Party System and the Oligarchy Thesis

The second key stream of research has been described as the ‘oligarchy thesis’ (Aspinall 2013, p. 104), but shares some features with the cartelization theory that has attempted to apply ideas stemming from European party development to the context of Indonesia (Mietzner 2013, p. 215). This thesis has been applied to Indonesia by scholars such as Hadiz (2003), Hadiz and Robison (2013) and Slater (2004). The primary argument presented by these theorists is that Indonesia’s reformasi was less a revolution and more a reorganisation of power—and many of the same oligarchic interests that existed in the Suharto era continued on into the reformasi era. Democratization ‘enabled the repositioning of a variety of interests, incubated and entrenched during Suharto’s long rule, within a new democratic political framework, preserving the illiberal nature of Indonesian politics’ (Fukuoka 2012, p. 992). As such, the connection of political parties with society is less relevant than the ongoing influence of these oligarchic interests. Hadiz (2003, p. 607), for example, argues that we should focus primarily on the continuation of ‘predatory’ power politics in post-Suharto Indonesia:

The reorganization of power in contemporary Indonesia recalls some of the experiences of countries like Thailand and the Philippines, and that of post-Soviet Russia ... they show that old interests and such uncivil forces as local bosses and political gangsters may reinvent themselves and appropriate the democratization process, and thereby exercise predatory power through money politics and political thuggery.

While these authors have proven to be the most forceful proponents of the oligarchy thesis, the broader cohort of Indonesianist political scientists have become increasingly cynical in their assessments of democratisation. As a result, many studies of Indonesian politics now emphasise the continued practices of corruption and the impact of money politics during elections. While the oligarchy thesis may not capture a complete picture of post-Suharto Indonesia, it is an important analysis that needs to be considered in any account of party politics, including the present study.

Indonesia’s Party System and Institutionalisation

A final approach to the study of party politics seeks to understand the extent to which political parties have become institutionalised. Based in particular on the work of
Mainwaring, Jones, Scully and Torcal, measures of party system institutionalisation consider to what extent there is ‘stability in who the main parties are and how they behave’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, p. 207). Hence party system institutionalisation measures are keenly interested in the level of stability and predictability in both the competition between parties and their relationship with society itself. The impetus for these measures is immediately obvious, as one of the key factors separating parties in developing and developed democracies has been the level of institutionalisation within the political system—indeed, parties in developing democracies have been known for their instability and rather erratic behaviour (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). In one of the most well-developed models, Jones (2007) describes four dimensions on which his measure of party system institutionalisation is based: stability of patterns in interparty competition, party roots in society, the legitimacy of parties and elections, and party organization. He further identifies indices that can be used to measure political parties on each of these dimensions. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Randall and Svasand (2002) have also detailed measures of party system institutionalisation, and Jones’ model is also heavily influenced by their work.

Party system institutionalisation models have been applied by a number of scholars to Indonesia’s party system. Tomsa’s (2008) valuable study of the institutionalisation of Indonesia’s political parties (especially Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)), for example, focuses on Golkar’s party machine, decisional autonomy, political communication and political values/ideology. He finds that:

Golkar is indeed better institutionalized than most of the other parties … at the same time, [Golkar] can hardly be classified as highly or strongly institutionalized. On the contrary, the analysis has revealed that Golkar also suffers from various institutional weaknesses, especially in the dimensions of decisional autonomy and value infusion. (2008, p. 180-181)

Tan (2006) applies Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) model of party system institutionalisation, arguing that:

On balance … Indonesia’s party system has deinstitutionalized slightly since 1999, particularly with the focus on individuals rather than parties because of the presidential contest, continuing into the races for regional heads around the nation. Still, the parties exhibit conflicting signs of institutionalization, strong in some areas and weak in others. In many ways the parties’ strengths make their weaknesses worse (Tan 2006, p. 109).
Like Tomsa, Ulla Fiona (2013) provides a book-length study of party system institutionalisation in Indonesia. She focuses on four political parties—Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the East Java city of Malang. Her findings are, largely, more pessimistic than those of Tan. Fiona (2013, p. 207-208) argues that:

Despite the progress Indonesian parties have shown and the requirements of the political system for even more, there have been more reasons for pessimism than optimism about the parties’ capacity to contribute to democracy…parties face significant problems achieving higher levels of institutionalisation. Although some parties have made significant progress at the local level, they have yet to achieve a number of essential requirements of institutionalisation.

While these studies explicitly refer to the theories and models of party system institutionalisation, a number of other studies of political party development in Indonesia could be said to be operating within the same broad parameters and applying similar assumptions as these authors. Mietzner (2013, p. 192-193) for example, utilises Webb and White’s (2007) framework of systemic functionality, which applies many of the same criteria as party system institutionalisation approaches. What all of these approaches have in common is a focus on what is considered to be the most appropriate functions and organisation of political parties—and in almost all of these studies Indonesia’s political parties received a mixed scorecard.

These three approaches to understanding party politics in Indonesia are informative and are regularly drawn on throughout this study. Yet, it is argued here that an important addition to this literature is a more detailed analysis of the concept of political representation. Like the broader literature on institutional engineering, most studies of Indonesia’s political parties focus on the function of political parties, and tend to favour an instrumental understanding of political representation. As I suggest in the next section, this instrumental understanding of representation provides important details regarding the functional nature of political parties; this is crucial particularly in the early stages of democratisation, but contemporary Indonesian politics increasingly demands the addition of analysis with an explicit focus on the nature of political representation.

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11 This may in part reflect the later date of publication.
The Missing Element – Political Representation

Empirical and Normative Justifications
There are several important reasons for applying a study of political representation to Indonesia’s political party system. Firstly, from an empirical perspective, in the context of this study acts of representation are favoured by the prevailing institutional structure. Contemporary Indonesian politics, like most contemporary democratic states, is based largely on representative institutions. Political decisions in Indonesia are largely carried out by elected representatives of one form or another. As unpopular as political parties and politicians may be, they still dominate the political scene, and there is little immediate prospect of politicians, parties and representative institutions diminishing in importance. In relation to this reality, Saward and van Biezen have argued that:

When addressing empirical reality and advancing practical solutions for the improvement of the quality of democracy, democratic theorists should be less reluctant to acknowledge the reality (and indeed the potential) of the political party and to incorporate the findings of party scholars. (2008, p. 23)

This acknowledgement does not ignore the numerous empirical failures of political parties and party systems, but simply argues for an interest in engaging with their presence and potential.

If political representation is a continuing important feature of politics as it is currently structured, then representative practices face the most significant burden in regards to other important outcomes such as trust, legitimacy and stability. Where representative practices are poor and where citizens and communities are unhappy with the way they are represented, we can expect a range of detrimental effects. The level of legitimacy of the political regime, for instance, can be assessed by outsider observers (the organisation Freedom House is a good example), but the way in which it is assessed by members of the polity is also crucial. Where there is a perceived lack of legitimacy we can also expect other detrimental outcomes, such as a reduction in trust between society and the state and even reduced levels of regime stability. Recent scholarship may doubt the ability of representative democracies to deliver desired outcomes in regards to democratic theory and social justice – but this does not mean that we should avoid seeking to understand how political representation works where this form of government is entrenched.
Secondly, despite recent trends within political science, a normative argument can be made for the importance of studying political representation. It is important to acknowledge that democratic theory has recently taken a ‘deliberative turn’, where the prevalent literature is now more interested in moving beyond representation and representative institutions (like political parties) to focus on the potential for direct or deliberative forms of decision making to occupy the perceived democratic deficit in current political systems (see for instance Cohen 1989, Elster 1998, Dryzek 2002, Fishkin 2011). One well known critique is provided by Benjamin Barber (1984, p. 132) who argues that representation ‘is incompatible with freedom … Representation is incompatible with equality … Representation, finally, is incompatible with social justice’. Tormey (2006), similarly, has argued that there is a need to go ‘beyond representation’ and that we are now living in a ‘post-representation’ political context. Central to this body of scholarship are arguments that recent trends, such as the dwindling membership of political parties and apathy regarding formal political processes in many nations, is evidence of both an empirical change in the position of representation, as well as a normative need to consider alternatives to representation. To some extent this is echoed in John Keane’s The Life and Death of Democracy (2009), where he postulates the emergence of ‘monitory democracy’: a new form of democratic governance that surrounds formal electoral representation with an array of community organisations and NGOs designed to monitor the work of these formal institutions.

There is immense value to this scholarship, as traditional conceptions of representative government are no doubt overly narrow and have often failed to critique the weaknesses of representative government. The changing nature of democratic societies that Keane and others have noted is difficult to refute. It makes sense, as Laycock (2004, p. xv) argues, that representation as a concept has received less attention from normative studies of democracy, as ‘some of this inattention can be accounted for in terms of the perception and reality of widespread representational failures in Western polities’. However, I would argue that the notion that we can or should go ‘beyond representation’ is flawed. This is evident once representation is divorced from its institutional embodiment, and considered as practices that are constitutive of politics itself.
Representation, as Thomassen (2007, p. 111) has argued, is an unavoidable reality of human interaction, including politics. Thomassen (2007, p. 111) bases this argument on the philosophy of Derrida, who contends that ‘representation is constitutive, by which I mean that there is no politics or experience outside representation, which can, then, not be opposed to some true or authentic presence’. Human interaction is replete with the making of representations; political communities, ideas and arguments are constructed by representation of one form or another, meaning that even without formal representative institutions, representation continues. For Thomassen, this means that ‘there is no way “beyond representation”, and representation is not a second best’ (Thomassen 2007, p. 112).

This is a point also taken up by Urbinati (2000, p. 759), when she argues that:

> When we express our dissatisfaction with the way in which we are represented, we implicitly allude to some ideal of representation. As for the character of democratic politics, focus on deliberation allows us to perceive participation and representation not as two alternative forms of democracy but as related forms constituting the continuum of political action in modern democracies.

If representation and participation are understood as related forms of political action rather than as opposing foundations on which political systems can be built, then the distinction between ‘direct and indirect politics’ becomes:

> A promising path of interpretation: it frames the institutional and sociocultural space within which the various components of political action—from opinions and will formation to decision making—take shape (Urbinati 2000, p. 759).

Urbinati further develops these points to suggest that acts of representation, as a form of indirect politics and of advocacy, have a quality that can be beneficial to democracy. This point will be taken up again in the following section.

These arguments become clearer once applied to concrete examples of political interaction. As David Plotke (1997) has so convincingly argued, attempts to make democracy more participatory do not necessarily exclude practices of representation; indeed, representation (at least in an informal sense) is almost unavoidable. Plotke (1997, p. 25-26) provides a hypothetical participatory forum to discuss the continued presence of representation as practices:

> At this meeting of (say) one thousand people, who gets to talk first? And last? Imagine an open floor … when an agenda for deliberation is shaped. Presume a long evening meeting of 2.5 hours. Interventions average three minutes, including applause and pauses between speakers. Fifty speakers get the floor … Are the other 960 members of the assembly participants or highly interested spectators at a political event? If
‘direct’ means more than being physically present, in what sense would this 96% of the assembly be engaged in strong or direct democracy?

Urbinati echoes this argument. She follows Mogens Herman Hansen (1991) in noting the distinction in Athenian democracy between ‘wholly active citizens’, who spoke and proposed motions, ‘standing participants’, who attended assemblies and voted but did not speak, and ‘passive citizens’, who did not attend the assembly. From this assessment, Urbinati (2000, p. 763) argues that:

If we compare Athens to contemporary democracy, we can say that our right to vote corresponds to Athenian standing participation, to abstain from voting corresponds to passive citizenship, and representation corresponds to wholly active citizenship.

Thus, even where formal forms of representation (such as committees or elected leaders) are not present, a form of representation still occurs; some speak more often or louder than others, children are represented by their parents, and some members of the community defer to others that, they believe, argue strongly for the position they themselves hold. Put simply, we can do away with the formal elements of representation, but representation as a political practice is unavoidable. If ‘representation is ubiquitous, there can be no democracy or politics without representation’, meaning that the distinction between representation institutions and new ‘institutional forms of so-called “direct democracy”’ is not as significant as thought: ‘Both are inevitably representative’ (Lievens 2014, p. 4).

Thus, in addition to the empirical reality of representative government, representation is a ubiquitous practice within political communities. Yet it is important to separate the practice of representation from the systematic embodiment of representation. Representative political systems that actively subdue opportunities for participation and engagement warrant critique. At the same time, it is important to recognise the continued existence of practices of representation that are not necessarily unnatural or a detrimental aspect of democracy.

Absence of Political Representation in Existing Research
The third justification for a focus on political representation lies in the fact that a comprehensive operationalisation of political representation is rarely provided in most research on political institutions and political parties. Despite the importance of political representation as a practice within representative democracies, existing research largely applies what could be called an ‘instrumental’ understanding of political representation. This understanding of representation likely emerges from a
basic assumption about democracy in large states: that representation serves an instrumental role as a ‘pragmatic expedient to cope with large territorial states’ (Urbinati 2000, p. 758). If political representation is a necessary compromise due to the scale of modern political communities, then political parties and other representative institutions are naturally viewed as the functional embodiment of that compromise. There is, of course, some merit in this assumption, and indeed the organisation and nature of representative institutions and political parties are an important focus for empirical analysis. The extent to which political parties, electoral systems, and legislative bodies exhibit specific traits and characteristics most likely has a direct causal relationship with the nature of representation in a community. Yet, this literature is much more interested in the independent variable (the nature of political parties or of institutional designs) than exploring the dependent variable (political representation). Too often, the meaning of political representation is absent from studies, or simply assumed. Put simply, existing research is well-equipped to explain the supporting conditions of representation, rather than to directly respond to the question: ‘Is that community well represented?’

This is true to some extent of the debates regarding institutional design introduced in chapter one. Lijphart (1999, p. 301) for example, suggests that consociational institutional design provides ‘representation on a more proportional basis’ and argues that consociational democracies ‘outperform the majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of … democratic representation’. These may appear to be common-sense statements, but what does representation on a proportional basis actually mean? Lijphart is using the term representation here to describe the correspondence of electoral results (i.e. seats in parliaments) to votes placed. This is of course an important problem, but if we were to ensure that representation was provided on this more proportional basis, does this necessarily guarantee a better ‘quality’ of representation? Do we assume that 10 representatives elected on a proportional basis necessarily represent ‘better’, or are perceived to represent better, than 10 representatives elected using an electoral formula that is less proportional? What of other key factors, besides the proportionality of electoral formulas? If, for example, political parties are universally hated by the community and there is little perceived difference between their performance or policies, it seems that the reason for such poor choice is of greater consequence than the proportionality of the electoral formula. This is not to say that proportionality is not important. I simply contend that if we wish to
know whether a particular community is well represented, the proportionality of the electoral formula does not exhaust our analysis—far from it.

Studies of party system institutionalisation can be critiqued in the same way. The concept of institutionalisation is of course highly useful; yet, there are gaps in the explanatory power of research based on party system institutionalisation. Indicators of party system institutionalisation are heavily skewed towards ‘consolidation, regularity, predictability, and “systemness”’ (Webb & White 2007, p. 4)—worthy subjects indeed—but while the extent to which a party or party system is institutionalised may influence its ability to ‘represent’, institutionalisation and representation are not the same thing. This is a distinction that is not always clear in relevant studies. Croissant and Volkel (2010, p. 24), for instance, mention ‘insufficient institutionalization’ in the same phrase as ‘the lack of adequate opportunities for political representation’, though they do not define the concept of political representation or how it may be influenced by differing levels of institutionalisation. Ufen (2008b) contends that, amongst other benefits, ‘a relatively stable party system fosters more effective programmatic representation’. It may seem common sense to argue that better institutionalisation means better representation, but in making this assumption there is the risk of neglecting other important findings about representation.

Indeed, it is conceivable for a political party system to be highly institutionalised, yet at the same time poor in providing representation. Juan Pablo Luna (2008, p. 5), for example, argues that ‘the relationship between institutionalization and high democratic quality is not linear, as too much institutionalization can lead to party system sclerosis’. Why is it, for example, that in a country with a party system that could be considered one of the most institutionalised in the world (the United States) satisfaction with representative officials and parties remains extremely low (Dennis & Owen 2001, p. 399)? This is not to say that there is no relationship between institutionalisation and representation (there most certainly is and chapter nine explores some aspects of this relationship), but instead that simply assuming this relationship without interrogating the concept of representation may prevent a deeper understanding of the exact nature of that relationship.

12 It is useful in this study too – Chapter Nine utilises a number of findings from some excellent applications of party system institutionalisation theories to Indonesia.
Admittedly, some institutionalisation scholars do offer some degree of attention to the concept of representation. The way in which political parties connect with society is often built into institutionalisation accounts, particularly in analysing the ‘rootedness’ of political parties in society\textsuperscript{13} (Hicken 2006, p. 12). Yet this analysis suffers from several flaws. Firstly, representation is frequently under-interrogated as a concept, or too simply operationalised. Definitions borrowing from the immense literature related to representation in democratic theory are rare—as mentioned above, the term is treated in a way that suggests its meaning can be simply assumed. This leads to some simplified operationalisations of the concept. Jones (2007), for example, operationalises this component in two ways: the percentage of the population possessing a connection to political parties, and the percentage of legislators believing that parties are distant from society. But does party membership necessarily indicate the quality of representation? And what does ‘distant’ mean in this context? Why should legislators be in the best position to judge the distance of parties from society? Secondly, these accounts pay little attention to how representation is understood and contested. Party system institutionalisation measures are frequently deployed in cross-national studies in order to compare party systems; this is reflected in the reliance on survey data and statistics for a number of the operationalisations. Yet, as pointed out by Rehfeld (2006) and Saward (2010), the way in which representation is perceived by members of society is highly significant, and should not be ignored.

Some of these same issues are present in cross-national studies on the concept of ‘party linkage’. For example, \textit{Political Parties and Democracy: Contemporary Western Europe and Asia}, an edited volume by Inoguchi & Blondel (2012) features separate chapters on a number of western European and Asian democracies (including Indonesia). The book’s chapters seek to understand ‘party societal links’ between 1990 and 2010 through the use of eight different indicators:

1. general election turn-out;
2. nature of the national electoral system;
3. the parties that have either contested elections or disappeared;
4. newly emerged parties;
5. proportion of votes obtained by each party at the general elections;
6. level of volatility affecting the parties;
7. geographical coverage of these parties within the nation; and
8. social background of the electors of the parties (Inoguchi & Blondel 2012, p. 6).

\textsuperscript{13} Arguably the interest in politik aliran in the early period of reformasi in Indonesia draws on assumptions about the roots of parties within society.
The result is an informative and detailed comparison of a number of party systems in Western Europe and Asia, but without any significant attention to the dynamic of political representation that influence those society-party links.

This is not to suggest that research on parties and political institutions is unique in under-operationalising the concept of political representation. Even in studies with a declared focus on the concept the approach can be quite limited. One of the most common types of empirical study into political representation is the use of survey data, and the assumption that the quality of representation can be gauged through the correspondence of opinions or values between represented and representative. Luna and Zechmeister (2005), for example, examine the concept of political representation in the context of Latin America and define representation ‘as the extent to which political parties and their constituents have consistently matching preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions’ (Luna & Zechmeister 2005, p. 396). In formulating this definition, the authors are heavily influenced by the literature of ‘issue representation’, a literature focused on the ‘policy divergence among the parties contesting the election and policy voting on the part of the electorate’ (Luna & Zechmeister 2005, p. 396). Based on this definition, the authors operationalise the concept of political representation by comparing survey data of public opinion and the opinions of representatives. Such an approach is in good company. Miller and Stokes (1963) consider political representation in the United States’ Congress, seeking to understand the influence that constituents had over their congressman through an empirical study of constituent and representative perspectives and voting records. Heavily influenced by the work of Miller and Stokes, Converse and Pierce (1986) apply their empirical approach to political representation in France, while Russell Dalton (1985) applies a similar approach to the study of political representation and political parties in nine European democracies. More recently, Stadelmann, Portmann and Eichenberger (2014, p. 18), apply a similar approach when they:

Take the absolute difference between the voter yes-share in a referendum and the yes-share of politicians in their parliamentary decisions in the respective house as a natural and inverse measure of the quality of political decisions, i.e. [they] observe divergence from voter preferences in the two houses. The absolute difference to the voter yes-share of each house represents a meaningful measure of preference representation.

Again, there is clear value in this form of research. Yet, important considerations are left out. Why should we believe that politician A represents constituency B well simply because they have the same opinions on key issues? What if I share the same beliefs
as a political party I voted for, but that party is riddled with corruption that influences its ability to represent well? More importantly, stating a preference on a survey is far removed from developing policy or carrying out particular political action based on that preference. The extent to which voters and elected representatives have similar views on particular issues is important, but by assuming a simplistic connection between issue convergence and the quality of representation we potentially miss important details about the nature of political representation in a given polity.

To some extent, these weaknesses are also present in otherwise excellent studies of the political representation of both women and minority ethnic groups. This research is commonly focused on descriptive representation\(^\text{14}\)—the extent to which representatives and groups of representatives possess a similar identity to the represented. In the case of women, the most common technique is to study the percentage of women who reach political office. Rosen (2011, p. 310), for example, describes the dependent variable in her research as being ‘the percentage of seats occupied by women in single or lower houses of a country’s main legislative body’. However, she (2011, p. 310) cautions that:

> The outcome, therefore, concerns the number of women in parliament rather than the effects of having more women in parliament (descriptive vs. substantive representation). This article, however, is predicated on the belief that greater legislative participation of women at least increases the possibility that women’s interests will be better represented.

Celis and Erzeel (2013, p. 488) similarly focus on ‘descriptive’ representation:

> More precisely, we ask how the ‘new’ demand for descriptive representation of ethnic minorities interacts with women’s representation on electoral lists, and how this in turn influences the representation of intersectional groups (i.e., groups at the intersection of gender and ethnicity). In order to answer this question, we analyse the composition of party lists for national/federal elections in the two countries over time (1994/95–present).

While Forest (2012, p. 320) uses:

> Racial/ethnic data from the 2000 (US) and 2001 (Canadian) censuses, and political data from the US 109th Congress (2004–2006) and 37–39th Canadian Parliaments (2001–2007) to compare the proportions of visible minorities in each country’s population; the respective proportions of supermajority, majority, and influence FEDs; and the proportions of visible minority representatives in the lower house of each federal legislature. I also examine the proportion of women representatives in each legislature to provide a baseline standard for comparison. I find that despite the two countries’ different legal and institutional mechanisms for creating electoral...

\(^{14}\) This concept is referred to as ‘identity’ representation in this study.
constituencies, Canada and the US actually share similar levels in the representation of visible minorities.

There are no doubt connections between the participation of minorities in higher office and at the grassroots levels of politics, as Barnes and Burchard (2013, p. 767) note:

We find that as women’s descriptive representation increases, the political engagement gender gap diminishes. This finding is robust across several measures of political engagement. Our findings suggest that the incorporation of women into political institutions encourages the political engagement of women at the citizen level.

Yet while this body of literature can comment on the connection between descriptive representation and some observable outcomes (greater numerical participation at the grassroots, for example) it clearly is more limited in being able to argue that the quality of political representation for these minority groups has necessarily improved. To do so, these studies would need to delve deeper into the meaning of representation, and seek to understand the many factors that lead to a citizen or community feeling well (or poorly) represented. Descriptive representation may be one component of why a community is or is not well represented, but it only provides a limited insight into what is happening when one entity is represented by another. Tan (2014, p. 36) sums up this difficulty in her analysis of ethnic quotas in Singapore:

What remains to be seen is whether the increased legislative presence of minority ethnic groups and women makes a substantive difference to their respective groups…Singapore’s experience with ethnic quotas suggests that electoral institutions can improve legislative diversity. But whether the legislative diversity brings about substantive democratic development is another question that deserves further study.

Addressing the under-developed state of the notion of political representation in empirical research, in my view, necessitates returning to a more detailed understanding of how representation is conceived. In this regard I agree with van Biezen and Saward (2008, p. 21), who argue that there remains a ‘curious, persistent, and ultimately indefensible divide between two distinct sub-disciplinary domains: democratic theory (DT) and the study of political parties (PP)’. This divide has meant that:

The current literatures on political parties and normative democratic theory continue to develop to an extraordinary degree in mutual isolation. While assuming that political parties are inevitable for modern democracy, empirical studies of contemporary parties, party organization, and party systems tend to have little to say about the varied meanings and possibilities of democracy, and therefore of the varied potential roles of political parties within it. Conversely, modern democratic theory is noticeably silent on the question whether political parties have a legitimate place and function in a democracy (Van Biezen & Saward 2008, p. 22).
To fully engage the key research problem at the core of this research, it is important to address this problematic divide. While this study provides an empirical consideration of the role of political parties in Indonesia’s democratic system, it requires a comprehensive model of representation that can provide a theoretical background for this task. This means following the advice of Van Biezen and Saward (2008, p. 23) when they state that:

Party scholars … when addressing normative and empirical issues of democracy, could benefit from developing a greater sensitivity to the broader significance of the place and role of political parties in modern democracy, and a greater awareness of the conceptual and theoretical dimensions underlying democracy.

In the following section, some key contributions of political philosophy to understanding representation are surveyed in order to better understand the full meaning of political representation.

**Defining Political Representation**

If representation is to form the basis for our theoretical framework, how can we unravel this complex and contested notion? How can the concept be applied to empirical political contexts? An important starting point is to survey the different normative visions of representation. There are, clearly, different ways of understanding representation, and by only focusing on one notion there is a risk of missing important detail. This section surveys some of the key normative visions of what representation is or could be – arguing that together they provide a comprehensive range of ideas about representation that can be used not only by scholars, but also by citizens to make judgements about representation.

Academic interest in political representation is not new—the question of how one individual can or should stand as representative for another has been a feature of scholarship for some time. Political philosophers such as Hobbes, Madison, Mill and Burke considered how representation should work in the context of representative democracy (Pitkin 1967; Skinner 2005, p. 155). Even before these theorists, Skinner (2005, p. 155) argues that:

A number of English political writers had already developed a fully-fledged theory of representative government. Furthermore, they had put their theory to revolutionary use in the course of the 1640s to challenge the government of King Charles I.
In more recent times, however, Hanna Pitkin in *The Concept of Representation* (1967) provided perhaps the most significant contribution to our understanding of the concept, both in terms of its breadth and depth. It is little surprise that Pitkin’s work significantly influenced later researchers, who in many cases have further defined, or indeed redefined, Pitkin’s original work. Central to Pitkin's focus was a concern with the way in which representation as an idea is conceptualised, both in political and non-political terms. Her application of ‘ordinary language’ or ‘Oxford’ Philosophy is intended to draw out the different ways in which representation is understood. In this way, Pitkin views representation as a ‘multi-faceted’ concept, or, in her words, ‘a rather complicated, convoluted, three–dimensional structure in the middle of a dark enclosure’, where political theorists provide ‘flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from different angles’ (1967, p. 10). While allowing for different understandings, Pitkin still envisages these notions as being encapsulated within a single form of representation: ‘It is not vague and shifting, but a single, highly complex concept that has not changed much since the seventeenth century’ (1967, p. 8).

In the following chapter, this study seeks to describe the dynamics of political representation and how it can be operationalised in regards to political parties and real world events. This analysis is based to a large extent on the recent work of Michael Saward (2010), who has argued for moving away from normatively based typologies of representation. Yet, as noted in the following chapter, this study follows Saward in considering the way in which the audience of representative claims understands and assesses claims based on different notions of representation. As such, the normative understandings surveyed by Pitkin and explored by other scholars have immense value—they describe the various ways in which representation can be understood by individuals and communities. Indeed, Castiglione (2012, p. 120-121) has argued that Pitkin deserves more credit as her book ‘was not about a typology of concepts of representation, but was an analytical and critical reconstruction of conceptual controversies behind which emerge the “problems” of politics’. He continues to argue that ‘…from this perspective, *The Concept of Representation* is not about representation is, but a discussion of what different authors were doing in proposing different conceptions of representation…’ (Castiglione 2012, p. 121). As such, this chapter surveys the most important conceptions of representation provided by Pitkin and others. In recognising the role of these notions in informing the way in
which individuals understand the way that they are represented, some well known terms are replaced with more accessible language.

The Identity (or Descriptive) Notion of Representation

The notion of identity representation is a common means for understanding representation, and one that should be of immense interest to the purposes of this study. Indeed, this form of representation is often being channelled when the term ‘representative’ is used as an adjective. Being representative, according to this notion, means resembling as closely as possible the represented entity—in other words, a ‘person who is in some respects typical of a larger class of persons to which he belongs’ (Birch 1971, p. 16). For those who advocate identity or descriptive representation, the extent to which communities based on a form of identity are represented by those who share that identity is crucial. For example, writers on the representation of women have focused on efforts to provide opportunities for women to take part in politics; a parliament made up only of men is rightly considered as ‘unrepresentative’ of the population as a whole. Similarly, political systems which lock out particular significant ethnic or religious minorities are also considered unrepresentative. Consequently, the importance and dynamics of identity representation have become a focus for a number of studies related to the inclusion of minorities and women in electoral politics (for example Phillips 1995; Dovi 2002; Gay 2002; Hardy-Fanta et al, 2005; Childs 2008). In a well-known study, Anne Phillips focuses on what she calls the ‘politics of presence’. Phillips (1995, p. 5) argues that:

Many of the current arguments over democracy revolve around what we might call demands for political presence: demands for the equal representation of women with men; demands for a more even handed balance between the different ethnic groups that make up each society; demands for the political inclusion of groups that have come to see themselves as marginalized or silenced or excluded.

As these demands for a more even representation of different groups have emerged, the issue of identity representation has ‘returned with renewed force’ and this time with ‘the added attraction of appearing severely practical’ (Phillips 2002, p. 6-7). Indeed, efforts to promote descriptive or identity representation have led to a range of real political outcomes and compromises. Scholarship regarding identity representation is in many ways relevant to recent attention to forms of deliberative democracy, where the key aim is to provide a more ‘inclusive’ form of political decision-making. It should also be noted that the importance of identity representation has also informed Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism. Lijphart’s
clarification of consensual democracies is certainly opposed to systems based on majority rule, which, he argues, are ‘not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime’ (Lijphart 1984, p. 22-23).

Of course, ensuring the representation of different identities presents some complications. As Pitkin (1967, p. 87) notes, ‘representation as “standing for” by resemblance, as being a copy of an original, is always a question of which characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction.’ Is ethnicity politically relevant? Does the religious background of voters matter to the type of decisions made in national parliaments? And when there are cross-cutting sources of identity, which are most important to mirror? Taken to an extreme, the focus on identity representation can instigate some challenging practical issues of legitimacy, as Anne Phillips (1995, p. 8) has suggested:

In the subsequent development of feminist politics, the question of who can best speak for or on behalf of another became a major source of tension, for once men were dislodged from their role of speaking for women, it seemed obvious enough that white women must also be dislodged from their role of speaking for black women, heterosexual women for lesbians, and middle-class women for those in the working class. The search for authenticity—or what Kathleen Jones sees as the dead-end pursuit of that experience which will ground one's authority—then makes it difficult for anyone to represent an experience not identical to her own and, taken to this extreme, renders dialogue virtually impossible.

Thus while identity representation is important, it does not exhaust the potential methods of understanding and assessing representatives.

**The Character Notion of Representation**

The concept of symbolic representation is considered quite broadly by Pitkin and others – but I argue that it is important in prompting consideration of representation as ‘character’ representation. This concept, like identity representation, is interested in the nature of the representative—but rather than the representative resembling the represented, the representative here must possess particular traits, qualities or background that are considered desirable (and may differ greatly from those possessed by the represented). Perhaps most commonly used to describe particular national symbols (the flag, an animal, a song, and so on) Pitkin (1967, p. 92-93) argues that the notion of symbolic representation can also be applied to humans: ‘under the right circumstances [human beings can] stand for a nation just as the flag does’. This type
of representation relies on passive qualities such as charisma, emotion and the carrying out of ritual activities (Pitkin, 1967, p. 95-103). A representative is representative because they are accepted by the represented as symbolising something—be that the nation, the royal family, an important trait or cultural value. According to this notion:

Whatever facilitates identification or acceptance brings about representation. What matters is always the alignment of wills between ruler and ruled; representation is that alignment, no matter how it is brought about (Pitkin 1967, p. 108).

While discussions of symbolic representation are more relevant to the study of authoritarian regimes, a more focused consideration on the role played by character in the understanding of political representation is relevant more broadly in all societies and political system. Discussions of character are frequently made regarding representatives—and whether explicit or implicit, play a potential role in shaping assessments of representation.

The Performative Notion of Representation

While Pitkin recognised other forms of representation, her preference is clearly what she identifies as the substantial notion of political representation (but will be described as performative representation throughout this study). Understanding the substance of representation means that:

We are now interested in the nature of the activity itself, what goes on during representing, the substance or content of acting for others, as distinct from its external and formal trappings (Pitkin 1967, p. 114).

In other words, we should understand representation as being primarily an activity, something which is done, rather than being invoked passively through identity or character.

As argued in the next chapter, Pitkin’s analysis too neatly separates this form of substantive representation with other forms of representation. As Saward argues, all forms of representation must be ‘claimed’—hence there is an active component to invoking all notions of representation. On the other hand, substantive or performative claims of representation can also carry important symbolic meaning. Yet in describing the importance of this concept, Pitkin highlights one more key way in which representation can be understood.

As Pitkin (1967, p. 144) notes, defining representation in an active way also presents challenges. Focusing on the activity of representation, and judging a representative on
activity rather than characteristics requires a consideration of what that activity should be. It is tempting to see the activity of representation as that of directly mirroring the views and preferences of those who are represented—a vision known as the ‘mandate’ view of representation, but is also often described as the ‘delegate’ conception of representation. The idea is that the representative must act directly as the represented would; they ‘must act as if the [represented themselves] were acting’ (Pitkin 1967, p. 144).

Yet this account of political representation is also problematic. As Pitkin (1967, p. 144) points out:

> If we think of a representative acting not merely for a single principal but for an entire constituency, an unorganized set of people, then ‘Act as if your constituents were acting themselves’ becomes a questionable slogan.

It may seem logical to then argue that the majority position of that set of people should become the favoured position of the representative—and this resolution may hold some truth. But it is problematic in itself: the majority position for every single decision a representative must make is not known, and even where it is, the point of view individuals may profess can differ depending on the way a question is asked, or more importantly on the information known. Even representing an individual is ‘not a matter of imitation’, as the represented individual would expect that the representative act as he or she would, given the information available (Pitkin 1967, p. 145). Put simply, acting as the represented individual would does not necessarily mean acting in the manner that their stated preferences demand; instead, given the information and choices available in the position of representative, it may be right for the representative to act following their own judgement, rather than responding to the majority position at a given time.

But neither is it possible for a political representative to be completely unresponsive to the desires or views of those they represent. The independence view of representation entails representatives being selected by those they represent, but then making decisions based on their own judgement. This is the position famously put forward by Edmund Burke, who stated that ‘Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion’ (The Founders Constitution 1987). But can it really be representation where the representative does not consider the wishes or views of those he or she represents? Where a representative no longer considers the position or
preferences of those he represents, then it would seem odd to label the practice ‘good’ representation.

The debate between mandate and trustee visions of representation has a long history within the relevant literature and will certainly continue to generate further contestation. Yet in the context of this study, the relevant point is that both of these understandings of performance are possible. In the performative representative claims made by would-be representative, audiences of these claims (usually described as constituents) may apply understandings based on the trustee vision (the representative is too ‘poll-driven’ or lacks conviction) or the mandate vision (the representative is out-of-touch, aloof, or does not understand the problem of regular people).

The Democratic Notion of Representation

While many writers since Pitkin have added to or built on the notions of representation described above, one additional understanding of representation stands out for inclusion: democratic representation. This notion sees representation as the extent to which representatives advocate for the democratic rights of citizens, and foster their participation within political processes. This is the understanding of representation of most interest to Suzanne Dovi (2007, p. 2), who focuses on the democratic nature of representatives, arguing that ‘good democratic representatives are those political representatives whose advocacy work maintains and advances the legitimacy of democratic institutions’. Dovi suggests that there are three key ‘virtues’ that representatives must demonstrate to be judged as ‘democratic’: fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and good gatekeeping. The first describes the manner in which representatives pursue decision-making—while it is reasonable for representatives to pursue particular policy agendas, they must respect the political equality of all citizens (Dovi 2007, p. 115):

A commitment to formal equality, even in grounding a duty on the part of every democratic representative to advocate zealously on behalf of his or her own constituents, also grounds a constraint on such advocacy: such advocacy must respect the equal formal political standing of all democratic citizens.

The second virtue describes the extent to which representatives ‘create opportunities for proper civic participation and foster citizens’ capacity for self-governance’ (Dovi 2007, p. 135). This means that representatives have a role in educating citizens and ‘nurturing in them the qualities, talents, and skills necessary for … full citizenship’ (Dovi 2007, p. 145).
The last virtue describes the extent to which representatives open the political process to citizens. This means not only opening opportunities for key supporters or a political base to influence the activities of government, but also providing broader opportunities for citizens to engage in this process. This activity includes developing ‘mutual relations with (1) … political opponents, (2) the dispossessed, and (3) the marginalized.’

Urbinati also argues for the potential for representation to act as a form of advocacy. She argues that:

In defining representatives as advocates, we have to see them not merely as partisans but as deliberators. Even though representatives do not deliberate when acting as advocates … nevertheless they consciously speak with deliberation in mind. Without deliberation, there would be no reason for advocacy (Urbinati 2000, p. 775-776).

Urbinati notes that the distinction between active and passive forms of citizenship is common in all political communities, including the direct democracy of the Greek polis. Thus in all political settings, and especially in formal representative democracies, we need ‘neither fanatical (or bureaucratic) representatives nor philosopher kings but, rather, deliberators who judge and in turn plead causes ‘passionately’ in accordance with the principles and procedures of democratic government’ (Urbinati 2000, p. 776).

This final addition is important as it captures aspects of the concept of representation which the other notions do not. To judge a representative as being representative based on identity, character or performance does not necessarily mean that the representative also carries out their activity in a ‘democratic’ manner. Democratic representation provides an additional model of representation that differs from the existing types, and is likely to have significant empirical value.

Another reason for including a democratic notion of representation is that it speaks to critiques of minimalist definitions of democracy. Representation may be a reality of politics, but, as discussed earlier, it does not preclude attempts to provide more opportunities for genuine participation or deliberation that go beyond simply voting. A democratic notion describes how representatives can be assessed based on the way in which they value ideas regarding participation and deliberation, and provides opportunities for societies to engage in these practices. The democratic understanding,
together with the other three understandings explored in this chapter, is summarised in the figure below.

**Figure 2.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity (Descriptive)</td>
<td>The extent to which the representative resembles the represented. This can include resemblance based on ethnicity, religious belief, gender, cultural affinity and class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character (Symbolic)</td>
<td>The extent to which the representative possesses or exemplifies qualities/characteristic/status which are considered desirable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performative (Substantive)</td>
<td>The extent to which the representative acts in the interests of the represented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Engagement</td>
<td>The extent to which the representative values the democratic rights of the community and assists them to participate in politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

This chapter has sought to describe the unique position of this study within the relevant literature. Empirically, this study can draw on a well-developed existing literature which analyses the characteristics of Indonesia’s political parties and party system. This literature has featured several stands—including analysis of the institutionalisation of the party system, the oligarchic nature of political parties and the re-emergence of *aliran* as a basis for some parties. Yet, this literature so far lacks an in-depth analysis of political representation. This is no surprise, as research on political parties and institutions more broadly has rarely sought to engage with the full potential meaning of the concept. This chapter finished by arguing that the relevant literature within
political philosophy can assist in providing four key normative visions of how representation can be assessed – the notions of identity, character, performance and democratic engagement. The next chapter constructs a conceptual and theoretical framework that can be applied in this research.
Institutions and Repertoires of Representation: Theoretical Foundations

Introduction
The previous chapter has noted the extent to which existing research on political parties and elected leaders often lacks a focus on the concept of political representation. It has also defended the emphasis of this study on the concept—for normative but also empirical reasons. Yet while some important works of political philosophy give significant attention to the concept of political representation and provide a strong ontological basis for this study (i.e. identifying ways of understanding what representation is), this chapter will argue that further theoretical development is needed to comprehend how these different understandings inform the way in which both representatives and the represented engage with different ideas about representation. This chapter puts forward a theoretical framework based on the notion of ‘representative repertoires’ (Hatherell 2014, p. 3-5), which allows the dynamic of representation claim-making to be understood within the context of the institutional environment. This chapter begins by describing how representative claims become representative repertoires, before turning to how the institutional context can influence the formation of these repertoires.

Representative Claim Making

A Constructivist Approach to Representation
While the previous chapter has provided a useful typology of the different ways representation can be understood and assessed, we still lack a method for assessing the way in which representatives and the represented engage with these different notions. Here, it is argued that a constructivist-inspired understanding of representation, informed most prominently by the recent work of Michael Saward (2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2010), provides a very important foundation for this study. While Saward is not the only author to present an argument for this approach (see, for example, Rehfeld 2006), his work has been the most influential, as evidenced by the number of academics who have recently engaged critically with his work. For instance, Saward’s representative claim conceptual framework inspired a critical exchange in a 2012 issue
of the *Journal of Contemporary Political Theory*. As one contributor to that discussion, Lisa Disch, states:

> His very phrase ‘representative claim’ is having a nearly revolutionary effect on the way political theorists think and speak about political representation. It has brought to the fore that political representation is a creative activity and has directed political theorists to the tools of rhetorical analysis for understanding it. Saward is, thus, the first theorist in over 50 years to achieve conceptual innovations in the normative analysis of representative politics. (2012, p. 118)

The key aspects of Saward’s approach include understanding representation as a dynamic process of performance, claim-making and claim-judgement, accepting the role of culture and ideas in the construction of representation, and recognising the role of claimants and audiences in this process. This section outlines these key aspects of Saward’s constructivist approach to representation, arguing that they constitute a critical ontological basis for the empirical work in this study.

The constructivist understanding of political representation conceptualises representation as an ongoing and dynamic phenomenon which is not tied simply to formal positions, institutions or titles and is not simply ‘a static fact of electoral politics’ (Saward 2010, p. 3), but instead seeks to understand:

> What representation does, rather than what it is; to explore the effects of its invocation rather than its institutional embodiment; to stress its dynamic character rather than its correctly understood forms or types. (Saward 2010, p. 4)

That is, they are not so much interested in who is considered a legal and legitimate representative, but how it is that individuals and organisations claim to be representative, and what they do during the process of representing. How do audiences judge representatives, and what leads to rejection or acceptance of a representative? These are all crucial questions that require a consideration of the dynamic nature of representation.

A representative claim, Saward (2010, p. 38) argues:

> Is a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something. It is a claim; it may or may not be a well-founded claim. I could claim, for example, to represent the interests of a person or a group of people or of animals. I could claim to stand for or embody the true character of a country or a region...moreover, all of these claims are directed to an audience, which might consist of a large or small, proximate or dispersed, or self-aware or disparate set of people.

This definition of representation has a constructivist foundation in that it recognises the importance of processes of meaning-making between human actors. Hence the
quality of representation is defined not just by the fact that someone is elected, or by counting the number of people from a particular ethnic group who have entered parliament, or by matching the political beliefs of constituents and representatives. All of these approaches rely on a largely positivist-inspired approach to representation—that is, ‘representativeness’ can be adequately defined by the researcher and then scientifically measured. Instead, this approach is interested in the ideas and understandings that inform the way in which would-be representatives claim to be representative (and crucially, how they claim to be ‘good’ representatives), and the ideas and understandings used by the audience of those claims to make their assessment. As such, Saward’s definition represents a ‘constructivist turn’ in the study of political representation, which:

Similarly emphasizes the effects of representation on constituencies, arguing that they do not precede acts of political representation but are, rather, figured by them so as to solicit them into being in relationship with a particular representative. Political representation is not literal and mimetic; it has an inescapably figurative element. Viewing political representation as possessing inescapable figurative elements means paying attention to the constitutive and creative aspects of representation. Disch (2012, p. 115)

Some political scientists may reject the introduction of a constructivist approach to the study of political institutions and political parties. Yet, the motive for doing so is not a desire to sink political analysis into the depths of post-modernism, but instead to recognise that the way in which the concept of political representation is understood has very real political implications. While constructivists ‘focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics’ while ‘stressing in particular the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas and understandings on social life’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, p. 392), Saward (2010, p. 39) similarly argues that the representative claim concept:

Is less about pinning down meaning, more about asking how meanings are generated and contested; or, again, how something absent is rendered as present. How is the impression of presence constructed, defended, and contested? What determines the success or failure of the effort to construct such an impression?

Hence adopting a constructivist ontological position regarding the concept of political representation allows for stronger conclusions to be drawn about the nature of political organisation. It rejects the ‘unalloyed presence’ of representation, but instead is interested in representation ‘as a set of practices, of events and in particular of claims, claims to be representative’ (Saward 2010, p. 39). Such an approach is not out of place
in mainstream political science. In describing what she calls the ‘politics model’ that is commonly applied in political science, Ruth Lane (1997, p. 8) suggests that:

Analysis of the cognitive structures of the participants is made a separate, important analytic step in the politics model. Attention is put not on how the observer sees the matter, but on how the participants themselves define the situation and the issues of which they are a part. This does not involve ‘deep’ studies of subjectivity, but only a recognition that the participants’ views need to be considered.

It should also be noted that while the previous chapter has broadly critiqued the neglect of the concept of representation within institutionalist studies, some forms of new institutionalism are more conscious of the importance of ideas. Sociological institutionalism, for instance, defines institutions ‘in terms of norms, values, culture, and ideas,’ and focuses on ‘the cognitive, rather than the historical or strategic, dimensions of institutions’ (Lecours 2005, p. 17). As such, this study broadly fits within a field of research that is increasingly interested in studying institutions with a focus on the importance of ideas and common understandings regarding concepts like political representation.

**Components of a Representative Claim**
One important feature of Saward’s conceptual framework is the elaboration of who is involved in the process of a representative claim. While traditional approaches to political representation focus on the role or nature of the representative, the constructivist approach to representation recognises the importance of audiences and their role in this dynamic process. Indeed, Saward (2010, p. 37) identifies a number of key actors in the process of making representative claims: ‘A maker of representations puts forward a subject which stands for an object that is related to a referent and is offered to an audience’. For example, the:

MP (maker) offers himself or herself (subject) as the embodiment of constituency interests (object) to that constituency (audience). The referent is the actual, flesh-and-blood people of the constituency. The object involves a selective portrayal of constituency interests (Saward 2010, p. 54).

While some aspects of this model have been debated, including the need for a separation between the object and referent of a claim (Thompson 2012, p. 111), there are several key insights here. Firstly, in identifying makers and subjects, Saward alerts us to the purposeful and creative nature of representative claim-making. The maker and subject may sometimes be the same political actor, but the separation highlights the way in which representation is in many ways a performance. Even when a maker offers themselves as a subject, they offer a particular version or vision of themselves.
Makers of claims seek to promote particular qualities that might be considered attractive (for example piety, honesty or intelligence) while hiding or downplaying other qualities or details (for instance drug addiction or involvement in corruption). What makers of claims seek to promote about their subjects can provide valuable information about the type of claims they are making and their conceptualisation of what the audience of the claim is interesting in.

By separating the object and audience of representative claims, Saward emphasises the constitutive elements of this process. That is:

Would be representatives have to make claims, about themselves and their would-be constituencies, and use these claims in order to try to impose, or encourage a belief in, a particular set of ‘interests’ as an unavoidable precondition of speaking for those interests. In this sense, representation is as much constitutive as reflective of facts about interests and capacities (Saward 2010, p. 44-45).

Thus to make a representative claim is to make a claim about the constituency itself and what is important to them. By labelling or defining the constituency (‘hard-working families’ being an interesting example in Australian politics) the representative is making a claim about the constituency and what is important to them. For this reason, representatives do not only represent established interests and facts, but also play a role in defining those interests. Plotke (1997, p. 29) makes a similar point when he argues that:

Political representation includes a substantial role for the judgment of the representative in choosing how to act as a responsive agent. The preferences of the person being represented are subject to interpretation – making them clear requires dialogue.

In taking this perspective:

No would-be representative, including an elected one, can fully achieve ‘representation,’ or be fully representative. Facts may be facts, but claims are contestable and contested; there is no claim to be representative of a certain group that does not leave space for its contestation or rejection by the would-be audience or constituency, or by other political actors (Saward 2010, p. 45).

This last point, regarding the contestation of representative claims, is an important one. By adopting a constructivist approach to political representation, the focus of study is not the assessment of the outside observer, but instead how audience themselves judge representative claims. Rehfeld (2006, p. 2) is making this argument when he argues that:

Political representation, I argue, results from an audience’s judgment that some individual, rather than some other, stands in for a group in order to perform a specific
function. The audience uses a set of ‘rules of recognition’ to judge whether a claimant is a representative in any particular case.

While Severs similarly observes that:

The intricate interplay of claims’ production and their reception is bound to generate diverging interpretations among audiences. How the absent thing is made present and who considers it so will inevitably give way to diverging interpretations of ‘what is going on’ within a particular claim. (Severs 2012, p. 173)

In advancing the representative claim, Saward sees an important role for the audience in making judgements of representative claims. As external observers, we may attempt to analyse whether a representative stands for or acts for a represented entity—but the key object of analysis is how representative claims are received, accepted or rejected by the audience of the claim. That is, instead of asking whether entity A represents entity B well, it is more important to consider the representative claims that entity A makes, and ask how these claims are received by entity B: are they accepted or rejected? Why? As Saward (2010, p. 39) argues:

The how rather than the what questions are the ones that are pressing, not least at a time when traditional modes of political representation are facing serious challenges, and new ones emerging.

Focusing on the audience of representative claims as the judges of these claims has several clear advantages. Firstly, the audience of claims may collectively be in a better position to judge claims. Living within the environment in which the representative claim is made, as well as understanding the local historical and social context places the local audience in a potentially beneficial position to assess a particular claim to be representative. Secondly, and more importantly, to what extent is the judgement of representation of political interest beyond how it affects the intended audience of the claim? If, for example, the political scientist studies representation in country B and believes that the quality of representation is high, while the members of society in country B view representation there as highly flawed – which is the more important political phenomenon? How can a representative be a ‘good’ representative without a fair degree of acceptance by the represented? And more broadly, if we believe that the quality of representation affects the stability of democratic societies and political systems, then we are inevitable interested in how the represented view the representatives, and not simply the assessment of an external observer.

This is not to say that audiences always have perfect information or that the political and social context allows them to make a fair judgement of representation claims.
Saward (2010, p. 145) argues that ‘provisionally acceptable claims to democratic legitimacy across society are those for which there is evidence of sufficient acceptance of claims by appropriate constituencies under reasonable conditions of judgment’. This means that, while:

It is not the role of political theorists to make first-order judgments about democratic legitimacy of representative claims using some set of substantive or even presumptively universal criteria … this does not mean that theorists should have nothing to say on the matter—far from it. There is a critical (and varied and complex) second-order role, interpreting the judgments that the appropriate people do make about representative claims and examining the conditions that have enabled those judgments. (Saward 2010, p. 146)

Hence while the judgment of the audience is of primary importance, it is crucial to put this judgment in the perspective of local conditions, culture and the social and political climate. This is especially important, as:

The idea of representative claim-making and claim reception is intended to help us to understand the politics of representation across varied cultures and contexts. Who may be likely to make claims, the materials out of which claims may be constructed, how they will be targeted, how they may be seen or heard, and what opportunities recipients may have to respond will differ greatly across cultures and continents ... Representative claim-making and claim-reception are deeply culturally inflected practices; there can be no single or stable set of gauges or filters to be used as measures of democratic legitimacy. (Saward 2010, p. 147)

It is clear that scholars like Rehfeld, and especially Saward, are seeking to improve our understanding of political representation by incorporating a constructivist understanding of the concept. This section has argued that Saward’s conceptualisation of representation provides an important ontological starting point for empirical research into political representation. Understanding representation as a dynamic process of claim making brings attention to the way in which would-be representatives claim to be representative, and the important role of audiences in the process of assessing these claims. This model recognizes the creative and inter-subjective nature of claim-making, moving our understanding of representation from an established institutional fact to a constructed notion that is influenced by political history, social characteristics, culture and other contextual factors. Introducing a constructivist approach does not deny that representation is a real political phenomenon—on the contrary, it alerts us to the way in which political actors and society through their interactions construct the very nature of the concept. The following section builds upon this ontological base.
Introducing Repertoires of Representation

The representative claim concept is an important starting point for the theoretical framework used in this study. Yet further development is needed in order to allow for empirical research of the type intended here. The dynamic process of claim-making assists in understanding how individual claims are made and assessed, and allows for analysis of single incidents of claim-making. Yet if representative claims are as common as Saward suggests, and if the process of claim-making is dynamic, then how are we to make sense of a large number of claims in a given political system? This is particularly problematic in a study such as this, which applies a broad-brush approach to representative practices in the world’s third most populous democracy. It is clearly crucial to develop a theoretical framework that allows for systematic analysis of claim-making in a given social and political context.

The potential for this type of theoretical framework is clearly present in Saward’s work. In outlining the representative claim, Saward hints at different ways in which claim-making may lead to patterns of claims. For example, Saward (2010, p. 43-44) himself uses the term ‘repertoire’, when he argues that:

> What the presence approach sees as representative roles, the event approach additionally sees as resources for representative claims; the cultural availability of notions such as trusteeship or stewardship can be invoked to the claimant's advantage. These resources are culturally recognized repertoires for claim-making performances.

Saward’s work is aimed, crucially, at correcting some of the gaps in the existing literature on representative practices, and thus does not further develop this analysis. I argue that we can follow this lead, and build upon the concept of the representative claim by interrogating the way in which ongoing processes of representative claim-making in a given social and political context lead to the formation of ‘repertoires of representation’ (Hatherell 2014, p. 3-5). While individual acts may be described as claims, claim-makers do not simply employ randomly chosen claims. Instead, they refer to established or socially embedded expectations, examples or experiences. The same is true of the audiences of representative claims, who rely on their own previous experience and culturally embedded expectations to assess the way in which representation is claimed. As such, individual acts of claim making and claim assessment can group together into established repertoires of representation—that is, established ways of making and assessing representation.
Charles Tilly has previously elaborated on the theatrical metaphor of repertoires in analysing contentious claims, but I argue that the concept is just as applicable to representative claims. Tilly (2006, p. 35) suggests that:

Once we look closely at collective claim-making, we can see that particular instances improvise on shared scripts [constituting performances] linking at least two actors, a claimant and an object of claims. Innovation occurs incessantly on the small scale, but effective claims depend on a recognizable relation to their setting, to relations between the parties, and to previous uses of the claim-making form … Performances clump into repertoires of claim-making routines…the theatrical metaphor calls attention to the clustered, learned, yet improvisational character of people’s interactions as they make and receive each other’s claims.

Crucially, as ‘similar groups generally have similar repertoires, we can speak more loosely of a general repertoire that is available for contention to the population of a time and place’ (Tilly 1986, p. 4). While contentious claims and representative claims are different in many ways, this metaphor, I argue, is similarly applicable to the act of representative claim-making. It would be illogical to claim that representatives begin their work without prior expectations and understandings of what it means to ‘represent’. Instead, we can expect would-be representatives learn to make representative claims based on shared scripts emerging from the historical, cultural, social or political context. Representative claim makers have their own life experience: they are exposed to representative claims throughout their lives and experience the way in which communities assess and seek to understand representative claims. There are obvious examples of this process—for instance the politicians who claim to model their style of leadership on popular historical leaders. Yet the influence of these shared scripts certainly goes beyond the act of reading presidential biographies—individuals are aware, perhaps unconsciously, of a range of representative performances during their lives. A present leader may be aware of and value the leadership style of a historical representative, but they also likely witnessed their parent’s response to that leadership style, the reaction of other groups within the community, and have an innate awareness of the cultural and symbolic environment in which that leader operated. As representative claims are not isolated to formal political offices, any individual who engages in organised society is exposed to representative claims of one form or another.

Yet, while repertoires call to our attention the importance of the sharing of ideas, it is clear that there is also room for innovation, or ‘creative modifications or extensions of familiar routines’ (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 49). Representatives develop their own
styles of leadership and innovate on old ones. Consider, for example, the way that new social media has been adopted by would-be representatives, requiring a new approach to traditional forms of claim-making. Or, a political party facing falling membership numbers may introduce a new voting procedure to increase the power of grass-roots members—this too is an improvised claim made by the party to assert that it represents these members. Cross and Gauja (2014, p. 612) for instance, note that political parties in Australia have attempted a number of new strategies to engage members, including online policy forums and branches based on policy issues rather than geography. Thus while claim makers are likely to borrow on shared cultural scripts, they also play a role in creating and developing those scripts. Some claim makers do this more than others—the recent emergence of Joko Widodo (better known as Jokowi) as an influential political leader in Indonesia demonstrates the extent to which one individual can significantly affect the way in which representatives make claims and the expectations communities have of claim makers. The influence of Jokowi in Indonesia on ideas about representation is reflected by his frequent appearance as an example in this study.

Representative repertoires possess a combination of two key ingredients: a theme or concept that is perceived as important for practical, cultural or social reasons, and a methodology or technique that allows the claim to be made. The two are often likely to be linked—representative repertoires based on the notion of humility and simplicity, for example, may include claims made through choosing a simple form of transport to get to work, such as riding a bike. The technique included in this particular claim is the use of the bike (and efforts to ensure that the audience knows about this act could also be considered). This technique is, however, clearly linked to the cultural notion being invoked, that of being humble.

The political relevance of Representative Repertoires
The political practices being described by the concept of representative repertoires have very real implications. Repertoires describe the way that political representatives in a given context over a given period of time present themselves as representatives, and the extent to which these representative acts (claims) match the expectations of constituents. In any political system, there are community expectations of the repertoires that will be performed by political actors—in other words, expectations about how a representative will perform the task of being a representative. While the use of terms such as ‘claim’ and ‘repertoire’ suggests a focus on politics as
performance, it is important to remember that what is being described is not simply ‘symbolism’ at the expense of more concrete policy or substantive outcomes. Instead, it is important to be clear that the symbolic and the substantial in politics are not as detached as might be expected.

Every substantive policy decision is political—all decisions and acts are defended by those who implement them and those who agree, and attacked by those who do not. All political acts are, in one way or another, contentious, and will often, in themselves, carry particular symbolic meaning. On the other hand, symbolic acts frequently have some substance; ideas and gestures often matter, and engaging with these is one potential expectation of a political representative. National leaders, for example, are often expected to respond to key domestic debates, and their statements are often thought to matter a great deal. Consider, for example, the importance placed on the way in which representatives respond to incidents of racism or human rights abuses. Most representative claims, in reality, possess some degree of substance and symbolism, and it is unrealistic to think that we can separate the two. With this being the case, the overall successful invocation of repertoires in a particular context is likely to mean that political representatives have engaged with substance and symbolism in a way that is assessed positively by the public. Analysing representative repertoires, therefore, does not mean that we are ignoring real political outcomes for citizens; we are just analysing them from the perspective of those citizens.

Just as importantly, seeking to understand the development of representative repertoires draws our attention to the potential positive and negative impacts of these social embedded norms. Repertoires can be constraining on political actors, because they establish what is considered the ‘norm’ over creative new performances. Yet the potential positives are also evident - representatives who are able to effectively draw on successful forms of claim-making will contribute not only to their own political success, but also to the overall legitimacy of a political system. The emergence of Jokowi, for instance, as a relatively successful and popular politician in Indonesia is clearly due to his selection and application of desired repertoires. This has led not only to his own success, but also to a renewal of legitimacy in the political system in Indonesia overall. Jokowi’s successful invocation of representative repertoires further establishes these repertoires in the minds of the audience (‘that is how a representative should do their job, why aren’t more representatives like Jokowi?’) and also leads to other representatives learning from and attempting to model their own practices on
CHAPTER THREE—INSTITUTIONS AND REPETOIRES OF REPRESENTATION

him. There are, consequently, implications for a range of outcomes such as legitimacy and the quality of decision-making. Put simply, by adopting an approach with an interest in the development and adopting of representative repertoires, we are able to better analyse the quality of representation in a given political system and society.

The Importance of Selection and Capability
Importantly, by focusing on patterns of claim-making within a given political system, we are better able to contextualise representative acts within an institutional and social context. Just as Tilly (2010, p. 34) seeks to understand how variation within the structure and culture of a regime affects the nature of contentious repertoires, this study seeks to understand the way in which variations within the institutional and cultural environment influence the nature of representative repertoires. If we move our focus up from individual claims to the existence of broader trends in forms of claim-making, we can begin to ask important questions about the way in which the adoption of these repertoires is impacted by both structural factors (such as political institutions) and social factors (such as cultural norms and practices). The representative repertoire framework can assist in understanding the success and failure of representative by focusing on two key variables: the selection of repertoires, and the capabilities to draw on these repertoires.

The Selection of Representative Repertoires
Selection of appropriate forms of claim-making is crucial. In this regard, contextual factors such as culture, changing social values, interests and the prevailing political climate are all important. Saward (2010, p. 60) for example, argues that:

> Our cultural and temporal situatedness is a key part of what we need to analyze, since it is that which conditions what sorts of representative claims will be familiar and comfortable, or unfamiliar and unsettling.

There may also be some relevance to Tilly’s (2006, p. 41) observation regarding the paradox of contentious claims: ‘genuinely unfamiliar performances almost always misfire, but perfect repetition from one performance to the next breeds boredom and indifference on the parts of claimants and their objects alike’. Repertoires of representation may be more successful where they rest on common themes or techniques but introduce an original element. Further, repertoires must also be selected in the context of other claims that the representative has drawn on in the past or present. An inconsistent invocation of repertoires may lead to a lack of belief from the
audience. The successful drawing on of representative repertoires requires some consistency, constructing a cohesive narrative that is believable for the audience.

Selecting the right repertoires is not a simple process. The inter-subjective process of defining what is good and bad representation is a dynamic one, and can be influenced by changes in the political climate. As has been argued, representatives do not simply start their first day on the job with a playbook of possible representative repertoires, but are instead deeply affected by previous experiences and the social embeddedness of particular practices. Representatives may have previously engaged in discussion of representative repertoires in their efforts to be elected to their formal position. Additionally, the knowledge of audiences about potential forms of representative claim-making may be limited in important ways. Audiences may not be satisfied by existing representative claims, but may not have an awareness of alternative forms of representation until they experience them. New and innovated repertoires may not occur to the audience before their invocation, but once they have been performed they may be very successful. Hence the selection of representative repertoires does not simply rely on a choice between existing repertoires, but also a process of creativity and innovation.

Lastly, but just as importantly, even if a representative is aware of the type of claims that would lead to them being considered a ‘good’ representative, this is not the only potentially objective that must be considered. A range of other interests may compete with the performance of repertoires. For instance, many representatives rely on other political actors (a political candidate on the party that nominates them is one example) and hence some (otherwise desirable) repertoires may be avoided or too costly. To provide a simple example, a representative giving away their whole salary to the poor may form a potential fruitful representative claim, but the personal desire to benefit from that salary may take precedence. A party that avoids links to wealthy donors may possess a greater capability to position itself as a defender of the poor, yet the campaign funds provided by wealthy donors may be considered more important than selecting this claim. And clearly, a party that has never had members implicated in cases of corruption is better positioned to make claims about fighting corruption – yet individual members may regularly chose the personal benefits over corruption. Here, we can bring into our analysis the important factors that have often dominated studies

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15 This has become a common form of claim-making (or repertoire) in contemporary Indonesian politics.
of political parties—the institutionalisation and organisation of political parties, practices of corruption and patron-client networks, and even culture may have a limiting effect on the repertoires that are selected.

**The capability to perform representative repertoires**

Beyond selection, the capabilities of the representative are also crucial. Representatives greatly differ in their capability to perform and develop repertoires of representation. This is true of individuals as well as organisations. The term capability here is rather broad: it can refer to the actual skills that an individual or organisation has (for example public speaking skills, ability to build a rapport, the collective talents present in a political party), or background characteristics such as gender, ethnicity or family life, or their track record as a representative. Consider, for example, the skill of democratic rhetoric that Kane and Patapan (2010, p. 386) call the ‘artless art’: ‘Democracies thus impose a difficult burden on their leaders, expecting them to have special abilities to lead even while demanding they cloak those abilities in an aura of ordinariness’. The background and track-record of a would-be representative can be just as important—a political party with a history of corruption may lack the capability to draw on repertoires based on the notion of cleanliness, while the personal fortune of a candidate in some settings may hinder their ability to draw on repertoires based on ordinariness or an ability to connect with ‘everyday’ people.

Would-be representatives may have an awareness of the type of repertoires that would be successful, but they may lack the capability to perform them. In the context of a political party or party system, there is no guarantee that the type of individuals who become part of parties or the party system are those with the best capabilities to perform desired repertoires. To give one example, Aburizal Bakrie is the head of the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party, and sees himself as a presidential candidate for the party. It is clear, though, that Bakrie lacks a range of capabilities to perform successful representative repertoires in Indonesia: he lacks the personal quality of charisma, he is extremely rich and thus faces severe limitations in presenting himself as simple or humble, and his company was involved in a disastrous environmental disaster in East Java that still tarnishes his image in the eyes of many Indonesians. The combination of these factors suggests that Bakrie is lacking many of the more important capabilities in Indonesia, yet his wealth and connections mean that he is able to become the leader
of Golkar\textsuperscript{16}. A capability to perform desired representative repertoires is therefore clearly not the only factor (or even the main factor) in deciding which leaders reach prominent positions—and again, here we can begin to chart the connection between representative capabilities and other factors such as institutional design, corruption and money-politics. Indeed, many of the most pressing issues within political science are part of what could be described as factors affecting the selection of claims and the capability to perform them.

**Representative Repertoires and Institutions**

If the extent to which political actors engage with different repertoires of representation can be understood according to their process of selection and their capabilities, then we can also begin to understand which factors affect these two variables. This includes, importantly, the effects of political institutions, which is a beginning point for this study. While the geographical branch requirement can be understood as a formal institution and are an important focus of this research, it is important not to limit the analysis to formal institutions. This study thus also considers representative claim-making within the broader historical, social, cultural and political context that emphasises national political organisation. This is important, as formal rules are influenced by the context in which they are embedded, but also potentially influence that environment once they have been embedded. As such, the relationship between formal institutions and informal norms is more complex than might be expected.

This connection between informal norms and the development of formal institutions is of most interest to historical institutionalism, which seeks to understand the role ideas have in the formation of political institutions (Peters 2012, p. 75). One important task in this study, therefore, is to understand the role of cultural norms in the creation of the formal institutional structure that guides party nationalisation in Indonesia, as well as the ongoing role of both formal and informal institutional influences. For this reason, Chapter Five provides an account of how the geographical branch requirement in Indonesia, as an element of formal political structure, is best understood within the context of informal norms embedded within Indonesia’s political history. Chapter Five

\textsuperscript{16} At the time of writing *Partai Golkar* was split between two factions and candidates, with both attempting to register themselves with the government as the legitimate leadership faction. Bakrie’s position as leader of the party is thus currently contested.
goes on to argue that the party registration laws are the result of the formal institutionalisation of these established norms.

Having defined the institutional context that prompts party system nationalisation, it is important to understand how the nationalisation of Indonesia’s political parties affects the way in which political parties draw on representative repertoires. If, as this chapter argues, the most important factors are the selection process and capability of actors to engage with different representative repertoires, then these factors naturally fit within the bounds of institutional analysis. Steinmo (2001), for example, summarises some of the most important foundations of institutionalist research when he argues that institutions can affect political outcomes by: ‘[Defining] who is able to participate in a particular political arena…[shaping] the various actors political strategies…and [influencing] what these actors believe to be both possible and desirable’.

Each of these points fits comfortably with an interest in the selection process and capabilities of representative claim-makers. Firstly, by influencing who takes part in a political arena, there is potential for the institutional context to affect both of these factors. Broadly speaking, by influencing the makeup of a party system (deciding, for instance, the type of parties that can take part and those that are excluded), the institutional context has the potential to influence repertoire selection. The nature of actors who are able to enter the political system may also align with other characteristics (in this context the most obvious example is the fact that national political parties are favoured over ethnic or regional parties). Yet by creating different barriers for political parties, there is the potential that the very act of passing those barriers leads to a range of selection imperatives. To provide one hypothetical example – where registration for elections is a more expensive exercise, we can expect that political actors are more likely to require wealthy backers, and the need to reward these backers can potentially create incentives to act in some ways and not in others when in office. The same is true of the factor of capability. The actors who are able to participate may differ in the capabilities that they have to those who are excluded or hindered. Because capability refers not only the abilities of actors but also their situation, there is also the potential for the formal and informal institutional environment to constrain their opportunity to make use of their abilities.

Secondly, we could hypothesise that party system nationalisation could also influence the strategies that political parties adopt. This is clearly evident in Pippa Norris’s
(2004) identification of the difference between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ strategies, where minority parties seek to bond together a particular community, while broad-based parties pursue strategies aimed at bridging the gap between different communities. There are other potential ways in which strategies could differ. Within parties, for instance, the balance of power in a large national party is likely to be different to that of a smaller ethnic party, and this could influence the relative strategies of members. Additionally, we could also hypothesise that restrictions on the formation of parties favour different forms of party development over others—this could also affect the strategic environment of political parties. The strategic imperatives of political actors potentially influence the capabilities and selection process.

Lastly, because institutions establish patterns of behaviour, we can hypothesise that they also influence the ideas that occupy a political environment. Party system nationalisation, for example, may not only affect the makeup of a party system, but may also establish norms of accepted political behaviour. It is possible, for example, that institutional regulations such as party registration laws effectively shape outcomes not only because of their mechanical effect, but more broadly because they establish what is considered ‘proper’ political organisation. Political representatives are not the only relevant focus here, though; established ideas about political organisation also potentially influence the views of the audience of representative claims.

**Repertoires, parties and independent claim-makers**

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter can be applied to both individuals and organisations. It is important, then, to be clear about the roles that individuals and organisations (particularly political parties) can play in engaging with claims and repertoires. Political parties are of course heavily involved as both the maker and subject of representative claims. As Saward (2008, p. 274) argues:

> Looking at political parties through the lens of the representative claim brings to light the fact that parties need to be creative actors, offering portrayals and enticements to constituents and audiences. Those portrayals and enticements are always subject to dispute, by opposing parties and an array of other political actors. Careful strategic choices (and gambles) need to be made by parties – how do we claim to stand for the interests of this group? Which aspects of their interests do we focus on (and which do we downplay or sideline?) … what resources can we call on to back up our claims? Crucially, answers to these questions depend a great deal on when and where the claims are made; different resources (technological, political, economic, etc.) are available, and different strategies thinkable, in different eras and places.

Political parties are, of course, constituted of individual members and politicians. Broadly speaking, parties and individuals can also play varying roles within the
representative claim equation – individuals can make claims that place themselves as the subject of the claims or can make claims that place the party as the subject (or both). Parties can also make claims about themselves, individual politicians or both. In this sense, while individual politicians regularly make claims about themselves, the claims analysed in this study as featuring the party system are those made by the party or individual members that potentially influence the image or reputation of the party either directly (where the party is the object of the claim) or indirectly and by association (where the individual is the object of the claim but there are implications for the image of the party because the individual is associated with the party). This approach obviously glosses over some key distinctions and detail – but the intention is a broad brush understanding of key ideas about representation rather than a detailed analysis of the relationship between parties and members.

Yet one distinction is made in this study. While the importance of individual leaders is not new within Indonesian political discourse, this study argues that in recent years a number of politicians have emerged that could be described as independent claim-makers. These independent claim makers are not necessarily independent in the sense of not having party affiliations – indeed, they regularly do. But they are independent in the sense that their reputation and representative claims rarely feature the identity of the political parties that support them. That is, there own identity as an independent goes far beyond an affiliation to a political party – and their successes and failures as representatives have a much greater impact on themselves than any political party. Jokowi is the most prominent example of an independent claim maker – while he has been supported by PDIP in each of his campaigns, and also by Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) in his campaign for Jakarta governor, Jokowi’s identity arguably grew independently to any party affiliation17. Beyond Jokowi, a number of local and regional leaders have continued this trend, including Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok) in Jakarta and Ridwan Kamil in Bandung.

Despite the broad brush approach discussed earlier, I argue that it is important to separate parties from independent claim-makers for two reasons. Firstly, as independent claim-makers actively avoid association with political parties, they avoid some of the weaknesses of the party system and lack some of its strengths. The internal

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17 While this might be the case, it is interesting to consider how Jokowi’s need to rely more on his party affiliation during the recent Presidential election also impacted on his capability to make representative claims. The status of independent claim-makers is therefore not static.
dynamics of a political party, for example, can be complicated and feature significant levels of internal indecision and conflict. This can mean that there are multiple, and possibly sometimes conflicting, representative claims taking place. For example, consider the recent standoff in the United States congress regarding the increase of the debt ceiling. Within the Republican Party of the United States, there was significant disagreement about how to handle the crisis. Members of the Tea Party faction were arguably making quite different claims about who and what they represented, compared to more moderate Republican politicians. In Indonesia, where political parties are typically not held together by a strong sense of common ideological purpose or cohesion, this is also an important consideration. To cite another example, the general unpopular reputation of political parties in some contexts may make it more difficult for them to make representative claims— and independent claim-makers who avoid party affiliations may avoid this reputation and simultaneously take advantage of it.

On the other hand, a party has resources available to it that an individual politician may not. A party, as a collection of individuals, can potentially make identity claims that an individual cannot. For example, the opposition in the Australian parliament recently sought to contrast the high number of female members within its shadow cabinet with the Coalition cabinet, which featured only one woman. This was a representative claim (an identity claim based on gender) that a party can make, but is difficult for an individual to make. Political parties, through their ability to form governments and fill executive positions, may also be in a better position to make performative claims (‘we enacted that policy that benefits you’), compared to individual politicians who may be stuck with little political influence over decision-making.

Secondly, independent claim makers in the context of Indonesia, I argue, have emerged partially because of some of the selection and capability issues affecting political parties—some due to the influence of party system nationalisation. Therefore, in order to analyse the engagement of national political parties with representative repertoires, it is important to also be conscious of the rise of these independent claim makers.
Conclusion

The previous chapter has argued that existing approaches are inadequate for dealing with the connection between institutional engineering and representation in Indonesia. This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical model that can be used to engage with this important question. Starting from a conceptualisation of representation as a dynamic process of claim-making and claim reception, this chapter argues that it is important to understand how audiences conceptualise representation and how they judge the representative claims of relevant political actors. To do so, understanding particular types of representative claims as repertoires allows us to consider the different ways in which representation can be considered as successful or unsuccessful. Finally, this chapter argues that variations in the institutional character of a political system potentially influence the process of representative claim making and reception. As a result, variations in institutions are one explanation for the existence or success of different representative repertoires. As the combination of formal rules and informal norms, the nationalisation of the Indonesian party system potentially influences repertoires of representation in Indonesia’s region, and this process is the focus of this study. The following chapter considers how this theoretical approach can be effectively operationalised.
CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology: Exploring Parties, Claims and Audiences

Introduction
Having outlined the theoretical foundations of the study, it is important to now consider how this foundation can be operationalised through the collection and analysis of data. This study has an interest in both the nature of political institutions (most appropriately studied via positivist-inspired approaches) and the dynamics of representative claim-making (best studied through the use of interpretive-inspired approaches). These two distinct approaches are outlined before considering some other important issues, such as research ethics, language issues and methodological limitations. Overall, this chapter seeks to bridge the gap between the broad theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter, and the empirical work outlined in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight.

Evaluating the Institutional Context

Analysing formal and informal institutions
The starting point for this research is the geographical branch requirements and the process of party system nationalisation. Chapter Five considers the geographical branch requirement in more depth, including the establishment of the requirement and the way in which it has become politicised. This chapter also seeks to understand how other factors contribute towards a broader norm regarding national political organisation. In understanding this institutional framework a range of data was collected, including the text of the requirements themselves within the Indonesian constitution, official documents related to the process of verification of these laws, observation, interviews and relevant literature. Voting data was also used to understanding party system nationalisation—the way in which this data was analysed will be discussed below.

The study of political institutions themselves is largely uncontroversial compared to more contested notions such as political representation; therefore, this analysis was based on a largely positivist approach. The combination of positivist-informed and
constructivist based research is not necessarily contradictory - As Dvora Yanow, a leading proponent of interpretive methods, argues:

Good contextualists that we are, we mostly argue in favor of letting the research question drive the choice of methods, itself an implicit argument (and sometimes made explicitly) that positivist-informed methods are good for some questions, interpretive-informed methods, for others (Yanow, 2003).

Beyond considering the nature of the geographical branch requirement and the nationalisation of the party system, this study is primarily focused on the extent to which the nationalisation of political parties influences the way parties as representative claim makers select forms of claim-making and their capability to perform claims. As such, this study also returns in chapter nine to consider which characteristics of Indonesia’s political parties affect their claim-making. To do so this chapter connects the nationalisation of parties to various characteristics. Here, the first hand data obtained by the researcher is also heavily supplemented with second hand accounts provided by the literature regarding the nature of Indonesia’s political parties.

Measuring Party System Nationalisation

While the national nature of a political party could be operationalised in a number of ways, the most reliable indicator of the national organisation and focus of a political party is the extent to which that party receives a similar share of support from different regions. Firstly, equal shares of votes over different districts evidence that the party actively campaigns over different regions and is able to attract supporters in different regions. Secondly, we can expect that political parties receiving votes across a whole nation are driven to market themselves to that broader constituency, rather than a single regional area; conversely, voters are not likely to vote for a political party that does not market itself to them. Lastly, from a practical point of view, data for vote share by region is readily available for the national elections of 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 in Indonesia. This operationalisation is certainly not perfect—it is possible for a political party to be equally organised and focused on two different provinces, but for some reason still receive a significantly larger share of votes in one region than another (for instance, despite a significant party organisation in region B, the political party leader originates from region A, and hence receives a greater share of votes in region A). For this reason, it is important to apply data analysis that takes some variations into account—it would be erroneous, for example, to understand nationalisation as a binary state, where party A is either national or regional and nothing in between.
Several researchers have put forward techniques for the empirical measurement of nationalisation. Morgenstern et al. place measures of nationalisation into two categories—‘Dynamic’ and ‘Static/Distributional’ measures (Morgenstern et al. 2009, p. 1322). Static/distributional measures examine the homogeneity of each party’s vote share over all electoral districts in a single election (Morgenstern et al. 2009, p. 1323). Conversely, dynamic measures of nationalisation examine the extent to which changes in a party’s vote share in different elections are consistent across voting districts (Morgenstern et al. 2009, p. 1324). As Morgenstern and colleagues state, there is a ‘non-necessary link between the two measures’ (Morgenstern et al. 2009, p. 1322). While static/distributional measures can tell us much about the geographical spread of a party’s votes (and hence the strength of its relationship with voters in various regions), dynamic measures are more interested in the reasons for a party’s comparative success or failure in different provinces. If a party’s vote share dropped by 50 percent in one electoral district but stayed the same in all other districts, this would suggest regional issues in that electoral district were likely the reason for the party’s relative failure. If on the other hand a party’s share drops consistently over all electoral districts than this is probably due to national factors—for example national political decisions, scandals or a drop in leader popularity. This study’s core interest is in the Indonesian party system as a whole, and as a result a static distributional measure will be more useful in testing the nationalisation of the system. With four elections to compare, the change in nationalisation of single parties and the party system as a whole over time can be explored in some depth.

One of the most well-known measures of nationalization is Jones and Mainwaring’s Party Nationalization Score (PNS) (Jones & Mainwaring 2003). This measure uses an inverted Gini coefficient to measure equality of voting results over electoral districts. The Gini coefficient is most commonly used in economics to measure income inequality (Jones & Mainwaring 2003). Jones and Mainwaring subtract the score from 1, to give a measure where 1 represents a completely nationalised party system, while 0 is a completely unequal party system. A key strength of this measure is that it can be used to measure individual parties (via the PNS) and also party systems as a whole (Party System Nationalization Score, PSNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, p. 143). The PSNS is achieved by multiplying all parties’ PNS score by their share of the national vote, and then summing the product of these equations together (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, p. 143). The result of these statistical measures is a score we can
use to compare parties in one election, compare single parties between elections, and compare party systems between elections. The measure is also not country-specific, hence it can be used to compare parties and party systems between states (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, p. 143). In a more recent contribution, Boschler has analysed various measures of party system nationalization, selecting the PNS and PSNS as the best available measures (Boschler 2010, p. 45). According to Boschler, the PNS is ‘better known than the other indices used and is based on a powerful measure of heterogeneity in distributions, so that shortcomings might be fixed’ (Boschler 2010, p. 45-46). The author goes on to propose amendments to the measure to better correct for weighting of territorial unit size and differences in the number of units. The first of these corrections is important. The size of territorial units can differ substantially in many states, including Indonesia. By weighing the results in an electoral district against the relative size of the district, we ensure that patterns that occur on a larger scale are weighted against patterns that occur on a very small scale. The practical implications of this technique are demonstrated in figure 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 4.1</th>
<th>District 1 (1,000 voters)</th>
<th>District 2 (200 voters)</th>
<th>District 3 (1,200 voters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>56 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In figure 4.1, Districts 1, 2 and 3 are of different sizes. Party A achieved a similar vote share across each of the districts, while B achieved high vote shares in 1 and 3 but not 2, and Party C achieved a high vote share in District 2 but not 1 and 3. In not weighting the results of this election, the PNS treats a result in District 2 in the same way as a result in District 3, even though District 3 has 6 times the voters of District 2. Under the PNS, the result achieved by B in District 2 would be weighted exactly the same as the results achieved by A in District 3. This means that the voters of District 3 are not being treated equally to the voters of District 2, as relatively fewer voters are having the same impact on the nationalisation score of the party as many more in District 3 (Boschler 2010, p. 162). While it is significant that party B achieved a poor result in
2 and this result should impact nationalisation, it needs to be weighted so that it does not have the same impact as the poor result of A in District 3. Correctly weighting the difference in district size, as Boschler proposes, ensures that all votes are treated equally in their impact on the nationalisation score. As Boschler (2010, p. 162) notes, ‘An ideal measure of homogeneity should thus be affected as little as possible by changes of administrative boundaries’, an important consideration for the context of Indonesia, where administrative boundaries have changed considerably between the three elections studied here.

The second of Boschler’s alterations relates to the number of units. As Boschler notes:

> For the same parties and exactly the same vote distribution across the territory, measures of homogeneity or variance can vary substantially, depending on the level of aggregation of the electoral data. (2010, p. 163)

Hence the regional differences of a state are more pronounced when the electoral data is broken down into smaller, more numerous electoral districts, than when it is broken down into only a few, much larger electoral districts. This inaccuracy also affects the PNS, and Boschler puts forward an alteration to correct the ‘effect of granularity of territorial data’ (Boschler 2010, p. 162). This alteration is based on the assumption that ‘party nationalization is a phenomenon that decreased steadily with every increase in the number of territorial units’ (Boschler 2010, p. 164). To counteract this phenomenon, Boschler has built in a standardisation to his measure which actively counteracts this influence. Both Boschler’s alterations to Jones and Mainwaring’s PNS are important for the task of measuring nationalisation in Indonesia. Firstly, electoral districts in Indonesia can greatly vary in their size. For example, in the most recent election in 2009 the electoral district of Papua Barat recorded 381,121 valid votes, while Jawa Barat district 7 recorded 2,151,500 valid votes. In the election of 1999 these differences were even greater: Timor Timur had 346,454 valid votes while Jawa Barat had 23,067,009 votes counted. Without weighting, the patterns found in Jawa Barat would count the same as those in Timor Timur even if the former is over 66 times larger than the latter. With weighting, the result in Timor Timur impacts the final nationalisation score of the parties, but not to the same extent to the result in Jawa Barat and other larger electoral districts.

Secondly, in each of the three elections since reformasi in Indonesia, different electoral districts have been used. This is particularly the case when comparing the 1999 election to the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections. In the 1999 election the country was
divided into only 27 electoral districts, whereas 69 were used in 2004, and 77 in 2009 and 2014. Boschler (2010, p. 162) hypothesises that as the number of electoral areas used increases, the degree of heterogeneity is also likely to increase. Comparing the results in 1999 with those of the later elections would give inaccurate results, as the 27 provinces (through structural difference alone) would provide less heterogeneity than the 69 or 77 electoral districts in the later elections. With Boschler’s standardisation, we are in a better position to compare these different elections.

While data was largely available for all major parties in these elections, a lack of data in some cases meant some liberties were taken. In particular, the results of PK and PKP were not available in several electoral districts for the 1999 election, and their respective vote result in these districts was an equal share of the remaining votes needed to achieve their total national share. Due to the small share of these parties’ votes in the mentioned districts, this correction should have very minimal impact on the result. Additionally, the votes received by ‘other’ parties were part of the measurement for each election, and generally made up approximately 10% of the vote. As these votes all came under the banner of ‘other’ and not their individual parties, they are likely to have a slight homogenising effect on the result. Many of these smaller parties did very well in one province but not very well in others, and thus calculated individually they would most likely receive lower nationalisation scores than being compiled together as ‘other’. As the vote share is relatively similar in each election, this influence should not greatly affect country comparisons of different elections or parties, but may slightly increase Indonesia’s nationalisation score when compared with other states.

**Understanding the Making and Assessment of Claims**

**Observing Claims and Repertoires**
The second step in this study was to understand the way in which different representative claims form representative repertoires within the Indonesian party system. In this endeavour, it is important initially to define which claim-makers this study is interested in. It would be possible, for example, to limit the study to a small number of parties or leaders in a single region and analyse their claims in greater depth. This approach would no doubt elicit valuable findings. Yet as the aims of this study are to present an explorative study of the broader nature of representative claim-making in Indonesia (rather than providing an in-depth examination of a single
representative), the party system as a whole provides the context for the claims and repertoires considered here. The data used in this study includes the activities of all of Indonesia’s political parties, in a range of different provinces and at different political levels. What is of interest is not a single relationship between a representative or community, or even the structural or organisational differences between parties; but rather, more broadly, the wider themes that emerge from representative claim-making within the party system. It should be noted here that while this approach matches the objectives of the study (understanding the role of the party system) it necessarily restricts the range of claim-makers that could have been included. The dynamic nature of representative claim making, as Saward reminds us, is not limited to elected or formal leaders—representative claims are made by a range of different individuals and organisations. It is important to be aware of this, even if this broader range of claim-makers could not be examined here.

This broad-net approach to understanding repertoires within the party system meant aggregating a wide range of data. Given this broad approach, it was especially important to employ a systematic approach to data collection. Firstly, the collection process focused on representative claims made during the 2009-2014 period. This period was a natural fit, given that it was the second term of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency, a full term of the national parliament (the DPR), and it also matched the term of some regional and local assemblies. In regards to political discourse, it also encompassed a period in which apathy towards political parties grew considerably, while new trends, such as the emergence of popular local and regional executive leaders (independent claim-makers), began to emerge. This period also included several different phases within the electoral cycle, including the lead up to and the campaign for the 2014 legislative and executive elections. Due to the heightened activity of political parties and candidates (and abundance of claim-making) during the lead up to the 2014 elections, this period is of natural interest to the study.

Having considered whose claims would be included in the research, an additional key consideration was what exactly a claim can consist of. It is important to emphasise that the conceptual framework of representative claims should not be taken to mean that representative are always acting out of a single-minded and wholly rational attempt to be considered a good representative by any means possible. Representatives may act out of ideological attachment or emotion, for instance. Yet, I argue for a broad
definition of claims-not because the representative claim-maker does not act with other considerations in mind, but instead because the audience of claims (which this study is most interested in) does not limit their judgement to a limited set of activities. We should not isolate analysis, for instance, to acts conducted during formal representative functions (such as speeches in parliament).

A second consideration is the access of both the audience and the researcher to representative claim making. Within this study, access to data was not a significant issues: representative claims are necessarily public acts, and hence they are easily observable. Put simply, if the representative claim is not public in some way, then it is not really a claim and not relevant in the context of this study. This is a significant advantage compared to studying other aspects of political organisation (for instance political corruption). Indeed, while accessibility was not an issue, overabundance certainly was. In this case, one additional consideration is to what extent the claims accessed by the researcher are similar to those available to the audience in Indonesia. In analysing the 2004 election, Tomsa (2007, p. 79) notes that television was by far the most common source of ‘information about the election process’. Despite the lower circulation of newspapers, Tomsa (2007, p. 79) argues that newspapers still:

play important roles in the Indonesian media landscape as they provide a vibrant forum for the exchange of intellectual discourses about political, economic, and social issues. In partnership with the electronic media, the print media forms some kind of symbiotic relationship in which the press determines what is news, while television spreads these news all over the country.

In the 2009-2014 period this argument is still relevant, though the spread and influence of social media in particular has only grown since the 2004 election. Indonesia possesses one of the highest rates of social media participation in the world, and political parties and representatives have been keen to take advantage of this. This study therefore sought to engage with claims presented in a range of media formats from three distinct sources: claims made via electronic means (for instance, social media and party websites), claims reported in secondary sources (news sites, videos and newspapers), and claims made in public areas (billboards and posters). Each of these sources were rich in evidence of claim-making.

Recognising the importance of television, the researcher surveyed television networks while in Indonesia on field research. While outside of Indonesia, videos from popular TV shows (Mata Najwa is one example) were readily available via YouTube. The researcher also followed the major television networks and well-known television
programmes on twitter and received regular updates on program features. Some advertising campaigns run by political parties on television are also accessible through other sources—for example the PKS 2009 and 2014 campaign ads on YouTube. Newspapers and news sites were also a key site for surveying representative claims. These news sources provide access to two potential claims at the same time—the news report itself is a means by which claims are made public (and press releases mean that claim-makers play a role in shaping news reports). But news reports also report on claims made in the public domain—for instance a politician meeting with the public. Print newspapers also regularly feature political advertisements or articles written by candidates and parties. While the national news sources are readily available online, access to local news reporting was available in the two case study regions of Padang and Kupang, where the researcher had access to print collections of two local and well-known newspapers, Haluan Harian (Padang) and Victory News (Kupang). These two sources feature quite strongly in the study as examples of local media reporting of claims.

Websites and social media sources were also regularly drawn on during the data collection phase. The twitter accounts of political parties and well-known politicians were followed throughout the data collection phase, while other sources such as facebook pages, websites and youtube channels were also surveyed. In some cases data was accessed through using search functions in facebook or google (such as searching for the names of political parties) while in other cases data emerged from links originating in previous data sources (for example newspapers referencing a website, or a national party website linking to the facebook page of a local chapter).

Beyond this primary evidence of claim-making collected by the researcher, secondary sources such as books and journal articles provide some further detail regarding common forms of claim-making. The activities of political parties and candidates have been described by other researchers in some detail, and while the conceptual framework applied in this study may differ, these secondary sources were also extremely useful. In this regard, Marcus Mietzner’s comprehensive study of the Indonesian party system (2013) and Ulla Fionna’s study of party politics in the context of Malang (2013) were particularly useful and are both frequently referenced in the study.
During fieldwork in Padang and Kupang the researcher was also able to access evidence of a number of claims— including those evident simply from walking around the local area. A large number of photos were taken in Padang and Kupang (as well as some other locations including Jakarta, Bogor and Yogyakarta) of street advertisements. These street advertisements ranged from pamphlets to large bill boards, and were advertising national legislative and presidential campaigns, as well as local executive and legislative contests. During engagement with local party leaders and civil society leaders, details of engagement between parties, their members and the community were also obtained (which often contains evidence of claims).

Having collected a wide range of evidence about representative claims, the data was then analysed. The beginning point for this analysis was the typology of representative notions outlined in the previous chapter—that is, claims based on identity, character, performance and democratic engagement. While these categories provided a strong starting point, the researcher remained open to the emergence of different broad understandings of representation. In the end, this typology largely covered the range of claims being made, perhaps demonstrating its breadth. Within these broad repertoires, more specific ones began to form around common themes. Examples of these are detailed in Chapters six and seven.

**Audiences of Representative Claim-Making**

Having mapped some of the most common forms of claim-making within Indonesia’s political party system, it is important to consider how these claims are assessed. In doing so, it is imperative to recognise the constructivist foundation of the study. Having explored some of the ideas, cultural values and norms that are evoked through representative claim-making, this study then needs to consider how audiences understand these claims. As Saward (2010, p. 144) argues:

> That point, in turn, enables me to clarify the fact that my concern here is not with political legitimacy in general; I am not seeking a set of universal standards for political legitimacy, but rather democratic legitimacy as acceptance by appropriate constituents, and perhaps audiences, under certain conditions.

Research based on constructivist ontological foundations necessitates a consideration of the position of the researcher in relation to the research subject. Because the research is attuned to the way that meaning is created, transformed and applied, the researcher is never a completely impartial observer, as may be the case in the natural sciences. The researcher brings their own assumptions, ideas and background to the research.
Within this research, in putting forward a model of representative repertoires, the researcher’s own pre-assumptions about the nature of representation (and what it can be) are unavoidable. Therefore, within the process of conducting the research, this model of representative repertoires was left as open as possible. The model allows for a range of different modes or types of representation, and allows for all or none to be present in a particular context. The researcher was also open to new understandings of representation emerging during the process of the research.

It is also important to consider the identity of the researcher during the process of data collection. In conducting interpretive research the responses gained during the research can be influenced by a range of factors. Being an outsider to the country and regions focused on in this study potentially had both positive and negative impacts on the research. Some respondents were more willing to speak or to share information than they would have been likely to do with a local researcher, seeing the researcher as not threatening in the way a local might be. Other respondents viewed the research with some caution, and in some instances questioned the political motivation of the study. Both negative and positive responses and their role in the process of the research need to be considered. More broadly, it is important to recognise that just as citizens and would-be representatives are influenced by their environment and the representative claims that have been made, researcher, too, are influenced by their own exposure to political and social discourse. In this regard, being partly removed from Indonesian culture and society may lead to findings that might not be apparent to a researcher with a closer position to the case study country, and may also restrict the attention of the researcher in other ways.

Having adopted the audience of representative claims as the basis for this analysis, two problems remain: How do we engage with that audience? And how can responses regarding the quality of representation be elicited? Both of these issues are considered here.

**Engaging with the Audience of Representative Claims**

From the outset, this study has identified Indonesia’s ‘diverse society’ as the focal point – yet it is important to consider how such a broad conceptualisation can be effectively operationalised here. Considering the size of regional communities (each province in Indonesia might have between 3 and 40 million citizens), large-scale polling is likely the only method of obtaining a representative sample of this whole
population. Polling of this sort, however, is beyond the resources of this study. This form of polling is also a poor fit with the approach of this study—it would be difficult to conduct a representative poll with the qualitative depth required by the conceptual and theoretical model applied here.

This research therefore argues that the best possible alternative is to apply an approach more common to forming focus groups: constructing a participant group with a broad set of interests, backgrounds and from different regions of Indonesia. In this regard, the most appropriate source for this participant group can be found within civil society. This is by no means a perfect alternative—there is indeed some irony in asking civil society leaders to ‘represent’ their communities in a study aiming to unpack ideas about representation. Yet, where a better alternative is not available, there are several reasons why civil society participants are the next best group to engage with regarding the nature and quality of representative claims.

Firstly, civil society can mirror many of the existing views, interests and identities within Indonesia. To an extent, civil society organisations emerge organically from within a given community based on the most important interests and identities within that community. The type of organisations which emerge generally reflect the issues of significance in a given region. It is no surprise that civil society organisations concerned with the environmental effects of tourism have emerged in Bali, for instance, but are not as evident (as yet) in Aceh or East Java. Islamic civil society is strongest in areas with large Muslim populations, while environmental organisations are likely to emerge in response to specific regional issues. Civil society can never truly represent the population as a whole, but it can provide some approximation of community views and values.

Secondly, civil society leaders through their work engage with and build an understanding of the community that is of great value to this research. Either as paid or volunteer staff, civil society leaders generally spend a great deal of time working directly with the community in relation to a range of issues. Through this work, they obtain a valuable understanding of the identity, views and needs of that community.

Thirdly, civil society has a long and quite proud history in Indonesia. Many civil society organisations, including the large Muslim organisations *Muhammidayah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, have existed in Indonesia for well over 100 years. Notably, these organisations and others continued to operate during the more repressive years of the
Suharto regime, although they avoided formal politics to focus on the provision of social programs. Since the period of reformasi began in 1998, Indonesian civil society has largely flourished (Beittinger-Lee 2013, p. 118). While civil society organisations do not always act in ways that promote notions of liberal democracy (Beittinger-Lee 2013, p. 133-134)

18, the sector has become freer and more influential—civil society organisation are much more forthright in arguing for the rights of particular communities or the interests of their members. Indonesian citizens are generally very active in civil society as well. A survey conducted in Indonesia has revealed that:

57% of Indonesians have become a member of at least one civil society organisation. Furthermore, one out of three Indonesians (32%) belongs to more than one CSO. Indonesians mainly live in groups, in a small and less informal community strongly correlated with their social, economic and religious reality. (Ibrahim 2006, p. 29)

The strength and presence of civil society means that Indonesia, unlike some other democracies, is a suitable context in which to apply this approach.

Finally, engaging civil society provides particular practical advantages. Civil society leaders, because of the nature of their jobs, are interested in speaking for their area of concern, and are relatively accessible. A well-known research institute in Indonesia (SMERU) provides a database of civil society in Indonesia, meaning that the researcher can easily access a range of civil society organisations. Additions to this database were made where the researcher saw a significant missing section of civil society (this was true particularly of religious and business organisations). Civil society leaders are also more likely to use information technology resources and are generally more willing to take part in interviews.

This research engaged with civil society leaders in two ways. Firstly, a wide range of civil society organisations from all of Indonesia’s provinces were surveyed via an open-ended questionnaire, which was released to participants on an anonymous basis. An invitation to the questionnaire, using a well-known online survey company, was sent to 1,435 potential participants via email. The response rate was affected initially by the inactive status of some email addresses in the database—approximately 20 percent of emails bounced immediately. A number of participants who began the survey did not finish it- suggesting that the more demanding nature of qualitative

18 The interests taken up by civil society organisations are quite broad, and some are not represented as much as others within this study. Organisations like Front Pembela Islam (FPI - the Islamic Defenders Front), for instance, should also
questions turned some away. In the end, 60 participants from 22 provinces participated in the questionnaire.

The questionnaire collected two types of classifying data: the province of the participant, and the field or type of work that the participant’s organisation was involved in. This allowed the researcher to understand the geographical spread of results and for some sensitivity to the range of organisations that were being surveyed.

Following the questionnaires, the author conducted a fieldtrip to Indonesia, conducting interviews and direct observation in several Indonesian provinces (specifically West Java, Jakarta, West Sumatra, Nusa Tenggara Timur and Yogyakarta). While some of the in-country research was intended to better understand the institutional context presented in Chapter Five and the nature of representative claims being made on the ground, the research was also designed to further explore the assessments presented in the survey research. Indeed, while the questionnaire process allowed for breadth of analysis, the interviews and observation allowed for more depth in the researcher’s understanding of the way in which representation is understood and applied.

**Constructing the Qualitative Survey**

Having established the target participants, the remaining challenge was to design the method for data collection. Representation, as discussed in the previous two chapters, is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Often, aspects of representation may not be recognised as ‘representation,’ or a particular narrow view may be conceived of as the whole concept. In addition, understanding how political parties provide (or do not provide) particular avenues for representation means also moving beyond anti-party sentiments which may prevent respondents from fully considering the activities and nature of political parties and their members. Anti-party feeling itself is certainly relevant to this study and is likely based on specific traits of local political party performance, but to some degree distrust of political parties is a generic phenomenon which can serve to obscure the full picture of the role and performance of political parties. While the audience of representation is the best primary judge of representation, a framework is required in order to understand how the full representative performance of political parties has been assessed.

An open-ended, qualitative survey was an obvious choice for many reasons. Firstly, as this data collection is designed to understand the way in which participants viewed representation, it made little sense to conduct a quantitative survey that would strictly
impose the researcher’s definitions on the participants and give them little chance to present their own notions and definitions. Pasek and Krosnick (2010) suggest that:

Open-ended questions also discourage satisficing. When respondents are given a closed question, they might settle for choosing an appropriate-sounding answer. But open-ended questions demand that individuals generate an answer on their own and do not point respondents toward any particular response, thus inspiring more thought and consideration.

Participants were free to write as little or as much as they wished, with no time limit, and were free to answer or not answer any of the questions. Despite this option, the majority of participants answered every question, and while there were a couple of short answers, most participants provided a detailed response to each question.

Lastly, the qualitative nature of the survey, together with the lack of any material incentive to finish it, meant that the researcher was able to better monitor the integrity of responses. Because the survey was conducted without collecting any personal information or an IP address, there were no restrictions on participants completing the survey more than once. Due to the nature of the survey however, multiple responses would have necessitated presenting material in a different way each time, requiring a great deal of time for little reward. Each response was analysed in significant detail, meaning that the integrity of the results could not be as easily influenced as might have been the case using a quantitative survey.

Another significant concern was how the list of questions would be constructed. In this endeavour, the typology of representative notions presented in chapter two formed a starting point for the questionnaire. These concepts, as argued previously, are not only useful for scholars researching political representation, but rather also summarise different ways in which citizens can understand representation. Applying the model of representative repertoires, respondents (both in the survey process and during field research) were asked questions based on the nature of each conceptualisation of representation. For example, the concept of character representation was broken down into judgements about whether there were particular qualities/forms of identity that were desirable in judging representatives, and whether the respondent felt their representatives possessed these qualities. In other words, questions were constructed based on intuitive ideas and judgements that prompt consideration of varying potential notions of representation.
At the same time, respondents were given considerable freedom both to identify whether a specific understanding of representation was important, and whether there were other understandings not mentioned within the research that were considered important. Several questions within the questionnaire did not focus on any notion of representation and instead asked participants to provide their own justification for why parties were or were not good representatives. Crucially, these open ended questions were provided after participants had been exposed to questions based on the more focused conceptualisations of representation. This meant that participants were able to consider their responses to these questions before answering the more open ended questions. Overall, however, the prior assumptions of the researcher were not the only guiding principle during the process, reflecting the significance of context and culture in the process of meaning-making as well as in political action.

It is important to note that this process produced a large amount of qualitative data. While participants were free to leave some answers blank or to provide one-word answers, this rarely occurred. It appeared that the interest of participants in their communities and their areas of concern provided a significant incentive to explore the issue of representation in some depth. It was common for answers to individual questions to be over 200 words.

Finally, as the participants were an important part of this stage of the research, the last question asked whether they had any feedback or advice for the researcher. Most participants answered this question, and a very wide range of responses was provided. Some were directly relevant to their responses to other questions, while others questioned the research process and the researcher himself, or gave suggestions for further data collection. This was a valuable step in a study that questions the position of both the researcher and the participant. Some of these responses provide grounds for reflection in the conclusion of this study.

**Research Ethics**

This research considers some sensitive political issues within the broader context of a developing democracy. As such, it was important to consider a range of ethical issues. Participants within the research often held ongoing positions in local communities and political systems—some as political party leaders and others as members of local organisations and NGOs. Where possible, it was important to protect the identity of
these participants. In most cases this meant very little compromise to the results of the study: as the objects of analysis were not the participants themselves but their conceptualisations of political representation, the detailed identity of participants was not critical to the overall results. Throughout the study, interview and survey participants are identified by their sector of work and sometimes their region, but not by name or title.

The survey research conducted here also presented ethical concerns. The internet-based survey platform SurveyMonkey was used to conduct these surveys. To ensure that the responses of participants were secure, only region and sector of work were collected and known by the researcher and the survey software. Importantly, no IP address details were collected or stored by the survey company. During the research process, this necessitated moving to SurveyMonkey from another survey site that did not allow for anonymous surveys. Where information offered by participants potentially identified them, this was left out of the published findings, though this was quite rare.

Additionally, the field research conducted within Indonesia also required a careful approach. As an outsider (not being an Indonesian citizen, or from the local area), it was important to be aware of potentially sensitive local issues and connections. In some cases interviews were arranged by third parties, who had ongoing relationships with the interview participants. In all cases it was stressed that I was a visiting researcher, and that my views and questions did not necessarily reflect those of my host organisations. In some cases my host organisations made alternative arrangements where a conflict of interest might exist.

Notes on Language

The vast majority of data collected within this study was collected in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language of Indonesia. Political party advertisements, official documents and the survey responses were all written in Indonesian, and most interviews were conducted in Indonesian as well. The researcher is a competent user of the language, and all translations were completed by the researcher. It should be noted, however, that interpretive research, with a significant focus on discourse, places extra demands on language skills, and this was a constant challenge during the process of the research. In some instances colleagues were consulted regarding the meaning of
particular words or phrases. In particular, some contextual factors (such as cultural or historical references) as well as idioms were also checked with colleagues. All original Indonesian language quotes are included in an appendix to this study, and can thus be compared with the translations where relevant.

While in many cases respondents were capable speakers of English, using Bahasa Indonesia allowed for survey and interview participants to speak more freely and conceptually about notions of representation. Overall, it appeared preferable to spend more time checking the meaning of language use during the analysis phase, but have richer responses, than to conduct significant parts of the research in English to save time, but lose some of the detail. Of course, any errors in translation are the responsibility of the researcher alone.

Limitations of the Methodology

There are several limitations of the approach adopted here. Firstly, while this study has focused on the strengths of constructivist analysis, qualitative research of the sort pursued in this study is not immune from issues of bias. Interpretive research within political science relies on the consideration of narratives, which ‘explain actions and practices by reference to the beliefs and desires of actors’ (Bevir 2005, p. 285). Yet while the study of narratives and the assumptions that underpin political practice opens up new avenues for analysis, the researcher must remain aware that their own biases and understandings can influence the way in which the research is conducted.

Secondly, while survey data covered almost all provinces of Indonesia, the researcher was only able to focus on two case study regions in more depth. This inevitable reduces the ability to draw conclusions that are relevant to all of Indonesia’s regional communities, as well as to the complete picture of the representative relationship between the central government and those communities. While the selection of case studies is aimed at providing the most representative image of these issues, it is inevitably an incomplete image.

Similarly, limiting the survey participation to what have been labelled ‘civil society leaders’ also presents methodological issues. While the intention was for these community leaders to be able to speak for the identities and interests present within their local communities, this is of course a limited window into these communities. NGO organisers have their own interests and constituents, and in some cases these
clearly influenced their responses. The broad nature of the survey responses meant that some participants were clearly unsure whether the survey wanted them to speak for the community (broadly defined) or their specific community (people attached to their organisation and its interests). As a result, some participants spoke more about the way in which political parties represented their organisations rather than broadly about the community. While issues of sampling are not as critical for qualitative surveying as they are for quantitative surveying, the study was also limited by varying exposure to and interest in the research—some types of organisations were more heavily represented within the databases used by the researcher, and some organisations appeared more likely to take part in the research. Islamic organisations, for instance, were generally not as well represented within the study, and this should be understood as a limitation. Organisations like Persatuan Islam (PERSIS – Islamic Union), members of Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and their networks and even vigilante groups like Front Pembela Islam (FPI – the Islamic Defenders Front) were not included in the study. While members of some of these organisations, as well as members of other religious organisations like the Catholic Church were invited to take part in the study, they are not well represented.

It is also important to note that civil society and the party system in Indonesia do not operated entirely separate of each other – indeed activists within civil society have regularly sought to enter formal politics (Mietzner 2013, p. 28-30). While most participants in this study argued that they and their organisation did not wish to engage formally with political parties, some identified links with formal political institutions.

Lastly, there are limitations in the way that the concept of representative repertoires is operationalised within this study. This conceptual framework continued to develop alongside the process of data collection, and having further refined the framework later in the research process, there is no doubt that some changes would have been made had the data collection and analysis been repeated. For example, the participants in the research could have occupied a more significant role in identifying repertoires. The process of developing this theoretical framework and conducting the research itself was certainly an important learning experience, and will hopefully inform future research projects to improve the quality of research undertaken.
Conclusion

This chapter has considered the methodological approach of this study. Firstly, the chapter has noted the combination of institutional analysis and interpretive approaches in this study. While political parties and institutions are studies according to a relatively positivist-based approach to research (particularly in the inclusion of a quantitative study of party system nationalisation), the nature of political representation is analysed according to an interpretive approach. The combination of these different approaches is based on the argument that the type of research question primarily drives the approach that is used. This chapter concludes by considering how the research sought to analyse the institutional environment, party system nationalisation, representative claims and assessment.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Institutional Context of Party System
Nationalisation

Introduction

Indonesia’s geographical branch requirement is unique—no other democratic political system requires such extensive branch organisation simply to qualify to take part in elections. For this reason, it is important to consider the laws and their effects in some detail. This chapter begins by outlining the requirement itself and the way in which it has changed since 1999. It is argued here that the branch registration requirement presents a significant hurdle for political parties, in particular smaller political parties without a significant financial or social network to support them. I also argue that the increasingly strict interpretations of the law has demonstrated the way in which the law has become politicised. Secondly, this chapter contextualises this formal branch requirement within the context of informal institutional norms that have historically developed in Indonesia. It is argued that in the process of nation building, the Suharto regime as well as the military have influenced the development of norms regarding national political organisation, particularly within the context of Indonesia’s diversity. Finally, this chapter explores the extent to which Indonesia’s party system could truly be described as being national in nature. Voting data is used here to chart the nationalisation of Indonesia’s political parties through the four elections since reformasi (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014), and argues that, considering the diversity and geographical spread of Indonesian society, the party system exhibits quite strong national characteristics that have only become more pronounced since 1999.

The Party Nationalisation Laws

The Laws

Following the fall of Suharto, the political institutions which had been co-opted to support his regime were an obvious target of reform. Macintyre (2003, p. 137) goes so far as to argue that Indonesia presents:
The extreme case, with its political architecture undergoing dramatic change in the wake of the 1997-98 regional financial crisis. The changes to Indonesia’s political architecture were so fundamental that it was a case of regime shift.

These changes arguably took place in two phases—the first was in the short period of time leading up the first reformasi election in 1999, and the second was in the period following 1999. The first phase saw a wide range of significant reforms, such as the removal of previous bans on the establishment of political parties, new election laws, freeing of the press and the beginning of decentralisation. The second phase progressed at a slower pace, and saw more incremental but still quite important reforms, such as the establishment of the anti-corruption commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi-KPK), the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK), and the implementation of direct presidential elections. Both of these periods are relevant in understanding the implementation and development of the branch requirement.

In the first phase, several important actors were involved in the process of designing new electoral and political party regulations. As Ellis (2004, p. 259) explains:

…The Habibie government appointed a technical team (‘Tim Tujuh,’ or the Team of Seven) responsible for drafting the package of new electoral legislation. Much of Tim Tujuh’s drafting took place before international support or involvement was available: its only source of external technical advice was a resident Australian who volunteered help. Second were the parties within the existing legislature: Golkar, which rapidly began its transition to a party of the new era; and PPP, which realized early that its only hope of survival was to present itself as the voice of reform within the old institutions. Third, new parties formed outside the legislature endeavoured to be voices of the reform movement.

These three key groups were operating within a relatively uncertain environment. Suharto’s regime had lasted for over 32 years, and thus there was relatively little experience with any alternative form of governmental structure. Secondly, a range of social and political tensions that had been suppressed by the Suharto regime had emerged dramatically during the years between 1997 and 1999. Distrust on the part of ‘indigenous’ Indonesians (known as ‘Pribumi’) towards the Chinese community resulted, particularly in Jakarta, in rioting and attacks against Chinese businesses and Chinese citizens (Min 2002, p. 39-57; Purdey 2002, p. 605-607). Ethnic conflicts in locations such as Ambon, Kalimantan and Java flared violently. Provinces that had long sought autonomy or independence stirred, including Aceh, Papua and East Timor. In the case of East Timor, the ongoing violence there eventually resulted in an UN-sanctioned vote on independence (begrudgingly allowed by the caretaker Habibie regime). The vote resoundingly supported independence, but more violence instigated
by pro-Indonesia militia followed, and eventually led to an Australian-led intervention in the province. And even in provinces where tensions did not reach these extremes:

There were various forms of ethnic political mobilization—for example, movements aiming to create new provinces or districts or demanding that preference be given to locals over migrants in government employment (Aspinall 2011, p. 289).

These events undoubtedly had a significant influence on the various parties involved in drafting electoral regulations at the time. As Aspinall (2011, p. 289) highlights, after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia went ‘from being a highly centralized polity that repressed ethnonationalist mobilization to one that was both decentralized and affected by severe communal and separatist violence in several provinces’. And importantly, this sudden shift in the relationship between regions and the central government was occurring at the same time as greater attention was being given to the development of the party system. Under Suharto, the electoral system used had little significance, as tight controls on the number of parties and the choice of voters meant that these factors had more influence on the result than the electoral system itself. Following reformasi, political parties would play a much more powerful role in the execution of decision making and power than they had under the New Order; as such, the nature of political parties—and the party system overall—was and is crucial to the dynamics of the new political system.

Beyond the social and political climate, it is also important to acknowledge that the design of new political institutions have also had a significant political component. As Macintyre (2003, p. 143) notes, while many politicians debating the new architecture of party and election regulation were former Suharto era politicians, ‘all had their eyes clearly focused on the new game of competitive elections, understanding full well that the design of the institutional framework would favor some interests over others’. Thus for decision makers involved in the process of institution design, normative concerns regarding the integrity of the Indonesian state and nature were combined with self-interested calculations regarding which institutional requirements were best able to protect or foster success for individual careers and political parties. This point will be returned to in the context of ongoing changes to the branch requirement.

It was in this context that tim tujuh, headed by the director general in the ministry of home affairs, Ryaas Rasyid, and made up mainly of academics (Ellis 2000, p. 241), combined with the political parties to put together party registration laws with a geographical requirement (Macintyre 2003, p. 143). In their initial form, these laws
dictated that parties should be loyal to Pancasila (Election Law, article 43), through acknowledging that Pancasila is the state ideology of Indonesia and that the party’s ‘principles or characteristics, aspirations and programs do not contradict Pancasila’ (Party Law, article 2). Further, the political party ‘may not endanger national unity and integrity’ (Article 3). Article 9 further required political parties ‘to maintain the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’ and ‘maintain the unity and integrity of the nation’ (Article 9, 1999). Political parties that were deemed to not adhere to these requirements would not be registered for the election.

Beyond these descriptive requirements, the party law put in place for the first time a geographical branch requirement. This meant that:

To be eligible to compete in the 1999 elections for the DPR, a party must have established party organizations in at least one-third (nine) of Indonesia’s 27 provinces and in at least one half of the regencies/municipalities within those nine provinces. (Election Law, Article 82.) Once a party has qualified under these rules, it is eligible to run candidates anywhere in the country. (Election Law, Article 41.) (NDI Report 1999, p. 6)

The exact meaning of ‘establishing party organization’ in the 1999 law was not particularly clear. Unlike in later years, the geographical branch requirement was contained in the laws regarding elections rather than political parties (UU Pemilu rather than UU Partai Politik). Two further issues confused the implementation of these requirements. The first is that the requirement was mentioned in two separate articles within the electoral law – article 39 and article 82. The articles (Republic of Indonesia 1999) are as follows:

**Article 39**

Political parties can become participants in the general election if they fulfil the following requirements:

b. possess management in more than ½ (half) of the number of provinces in Indonesia;

c. possess management in more than ½ (half) of the number of districts/city regions in the provinces mentioned in Part B;¹⁹

**Article 82.**

For the general election in 1999, the political party requirements to become a participant in the general election as mentioned in article 38 line b and line c are confirmed as becoming:

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¹⁹ For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 270-271.
a. Possessing management in 1/3 (one third) of the number of provinces in Indonesia;

b. Possessing management in 1/2 (half) of the number of districts/cities in each of the provinces mentioned in Part A.20

It appears that article 39 was intended to become the permanent requirement, while article 82 was meant to temporarily reduce the hurdle for political parties (considering the short period of time for parties to get organised in between the establishment of the electoral laws and the election itself in 1999).

![Figure 5.2 – Geographical Branch Requirement for 1999 Election](image)

The second issue was the enforcement of the law. A team was established before the election in order to screen political parties for the 1999 election—this team was known as the ‘preparatory committee for the formation of the General Election Commission’ (P3KPU), but was better known as the Team of Eleven (*Tim Sebelas*) (Suryadinata 2002, p. 90). This team was headed by a well known Islamic scholar (Nurcholis Madjid), and was independent from the government. According to Suryadinata (2002, p. 91):

> The Team of Eleven was given a limited time to do their job. They had to travel to the provinces to check the accuracy of the information provided by the political parties … The Team of Eleven was criticized for only working thirty-six hours and only managing to visit ten provinces.

Despite the fact that the Team of Eleven also appears to have engaged students and local NGOs to assist its work21, given the significant requirements of political parties

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20 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 267.

21 Madjid was quoted in news reports at the time as being interested in engaging the services of local communities in the verification process: ‘We will work together with civil society organisations,
and the geographical spread of Indonesia it is unlikely that the Team of Eleven was able to effectively determine whether many of the political parties had achieved the full national organisation—at best they are only likely to have achieved a snapshot of the organisation level of political parties.

Despite the limited enforcement of the law, a large number of political parties failed to pass the requirements for the 1999 election. Of the 141 parties that originally declared themselves as participants in the 1999 election, 35 were immediately barred due to not even lodging their applications with the Team of Eleven (Suryadinata 2002, p. 91). From the remaining 94 parties that began the process of registration, only 48 were eventually allowed to take part in the election (Suryadinata 2002, p. 91). Many of these parties were barred due to missing paperwork, but in many cases it is likely that political parties who lacked sufficient paperwork were also more likely to not have the geographical coverage to pass the requirement.

**Further developments**
The first geographical branch requirement was a significant barrier for some parties, particularly parties with few resources or members. Yet in the following three elections, these geographical requirements were significantly expanded. This section demonstrates the increasing severity of the laws, and argues that the further development of the party registration laws between 1999 and 2014 is related to the politicisation of this form of institutional engineering.

A number of considerable changes were made before the 2004 election, including the direct election of the President and the complete removal of allocated military seats within the parliament. Yet another change that occurred between the 1999 and the 2004 election was the expansion of the geographical branch requirement for political parties. Unlike in 1999, the formation of political parties was now dealt with in the political party law (Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties) as well as the electoral law. In Article 2 of the 2002 party law, political parties were required to ‘possess organisation’ in at least 50 percent of the number of provinces (in 2004 the number of provinces had increased to 33), 50 percent of the smaller city/district regions within those provinces, and for the first time also demonstrate organisation in 25 percent of [university students and other sources from the community’](https://www.detik.com/). The extent to which this actually occurred is not clear (Detik.com 3 February 1999).
the much smaller *kecamatan* districts within each of these city/district regions\textsuperscript{22}. This basically meant two extra requirements would need to be met by political parties—to organise in 17 provinces instead of 9, and to extend their organisation down to another level of political administration. The *kecamatan* districts are made up of villages or small city districts, and usually include a local population of approximately 50,000-60,000 residents\textsuperscript{23}.

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5_3.png}
\caption{Geographical requirements for political parties in 2004 election}
\end{figure}

The branch requirements were again increased in the lead up to the 2009 election, in the form of Law No. 2, 2008. The requirements for the two lower levels remained the same, but the number of provinces in which political parties would need to register was increased from 50 percent to 60 percent. This meant that political parties would need to register in 20 provinces instead of 17. While this was the case, the election law continued to require organisation in two thirds of provinces and two thirds of districts, creating some potential confusion. In 2011, looking forward to the 2014 election cycle, the laws were taken even further. Parties would now need to register in all of Indonesia’s 34 provinces, 75 percent of the *kabupaten/kota* regions, and 50 percent of the *kecamatan* districts within those *kabupaten/kota* regions. For the first time, the party law and election law both contained the same requirements. The gradual increasing of party regulation is summarised in Figure 5.7 below.

\textsuperscript{22} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{23} The election law required even more significant organisation: in two thirds of provinces and two thirds of districts
Figure 5.4 - Geographical requirements for political parties in 2009 election

Figure 5.5 - Geographical requirements for political parties in 2014 election

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<td>50 percent</td>
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<td>Districts</td>
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<td>25 percent</td>
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Figure 5.7 – Changes to Geographical Branch Requirement

Significance of the Requirement
At the time field research was conducted for this study, the process of verification had recently been carried out for the 2014 election. This provided an opportunity to understand the nature of the registration process and the effect of the law in barring political parties from the 2014 election cycle. The following observations are based on research conducted in Padang, West Sumatra and Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara.
The process of verification is managed by the Indonesian electoral commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU). The organisational structure of the KPU mimics the required political party structure, with offices at the propinsi (province) and kabupaten/kota (district) levels. The provincial level office is responsible for managing the process of verification and for compiling the final results of the inspections. Each of the political parties attempting to register is required to submit a range of forms to the regional KPU.

While the administrative requirements are quite onerous, most political parties were able to provide the required detail. Once the details were provided to the KPU, the process of verification began. Teams of KPU officials travelled around each province, visiting the address or workplace of nominated local political party leaders, checking the existence of party offices, and verifying a random sample of the local party membership. During interviews with members of the KPU from Padang and Kupang, it was clear that the procedure in these two locations was relatively uniform despite being in very different parts of the country. During the verification process, complaints were made by some smaller parties about the work of the KPU in other regions; Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK) for example, argued that the process in regions such as Kota Depok, parts of Papua and Jawa Tengah had not been carried out professionally (Rumah Pemilu 20 February 2013), yet this was evidently not the case in the two regions that were the focus of this study. Central planning for the process appeared quite clear, and respondents reported having attended training sessions that brought together KPU staff from different provinces. Political parties were given two chances to pass the requirements—failed results in the first stage could therefore be overturned if the party was able to correct the error or find missing data.

During the fieldwork a number of tabulation forms (known as F7 forms) were obtained by the researcher, which detail the results of verification for each party in each kabupaten and kota district. In West Sumatra, for example, there are 12 kabupaten districts and seven kota districts (including the centre of the capital city, Padang). Apart from the requirement that women make up 30 percent of leadership, if a party failed any of the individual requirements (tidak sesuai, ‘not fulfilled’) then the party was classed as not meeting the requirements in that kabupaten or kota region (tidak memenuhi syarat, ‘did not fulfil the requirements’). If a party was not able to meet the requirements in at least 75 percent of the kabupaten and kota regions, then it would be
assessed as not having fulfilled the requirement in that province (and hence, failing the national requirement of being registered in all provinces). Based on this data, it was clear that the verification presented a significant hurdle to a number of political parties: even some well-known and long established ones. In some cases, a political party failed all requirements in a particular district, likely indicating that details were not provided for that district or that the party did not make a serious attempt to register there. This was the case, for example, for Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)\(^{24}\) in the Kota Sawahlunto district of West Sumatra.

By far the most difficult requirement, however, was the membership test \((\textit{keanggotaan})\). As detailed above, each political party must possess at least 1000 members in each kabupaten/kota district, or 1/1000 of the total population of the district. In reality, few districts have more than 1,000,000 residents, thus the required number of party members is likely to often be less than 1,000. The largest district in West Sumatra, Kota Padang, has a population approaching 900,000, and thus the required number would have been less than 900. The smallest district, Kota Padang Panjang, has a population of approximately 50,000 people, and thus parties would only be required to demonstrate somewhere around 50 members. Political parties were responsible for preparing a list of members in each kabupaten/kota region to be submitted to the KPU, and the KPU then verified a random sample of those membership lists by meeting members declared by the parties and checking their membership cards.

While the total number of members needed might not be that large, a number of political parties were attempting to register in each district, and hence the supply of political active or inclined local residents could be quickly exhausted. A total of 21 parties were able to demonstrate this level of membership in Padang Panjang, for example, meaning that that were approximately 1000 people from a total population of 50,000 who were members of a political party (and probably more, considering this was only the minimum requirement). In Kota Padang, 17 political parties succeeded in demonstrating their membership ahead of the 2014 election, meaning at least 15,000 people were signed up for one of the political parties. In both Padang and Kupang,

\(^{24}\)PBB is a well-known and long-standing political party in the reformasi period.
KPU officials observed that in many cases members listed by the parties could not be found, or could not be verified as being party members.

For many political parties, this requirement was too onerous. A number of political parties went through the whole process of verification, only to fail the requirement in most kabupaten districts. In West Sumatra, this was the case, for example, for Partai Bhinneka Indonesia (PBI), Partai Karya Republik (Pakar), Partai Kesatuan Demokrasi Indonesia (PKDI), Partai Kongres, Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia (PNBKI), Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (PNI-M), Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PPDI) and Partai Republik, Partai Republika Nusantara (Republikan). These seven political parties failed to meet the requirements in any of the 19 districts of West Sumatra. The significance of this should be understood: these were not political parties formed on a whim, but organisations that went through a difficult process of bureaucratic procedures (and cost) just to have their party take part in the verification process.

Some other results are even more notable. Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) was a Christian political party\textsuperscript{25} that had passed the verification requirements in 2004 and 2009, achieving some reasonably strong results. In 2004 the party won 2.1 percent of the national vote, which was enough to win 12 out of the 550 seats in the national parliament. In 2009 the party won 1.5 percent (just over 1.5 million votes) of the national vote, but failed to reach the parliamentary quota and was not awarded any seats. Beyond the party’s electoral fortunes, its position as the only relevant Christian political party (in a nation with a significant Christian minority) increased its prominence.

Yet PDS faced significant challenges during the verification process. In West Sumatra it was able to demonstrate a party structure and offices in most districts (as would be expected from a political party with a strong history), but passed the membership requirement in only three of the 19 districts. The three districts in which PDS achieved the requirement (Kepulauan Mentawai, Padang and Pariaman) feature a much more significant Christian minority than other parts of West Sumatra. This was repeated in other parts of the country. In Yogyakarta, for example, PDS passed the other requirements (possessing offices and office holders) in four of the five districts, but

\textsuperscript{25} While the party had a clear Christian identity, it also nominated 21 Muslim candidates for the 2009 election.
failed the membership requirements in all districts. PDS failed to register, was not allowed to nominate candidates at any level in 2014, and disbanded as a party as a result, merging with the new political party, Hanura.

Other examples also demonstrate the significance of the registration hurdle. The *Serikat Rakyat Independen* party (SRI), for instance, was formed with significant media attention and borrowed on the identity of the former cabinet minister Sri Mulyani (though it was not clear to what extent she supported the party). Yet SRI was only able to pass the verification in four districts within West Sumatra (most of these were city districts). It also failed the verification nationally. *Partai Buruh*, a labour party, was only able to pass the verification in three districts, two of those being city districts. *Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama* (PKNU) had passed the verification in 2009 and won 1.5 percent of the national vote and 4.6 percent of the vote in East Java. In West Sumatra it was only able to gain verification in seven of the 19 districts. Even large nationalised political parties that did manage to gain registration for 2014 faced some problems: PDIP, Golkar and *Partai Demokrat* (PD), three parties with extensive resources and organisation and three of the largest vote winners nationally in 2014, failed to verify their organisation in some districts of West Sumatra.

**The Politicisation of the Party Laws**

This chapter has noted the dramatic expansion of the geographical branch requirement between 1999 and 2014. As noted, the original process that led to the law was, at least in part, political: old and new political parties were important in the process of making decisions regarding Indonesia’s electoral infrastructure, and their own self-interest was clearly a factor in the decision making (Mietzner 2013, p. 65). What is even clearer, however, is that this particular requirement continues to be politicised.

Debates regarding changes to the branch requirement in the lead up to the last two elections in 2009 and 2014 clearly demonstrate the politicisation of the laws. This debate has increasingly seen the larger, more established parties supporting increased thresholds, while smaller and new political parties have generally been very critical of the requirement\(^\text{26}\). For example, Didi Supriyanti—chair of the National Union Forum (FPN), which represents non-parliamentary parties—argued, as paraphrased by the Jakarta Post (21 February 2011), that the ‘law had been deliberately designed to “kill”

\(^{26}\) Smaller political parties have also been critical of other electoral regulations, such as the increase in the parliamentary threshold (Mietzner 2013, p. 64-65).
smaller parties.’ He went on to argue that it was a ‘violation of the people’s constitutional right to establish political parties’ (The Jakarta Post 21 February 2011). Similarly, supporters of the disqualified SRI party argued that the law ‘makes establishing a political party nonsensical and difficult’ and that the ‘regulation is disturbing and violating the constitutional right of a political party’ (The Jakarta Globe, 15 June 2011, p.). The chairman of the SRI party, Damianus Taufan, was reported by the Jakarta Globe (15 June 2011) as stating that:

> Only rich citizens could form political parties since the obligation to establish so many local branches would cost billions of rupiah. In their press statement, the petitioners said it would cost at least Rp 200 million (US$22,000) just to buy seals for official documents. With the country’s 497 cities and regencies as well as about 6,300 districts, it would cost an additional Rp 7.04 billion for rent, assuming a small office cost Rp 2 million in annual rent.

Some parties that failed to meet the requirements also made allegations of foul play. The Chairperson of Partai Kemakmuran Bangsa Nusantara (PKBN) and daughter of former President Abdurrahman Wahid, Yenny Wahid, argued that the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, had interfered in PKBN’s registration application: ‘We see that there is a conspiracy to eliminate PKBN, because we had so many suspicions during the verification process’ (The Jakarta Post 17 December 2011). This allegation was based on the fact that PKBN was a splinter party from Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and Iskandar was a PKB politician.

In another sign of the politicisation of the requirement, cases against this form of institutional engineering have reached the legal system. Several smaller parties have filed challenges to the law in the Constitutional Court, though have so far been unsuccessful in overturning the requirement. In 2003, for instance, Haji Agus Miftach, the chairman of Partai Persatuan Rakyat Indonesia (PPRI), launched a challenge to the branch requirement. In the official challenge to the law, it was argued that the laws ‘clearly are in opposition to the right of free association and assembly as meant in section 28 of the 1945 Indonesian constitution’ (Mahkamah Konstitusi [MK] 2003). The case goes on to argue that the laws have resulted in significant damages:

> In the conduct of national life, including 1. Hindering the democratic process, 2. Social isolation, 3. An increased potential for restrictions regarding the conduct of elections, 4. A political situation that is discriminatory, 5. Political Instability, and 6. Moral and material damaged to political parties that are declared by the ministry of internal affairs and human rights to not fulfil the party laws (MK 2003).
Interestingly, the response of the government and courts to these challenges has been based on several different arguments. For instance, the national government had the right to make its own submission to the Constitutional Court in the legal challenge mounted by PPRI, and put forward several different justifications for the branch requirement. The first one centred on the quality of political parties:

We need to clarify that in the regulation of political development in Indonesia, in the context of building a democratic state, one aspect is the strengthening of the capacity of political parties. One function of political parties is as a source of political education for their members and the broader community, together with becoming a medium for creating a conducive environment and a unifying glue for the unity of the nation and the prosperity of the people (MK 2003).

The second justification centres on the representation of diversity:

[In regards to the sections of the law dealing with geographical registration], the intent is to build quality political parties that are independent and have roots within the community. Besides that, with the regulation it is hoped political parties will form that have credibility and have a broad organisation in all of Indonesia, have a strong mass support, and are national in nature (Indonesia is an archipelago and is made up of many different cultures as well as religions). Through the requirements and criteria it is intended that in the future political parties will be formed that reflect the diversity of ethnicity, of different peoples, cultures, and religions in one vessel and goal in the interests of the nation and the state (MK, 2003).27

The Constitutional Court rejected the challenge, and in its explanation it largely agreed with the government response. The most interesting section of the court’s judgement argued that

[The geographical requirements] are needed in a country which is now in the process of developing a mature democracy. In that context, the law is not only needed as a medium to protect the certainty of a just legal order, but it must also play a role in the development of society (MK 2003, p. 35).

The Constitutional Court has often challenged the decisions of governments, and hence it must be understood that this judgement is not simply an act of deference on the part of the court. Clearly, in the view of the Constitutional Court at the time, the branch requirement was an important compromise needed to contribute towards the development of Indonesia’s society and political system.

The fact that some of the justification for the laws seems to have shifted is significant. The government and the Constitutional Court both cite the importance of developing the party system in the context of a developing democracy, rather than the importance

27 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 271.
of preventing regional political parties. Part of this logic is that the geographical branch requirement not only prevents regional political parties from emerging; it also prevents too many of them from emerging. The term *penyederhanaan* (simplification) is often used to describe the need to simplify the party system and reduce the number of active parties—an endeavour that is generally supported by the Indonesian public when surveyed (IFES p. 2010; Mietzner 2013, p. 66). This alternative justification for the party registration requirements will be explored further in Chapter 10.

A number of other legal challenges have also been launched, mainly by parties who were unable to pass the requirement. In the most recent election, 15 political parties that were disqualified by the laws mounted legal challenges to the result. PBB was disqualified by the KPU for failing to meet the requirements, and challenged that decision (The Jakarta Post, 4 February 2013). PDS also challenged its disqualification from the 2014 election. As reported by the Jakarta Post (11 January 2013):

‘Bawaslu asked us to complete some more paperwork. We will then file the suit with the PTUN [Jakarta State Administrative Court],’ Sahat said. ‘We will not give up until justice is served’. The PDS leader accused the KPU of failing to perform its job, claiming that during the factual verification process, commission officials failed to make physical inspections of the PDS’ regional offices, particularly those in the predominantly Muslim regions, such as Aceh and Muara Enim, South Sumatra. ‘We found out that the KPU didn’t check on our branches in five districts in Aceh. The provincial KPU in Aceh told us that they did not do it since the [national] KPU didn’t send our documents to them. The same thing also happened in Muara Enim,’ Sahat said.

The efforts of existing political parties to promote stricter geographical branch requirements in part reflect the analysis presented in Katz and Mair’s (1995) seminal ‘cartel party’ thesis, in which they argue that the weakening of the roots of parties within civil society, together with the strengthening of connections between parties and the state, have led to the emergence of ‘cartel’ parties. These parties collude just as much as they compete over state resources, and as such they have a vested interested in restricting the emergence of new political parties (particularly parties with a different modus operandi). While political parties in Indonesia certainly features some of the qualities of cartel parties, it should be noted that the state itself, as well as community groups, have also played a role in the ongoing development of party law. As Mietzner (2013, p. 68) notes:

Indonesian bureaucrats in the Ministry of Home Affairs ensure that their interests were clearly reflected in the post-Suharto party and election laws … non-party and non-
state actors were involved too. Public pressure, for example, was decisive in both the liberalization of party laws and the subsequent introduction of limits and controls.

While Mietzner rejects the thesis that Indonesia’s party system is dominated by the dynamics of cartelisation, he does recognises the role played by political parties in further expanding the geographical branch requirement.

A number of conclusions can thus be drawn. Firstly, the establishment and strengthening of the party registration laws must be understood as possessing political elements. While ‘in hindsight it is clear that fears of Balkanization were greatly exaggerated’ (Barton 2010, p. 478), the laws have been continuously strengthened. Political parties, in particular the larger political parties, have been instrumental in ensuring the laws have become harsher in the lead up to each new election. Smaller and aspiring political parties have challenged, both rhetorically and legally, the nature of the laws, but their arguments have largely been rejected by both the government and the main means of legal review, the Constitutional Court. The arguments of both the Constitutional Court and the government suggest that several of the underlying justifications for the laws have become influential, in particular the notion that the laws are needed in the context of Indonesia’s maturing democracy. This is an interesting notion, considering the rarity of such laws in other developing democracies (and in the history of developed democracies), and the tenuous connection drawn between national organisation and the quality of political parties. This point will be returned to in Chapter Eight.

The Promotion of National Political Organisation

The response of the Indonesian government, constitutional court and society to the issue of party system nationalisation suggests that formal laws are not the only institutional factor that must be taken into account. As such, Indonesia’s formal geographical branch requirement should be considered within a broader historical, political and social context that favours political organisation that is national in nature rather than regional. While the development of these social norms warrants a detailed study in itself, this section briefly identifies three sources of norms regarding national political organisation within Indonesia’s recent history – the Dutch state and independence movement, the Suharto regime and the military.
The Dutch State and the Independence Movement
While ‘national historicist myths about the abiding existence of Indonesia’ include precedents such as the Srivijaya and Majapahit kingdoms, the notion of ‘Indonesia’ can mainly be traced back to the spread of Dutch colonisation in the region (Elson 2005, p. 146). As Anderson (1983, p. 479) argues, ‘Indeed, the Indonesia we know today is the exact product of the extraordinary extension of Batavia's politico-military power between 1850 and 1910’. The Dutch colonisation provided the earliest form of political organisation across the whole archipelago, combining people of distinctly different ethnic and cultural identities within the one political structure. Despite the colonial and repressive nature of this political construct, Anderson (1983) argues that it was, in many ways, a ‘state’ in the key senses of that term.

This Dutch state was not completely separate from the indigenous population of the archipelago. As Anderson argues:

Europeans still numbered only slightly over 10 percent of the entire state apparatus. In 1928, there were almost a quarter of a million native officials on the state payroll (Vandenbosch 1944, 171). To put it another way, 90 percent of the colonial civil service was composed of ‘Indonesians,’ and the state's functioning would have been impossible without them. As Benda has written (1966), this situation represented the last stage in the long process by which various strata of (largely Javanese) native ruling classes had, since the mid-nineteenth century, been absorbed and encapsulated into an ever more centralized and stream-lined colonial beamtenstaat. (Anderson 1983, p. 480)

Thus, despite the even greater influence of ethnic and regional identity prior to the creation of the independent Indonesian state, a precedent existed for a national political structure, or state, that brought these different regional groups under the same political organisation. As Robert Cribb (2001, p. 303) argues, despite the Dutch reserving positions of power for their own citizens, ‘Javanese, Bataks, Malays, Minangkabau, Timorese and Manadonese began to congregate in the lower rungs of the colonial administration and to learn the ways of the west’.

The response to the Dutch occupation is just as important in understanding the early impetus towards national political organisation. Arguably, the common experience of Dutch occupation (and with it, the varied experiences of repression, exploitation and racism that accompany colonisation) was an impetus for the earliest forms of nationalism. Certainly resistance against Dutch rule often took on a regional or ethnic character, and there are numerous examples throughout the history of Dutch colonisation of individual ethnic or regional groups resisting Dutch rule. Even in the
beginning of the 20th century, some of the key resistance organisations had a regional flavour, such as the Budi Utomo and Jong-Java organisations, and even ‘a committee for Javanese Nationalism which was unabashed in its preference for basing the future on a Javanese identity, rather than a broad archipelagic one’ (Cribb 2001, p. 303; also see Suryadinata 1978, p. 108). Yet the broader nationalist movement went beyond individual ethnic identities, to be based on the idea of a broader idea of ‘Indonesia’, a place ‘that was to be dedicated to prosperity, modernity and opportunity in a way that old Java had never been (or at least was imagined never to have been)’ (Cribb, 2001, p. 303).

According to Reid (1974) this sense of being Indonesian emerged most strongly in the growing number of cities within the archipelago. ‘The knots tying this new state together,’ argues Reid (1974, p. 1-2):

were the burgeoning cities, of which there were seventeen by 1930 with populations over 50,000. Their combined population comprised 1.87m ethnic Indonesians, 0.29m Chinese, and 0.14m Europeans, with social and economic status in inverse proportion to their number. The city became ‘a scene of conflict’, as a late colonial report put it … only in these competitive cities could the Indonesian bottom layer see itself as a whole, rather than as a number of unrelated cultural groups.

The nationalist movement was dominated by groups that were based not on a single ethnic or regional identity, but on a common struggle against occupation, and a common dream of independence from that occupation. And while, as Bertrand (2003, p. 30) notes, there were no shortages of conflicts regarding the form that the future independent state would take, these conflicts were fought largely over concepts that all envisaged a unitary national Indonesian state. ‘Self-defined nationalists,’ Bertrand (2003, p. 30) argues, ‘focused on independence and a nation based on the modern, European principles of self-determination, democracy, and modern political institutions’ while Islamists ‘preferred an Indonesian nation that would build unity around Islam as the common characteristic of the diverse people of the archipelago’. Communists, while less focused on the notion of the unitary state, were nonetheless promoting ‘revolution for people included within the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies’ (Bertrand 2003, p. 30). It should be remembered that these three streams did not posses equal influence in each region of Indonesia (the communist party were mainly influential in Java, while Islamists were much more dominant in the coastal regions of Sumatra and Java), yet the conflicts themselves were over ideas that were
all consistent with national organisation, and each of these groups sought to obtain a national political organisation, rather than am exclusive ethnic one.

Hence in both the state that had been imposed by the Dutch colonisers, and the nationalist movement that emerged as a response to that colonisation, the diverse peoples of the archipelago were organised along broader national lines, rather than more exclusive ethnic and regional lines. This is not to suggest that ethnic or regional identity was not strong—it was undoubtedly a more influential force at this time for the majority of the people of the archipelago than any national impetus. Yet, in the exercise of political power and the resistance against it, there was already an impetus towards national political organisation.

**The Indonesian State and the Suharto Regime**

At the time of independence, most Indonesians were attached much more closely to their own ethnic, regional or religious identity than they were to any notion of being ‘Indonesian’. Regional differences also often informed (but were not the only factor in) disillusionment and indeed outright struggle against the central government. In 1950, for example, pro-Dutch members of the former Netherlands East Indies army (KNIL) rebelled in Makassar, and in Ambon an independent state, the republic of the South Moluccas, was proclaimed (RMS, *Republik Maluku Selatan*) (Kahin 1999, p. 166). The rebellion itself was quickly crushed by the Indonesian military (Bertrand 2003, p. 33), but nonetheless demonstrated the impact of issues of identity in the early development of the state. A number of other serious regional conflicts took place throughout the 1950s, in large part driven by tension arising from the Javanese dominance in the central government and the lack of regional autonomy, but also disappointment with the settlement regarding Indonesia being declared a secular rather than an Islamic state (Bertrand 2003, p. 36). The Darul Islam and PRRI rebellions were the most significant crises in this period, but were eventually subdued in the late 1950s when President Sukarno suspended parliamentary democracy and enacted ‘Guided Democracy’. This, of course, did not put an end to tension—even in communities that had played a significant role in the struggle for independence, such as the Minang people of West Sumatra, there was dissatisfaction with the centralised state structure and the influence of the Javanese (Kahin 1999, p. 165).
Yet when restrictions put in place by President Sukarno were party lifted, Indonesia’s political discourse was again split between several distinct ideological groupings. Anderson (1983, p. 485) quite clearly characterised this period when he argued that:

The punctuational rhythms and legislative focus of parliamentary constitutionalism were replaced by an accelerando of mass politics penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society. The major political parties of the period—the PKI, the PNI, and the conservative Muslim NU—threw themselves into expanding not merely their own memberships, but those of affiliated associations of youth, women, students, farmers, workers, intellectuals, and others. The result was that by the end of Guided Democracy each of these parties claimed, with some justification, to be the core of a huge, organized, ideological ‘family’ each about 20 million strong, which competed fiercely for influence in every sphere of life and on a round-the-clock basis. Hence the popular penetration of the state, which had been stemmed, and even reversed, after the declaration of martial law in 1957, resumed.

Like in the pre-independence era, these ‘ideological families’ did display regional biases, but the key debates of the time were mostly focused on ideological issues rather than ethnic or regional issues. This ideological conflict, with the addition of the military as a separate structure of power, finally spiralled into the coup and counter-coup of 1965-1966, which left hundreds of thousands of Indonesians dead and virtually wiped out the PKI and political left (Eklof 2004, p. 44-45).

The Suharto regime that formed following this destabilising period would be in power for over thirty years, and would have the greatest role in developing the power and cohesion of the Indonesian nation and state. In regards to the Indonesian nation, Suharto’s regime would construct a new ‘apolitical’ political culture, meaning that ‘politics were to be suspended in favour of (economic) development (pembangunan), which would lead to a harmonious and prosperous society’ (Eklof 2004, p. 51). In place of the previous ideological debate, the government:

Fashioned a revivified ‘Pancasila ideology,’ which stressed social harmony and the organic unity between state and society. According to the ‘family principle’ (asas kekeluargaan), individuals and groups were expected to subordinate their own interests to those of the society as a whole. All forms of division, and political opposition in particular, were labelled inimical to the Indonesian national character. (Aspinall 2005, p. 23)

The state’s focus on *pancasila* also meant that regional and ethnic differences were to be secondary to the unitary vision of Indonesia—Indonesians in all parts of the archipelago were expected to engage in nationalistic ceremonies and *pancasila*

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28 Due to limited space this characterisation leaves out a great deal of detail – Suharto himself played a significant role in the events that occurred, as did the Indonesian military.
training. Uncontroversial elements of ethnicity, or—as Aspinall (2011, p. 297) describes them—‘soft’ forms of ethnic identity such as regional dress and architecture, were celebrated (such as in the Taman Mini adventure park in Jakarta and in school textbooks). Yet the national motto ‘Unity in diversity’ (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) was emphasised—regional or ethnic differences should not disrupt the project of establishing a cohesive Indonesian identity.

In regards to the state, the Suharto regime oversaw the establishment of a vast and powerful state structure throughout the whole of the archipelago. Key to Suharto’s redevelopment of Indonesia’s political structure and culture was the merging of civilian bureaucracy and the state party known as Golkar. Besides the military, Golkar was perhaps the most dominant national organisation in the country, and acted as a political vehicle for Suharto and his supporters. Unlike the only two opposition political parties allowed through much of the Suharto regime (PPP and PDI), Golkar was allowed to organise branches at both the regional and local level, while the ‘bureaucracy was mobilised in support of Golkar, and civil servants were pressed to sign declarations of ‘monoloyalty’ to the government, which implied support for Golkar’ (Ekloff 2004, p. 50). If pancasila was the primary national ideology, Golkar was its formal and structural host. As Ali Moertopo (cited in Eklof 2004, p. 51), a key military and political figure within the New Order, stated:

Golkar is the only socio-political force outside the compartments of ideologies based on Nasakom [nationalism, religion and communism], and which is based on nothing but the ideology of Pancasila; Golkar is the only socio-political force which is oriented towards reform [pembaruan] and development [pembangunan], and the only one which is able to unite all the diverse functional groups under one symbol in the elections.

Golkar, with its strong connection to the bureaucracy and its dominance over the two opposition parties, thus became the centre of a ‘reorganisation of the political system and society at large into a state corporatist system’ (Eklof 2004, p. 58). This system became a reality for communities all around the diverse archipelago; despite regional, ethnic and cultural differences, the web of organisation that was centred on the bureaucracy and Golkar was based on a relatively similar structure in all parts of Indonesia.

The efforts of Suharto’s new order regime to nationalise conceptualisations of the Indonesian state and nation are important because of the powerful and recent influence of the regime. While significant reform has taken place under the banner of reformasi,
the Suharto regime, as we might expect, left behind a significant cultural and normative legacy in regards to how politics should be structured in Indonesia. The majority of Indonesians currently engaged in civil society and formal politics grew up during the Suharto regime, and for most middle aged and older Indonesian the regime was the context of their only formative experience (being too young to have experienced the Sukarno era, and already adults before the *reformasi* period began). It is no surprise then that many of the ideas and norms developed during the New Order regime remain stubbornly embedded within Indonesian society.

**National Organisation and the Military**

Any consideration of political organisation in Indonesia would be incomplete without noting the role of the military. Indonesia’s military has occupied a significant position within its history, and it is this history that in part explains the unique role that the military has been able to play for some time within Indonesian politics. It is important to remember that, like the United States, Indonesia had to fight for independence against a militarily superior foe (in the case of Indonesia it was the Dutch), and the origins of the Indonesian military lie in the idealised fighters of that struggle. The military would later play a key role in the counter-coup of 1965-1966, allowing it to portray ‘itself as the essential vanguard against the resurgence of social upheaval and mass violence’ (Eklof 2004, p. 46).

The war of independence saw the military emerge not only as a military force, but also as a political player. As Rinakit (2005, p. 6) observes:

> Since the struggle for independence, the military has been involved in Indonesian politics. The military’s perception of itself as a political force arose from the blurred distinction between its military and political functions during the revolutionary war against the Dutch. By its very nature, the struggle for independence was political as well as military.

Jenkins (1984, p. 1) similarly argues that:

> the notion that the army emerged from the people, that it fought for independence alongside the populace (even when the civilian political leaders had ‘surrendered’), and that it had participated extensively in nominally ‘civilian’ matters during that time was to give birth to the idea that the armed forces were justified in playing an extensive role in non-military affairs.

The role of the military within what are usually considered civilian affairs was formally outlined in the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (‘dual function’). *Dwifungsi* was first introduced by the General Nasution in a 1958 speech, and meant that the military is...
expected to perform a ‘avowedly double role both as defender of the state and as an active component of the social and political life of the state’ (Kingsbury 2003, p. 9).

With its active involvement in society and politics, the military provides an alternative example of national political organisation. During the Suharto regime (and to some extent still today) a significant portion of the military is organised as territorial units—that is, spread out throughout the archipelago (Aspinall 2005, p. 22). As Kingsbury (2003, p. 72-79) notes:

> About a third of the TNI is located throughout the country, placing units of soldiers at every level of society, paralleling or involved in each political tier of administration. The purpose of this placement is to ensure that a potentially alternative and politically engaged administrative structure to the government exists throughout the archipelago, one that is able to respond to the local crises until more highly trained troops from the centralised divisions can be transferred ... in each area in which it is present, the TNI influences and watches over social and political life.

The political role of the military, together with its reach into every section of Indonesian society, has had a profound impact on Indonesian society and political discourse. This is true, despite the partial withdrawal of the military from political affairs during the recent process of democratisation. As noted, most of those active in forming and running political parties grew up during the Suharto regime, and the form of political organisation possessed by the military would have provided a formative experience. Additionally, many current politicians have more obvious experience in the territorial structure of the military as former military personnel. Well known national politicians such as Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono were all former generals, while other ex-military figures have contested and won seats at the local and regional level. Notions of organisation and structure emerging from the military are thus familiar to many members of the political class.

It is interesting to note the potential example provided by the military role and structure for the geographical branch requirement. Significantly, the web of posts the military maintained under the territorial command structure is very similar to the organisation expectations contained within the branch requirement. While this research has not been able to find any explicit mention of the examples provided by the military for party regulation, it is not hard to believe that this prior example would have influenced

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29 The military has given up its seats in the national parliament, together with other reforms to its structure and modus operandi. It is important to note, however, that the military is still powerful and continues to possess influence in political and social affairs.
those considering forms of institutional engineering at the time. Additionally, one finding evident in the research was the extent to which political parties around Indonesia are active in local events and causes; for example, several political parties in Kupang, West Timor, provide ambulances for the local community. It appears, then, that political parties are taking over some of the functions that would have traditionally been performed by the military and by the Golkar party.

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that the party registration laws have provided a significant constraint on party development, and an incentive towards organising at a national level; yet, restricting our analysis to the formal institutional effects of party regulation risks ignoring many other informal institutional factors. Indonesia’s unique history has led to the development of norms of political organisation. These norms have their root in the nationalism movement and the war of independence, where regional resistance eventually informed a national independence movement. This did not mean that regional and ethnic identity became unimportant, but instead that the reasons for organising politically were largely shared across those cultural lines. This was arguably less the case once the process of state building began, where regional differences led to distrust and struggles for power. Yet debates regarding the nature of the Indonesian state were largely ideological and intertwined with notions of ethnic diversity. In the construction of the Indonesian state, and through the continued political and social role of the military, ideas of national political organisation are entrenched within Indonesian society. However, this does not necessarily mean that this will not change—as Schmidt (2008, p. 303) argues, ‘Norms are dynamic, intersubjective constructs rather than static structures’.

**Party System Nationalisation in Indonesia**

Having considered the geographical branch requirement together with the broader social and political context, it is time to consider how this impetus for national political organisation has influenced the level of nationalisation within the party system. Party system nationalisation describes the ‘extent to which parties have broad, national constituencies as opposed to constituencies that are primarily regional, local, or parochial in nature’ (Hicken 2009, p. 6). As Hicken argues (2009, p. 8):
The degree of nationalization communicates important information about the nature of political parties’ and politicians’ constituency. The more nationalized the party system, the larger or broader the constituency is likely to be, ceteris paribus. In other words, the nature of the groups and interests to whom parties respond very much depends on the extent to which parties garner votes nationally … or draw support from narrow subnational constituencies.

As a result, national political parties tend to aggregate the interests of diverse regional groups. This occurs not only because parties that focus on national issues are more likely to achieve a broad national share of the vote, but also because parties that receive a national share of votes are also prompted to try to maintain that support. For this reason, national political parties are often considered as ‘aggregative’ parties, while small regional parties can be called ‘articulative’ parties (see Janda 2005, p. 20). Janda (2005, p. 20) argues that:

Parties with broad social bases normally aggregate diverse interests rather than articulate specific ones. And parties normally differ from interest groups by aggregating rather than articulating interests. However, some parties … rate higher than others in interest articulation and lower in interest aggregation. Ethnic parties in particular are thought to articulate their ethnic interests ahead of societal concerns.

As I have argued in Chapter Four, voting data can provide a suitable means for measuring the spread of a party’s constituency for two reasons. Firstly, the spread of votes received by political parties indicates the extent to which they appeal to, connect with, or focus on different regions. A region whose population has little interest in a specific political party are unlikely to vote for that party in large numbers. Similarly, where political parties ignore or neglect a particular region, this is likely to have an effect on their ability to win votes in that region. In reality, the two cases are most likely to be connected—political parties who do not expect to be popular in a particular region are also less likely to put effort in to that region. This situation is quite common in the United States, for example, where both major political parties focus resources and effort in regions where they expect to be competitive, at the expense of ‘safe seats’ for the opposition where they see little hope.

Secondly, political parties are likely to be more responsive to regions in which they have large numbers of supporters. These supporters are, in effect, their constituency. A political party that wins all of its votes and seats in one specific region is likely to be more responsive to that region (and may be able to pursue specific policy goals that are popular or important in that region), while a party with a broad national constituency needs to appeal to that broad audience, and will likely need to consider
competing interests in making political decisions.\textsuperscript{30} For both of these reasons, analysing the spread of votes for political parties allows for a reasonable analysis of the extent to which they are national in nature.

Beyond individual political parties, this analysis can also provide insight into the nature of the party system as a whole. Individual political parties may differ in the extent to which they are relatively national or regional, but the nature of the party system as a whole depends on the interaction of these political parties. Potential party system dynamics might include, for instance, a system of many regional parties; many national parties; one or few national parties accompanied by a large number of regional parties; or a large number of national parties with a small number of regional parties. The relative size of political parties mixed with the differing levels of party system nationalisation means that many different patterns of party competition are possible. Beyond the nationalisation of individual political parties, this analysis will provide further detail regarding the nationalisation of the party system as a whole.

**Analysis**

Figure 5.8 outlines the results of the statistical analysis applied in this research, divided by political party for the 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 national legislative elections. A total party system wide figure is provided for each election, as well as an overall average for all parties over each election. Gaps in the data indicate that a political party did not yet exist in that election cycle. The result for the party *Partai Keadilan* (PK) is included in the 1999 space for PKS as the former is generally considered to be the precursor to the latter.

\begin{table}
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\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Parties} & \textbf{1999} & \textbf{2004} & \textbf{2009} & \textbf{2014} \\
\hline
PNI & 60\% & & & \\
\hline
PBB & 65\% & 59\% & 64\% & 67\% \\
\hline
PPP & 75\% & 71\% & 70\% & 74\% \\
\hline
PPDK & 46\% & & & \\
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\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{30} While this is the case, it is important to keep in mind a possible exception—where a political seat is considered to be ‘safe’, there may be an incentive for political parties to focus on ‘swing’ seats where there is a greater chance of voters changing their vote between different parties. While this is considered a political reality in two-party systems such as Australia and the US, there has as yet been little research into whether this trend occurs in Indonesia.
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<tr>
<td>PNBK</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>81%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>66%</td>
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<td>PPDI</td>
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<td>73%</td>
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<td>PKPB</td>
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<td>PKB</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td>PK/PKS</td>
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<td>PBR</td>
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<td>PDIP</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td>GOLKAR</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>74%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
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<td>83%</td>
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<td>PPRN</td>
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<td>Hanura</td>
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<td>PKNU</td>
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<td>PKP</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<td>Nasdem</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Figure 5.8 – Party System Nationalisation in Indonesia 1999-2014

It is worth restating what these results mean: a low level of nationalisation reflects an imbalance in the spread of vote share for a particular party, while a high score reflects consistent results over the whole nation. 0% would indicate, for example, that a party received its complete vote share in one province and no votes in any other region, while a score of 100% would indicate a party that received exactly the same percentage of votes in every electoral district. The result of PKB in 1999 of .50 reflects the fact...
that PKB received a very high share of votes in one region of Indonesia (East Java) but a relatively much lower share of the vote in other parts of Indonesia, particularly outside Java and Sumatra. The high result achieved by parties such as PD, Gerindra and Hanura represents almost identical vote shares in electorates around Indonesia, with only minor biases (such as PD achieving a slightly higher result in city regions than rural regions and better results in Sumatra and Western Java than other regions of Indonesia).

Based on this analysis, the level of nationalisation in Indonesia’s party system since reformasi has been relatively high. The lowest level of nationalisation was 68% in 2004, but even this result can be considered relatively high considering the diversity of Indonesian society. An aggregate party system score of 74% in both 1999 and 2009 compares to states such as Latvia (75%) and Estonia (77%) according to the analysis carried out by Boschler, while 79% in 2014 is comparable to the nationalisation score of Romania (79%) and Croatia (80%) in Boschler’s study. Unfortunately the only other national party systems that have been analysed using this measure thus far are in Eastern Europe, where quite different social, political and historical circumstances are present. Yet it is noteworthy that in 2014, the Indonesian party system is as national as that of Romania—a party system of only a few parties based mainly on ideological rather than regional cleavages. As a comparison, the party system of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Boschler’s study possessed a nationalisation score of 45%, mainly due to competition between a large number of smaller political parties based on ethnic Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian ethnic identities, with regional implications.

Secondly, while the overall level of nationalisation dropped between 1999 and 2004, there has since been a steady increase in 2009 and 2014. There were a large number of changes to both the electoral system and the party system between 1999 and 2004, including significant changes to the boundaries and size of electoral districts. As alterations to the electoral system have focused on consolidation rather than reform between 2004 and 2014, the party system has also become increasingly national. It should be noted that this increased nationalisation has occurred at the same time as a tightening of the branch requirement.

A closer inspection of individual political parties helps to understand changes in the overall nationalisation of the political party system. Firstly, it is important to note changes to the level of nationalisation of political parties that have taken part in all
four of the post-reformasi elections. These parties, with a couple of exceptions, have become increasingly national between 1999 and 2014. PKB, for example, was the least national party in 1999 with a nationalisation score of 50%. This was mainly due to the very high number of votes that PKB received in one province (East Java) and the relatively few votes received in other regions. In 1999, PKB won over 35 percent of all votes cast in East Java, but only 1.1 percent of the vote in North Sumatra, 1.6 percent of the vote in Bali and 8.8 percent of votes cast in South Kalimantan. In 2014, PKB achieved a result of 67%, representing a significant increase in its nationalisation. Changes to PKB’s spread of votes demonstrate why this occurred: in 2014 the party won 17 percent of votes cast in East Java, while winning 4 percent of the votes cast in North Sumatra, 1.9 percent of votes cast in Bali, and 11 percent of votes cast in South Kalimantan. The discrepancy between East Java and other regions remained, but a significant drop in PKB’s control of that province together with modest increases in its results in other regions led to a more national political party. It should be noted that this also meant a larger spread of PKB’s members of parliament from different regions in 2014 compared to 1999.

Some other 1999 participants saw similar nationalisation between 1999 and 2014. Golkar, for instance, jumped from 73% in 1999 to 81% in 2014, fuelled mainly by a better balance between results in Java compared to outer islands. In 1999 Golkar had won over 40 percent of votes cast in East Nusa Tenggara but only 13.3 percent of votes in Central Java. In 2014 Golkar won 19 percent of votes cast in East Nusa Tenggara and 14.1 percent of votes in Central Java. PKS increased from 59% to 78% between 1999 and 2014. While the party had by far its best results in West Java and West Sumatra in 1999, it barely competed in some other provinces. In East Nusa Tenggara, the party only won 1485 votes (.08 percent of the total votes). Overall, 53 percent of PK’s total votes were won just in Jakarta and West Java, and only 9.4 percent in Eastern Indonesia. By 2014 this situation had changed: PKS won just under 62,000 votes in East Nusa Tenggara, enough to achieve 2.6 percent of the total vote there. Its results in eastern Indonesia had also improved: 19.6 percent of PKS’s total votes were won in the eastern half of the country.

While several other political parties produced similar levels of nationalisation in 2014 as they did in 1999 (PAN, PBB, PPP), the case of PDIP deserves special attention. While PDIP increased their level of nationalisation between 2004 and 2014 from .72
to .76, the 1999 results stand out as the election in which PDIP achieved by far its most national result (.85). This appears to be due to the special position of PDIP at that time. More than any other party, PDIP, together with its leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, was seen in 1999 as a symbol of the *reformasi* movement. PDIP in that year won over 33 percent of the vote—a significant achievement considering the large numbers of political parties taking part. And this enthusiasm was relatively even across Indonesia: in 18 out of 27 provinces PDIP won between 20 percent and 40 percent of the vote. There were only a few exceptions: in Bali PDIP won almost 80 percent of the vote, while it won just under 7 percent of the vote in South Sulawesi. As the initial image of PDIP as the party of reform began to dissolve in 2004, PDIP’s vote share began to exhibit a more regional nature. PDIP’s 2004 share of the vote shrunk by a lesser percentage in provinces such as Yogyakarta (26.1 percent down from 35 percent) and Bali (52.5 percent down from 79 percent) than it did in provinces like Aceh (just over 4 percent compared to 11 percent in 1999) and West Java (15.5 percent compared to almost 33 percent in 1999). Having accounted for the surprising result of PDI-P in 1999, the results between 2004 and 2014 demonstrate a slight increase in nationalisation.

A second factor in the development of party system nationalisation in Indonesia is the emergence of new, highly national parties. The most notable of these include PD (2004), Hanura (2009), Gerindra (2009) and Nasdem (2014). These four parties are, by far, the largest of the new political parties to have emerged since the 2004 election, and they are also notable for following a similar pattern of development. Each of these parties is centred on the identity of a well-known leader—Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (PD), Wiranto (Hanura), Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra) and Surya Paloh (Nasdem). The first three of these figures are well known ex-generals, while Surya Paloh is a media tycoon. The way in which each of these parties was formed will be explored in more detail in chapter nine, but it is worth noting here that each party was built from the top down through the identity of its leader and significant financial resources, rather than from the bottom up through grassroots connections.

Each of these new political parties emerged with a relatively national spread of votes in their first elections. PD achieved a result of 73% in 2004 (roughly similar to PDIP), while Gerindra and Hanura were the most national political parties in their first election in 2009, with each achieving 83%. In its first election in 2014, Nasdem
achieved a nationalisation score of 79%. Examining results in individual districts quickly demonstrates the source of these high levels of nationalisation. In 2014, Gerindra achieved a nationalisation score of 88%, the highest of any party. The party won 11.8 percent of the national vote, but did not win less than 5 percent of the vote in any of the 77 voting districts. Its highest result was only just over 17 percent (in North Sumatra’s second electoral district). Put simply, Gerindra won close to the same percentage of votes in every electoral district as it did at the national level.

The influence of the highly national new parties is twofold. Firstly, their own level of nationalisation, together with their relative size (these four parties collectively won 34 percent of votes cast in 2014) has led to a higher overall nationalisation score. Secondly, as each of these new political parties have had success all around Indonesia, they have been responsible for some of the major losses of the older parties in their traditional strongholds. PD is a good example of this trend. In 1999 PKB had won 35 percent of votes cast in East Java and PDIP had won 79 percent of votes cast in Bali. But in the 2009 election, PD won 22 percent of the vote in East Java to PKB’s 12 percent, and PD also competed well in Bali, taking 17 percent of the votes there, while PDIP was reduced to 40 percent. The introduction of the other new parties has continued this trend. For example, the charts below demonstrate the impact of the introduction of these new parties on the hold Golkar and PDI-P had on the province of Bengkulu in 1999 compared to 2014. While in 1999 Golkar and PDIP had collectively won almost 60 percent of the vote in Bengkulu, nine parties had a relatively even share of the vote in 2014.

Figure 5.9 – Party Vote Share in Bengkulu 1999
Lastly, a number of political parties with uneven popularity have been effectively removed from the party system. PDS is the primary example. With nationalisation scores of 46% in 2004 and 43% in 2009, PDS was one of the party system’s most regionally biased political parties, mainly due to its poor results in regions with a heavier Islamic influence, and its better results in eastern Indonesia. The same factors that led to PDS’s low nationalisation score also made it difficult for the party to pass the most recent form of the branch requirement in 2014. A number of other minor political parties with previous low levels of nationalisation were barred from competing in 2014.

Overall, Indonesia’s party system clearly still exhibits regional characteristics. The contention that ‘most Indonesian political parties are quite regional in character, with concentrations of popularity in different areas’ (Sherlock 2005, p. 28), however, appears to be becoming less and less applicable over time. A combination of different factors – including the nationalisation of older parties and the emergence of new highly national parties have resulted in a party system that can be described as increasingly national in nature. Given the current institutional design and the existing nature of links between parties and society, the process of party system nationalisation is only likely to continue.
Summary

This chapter began by outlining the relevant laws, including their justification and the way that existing parties have sought to see the laws become even more restrictive (to the protest of smaller parties). Secondly, this chapter has noted that the laws should not be understood in isolation. There are several other important sources of norms regarding national political organisation, and these norms both provide justification for the laws and potentially influence the formation of political parties themselves. Finally, this chapter has analysed the nationalisation of Indonesia’s party system, arguing that it is surprisingly national, and increasingly so.

This analysis is, however, just the starting point. It may be clear that Indonesia possesses a quite national party system, and that the nationalisation of the party system can be understood both in terms of the formal institution of party law and the informal institutional environment. Yet, this raises very important questions that are central to this study: how do these national political parties representative a diverse nation-state? The following three chapters explore the nature of political representation in Indonesia with a focus on this important question.
CHAPTER SIX

Repertoires of Identity and Character

Introduction

Having established the existence of nationally organised political parties in Indonesia, this chapter now progresses to the next crucial step: considering the representative claims and repertoires that are frequently adopted in Indonesia during the period of study. This chapter begins this endeavour by considering repertoires based on notions of identity and character. Based on a comprehensive analysis of claim-making in Indonesia over the studied period, this chapter presents a number of common forms of claim-making (repertoires) based on these two conceptualisations of representation. Each section here provides examples of claims made in varying forms—from direct quotes made by candidates, to political advertisements, to gestures and policy decisions. Based on this analysis, this chapter argues that identity and character notions of representation have proven to be a fertile source of representative repertoires in Indonesia, and both political parties and individual claim-makers have engaged with these repertoires. Some very common repertoires have formed around ethnicity, cultural plurality, religiosity, class, nationalism and to some extent gender. This chapter continues to argue that these repertoires are some of the easiest to draw on for both political parties and individual claim-makers, but that this may also affect their relative success, as analysed in Chapter Eight.

Representative Claims Based on Identity and Character

Repertoires Based on Ethnic Identity

Representative claims based on ethnic or regional identity are a logical starting point for this study. After all, these are the type of claims that local political parties would be expected to have an advantage in making. Ethnicity does form the basis for a considerable number of representative claims based on both identity and character. Representative claims based on ethnic identity could be described in the following manner, based on Saward’s formula: The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or a candidate (Subject) as being descriptively representative of the Object (their...
vision of a cultural or ethnic community) with the audience being that cultural or ethnic community, and possibly other communities around Indonesia.

Making use of ethnic and regional symbols is a common basis for these claims. Political parties in local regions adopt and manipulate locally relevant symbols, which are embedded within the culture. This was evident in data collected from all around Indonesia, but also in the case study regions. In Padang, political advertisements for both candidates and political parties often feature important symbols of Minang identity, such as architecture, clothing and language. The PDIP Facebook page (PDIP Padang Pariaman 2013) for the region of Padang Pariaman, for example, features the symbol of the PDIP party (the bull) and the traditional housing of the Minang people from this region, which is itself based on the significance of the bull horns to the local culture. The image clearly attempts to connect the symbolism of the Minang architecture to that of the political party. A Partai Pembangunan Persatuan (PPP) political billboard in Padang declared that the party was involved in the act of ‘membangun nagari’ (building nagari). Nagari are the traditional political structure of the Minang ethnic community—another important local symbol of identity. Golkar in Bali similarly make use of Balinese cultural symbols on their own social media accounts—the official Facebook page for Golkar in Bali features a ceremonial figure from Balinese culture in front of a Balinese temple, with the Golkar flag also present in the background. The Facebook page for Golkar in Aceh similarly features local ethnic images: a traditional building, a mosque and women dressed in local attire. The image also features the Golkar emblem and a map of Aceh.

Candidates for office—be they political party candidates or independents—also often seek to make claims based on their ethnic identity. One Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) candidate, for instance, for the position of mayor of Padang, Mohammad Ichlas El Qudsi (better known by his nickname ‘Michel’), told reporters that he was born and raised in Padang, while his deputy candidate was also a local. He was quoted as stating ‘It is already time for us to work for our birthplace, the city of Padang’ (Haluan Harian 6 July 2013, p. 7). A Partai Pembangunan Persatuan (PPP) candidate for the DPRD in Padang, Fetris Oktrihardi, installed street posters that portrayed his Islamic credentials, but also featured the slogan Anak Nagari berbakti untuk Nagari (‘Children of the Nagari devoted to the Nagari’) (Haluan Harian 3 July 2013, p. 11). A similar claim based on ethnic identity was made by the al-tara organisation (and by implication the Golkar national DPR members, Azwir Dainy Tara, who setup the organisation)
when the group engaged in the cultural significant *mandi balimau* custom in the leadup to Ramadhan (Haluan Harian 10 July 2013). Claiming to be a *putra daerah* (son of the region) can carry significant importance.

Language can also be used as a means of making identity claims. Language is a common defining feature of regional communities in Indonesia, and for this reason it is a powerful symbol of regional identity. The use of local words or phrases is a common way of expressing affinity for the local culture, and the ability to use the local language when meeting with the public is also a powerful claim-making tool for politicians. One very common repertoire is for visiting national leaders to use words or phrases from the local language in their speeches to demonstrate respect for the culture. Local candidates also frequently use terms from the local language in their political advertisements. In Bogor, for example, Ifan Hariyanto, a PDIP candidate for the local parliament, used the Sundanese term *Kang* (term of address for a young male) in political advertisements on power line poles, shopfronts and free-standing banners. This is a subtle, but powerful, use of language to claim ‘Kang Ifan’ is a member of the local Sundanese community.

Cultural events are another medium through which parties and candidates can make identity claims. Political parties and candidates are often involved in local festivals and special events with cultural significance. This might include performances of local dance forms: the Golkar party chairman Aburizal Bakrie, for example, appeared at a performance of the Kecak dance in Bali before attending the declaration of his presidential bid on that island in June 2012. Similarly, the official PD website posted a press release in 2011 detailing the attendance of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also the head of the political party) to a local *adat*31 ceremony in Yogyakarta, Java (PD 2011). In the West Sumatran region of Sijunjun, national parliamentarian Poempida Hidayatulloh joined local regent Yuswir Arifin in observing a local Minang ceremony, before discussing the issue of the security of migrant workers (Haluan Harian 3 July 2013). In Kupang, the mayor of the city, Jonas Salean, sought to make amends for a mistake he had made by apologising according to the local culture (*adat*): ‘As the mayor, in the near future I will apologise according to local culture to the families … [who were affected by the mistake]’ (Victory News 29 June 2013). Religious practices can also overlap with ethnic cultural practices. In

31 The term *adat* refers to traditional customs.
many parts of Eastern Indonesia (including Kupang) local candidates seek to connect with local church communities, including speaking at church services and church-organised events.

These findings reflect those of some other scholars. Aspinall (2011, p. 297), for example, notes that:

Due to a proliferation of case studies of pilkada, we now have much evidence that the mobilization of ethnic symbols and appeals is pervasive in elections for local political office. Throughout the country, pilkada candidates routinely include adat performances and ceremonies in their campaigns, make speeches in local languages, wear traditional costumes, and otherwise invoke local traditions and cultures to increase their electability.

These repertoires are, of course, very public, and utilise ethnic and regional identity in a very minimal fashion. While this is the case, it is important to make two points. The first is that ethnicity undoubtedly plays a role in local elections, particularly in communities where ethnic tension is a significant local dynamic. In some regions, ethnic identity may feature strongly in a particular election or at a particular time. At a national level, one example is the response of PDIP to the perceived existence of a ‘black campaign’ against Jokowi when running for the Presidency in 2014. In a Twitter post, the official PDIP Twitter account declared that ‘The “black campaign” to attack Jokowi and to sideline minorities actually strengthened the minorities in their support for Jokowi’ (PDIP 2014b)32. But, broadly speaking, claims based on ethnic identity are mostly what Aspinall (2011, p. 297-298) terms ‘soft’, that is, claims that:

involve a soft form of ethnic mobilization that aims simply to provide candidates with claims to local authenticity and does not appeal to a sense of ethnic grievance nor even explicitly highlight ethnic difference.

Thus, repertoires of representation that directly focus on ethnic or regional identity are evident. They involve making use of local symbols such as clothing, language, cultural ceremonies and events and local religious organisations. These repertoires may be genuine in their use of appropriate symbols, but they are also commonly based on uncontroversial expressions of identity, instead of divisive ethnic issues. Candidates and parties may occasionally make claims that are more controversial or divisive, but this would be an exception to the well-established repertoires that currently exist. Both political parties and independent claim-makers appear well-versed in making claims

32 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.
based on ethnicity, with a strong focus on claiming recognition and respect towards the existence of local cultural symbols and identity.

**Kebhinnekaan and Pancasila Repertoires: Cultural Pluralism**

Related to the notion of ethnic identity, a very common form of claim-making relies on ideas surrounding cultural pluralism and Indonesia’s diversity. This repertoire could broadly be labelled the *Kebhinnekaan* repertoire, as the term *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (‘unity in diversity’) has come to symbolise interethnic and interfaith tolerance. Another term that could be appropriately used to identify this broad repertoire is *pancasila*. *Pancasila* is a secular ideology that was developed in the early stages of the Indonesia state and adopted by Suharto as the guiding principle of the government and all organisations. Indeed, during the Suharto era all organisations were forced to accept *pancasila* as their guiding ideology, and students and workers regularly received *pancasila* education. The ideology of *pancasila* is made up of five principles. While tolerance is not explicitly one of them, the fact that *pancasila* only requires belief in the one and only God (*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* in Indonesian) without reference to a specific religion, and also mentions the unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*) has led to the ideology being considered a statement about religious and ethnic pluralism and peace, and in contemporary Indonesia it is regularly invoked to make a statement about religious and ethnic tolerance. The form of the claim can be summarised as: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as having identity or character consistent with respect for the Object (Indonesia’s plural community) with the audience being both specific communities and the broader Indonesian community.*

This broad repertoire has very strong foundations within Indonesian society and culture. For example, Schlehe notes the way in which the popular Jakarta adventure park *Taman Mini* (Miniture park) has been used to present ‘decontextualised, essentialised and simplified regional cultures, and thereby [it serves] the celebration of nothing but romanticised and exoticised traditions, and [it] reproduces stereotypes while having a Javanese bias’ (Schlehe 2011, p. 156). The objective of this Suharto-era social project was to present an ideology of ‘multiculturalism as a collection of selected, unrelated ethnic entities manifested in *rumah adat* [ethnic housing]’ (Schlehe 2011, p. 167). There is, as a result, a strong connection between this notion of cultural diversity and a focus on nationalism and the unity of Indonesia.
CHAPTER SIX—REPERTOIRES OF IDENTITY AND CHARACTER

This repertoire emerged quite early in the reformasi period—in the 2004 election Prasetyawan argued that:

Yudhoyono, Megawati, and Jusuf Kalla expressed nationalist sentiments in a background of cultural diversity within a multicultural society. For example, the traditional use of the national flag as signifier of nationalism extended to folk songs from different ethnic groups as part of a broader national culture. It was Yudhoyono who strongly emphasized this multi-ethnic point with his SBY Presidenku (SBY my president) advertisement. (2012, p. 320)

The strong social embeddness of this notion has likely contributed to its strong influence in representative claim-making: all of Indonesia’s political parties regularly engage in claims regarding cultural and religious pluralism.

The most basic claims within this repertoire are based on candidate selection. There are many reasons for selecting particular candidates—studies of Indonesian politics have regularly noted the importance of patronage networks, and the financial cost of putting oneself forward for office. Yet these other factors should not prevent candidate selection from also being seen in itself as possessing elements of a representative claim. Firstly, at a basic level, Indonesia’s political parties generally recruit candidates for office that come from the regions that they are to represent. There are of course exceptions: some representatives are born in different parts of Indonesia, while there are also those that have not spent much time in the region that they are destined to represent. Yet most candidates for office are born or at least have spent most of their lives in the region that they are nominated to represent. This is particularly true of local level positions, where a candidate’s connection not only to the local community, but also to the local structures of political parties, is crucial (Fionna 2013, p. 182-186).

In some cases, this can mean balancing between different ethnic identities within the same region. In West Kalimantan, for instance, Tanasaldy (2012, p. 305) notes that political parties in Dayak-predominant districts ‘would usually put Dayak candidates at the top of their lists in order to attract more votes from the Dayaks’. Ethnic identity also often crosses over with religious identity. In the same region, for example, the PDIP political party put forward ten candidates for the national parliament. Of those, four candidates were Catholic, three Protestant and three Muslim. This is true not only of relatively plural parties like PDIP, but also of Islamic parties. PAN, for example, nominated four Hindu candidates of its nine candidates for the province of Bali in 2014, despite being an Islamic party. Of those candidates, the two highest-ranked on the party list were Hindu. These measures can form an important element in efforts to
diffuse social and political tension between different ethnic communities, but they are also a form of representative claim-making.

This same norm operates at other levels in Indonesia. It has become common to team candidates for the Presidential and vice-presidential positions that are mixed in their identity. The most common feature of this is teaming a Javanese candidate with a non-Javanese candidate—for example President SBY (from Java) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla (from South Sulawesi) for SBY’s first term in office (2004-2009). Similar patterns are evident at other executive levels: in some regions candidate teams for mayor and governor positions are mixed in terms of ethnicity or religion (or both), as Aspinall observes:

It has become a new political norm in ethnically diverse provinces and districts for ethnically diverse tickets to run for these positions. Thus, most tickets for the governorship and deputy governorship in West Kalimantan consist of a Malay paired with a Dayak, in West Nusa Tenggara they are Sasaks (the largest ethnic group in Lombok) paired with candidates from Bima in Sumbawa*, and so on. This pattern also applies in former conflict areas like Poso, Central Sulawesi (Diprose 2006), or Maluku where, in the gubernatorial elections of 2008, each candidate ran with a deputy from another ethnic and/or religious group. (2011, p. 303)

This is again apparent in West Kalimantan, where in local executive elections in the same province, the norm of nominating a district head from the Dayak community and a deputy from the Malay community began to emerge following reformasi (Tanasaldy 2012, p. 303). While political considerations may also impact the decision to select mixed teams of candidates, this should also be understood as a form of representative claim.

Parties also actively promote their plural credentials. An example from the official Twitter account for the Gerindra party reads: ‘This is the perspective of a Tionghoa person regarding why they want to work together with @Gerindra’ (Gerindra 2014a). The link provided in the tweet is to a Youtube video featuring the deputy governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (commonly known as Ahok) discussing his reasons for joining Gerindra as an Indonesian with a Chinese ethnic background. Another member of Gerindra, Budi Cahyono, was quoted arguing that:

Prabowo [the founder and chairman of Gerindra] is the only person who doesn’t look at you based on who you are, which ethnicity you are from, which culture you are from. Prabowo places importance on the nationalistic spirit of an individual. 33

(Tribunnews.com 8 April 2014)

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33 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.
Again, the link between cultural pluralism and nationalism is apparent here. Similar sentiments have been expressed by members of other political parties. One Golkar official declared that:

The Golkar party does not prioritise the winning of votes in the general election based on ethnicity … Golkar is a party based on pluralism. There is no reference to or prioritising of voters (based) on a specific ethnicity. (Republika.co.id 24 March 2014)

The secretary general of PKB made a similar announcement, declaring that ‘PKB does not have a specialisation in terms of voters from a particular ethnic group’\(^{34}\) (Republika.co.id 24 March 2014). He went on to point out that despite the traditional strength of the party in Madura, in the last election one seat was won in Papua and one in Maluku. These examples demonstrate that this repertoire can be based on both claims about individual political leaders (Prabowo) and political parties (Golkar and PKB), but the message itself is a well-established one.

Cultural pluralism, as a representative claim, is not only based on the representation of diverse ethnic or regional groups, but also religion. In 2013, PDS (a party with a Christian identity) announced that they were supporting the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), an Islamic political party. In response to the announcement, the head of the parliamentary wing of PAN claimed that:

The support of PDS towards PAN is evidence that PAN is an open party which supports diversity. And the support of PDS will further strengthen the identity of PAN as a party which represents this nation with all of its diversity. (itoday.co.id 10 May 2013)

Besides PAN, PKB has actively ‘courted Christians, notwithstanding the party’s distinct NU identity’ (Mietzner 2013, p. 149). In a similar gesture, the Christian deputy governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok), performed the ritual Islamic request for forgiveness during Ramadhan 2014. His statement included a number of Arabic terms, while his dress resembles that worn by Muslim men when attending prayers at a mosque\(^{35}\) (Viva.co.id 25 July 2014).

One other key example is PKS. PKS is considered to be one of the most Islamic parties in Indonesia; yet, approaching the 2004 and 2009 elections the party increasingly made claims about its inclusive nature (Aspinall & Fraenkel 2013, p. 21). The parties 2009

\(^{34}\) While the party makes this claim, the previous chapter has noted the extent to which PKB have won a far greater share of votes in Java than anywhere else in Indonesia.

\(^{35}\) Ahok was quoted as saying ‘*Kami, pemprov DKI minta maaf lahir batin, minal aidin wal faidzin, karena kami banyak kekhilafan*’. The words in bold are arabic and not Indonesian.
campaign featured political advertisements portraying different identities within the community, with the slogan *Partai Kita Semua* (‘a party for all of us’) central to the campaign. The ads feature a wide range of stereotypical cultural and ethnic depictions, while women in the advertisement are presented wearing the Muslim *jilbab* and also without, which in itself is symbolic of a divide between strict adherence to Islam and a more moderate expression of the faith (often characterised by the terms *Santri* and *Abangan* respectively). In 2014 this trend continued. In one PKS advertisement, uploaded to their YouTube channel and played on Indonesian TV, a group of four young Indonesians are meeting at a coffee shop. Two of the three women present are not wearing a *jilbab* and are wearing modern clothing, while the third is wearing what is clearly Islamic dress (PKS 7 March 2014). The party President, Anis Matta, frequently appears in public events and before the media in jeans and a plain white shirt rather than more Islamic-themed clothing. These acts clearly suggest representative claims aimed at changing their image from that of an exclusive Islamic organisation to that of an inclusive, catch-all party.

At a broader level though, the experience of PKS suggests that it is important for political parties to find a balance between different repertoires. By drawing exclusively on repertoires based on religious identity, PKS appeals to some audiences in Indonesia (pious and often city-dwelling Muslims) but alienates others (*Abangan* Muslims, often from rural regions and members of other religions). Drawing on a repertoire based on notions of cultural and religious diversity may have a broader appeal, but could also damage the party’s connection to its base audience. Political parties are no doubt aware of this balance, and arguably PKS is not the only party that deals with this issue. PDIP, for example, needs to balance between its support for plural causes (its opposition to religiously inspired pornography laws in 2008 is one example) while also ensuring that it appeals to more pious Muslim voters.

Claims based on the notion of cultural pluralism can also be made through political acts, though this has been rarer and thus cannot yet be considered a well-established repertoire. This is one form of claim that has been a part of the political emergence of Jokowi. The selection of Ahok, an ethnic Chinese Christian, as his running mate in Jakarta was likely not Jokowi’s choice alone, but is often perceived as representing a desire to prioritise ability over identity. This choice led to a significant backlash in the election campaign; the opposition candidate Fauzi Bowo focused his campaign on his local cultural and religious credentials (Miichi 2014), while some conservative Islamic
study groups in Jakarta asked their followers not to support the pair because of Ahok’s background. In a second well-known incident, Jokowi as governor of Jakarta defended the position of Susan Jasmine Zulkifli, an unelected CEO of a region in Jakarta. Local citizens had repeatedly protested the selection of Zulkifli on the grounds that she is Catholic, while most of the local citizens are Muslim. Such protests in contemporary Indonesia have often led to elected leaders giving in to pressure, but Jokowi has repeatedly refused to remove Zulkifli from office. In response to the issue, Jokowi declared that Zulkifli had ‘passed the selection process. She has the ability’ (Detik.com 27 September 2013; Tempo.co 28 September 2013). In a speech during the Jakarta gubernatorial campaign, Jokowi argued that:

> Every Indonesia citizen…has the right to progress this country … its not the time anymore for us to talk about which district you are from, which area you are from, which ethnicity you are from, which culture you are from…if we talk like that, our country will never progress … who can give solutions? Who will work through the problems … for a better Jakarta, a new Jakarta…that is what we need to choose (JBCyberTroops 2012)\(^\text{36}\).

Statements regarding respect for plurality and the avoidance of a narrow ethnic or religious focus are therefore a common repertoire, and are made not only through the choice of candidates as suggested above, but also in the form of public statements from party officials. This repertoire has spread through all the political parties, and is likely to have origins in Indonesia’s recent history. Periods of regional instability and the response of the Sukarno and Suharto regimes through propaganda, educational programs and formal regulations have no doubt established a norm of avoiding narrow ethnic appeals. The term SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar golongan—‘ethnicity, religion, race, intergroup’) is often used in public discourse to criticise cases in which ethnic, religious or cultural identity is used in a divisive way by politicians or public leaders. Statements regarding the avoidance of SARA appeals often refer to cases of conflict in the past and the importance of avoiding sensitive issues that could lead to violence or instability.

In regard to identity representative claims, claims based on cultural pluralism have formed perhaps the most well-established repertoire in Indonesia. All major political parties and many individual claim-makers have drawn on this repertoire when making representative claims. It should be noted, however, that like all representative claims, claims based on this repertoire are not beyond contention. The example of Taman Mini

\(^{36}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.
at the beginning of this section may be illustrative in this regard. While existing repertoires largely celebrate and proclaim a respect for diversity, like Taman Mini this repertoire is broadly based on the less controversial issues of diversity. Some in Indonesia may critique the commitment of parties and candidates to make performative claims based on these notions (for example, by protecting minorities when in office). The repertoire noted here relies mainly on the invocation of representative ideas based on identity and character, and as such is vulnerable to critique based on these limitations.

**Repertoires of Agama and Kepercayaan: Religion**

Claims regarding belief and religion can possess both elements of identity and character. On one hand, representative may seek to claim that they are similar to the audience in regards to their religious identity; on the other, they may seek to demonstrate their religious credentials, or their respect for religiosity (even where they possess a different religion to much of the audience). The form of the claim can be summarised as: *the maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or a candidate (Subject) as being representative based on an identity or character that includes the Object (their vision of religious identity) with the audience being that religious community, and possibly other communities around Indonesia.* The prominent position of religion within Indonesian society makes this an obvious source for representative claims.

During fieldwork in Padang and Kupang (just following Easter and before the Islamic holy month of Ramadhan), it was clear that political parties and candidates sought to make religious claims in connection to religious events. In Padang, posters all around the city wished local people a happy Ramadhan, while in Kupang, West Timor (a predominantly Christian region) billboards were used to wish local residents a happy Easter. Interestingly, this was also true of Islamic parties in the region; PKS, an Islamic party, also produced posters with an Easter message. Claims based on connection with religious holidays also appear on social media. Twitter, for instance, is regularly used to deliver these type of messages. In 2014 the Gerindra twitter account posted, ‘Good morning friends. Best wishes for the morning prayer for all followers of Islam who observe it’ (Gerindra 2014b), while PDIP tweeted on 20 April, 2014: ‘The Big Family of PDI-P wishes a Happy Easter 2014 for those who follow Christianity’ (PDIP 2014a). These are by no means isolated cases: this is a well-developed repertoire, albeit based on a very simple form of claim.
Religion is also infused within the identity of some parties. PKB, PKS, PAN and PPP all claim to have the basis of Islam, while the deregistered PDS party based itself on Christianity. Those political parties, which claim the more nationalistic and secular notion of Pancasila as their basis (PDIP, Golkar, PD, Gerindra, Hanura and Nasdem) also regularly emphasise their religious credentials. For example, one form of the PD official logo features the phrase *Nasionalis-Religius* (‘National-Religious’), suggesting that the party combines the two elements. PDIP, often though of as a party dominated by Abangan Muslims, has set up an Islamic wing called *Baitul Muslimin* (‘House of Muslims’) to ‘counter the party’s image as an assembly of fun-loving Abangan’ (Mietzner 2013, p. 15; also see Aspinall & Fraenkel 2013, p. 21). Claims about religious identity are not limited, therefore, to the officially religious parties – as Barton argues:

> All of the large parties made reference to Islam in their campaigns, some Islamic parties appealed primarily to observant Muslims but campaigned on secular principles, and some other Islamist parties campaigned for the application of sharia and the (eventual) achieving of an Islamic state. (2010, p. 474)

The use of symbols is an important means for making claims about the religious identity of a party. The term ‘Islam’ is not used in the names of any of the Islamic parties—terms such as prosperity, unity and development are much more popular—but all of these parties clearly define themselves as being ideologically based on Islam. In political discourse, leaders of these Islamic parties regularly refer to the religious basis of their parties. In the aftermath of the 2014 legislative election, for example, the PKS party issued a press release taking pride in the fact that parties based on Islam had achieved much better results than the predictions of analysts (PKS 2014). Advertisements and slogans are also used to claim the Islamic identity of these parties. Leading up to the 2014 election, PPP produced large billboards and online advertisements with the slogan ‘*rumah besar umat Islam*’ (‘the big house of followers of Islam’). On the PPP party website a schedule detailing times of the five daily prayers is prominently displayed—a feature present on the website for several other political parties as well (PPP 2014). Beyond the names of the parties, symbols are also an important form of claim-making. PKS and PBB, for example, use the Islamic symbol of the moon in their party logo, while PPP uses a well-known site in Mecca. This use of symbolism and language should not be dismissed as unimportant—in all of these cases, conscious representative claims are being made about the identity of the political party.
Individual politicians also draw on the use of religious dress to make representative claims regarding religion. Religious clothing such as the female headscarf (known as the *jilbab* in Indonesia) and the male cap (known as the *peci*\(^ {37} \)) are featured commonly in the way that Muslim candidates advertise themselves. Dahlan Iskan, for example, a candidate in the presidential primary conducted by *Partai Demokrat* for the 2014 presidential election, began his opening speech by using a joke to point out that his wife was wearing the *jilbab* (Mujid Sandra 2013). Candidate images on billboards and in newspapers regularly use religious dress—and this dress can be used to make a clear statement about the identity of the candidate. Female candidates who otherwise do not wear the *jilbab* may choose to wear it for political advertisements, while the mix of clothing for male candidates (ranging from suits, to informal clothing, to the *peci* and Islamic-styled shirts) is often a revealing claim about the identity of the candidate. Other forms of religious dress are also common in different areas—for example Hindu-themed clothing is common for candidates in the mostly Hindu province of Bali. Choice of clothing can be analysed in a number of ways, but it is important not to sideline the extent to which this choice carries clear claims of identity.

Religious gestures are often a component of events organised by parties as well as independent candidates. In Padang, for instance, one of the pairings seeking the position of mayor and deputy mayor, Emma Yohanna and Wahyu Iramana Putra, launched their campaign to the tune of Islamic music. Before the launch, they visited a local mosque for one of the five daily prayers, before listening to a religious speech at another mosque and providing a donation for the mosque (*Haluan Harian* 6 July 2013). A national MP from West Sumatra, Jeffrie Geovanie, took out a one page advertisement in *Haluan Harian*, to include a one page short essay with the title ‘Conduct your religion with humility’. Within the essay, Geovanie argues that ‘As a Muslim, I am often sad to see how religion is often used to force ones will on to others. The most recent example was when hundred of Shia had to be relocated from the land of their birth, just because of their beliefs. They are Muslims, just like me and many of us’ (*Haluan Harian* 11 July 2013). This advertisement is in many ways making claims about religious plurality and could be assessed under the previous heading—but it is also important to recognise that in claims like this, the religious identity of the

\(^{37}\) The *peci* conveys not only religious identity, but arguably also symbolic national identity.
political leader is also a part of the claim. In this one paragraph, Geovanie reminds reader twice that he is a Muslim.

Language can also form a particularly powerful form of religious claim-making. Particular forms of speech and phrases possess symbolic importance. At a general level, Indonesian politicians regularly use forms of speech which refer to God and religion. ‘Insyallah’ is a particularly common phrase which means ‘godwilling’. Interestingly, this phrase suggests that a particular outcome is not in the hands of the representative, but instead in God’s hands. As such, it is difficult to imagine claim-makers in some other contexts using this type of language (politicians, after all, like to suggest that they themselves are in control of outcomes!) Yet, in Indonesia, the use of this phrase is common. The current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has regularly used this term during national speeches and statements. Requests for prayers are also a common element of many political advertisements. A political ad for a candidate in Jembar (Ridwan Dedy Luviyana) for PPP, for example, requests ‘prayers and support’, while in Kupang, one candidate for the DPD, Piter Thinung Pitoby, also asks for prayers and blessings for his campaign (though the language use is notably Christian rather than Muslim) (VictoryNews 19 June 2013). Indra Dwipa, a deputy mayoral candidate in Padang, suggested at his campaign launch that the support they received was due to the direct will of Allah and asked for support and prayers from attending supporters (Haluan Harian 6 July 2013, p. 8).

To some extent, politicians and parties when in office have used that opportunity to implement laws which accord with religious identity. These decisions could be viewed as performative claims, but also overlap here with claims about identity. Indeed, implementing said policies may be one method of ‘proving’ religious identity. Miichi (2014, p. 59) notes that ‘more than fifty regencies/municipalities introduced local by-laws on prostitution, gambling, alcohol, reading the Koran, paying zakat (alms or religious tax), wearing Muslim clothing and the conduct of women in public.’ To an extent, the support of particular political parties for controversial religious legislation at the national level is also a source for religious claims. The anti-pornography laws, for example, that spent many years passing the DPR, were a fertile source for individual politicians and parties to make claims about their religious and moral identity (Sherlock 2008, p. 169-171).
Claims based on religious identity are common and over time common repertoires of claim-making have formed. Religious symbols are broadly used to make claims about the identity of a party, while religious gestures, ceremonies and the use of clothing and language all contribute to repertoires that are regularly drawn on by all of Indonesia’s political parties. There are, clearly, differences between political parties—with some political parties seeking to draw more heavily on religious, particularly Islamic identity claims. Yet, across the spectrum of religious-nationalist parties, all political parties in Indonesia make claims about religion. Well-established norms of connecting religion and politics are present, and should be understood as repertoires of representation.

**Repertoires Based on Gender**

Gender is one other key aspect of identity, and one that has been extensively explored in existing literature from other societies. This section argues that repertoires of gender identity do exist, but are so far not nearly as developed as the repertoires described above. In regards to representative claims based on gender, the form of the claim can be summarised as: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as having identity or character suited to representing the object (gender—either female or male) with the audience being primarily members of that gender, but also more broadly members of both genders.*

The selection of candidates, as well as making claims about ethnicity and plurality, can also be seen in some cases as an identity claim based on gender. As previously argued, the selection of candidates is based on a number of different factors and not only the making of representative claims. Yet this should not prevent us from viewing candidate selection as a form of claim-making in itself, and this claim may have various elements.

As Soetjipto and Adelina (2012, p. 1) have found in their excellent study of political parties and gender strategies, there was an increase in the number of women nominated and elected in 2009 compared to previous elections. 3,895 women stood as candidates for the national parliament in 2009, which is 34.7 per cent of the total number of candidates, and an increase from 32.2 per cent in 2004 (Soetjipto & Adelina 2012, p. 2). This resulted in women being elected to 18 per cent of the 550 seats in the national parliament, compared to 11 per cent in 2004 (Soetjipto & Adelina 2012, p. 2). These results, as Soetjipto and Adelina (2012, p. 2) point out, are still much too low, but the increase in both the nomination and election of female candidates is encouraging.
Beyond selection of female candidates, there are other ways in which candidates and parties can make claims based on notions of gender identity. Several political parties in Indonesia have promoted initiatives based on gender, such as events focusing on female leadership or wings of the parties that are supposed to focus on the empowerment of women. Parties and female candidates also make statements based on the notion of gender. For example Syamsidar, a candidate for local office in Central Jakarta in the 2014 election, argued that ‘I want to reduce the mortality rate for women and children along with an agenda of gender equality. The time has come for women to fight for the interests of their gender’ (Antara News 15 March 2014)\textsuperscript{38}. Sherisada Manaf, a PD member for local office in the province of Banten, argued in an opinion piece that:

> By becoming part of political life, it is hoped that women can decide their own destiny and not rely on men who have always been dominant in making all policy. The effect of the low participation of women has already provided many examples of policies that directly affect women but at this time still do not genuinely appreciate the potential of women\textsuperscript{39}.

While these type of claims are not common, they are evident. Like with most claims based on the identity representation of gender, there is an expected link between identity representation and performative representation present in these statements.

Repertoires based on masculine identity are arguably rarer, and perhaps more subtle. It is less well-understood; as Clark (2010, p. 145) notes, gender issues related to masculinity remain ‘unmasked’. In the context of the long-term and continued domination of politics by men, there is little need to rely on obvious claim-making based on masculine identity. However, it is worthwhile to consider how aspects of masculinity, and of identity traditionally attached to masculinity, can form the basis for claims. Some forms of character claim-making (for example ‘strength’ and a military background) are traditionally attached to notions of masculinity. The possible connections between notions of masculinity and the representation of identity are beyond the scope of this study, but it is important to be aware of the implicit ways in these can influence claim-making.

While representative claims based on gender do exist, these claims are not common enough yet to form a well-defined repertoire that is regularly drawn on. Given the recent focus on the quota for female representatives within branches and party...

\textsuperscript{38} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.

\textsuperscript{39} see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.
leadership, and similar quotas within other government institutions, it is conceivable that more well-established repertoires based on the descriptive representation of women will emerge within political parties. To some extent, this will depend on the reception of these type of claims within Indonesian society.

**Class, Merakyat and Kesederhanaan**

In many societies, class is a key form of identity that drives the construction of identity repertoires. This is particularly true of European societies and political systems, where class is clearly the main source of distinction between political parties. In Indonesia there is little apparent class distinction between political parties themselves, and as such we can expect that representative claims based on class are relatively less evident. Yet while they may be vague in nature, there are still a wide range of claims based on class. The form of the claim can be summarised as: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as having identity or character that represents the object (people of a particular class) with the audience being primarily members of that class, but also more broadly members of all classes.*

Where class is a source for identity claims in Indonesia, these claims are often vague. The term ‘rakyat’, which in Indonesian roughly translated to ‘the people’ is often employed to suggest an affinity or connection with everyday people. The verb ‘merakyat’ is also very often employed, meaning to ‘engage with the community’. This term is an important element of democratic representative claims discussed below, but it also connects with identity claims based on the notion of the rakyat. Both of these terms are common components of representative claims, from party slogans, billboards, newspaper advertisements, to symbolic acts.

In the last election, for instance, PAN adorned most of its advertisements with the term ‘merakyat’. An advertisement for a local PD candidate from West Sulawesi, Yakub SE, features several mentions of the term. The slogan ‘utamakan kepentingan rakyat’ (‘prioritising the interests of the people’) is featured in the top section of the advertisement, while the phrase ‘anak rakyat bisa!’ (‘a child of the people can do it!’) is also featured in the middle. Finally, the slogan ‘saya berpikir maka saya ada untuk rakyat...’ (‘I think therefore I am there for the people’) is present on the lower section. Similarly, in Bogor, a large billboard in the centre of the city declares ‘Kami rindu pemimpin sederhana yang berasal dari rakyat, didukung rakyat serta melayani...’
rakyat’ (‘we miss simple leaders who come from the people, are supported by the people and serve the people’).

Similar slogans can be found on thousands of advertisements all around Indonesia for candidates from various political parties and in different regions. In the Nagekeo district of Flores, for instance, a candidate for district head stated in a speech at a transport terminal that citizens should not be afraid to elect him and his deputy candidate, because:

we already are accustomed to the ups and downs of everyday life in the community. All of the problems of the community we already know and we will certainly work hard to overcome them. (VictoryNews 28 June 2013)40

Another very familiar repertoire for claiming to be part of the rakyat is the use of biographical data and stories that link to a candidate’s upbringing or childhood experiences. For more prominent national leaders, biographies have become a very common means for making claims about the candidate and their party. Many of these biographies are written by official or unofficial supporters of the candidate, and seek to highlight desirable information such as a poor background or a particular act of struggle or sacrifice. A particularly prominent example of this was the book SBY: Sang Demokrat (SBY: The Democrat) which was launched at the time of the 2004 election. In more recent times, films have also been used to make the same type of claim (though the extent to which this is a conscious claim on the part of the candidate may not always be clear). For local leaders who may not be able to afford published biographies, these stories can be shared in meetings with the public, speeches or in released biographical information. This repertoire rests on the same basis—the representative has a poor background, and thus is a better representative as a result.

One distinction that should be made is that representative claims regarding class are rarely made in an adversarial manner. The term rakyat is so broad that it does not clearly define who is being discussed. Representative claims in other societies that focus on class are often clear in defining who belongs to that class, and also politicise the ‘other’ (who the class struggle is against). Making representative claims based on the term rakyat rarely requires a clear definition of class conflict—the rakyat does not need to be opposed to a competing class. Even where a distinction is made, it remains

40 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.
vague. For example, a candidate for local office from the Nasdem party, Damini Emeli, argued:

> I want to bring prosperity to the people who have lived in poverty. As a result, Jakarta will not only be enjoyed by the people who have money, but also truly by the whole community. (AntaraNews 18 March 2014)\(^4^1\)

This statement does provide a sense of a competing class (people with money) but still provides little detail, and no sense of necessary policy trade-offs between different classes. As such, while an established repertoire has formed around claims of being part of and serving the *rakyat*, claim-makers who draw on this repertoire commonly invoke class in a very vague sense.

While the claims described above largely rely on an identity claim (‘I/we have a similar background to you’), a second well-developed repertoire seeks to make claims about the character of a representative, based on the notion of being *sederhana*—a term meaning ‘simple’ in Indonesian. Note that this particular claim is not unique to Indonesia: being simple or ‘down to earth’ is a representative claim that can be found in a wide range of polities and society. Yet, Indonesia’s specific historical and social setting means that this claim has particular power. A range of techniques for claiming *kesederhanaan* (simplicity) has arguably formed one of the most cohesive repertoires available to would-be representatives in Indonesia.

At a basic level, claims to being *sederhana* can be made through speech acts which draw attention to this quality. Consider for example how one of the most skilled proponents of this repertoire, Joko Widodo, speaks about his campaign:

> I’m just talking about the situation. I don’t have anything. A television station, I don’t have that. Newspapers and media, I don’t have that either. I think everyone knows … what I do have is volunteers, the community that supports me with spirit and tenacity. This is because what we want to build in the future are governance structures that are orientated to the community. That is all that I have (TribunNews 11 April 2014)\(^4^2\).

Here, there are clear connections with the identity claim of being part of the *rakyat*. Being perceived to have a simple or poor background may help to make character claims based on being *sederhana*. The billboard in Bogor, for example, which claimed the city missed simple candidates who were of the people, clearly attempts to make this link: people who are close to the *rakyat* are, as a result, lacking the detachment and fancy trappings of the political elite. While we can make a distinction between

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\(^4^1\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272.

\(^4^2\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 272-273.
these identity and character repertoires, it is clear that the two can be connected, and this may lead to more successful claim making. Claim-makers who cannot effectively fulfil the identity claim may also face challenges in their capability to make the character claim.

Besides speech acts, many attempts to draw on the repertoire of *kesederhanaan* are through gestures and actions. Again, Jokowi is one of the most well-known proponents of this form of claim. Early in his time as mayor of the city of Solo, Jokowi had already begun to make representative claims centred on the notion of being a ‘regular’ person. As Majeed argues, Jokowi:

knew the value of a strong public image, and he used symbolic gestures as part of his efforts to gain the respect and credibility he needed to push ahead with his planned reforms. Having built substantial wealth from his importing business, Jokowi donated his salary of 6.2 million rupiah (about $700) a month to the city. Besides the sacrifice of his salary, upon becoming mayor of Solo, Jokowi chose to fly economy class and use his predecessors official car rather than buying a new one. (Majeed 2012, p. 6)

Having begun to adopt this repertoire during his early career, Jokowi has continually drawn on it in making representative claims. As Governor of Jakarta, Jokowi personally purchased tickets for poorer patrons waiting outside a concert venue and then sat with them during the concert rather than with the VIP guests (*Kompas* 28 June 2013), and a few days later he refused to celebrate the city of Jakarta’s birthday in a private venue and did it instead amongst the public. In Jokowi’s words, ‘The birthday of Jakarta must give joy to the people. It can’t be celebrated in a fancy building. It has to be celebrated in public so every citizen can enjoy it’ (*Kompas* 30 June 2013). During the election for the position of governor of Jakarta, Jokowi famously rejected more formal dress to wear a checked red, white and black shirt (or *kotak-kotak* in Indonesian). As Fealy (2013, p. 108) notes, the wearing of the checked shirt by Jokowi and his deputy:

Set them apart from the other candidates who opted for more standard election attire, such as traditional ethnic or religious garb, safari suits, batik shirts, the black felt cap (*peci*) or casual business shirts and slacks. This design quickly became the emblem of their campaign.

During the campaign supporters of Jokowi also wore the checked shirt, and the phenomenon has now led to other candidates for elected office using the same shirt to try to connect themselves to Jokowi. A candidate in a local election explained his use of the shirt by stating that he and his deputy ‘share views similar to those of Pak Jokowi, and we decided to wear shirts identical to his for the West Java gubernatorial
election’—although they did at least work with designers to create a new pattern for the shirt! (*Jakarta Post* 13 November 2012)

While Jokowi is a very prominent (and thus far quite successful) example, similar gestures can also easily be found throughout the party system. Like Jokowi, the most common form of claim-making is to demonstrate that party members or candidates are simple and not above ‘regular’ people. In the campaign for the 2014 election, for example, a PKB candidate for the DPR in East Java, Arzeti Bilbina, spent time massaging the feet of bus passengers (*tempo.co* 19 March 2014). In a series of Twitter posts, Aburizal Bakrie sought to highlight the fact that he had used the form of public transport known as *Ojek* in Indonesia. *Ojek* are a flexible form of transport consisting simply of riders with motorbikes, and travellers hire them to get to a specific location. Importantly, *Ojek* are considered a common form of transport for lower and middle class Indonesians, while richer Indonesians are expected to have their own vehicle or take a taxi. In the Twitter posts, Bakrie wrote: ‘Thank God the political address earlier went well and many cadres turned up. It turns out my trip using *Ojek* was not wasted earlier :)’ (*Kompas.com* 17 August 2011)\(^{43}\). This was later followed by a second post (ostensibly in response to other tweeters), reading: ‘Many people are shocked that I use *Ojek*. Actually I often use *Ojek*. I wrote about it in my blog icalbakrie.com’. As this example and the ones above demonstrate, the use of an observable gesture (using *Ojek* or celebrating with the public) is often tied to a speech act which draws attention to the gesture, and seeks to attach meaning to the gesture.

In a similar claim, Ifan Haryanto, a PDIP candidate for local office in Bogor, rode a traditional *ontel* bike to submit his registration form to apply for office. According to the local media agency, *Antara*:

> his willingness to ride the traditional *ontel* bike to return the nomination form, according to Ifan, was a symbol to show his ideology and willingness to be on the side of the *wong cilik*\(^{44}\), who are the traditional supporters of the PDI-P party. (*Antara Bogor* 22 March 2013)\(^{45}\)

This claim presents both the individual politician and the party as the subjects of the claim.

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\(^{43}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.

\(^{44}\) *Wong cilik* literally means ‘unfortunate people’ and is a common term used to mean the poor or unempowered. In particular, this term regularly features in claims made by PDIP and its members.

\(^{45}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.
The same is true for the way in which PAN sought to highlight the attendance of leader Hatta Rajasa at a local community event in Central Java, in the lead up to the 2014 election. The following account of the event was made available on the party’s website and was relayed by several news sources:

The tradition of fishing is not an unusual activity for the local community. ‘This is for enjoyment and togetherness,’ explained the secretary general of the PAN parliamentary wing, Taufik Kurniawan, just after releasing a fish. According to him, PAN does not always think about serious and complex political issues. His party prefers to be together with the community. Being together, according to him, is a more effective way of strengthening friendship. The ceremonial releasing of the fish was directly observed by the chairman of the PAN parliamentary wing, Hatta Rajasa. He held a catfish that was approximately 60 centimetres long. Then it was released into the channel. Hatta was seen enjoying the competition. He recorded the event with his phone. Occasionally he smiled. (PAN 2014b)

Here, like in the above examples, it is clear that a character claim based on the notion of *kesederhanaan* is being made about PAN and Hatta Rajasa himself. The party, we are told, likes to be together with the community. This event, it is argued, is an example of that. The farming of fish, particularly *ikan lele* (catfish) is a very common activity in Indonesia that many people can relate to, though the practice is more common amongst poor and middle class Indonesians than upper-class citizens. There is, therefore, significant symbolism in PAN leader Hatta Rajasa holding a large catfish in his hands.

The above examples are but a snapshot of the well-established repertoire of *kesederhanaan* character claims. Would-be representatives repeatedly make these claims, and established means of doing so—such as biographies, stories or specific gestures—have clearly spread throughout the political system. Candidates seek to claim to be simple, and political parties generally seek to establish their connection to the ‘common man’.

**Kebersihan: Character Claims Regarding Corruption**

Besides being *sederhana*, one other important character claim that candidates and parties frequently make in Indonesia is that of being free of corruption. This is usually expressed through claims based on being *bersih* (clean). Corruption is a significant political issue in contemporary Indonesia, where the work of the anti-corruption commission (the KPK) and the media has highlighted the continuing prevalence of corruption, collusion and nepotism in politics (known as KKN in Indonesia – *Korupsi*,

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46 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.
**KAOSI and Nepotisme**). Hence, representative claims based on being clean of corruption are considered important.

Political parties have sought to incorporate cleanliness into the slogans and symbols of their party. One example of this was PKS in 2004; one key elements of their campaign was claims based on being *bersih*. The term itself appeared on the party’s official logo and was central to spoken claims made during the campaigning. Hilmy (2010, p. 124) notes that:

> The remarkable achievement of PKS in the 2004 elections is inseparable from its strategy in downplaying Islamic issues and instead articulating more popular and, importantly, more secular themes during the campaign. The theme Bersih dan Peduli (clean and caring) was turned in the more eye-catching slogan ‘Clean National Leadership from Corruption and Care for People’.

Besides PKS, all of Indonesia’s political parties have attempted to incorporate references to being *bersih* in their advertising. A number of posters in the case-study regions of Padang and Kupang included the term, or the related notion of being *anti-korupsi* (anti-corruption).

Besides political parties, the notion of *bersih* has also been regularly used by individual candidates in their campaigns. The adjective is often used for candidate posters: for example, Teuku Gandawan Xasir, a DPR candidate for Hanura in the 2014 election, uses three adjectives in the heading banner of one of his ads—*bersih*, *peduli* and *tegas* (clean, caring and determined). Within the text of his advertisement, Teuku explains why he is running: ‘An offer came from a party that was relatively clean in the cauldron of Indonesian politics. In the end I decided to try something greater’

> Another candidate from PDIP, Masinton Pasaribu, lists one of his two goals in office as ‘a clean parliament (clean from the practice of bribery and corruption)’ (Global Indonesian Voices 2014). Speech acts are also another very common way of making claims about cleanliness. For example, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is quoted in a press release from his party (PD) as saying:

> I hear about the culture of money politics that is still persisting. Going forward, let us continue to develop an improvement in the politics of Indonesia, we should make sure that the voice of the people comes from their heart, not from another cause or reason. (*Jpnn.com* 17 April 2014)

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47 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.
48 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.
Character claims based on cleanliness are common and relatively simple to make. Their effect however, depends on the ability of representatives to also draw on performative repertoires. Maintaining a record unblemished by corruption scandals is important, as are decision that are seen as fulfilling a pledge to be anti-corruption. In this regard, it is revealing to chart the representative claims made by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on this issue between his first and second terms. During his first term, his perceived support for the anti-corruption commission, and decisions not to intervene in particular cases (notably a case involving his father-in-law) led to increased political capital on the issues. In his second term, the continued revelations of high-ranking individuals within his political party being involved in corruption scandals had a negative impact. The same is true of the party system overall—character claims based on cleanliness have formed a well-developed repertoire for representatives, yet this has not prevented the party system from being perceived as corrupt by the public. In this regard, character claims based on this issue are clearly related to, and indeed heavily dependent on, performative claims. This will be explored in the following chapter.

**Repertoires Based on Nationalism**

One final important source for character claims is nationalism. Claims based on nationalism take the form of: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as possessing important characteristics that demonstrate a commitment to the object (nationalism) with the audience being the broader Indonesian society.*

Nationalism is a very important ideological source of claim-making, and political parties and candidates make a variety of different claims based on the notion of nationalism. There are several key reasons for the power of this repertoire. The first is Indonesia’s history: having to fight for independence against foreign colonisation has had a particular powerful influence on Indonesian society, as has a history of foreign intervention in Indonesia’s domestic affairs. Many powerful symbols emerged during these periods of struggle, and arguably the Indonesian word for struggle—*perjuangan*—also owes its important symbolic value to this history. Secondly, as detailed in Chapter Five, nation-building has been a significant focus during Indonesia’s short history as an independent nation, and this project has also led to the creation and development important symbols.
The Indonesian flag, like the flags of many nations, is a source of national identity, and features strongly in the way that some political parties and candidates make claims. The Indonesian flag commonly appears in rallies and advertisements, often in conjunction with other symbols of the party. The colours of the flag (red and white) are also used in a number of party logos. Hanura and Gerinda, two relatively new nationalist parties, use mainly red and white in their logos. PDIP recently changed their party symbol from a red and black design in 2009, to a red, black and white design in 2014. The font of the party name also changed from black in 2009 to white in 2014. In both case-study regions, political parties frequently used alternating party flags and Indonesian flags in streets and on party headquarters.

Parties and party figures have also drawn on nationalist sentiment in statements, documents and speeches. Political party platforms (presented in vision and mission statements) regularly focus on the importance of the independence (kemandirian) and sovereignty (kedaulatan) of Indonesia. PPP, for example, in their mission statement, focus on establishing ‘the independence of the community and national economy of Indonesia’\(^{49}\) while also:

> developing a foreign policy which is free and active, in the sense that Indonesia is active in promoting world peace and opposing all forms of colonisation, rejecting dependence on all foreign players which can reduce the sovereignty of Indonesia.\(^{50}\) (PPP 2013)

Similar sentiments can be found in the official documents of other parties, while politicians have also used the threat of foreign intervention or economic liberalism to makes claims about their commitment to Indonesia’s sovereignty. Indonesia’s history of foreign intervention, from the colonisation of the Dutch to the role played by the IMF following the 1997 Asian economic crisis, provides fertile conditions for this type of claim.

Other symbols also carry ideological importance, for example pancakesila and the mythical garuda. Pancasila has been addressed in the previous section as a source of identity claims, but also carries meaning as a symbolically important representation of the Indonesian state. Use of the term pancakesila not only suggests alignment to ideas about cultural plurality, but also the unity and identity of the Indonesian state. The

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\(^{49}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.

\(^{50}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 273.
garuda, a mythical half-eagle, half-lion creature also possesses national significance, and is often featured with a shield featuring the five lessons of pancakesila.

Significantly, the term pancakesila has also been employed in the names of many political parties such as the pancakesila patriot party (though none of the surviving parties in 2014). Other terms related to pancakesila and nationalism have inspired the names of political parties, including: Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme, Partai Republik Nusantara, Partai Merdeka, Partai Pemersatu Bangsa, Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan Bersatu, Partai Matahari Bangsa, Partai Republiku Indonesia, Partai Bhinneka Indonesia, Partai Kedaulatan, Partai Nusantara Kedaulatan Rakyat Indonesia, and Partai Indonesia Tanah Air Kita. The use of terms such as republik (republic), merdeka (independence), bangsa (nation), marhaenisme (a philosophy made famous by nationalist leader Sukarno), Bhinneka (a reference to the national motto), Nusantara (the archipelago), and kedaulatan (sovereignty) are all references to notions of nation and nationalism. The use of Indonesian terms featuring the root word ‘satu’ (‘one’—ie. bersatu, pemersatu, ‘unity’) is also common.

Beyond symbols and names, statements and acts can also present character claims based on nationalism. One common example is references to heroes of the nationalist movement. The most well-known of these heroes is Sukarno, Indonesia’s foremost independence leader and first president. The legacy of Sukarno is drawn on most strongly by his daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri’s political party, PDIP, though politicians from many other political parties frequently make claims based on the legacy of Suharto. A PDIP advertisement from 2014, for instance, clearly seeks to connect Sukarno to the contemporary political party. On the advertisement Sukarno stands beside his daughter with a reference to the 41 years since his death at the top of the poster. A 2014 interview with Megawati’s daughter, Puan, also revealed a significant focus on the legacy of Sukarno. According to Puan:

Ibu Megawati said three years ago that 2014 would be a decisive point for the PDI-P. That’s why we’ve worked very hard over the last three years to win the legislative election. And the results do show. Alhamdulillah [Thank God] there are still descendants of Sukarno in politics (The Jakarta Post April 15 2014).

When asked about the possibility of someone outside the family leading the PDIP, Puan went on to argue that:

It’s not a matter of being willing or unwilling but, rather, how to continue the promotion of Sukarno’s ideology in this election year and beyond … We do hope that
the one holding the mandate has the same confidence in [Sukarno’s ideology] as we do.

The symbolic importance placed on the legacy of Suharto was again evident in a peculiar statement by the deputy secretary general of PDIP, Achmad Basarah, when he stated that it was important that Jokowi’s vice presidential candidate was announced on a Friday, as that was the same day of the week in which Sukarno had declared independence on 17 August 1945 (Kompas 24 April 2014). Statements made during interviews, as the theoretical discussion presented earlier in the study has made clear, are not idle words. They can be analysed, like many other political acts, as representative claims.

Political parties and their members have in some cases also sought to make nationalist representative claims in response to sensitive international issues that contain nationalist components. One example is an incident in August 2010, when several Indonesian officials from the ministry for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries were detained by the Malaysian marine police. Tomsa notes that:

PDI–P legislators were particularly outspoken in their criticism, but Golkar, too, sensed an opportunity to score political points by fanning populist sentiment. Several Golkar legislators expressed their support for the parliament to invoke its right to call in the president for questioning (interpelasi, interpellation). On 30 August, party chair Aburizal Bakrie announced that he would seek clarification from the government about the incident. The following day, Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita of Golkar’s parliamentary faction told the press that all but one of Golkar’s 107 DPR members had agreed to call the government in for questioning. (2010, p. 315-316)

Similarly, during the tension caused by the spying scandal between Indonesian and Australia, party politicians also sought to make claims based on the notion of nationalism. Examples like this demonstrate the power that nationalism still possesses as a source for claims – and these claims can have distinct implications for Indonesian foreign policy.

**Summary**

A range of representative claims are made based on the notions of identity and character representation. By the period that is the focus of this research, a number of these methods of claim-making had formed into quite well-established repertoires that are evident throughout the party system broadly. Overall many of these claims are easy to make—they require only that the representative identifies the key cultural or social concept (cleanliness, ethnicity, religiosity, and so on) and perform speech acts,
gestures or make decisions that invoke this concept. It is not difficult to observe, for example, the deliberate invocation of a representative repertoire by Aburizal Bakrie in his clumsy mention of his use of *Ojek*. Importantly, it is clear that the majority of these forms of claim-making include both parties and candidates as the subject of the claim. In some cases, individual representatives make claims about themselves, while in others they make them about their parties. Parties, through social media, websites, press releases and their decision-making also make claims about themselves. It is clear from the material presented in this chapter that notions of identity and character have proved a fertile source of representative claims within Indonesia’s party system. The next chapter considers the way in which notions of performative and democratic engagement have informed representative practices.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Repertoires of Performance and Democratic Engagement

Introduction

Besides claims based on identity and character, the other most common forms of representative claim-making are based on performance and democratic engagement. Performative claims focus on policy and political decisions—either decisions that have already been made, or decisions that will be made in the future. While there may be a tendency to focus on policy and political decisions as the real ‘substance’ of political leadership, it is important to note that claim-making is still important: claim-makers must make claims about what they have achieved or plan to achieve, and these claims are always contested.

Democratic engagement, as has been argued in Chapter Two, is an important addition to our understanding of notions of political representation. While related to performance, claims based on this notion are unique—they seek to present the candidate as providing opportunities for citizens to engage with the political system. This chapter considers the representative repertoires in Indonesia that rest on these two notions. It is argued that while claims are made based on these notions, these claims mostly place the individual as the subject of the claim, rather than political parties. As such, individual claim-makers have been much more successful in drawing on these repertoires than political parties.

Repertoires of Performance

Janji Politik—Political Promises as Substantive Claims

Promises or commitments are a common form of claim making in most political systems, and this is also true of Indonesia. Yet the way in which performative claims are made in Indonesia is also influenced by contextual factors such as the unique interests of the community. These types of claims take the form of: The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as having understanding and planning to act on the interests of the object (the community with that interest) with the audience being those affected by that decision specifically, and the audience generally.
The most basic form of political promise is the *Visi* and *Misi* (‘Vision and Mission’) statement, which are almost universal amongst political and social organisations in Indonesia. Indeed, political representatives, including parties and individual candidates, are required by law to possess and make public a vision and mission statement. These statements are usually prominently displayed on political advertisements, websites and referred to during public statements and media interviews. It is common for these statements to be both ambitious and lacking in detail, while the vision and mission statements of the political parties are almost indistinguishable from each other. PAN, for example, provide the following vision:

> The realisation of PAN as the most advanced political party in realising a civil society which is fair and prosperous, good, clean governance in a democratic and sovereign state of Indonesia, with the blessing of Allah, the all-powerful. (PAN 2014a)

The lofty and vague goals mentioned by PAN resemble those in PD’s vision statement:

> The Democrat Party, together with the wider community will play a role in forming a lofty desire with the people of Indonesia to reach enlightenment in national life which is free, united, sovereign, fair and prosperous, highly honouring the spirit of nationalism, humanism and internationalism, based on loyalty to the all-powerful God in a new world order which is peaceful, democratic and prosperous. (PD 2014a)

Presidential candidates also provide these statements as a part of their campaign. In the lead up to the 2014 presidential election, both presidential/vice-presidential teams (*Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla* and *Prabowo-Hatta*) put forward vision and mission statements. While there were some minor differences in these documents, the vague statements made focused on many common themes, such as social justice and prosperity, independence and sovereignty, and competitiveness for Indonesian industry.

The extent to which vision and mission statements have formed a very well-known repertoire is evident in the degree to which this practice is considered an essential component of a campaign (rather than just a document required to pass the regulation). Indeed, ceremonies are often carried out to present these statements to the public and the media. One example of this can be found in the lead-up to the election of regent (*bupati*) for the region of Nagakeo in NTT, where seven sets of candidates for the position attended a special session of the local legislature in order to ‘launch’ their...
vision and mission statements (VictoryNews 24 June 2013). These statements may be quite vague in detail, yet they are very common repertoire that is expected of both political parties and candidates.

While these claims might be vague in nature, some political parties have published more substantial accounts of their policies. PD for example, have made available a 56 page document detailing poverty in Indonesia and their approach to alleviating poverty. The policies detailed in the document are in various stages of implementation—some have been implemented while others are still in process. One page of the document states nine programs that are designed to ‘increase the prosperity of the people’. The document is more detailed than the visi and misi statements described above, with entries including: ‘4. Capital for as many as 3,340 communities of fisherman’ and ‘9. Rice for poor citizens and semi-poor citizens costing up to 15.6 trillion rupiah’ (PD 2014b). At the top of the page, above the list of programs, is a photo of the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The claim here appears clear: the president’s government are representing the community (particularly the poor) well because of the implementation of these policies. As our discussion of claim-making argues, the use of the president’s photo is not accidental, but instead a very conscious aspect of the claim.

Golkar, similarly, have presented a more detailed four-page document titled ‘Vision for Indonesia 2045: A Prosperous Nation’ (Partai Golkar 2014). This document presents detailed economic and social targets for each ten-year period after 2015, including life expectancy, percentage of tertiary-qualified citizens and alternative energy targets. Again, this document clearly ties claims of performative representation to the identity of the party leader, Aburizal Bakrie. The first line of the document notes that Bakrie has been developing ‘a blueprint for a prosperous Indonesia since 2010. Now that blueprint is becoming a plan for Golkar approaching Indonesia 2045’ (Partai Golkar 2014, p. 1). A photo of Bakrie is featured on three of the four pages of the document, and includes a number of supposed direct quotes from Bakrie. The document states that:

Beginning with the desire of Aburizal Bakrie (ARB) to make Indonesia an esteemed, respected and dignified nation, the Golkar party has provided a number of steps to realise the prosperity of Indonesia in the future through the agenda ‘A Prosperous Indonesia 2045’ … The need for a vision for a future Indonesia approaching the 100

54 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 274.
year anniversary of Independence has been posed by Aburizal Bakrie in 2010 and 2011 when celebrating the birthday of the Golkar party. ‘In that way we are realising Golkar as the party of ideas’ said Aburizal Bakrie at the time (Partai Golkar 2014, p. 3).

To some extent it is also common for candidates to make general claims based on promises of performative achievement. Some of these claims can be very vague in nature—an advertisement for the candidate Andre Rosiade in Padang, for instance, declares ‘Untuk Kota Padang yang Lebih Baik’ (‘For a better Padang’). These types of general claims about development or improvement are very common and regularly adorn posters for both candidates and parties. But other claims are more detailed. Again, in Padang, two candidates running for the position of mayor and deputy mayor, Kandris Asin and Indra Dwipa, promised to implement cheap housing for workers, farmers, fishermen, the disabled, and other less fortunate groups. They also promised to ensure that children from poor households could obtain a degree by providing education funding from the city and from third party organisations (Haluan Harian July 8 2013). Another pair of candidates, Ibrahim and Nardi Gusman, promised free education for students from primary school until the end of high school, free healthcare including medication, and an end to unemployment in the city of Padang (Haluan Harian July 6 2013, p. 6). Emma Yohanna, another mayoral candidate in Padang, puts forward five pillars: better and cleaner governance, optimisation of local natural resources, development of the quality of human resources, the creation of peace and order and the assurance of harmony between local cultural leaders (Haluan Harian July 6 2013, p. 3). These are lofty promises given the limited budget of a small city like Padang, and the claim itself does not include details about how these promises would be funded. Yet statements such as this are common from both independent candidates and political parties.

**Performance Claims Based on Completed Action**

Completed actions can also form the basis for claims, though this is undoubtedly rarer than promises or commitments. These types of claims take the form of: The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as having made decisions or carried out actions that are in the interest of the object (the community with that

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55 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 274.
interest) with the audience being those affected by that decision specifically, and the audience generally.

**Party Performance**

Claims made based on the notion of performance can take many forms. In the context of Indonesia, it is important to consider the role of political parties in directly providing services, goods and cash to local leaders and communities. This repertoire is undoubtedly better developed and more commonly drawn on than performative claims based on policy delivery. A number of terms are used by Indonesians and outside observers to describe these practices—for instance *politik uang* (money politics), patronage, or *dana aspirasi* (aspiration funds) (Aspinall and Fraenkel 2013, p. 29). These practices have also been studied in some depth, including during the most recent legislative election. But it is important to understand that while we can seek to understand the dynamics of these practices and present normative arguments regarding the connection between these practices and democracy, they can also be broadly understood as representative claims. The politician or party in this instance is seeking to prove that they are good representatives because they can provide for their supporters and members.

A broad repertoire based on political parties acting as providers has strong historical roots in recent Indonesian society. During the New Order period, Suharto’s electoral vehicle, Golkar established a position within Indonesian society as a provider of services, positions and goods. Ward (1974, p. 83) notes, for instance, that in the early years of the Suharto regime Golkar had established itself as the ‘greatest source of patronage, greatest provider of facilities, greatest distributor of offices’ and the ‘greatest procurer and supplier of finance’. Golkar’s appeal was not tied to any grassroots demand, as Tomsa (2008, p. 37) notes, but instead to ‘the dispensation of patronage as the party offered lucrative jobs in the bureaucracy and other affiliated organizations’. Golkar also ‘…routinely misused state resources in electoral campaigns’ (Manikas & Emiling 2003, p. 82). Even after Suharto had stepped down and party politics had become more competitive, the patron-client practices that Golkar relied on at the local level continued to form a ‘defining feature of Golkar’s party apparatus’ (Tomsa 2008, p. 44). The historical and contemporary role of Golkar has also arguably influenced the practices of other political parties who must compete with Golkar’s level of organisation and its traditional influence in many regions around Indonesia.
These claims are certainly evident during election times, where political parties often use the provision of goods to attract supporters to their events and rallies. Often this can take the form of a free meal or t-shirt. In one example, PD handed out free mobile phones to some supporters at one of its rallies in the lead-up to the 2014 election (Republika.co.id 22 March 2014). In a slightly more unusual case in Palu, the Gerindra party provided free circumcisions to approximately 217 local boys and free cataract surgery to approximately 27 other locals. In a press release, the Gerindra party website for the region stated that ‘of course all of these health services did not need to be paid for [by the patients] because they were bundled in with celebrations of Gerindra’s sixth birthday’ (Gerindra Sulawesi Tengah 2014)56. These practices are very common during election times and all political parties and many candidates engage in them. Aspinall and Fraenkel (2013, p. 30-31) observe that:

Anecdotal evidence abounds of individual voters being offered direct inducements: envelopes full of cash, or rice, sarongs, prayer outfits or similar materials, by candidate’s so-called ‘success teams’ (tim sukses). There is some polling evidence to suggest that a large proportion of voters (as high as 30%) are offered inducements in this way and that a sufficient proportion of them report being swayed by such offers to provide a margin of victory in many legislative and executive races.

While this particular well-known (and critiqued) repertoire is most common at election times, there are examples of claims outside of election times. The provision of services and funds by political parties was clearly a common practice in the case study region of Kupang, West Timor. One case that emerged in the research was the Kupang office of then Golkar treasurer and parliamentarian Setya Novanto57. This Member of Parliament established the Novanto centre in Kupang, which exists outside the normal hierarchical structure of the Golkar party. A member of Setya Novanto’s staff explained to the researcher that the centre was a residence for Novanto when he was in Kupang, but also constituted a point at which Novanto could engage with the community and hear their aspirations (mendengar aspirasi). The centre also featured a mobile library vehicle, complete with images of Novanto and Golkar party colours and logos. In Kupang, political parties also offer ambulance services, filling a community need while ensuring that citizens know which political party has come to their aide. In Padang, another Golkar national MP, Azwir Dainy Tara, has made similar claims through his establishment of the organisation known as ‘Al-tara’. This

56 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 274.
57 At the time of writing Setya Novanto had been reelected with the second most votes in his electoral district and was appointed as speaker of the house (ketua DPR).
organisation claims to provide a number of services directly to the community, such as handing out assistance to poor families during Ramadhan and providing disaster relief (Haluan Harian 10 July 2013; Al-tara Website 2014). Azwir Dainy Tara described the handout’s: ‘Although this assistance is not a lot, at least it can reduce the burden on the community that is here, especially since there are many who work with cleaning services whose wages are below the minimum wage’ (Haluan Harian 10 July 2013). Notably, in both of these cases the identity of the individual is much more prominent than the party they represent, and the infrastructure they have organised bypasses the regular structure of the party. This in itself points to the ongoing process of innovation in the making of claims.

Hamayotsu (2011, p. 981) notes that one of the key reasons for the emergence of the PKS in 2004 was related to the direct provision of services to the public:

As the party has become involved in competitive and expensive electoral politics, PKS has increasingly emphasized welfare services to recruit and mobilize supporters. The provision of welfare services such as religious schooling and health care was packaged in ‘Islamic’ terms as an essential component of the dakwah movement to build a caring, just society. These comprehensive programs have expanded for the most part in urban areas but also have grown, slowly, in rural areas to expand community networks.

While these ‘direct’ performative acts vary significant from province to province (the lack of infrastructure in some provinces may open opportunities for political parties to fill a community need at a low cost), it does appear that these repertoires spread between parties in particular locations. These findings are consistent with those of Ulla Fiona (2013, p. 99-109) in Malang, who notes that political parties like Golkar were engaged in receiving and fulfilling requests from the community for services and facilities, including finding jobs for some party supporters and providing kindergarten and primary school services. Indeed, as mentioned previously Golkar has historically established a reputation in particular regions for this type of claim—and its success in continuing to draw on this repertoire can explain some of its ability to recover following the fall of Suharto in 1998. This repertoire, however, as this section argues, is not isolated to Golkar, but has instead informed practices within all political parties.

These claims differ to claims based on policy delivery because the services or goods are provided directly by the political party, rather than by policy provision by the state. Due to the prominence of the candidate or political party in these claims, it is relatively easier to connect the benefit to the representative. This does not mean that political
parties acting through government do not try to make the same claim. Indeed, one of
the most significant representative claims of the past 15 years was the provision of
economic assistance to poor families around Indonesia leading up to the 2009 election.
Having reduced subsidies on oil, the president (and by association, PD) offered a direct
cash assistance program for low-income families (Sherlock 2009, p. 15-16). Mietzner
(2009, p. 4) observed that:

The dramatic turnaround in Yudhoyono’s electoral fortunes was not due to a sudden
change in his political image or personal style… Rather, it was the introduction of
massive cash programs for the poor that triggered Yudhoyono’s meteoric rise from
electoral underdog to almost unassailable frontrunner. Between June 2008 and April
2009, the government spent approximately US$2 billion on compensation payments
for increased fuel prices, schooling allowances and micro-credit programs. As a
result, Yudhoyono’s popularity skyrocketed from 25 per cent in June 2008 to 50.3 per
cent in February 2009, and PD’s support surged to 24.3 per cent in the same time-
frame.

This policy was enacted through government policy (and not directly through the
political party) but PD and the president still attempted to connect their identity to the
benefits of the program.

While representative repertoires based on the practice of providing goods and services
are influential in Indonesia, they arguably also possess significant limitations. Firstly,
many of these claims target party members and officials by seeking to demonstrate
that a political party can provide opportunities and financial support if they remain
loyal to the political party. As such, the breadth of these claims is limited with the
broader community. Secondly, and related to this point, by continuing practices of
patron-client relations and money politics, political parties may be limiting their ability
to perform other representative claims. The perception of political parties as corrupt
and driven by money politics is very powerful, and can potentially harm their ability
to perform important character, performative and democratic forms of claim-making.
The extent to which parties are perceived to be looking out for their own may lead to
claims that are successful with their members and supporters, but may hinder claims
aimed at presenting themselves as representing the broader public.

Policy Performance
Representative claims based on policy performance differ to the above repertoire in
that they position the claim-maker in the role of governing and providing benefits via
government policy and decision-making. It is important to note that this does not mean
that these claims are necessarily more passive on the part of claimants; claim-makers
who use government to make performative claims rarely let the decision speak for itself. The decision or act in itself is a part of the claim, but it is common for claimants to also attempt to highlight and spin the claim that they have made.

Claims based on policy delivery are relatively rare in post-Suharto Indonesia. The most simple reason for this is that the era of reformasi is barely 15 years old and most of the political parties cannot trace their achievements beyond this time (except perhaps for Golkar, which does draw to some extent on its past record as the party of development (pembangunan)). Secondly, the threshold for making claims based on policy performance is quite high – very few parties or individual politicians have been perceived as successful during the reformasi period. As such, the pool of claim-makers who need to rely on other claims (for example promises) is far greater than those who can make claims about their previous policy delivery. Many claims are vague in nature; for example, Prabowo, the leader of Gerindra, tweeted just after the legislative election in 2014: ‘A party that does not just talk but truly carries out real change’ (Prabowo 2014). This statement suggests that the party has already carried out real change, but given the establishment of the party took place just before the 2009 election and has never governed at the national level, it is difficult to gauge what type of change this statement refers to.

The most significant policy performance claims made by a political party have unsurprisingly emerged from PD. In the 2014 election campaign, PD have sought to use the ten year presidency of their leader, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), to make claims about performance. In many cases, these claims seek to clearly distinguish between claims based on promises and claims based on delivery. One claim made through the parties’ official Twitter account reads: ‘We have already given evidence, not just promises, during the time Partai Demokrat has been governing these ten years’ (PD 2014c). An advertisement from the party also features performative claims. Three well-known leaders of the party are featured, each with a quote based on the parties claimed achievements. The three claims read:

> Tackling national issues with leadership that is wise, thorough and appropriate; debt is no longer undermining, the IMF has been repaid, the CGI has been disbanded, and the ratio of debt in 2008 has reduced to 34 percent. Indonesia increasingly has self-respect, just look at information technology; Education has become a top priority. The

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58 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 274.
funding of education has risen to 20 percent of the budget. The first time in history.
(Material collected by researcher during field research)

There is evidence that PD candidates have also made use of the party’s time in power
to make claims about both the party and their own candidacy. One PD legislative
candidate, Sherisada Manaf, for example, while speaking to a small crowd made up
mostly of women and children, repeatedly mentioned the government programs put in
place by the SBY government. Based on these achievements, she argued that ‘SBY’s
government is actually on the side of and truly cares about the community—especially
women!’ (Sherisada Manaf 2014).

President SBY has also played the role of claim-maker drawing on this repertoire,
noting that his visits to villages had allowed him to see the developments there over
his time in office, and he further hoped that ‘the development efforts of the past decade
will not stop; they must be increased to further the villages’ (AntaraNews.com 24
March 2014). These claims demonstrate the extent to which political parties and
individual leaders can act as makers and subjects of representative claims, or both. The
legacy of SBY’s government can be used to make claims with SBY as the subject or
with PD as the subject, but to some extent there is an attempt to connect the legacy of
the president with the legacy of the party59.

Yet, beyond PD, political parties have rarely been in a position to attempt claims based
on policy performance. Political parties potentially benefit at the local level for the
success of particular local leaders, but in most cases of successful local leadership the
claim benefits the individual rather than the party. Indeed, in recent years, independent
claim-makers have more regularly drawn on this broad repertoire. Again the example
of Jokowi is the most prominent (though several other examples will also be
considered below). It is largely acknowledged that Jokowi’s rise to national
prominence was only possible due to the perception of his successful term as mayor
of the city of Solo. According to Majeed (2012, p. 1), Jokowi:

built alliances with businesses, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations
representing the poor. Initially he relocated thousands of street vendors to relieve
traffic congestion and created a one-stop shop for business licenses and other services.
He also expanded facilities at new vendor locations, improved conditions in slums and
upgraded health services. Jokowi then worked to boost tourism and strengthen the
economy by reviving Solo’s image as a regional center for arts and culture, both to its
own citizens and the outside world. While economic growth bolstered the city’s
revenue base, Jokowi reorganized parts of the government to promote efficiency and

59 And for SBY the ongoing role of his family within PD is one key incentive to do this.
opened the budget process to greater public scrutiny. In 2010, he and Rudyatmo were re-elected with 90.9% of the vote.

The perception of Jokowi’s track-record has allowed him to continue to draw on this repertoire. His record in that city was crucial to his campaign for Jakarta in 2012, where he made numerous speeches focusing on policy positions, including solutions to Jakarta’s traffic and flooding issues. These speeches regularly referred back to his work in Solo, seeking to connect his potential for future action to these past achievements.

Two important Indonesian terms within this broad repertoire are ‘kinerja’ and ‘tegas’. *Kinerja* is an Indonesian word used as a noun to mean ‘performance’; it highlights both qualities of hard work and effectiveness. This concept is regularly used by both claim makers and members of the audience of the claim to discuss the merits of individuals and parties. *Tegas* is an adjective meaning something close to being ‘assertive’ and ‘determined’. A number of independent claim-makers in the most recent period of *reformasi* have begun to make more comprehensive claims based on ideas surrounding *kinerja* and the quality of being *tegas*, for example government ministers and heads of government enterprises. Dahlan Iskhan, for instance, rose to fame mainly due to his work with the state electricity company, PLN, and later as the minister for state enterprises (*Menteri Badan Usaha Milik Negara*, BUMN). Being an unelected figure with no political party affiliations did not prevent Dahlan Iskhan from making representative claims—indeed, as has been previously noted, Saward’s exploration of the representative claim is, at least in part, intended to open up research into the representative claims that non-elected leaders make. Additionally, due to the direct relevance of his position as the director of the state electricity company to everyday people’s lives, Dahlan was in an excellent position to make performative claims.

To give one example, Dahlan travelled to East Kalimantan recently, where local residents were complaining about issues with their electricity supply. Dahlan, as reported by business news source *Liputan 6* (5 August 2014), was shocked, because ‘he had already addressed the issue during his time as director of the state electricity company’. Dahlan was quoted (*Liputan 6* 5 August 2014) as declaring that:

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60 Electricity supply regularly fails in some parts of Indonesia (the term *mati lampu*, meaning the lights are out, is a familiar phrase). Therefore any success in making electricity supply more reliable has an obvious effect on people lives, and hence makes performative claim-making more public.
At that time I fixed [the issue] by installing cables under the sea from mainland Kalimantan, at a level that was 50 kilometers from the island of Nunukan… I spoke quite firmly with the director of the state electricity company for East Kalimantan, mainly because he could not answer my question regarding why there were interruptions, where the interruptions were occurring, why they were taking so long, and other issues … I can’t accept that no one can explain what is causing the interruptions61.

The style of language used by Dahlan in this interview (and in many similar statements) clearly draws on notions of performative representation. Though Dahlan himself is directing these projects and not laying the cables personally, the statements do not directly create that sense of space. In discussing the previous action and the response to the present issue, the use of language situates Dahlan as assertive (tegas) in his response. Dahlan himself, when asked about political marketing in an interview (Mata Najwa 2 October 2013), argues that making performative representative claims is important:

I think that the best thing is to become known through the quality of work, what I mean is that … the theory of marketing also says this, however you try to market yourself, if the quality of the work is not there then it won’t work, as a result I choose to work effectively … because this … is not shopping … this is choosing a leader62.

A range of performative representative claims just like this one provided the basis for Dahlan’s rise to prominence—so much so that he was discussed as a potential Presidential candidate in 2014, and was the most popular candidate in the ultimately futile PD primary (Republika 25 December 2013).

Besides Dahlan, another emerging example is that of the new Transport Minister, Ignasius Jonan, who in his previous role as managing director of state railway company PT Kereta Api developed a reputation for reform. One media report notes that:

Five years ago trains and stations were known for untidiness and chaos. Now, go to a station and you will see a change. Cleanliness, hard work and discipline are evident. Millions of train passengers have become witness to this. (Metrotvnews.com 26 October 2014)63

Again, though not an elected representative, Ignasius Jonan was the head of a public enterprise that had a noticeable effect on the everyday lives of citizens (literally being

61 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 274-275.
62 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
63 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
responsible for making the trains run on time), and was thus in a good position to make representative claims as an independent claim-maker.

Similarly, Ahok has quickly risen to fame in recent years. Ahok was a local leader on the island of Belitung, before being teamed with Jokowi as the vice-governor candidate for Jakarta. Following Jokowi’s election as President, Ahok has recently been promoted as governor of Jakarta for the remainder of the term. Despite Ahok’s minority identity (and hence possible limitations in making broadly popular identity claims despite those mentioned in the previous chapter) he has been very successful in making performative representative claims. Ahok has built a reputation for being a fierce enforcer of efficiency within the Jakarta city administration, and his style of language (short, sharp and regularly critical) has reinforced this image. Indeed, his use of language (together with his identity) has become the source of considerable debate, particularly following recent tension between Ahok and the vigilante Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front) (Selasar.com 2014). In relation to the study of representative claims and repertoires, Ahok is one of the most prominent claim makers in Indonesia, given his unique style and background, his previous partnership with Jokowi and the importance of the position he now holds. Daily news stories describe Ahok’s latest acts, usually with a focus on the assertiveness of his actions as distinct from expectation. A google search for Ahok will uncover hundreds of similarly themed articles, but a typical example is a short Kompas article with the title ‘Ahok is assertive, he can take care of the problems of Jakarta’ (Kompas 23 July 2014). Notably, the local Jakarta government provides a free YouTube channel mainly featuring the governor (Pemerintah Provinsi Jakarta 2014). Having been a member of both Golkar and more recently Gerindra, Ahok recently withdrew from Gerindra following their support of a bill to remove elections for local executive posts, a move that demonstrates Ahok recognises his significant political capital as an independent claim-maker.

The cases of Jokowi, Iskhan, Ignasius Jonan and Ahok are not isolated; there are numerous other regional and provincial leaders who have established their own record of personal leadership. A number of well-known mayors, bupati (regents) and governors have received national political attention. Ridwan Kamil, the mayor of Bandung for 2013-2018, has begun to receive national media attention and is very active on social media. He tweets daily (over 35,000 tweets at the time of writing) and
is followed by close to one million people. Kamil’s social media profile is a rich source for the study of representative claims of many forms. In one tweet, Kamil responds directly to a citizen who has sent a photo and a report of an uncovered drain in the city. Kamil promises a team will arrive the next day to fix the problem (Kamil 2014). Other local leaders, such as the mayor of Bogor Bima Arya, have a similar social media profile and are also beginning to receive attention from the national media. Beyond these elected claim-makers, individuals from other political and social institutions such as the constitutional court (Mahfud M.D) and the anti-corruption commission (Abraham Samad) and even the royal family of Yogyakarta (Sultan Hamengkubowono X) have been successful in building political capital through well-established representative claims.

One particularly successful repertoire that independent claim-makers have recently drawn on is that of providing signature healthcare and education plans. Jokowi’s Kartu Jakarta Sehat (Healthy Jakarta Card) and Kartu Jakarta Pintar (Smart Jakarta Card) are both significant examples of this trend. The website for the Smart Jakarta Card clearly displays photos of Jokowi and his deputy Ahok in the banner at the top of the page, leaving little doubt who is responsible for the card (Education Department of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta 2014). Yet this repertoire had already emerged before the Jakarta programs began. In several regions around Indonesia, local and regional leaders have sought to provide these signature service cards. As Aspinall and Warburton note:

> Over the past decade, Indonesia has witnessed an explosion of local health insurance programs, or Jamkesda (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah). The nature and scope of these schemes vary greatly from region to region, but most involve a district or provincial government subsidising basic medical services for residents. Sometimes the services are provided free to all residents, more commonly just for the poorest. (Aspinall & Warburton 2013)

Aspinall and Warburton (2013) go on to argue that:

> the model is so widespread that most local politicians see it as a basic ingredient of a winning campaign nowadays. Some of the politicians offering these schemes, like Gede Winasa, have reputations as reformers, but many of them are machine politicians and oligarchs of the traditional sort.

These performative representative claims:

> have become all but ubiquitous in local executive government head elections. At the national level, too, successive governments have offered increasingly ambitious and generous social programs…it is impossible to deny the new political salience of social welfare in Indonesian politics. (Aspinall 2013, p. 114)
The use of the term ‘model’ here fits well with the concept of a repertoire as elaborated in this study, and one that is clearly spreading quickly around Indonesia and between politicians. What is clear, however, is that these types of claims have been largely made by independent claim-makers and about independent claim-makers. Political parties are rarely the main subject of claims based on completed policy action.

### Repertoires of Democratic Engagement

#### Parties and Candidates as Democratic Vehicles

Parties and independent claim-makers can engage with the idea of democratic engagement by claiming that they are themselves a democratic conduit for citizens, and there is some evidence of a weak but emerging repertoire based on this notion. These types of claims take the form of: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as being a conduit for democratic engagement (Object) with the audience being both specific communities and the broader community.*

Like most representative repertoires, there are important historical origins to this claim. Golkar under Suharto operated in a corporatist fashion, where:

> societal interests, formerly articulated by outspoken mass organizations, were canalized under the umbrella of corporatist associations linked to Golkar while grassroots politics in the villages was bureaucratized and thus brought under Golkar control. (Tomsa 2008, p. 38)

As such, Golkar claimed to be much more than a political party; instead it was an embodiment in itself of the regime, an ‘important mosaic stone in the New Order regime’s drive for hegemony’ (Tomsa 2008, p. 2). As such, part of Golkar’s representative claim at the time was that it was beyond politics: it was instead the primary and rightful conduit between society and government. While the democratic credentials of this claim can certainly be critiqued, it is a historically influential claim and one that likely has an ongoing influence on political discourse.

In this sense, attempt to establish relationships and dialog with citizens and organisations within the local community can be read as a claim based on the notion of democratic engagement. This can include direct meetings with residents at local party offices and the residence of the representative. During field research a number of trips were made to party offices at various levels, and the level of activity at these offices varied greatly. Many party offices, particularly at the lower levels of
organisation, are simply not open or are mainly engaged in internal party organisation. One local politician in Kupang explained that in his experience, the residences of politicians were a much more common site for meeting members of the public rather than in the more formal surrounds of the official party offices. This statement is supported by empirical studies of Indonesia’s party system. Tomsa (2008, p. 41), for example, notes that party offices are not much more than ‘empty shells’, and that party activities usually take place in ‘local parliament buildings, public places or in the private house of party officials’. The office of Setya Novanto, as described above, was a clear exception, though it also appeared that this active office was engaged more in providing goods and services to the public than in direct consultation with the public over broader legislative matters. One member of staff at the office described the main engagement with the community as being the receipt of proposals for funding, which were then considered by the Novanto centre.

While the potential for the vast network of offices required of political parties to be turned into a successful representative claim has largely not been realised, it is clear that engagement between political parties and communities does occur. Recent detailed studies of Indonesia’s party system by authors such as Fionna (2013) and Mietzner (2013) clearly note the extent to which political parties are active in their communities. Fionna describes the activities of four parties in Malang in significant detail, while Mietzner provides a comprehensive survey of parties across Indonesia. While official offices may often not be active, it is clear that parties minimally seek to network with community organisations and local leaders in the hope of obtaining support, funds and votes. Within these relationships there is the potential for claim making based on democratic engagement to occur; but the extent to which parties and candidates connect with the broader community as opposed to select elites and party members is clearly important in deciding the success and nature of the claim, as is the type of engagement that members of the public have available to them.

It is also worth considering internal party democracy as a form of democratic claim. Indonesian political parties have regularly been derided as hierarchical and lacking in democratic opportunities for members, though this does not preclude initiatives within parties that form claims about the nature of the party. In this regard, the implementation of a party primary process to choose the PD presidential candidate is relevant. This primary was introduced as a unique approach by PD ahead of the 2014
election, and meant that, in theory, members of the community could select which candidate PD would nominate for the presidency in the presidential election. Unlike Presidential primaries in the United States, however, there was effectively no guarantee that PD would be able to pass the threshold to nominate a candidate by itself, and indeed its result in the legislative election meant that it would need to join with other parties in order to legally nominate a candidate.

Yet despite these important realities, a long process of candidate registrations and campaigning took place, with candidates visiting most of Indonesia’s provinces and giving speeches to argue their case. This process presents an interesting democratic claim: PD is claiming to represent in a more democratic fashion because the public take part not only in choosing between candidates in the general election, but also in selecting with candidates are put forward by the party. In introducing the concept, President SBY stated on his Twitter account that ‘my idea is to involve the people in the selection of a presidential candidate for 2014’ (Republika 30 April 2013), while the leader of one of PD’s supporting organisations, M. Yasin, was quite blunt in arguing that it was hoped the primary process would help improve the image of the party (AntaraNews 8 April 2013). In another experimental claim, president-elect Jokowi established an online poll for members of the community to express their opinions on his choice of cabinet ministers64. In a press release from the Jokowi Centre (18 September 2014) who conducted the poll, it was argued that ‘We believe polling like this is good news for democracy in Indonesia. The public can oversee and criticize the names that emerge’65.

Yet, all of Indonesia’s political parties—including PD—have been critiqued for their lack of internal party democracy. Despite, for instance, the unique engagement PKS has pursued with the community, the party itself has been critiqued for lacking internal democratic processes (The Jakarta Post 6 August 2007). While Hamayotsu (2011, p. 149-151) highlights the differences between PKB and PKS in relation to the recruitment and promotion of party cadres, she also notes that as PKS becomes larger, some of its highest-level leaders are defying the norm of party regeneration from below. Other political parties arguably fare worse. The continued influence of

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64 Cabinet ministers in Indonesia do not have to be members of parliament – the President can select anyone to become a minister. Generally ministries are balanced between party members and technocrats.

65 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
oligarchs within political parties and the lack of truly democratic internal party procedures may prevent a potential source of democratic representative claims.

Individual candidates have frequently sought to describe themselves as conduits for citizens in the conduct of government. In particular, the introduction of direct elections for local leaders in 2005 led to a number of claims about the direct connection between leaders and citizens. McGibbon (2006, p. 332), for example, notes that ‘In Jimbrana and Banyuwangi, the winning candidates were ‘deliberative democrats’ who adopted a personal leadership style in appealing directly to the electorate’. Yet legislative representatives have also sought to make these type of claims. Then PDIP DPR candidate Masinton Pasaribu, for instance, describes his intention to set up a:

\[
\text{house of aspirations, as a form of accountability in relation to the voters. The house of aspirations will function as a place for complaints, service and delivery of the aspirations of citizens to Masinton as the Member of Parliament for five years, where at any moment the community can access it without any obstacles. (Global Indonesia Voices 2014)\textsuperscript{66}}
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Having been elected, Masinton has setup an active twitter account called ‘Rumah Aspirasi MAS’ (@Mas_DPR) that is followed by over 5,000 people. This twitter account has publicised Masinton’s ‘active dialog’ (dialog aktif) with the community. These type of claims have also been made by Jokowi – for example when he argued that in Solo he had ‘completely opened up my office and the city office to everyone, especially my community’ (JBCyberTroopers 16 July 2012).

Social media interactions—especially through Twitter—have been noted in both this chapter and Chapter Six. It is clear that both political parties and independent claim-makers are becoming increasingly active and interactive in their use of social media platforms like Twitter. Most of the major political parties have very active official Twitter accounts, and engage with messages from members and the general public. Independent claim-makers, however, have been the most innovative and successful in making these types of claims. The mayor of Bandung, Ridwan Kamil, is a good example in this regard. The previous section has noted the way in which Kamil responded to the concerns of a member of the public to make a claim about performance. Yet, his engagement with the community through Twitter can be broadly

\textsuperscript{66} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
understood as a claim about democratic engagement. Kamil’s Twitter account engages directly with citizens daily, including responding to complaints, questions and comments. Kamil himself recently discussed the use of Twitter to engage with citizens:

Before I became mayor, I tweeted a lot. When I became mayor, I tweet a lot (too). I tweet in the morning, at lunchtime, or at night. On Twitter, I post information, send messages, answer questions, and so on. I have about 600,000 followers. I also have a YouTube account … On social media, people can curse you or criticise you directly with little censorship. As a public official, you have to be really patient. If they find out you’re doing something, they will comment on it. And if they do not hear anything from you, they assume you are doing nothing. It’s about patience, about doing the right thing, and focusing on the change that we want to deliver…The revolution of social media is really helpful. Social media allows me to scan the mood of the people, to locate where criticisms or complaints are coming from. With this technology, I can make quick decisions. Without it, accessing data is a problem. (FutureArc 2014)

The act of establishing centres or offices in which engagement with the community can be professionally managed is beginning to form an increasingly important repertoire that has been shared by a number of local and regional leaders. As a medium for engagement, claims about performance, identity and character are also evident, but broadly the comprehensive use of these forms of engagement also constitutes a claim about democratic engagement. Notably, this very successful repertoire has mainly been developed by independent claim-makers and relies on their own initiative rather than party support. It is clear in the above example that the claim is about Ridwan Kamil and his team, rather than the PKS and Gerindra parties that official supported his election. Indeed, throughout Kamil’s social media interaction it is very difficult to find any reference to his party affiliations. While candidates like Masinton are more likely to connect themselves to their party (a PDIP logo features on many banners and photos used by Masinton) his name is still dominant in advertising – including in the name of his centre.

**The Democratic Repertoires of Merakyat and Blusukan**

As argued in Chapter Six, references to the *rakyat* can be used to make representative claims about identity and character. The term takes on even more significance in discussing democratic representative claims. While references to the *rakyat* can be used to suggest an understanding of the broader socio-economic issues of class in society, the prefix *me*- can be added to the base word to create the verb *merakyat*,

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67 There is little doubt that staff are involved in managing this account. Hence while the use of social media should be considered as a claim about the claim maker, this does not mean that in practice the claim maker is acting alone.
meaning ‘to engage with the community’. Broad claims about engaging with the community have become increasingly common—PAN, for example, have made it a key focus of their campaign platform in 2014. These types of claims take the form of: *The maker of the claim (M) puts forward the party or candidate (Subject) as directly connecting with the community (Object), with the audience being those directly engaged together with the broader community.*

Claims based on the notion of *merakyat* can be made through gestures and acts. The most well-known example of this is the popularisation of the concept of *blusukan* in contemporary Indonesian political discourse, mainly via the political rise of Jokowi. The term is Javanese and means to make an unexpected visit – usually to lower class areas. There are important origins for this repertoire in Indonesian history, but it is clear that Jokowi began to adopt some elements of it in his election as mayor of Solo, where ‘instead of displaying Jokowi and Rudy’s faces on posters or billboards, the couple visited residential areas by motorcycle to promote their platform’ (*The Jakarta Post* 18 November 2013). A campaign staff member quoted in the *Jakarta Post* explained that:

> Local reporters asked us what our campaign model was called. We spontaneously came up with the term blusukan [Javanese slang meaning an impromptu visit] … We thought we would find a permanent term later, but we never did (*The Jakarta Post* 18 November 2013).

Jokowi continued to draw on this representative repertoire during his time as mayor of Solo and during the election for Jakarta. Thus far as governor of Jakarta, Jokowi’s trips to local and often impoverished areas have gained even larger headlines, assisted by furious media attention. Typically, Jokowi pays visits to poorer areas, pursuing what he calls ‘street democracy’ (Kate and Moestafa 26 June 2013). In one example, Jokowi visited a squatter settlement that was to be moved to a new region and proceeded to hand out colouring books to children and personally engage with the community. These impromptu visits to local areas were reported on almost weekly while Jokowi was governor of Jakarta (and are receiving even more attention now that he is president), with one news report quoting Jokowi as saying that ‘conducting *blusukan* in Jakarta can make you cry’ (*Tempo.co* 27 October 2013).

Unlike vague references to the notion of *merakyat* by political parties and candidates, Jokowi’s use of *blusukan* is tied to the perception of genuine engagement and influence. This perception began with his first significant success as mayor of Solo:
the efforts to move illegal street traders to a new location. This case is often one of the first anecdotes that supporters refer to when speaking of Jokowi’s leadership style. According to Majeed (2012, p. 3):

Street vendors were the hot-button issue. The vendors blocked traffic and public spaces, as well as access to other businesses and homes. A focal point of complaints was Banjarsari, a historic park with a monument commemorating the 1945-49 independence struggle, where an estimated 1,000 street vendors crowded walkways and roads. Well-to-do residents of the area accused the vendors of damaging the park, taking over public space and harbouring petty criminals.

Jokowi’s predecessors had attempted to move the street vendors since 1998 with very little success. It is interesting to note that Jokowi initially approached the problem in a similar way to those predecessors, prompting fierce objections from the vendors, with some displaying signs declaring ‘Struggle till the end of our life. We would rather die than move’ (Majeed 2012, p. 8). This outcome forced a change of tact that would prove ground-breaking in the development of this now well-known repertoire. Jokowi attended over 50 lunch meetings with representatives of the street vendors, and ensured that his city office collected substantial data on their situation, leading to a proposal to move them to a site at Kithilan Semanggi (Majeed 2012, p. 8). The research and input from the traders also led to a support package worth approximately 9 billion rupiah, or about US $1 million, to provide public transport, advertising, free trading licenses, affordable loans, education and training, tax exemption for the first 6 months and free tents/stall materials (Majeed 2012, p. 8). The relocation was completed successfully and peacefully; the moved vendors paraded together with Jokowi to the new venue chanting ‘we have all won’ (Majeed 2012, p. 1).

Once developed, representative repertoires can be adopted by other representatives or redeployed by the same representative. Indeed, it seems logical that representatives will continue to use repertoires that have worked, and will have developed an understanding and skills that can assist in continuing to draw on the same successful repertoire. After winning the election for governor of Jakarta, Jokowi continued to draw on this repertoire. Several similar groups of street vendors have been moved to new venues (though with perhaps less success than in Solo), while the approach has also been applied to squatter communities—for example, the community of Pluit in Jakarta, who were moved to prepare a solution for Jakarta’s flood problem. As one former squatter, Hanifah, suggests:
In the case of Jokowi, before we were moved he came and met us first, we were told why we had to move, we came to understand what it was that the government wanted (Merdeka.com 29 August 2013).

The success of Jokowi in developing and repeatedly drawing on this repertoire of *blusukan* has led to other politicians and parties attempting to adopt the same repertoire. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was driven to recently claim that he had been conducting *blusukan* since he was first elected in 2004, expressing apparent dismay that no one had noticed all this time (AntaraNews.com 24 March 2014). During the 2014 legislative campaign the term *blusukan* appeared regularly in news articles describing various campaign events. This was true of the well-publicised Jokowi campaign together with the party that backed him, PDIP, but also of many other politicians. Jokowi, for example, met local residents while eating at a street food vendor’s stall in the province of Lampung (Republika.co.id 22 March 2014), while his main rival Prabowo was reported to have conducted *blusukan* in a religious school in central Java (Detik.com 20 April 2014). Just like hundreds of other local candidates, a local candidate in Bali, Ni Luh Renanda Laksita, conducted *blusukan* in her region in order to gain support (Asiaone.com 6 April 2014), while another candidate, Sherisada Manaf, used Youtube to broadcast live footage of her own *blusukan* efforts (Sherisada Manaf 2014).

Representative claims based on the concept of *blusukan* were indeed very commonly used during the 2014, yet the manner in which *blusukan* was carried out appeared to vary greatly. In some cases, it appears that the term was used to cover a range of ways in which candidates engage with the community, including planned meetings between candidates and communities, and events in which the candidate mainly lectures the audience (rather than listening to them). This demonstrates that some of the nuances of the representative acts contained within a repertoire is not always understood by representative claim-makers. Arguably, Jokowi’s success in developing the repertoire of *blusukan* was due to the unique style in which the *blusukan* were carried out. The power of these claims was the perception of genuine engagement between the representative and the represented, to the extent that feedback and views expressed during these events had a meaningful impact on public policy. Arguably, Jokowi’s ability to make character claims is also tied to these democratic claims—representatives who were not able to present themselves as simple and humble may find it more difficult to successfully draw on these democratic repertoires.
Summary

In analysing the development of repertoires based on democratic and performative notions of representation, it is clear that political parties are aware of the importance of these understandings of representation and feel compelled to attempt to make related claims. Yet the most important innovations in this regard have come from independent claim-makers such as Jokowi and Ridwan Kamil, and these claims firmly put forward these individuals as the subjects of the claim. This is certainly true of democratic claims, where independent claim makers have been the most influential innovators, but is also true to some extent of performative claims. Hence even though these individuals have official political party support, there is little connection between their claim-making and the perception of those political parties. The next chapter brings in the perception of the community, through an engagement with civil society leaders from around Indonesia, to test the extent to which these notions of representation guide their perception of Indonesia’s political party system.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Assessing Representative Repertoires in Indonesia

Introduction

The analysis presented in the previous two chapters has detailed the extent to which representative repertoires based on notions of identity, character, performance and democratic engagement have emerged within Indonesia’s party system and amongst independent claim-makers. This provides some idea of the way in which the concept of political representation is understood by claim-makers and the way in which they present themselves to the public. Yet there remains a second important step: to understand the way in which communities assess, accept or reject these notions as the basis for representative claims. Based primarily on a qualitative survey of community leaders from around Indonesia and supplemented by in-country research, this chapter argues that the notion of identity rarely emerges in the way in which participants understand representation, while character is important but largely contingent on other notions of representation. Ultimately, performance and democratic engagement are the main means through which participants understand representation and provide the basis for their main critique of Indonesia’s political party system.

Assessing Repertoires Based on Identity

It was clear that very few participants in the research based their views regarding representation on the notion of identity. The survey did not ask participants to discuss ethnicity, religion or regional identity directly, but instead questions were based on the vague concept of komunitas (community). Some participants defined this as the immediate community supported by their NGO, while others defined it as the broader community that they were particularly interested in (i.e. children, ethnic community and immigrant workers). Most applied a more general definition of what community meant in this context. One question prompted participants to discuss the opportunities for involvement of their community within political parties.

Some participants suggested that there were opportunities for members of their community to become active in political parties. For example, one respondent from Jakarta argued that ‘the opportunity to become a member of a political party is very
open, organisations open that opportunity as much as possible. Another respondent from West Java was more cautious in analysing the nature of the opportunities:

There are many opportunities and offers, but a large number of these offers don’t really place the community in a strategic position, a few or a very small number of party members have idealism and background which resembles our community.

Some respondents also suggested that opportunities to become active in political parties had actually increased, mainly due to the poor standing of political parties and their desperation to change that image. One respondent from West Java, for example, argued that ‘these days, due to political parties not being trusted anymore by the community, there have emerged opportunities for people outside the parties to become members and even legislative members.’ Another respondent from South Sumatra argued that ‘opportunities to become a member of a party are very open. The parties actually have trouble to get the best cadres from civil society because their image is so poor.’

Ethnicity or religion was not seen as a significant barrier to enter politics. For one respondent from an Islamic organisation focused on education in North Maluku:

The opportunity is there as wide as possible for members or cadres of our organisation to enter party politics. Not only in parties with an Islamic background but also nationalist parties, but generally many of our cadres choose Islamic parties because they have the same ideology.

Notably, those respondents who disagreed about the opportunity to become active in the party system generally did not base this assessment on issues of ethnicity or regional identity, but instead on class. For example, one respondent from North Sumatra argued that there are ‘almost no opportunities because we support poor citizens from the city who almost never dream to become active in political parties.’ Another participant from Central Java argued that

the background is generally different. The background involved in political parties is generally that of those who are economically powerful and who aren’t able to analyse the issues that are occurring in the community.

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68 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
69 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
70 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 275.
71 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
72 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
73 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
74 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
A respondent from Lampung argued that ‘There are no opportunities … because the political parties that are there just talk about financial issues … not the interests of the community’\textsuperscript{75}. Similarly, a number of other respondents were pessimistic about the opportunities for the community to join political parties, based on their very different class basis.

Beyond opportunities to become active in political parties, some participants also suggested that class played a role in deciding which party members reached strategic positions. One participant from North Sumatra argued that:

> With the political party system we have now there are open opportunities for our members to become members of political parties, but to represent political parties in parliament…that is very much impossible looking at the background that we possess. Yeah … most of the members of parliament now were lower or middle class under the Suharto regime, but they don’t understand and don’t work hard to fight for the lower classes … particularly the poor to fulfill their rights. Most of them are involved in corruption and collusion … very few amongst them want to look back and help\textsuperscript{76}.

These views were echoed by a participant from Jakarta who argued that there were no opportunities for people from their community to become active in political parties ‘because our community is a community of poor people. It is not possible for poor people to become members of parliament in our country.’\textsuperscript{77} The notion that those who became involved in politics quickly forgot their local community once the election was over was common. For instance, one participant argued that ‘The people’s representatives should fulfil the desires of the community, but after they sit in the parliament they forget the ones they represent’\textsuperscript{78}. One respondent from Padang explained that many local members who joined political parties began with the support of the local community and perhaps even a desire to make real change, but once they entered the world of party politics they quickly forgot their constituents. A discussion participant in Kupang expressed a similar sentiment about political parties, arguing that there was an appetite for new political parties each election, because once parties became established they would quickly forget the grassroots supporters and ideas that had allowed for their establishment.

\textsuperscript{75} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{76} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{77} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{78} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 276.
When asked whether political parties represented their communities well or not, respondents rarely based their answer on notion of ethnic or religious identity. While this was the case, several participants separated the idea of being ‘of the people’ and ‘of the political party’. For example, a respondent who works on issues of human rights in West Java responded: ‘No. Because they only represent the tendencies of the party alone and not the tendencies of the community’. Notably, the respondent here used the broad term *rakyat* to denote community. Another respondent who worked with the protection of cultural arts in Jakarta made a similar argument: ‘No, political parties care more about their own interests’, while a legal advocate from Jakarta also argued that ‘parties are more likely to put forward the interests of the elite and forget the community’. Again, the use of the term *rakyat* suggests that the broad division is between party elites and the rest of the community, rather than a reflection of specific class conflict or ethnic identity. A similar sentiment was expressed in a number of responses. As such, while ethnicity or religious identity is not mentioned within these critiques, a vague distinction between the parties and their members as elites and the *rakyat* was made. This could be understood in class terms, but it is arguably also related to issues of public trust surrounding politicians and political parties more broadly. What is notable, however, is the largely similar form of the critique, despite participants possessing vastly different social and geographical backgrounds.

Gender is one other key form of identity, and interviews with several informants in Indonesia suggest that this is an area in which further research is needed—particularly related to community groups that are both largely occupied by women and also lacking political empowerment (migrant workers and commercial sex workers are two such groups). Within the survey research gender did emerge as a theme, particularly from participants who were working with these issues. For some respondents, the formal quota of 30 percent for women was significant. One respondent argued that ‘as party organisers they already have a gender perspective but a number of them also don’t because the connotation is that men are more involved in parties, but because the law regulates attention to 30 percent representation for women it has become something that parties accommodate’. This response suggests that while parties need to achieve the formal requirement, this does not always lead to a perspective that values the role

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79 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277.
80 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277.
81 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277.
of women in politics. The use of the term ‘konotasi’ here (connotation) suggests that
the participant believes there is a norm regarding the involvement of men, rather than
women, in politics. Several other participants who worked with issues related to
gender were also very critical of political parties. In some cases it did appear that
gender formed an aspect in dialog between community organisations and political
parties. One participant detailed a relevant experience:

At that time the Kendari women’s solidarity organisation pushed the participation of
active women in the election of governor and deputy governor for Sulawesi Tenggara
province in 2012, one of the activities that we carried out was to engage in dialogue
directly with political parties, about how political parties could promote candidates
for governor and deputy governor who were on the side of equality in terms of gender,
poverty and marginalized groups82.

One other participant who worked with female sex workers, gay men, transgender
individuals and women and children who were victims of violence was very critical of
the lack of effort of political parties to engage with the interests of that community,
arguing that ‘Until now there has been no visible effort from them [the parties] to
handle these issues83’. In detailing the qualities a representative should possess, the
same participant listed, amongst other qualities, not being discriminative or using
stigma84, and argued that ‘At this time not all the parties possess these qualities or
characteristics. It is just slogans and jargon85. The participant went on to suggest that
‘there is a need for research about the representation of marginal groups (sex workers,
gay men, the transgender community, women who are victims of violence) in the
organisation of political parties86. These responses mix several different
understandings of representation (for instance performance and democratic notions of
representation) but suggest that the representation of women and other groups facing
marginalization from politics deserves further attention from researchers.

These responses indicate that ethnicity and religious identity are not a primary concern
for participants—including, for instance, members of adat communities who
participated in the research. Yet it is important to recognise that in Indonesia there are
complex cross-cutting issues of identity. Ethnicity in particular regions can intersect
with economic, gender or social disempowered. Members of small adat communities,
for example, are often numerically outnumbered in electoral districts, and hence may lack the political voice or economic strength of larger ethnic communities, such as the Minang, Balinese or Javanese. Exclusion can be based on both class and gender but also ethnic lines—and as such discussion of class or gender based exclusion may also inherently involve the exclusion of ethnic minorities. Duncan (2007, p. 728), for example, notes that ethnic minorities that ‘were well integrated into the political system prior to regional autonomy’ have fared better under decentralisation than those who were not. Yet it is notable that participants in this study from a wide range of regions around Indonesia largely emphasised class over issues of ethnic identity. While ethnic identity and class may often intersect or overlap, it is class and economic power rather than ethnic identity which emerges as the most significant source of concern regarding the representation of identity. These findings largely reflect those of survey studies of voting preferences conducted by Liddle and Mulyani (2007; 2010), where ethnicity is not seen as a main consideration for voters preferences.

Data collected during research trips to Padang and Kupang largely supported the findings from the survey. In both of these regions the involvement of local people in the national political parties was obvious. In Kupang, for example, several members of political parties who were interviewed by the researcher clearly originated from the local area, and a number of prominent local citizens had recently joined the new Nasdem political party. There was very little sense that the political parties were dominated by outsiders—indeed, it appeared that prominent local figures were sought after by the national political parties. When asked about the possibility or advantages of locally based political parties, very few participants in the research saw this as very desirable or much of an issue. Indeed, many activists with little investment in the party system expressed surprise or shock at the idea of local political parties. It was clear that what frustrated participants about political parties was not their lack of local membership, but instead an imbalance of opportunity based on class and established client-patron connections.

Issues of identity are no doubt still important in Indonesian political discourse. In some provinces, such as Aceh and Papua, ongoing separatist sentiments and tension over human rights concerns mean that special attention is needed for the dynamics of politics in those regions. Additionally, issues of identity are likely to be a greater concern for some adat communities, particularly where there is a local history of
exclusion from formal politics. Yet, despite the existence of exceptions, the absence of appropriate representative repertoires based on ethnic or regional identity does not appear to be a common or strong critique.

**Assessing Repertoires Based on Character**

In order to analyse the extent to which character representation informs understanding of political representation, participants in the research were asked to detail the type of background or qualities that they thought were important in a representative, and whether these qualities were present in the Indonesian political party system. This question elicited a wide range of responses and provided some insight into the type of characteristics that were considered important. Overall, there appears to be a connection between the characteristics that parties seek to focus on and the characteristics that participants see as important—suggesting that the repertoires that are currently emerging are impacted on by both claim makers and audiences of claims.

One clear example was the focus on corruption and cleanliness. As argued in Chapter Six, being bersih (clean) is a very common claim made by political parties and independent claim makers. The importance of cleanliness emerged strongly within the survey and in country research, with connections drawn between this character quality and other notions of representation (performative representation, for instance). A large number of participants used terms such as bersih and anti-korupsi when describing the ideal qualities that representatives should possess. References to money politics (in Indonesian and in English) were also common. One participant from Jakarta, when asked whether their community was well represented, answered: ‘Not yet, because money politics [politik uang] still goes on’\(^\text{87}\). There was a clear feeling in the data that corruption was endemic to the party system. Consider, for instance, the view of one participant from West Nusa Tenggara:

> Corruption, in my opinion, has already really wrecked the internal and external conditions of the political parties. So it is difficult to put forward and discuss what could be considered ‘not urgent’ in this context\(^\text{88}\).

Similarly, a respondent working in the legal aide sector argued that:

> Generally, all of the parties are anti-corruption but the reality is that many politicians are involved in corruption. Members of the DPR also don’t support the eradication of

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\(^{87}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277.

\(^{88}\) See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277.
corruption precisely because they want to weaken or get rid of the KPK. Indeed there are a few members of the DPR who support the eradiction of corruption, but the amount is quite small\textsuperscript{89}.

Those who provided a more comprehensive response to the question often connected corruption with the notion of being selfish as opposed to selfless—corrupt representatives are looking out for themselves, while non-corrupt representative are looking out for the community. Consider the following response given by a respondent who oversees 96 NGOs in 15 of Indonesia’s provinces:

\begin{quote}
The ideal quality that [representatives] should possess is: Fighting for the needs of the community and not just the individual or the party, being anti-corruption, having sufficient knowledge and education, being brave enough to be critical of the government amongst other things. A large number of political party members in Indonesia at this time are only orientated towards power, corruption, and only fighting for the interests of themselves and their political parties.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Corruption is here clearly connected to selfishness. Similarly, a participant from North Sumatra argued that:

\begin{quote}
The quality that should be attached to the party member who sits in parliament, in my opinion, is that of being anti-corruption, having the ability to fight for the interests of the community and agreeing with the values of social justice.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

Similar sentiments were expressed by a participant who worked in the agricultural sector in Aceh:

\begin{quote}
They have to begin with a desire to build the lower classes of the community (in its real meaning), which is the opposite of starting with the desire to be rich, to take control of big development projects, to carve out power. Not all of these qualities exist in the current political parties. In fact, a majority begin with the agenda (a hidden agenda) to favour the interests of a particular group\textsuperscript{92}.
\end{quote}

These responses suggest a dichotomy between corruption and self-interest on one hand, and cleanliness and selflessness on the other. Candidates who demonstrate personal integrity and cleanliness are also expected to ignore the temptations of office and put the community first.

Identification with an ideological background was important for some participants. In some cases this ideological focus was the long-standing divide between religious and nationalist/secular trends in Indonesian politics. For example, one participant suggested that ‘firstly, from the perspective of ideology, they have to be based on

\textsuperscript{89} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 277-8.
\textsuperscript{90} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{91} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{92} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 278.
Islam’; for another participant, it was important for representatives to be ‘nationalist, not based on religion, and with a high respect for democracy’ and to ‘have a patriotic spirit.’ A participant from West Java argued that they should ‘be on the side of nature.’ There was significant diversity in the ideological traits that parties and their members were expected to fulfill—but at least in regard to religion and nationalism there appeared to be some satisfaction that parties with those traits did exist. Overall, ideological background appeared much less often within the research than personal qualities.

A broad range of personal qualities were put forward by participants. Some examples of these include: ‘being honest, not manipulating attention and assistance for the interests of the party or the legislative members of the party’, ‘being intelligent, determined, but accepting of feedback, advice and the opinions of the community’, ‘being intelligent’, ‘being honest, fair, democratic, and being on the side of and protecting the rights of the community,’ and ‘fighting with all one’s heart for the interests of the community.’ Interestingly, the term sederhana did not emerge in any responses—yet related concepts such as being rendah hati (‘humble’) and tidak bersikap hidup mewah (‘not oriented to living richly’) did emerge.

Overall, it appears that the expectations of participants in the research regarding character claims largely matches the type of repertoires that are commonly drawn on in Indonesia. Parties and candidates are aware that they need to make claims about cleanliness, a simple background and other symbolic qualities. If claim makers are aware of the importance of these characteristics, why would the participants in the research still have such a negative perception of these repertoires?

The answer to this question appears to lie in the important connection between character claims and both performative and democratic engagement claims. While character claims can be made in their own right (one can claim to be ‘clean’ on a campaign poster) these claims are only assessed positively when they are backed up...
by performative claims (demonstrating an ability to operate in politics without suspicions of corruption, and by demonstrating a desire to tackle corruption). Indeed, it appears that character notions are important as methods of signalling performative and democratic representation in particular. Many responses connected traits to the judgement of those traits through action. For example, one participant from Nusa Tenggara Barat argued that representatives should

possess the quality of comprehending the real conditions and have a serious desire to carry out measured improvements. This quality is something I haven’t seen in the political parties, if it is there it is limited to just one or two people.\textsuperscript{102}

Another participant from Riau argued that it was important for parties to display ‘continuous empowerment, social justice and building the prosperity of the people. This is something that is not being substantially achieved by political parties’\textsuperscript{103}. A participant from South Sulawesi argued that representative should possess ‘honesty and a commitment to real change, not just stories and not just promises. In my opinion this is often not possessed [by representatives].’\textsuperscript{104} This sentiment was also expressed by a participant from Jakarta:

Parties should be compelled to carry out real action and not just for the community alone, and not just at election times. And they have to have a neutral attitude in the process of socialisation. At this time there are no parties like that\textsuperscript{105}.

These responses clearly connect characteristics with evidence of action. That is, it is not enough to claim to have these qualities; instead, they need to be actively demonstrated. This suggests that there are important links between character and performative representative claims.

There were also important connections made between character and democratic notions of representation—a candidate or party that is closer to the people or able to engage in the process of \textit{meraykat} is better able to understand their interests and engage democratically with them. For example a participant from the Jakarta region argued that representatives should ‘have the attitude of being on the side of the poor. Maybe there are members of political parties who have that quality, but very few’\textsuperscript{106}. Another argued that parties should be ‘pro the people—this is something that is not possessed

\textsuperscript{102} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{103} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{104} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{105} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{106} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
by the parties we have now”\textsuperscript{107}. A participant from East Java argued that representatives should:

\begin{quote}
fight with all their heart for the interests of the community. They should often communicate with the members of the community. They should be smart. Those qualities are not there in all of the political parties. Those qualities are only evident approaching the election\textsuperscript{108}.
\end{quote}

Participants were keen to engage with ideas about character. Yet it was clear from the research that these understandings of character are closely tied to other understandings of representation. While parties and independent claim-makers can make claims about their character, they can only ultimately be supported and reinforced by performative and democratic claims. As such, repertoires based on character appear to be important, but largely contingent on the making of other claims.

**Assessing Performative Repertoires**

References to performative representation were common in all data collected in this research, including survey data. When asked both about what representation should mean and whether parties could be considered representative, many of the responses were based on a performative understanding of representation. While this is evident in responses that directly discuss policy-making and other substantive acts that parties are responsible for, it is evident that an emphasis on this understanding of representation has been noted in both previous sections. Hence, even when participants are discussing representation as character or as identity, connections are readily drawn to performative aspects of representation.

When asked what makes a good representative, there was a clear focus on performative representation. According to a participant from Riau, political parties should be involved in ‘Continuous empowerment, social justice and building the prosperity of society. These things are not being fully attempted by political parties’\textsuperscript{109}. For another participant from South East Sulawesi, ‘they have to get involved in the management of protected forests and the strengthening of cooperation’,\textsuperscript{110} while another participant argued that issues of migrant workers were also an important substantive issue that needed to be addressed: ‘caring for the interests and rights of migrant workers [makes

\textsuperscript{107} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{108} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{109} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{110} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
a good representative]. That quality is not there in political parties.\textsuperscript{111} Other substantive issues that were seen as important were ‘free health or free education,’\textsuperscript{112} ‘empowering women,’\textsuperscript{113} being ‘transparent, participative, not corrupt, having pro-poor community policies.’\textsuperscript{114} More generally, ‘always protecting the interests of the little person,’\textsuperscript{115} ‘consistently fighting for the interests of the community in formal policy and government, in the local, sub national and the national level,’\textsuperscript{116} and ‘representing the interests of the community’\textsuperscript{117} were also mentioned. As one participant cautioned, performative acts of representation are not always simple:

There needs to be a strong understanding focusing on multiple aspects, like social problems, economic problems, environmental issues, women, politics, economics, the rights or communities that are marginalised by the system and other similar issues.\textsuperscript{118}

The distinction between performative claims based on promised future action and those based on completed acts as discussed in Chapter Seven was also a focus for some of the participants in the research. One participant from West Java, for instance, argued that parties should possess:

visionary ideas, not being corrupt, and having the ability to fight for the aspirations of the community. In my opinion, political parties are too clever in putting promises ahead of realisation.\textsuperscript{119}

Another argued that ‘parties should have an obligation to conduct real work and not just [make promises] to the community.’\textsuperscript{120} Terms such as rakyat (community) and merakyat (to connect with the community) also feature in the way that participants discussed these performative acts. For example, a participant working in the field of children’s rights argued that parties should ideally ‘Get down to the community [merakyat] and have a desire to serve the people [rakyat] especially poor people. Unfortunately this issue is only lip service.’\textsuperscript{121} Another participant who used the term merakyat similarly argued that parties should:

\textsuperscript{111} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{112} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{113} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{114} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{115} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{116} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{117} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{118} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{119} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{120} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{121} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
Truly understand us and have the desire to bring positive change in the community. Not parties who prioritise the prosperity of parties and their members alone. Truly connect with the community [merakyat]…\textsuperscript{122}

These perspectives also suggest that connections are often drawn between notions of performative representation and repertoires of democratic engagement.

The performative understanding of representation was clearly a focus for many participants when they critiqued political parties and the party system. For instance, one participant working in the field of education in Lampung argued that ‘they don’t understand the real issues in the community, I don’t really understand which section of society they represent.’\textsuperscript{123} Similarly, another participant argued that parties should possess:

the quality of understanding the real conditions and also having a serious desire to carry out a measurable improvement. This quality is something I haven’t seen in political parties, if it is there it is limited to just one or two people.\textsuperscript{124}

Even when parties are assessed as understanding the issues faced by communities, there was clearly pessimism regarding their response. For one participant from an Adat community in West Kalimantan:

Political parties really understand [the issues in the community], however many don’t act on it. For that reason, it is important for us to enter our people to become political party members. So that they better understand and quickly act to address important issues regarding the community.\textsuperscript{125}

Similarly, a participant from North Sumatra argued that ‘the issues in our community are considered very important according to them, but they don’t give any response or promise to address or accommodate the issues that we highlight.’\textsuperscript{126}

Positive assessments based on the notion of performative representation were extremely rare within the research, both in survey research and in country discussions. Even those answers that expressed some positivity remained somewhat cautious. For example, one participant argued that parties should be involved in ‘understanding the problems that occur in the community, and knowing the way to improve policy to overcome those problems. It is there, but it is very weak.’\textsuperscript{127} One other response from a participant working in the farming sector in Aceh was clearly responding in a tongue-

\textsuperscript{122} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{123} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{124} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{125} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{126} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{127} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
in-cheek manner: ‘Yes, there are those who support by providing a little funding. There are those who help to find funding … and there are those who order us to wait for the right time in the future’\textsuperscript{128}.

\textit{Mewakili Partai Bukan Komunitas}

A number of participants suggested that the reason political parties and their members failed to fulfil expectations regarding performative forms of representation was that political party members were more interested in representing their parties than the community. One participant working with environmental and development issues in Riau suggested that when:

\textquote[\textsuperscript{129}]{Someone has already been elected and then sits in the legislature, they feel that they do not represent their constituents, in fact they act like they chose to represent their political parties.}

Another participant from West Kalimantan agreed that representatives ‘put first the interests of their parties and forgot about the needs of the community,’\textsuperscript{130} while a respondent from East Nusa Tenggara argued that:

\textquote[\textsuperscript{131}]{In a good spirit of development, no. All this time political parties only try to understand the important issues to the community for the benefit of their campaign and victory in the election.}

A participant from Bengkulu provided a more in depth response on the issue:

\textquote[\textsuperscript{132}]{In practice political parties don’t represent any community, and don’t carry out their mandate to fight for the aspiration of the community that elects them, even though in the system of elections and governance in Indonesia that is what is expected. Political parties only represent their own aspirations and interests. In terms of legislation, for example, regulation is not put forward based on aspirations and the community, there is no mechanism from the political parties to understand the aspirations from the community that elected them that can then be worked on in a bottom up manner to produce policy. Another example is the fact that political parties don’t get involved in settling conflicts in the community, for example when a community of farmers is evicted because their land has been given by the government to a large farm investment.}

This response demonstrates the perception that areas of potential performative representative performance (advocating for the rights of victimised communities) are not addressed by political parties. In this regard, it is relevant to consider the fact that Indonesia’s political parties are regularly described by studies as catch-all in nature,

\begin{itemize}
  \item For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
  \item For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
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  \item For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
  \item For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281.
\end{itemize}
and lack a strong ideological commitment to any particular group in society. In some other party systems, issues that involve a significant sector such as farming would likely possess strong links to at least one political party that may seek to intervene on their behalf (or at least speak up for them).

A similar view was expressed by a respondent from West Nusa Tenggara, who argued that political parties should have the:

quality of being the servant of the community … they do something as a means to support family and the community, to always develop society which is based on local values and wisdom so that what they do is actually what is truly a need of the community and can give direction to and build the community, not to benefit themselves, their family or their clan, in other words not just for the interests of the party alone. This quality is in the Vision and Mission statements of the political parties but it is not realised.133

This participant was not alone in pointing to the inconsistency between what is stated in the vision and mission statements (noted as a common repertoire in Chapter Seven) and what is achieved by parties. The same participant went on to argue that:

Generally, if we look at the vision and mission statements together with the aims of the parties they try to understand the issues in the community, however in the process of implementation they all get lost in their own worlds and eventually they forget the mandate that they sourced and promised to the community. Basically, issues in the community are just made into slogans to win the election and take seats. It is clear that they understand, yet they don’t have a desire to work just for the interests of the community. As a result, the interests of the community just become an instrument for sale.134

This sentiment broadly summarises one of the most common themes to emerge throughout the data. The focus of representative claim-makers on notions that are considered important by the community is clearly there. Parties and their members clearly understand the cultural and political context of Indonesia, and the type of performative claims which are most important in this context. But making effective performative claims obviously requires more than just a sound selection of appropriate representative repertoires.

**Assessing Representation as Democratic Engagement**

While democratic repertoires have only emerged recently in Indonesia’s political party system, it is clear that they are, like the performative notion, a significant focus for the

133 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 281-282.
134 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
participants in this research. Indeed, a number of participants applied a democratic understanding of representation when assessing the overall representativeness of the party system. For example, one respondent from West Java argued that:

If we are talking about representing, I feel the answer is no. There has almost never been a case of a party establishing direct communication with poor groups in the city.\textsuperscript{135}

Conversely, a participant promoting community and village radio services in North Sumatera stated: ‘I don’t know, because all this time there has never been a meeting between members of the community and members of the political parties.’\textsuperscript{136}

Participants were directly asked whether there were opportunities to connect with political parties, and whether the political parties respected the democratic rights of communities. The responses to this question were overwhelmingly negative. For example, one participant working in the sector of community housing argued that ‘political parties in Indonesia have not yet reached that phase. Maybe in general the government opens up those type of opportunities, but not representing political parties.’\textsuperscript{137} It is interesting here to note the distinction between the government and political parties despite the dominant role played by political parties within the government. A participant from South Kalimantan argued that ‘rarely does that type of thing occur, because they wouldn’t pay any attention if we didn’t attract their attention,’\textsuperscript{138} while a respondent working to empower village communities near Yogyakarta argued that ‘there are no opportunities to engage in dialog with political parties. We don’t know if the political parties respect the members of our community.’\textsuperscript{139} The perspective of a West Java participant working in the field of education echoed this view: ‘No, and I don’t know if they respect our political rights.’\textsuperscript{140}

Where engagement with political parties may have occurred, participants remained pessimistic. For example, one respondent from West Nusa Tenggara observed: ‘We

\textsuperscript{135} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{136} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{137} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{138} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{139} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{140} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
have tried to invite them to a meeting but their understanding is far away from a genuine understanding’, while another participant from Aceh responded:

No. During the time since the legislative election, many in society have complained about the relationship that has been constructed in the process of social interaction between the community and politicians.

Beyond possibilities for direct interaction, some participants suggested that political parties need to become more responsive generally to the feeling of the community. A participant from a legal aid institute in Jakarta argued, for example, that:

Political parties should listen to what is happening in the community. Because the parties represent the community, then they should give voice to the interests of the community. The issue is, the political class often have a different perspective to that of the public. At the moment the public are angry about the practice of corruption, members of parliament are actually defending their friends who have been involved in the corruption cases through supporting the weakening of the KPK [Indonesia’s anti-corruption commission].

**Menjelang pemilu saja**—Emerging only at the time of elections

Based on this notion of democratic representation, one very significant theme that emerged was the argument that political parties were only active or engaged during election times, and that for the rest of their time in office they abandoned the community. This is an important theme, as the geographical branch requirement that is the focus of this study in theory requires some basic level of connection with the community. Common sentiments in the research included the idea that ‘parties only emerge just before the election or local election,’ that ‘there is no dialog. If they want to get votes, that is when they arrive in the community,’ and that ‘they only emerge in the lead up to the election so in general the community does not really know them in a substantial way’.

Some responses were more detailed in elaborating on this theme. One participant from Bengkulu argued that:

It should be the case, parties who improve the future of the community would get the support of the community, and vice versa. In reality, however, that does not occur. A few factors which cause it are the fact that parties don’t get involved in the community anymore, they only put together votes to enter the parliament. As a result the dominant

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141 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 282.
142 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
143 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
144 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
145 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
146 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
factors which influence the results of the election are primordialism, sectarianism and money politics147.

For another participant from Lampung, it was important to highlight the focus on parties rather than communities (here the term *rakyat* is again used) in between elections:

The people’s representative council tends to act as a parties representative council during their term, but at the time of the election they are actually supported by the voice of the community [*rakyat*]148.

Similarly, a participant from West Java argued that:

The political system at this time has already provided a valuable lesson to the community in the giving of their vote, yet while that is the case, often politics is filled with interests that are not related to the promises that were made at the time of the campaign.149

This sentiment was reflected on in more detail by a respondent who worked with human rights and gender issues in Southeast Sulawesi:

In my experience with the community especially women at the grass-roots level, political parties are not important to raise issues in the community, but how parties campaign the candidates which they put forward, by bringing themselves closer to the community just with lots of promises...if the candidate that they bring is elected, whether that is as a local parliamentarian, a governor...the community is just abandoned without any more attention like that which was promised during the campaigning.150

Even where participants saw some opportunities to engage, it was clear that this was noted in the context of pessimism about the party system overall. One participant from an *adat* organisation in West Kalimantan, for instance, argued that:

There are only a few members of political parties who give opportunities to the community for dialog to request their aspirations related to development. The majority just engage in dialog in the lead up to the election. Only there is a limitation of interests which are advantageous for them and their parties. And then they will return again to praise and attract the community five years later.151

A similar observation was made by a participant from Lampung, who argued that:

The opportunity is very limited, the community is only invited to listen to political promises by the organisers of political parties who wish to nominate themselves to become members of legislative or executive bodies.152

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147 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
148 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
149 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283.
150 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 283-284.
151 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.
152 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.
Another participant from Aceh also highlighted the indirect nature of communication: ‘Yeah, not directly, sometimes via seminars or in discussions about laws regarding election procedures.’\(^{153}\) Similarly, a respondent from an Islamic organisation in South Sulawesi suggested that ‘Yeah … we often have dialog … we always value it but it can’t really be trusted…’\(^{154}\) Only one participant in the research responded in a largely positive manner regarding opportunities for engagement, arguing that:

> the opportunity is there, if the aspirations of the community are similar or the same to the desires of the political party then they will be given the opportunity to express them\(^{155}\).

One reason for the pessimism surrounding democratic representative claims may be the lack of connection with policy-making or political decisions (performative representation). For example, a participant from Jakarta suggested that:

> Political parties are actually open to dialog. It is just that much of the community is disappointed because the dialog has no result. In the context of eradicating corruption, political parties often invite me for discussion, but there are increasing numbers of DPR members who are jailed because of corruption\(^{156}\).

It was noted, for instance, that much of the success of independent claim-makers like Jokowi can be attributed to the ability to connect character and democratic claims to performative claims. The inability of political parties to do the same may be one key reason for their poor perception in the community.

In some cases opportunities to engage in governance appear to be limited, and possibly tied to close organisational links or client-patron arrangements. For example one participant from an Islamic organisation in North Maluku observed that:

> In my experience, when the local election for head of the region is won by a figure which is supported by the organisation or the majority of the organisation selects a particular figure or there is a member of our organisation who is elected, then I am involved in helping in governance\(^{157}\).

Interestingly, some participants noted that parties were focused on the structural and institutional requirements when engaging with communities. A participant from West Java noted that:

> There is a party that is represented by a legislative candidate who requested our identity cards as a form of support for the process of verification. The relationship

\(^{153}\) For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.

\(^{154}\) See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.

\(^{155}\) See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.

\(^{156}\) See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.

\(^{157}\) See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284.
they were trying to build was not ethical at all because they were only asking, or even it could be said in an indirect manner that they were forcing us, to give support (formality). And yet, we were not given any information about the ideas that were being offered by that party.\textsuperscript{158}

At all stages of the research it was clear that political party offices were not viewed as a location in which engagement between political parties and the community could take place. These offices, according to several interview participants in Kupang and Padang, were simply there to fulfil the requirements contained within the geographical branch requirement. One interview participant in Padang suggested that it was rather unclear what occurred in these offices, while a senior political party member in Kupang explained that meetings with the public or other organisations were much more likely to take place in the homes of party members than in the more formal surrounds of the party officers. The researcher’s own observations revealed that many of these offices were not open to the public on the weekdays when the research was conducted, while phone calls to the contact phone numbers displayed on the front of the office were often not answered. Even if the offices were open, many were protected by high fences, and in some cases it was difficult to even work out where the entrance actually was. Overall, this network of party offices, particularly at the more local levels of the organisation, are clearly designed to overcome the formal requirement, and are not viewed by the community as a location in which engagement can occur between party members and the community.

\textbf{Chapter Summary}

This chapter has presented the results of research into the way in which members of the audience (in this case civil society leaders from different provinces) understand representation and the role of political parties. Here, it has been argued that the representation of regional or ethnic identity is not seen as a primary concern for most participants. Instead, class—and to a lesser extent, gender—are seen as the key concern when it comes to identity representation. Participants also often used notions of character representation to assess representation or describe what representation should be. Yet, it was clear that these notions were closely reliant on both performative and democratic claims. Overall, these last two understandings of representation were the basis for the way in which most participants in the research understand

\textsuperscript{158} For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 284-285.
representation, as well as their critique of political parties and their members. Given the wide geographical and issue diversity of participants, it is startling just how consistent this critique was. The next chapter places this analysis in the context of the party system and the nationalisation of political parties.
CHAPTER NINE

Representative Repertoires, National Parties and Independent Claim-Makers

Introduction

This study has so far argued that Indonesia’s national political parties have encountered their most difficulties in engaging with performative and democratic engagement repertoires, rather than repertoires based on ethnic or regional identity. At the same time, there is growing evidence to suggest that some claim-makers are avoiding the structure of political parties, in order to make performative and democratic claims as independents claim-makers. This chapter connects this finding to the context of party system nationalisation by exploring the characteristics of Indonesia’s national parties that arguably impact their capability to engage with these increasingly important repertoires. It is argued here that party system nationalisation regulation in Indonesia has contributed towards the entrepreneurial nature of parties, the focus on organisational functions and the size of the parties, and that these factors each have important implications for the capability to make democratic and performative claims.

Independent Claim-Makers versus Parties

Given the extent to which the notion of independent claim makers has emerged in chapters six and seven, it is worth returning to this distinction here. Unfortunately this new trend emerged during the course of research – too late to inform the engagement with survey and fieldwork participants. It is important to address the validity of considering independent claim makers as distinct from members of the party system more broadly. It is possible, for instance, to construct the argument that independent claim-makers are frequently formally linked to political parties, and hence they could be understood as one component of the party system. Alternatively, it could be argued that the potential decline of political parties and the popularity of independent claim-makers is a positive development. Despite these potential arguments, this study argues that there are several reasons to be concerned about the inability of Indonesia’s political parties to develop their own reputation based on relevant repertoires of representation.
In response to the first potential argument, the rise of independent claim-makers is not an unimportant aspect of the existing party system. Admittedly, representative claim-making is a complex process. As this study has demonstrated, political parties and candidates for office can play different roles in the representative claim equation. Claims can be made with political parties as the subject of the claim (billboards connecting PAN with the concept of *merakyat* are one example), and it is also possible for claims to be made that connect individual leaders and parties as the subject of the claim (the press release from the fishing event in *Banjarnegara* included both the party leader Hatta Rajasa and PAN as the subject of claims about being *sederhana* (simple)). Yet there is a clear trend in contemporary Indonesian politics towards claims that are made with individuals as the exclusive subject of claims, while political parties are limited to being the political vehicles for those claim-makers (or, in the case of a growing number of independents, having no role at all).

The importance of individuals as claim-makers over parties was already evident in 2004 in the prominence of national presidential candidates, and the fact that voters did not follow party affiliations in their selection of Presidential candidates (Ratnawati & Haris 2008, p. 10). In reference to the 2009 election, Prasetyawan argues that:

> The elections in 2009 marked a dramatic shift in terms of political advertising where the candidates began relying more on constructed images of the self than on party reputation to appeal to voters. Previously political advertising focused on political parties and highlighted their logos, pictures as well as number because they were important for illiterate voters. By the 2009 presidential election, political advertising focused on the construction of the public image of the candidates. (2012, p. 317)

More recently, Aspinall and Fraenkel (2013, p. 3) note that ‘particularly in the eastern part of Indonesia, but also in remote and rural districts more generally, electoral contestation tends to focus on small-scale and highly personalised factors’. This trend is now clearly evident in Indonesia’s capital (Jakarta) and its third largest city (Bandung) as Ahok and Ridwan Kamil are now prominent examples of independent claim-makers who make claims about themselves as leaders, with little or no connection between their representative claims and political parties. Indeed, in the case of Ahok, he was confident enough in his own ability to engage with desired repertoires of representation that he left his political party (Gerindra). Successful and unsuccessful claims in this context affect the career of the claim-maker, but have relatively little bearing on the image of the party.
This divide, I argue, is important for two reasons: one empirical and one normative. Firstly, from an empirical perspective, political parties are unlikely to disappear from Indonesia’s political system. While there is no problem with independent candidates competing for office, their constitutional status is new and tenuous. Political parties remain the only legal competitors in local, regional and national legislative elections, and they occupy an important role in nominating candidates for the presidency. The continued central position of political parties is clearly evident in the difficulties faced by Jokowi’s in obtaining PDIP’s backing for his presidential campaign – despite his astronomical personal approval ratings at the time (Inilah.com 20 January 2014; Kompas 20 January 2014). Even where local and regional candidates for executive office are able to run independently, most candidates seek the support of parties, as the administrative and organisational burden of running for office is immense. Importantly, these same political parties occupy the national parliament—the government body through which changes to party regulation must pass. For this reason, it is difficult to see the legal role of political parties in Indonesian politics being weakened. If political parties are unavoidable, then it is important to consider how they may be developed as a positive element of the political system.

The position of parties in relation to independent claim-makers is clearly evident in the recent attempt by the national parliament to legislate to allow local executive leaders to be nominated by local parliaments, instead of being directly elected by the people (Globalindonesianvoices.com 26 September 2014). This move clearly demonstrates a desire from national political parties to ensure that local leaders are reliant on local parliaments—elected bodies that are required to be occupied only by candidates belonging to a political party—rather than building a direct connection with constituencies. In this most controversial case the divide between independent claim-makers and parties is clearly present. This attempt suggests that the growing popularity of independent claim-makers in relation to political parties has not led to a constitutional weakening of political parties, but instead to a destabilising attempt to restrict independent claim-makers. A continued situation of successful independent claims and failed party claims would potentially lead to further efforts by parties to restrict independent claim-makers.

Additionally, from a normative perspective, political parties as claim-makers possess qualities that independent claim-makers do not. The latter may be able to successfully
engage with popular repertoires for some time, but their political career is limited. Independent claim-makers are mortal, and are often also subject to other limitations on their time in office (the two-term limit for the presidency is one example). Political parties, as institutions, can outlive individual political leaders and their limited careers. Where political parties can engage with important representative repertoires, they stand to develop more long-lasting political capital and relationships with communities and constituencies. The concept of representative repertoires also suggests that political parties have potential to become the institution in which repertoires can be most readily shared and co-developed. As such, representative repertoires that are embedded within a political party can continue to benefit society once individual leaders has departed. For these reasons, the inability of political parties to make innovative and relevant representative claims is a matter of concern.

**National Political Parties and Capabilities**

If Indonesia’s national political parties have been less successful than independent claim-makers in developing and drawing on repertoires of representation, why is this the case? In elaborating the theoretical framework of representative repertoires, Chapter Three argued that two key factors are important in the success or failure of representative claim-making—the selection of appropriate representative claims, and the capability to make those claims. The selection of claims, it was argued, can rely on a number of factors, including information, creativity and the structural and institutional environment surrounding the claim-maker. The capability to draw on appropriate claims should be understood in broad terms to include the identity background, character, political history and organisational structure of the political actor. This section argues that party system nationalization, as explored in Chapter Five, is one important factor that has influenced the selection of and capability to employ appropriate representative claims (as explored in chapters Six, Seven and Eight).

It is worth restating the arguments made about party system nationalisation in Indonesia. Chapter Five has explored the institutional factors that have led to party system nationalisation—these certainly include the geographical branch requirements that constitute the starting point for this research. Yet chapter five has also argued that those laws must be understood within the context of a broader range of norms.
regarding political organisation. Not only do these norms provide a supportive environment for the establishment of such party system regulation, but they also arguably influence political discourse regarding the role and nature of political parties themselves. That political parties should naturally be ‘national’ appears to be much less problematic within political discourse in Indonesia than it would be in other societies. Chapter Five has also noted that Indonesia possesses a significantly national political party system, and indeed the political parties have become increasingly national since 1999. Clearly, there are strong formal and informal institutional forces promoting party system nationalisation, and unsurprisingly the party system features a considerably national makeup. Here, I argue that the nationalisation of Indonesia’s political party system affects the selection and capability of parties in three key ways: by influencing the basis on which parties are developed, by establishing a focus on uniform organisation within parties, and by enforcing large political parties. These issues are considered here, drawing on research data, theoretical perspectives and relevant studies of Indonesia’s party system.

The Formation of Entrepreneurial Parties
Theorising New Parties

Indonesia’s branch regulations should be seen as part of a larger trend to regulate political parties. Katz (2002, p. 90) for example, argues that political parties are now viewed in many societies as requiring regulation, to ‘a degree far exceeding what would normally be acceptable for private associations in a liberal society’. Additionally, the regulation of political parties can have a significant effect on the potential entry of new political parties (Van Biezen & Rashkova 2012, p. 900-901), and this appears to also be the case in Indonesia. Chapter Five has noted that a large number of parties that attempted to pass the registration requirement for 2014 ultimately failed. Yet besides this failure, it is important to consider the nature of those political parties that have been able to pass the requirement. In this regard, the severe nature of Indonesia’s geographical branch restriction allows some forms of party development and disallows others.

To understand the nature of a political party, as Duverger has argued, we should pay attention to the founders of the party and their goals (Duverger 1964, p. xxiii). While Michels (1962) famously declared that organisation and institutionalisation naturally lead to oligarchic tendencies, political parties do differ in the extent to which their internal structures feature strongly oligarchic tendencies versus a greater degree of
local autonomy and influence. Indeed, political parties can effectively use their structure as a representative claim: “we are a political party that favours internal democracy and therefore we are a good representative organization” (See Koelble 1989, p. 202). Koelbe’s study of the German Green’s party, for example, demonstrates an alternative form of party formation stemming from the original ideological position of the party. The German Greens enforce a number of measures aimed at ensuring that grassroots members have effective control over leaders and elected representatives—for example by requiring candidates and office holders to rotate office after a fixed period of time (Koelble 1989, p. 207). This distribution of power:

In the organization is designed to avoid the policymaking independence representatives in the established parties have. It signifies the initial intention to keep the political organization subordinated to the social component of the protest movement (Koelble 1989, p. 210).

The importance of the way in which the party is formed for its organisation is also stressed by Panebianco (1988: 50), who argues that a political parties ‘organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor’. There are no doubt a range of factors that influence the formation and ongoing development of a political party, yet the origins of the party are one important factor.

According to existing research on political parties in many different contexts, it is expected that there are a number of factors that drive the formation of new political parties. Key amongst these is the expectation that new political parties form ‘primarily to fill representational needs’ (Harmel & Roberston 1985, p. 502)—that is, they form due to a perceived gap or shortcoming in the existing party system. In research on party systems in Western Europe, this shortcoming is expected to be based on new social or political issues that are not catered for by the existing political parties. Zons (2013, p. 2) for example, argues that ‘programmatic supply by existing parties determines the leeway for programmatic innovations by new challengers and represents an important factor in the process of new party formation’. A key example of this is Green parties in Europe that have emerged and even played a role in government over the past 30 years (Poguntke 2002, p. 136-137).

The role played by ideology within Indonesia’s party system (and society) is significantly different to most European societies, and hence deserves special attention. In recent years, several scholars have noted that ideology is not completely
absent from the Indonesian political party system. Barrett (2011, p. 88) for example, has noted that ideology ‘can play a major role in driving contemporary political debates in Indonesia’, observing the extent to which different ideological positions on the notion of nationalism were important in debates regarding the Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA)\textsuperscript{159}. Mietzner (2013, p. 167-191) has also explored the ‘postponed end of ideology’\textsuperscript{160}, noting the role of ideology in debates regarding the religious status of the state, social issues such as the controversial anti-pornography laws, and the LOGA. Aspinall (2013, p. 109-114) argues that labor activism, though fragmented, is still relevant in Indonesian society and politics. Yet it is clear that divisive ideological appeals are rarely the basis for representative claims, and perceived ideological gaps appear to have played little role in the emergence of new political parties. There are important historical reasons for this— the ‘eradication of the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] for example, and ‘the suppression of the political left by the New Order regime’ are two factors that have led to the fact that the ‘capital-labor cleavage is today almost absent in the party system’ (Ufen 2008, p. 19). Additionally, some of the post-modern political and social issues that have emerged in European societies are yet to have the same influence in Indonesia.

Yet it could still be argued that dissatisfaction with existing parties provides impetus for the emergence of new parties within Indonesia. This dissatisfaction in many ways is not based on programmatic issues, but rather issues of performance. New political parties have arguably taken advantage of the failures of the existing parties to perform (or, in the language of this study, to make successful representative claims). Yet, while some of the limitations of existing parties have led to opportunities for new ones, it is notable that new political parties that have been able to overcome the registration laws share key traits with existing parties; this makes it difficult to challenge them (and their established style).

**Indonesia’s New Parties**

A simple distinction can be made between two vastly different motivations for establishing a new political party. On one hand, a party can develop as a result of the political desires of a social or ideological movement within society. These movements react to what they perceive as an injustice within society or an ideological niche within the political system. This is true of some green parties where an environmental

\textsuperscript{159} Also see McGibbon (2006, p. 326-329)

\textsuperscript{160} This is the title of the relevant chapter in Mietzner’s book.
movement commonly precedes the establishment of the party. Yet many other social movements—for instance organised labour, religious or anti-war movements—also potentially form political parties. The existence of an ideological or social impetus for the party does not preclude practices of oligarchy within the party, as Sartori cautions:

Patronage appears to be a rather constant feature of politics; thus the parties of principle may remain principled and ideologically uncontaminated and yet become involved in patronage as soon as they are in a position to distribute spoils. (2010, p. 12)

Yet these parties have an independent and meaningful identity; in Sartori’s words (2010, p. 12), the ‘party becomes more real than personalities or personages, at least in the sense that the party both outlasts its leaders and binds them to its own logic of inertia’. The sense of common purpose or mission that led to the emergence of the party provides some cohesion for its members and leaders, even while internal party politics and human weaknesses constantly—and perhaps inevitably—threaten that cohesion.

The alternative type of party formation has inspired numerous descriptions and labels; yet, an apt characterisation is what Harmel and Svasland (1993) call ‘entrepreneurial’ parties. Entrepreneurial parties are commonly formed ‘by one person who does not hold a position in government’ and ‘must have external and individual origins’. These parties therefore ‘are new formations that cannot rely on ties to already organized societal groups’ (Arter 2013, p. 3). In the absence of the ideological identity, support and resources provided by an existing movement, the entrepreneurial party relies on the ambitions, resources and profile of the founding leader who becomes the basis of the party. As the name suggests, these parties are not responding to a social or ideological gap in the political system, but instead seek to construct a market for themselves, and particularly for their politically ambitious leaders.

In Indonesia, it is clear that all of the new parties that have emerged since the 2004 election largely match the characteristics of the entrepreneurial party. PD (2004), Gerindra (2009), Hanura (2009) and Nasdem (2014) have all been established based on the leadership of a single leader (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Prabowo Subianto, Wiranto and Surya Paloh respectively) and without an already established ideological or social identity. Nasdem is unique in some ways as the party founder, Surya Paloh, a former member of Golkar and a prominent media mogul, together with other prominent figures, delayed the formation of the party to first pursue the creation of a
mass organisation called the *Nasional Demokrat*. This organisation held events throughout Indonesia featuring energetic speeches and stylish slogans, but with little in the way of a cohesive ideological position. After repeated denials that the mass organisation was the vehicle for the establishment of a party, a party was indeed setup to contest the 2014 elections—much to the disappointment of some prominent Nasdem members who later left the organisation (*The Jakarta Post* 26 April 2011).

Despite the efforts to go through the motions of establishing a social organisation, it is clear that Surya Paloh’s immense wealth and media resources have been particularly important to the establishment of both the organisation and the party, and once the party was established, the organisation disappeared.161 One of the senior figures within the organisation and party, fellow media mogul Hary Tanoe, left the party for Hanura in 2013, arguing that he was disappointed Paloh had decided to take the reigns of the party rather than promoting young leaders from the organisation. Tanoe was quoted as stating that ‘senior members should stand at the back and provide support, not taking the leadership themselves’ (*Merdeka.com* 21 January 2013)162. Despite the pretence of establishing a mass organisation, it is clear that Nasdem fits the above description of the entrepreneurial party.

In the case of the other three parties, there is little doubt that they are based on the ambition, resources and profile of their respective leaders. PD was designed as a political vehicle for SBY, allowing him to compete for and win the Presidency in 2004—to the extent that Tomsa (2008, p. 179) has labelled PD as a ‘blatantly personalistic party which relies almost exclusively on the appeal of its founder’. The members and leaders of the party do not reflect a specific social group within society, but instead a ‘rag-tag collection of former bureaucrats and military officers, provincial businesspeople, and former student and NGO activists’ (Aspinall & Fraenkel 2013, p. 16). The party became prominent only when SBY himself became popular just before the 2004 election (Qodari 2005, p. 80), and the popularity of the party peaked in the 2009 election when Yudhoyono’s popularity was at its highest point (Sherlock 2009, p. 9). Despite some attempts to promote other future leaders within the party, PD’s result in the legislative election in 2014 largely reflected both Yudhoyono’s flagging popularity, as well as his inability to run again for President having served the

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161 It is now very difficult to find evidence of the *Nasional Demokrat*.
162 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 285.
constitutional limit of two terms. PD has attracted a number of local, regional and national figures, and draws resources from a wide range of sources. But the profile of Yudhoyono has undoubtedly been central to its success, and it now faces the uncertain fate that is common to many entrepreneurial parties (Arter 2013, p. 3). Hanura and Gerindra are both also based on the identity of former military generals and feature an ‘equally heterogeneous social composition’ (Aspinall & Fraenkel 2013, p. 16).

The emergence of entrepreneurial parties during the reformasi period is no accident. There are a number of factors which have driven their emergence, including the failure of existing parties to establish strong connections with society and the ambition of powerful figures. Yet the geographical branch restriction effectively favour this form of party formation. Indeed, there are only two possible means by which a social movement would be able to form a political party under the current regulations. The first is for a range of organisations around Indonesia with a common purpose joining together to form an organisation sufficiently broad to pass the registration requirements. An example of this may be labour unions in each province around Indonesia coordinating themselves into a single political party. The cooperation and cohesion needed to achieve such a feat is highly unlikely without a strong central leader, which would arguably lead to the tendencies seen in the top down entrepreneurial parties discussed above.

The second possibility is an existing national social organisation or movement establishing a political party. The example of Nasdem suggests that were a genuine social movement to slowly develop and build a national organisation, then it would be possible for the organisation to establish a political party (though the threat of capture by powerful leaders would remain). Arguably, the only two existing social organisations with sufficient coverage and resources to establish a party would be the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Islamic organisations, and both of these organisations are already affiliated with political parties (PKB and PAN). Notably, both PKB and PAN established their identity before the strengthening of the laws. No other social organisation has the national coverage or resources to establish a political party in this way.163

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163 Indeed it is questionable whether even these large and long existing social organisations would be able to establish a political organisation that could pass the registration requirements as they currently stand, given their lack of influence in some provinces around Indonesia.
Hindering Alternative Forms of Party Development
It is worth considering the forms of party formation that would be possible without the existence of the current regulation. One possibility is for an ideologically based organisation to emerge in a locality or region, and have success at the local or regional political level. This success could then lead to the party attempting to develop in other regions. A hypothetical example can be provided: a workers’ party that gains a rise in the minimum wage for workers on the island of Batam would likely gain the attention of labour organisations in other parts of Indonesia. A range of possibilities could follow, including other parties attempting to engage with the established representative repertoire, or even the Batam party expanding based on its success and beginning to operate in other regions. At a basic level, the hypothetical Batam party is performing a performative representative claim at a local level, and using this success to make more convincing claims.

Besides an ideological identity, a political party could be established based on innovative political practices. This could include, for example, claims based on genuine democratic engagement with citizens or a merit-based cadre system. These type of claims are much easier to make successfully on a small scale without the need for a hierarchical party structure and organisation. To some extent, the establishment of Partai Keadilan, which would later become PKS, followed this model. The model of merit-based cadre recruitment and promotion established within the party is closely connected to the party’s roots amongst a dedicated, but small network of like-minded individuals in several urban areas of Javanese cities. The success of this model allowed the party to pursue its ideas in broader areas and amongst constituencies that did not resemble the typical supporters of the party. Another example could include parties whose structure does not follow the established hierarchical territorial network which is the norm among the established parties (as well as other organisations like the KPU). A social media party which connects members via social media rather than branches, or a party with headquarters in another region other than Jakarta are examples of parties making quite different claims about their representativeness, but are hard to establish under the current laws.

These examples are familiar in some regards, because they are a model which has proven so successful for independent claim-makers. Jokowi established himself via performative, character and democratic engagement claims at a local city level, before moving to a larger role as a governor and finally winning the presidential election.
Much of Jokowi’s later success is built upon engagement with smaller and more manageable issues at the local level. This is a crucial example of the extent to which representative claim-making can develop at lower levels before expanding to higher political offices. Other independent claim-makers have also established their identity as representatives at lower levels—for example Ahok was a regent on the small island of Belitung before becoming deputy governor and then governor of Jakarta, while Ignasius Jonan made successful performative claims as head of the Indonesian national rail network before becoming minister for transport. This model of representative development is likely to continue—successful local leaders like Ridwan Kamil are likely to seek to achieve higher office in the future. It is notable, therefore, that Indonesia’s party laws prevent political parties from following the same trajectory as successful independent claim-makers.

This is not to suggest that developing repertoires from the grassroots level to the national level will automatically lead to success. For every Jokowi there are numerous other politicians who lacked the innovative repertoires or the capability to employ them. A Darwinian process of political competition and judgement means that politicians who are able to prove their success at the local level can then use that profile and political capital in higher positions, while many others are not able to match that achievement. But the important point is that, in part due to the geographical branch restriction, there is little potential for a political party to follow the trajectory of these independent claim-makers. A local or regional labour party that delivers results for its constituency at a local level (in a way that other local labour parties have not), or a local party that proves over time to be disciplined in the face of corrupt and patronage politics at the local level cannot use this political capital to develop into a party operating at a broader level.

**Implications of Party Formation**

The fact that new parties are exclusively entrepreneurial has consequences for their nature and hence their ability to perform representative claims. As the party is designed to be a political vehicle for the party founder, power is naturally heavily centralised. Svasand (2013, p. 266-267) argues that:

> It seems reasonable to hypothesize that party entrepreneurs are motivated by using the party machinery to control access to power and may not, at least in the short run, be interested in building a party organization, which as it develops may be less easy to control … When party entrepreneurs eventually resign from politics one way or
Svasand’s characterisation of the entrepreneurial party is not completely applicable to the Indonesian political system—parties in Indonesia are better institutionalised and organised than many entrepreneurial parties, and appear likely to outlive their founders in some cases (even PD goes on despite SBY’s departure from office). Yet the emphasis placed on the party founder is clearly applicable.

While these party leaders are focused on the most significant political positions at the national level, the political party is also attractive to supporters because of the opportunities it provides. These opportunities are hence a much greater incentive for supporters than any programmatic or ideological connection to the identity of the party. Fionna (2013, p. 192), for instance, notes that:

...party ideologies serve as mere slogans and ideas largely unattached to party operations. Except for PKS, ordinary members of the party branches examined here had little knowledge of their parties and were not engaged in party life. In short, participation in party life was superficial for the bulk of party members.

Party supporters are mainly those who obtain an advantage from the party (a job, a chance at public office, a temporary reward such as cash or food). This does not mean that political parties are exclusively elitist or do not engage with everyday citizens—indeed, as Mietzner (2013, p. 90) notes, ‘Indonesian parties constitute a kaleidoscope of society, with all its attractive and ugly faces’. Aspinall’s (2010) observations of a national PDIP event would arguably also be relevant to these new parties:

In their physical appearance and personal style, the delegates looked like what they are: a cross section of remarkably ordinary, and mostly lower middle-class, small town and provincial Indonesians. Local party powerbrokers were in evidence, but most were small time entrepreneurs and provincial politicians, not big business types or big city sophisticates.

Yet opportunity is arguably the most important resource that political parties possess, and members of the public with no direct relationship with a party have little sense of connection. In a telling survey conducted in 2011, for instance, only 20 percent of respondents replied that they felt close to a specific political party—a reduction from 86 percent in 1999 when aliran connections were more influential (LSI, 2011).

These traits have implications for the selection of representative claims. Some democratic claims are also less likely to be selected by candidates and parties—particularly democratic claims that require giving up some authority or power within
the structure of the party. This is the case because leaders at all levels are primarily connected to the party as a vehicle for their own ambitions—and the selection of claims which may give up power to others may compete with their other interests. Lacking a strong ideological or social base, these parties are also more likely to work to their strengths and select performative claims that provide direct material benefits to citizens—the claims based on money politics discussed in Chapter Seven, for example.

There are also clear implications for the capability of such parties to make claims. The entrepreneurial nature of the political party means that it naturally attracts wealthier and successful candidates for office—as such these candidates will often face capability challenges in their ability to draw on representative repertoires based on being sederhana or engaging in activities of merakyat. The wealth of party leaders like Aburizal Bakrie from Golkar is well known, and presents challenges when attempting to draw on these claims. The claim that Bakrie made regarding his use of the the modest form of transportation known as ojek would be unconvincing to most Indonesian citizens. It is also difficult to hide the purpose of party development and the power relations within political parties. The public in Indonesia are well aware of the hierarchical nature of power relations within parties, and they are also aware of the substantial cost to individual candidates to gain the support of political parties for their campaigns. It is little surprising, then, that political parties are viewed as elitist and oligarchic in nature. The cohesive influence of money and opportunity means that cases of corruption, collusion and patronage are much more common within parties, harming their ability to make both character and performative claims about being bersih. The connection between these traits and their public image is noted by Tomsa, who argues that:

Of course, the lack of visionary ideas is just one of many problems the parties face. Other frequently mentioned shortcomings include poorly developed organisational infrastructure, neglect of parliamentary obligations, and susceptibility to corruption and illicit fundraising ... That these issues are not just of concern for academic debates but can have direct consequences for the parties’ electoral prospects—and thus, by implication, for their long-term survival—became clear in 2009, when all but one of the six core parties represented in all post-1998 parliaments lost votes. (2010, p. 317)

While Aspinall and Fraenkel (2013, p. 29) concur that the prevalence of ‘money politics’ is one of the major sources of public disillusionment with the political parties and wider political system’. Interestingly, a taxi driver quoted by Emmerson (2004, p. 95) makes the same observation: ‘Now there are lots of parties. Why? Because if you
set up a party you can get money from the government, that’s why. They only want the money.’

As entrepreneurial political parties act predominantly as a vehicle for the careers of national, regional and local level politicians, there are significant incentives for party candidates and officials to resort to undemocratic means and money politics in order to further establish their authority. This phenomenon was noted early in the *reformasi* period, particularly at the local level (see Choi 2004). And Indonesia’s new political parties are little different in this regard.

Lastly, in restricting political parties built from the grassroots, the party registration requirements prevent any political parties developing first at the local or regional level before (potentially) expanding their operations to the national level. This is important, as in a large and complex state like Indonesia, performative repertoires are much easier to develop at the local or regional level. The case of Jokowi (and to some extent other individual claim-makers like Ahok) demonstrates the power of beginning with small issues at a local level, developing effective and popular representative repertoires, and gradually expanding and developing these repertoires with larger issues and broader constituencies. Hence in the case of Jokowi the repertoire of democratic engagement he developed in responding to the issue of street traders in the small city of Solo was further developed and employed in response to issues such as flooding and public housing in the capital Jakarta, and has become the basis for the development of broader repertoires as a presidential candidate and president elect. Recently, for example, Jokowi’s transition team employed an online poll in which everyday citizens could give their feedback regarding cabinet choices (*The Jakarta Post* 25 July 2014). The development of a reputation based on successful adoption of representative repertoires at the local level is not likely in the case of political parties.

**Competition with the Established Parties**
The emergence of new political parties has implications for competition with Indonesia’s existing political parties. On one hand, there is evidence that some of the parties that existed prior to the strengthening of the laws have an established social or ideological base. Golkar can rely on a strong network of local organisers and members, and PDIP has a strong base in the *abangan* community in Java, as well as in Bali and some other provinces. PKB has a strong connection to the Islamic organisation *Nahdlatul Ulama*, while PAN is affiliated with *Muhammadiyah*. The continued
relevance of *aliran* connections means that some existing parties are at least embedded within existing social structures. PKS developed a strong cadre-based party structure, and its ideological basis is probably the strongest of any party. Analyses of political party organisation at the local level, such as those by Fionna (2013) and Mietzner (2013), demonstrate that political parties do engage citizens and communities in socio-cultural activities (Fionna 2013, p. 144) and provide material benefits for communities. Finally, it is important to add that many of the challenges and issues faced by political parties in Indonesia are not unique to that country—indeed, they are universal issues facing political parties in many representative democracies.

Yet, on the other hand, some of the traits found in the new political parties are also evident in these existing parties. PKB and PDIP have both featured strong central leaders, while all of Indonesia’s parties are strongly hierarchical in their structure. Even PKS has been critiqued for a lack of internal party democracy (Tomsa 2010, p. 318). While these parties were able to form before the establishment of the current laws, Chapter Five has noted that all political parties must pass geographical branch restrictions each election cycle—and hence some of the structural and institutional effects of the laws also affect these parties. The analysis presented in Chapter Five has noted that many political parties that existed in 1999 have gradually become more national—for example PKB, Golkar and PKS. Beyond the structural effects of the regulation, the norms reinforced by party regulation regarding the appropriate form of political organisation influence both new and old parties alike.

While the branch requirement may have had more of an influence on the development of new parties than existing parties, it is clear that the entrance of PD, Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem has implications for competition within the party system. New political parties, as argued above, are expected to respond to a gap in the party system—either performance or ideology-based. But new political parties can also potentially alter the competition between parties in the party system. By considering the way in which representative repertoires operate, it can be expected that parties that introduce innovative and successful repertoires will drive innovation and development within the party system itself. Yet the very nature of the new political parties in Indonesia has not achieved this. While they have been able to emerge partly due to dissatisfaction with existing political parties, it is not clear that they are any different in their ability to make different representative claims. As such, the entrance of new political parties
that do not select innovative repertoires or have the capability to perform them not only has implications for those parties, but also the party system as a whole.

**Prioritising the Organisational Function**

One effect of the geographical branch restriction affects all political parties—both old and new. The nature and severity of the regulations creates a powerful norm about political party organisation and function that favours structure and branch hierarchies over creativity. Specifically, they reinforce the notion that one of the most important functions of political parties is their organisational complexity. As such, one of the main priorities for Indonesia’s political parties is to use their resources in order to develop this organisational complexity.

This phenomenon was certainly evident during several stages of the research process. During a number of discussions with local party leaders, the researcher was regularly offered charts detailing the structure of political parties. Political party officials appeared proud of these documents and were much more comfortable discussing the achievement of organisational structures and hierarchies rather than creative representative claims being made by candidates or the party. In many ways, the achievement of structural objectives appears to be seen as an important representative claim in itself—‘our party represents well because we have developed a strong organisational structure’.

Moreover, a very specific organisational structure is effectively enforced by the branch requirement. Chapter Five has argued that this model has some precedence in other political or social organisations in Indonesia (Golkar and the military during the Suharto regime, for instance). Physical offices spanning across the three political levels, card-carrying members, and hierarchical leadership structures are basically imposed on political parties. There is no space, for instance, for a political party that seeks to connect with voters and constituencies through social media and online resources (the relatively new phenomenon of ‘e-parties’ or ‘cyber parties’; Margetts 2001). The law establishes one model as the model of political party organisation.

Yet there is substantial evidence to suggest that the imposed party structure is not an effective means for making representative claims. Many of the political party offices required by the law are only operational at the time of verification and during elections. The researcher conducted fieldwork in June and July 2013—in between the
verification process and the election, and during observations at several parties’ offices at the kabupaten and kecamatan levels in Padang, Kupang, Jakarta and Yogyakarta, it was clear that the offices were not open to the general public, and many appeared to be unoccupied. One kabupaten-level office in Padang, for example, was located on the second floor of a restaurant, with no clear entrance. The phone number on the sign in front of the office was not operational when called by the researcher.

Political party offices at the provincial level appeared to be more active (several discussions during field research were conducted in these offices)—but again there was no clear ongoing engagement with the community: most of these offices did not appear to welcome walk-in members of the public. When asked about the opportunities for community engagement, almost all respondents during fieldwork did not see this as a central role for political party offices. One interview participant in Kupang argued that most consultation between the public and political party figures in that region occurred in private homes, rather than the more uncomfortable surrounds of the formal offices. In theory, such a vast network of access points for the public possesses significant potential as a source of claims—particularly based on the notion of democratic engagement. Yet this potential appears to be largely wasted. Indeed, some of the evidence detailed in chapter seven suggestes that independent claim-makers are beginning to develop their own ‘centres’, ‘house of aspiration’ and active social media profiles in order to bypass the political party structure.

But despite the lack of purpose of many of these offices, significant resources, energy and time are required to maintain them. One estimate made by the SRI party petitioners in the case against the laws argued that:

> It would cost at least Rp 200 million (US$22,000) just to buy seals for official documents. With the country’s 497 cities and regencies as well as about 6,300 districts, it would cost an additional Rp 7.04 billion for rent, assuming a small office costs Rp 2 million in annual rent (The Jakarta Post 27 September 2011).

That is a figure of about US$600,000 just for the cost of renting offices—a significant amount of money in Indonesia. Other expenses, including staff wages, advertising and administrative costs, would likely significantly increase that figure. The time and energy needed to administer that network of offices and recruit members and supporters in each region is also significant. Thus even though the offices do not play an overall meaningful role in the way that political parties connect with local communities, the resources needed to maintain this network are huge. This cost is even
more considerable when compared to other political systems. In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, a political party can register itself based on a membership of 500 individuals and a $500 fee.

This extra cost is important considering the lack of state resources for political parties in Indonesia. The level of state funding for political parties has significantly reduced since the first few years of reformasi. Mietzner (2013, p. 73) for example, notes that in the case of PDIP, state subsidies had paid for 51.7 percent of their election costs in 1999, but only 1.1 percent in 2004 and .4 percent in 2009. Because there is little state funding, the extra cost imposed by these restrictions means that political parties have further impetus to ask for funds from aspiring candidates or to obtain them from other sources (further impacting the capabilities of candidates to perform some claims).

As a result, the laws contribute towards a specific party model. This model is based on a hierarchical network of authority and physical branches, but without a strong connection to the public through these branches. Party resources are needed to achieve the required organisational complexity, but are rarely used to make innovative representative claims. There is, notably, significant space for alternative forms of political party organisation that might challenge these existing norms regarding the function of political parties; yet, potential challengers are effectively barred from taking part in elections. Indeed, Chapter Five has demonstrated that Indonesia’s new political parties are amongst the most national in nature, and appear to have met the existing norm regarding political party function to a greater extent than some existing parties.

**Party Size and Development Speed**

One other important consequence of the geographical branch requirement is the size of parties. Indonesia’s political parties cannot be small organisations: they must have the organisational depth to cover the required geographical area (including sufficient cadres and members) and central administrative structure to oversee this nationwide network. Considering the geographical size and population of the nation, Indonesia’s parties are amongst the largest in the world. Beyond the required size, new political parties have had to develop this broad structure in a relatively short period of time – there is no phase of development in which parties start as small organisations.
The required size of parties has implications for their ability to engage with some repertoires. Historically, in theoretical terms, the relationship between size and democracy has been considered important. As Dahl and Tufte argue:

Until quite recently … there was little dissent among political philosophers from the view that a democracy or a republic had to be small: a democracy had to be a city-state, by modern standards quite tiny. (1973, p. 4)

Like democracy in states, scholars have turned their attention to the size of political parties and its effects on the nature of parties. Scholars—beginning with Michels—have noted the effects of party size and the development of complex internal party bureaucracies, arguing that complex organizational structures ‘diminish intra-party participation by increasing the importance of individual resources and decreasing efficacy and psychological engagement’ (Weldon 2006, p. 474; also see: Michels 1962). Tan (1998, p. 196) connects the size of a party to organisational complexity, and finds that ‘intraparty participation suffers in large parties’. Weldon (2006, p. 474-475) tests the relationship between size and intra-party democracy over a large number of parties and democracies, finding that while size has a negative effect on intra-party democracy, organizational complexity is associated with reducing some of these negative effects.

The size of Indonesia’s political parties also means that they are increasingly exposed to the behaviour of their members. With greater size comes a greater likelihood that some members or elected officials from that party will be involved in corruption scandals or other publicised misbehaviour. In recent years all of Indonesia’s major political parties have been plagued by scandals. SBY’s PD was particularly badly hit by the corruption scandals that engulfed some of its highest ranked officials, including former treasurer Nazzaruddin. Fealy aptly characterised the drama caused by this scandal:

Nazaruddin denied all of the allegations and retaliated by threatening to reveal the involvement in corrupt behaviour of many PD colleagues and other parliamentarians. At a meeting at SBY’s residence in May, for example, it is said that he brazenly told the president that his son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, together with Andi Mallarangeng and Andi’s brother, the trusted PD political consultant Zulkarnain ‘Choel’ Mallarangeng, were all implicated in corruption, and threatened to release evidence to support his claim. He later accused the chair of PD, Anas Urbaningrum, of also being party to financial misdealings. (2011, p. 341-342)

Other political parties have also been affected by these scandals and had their reputations tarnished.
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The greater exposure to issues of corruption and behaviour has a significant affect on the capability of parties. As has been argued in previous chapters, one of the most important representative repertoires centres around notions of ‘cleanliness’ from corruption, and individual claim-makers such as Jokowi and Ahok owe some of their popularity for establishing (at least so far) a reputation for cleanliness. This was also a key factor in the success of PKS in 2004—the party was able to establish its image as a ‘clean’ political party that was anti-corruption. Yet implication in scandals makes it very difficult for political parties to draw on repertoires related to cleanliness and anti-corruption. This is true, for instance, of individual politicians—Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono lost his image as being the leader of the national anti-corruption drive due to scandals affecting his party—but it is also true of political parties: a series of scandals has severely tarnished the reputation of PKS, meaning that the party’s capability to draw on repertoires based on being anti-corruption are not as successful as they were in 2004, and partially as a result of this PKS has made little progress since 2004.

To some extent this is an unavoidably reality of being part of an organisation. Yet it is not only the size of political parties that is relevant, but also the speed at which they are expected to become large. With parties expected to be large immediately, there is little opportunity to develop the type of cohesive identity, internal trust, ideological base or internal bureaucratic strength that might reduce opportunities for corruption. If traditionally scholars have been concerned about the lack of cohesion and trust in larger polities, these fears appear to be even more relevant in large organisations that did not previously develop from a smaller size.

Even in the case of existing parties that have had some time to develop into larger organisations, the pace of growth presents challenges. PKS, for example, was able to develop a strong core of cadres with a common ideological commitment; yet, the increasing demands of political party development and the parties ensuing attempts to spread its influence to all provinces in Indonesia have at the same time made it more vulnerable to scandals which have severely affected its image. Indeed:

Many in PKS regard 2011 as an annus horribilis in which the party has been beset by a succession of controversies that have greatly tarnished its standing as a ‘clean’, reformist and morally exemplary party. (Fealy 2011, p. 344)

Similarly, Hamayotsu notes that:
There is growing speculation and concern that a few powerful figures, most notably the chairman of the assembly and spiritual leader Hilmi Aminuddin and the secretary-general Anis Matta, exert extraordinary influence in the council and the party, particularly as the party becomes bigger and more powerful after the 2004 election (2011, p. 150)

All political parties are potentially susceptible to the immoral behaviour of their members; but the fast development of large political parties with access to power, and where opportunity (rather than a strong party identity) is the source of cohesion, the susceptibility to corruption and other scandals is arguably much greater.

Large, broad-based political parties face other potential capability issues. These parties are, by nature, highly aggregative—and as such need to balance between different priorities. The Sidoarja crisis in East Java is an example of a local policy issue that has significantly affected local residents. Can a national political party draw on performative repertoires in response to this crisis as well as a local political party could? Would the potential for affected local residents to establish their own political party provide a more effective response to the crisis?

Indonesia has also undergone a considerable process of decentralisation since 1999—meaning that a significant amount of state resources are now distributed at lower levels of government. There is research from other political contexts to suggest that where local and regional governments have a greater influence on the lives of citizens, citizens are more likely to vote for local parties over national political parties. Based on a study of Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States, Chibber and Kollman find that:

The cumulative effect of having voters and candidates who are motivated by the nature of political authority in the country is that party systems…respond to the degree of political and economic centralization in the country. More provincialization leads to greater party system fragmentation, especially along geographic lines, and more centralization leads to more consolidation of votes into national party labels. (2004, p. 223)

These findings suggest that small, local political parties may be more effective at making performative claims in decentralised states such as Indonesia. Additionally—while this study has argued that identity claims are not as important in Indonesia as performative and democratic claims—in contexts where identity is comparatively more powerful as a political issue, local or regional parties may be more suited to making effective representative claims – particularly in local and regional legislatures.
**Other Factors**

This chapter has argued that there are a number of ways in which party system nationalisation has influenced the capability of political parties to engage with important repertoires. It is important, however, to recognise that there are, of course, other important factors that limit the capabilities of political parties, and these factors are not necessarily limited to the Indonesian context. The discussion above has drawn attention to the constraints presented by the geographical branch restriction, but in understanding the capabilities of political parties to effectively draw on specific repertoires, it is important to also consider other relevant factors.

It has been argued here that the geographical branch requirement has incentivised leader-focused entrepreneurial parties. While these regulations are important, the trend of leader-focused parties is not limited to Indonesia—and indeed is evident in societies without strict nationalisation restrictions (Garzia 2011). In the United States, campaigns have increasingly focused on the identity and character of individual leaders, and this has also been evident in other countries such as Australia. Australian political advertisements in the 1950s and 1960s presented the party logo and identity ahead of candidates’ identities, whereas in modern campaigns the party identity often comes second to the leader themselves. Various reasons are often cited to explain this development, including the pervasive nature of modern media and the reduced relevance of traditional partisan divides. In the context of Indonesia, Liddle and Mulyani have argued that:

> Voter attention to leaders is almost certainly driven by the rapid spread and great popularity in recent years of television and of the current atmosphere of media freedom and pluralism. Television exposure has sharply increased both voter knowledge of individual political leaders and perceived ability to evaluate those leaders. (2007, p. 850)

While the side effects of Indonesia’s geographical branch requirement incentivise leader-driven parties, this also takes place in a context in which leader-focused campaigns have become more common.

It should also be noted that this study has largely conflated legislative and executive elections. While this has allowed the study to broadly explore the nature of claim-making, executive elections are arguably more leader-focused than legislative elections. Political parties may potentially have a greater opportunity to make claims in legislative settings – for instance in the parliament where their members are...
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expected to work together under a party or faction banner – than in an executive setting. As such, besides the impact of party nationalisation laws, the different context of executive and legislative elections should also be considered as a potential factor.

While this is the case, a further institutional change in Indonesia may have blurred the distinction between legislative and executive elections – the shift from a closed party list system to an open list. In 1999 the electoral system was based on a closed list, meaning that voters had no control over the individual candidates that would be elected when they choose a political party. While a change was made leading up to the 2004 election to give voters the option of expressing an individual preference, this reform was not particularly meaningful – only two candidates were ultimately awarded seats based on this system in 2004 (Sherlock 2009, p. 5). Further reform (initially in the parliament but later through the constitutional court) leading up to the 2009 election meant that a complete open list has been introduced, where candidates would be elected based on their individual vote share, and not their position on the party list.

The implication of this reform was that individual candidates had a further incentive to develop their own individual popularity as compared to the that of the party. Candidates were now competing not only with candidates from other parties, but also with other candidates from their own party. As Sherlock (2009, p. 7) notes:

The content of posters, banners and stickers began to focus more and more on local candidates instead of parties and national leaders. In the 1999 and 2004 campaigns, election advertising rarely mentioned candidate names. PDIP material, for example, concentrated on Megawati in previous campaigns, but now featured the names and photos of local candidates, with Megawati as a background figure. Many candidates went to considerable length to prove that they were “sons of the soil” of the local area or had some other profile worthy of attention.

Clearly, the change from a closed to a closed to an open list has important implications for the relationship between individual candidates and political parties. Individual candidates were clearly provided further incentive to focus on their own identity rather than that of their political party, while as a whole this also makes it more difficult for political parties to develop their own identity. While this study has focused on the implications of party system nationalisation, other institutional factors such as the use of the open list should also be recognized.

It is also important to recognise that the general unpopular position of political parties is, in itself, a constraint on their capability to make representative claims. The unpopular reputation of political parties is a widely observable phenomenon across
different societies and political systems. In Indonesia an anti-party sentiment is quite evident in post-reformasi society. As early as 2002, Paige Tan (2002, p. 485) had noted it was:

Common in Indonesian political discourse for parties to be derided as power-hungry, selfish, and corrupt. Commentators, intellectuals, and even party politicians themselves often lament that the country is experiencing a ‘crisis of leadership’ or a ‘moral crisis’.

The unpopular position of parties has certainly not reversed since 2002 (Mietzner 2008, p. 441). Tan notes several reasons for this anti-party sentiment, but the most important is the role of parties within Indonesia’s political history. According to this view, an anti-party sentiment is ingrained within Indonesia’s political history, partly due to the backlash against the experience of the 1950s, when political parties ‘took the overwhelming share of the blame for the government’s failure to deliver’ (Tan 2002, p. 490). This presented an opportunity for Sukarno to argue that:

Western liberal democracy and its attendant political parties needlessly sundered the harmony of the political community … Western liberal democracy, or 50 per cent + 1 (separu tambah satu) democracy, as Soekarno began to mock it, was not in keeping with Indonesia’s indigenous democratic traditions. Culture was used (and crafted) by Soekarno to justify moving away from parties and parliamentary democracy. (Tan 2002, p. 490).

This anti-party sentiment was embedded within Suharto era politics, where the number of political parties was heavily restricted and the government ‘party’ was not even a party at all (Tan, 2002: 491). More importantly:

Indoctrination through government-enforced ideological training classes and government control of the media reinforced the regime’s contention that Indonesia was far too heterogeneous a country to allow the unfettered competition of different political parties (Tan, 2002, p. 491).

Additionally, the perceived poor performance (and significant early proliferation) of political parties in the reformasi period has, at least for some citizens, reinforced the negative perception of political parties. Since reformasi, political parties and the party system have consistently ranked as one of the least trusted political institutions in Indonesia.

The negative image of political parties arguably reduces their capability as representative claim-makers. Distrust regarding the corrupt and self-interested nature of political parties means that many claims are not accepted by the community. It is difficult, for example, for political parties to make believable representative claims
based on the fight against corruption, or based on pursuing the interests of the community. This anti-party sentiment was clearly apparent in the survey data presented within this research. This negative perception of political parties is of course not directly caused by party system nationalisation, and the history of this sentiment stretches long before the geographical branch requirement was introduced. Yet the nationalisation of the party system, and the inability of those national parties to draw successfully on important representative repertoires, may have also contributed towards reinforcing anti-party sentiments in the reformasi era. And finally, while Indonesia’s short history as a nation has been coloured by a range of well-known individual leaders, there is also a strong tradition of political organisations with their own distinct character that transcends the influence of any one leader (NU and Muhammadiyah are good examples).

**Summary**

This chapter has presented three arguments. Firstly, existing regulations have affected the type of parties that are able to enter the political system and their competition with existing parties. Indonesia’s entrepreneurial parties are heavily restricted in their ability to draw on important democratic and performative claims, and their inability to challenge existing political parties is important. Secondly, the nationalisation laws contribute to the power of norms regarding what a political party is and which functions are important. Indonesia’s registered political parties are structured in similar ways, and innovative forms of organisation are unlikely. The cost of developing this structure also potentially restricts resources available for more creative representative claims. Lastly, this chapter has argued that Indonesia’s nationalisation laws require large, aggregative political parties. Large parties—particularly those that have grown over a short time—lack the opportunity to develop cohesion, and before the party can develop a strong identity it is prone to the misdeeds of its members. These three arguments must of course be understood in the context of other relevant factors, and some of the observations made here could be applied to political parties in other contexts. Yet it is clear that party system nationalisation, beyond preventing local identity based political parties, has considerable implications for the capability of political parties in making important representative claims. This outcomes is in stark contrast to the recent example of independent claim-makers.
Conclusions and Implications

Introduction
This study began by identifying the research problem—the apparent contradiction of broadly national political parties in a highly diverse state in Indonesia. The introduction chapter clarified that this was not only an empirical issue within Indonesia, but more broadly part of a larger debate within the literature about the design of electoral institutions. After identifying the relative absence of a focus on political representation within the relevant literature, this study then proceeded to outline a conceptual and theoretical framework that could allow for a meaningful assessment of how party system nationalisation has influenced the nature of political representation. Through an examination of these national political parties, together with prevailing forms of representative claim-making, a set of findings have been presented in the previous chapter. In this final chapter, these findings are reiterated and considered in the context of possibilities for further study and for future institutional change.

Revisiting the Research Questions
It is important to return now to the research questions introduced at the beginning of the study. A number of secondary research questions were proposed that allowed this study to effectively answer the primary research question. This study's response to each of these secondary questions is outlined here, before returning to the central research question.

The Nationalisation of Indonesia’s party system
Chapter Five has argued that based on the relative vote share of political parties across Indonesia, the party system could be described as largely national in nature. While some of Indonesia’s political parties have demonstrated bias in their vote share towards specific regions (particularly in the early years of reformasi), these biases have reduced over time. Significantly, new political parties such as PD, Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem have lacked the geographical biases of older political parties, and have demonstrated national support early in their development. The inclusion of these new political parties has also led to a decrease in the hold of some parties on particular
regions—PDIP in Bali and PKB in East Java, for example. Due to these trends, Indonesia’s party system has become increasingly national in nature.

Chapter Five has also contextualised this level of nationalisation within the context of formal and informal institutional influences. Party regulation has led to a much more restrictive institutional environment. The current form of the laws makes it very difficult for most minor political parties to compete; even well-known parties that performed well in previous elections were unable to register for the 2014 election. This effectively removed political parties with lower levels of national organisation, while incentivising the larger political parties to expand their organisations into more regions of Indonesia. Aside from these formal geographical branch restriction, this study has argued that we should also be aware of the establishment of norms regarding political organisation. Throughout the short history of the Indonesian state, a number of influential ideas have developed that promote the idea of national political organisation. These norms explain the relative lack of controversy surrounding the geographical branch restriction, the lack of impetus for local political parties, as well as reminding us that institutional engineering is not the only factor affecting party system nationalisation.

Key Notions of representation invoked in Indonesia

This study, through chapters Six and Seven, has demonstrated that political parties and their candidates are constantly engaged in making a wide range of representative claims. Through the process of claim-making, it is clear that some repertoires, or common forms of claim-making, have developed within Indonesia political discourse. This study provided a survey of dominant repertoires employed by parties and independent claim-makers in the period between 2009 and 2014, with particular attention given to the campaign leading up to the 2014 legislative and executive elections.

Firstly, this study has found that political parties and independent claim-makers both frequently draw on repertoires based on notions of identity and character. Claims based on identity were embedded within the party system in the early years of reformasi—identity was a key component of the aliran ties that were particular strong in the 1999 election. Political parties in particular frequently draw on the repertoires drawing on notions of cultural diversity, while ethnic and religious identity frequently form part of claims made by both parties and independent claim-makers. Character has also
represented a frequent source of claims—in particular claims about *kesederhanaan* (simplicity) and *kebersihan* (cleanliness). Despite the increasing attention placed on other forms of claim-making, repertoires based on identity and character are still some of the most commonly drawn on by political parties, and are amongst some of the easiest forms of representation to invoke.

In comparison, claims based on performance and democratic engagement, while clearly evident, have not always formed well-developed repertoires that political parties regularly draw on. Claim-makers are clearly aware of the importance of performative claims, and claims based on promises of performance are common. Some well-known repertoires have emerged, such as the use of vision and mission statements, and promises based on some very common but often vague performative notions such as developing prosperity, poverty alleviation, anti-corruption measures and maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty. Claims based on promises to achieve these policy goals are a well-worn repertoire, but one that is often lacking in exact detail about how these broad goals will be achieved, or where a claim-maker stands on debates about policy.

Claims based on policy delivery are relatively rarer, and could not be said to have formed well-developed repertoires that political parties draw on. One reason for this is the relatively short period of the *reformasi* era—very few political parties or leaders have a well-known track record that can be used to make these sort of claims. In contrast, claims based on the direct provision of patronage, funds and services from political parties are much more common, however, and could be understood as a repertoire with origins in the Suharto era. In regards to policy delivery, PD and its leader Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have sought to make claims based on their performance, while a number of independent claim-makers who have established an identity through local executive office have proved the most able to draw on notions of performance (current president Jokowi being the most well-known example). To some extent this is a quality of executive leaders that is independent of the institutional context—executive leaders in other political systems could be said to often make more effective claims about performance than parties. Yet this study also argues that the nature of party system nationalisation measures is also important in creating a different context for parties versus independent claim-makers.
Claims based on democratic engagement are far rarer. Indeed, the Jokowi phenomenon in Indonesia can partly be explained because his engagement with claims based on democratic engagement appear new and innovative. The newness of this repertoire is exemplified by the messy process of experimentation engaged in by Jokowi in Solo and Jakarta, with frequent mistakes made along the way.\textsuperscript{164} Yet, as argued in this study, representative performances are, by nature, public performances, and as such their success can lead to other claim-makers seeking to adopt them. Terms such as \textit{blusukan} and \textit{merakyat} were very common during the 2014 election campaign, demonstrating the way in which ideas about representation, in the form of established repertoires, can become influential and spread quickly within a given political and social context.

\textbf{The Assessment of representative repertoires}

Chapter Eight has found that, as might be expected, participants in this study generally have a negative perception of political parties. Yet some clear trends emerged when participants were asked to respond to a range of questions regarding understandings of representation and the role of political parties. Firstly, the national nature of political parties rarely emerged as a concern. The lack of local or regional political parties was not raised in the responses of any participants, both in the survey and fieldwork components of the research. Identity did emerge as an issue, but these concerns were mainly based on vertical rather than horizontal identity. The importance of class emerged strongly in the data, as did connection with related character claims. Indeed, character, where it emerged as an important part of representation, was frequently tied to other notions of representation. As such it appears that claims based on a representative’s character, while they can operate independently, are more effective when connected to performance and democratic engagement claims.

Participants clearly emphasised the importance of performance and democratic engagement as understandings of representation. When asked to describe a good representative, or to reflect on whether political parties were good representatives, notions of performance and democratic representation featured prominently. The importance of anti-corruption efforts, protecting vulnerable groups and providing prosperity where common performative themes, as was the importance of representatives being more focused on the community than their own political parties.

\textsuperscript{164} It should be noted that the very same street traders that paraded with Jokowi to their new place of business in Solo were protesting his work as mayor only a few months earlier.
their selfish nature. In assessing democratic claims, participants suggested that political parties were inconsistent in their connection with communities. In particular, it was argued that parties mainly sought to engage with communities at the time of elections. In reflecting on the political party system, participants in the research were generally critical of the political parties, but were much more critical of the lack of successful representative claims based on notions of performance and democratic engagement. This suggests that not only do participants see these notions as important, but they also see them as lacking within the Indonesian political party system.

**Representative repertoires and the context of party system nationalisation**

Chapter Nine has sought to connect the dynamics of representative claim-making and assessment to the broader institutional environment. Building upon the finding that political parties are more successful in invoking notions of identity and character in their claims than performance or democratic engagement, this study asks how the nationalization of the party system may have influenced this trend. In doing so, the theoretical framework provided in Chapter Three is important—the selection of repertoires and the capability to perform them is critical in understanding why successful claims are made or not made, and the institutional environment can impact both of these factors.

Chapter Nine has put forward three reasons why Indonesia’s geographical branch restriction is one key factor in the low capability of political parties to engage with important representative repertoires. Firstly, the level of organisation needed to register a party across a vast state like Indonesia naturally favours politically parties designed as entrepreneurial parties—that is, vehicles for financially and politically powerful individuals or groups. For a party to form under the current regulations it is necessary to have a broad national organisation immediately before taking part in any election at any level. This requirement naturally favours entrepreneurial parties who can rely on the powerful central leadership of an influential figure over political parties with their own social or political identity. Gerindra and Hanura are good examples of this new trend of party development—but even the Nasdem party, for all of its efforts to develop a social organisation first, appears to be very similar in character to the other new political parties that have developed. For these reasons, Indonesia’s new national political parties face a number of capability issues in adopting and performing
important representative repertoires, and the dynamics of the current party system face little challenge.

Secondly, the task of complying with party nationalisation laws in itself is a significant burden for existing political parties that reinforces existing norms regarding political party organisation. Considerable time and resources must be spent in order to ensure that the registration requirements are achieved—meaning these resources cannot be used to develop other aspects of political parties. Yet more significantly, the national organisation project required of the political parties appears to operate separately to any attempts to develop a connection with communities. That is, despite the potential for a broad network of political offices to be used in order to engage with the community in a creative manner, it appears that this rarely occurs. Offices setup to meet the geographical branch restriction are often unoccupied or only active around election times. Significantly, the geographical branch restriction also establishes an informal institutional norm regarding what a political party is and how it should be organised. This notion of a political party is rigid, focused on uniform organisation and does not favour creative new forms of party development. These factors also considerably influence the capability of political parties.

Lastly, political parties that must already be large in size at the time of their establishment face particular challenges. These parties already likely lack a cohesive ideological or programmatic identity due to the reasons for their development (as argued above); yet, operating at such a large size immediately also exacerbated oligarchic practices within parties. As such, the connection between members of a political party are likely to be based on their own interests (i.e. what they can get out of the party), rather than a common sense of purpose or history. This could be compared to a hypothetical political party that begins life as a small organisation (in a single district or region) and then develops into a larger organisation. Such a political party is likely to face growing pains as it becomes larger and assumes a larger membership, but common bonds and a sense of history are likely to be present.

**Party system nationalisation and the representation of a diverse society**

Having addressed the above secondary research questions, it is now possible to construct an overall answer to the research question at the heart of this study. Importantly, this study has argued that success in representing an audience relies
significantly on the assessment made by that audience. As such, the audience itself is the primary judge of the quality of representation, and the researcher plays a secondary role. Yet it is also important, as Chapter Four has argued, to caution that there are limitations in the way the audience in this study was operationalised. While engaging with civil society provided a valuable understanding of audience sentiments regarding representation, further research should focus on broadening the engagement with constituents beyond civil society leaders.

The findings presented in this study suggest that party system nationalisation has had a constraining effect on the way in which the party system represents Indonesia’s diverse society. Indonesia’s party registration laws have led to political parties that are more suited to drawing on some repertoires (such as repertoires based on notions of identity like cultural diversity) than others. Importantly, Indonesia’s political parties have proven poorly equipped to engage with the most important representative repertoires in contemporary Indonesia—those based on performative and democratic notions of representation.

Despite the fear that national parties are problematic due to the regional diversity of Indonesia, this appears to not be the case. Indeed, this study suggests that Indonesia’s political parties have been relatively successful in engaging with repertoires based on notions of identity and character. These forms of claim making are relatively easier to perform, and it appears that identity in particular is not as politically relevant as may be expected. There are certainly exceptions to this finding, but overall the party system is more capable of making identity claims than performative or democratic engagement claims. Attention is needed, however, for instances in which local identity and performative and democratic needs meet. Some performative issues are located within a single region, and connections between identity and performative expectations potentially exist.

Overall, efforts to nationalise Indonesia’s political party system are mostly detrimental due to the side effects of this form of institutional engineering. The geographical branch restriction has contributed to a party system that has seen the rise of entrepreneurial political parties. These parties feature traits that are detrimental to their ability to engage with important understandings of representation, such as performative and democratic notions. Political parties cannot develop a track record at the local or regional level where performative claims are relatively more achievable.
The impetus for establishing political parties exacerbated the elitist nature of parties and practices of corruption and money politics. The size of parties, as well as their focus on organisational goals also harm their capabilities in regards to representative claim-making. These issues, remarkably, are all side-effects of the geographical branch restriction: they are outcomes that have little relation to the initial impetus for designing this form of institutional engineering. And with new and old parties alike being largely restricted in their ability to meet the expectations of their constituencies, independent claim makers have increasingly bypassed the party system to emerge as the most successful claim-makers in contemporary Indonesia.

**Can Indonesia’s Geographical Branch Restrictions Be Changed?**

Given the finding that Indonesia’s party registration laws have a restrictive impact on the capability of political parties to engage with important representative practices, there is a strong justification for institutional change. Removing structural restrictions on the formation of political parties would open up some of the potential alternative methods of party development discussed in Chapter Nine. It would also partially weaken the monopoly of economic and political elites on the formation of parties. The potential for political parties to operate in smaller contexts (locally, regionally or across a couple of regions) before expanding to operate at a national level would open up the possibility to replicate the success of independent claim-makers, and to draw on claims that are at this time difficult considering the immediate national character of political parties.

Of course, while institutional change may allow for alternative forms of political party development, there are no guarantees that this will occur, or that it will lead to a better quality political party system. Quite clearly this depends on a range of other factors. While comparisons have been drawn with independent claim-makers, it is important to note that the opportunity for independent claim-makers to successfully draw on representative claims has been present for some time, but cases of leaders perceived as doing so have only emerged in recent years. Political parties that form at a local or regional level, or in several different regions, are not guaranteed to avoid the issues plaguing other political parties. The comparison between political parties and independent claim-makers is limited by the fundamentally different characteristics of these actors. The capability of political parties as claim-makers is also restrained by
the inherent qualities of political parties: they are, for instance, collective organisations with higher exposure to issues such as association with corruption and collusion. Hence, change to Indonesia’s party law should not be considered as a panacea to all of the problems of party politics in Indonesia; it is only a part, albeit a significant part, of the problem.

It is also important to consider the concerns that initially justified the introduction of the branch restriction. While this study has argued that ethnic and regional identity is frequently less politically relevant than other factors, there remains the potential for ethnicity to be used as a divisive tool in the making of representative claims. The current laws, despite the side effects discussed in this study, do restrict the use of ethnicity in political competition and promote political parties that are more suited to making claims based on notions of cultural plurality. Yet several counterpoints should also be considered. The first is that despite the current nationalised party system, ethnic politics still emerges. While political parties themselves must be national in nature, local ethnic and political dynamics regularly intersects with the way these parties are organised at the local level. Tanasaldy (2012, p. 288-297) for example, notes the dynamic engagement of the Dayak community in West Kalimantan with a range of different national political parties in the post-reformasi period. He also observes the politisation of ethnicity between ethnic Malays and Dayaks in competition over positions in the local DPRD: here, the dynamics of ethnicity inform political competition despite the national nature of the parties supporting candidates in the local DPRD (Tanasaldy 2012, p. 298-299). The entrepreneurial nature of political parties and the lack of strong party identity means that they are more likely to adapt their business model to local circumstances and local issues; hence, in regions where ethnicity is politically sensitive the national party system does not prevent this from emerging.

Additionally, there are other methods that can be used to restrict the emergence of overly narrow political parties that pursue divisive appeals to ethnic or regional identity. As has been noted in this study, Indonesia’s party laws not only require national organisation, but also explicitly define political parties as organisations with a national focus. These definitions could be used, for instance, to prevent political parties that use ethnic names or symbols in their party identity or advertising, or political parties that pursue divisive issues (such as regional autonomy or independence). It should be noted that ideological restrictions on political parties (for
example, outlawing parties based on communist ideology) have not required any supporting structural restrictions to be effective. The merit of political parties that make explicit ethnic claims can be debated, but if restricting narrow ethnic parties is still considered necessary, there are other ways of doing so without also being subject to the significant structural side-effects of the current laws.

In this regard, it is instructive to note the emergence of ethnic parties in Aceh—the only province in which they are allowed to exist. As a part of the negotiations over special autonomy for Aceh, special provisions were designed so that local political parties in the province could compete for local and regional (but not national) seats. This allowance was both central to the successful negotiations of a peace agreement with the Acehnese liberation front (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*; GAM) and also controversial with national-level politicians in Jakarta. The allowance for local parties in Aceh was also unpopular with the general public: 76.2 percent of those surveyed by LSI were opposed to local parties in Aceh (Sinar Harapan 16 August 2005). Yet the integration of local parties in Aceh has largely been a successful phenomenon that has strengthened the peace process with the Indonesian government. Hillman (2010, p. 14) argues that:

> As for arguments that local political parties will exacerbate ethnic or regional divisions by institutionalising cleavages in the party system, Aceh is an example of how such risks can be mitigated. So far, Aceh’s experience suggests that, if managed properly, local political parties can help build legitimacy and provide political access to communities that might otherwise not be represented in the political system.

Hillman (2010, p. 13-14) also suggests that local political parties may be beneficial in resolving political and social conflict in Papua.

It must be recognised, however, that there are strong barriers to the repeal of Indonesia’s geographical branch requirement. The most significant barrier is the support of existing political parties for this regulation. As Chapter Five has argued, political parties have been central to the establishment, and especially the strengthening of these laws. The main reason for this is self-interest—the restriction favours the established and well-resourced political parties, and provides a significant hurdle for new parties to challenge them. Recent attempts by some political parties to remove the direct election of district and regional heads can be understood as an attempt to further protect the position of existing parties against the threat of independent claim-making candidates—it is likely that any attempt to relax the entry requirements for new political parties would face similar resistance.
There is also little apparent support in Indonesian society for repealing the party registration laws. A 2005 survey across Indonesia, for example, found that 75.8 percent of participants rejected the re-emergence of regional political parties (Sinar Harapan, 16 August 2005). While some forms of legislation, such as the proposed law on civil society organisations (RUU Ormas) have been met with a critical response within the community, the geographical branch requirement has not sparked the same reaction. Indeed, the only critical voices seem to come (predictably) from representatives of political parties that have failed to overcome the restriction, as documented in Chapter Five. In field work discussions, numerous participants responded with surprise or confusion at the mention of local political parties, as if the suggestion itself made little sense. Thus even when political parties are unpopular (Tan 2002) and not trusted (LSI 2011) there is little belief that revising the national nature of parties might be one method of improving the quality of political parties. The academic community within Indonesia is hardly more critical of party system nationalisation; indeed, one of the arguments often expressed through public discourse is the importance of the ‘simplification’ (penyederhanaan) of the political party system (Mietzner 2013, p. 66-67; Tomsa 2014, p. 250). According to this view, the party registration laws also play a role in preventing a proliferation of political parties.

There is merit in the concern regarding the proliferation of political parties within the party system. Mietzner highlights (2013, p. 67), for example, the importance of preventing rival factions within existing parties from simply starting their own parties, rather than sorting out power struggles within those established parties. There are, however, other institutional restrictions already in place for this purpose. The parliamentary threshold, for example, prevents small parties from gaining seats unless they are able to win a minimum amount of the national vote. This significantly restricts the number of political parties that are able to enter the national parliament. Other restrictions, such as minimum organisational requirements, could also be used to restrict the number of political parties. Additionally, there is some evidence from research in India that political party proliferation is not only affected by institutional design and societal cleavages, but also that the:

Organizational structure of parties can have a large and independent impact on the effective number of parties, since it alters the incentive structure for politicians to stay within a party, to defect to another party, or to form a new party. (Chhibber et al. 2014, p. 499)
It is also unclear whether current situation—where internal struggles within political parties frequently lead to destabilising standoffs and rival factions sometimes even holding separate national conferences—is preferable to spin off parties emerging.

Yet, the geographical branch requirement is arguably the most significant barrier to party proliferation, and as such any change must be carefully considered. The argument for restricting the proliferation of political parties is an important one. But, based on the findings of this study, I would argue that the costs of such restrictions also have a very real political impact. The current geographical branch restriction creates a substantial barrier to party development. While lessening the restriction would not present an immediate panacea to the problem of political party legitimacy in Indonesia, it would provide some more potential for competitive processes of party development at the local and regional level. The recent trend of independent claim-makers developing representative repertoires at the local and regional level is one of the most positive developments in post-Suharto Indonesia. Independent claim-makers possess some advantages that parties do not, but this does not mean that political parties could not follow a similar developmental model. This being the case, the potential cost of removing or relaxing the geographical branch restriction (party proliferation and regional parties) needs to be balanced with the ongoing harm caused by the side effects of this form of institutional engineering (the poor development of political parties). I would argue strongly that concerns about the unity of Indonesia and the stability of the party system should begin to give way to more pressing concerns regarding the quality of representation and the capability of political parties to adequately represent Indonesian society.

Any changes to the existing laws would need to be accompanied or preceded by changing discourse surrounding the notion of local political parties. According to the established view regarding party system nationalisation, minor or local political parties are ethnically based and potentially divisive. Allowing local or minor political parties, according to this view, would lead to chaos, as the party system fills with a large number of small political parties all competing for power. This established view needs to be engaged with, and one way of doing so is to reframe the debate. As this study has argued, Indonesia’s party registration laws are not harmful because they restrict ethnic or local political parties, but because they incentivise entrepreneurial parties that are incapable of drawing on important representative repertoires. By demonstrating that divisive ethnic claims can be still be restricted—while allowing
grassroots political parties that take up important local, regional and national issues—
the established view of party system nationalisation may be questioned.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that some creative ideas have been put forward in response to the problem of political party formation and the simplification of the party system. Ramlan Surbakti, a former deputy head of the KPU, has argued in favour of a league system based loosely on the promotion and relegation mechanism used in some football leagues (Republika 23 December 2010). According to Surbakti’s idea, political parties who are successful at the local level would then be allowed to ‘promote’ themselves to the next league—the regional level. Success at this level would allow political parties to operate at the national level. Political parties that fail to perform (presumably based on poor election results) would potentially be relegated and only allowed to compete at the lower level the following election. This dynamic is not entirely unprecedented—in Aceh local political parties are only able to compete at the local and provincial level, while national parties compete for Aceh’s national legislative seats.165 While unlikely to be implemented, this system provides a creative attempt at resolving some of the structural issues noted in the study, while promoting competition between parties and maintaining a simplified party system at the national level. By better understanding the structural weaknesses of Indonesia’s party registration laws, such ideas can potentially be debated within Indonesian political discourse.

Beyond Institutional Change—the Importance of Ideas

While the geographical branch requirement at the heart of this research naturally leads to a focus on institutional engineering, this study has also noted the importance of institutionalised norms regarding political representation. As such, if we are interested in political outcomes such as improving the quality of representative practices, then institutional change is not the only relevant factor. It is crucial to also consider the role of ideas in influencing political practices.

It is clear that ideas can have a constraining effect. While a pure rational choice understanding of political competition (such as that proposed by Downs [1957]) would suggest that it is in the interest of representatives to pursue representative practices

165 The interaction and competition between national political parties and Aceh’s local parties has been problematic thus far, and rethinking of party and electoral law may be needed to govern the interaction between national and local parties (Hillman 2010, p. 14)
that will be favoured and increase their popularity, a more nuanced view of political
competition based on the notion of bounded rationality (see Bendor 2010, p. 14)
recognises the important role played by limited information and capabilities.
Representative claim-makers may attempt to pursue practices that will benefit their
popularity and their career, but they may only be aware of limited possibilities. In the
case of Jokowi, if experience had not led to the development of several successful
repertoires, it is unlikely that he would have been aware of these possibilities and
would not have been able to employ them. The same is true of the represented
audience. Where beneficial repertoires are known and have been experienced
previously, constituencies may demand or expect these repertoires in the future.
Existing representative repertoires therefore inform the understanding the represented
and the representatives possess regarding what representation is, and as such can have
a limiting effect on representative practices.

Conversely, however, repertoires can prove transformational. Representative
performances are, by nature, public performances; hence, where new representative
performances or practices have an impact, they can influence both claim makers and
audiences. This is true of politics within a specific political setting—for instance in a
local region—but the advent of national electronic media and the widespread use of
social media mean that representative performances can gain attention beyond their
initial political context. The case of Jokowi clearly demonstrates the way in which
representative performances themselves can spread beyond a limited political context
(the small city of Solo) to the national context very quickly, and to a certain extent the
exploits of other local and regional representatives are now having a similar effect.
Citizens around Indonesia are reading daily about the latest exploits of Ahok—despite
the fact that many of those citizens live outside of Jakarta. There is potential for
successful representative performances from political parties in a specific setting to
influence both audiences and representative claim-makers more broadly, leading to
positive outcomes for the party system more broadly.

Here, there is significant potential for civil society and the media to play an important
role. Indonesian civil society is active and, indeed, engaged with both representative
claim-makers and audiences of claims. At all levels of government there are NGOs
focusing on issues such as voter education and the facilitation of engagement between
representatives and constituents. If these NGOs increasingly work with both sides of
the representative equation to provide a wider range of information about potential
forms of representative performances (that is, what representation can be), this would arguably lead to significant beneficial outcomes. There is already limited evidence of this: several NGOs have sought to provide information to the public about what their representatives are doing, and whether they are fulfilling their promises. One interesting example is the ‘Patterns of Representative Communication on Twitter’ survey, conducted by the online news site selasar.com (14 November 2014). This survey tracks the number of DPR representatives that have Twitter accounts and the number of accounts that are active in engaging with constituents. In another example, the organization WikiDPR provides a daily source of information regarding the activities of DPR members, and recently urged followers on twitter to report what their local representatives were doing during the established period for constituency visits (WikiDPR 2014). There is significant potential to further build on the public debate and education regarding representative repertoires.

Theoretical Implications

Beyond the empirical implications of this research, it is also important to consider how this case study fits within the broader literature. In this endeavour, an important starting point is the literature on centripetal and consociational institutional designs. As has been noted, this literature is important in considering political inclusion and the prevention of conflict in societies in which this is a significant issue. While this was certainly a relevant concern in the early years of Indonesia’s transition to democracy (and hence the original impetus for the establishment of the party system requirements), it has less relevance as the transition has unfolded. Ed Aspinall has been one researcher who has questioned the political relevance of ethnicity:

It now increasingly appears that this new prominence of ethnic politics was a transitional phenomenon. With a new democratic system settling into place, ethnicity is losing political salience. In most of Indonesia, ethnic affiliation matters surprisingly little in everyday politics, and ethnic symbols are either rarely mobilized in the political domain or are mobilized only in a perfunctory and superficial manner. We see relatively few of the deep disputes about ethnohistory, language, or cultural policy that feature prominently in more ethnicized polities. Ethnic violence has declined steeply, and ethnic coalition building and cooperation, rather than conflict, are the norm at the local level. (Aspinall 2011, p. 289-290)

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166 This was a notable campaign, with followers from around Indonesia sending in schedules and reports regarding their local member’s activities, and some DPR members actively engaging with the campaign. It appeared that some DPR members saw this as a positive means by which to make representative claims.
This being the case, some of the impetus for both centripetal and consociational arguments is lost. In this context, this study has argued that the study of Indonesian politics can be enriched by further considering the way in which the dynamics of representation operate.

One issue identified in this research is that representative claims and repertoires are more complex than expected. By applying a constructivist understanding of representation, this study is in a position to complement a number of other theoretical approaches to understanding political parties. As such, the approach adopted in this study does not replace existing research, but instead complements it and is enriched by engagement with these other forms of research. It is important, for instance, to consider how more materialist considerations, such as the social and historical background of society and the impact of relations based on ethnicity, class and other power structures, potentially shape the capabilities and selection processes in the making of representative claims. While this study has provided a broad-brush consideration of the type of claims that are made and the way in which they are assessed, future research is needed in order to connect these processes better to these materialist foundations.

Yet this study highlights the extent to which ideas matter. By sidelining ideas about representation, it is difficult for scholarship on political parties to effectively engage with political representation as a concept. The degree to which a party system is institutionalised tells us little about why a society feels well represented or poorly represented by that party system (this is clear simply by noting that political parties that are highly institutionalised are not necessarily popular!) The extent to which political parties are formed based on aliran, or represent cartels that increasingly occupy the state is extremely important, but connections to society or practices of cartelisation by themselves do not clarify why an audience feels well-represented by a particular party system. All of these factors existed prior to and following the emergence of Jokowi in Indonesia; yet, it is clear that Jokowi has had an important effect on the way in which representation itself is understood by both political actors and communities. By applying a constructivist approach to political representation, we are in a better position to understand why ideas about representation matter.

There is, I believe, considerable potential to further build upon the theoretical foundations of this study. The concept of a representative repertoire, for example,
provided a useful tool for this study, but the complexity and potential transferability of representative repertoires could not be considered in much depth here. Inherent in understanding representation as the adoption and innovation of existing repertoires is the belief that repertoires can be shared and developed, not only within the boundaries of societies and political communities, but also across different societies. In the context of a society like Indonesia, the representative claims and performances of religious leaders such as *kyai*, military leaders, *adat* leaders and local figures (*tokoh*) are potentially significant areas of enquiry—and there is the potential for representative repertoires to be shared between these groups. Established forms of ‘being a representative’ can also move from one society to another, perhaps in conjunction with the adoption of specific electoral or political institutions. Innovations in political claim-making also regularly gain worldwide attention—Jokowi in Indonesia, Modi in India and Obama in the US are prominent examples of this. Additionally, it must be remembered that representative claims and repertoires are not limited to domestic political systems: political claims can be made by a citizen of one state about citizens in another state, or by a group about citizens in many other states. Saward (2010, p. 82), for example, notes the representative claims made by the lead singer of U2, Bono: ‘I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice at all … They haven't asked me to represent them. It's cheeky but I hope they're glad I do’. NGOs and charity organisations as well as intergovernmental groups regularly make claims to represent people across borders, and as such there is the potential for representative repertoires to develop at this level as well. The increasingly degree of interaction between leaders and citizens of different states, together with a greater awareness of what occurs in other states, is only likely to increase the degree to which representative repertoires spread beyond borders.

**Final Reflections**

This research not only led to the research findings described above, but also to the engagement of the researcher with the research context. As such, the process of research also provided interesting and worthwhile opportunities to learn from participants and to consider areas for future enquiry beyond the scope of this study. Some final reflections on these points are warranted here.

The researcher here engaged with different ideas regarding research as a practice. Within the survey research, participants were given the opportunity to provide
feedback to the researcher, and many took up this opportunity. Through these reflections from participants, it was clear that significant value was placed on the process of in-depth, in-country research. Several participants suggested that the researcher needed to come to Indonesia to see the local conditions directly. For instance, one participant suggested that I ‘come directly to Palembang in order to get more detail’ while another argued that ‘you have to come to Indonesia, and carry out interviews yourself with respondents in the community so that your data is validated’. One participant from Sulawesi also argued that ‘I think you should carry out observations directly in Indonesia, starting from the village level and finishing with the national level’. Many participants also argued that engaging with political elites and parties was important, reflecting a very common method of researching political parties in Indonesia. It is interesting to note these different ideas regarding the value and proper means of carrying out research; and this needs to be taken into consideration in future research projects167.

Another common suggestion was that the research engage directly with specific problems in the political system. For instance, one participant from West Kalimantan argued that:

It is very important to look at the influence of money politics in the election of members of parliament … because the outcomes of this money politics is what leads to members of political parties who don’t have the capacity but do have the money to be elected in the DPR and the DPRD.168

Several respondents suggested that it was important to consider the role played by political parties in the marginalisation of vulnerable communities, suggesting a potential area of future research. Political processes were also a focus: one participant from NTT argued that I needed to:

Study the mechanism of musrembang [consensus decision making regarding development] … starting at the village level until the provincial level. Compare the ideal process with the actual process. The gap between these two is the main cause of why the path of development often doesn’t reach the grassroots level and becomes a cause in why development doesn’t succeed in significantly reducing poverty.169

Overall, participants were (perhaps understandably) much more interested in what they considered concrete political problems than in political discourse and the study of

168 For Original translation see Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 285.
169 See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 285.
ideas. The ability of studies like this to justify their significance by demonstrating their relevance to these more ‘valued’ research problems, is therefore important.

One participant also suggested that:

There has to be parameters for measuring the work of political parties and connecting that to whether those political parties are consistent with the vote share they achieve in the election.\textsuperscript{170}

This is an interesting response, and one in which this study has engaged with to some extent. This study have focused on the parameters that communities use to measure representative performances; hence, the work of political parties is understood broadly as the type of claims they make, and the extent to which these are successful in being accepted by communities. This is not the only way to understand the performance of elected leaders, and not the only way of measuring it. No doubt some readers will perhaps prefer other techniques of understanding representative performance. Yet the extent to which the substance and symbolism of representation can be separated, and the extent to which researchers can provide a neutral assessment of the work of representatives, is debatable. I believe that the approach adopted in this study is a worthwhile contribution to this endeavour, and one that can be further refined.

Finally, this study was not able to consider one important feature of representative claim-making: the relationship between politicians and the media. Many of the claims analysed in this study were facilitated via media outlets, yet the nature of media ownership means that there is a complex relationship between the political system and the media. The founder and head of Nasdem, Suryah Paloh, for example, controls a number of media outlets, and these media organisations were the most active in covering the establishment of the Nasional Demokrat organisation. Saward’s conceptualisation of the representative claim raises questions about this role played by the media: should they be considered a claim-maker in their own right? Or do they simply facilitate the claim? What role do the media play in also constructing the nature of the constituency? The dynamics of media ownership can have an important effect on representative claim making, and deserve further attention in Indonesia and elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{170} See Appendix: Original Indonesian Language Quotations, p. 285.
Summary

Institutional design is important for many reasons. By shaping the involvement of different actors within the political process, institutional engineering can have a significant effect on the conduct and quality of democratic governance. We can approach the study of institutional engineering in a number of ways, and while the study of ideas has often been neglected in institutional literature, it is a very important complement to studies with a more concrete focus on the ‘nuts and bolts’ of party politics. By applying a constructivist approach to the study of party system nationalisation and political representation, this dissertation has identified new challenges and opportunities within Indonesia’s political system.

As one of the reformasi period’s most successful claim-makers, Jokowi, begins his first term as President, continued study of representative repertoires and their embodiment with the institutional realities of Indonesian politics is crucial. Jokowi is but an individual, and his continued popularity is not guaranteed. But the Jokowi phenomenon, as well as the experience of other political parties and politicians within Indonesia, can tell us much about the nature of political repertoires and the conditions which support them. These lessons can provide positive outcomes beyond the political career of one politician. Individual political careers will eventually come to an end, but the development of political parties with a strong record of drawing on important representative repertoires can provide more sustained positive outcomes, which will benefit the process of democratisation in Indonesia into the future.
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Appendix—Original Indonesian Language Quotations

Original Indonesian language quotations are provided here so that translations can be checked against originals quotes.

Chapter One

Page 15: ‘Partai Politik adalah organisasi yang bersifat nasional dan dibentuk oleh sekelompok warga negara Indonesia secara sukarela atas dasar kesamaan kehendak dan cita-cita untuk memperjuangkan dan membela kepentingan politik anggota, masyarakat, bangsa dan negara, serta memelihara keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia berdasarkan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945’


Page 16: ‘kepengurusan pada setiap provinsi dan paling sedikit 75% (tujuh puluh lima perseratus) dari jumlah kabupaten/kota pada provinsi yang bersangkutan dan paling sedikit 50% (lima puluh perseratus) dari jumlah kecamatan pada kabupaten/kota yang bersangkutan.’

Chapter Two

None

Chapter Three

None

Chapter Four

None

Chapter Five

Page 91: ‘Pasal 39
(1) Partai Politik dapat menjadi peserta Pemilihan Umum apabila memenuhi syarat-syarat sebagai berikut :

b. memiliki pengurus di lebih dari 1/2 (setengah) jumlah propinsi di Indonesia;
memiliki pengurus di lebih dari 1/2 (setengah) jumlah kabupaten/kotamadya di propinsi sebagaimana dimaksud pada huruf b’;

**Page 91**: ‘Pasal 82 Untuk Pemilihan Umum tahun 1999, syarat Partai Politik untuk dapat menjadi peserta Pemilihan Umum sebagaimana dimaksud Pasal 38 ayat (1) huruf b dan huruf c ditetapkan menjadi :

a. memiliki pengurus di 1/3 (sepertiga) jumlah propinsi di Indonesia;
b. memiliki pengurus di 1/2 (setengah) jumlah kabupaten/kotamadya di propinsi sebagaimana dimaksud dalam huruf a.’

**Page 94**: ‘Partai politik sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) harus didaftarkan pada Departemen Kehakiman dengan syarat : b. mempunyai kepengurusan sekurang-kurangnya 50% (lima puluh persen) dari jumlah provinsi, 50% (lima puluh persen) dari jumlah kabupaten/kota pada setiap provinsi yang bersangkutan, dan 25% (dua puluh lima persen) dari jumlah kecamatan pada setiap kabupaten/kota yang bersangkutan’;

**Page 101**: ‘…perlu kami jelaskan bahwa kebijakan pembangunan politikdi Indonesia dalam rangka mewujudkan negara yang demokratis, salah satunya adalah penguatan kapasitas Partai Politik. Salah satu fungsi Partai Politik adalah sebagai sarana pendidikan politik bagi anggotanya dan masyarakat luas, serta sebagai sarana penciptaan iklim yang kondusif dan perekat persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa untukkesejahteraan masyarakat.

Berkaitan dengan pengaturan dalam Pasal 2 ayat (3) huruf b Undang-undang Nomor 31 Tahun 2002 tentang Partai Politik, dimaksudkan untuk membangun Partai Politik yang berkualitas, mandiri dan mengakar di masyarakat. Di samping itu, dengan pengaturan tersebut diharapkan tercipta suatu Partai Politik yang mempunyai kredibilitas dan ketersebaran kepengurusan Partai Politik di seluruh Indonesia, memiliki dukungan massa yang kuat, dan bersifat nasional (Indonesia sebagai negara kepulauan dan beragam suku bangsa serta agama). Dengan persyaratan dan kriteria dimaksud pada saatnya nanti akan terwujud Partai Politik yang dapat merefleksikan keanekaragaman suku, bangsa,budaya, dan agama dalam satu wadah dan tujuan demi kepentingan bangsa dan negara’. 
Chapter Six

Page 124: ‘Kampanye hitam yg menyerang jokowi dan menyudutkan kaum minoritas justru malah menguatkan kaum minoritas mendukung jokowi.’

Page 127: ‘Prabowo satu-satunya orang yang tidak memandang kamu siapa, dari etnis apa, atau dari suku apa. Prabowo mementingkan sikap nasionalis seseorang.’

Page 130: ‘Semua warga Indonesia … punya hak untuk majukan negari ini…sudah nggak jamannya lagi kita berbicara kamu dari kabupaten mana, kamu dari daerah mana, kamu dari etnis mana, kamu dari suku mana, kamu dari daerah mana, kalau kita masih berbicara seperti itu, nggak akan negara kita maju … siapa yang bisa memberi solusi? Siapa yang bisa mengerjakan persoalan, siapa yang bisa memberi solusi untuk Jakarta yang lebih baik, Jakarta baru … itu yang harus (14:30) pilih…’

Page 136a: ‘Saya ingin menurunkan tingkat kematian ibu dan anak serta agenda kesetaraan gender. Sudah saatnya perempuan memperjuangkan kepentingan kaumnya’.

Page 136b: ‘Dengan menjadi bagian dari kehidupan berpolitik, diharapkan kaum perempuan dapat menentukan nasibnya sendiri dan tidak bergantung kepada kaum laki-laki yang selama ini dominan dalam membuat segala kebijakan. Dampak dari rendahnya partisipasi politik kaum perempuan sudah banyak memberikan contoh bahwa kebijakan yang bersentuhan langsung dengan hajat kaum perempuan saat ini masih kurang mengapresiasikan potensi kaum perempuan sesungguhnya’.

Page 138: ‘Sebab, kami sudah tahu pahit dan manis, asam dan asinnya kehidupan sehari-hari. Apa saja persoalan masyarakat kami sudah tahu dan sudah pasti kami berusaha untuk mengatasinya juka kami dipercayakan memimpin kabupaten ini lima tahun ke depan [sic]’

Page 139a: ‘Saya ingin membawa masyarakat yang tadinya hidup dalam kemiskinan menjadi sejahtera. Sehingga, Jakarta tidak hanya dinikmati oleh orang-orang yang berduitsa, tetapi benar-benar oleh semua masyarakat’.

Page 139b: ‘Saya ngomong apa adanya. Saya tidak mempunyai kekuatan apa-apa. TV, saya tidak punya. Koran dan media, juga tidak punya. Saya kira semua orang tahu
… yang saya punya adalah relawan-relawan, rakyat yang dengan semangat dan gigih mendukung. Ini karena yang ingin kita bangun ke depan adalah bangunan pemerintahan yang berorientasi kepada rakyat. Hanya itu yang saya punya)’.


Page 141b: ‘Kesediannya mengendari sepeda ontel dalam mengembalikan formulir pencalonan wali kota tersebut, katanya, sebagai simbol untuk menunjukkan ideologi dan keberpihakannya terhadap wong cilik, yang merupakan massa tradisional PDIP’.


Page 143b: ‘Saya mendengar tentang budaya politik uang yang masih menjadi-jadi. Ke depan, mari kita bangun terus peningkatan politik di Indonesia, kita pastikan betul-betul suara dari rakyat datang dari hati mereka, bukan dengan penyebab atau alasan lain’.

Page 145a: ‘demi terwujudnya kemandirian ekonomi masyarakat dan bangsa Indonesia’.

Page 145b: ‘mengembangkan politik luar negeri yang bebas dan aktif, dalam arti bahwa Indonesia ikut aktif memajukan perdamaian dunia dan menentang segala bentuk penjajahan, menolak ketergantungan terhadap pihak luar manapun yang dapat mengurangi kedaulatan Indonesia’.
Chapter Seven

Page 150a: ‘Visi: Terwujudnya PAN sebagai partai politik terdepan dalam mewujudkan masyarakat madani yang adil dan makmur, pemerintahan yang baik dan bersih di dalam negara Indonesia yang demokratis dan berdaulat, serta diridhoi Allah SWT, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa’.

Page 150b: ‘Partai Demokrat bersama masyarakat luas berperan mewujudkan keinginan luhur rakyat Indonesia agar mencapai pencerahan dalam kehidupan kebangsaan yang merdeka, bersatu, berdaulat adil dan makmur, menjunjung tinggi semangat Nasionalisme, Humanisme dan Internasionalisme, atas dasar ketakwaan kepada Tuhan yang maha Esa dalam tatanan dunia baru yang damai, demokratis dan sejahtera.’


‘Perlunya visi tentang Indonesia masa depan menuju 100 tahun Indonesia merdeka telah dilontarkan ARB 2010 dan 2011 ketika peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Partai Golkar. ‘Hal itu merupakan perwujudan Partai Golkar sebagai the party of ideas,’ kata ARB, ketika itu’.

Page 154: ‘Tentu saja seluruh pelayanan kesehatan itu tidak berbayar sebab dirangkaikan dengan perayaan hari ulang tahun Gerindra yang ke-6.’

Page 157: ‘Partai yang tidak hanya bicara namun benar-benar mengusung perobahan nyata. #GerindraBerterimakasih atas kepercayaan sahabat’

Page 160a: ‘Waktu itu Nunukan saya selesaikan dengan cara menggelar kabel bawah laut dari daratan Kalimantan, di daratan yang jauhnya 50 kilometer dari pulau Nunukan…Saya bicara agak keras dengan pimpinan PLN Kaltim, terutama karena dia
tidak bisa menjawab pertanyaan saya soal mengapa terganggu, di bagian mana terganggu, mengapa lama terganggu, dan seterusnya. Saya termasuk memaklumi terjadinya gangguan, tapi saya tidak bisa menerima kalau tidak ada yang bisa menjelaskan gangguannya karena apa.’

**Page 160b:** ‘Saya kira yang terbaik mengenalkan diri adalah lewat kinerja ya, artinya theory marketing juga begitu, diperkenalkan sebagai apapun, kalau kinerjanya kurang baik kan nggak laku juga, sehingga saya tetap memilih kinerjanya baik …karena ini kan…bukan jualan…ini kan memilih pemimpin.’


**Page 165:** ‘Kami percaya, polling semacam ini adalah kabar baik bagi demokrasi di Indonesia. Publik bisa mengawal dan mengkritisi nama-nama yang muncul’

**Page 166:** ‘Rumah Aspirasi, sebagai bentuk pertanggungjawaban Masinton terhadap pemilih. Rumah Aspirasi berfungsi sebagai “Posko Pengaduan, Pelayanan dan Penyampaian Aspirasi warga” kepada Masinton sebagai wakil rakyat (DPR) selama 5 tahun, setiap saat bisa diakses masyarakat tanpa dipersulit’.

**Chapter Eight**

**Page 173a:** ‘Kesempatan untuk menjadi anggota partai politik sangat terbuka, organisasi membuka peluang tersebut lebar-lebar’

**Page 173b:** ‘Banyak kesempatan dan tawaran, namun sebagian besar tawaran tersebut tidak menempatkan komunitas dalam posisi strategis, beberapa atau sebagian kecil anggota partai politik memiliki idealisme dan memiliki latar belakang yang mirip dengan komunitas kami’

**Page 173c:** ‘Dimasa sekarang setelah partai politik tidak lagi dipercaya masyarakat barulah mulai ada kesempatan untuk orang diluar partai menjadi anggota partai maupun anggota legislatif.’


Page 173f: ‘Hampi tidak ada karena kami mendampingi warga miskin perkotaan yang hampir tidak pernah bermimpi untuk aktif di Partai Politik’

Page 173g: ‘Latar belakangnya umumnya berbeda. Latar belakang yang terlibat di partai politik umumnya berkekuatan secara ekonomi dan tidak memiliki analisa yang baik tentang persoalan-persoalan yang terjadi di masyarakat’.

Page 174a: ‘tidak ada kesempatan...karena partai politik yg ada hanya bicara finansial..bukan bicara soal kepentingan rakyat.’

Page 174b: ‘Dengan sistem partai politik sekarang terbuka kemungkinan bagi anggota kami untuk menjadi anggota partai politik, tetapi untuk dapat mewakili partai politik di parlemen itu sangat tidak mungkin melihat, karena latar belakang yang kami bawa. Ya kebanyakan anggota partai politik sekarang semuanya berlatar belakang kelas bawah dan menengah di era rezim Soeharto, tetapi mereka tidak memahami dan tidak berusaha secara gigih memperjuangkan kelas bawah terutama rakyat miskin untuk dapat dipenuhihak hak nya, kebanyakan dari mereka terlibat korupsi dan kolusi. sangat sedikit diantara mereka yang masih mau melihat kebelakang dan membantu’.

Page 174c: ‘karena komunitas kami adalah komunitas orang-orang miskin. Tidak mungkin orang miskin menjadi anggota parlemen di negara kami’.

Page 174d: ‘Wakil rakyat semestinya perwujudan kehendak rakyat, tetapi stelah duduk di DPR menjadi lupa pada yang diwakili.’

Page 175b: ‘Tidak, Partai lebih mengedepankan kepentingan elit dan melupakan rakyat’

Page 175c: ‘sebagai pengurus partai sudah punya perspektif gender tapi sebagian juga belum karena konotasinya laki-laki lebih banyak terlibat dalam partai tapi karena Undang-undang mengatur harus memperhatikan 30% keterwakilan perempuan maka menjadi pegangan partai mengakomodir’.

Page 176a: ‘Komunikasi resmi, saat itu organisasi Solidaritas Perempuan Kendari mendorong partisipasi perempuan aktif dalam pemilihan gubernur dan wakil gubernur Sulawesi Tenggara pada tahun 2012, salah satu kegiatan yang dilakukan berdialog langsung dengan partai politik, seperti apa partai politik mendorong calon gubernur dan wakil gubernur yang berpihak pada kesetaraan gender, masyarakat miskin dan marginal’.

Page 176b: ‘Sampai saat ini belum terlihat upaya mereka untuk mengatasi isu tersebut’.

Page 176c: ‘Tidak stigma dan diskriminas’


Page 176e: ‘Perlu dilakukan penelitian tentang Keterwakilan komunitas marginal (WPS, Gay, Transgender, Perempuan Korban dipengurusan partai politik’.

Page 178a: ‘Belum, karena politik uang masih bermain’.

Page 178b: ‘Korupsi, menurut saya sudah sangat merusak kondisi internal dan eksternal di partai politik. Jadi sulit sekali untuk membincangkan hal-hal yang belum 'urgent' urgent untuk ukuran mereka.’.

Page 179a: ‘Secara umum, semua partai mengatakan anti korupsi tetapi kenyataannya banyak politisi yang justru melakukan korupsi. Anggota DPR juga tidak mendukung pemberantasan korupsi karena justru ingin melemahkan atau membubarkan KPK.’
Memang ada beberapa anggota DPR yang mendukung pemberantasan korupsi, tetapi jumlahnya sangat sedikit’.

Page 179b: ‘Idealnya sifat yang harus dimiliki adalah: memperjuangkan kepentingan masyarakat bukan individu atau partainya, anti korupsi, memiliki pengetahuan dan pendiidkan yang memadai, berani bersikap kritis terhadap pemerintah dll. Sebagian besar anggota partai politik di indonesia saat ini hanya berorientasi kekuasaan, corrupt, hanya memperjuangkan kepentingan diri sendiri dan partai politiknya.’

Page 179c: ‘Sifat yang melekat pada diri anggota partai politik yang duduk di parlemen menurut saya, harus anti korupsi, memiliki kemampuan untuk memperjuangkan kepentingan rakyat dan setuju terhadap nilai keadilan sosial...’

Page 179d: ‘Mereka harus berangkat dari sebuah cita cita ingin membangun masyarakat lapisan bawah[ dalam arti sebenarnya], kebalikan dari berangkat dengan niat ingin kaya, ingin menguasai proyek proyek pembangunan besar, ingin duduk berkuasa. Tidak semua sifat itu ada pada parpol, bahkan mayoritas berangkat dengan cita cita [hidden agenda] untuk mengeruk keuntungan sepihak.’

Page 180a: ‘Pertama, dari aspek ideologi harus berbasis Islam.’

Page 180b: ‘Nasionalis. bukan keagamaan. dan menjunjung tinggi demokrasi.’

Page 180c: ‘Sifat Yang harus dimiliki yaitu Berjiwa Patriot.’

Page 180d: ‘Berpikah kepada alam.’

Page 180e: ‘Jujur, tidak memanipulasi perhatian dan bantuan untuk kepentingan partai apalagi anggota legislatif dari partai.’

Page 180f: ‘Sifat yang harus dimiliki adalah sifat cerdas, keras kepala, tp mau menerima masukan/saran/pendapat dari masyarakat.’

Page 180g: ‘Pandai.’

Page 180h: ‘Jujur,adil,demokratis, berpikah dan membela hak-hak masyarakat.’

Page 180i ‘Berjuang sepenuh hati untuk kepentingan komunitas.’
Page 181a: ‘Sifat memahami kondisi yang sebenarnya terjadi dan juga ada keinginan serius untuk melakukan suatu perbaikan yang terukur. Sifat ini tidak saya lihat ada di partai politik, kalaupun ada hanya mungkin terbatas pada 1-2 orang saja.’


Page 181c: ‘Sifat jujur dan berkomotmen untuk perubahan yang nyata, bukan cerita dan bukan pula janji. menrut saya kurang di miliki.’

Page 181d: ‘Seharusnya Partai memiliki kewajiban untuk melakukan kerja nyata dan tidak hanya kepada komunitasnya saja, dan juga tidak hanya pada saat Pemilihan Umum saja . Dan harus bersifat netral dalam bersosialisasi. Saat ini belum ada partai politik yang bersifat seperti itu.’

Page 181e: ‘Puny sikap memihak kepada yang miskin (option for the poor). Mungkin ada anggota partai politik yang memiliki itu tetapi sangat sedikit.’

Page 182a: ‘Pro rakyat—hal inilah yang tidak dimiliki parpol yg ada sekarang.’


Page 182d: ‘Mereka harus turut serta dalam pengelolaan Hutan Lestari dan Penguatan Koperasi.’

Page 183a: ‘Peduli pada kepentingan dan hak buruh migran. Sifat itu tidak ada pada partai politik’.

Page 183b: ‘Kesehatan gratis atau pendidikan gratis.’

Page 183c: ‘Memberdayakan perempuan dll.’

Page 183d: ‘Transparan, Partisipatif, Tidak Corrupt, Kebijakan Pro Rakyat Miskin.’
Page 183c: ‘Selalu membela kepentingan masyarakat kecil.’

Page 183f: ‘Secara konsisten memperjuangkan kepentingan2 masyarakat tersebut dalam kebijakan2 resmi negara atau pemerintah baik local, sub nasional maupun nasional.’

Page 183g: ‘Mewakili kepentingan masyarakat.’

Page 183h: ‘Perlu adanya pemahaman yang baik dari multi aspek, seperti persoalan Sosial, ekonomi, Lingkungan hidup, perempuan, Politik, ekonomi, hak-hak masyarakat yang termarginalkan oleh sistem dan lain sebagainya’.

Page 183i: ‘Memiliki gagasan yang visioner, tidak korup, dan mampu memperjuangkan aspirasi rakyat. Menurut saya, partai politik terlalu pandai untuk mengutarkan janji-janji bukan realisasi.’

Page 183j: ‘Seharusnya Partai memiliki kewajiban untuk melakukan kerja nyata dan tidak hanya kepada komunitasnya saja.’

Page 183k: ‘Merakyat dan mau melayani rakyat terutama rakyat miskin. Sayangnya isyu ini hanya lips service saja’


Page 184b: ‘Tidak mengerti issu pentimng dalam komunitas, saya kurang paham partai politik itu mewakili rakyat bagian mana.’

Page 184c: ‘Sifat memahami kondisi yang sebenarnya terjadi dan juga ada keinginan serius untuk melakukan suatu perbaikan yang terukur. Sifat ini tidak saya lihat ada di partai politik, kalaupun ada hanya mungkin terbatas pada 1-2 orang saja’.

Page 184d: ‘Partai politik sangat mengerti, namun banyak yang tidak bertindak. untuk itu, penting bagi kami, agar memasukkan personal-personal anggota menjadi anggota partai politik. agar mereka lebih memahami dan segera bertindak untuk menyelesaikan isu penting tentang komunitas’.
Page 184e: ‘Isu dari komunitas kami sangat penting menurutnya, tetapi mereka tidak memberikan respon yang menjanjikan untuk menyelesaikan atau mengakomodir dari isu yang kami bawa’.

Page 184f: ‘Memahami masalah yang terjadi di masyarakat, dan tahu cara-cara memperbaiki kebijakan untuk menyelesaikan masalah tersebut. Ada, tapi sangat lemah’.

Page 185a: ‘Ya, Ada yang mendukung sedikit dana. Ada yang monolog mencarikan dana Ada yang menyuruh menunggu waktu yang tepat nanti.’


Page 185c: ‘Mereka lebih mendahulukan kepentingan partai dan melupalkan kebutuhan komunitas.’

Page 185d: ‘Dalam semangat pembangunan yang baik tidak. Selama ini partai politik hanya mencoba memahami isu penting komunitas sebatas untuk kepentingan kampanye dan pemenangan pemilu’.

Page 185e: ‘Pada praktiknya partai politik tidak mewakili komunitas manapun, dan tidak melaksanakan mandat untuk memperjuangkan aspirasi dari komunitas pemilihnya, meskipun dalam sistem pemilihan dan sistem ketatanegaraan di Indonesia menyebutkan demikian. Partai politik hanya mewakili aspirasi dan kepentingan mereka sendiri. Dalam hal legislasi misalnya, produk-produk regulasi tidak disusun berdasarkan aspirasi dan masyarakat tidak ada mekanisme kerja dalam partai politik untuk menyerap aspirasi dari komunitas pemilihnya untuk diperjuangkan secara bottom-up dalam penyusunan kebijakan. Contoh lainnya partai politik tidak hadir dalam penyelesaian konflik-konflik di masyarakat, misalnya ketika komunitas petani digusur karena lahannya diberikan oleh pemerintah kepada investasi perkebunan besar.’

Page 186a: ‘Sifat yang hamba Masyarakat…mereka melakukan sesuatu itu merupakan alat bagi keluarga dan masyarakat untuk selalu terbangun sosial yang berdasarkan pada nilai-nilai dan kearifan lokal yang telah ada) sehingga mereka berbuat adalah apa yang memang menjadi kebutuhan masyarakat dan dapat
mengarahkan dan membangun komunitasnya, bukan untuk membangun diri, keluarga dan golongannya, dengan kata lain tidak hanya untuk kepentingan Partainya saja. Sifat seperti ini ada pada Visi dan Misi Parpol tetapi tidak ada yang diwujudkan’.

**Page 186b:** ‘Secara umum bila dilihat pada Visi dan Misi serta tujuan masing-masing partai mereka mencoba untuk mengerti isu di komunitas, namun dalam proses implementasi mereka sama-sama asyik dengan dunianya yang akhirnya mereka lupa dengan amanat yang telah mereka susun dan janjikan bersama masyarakat. Pada dasarnya Isu-isu di komunitas hanya dijadikan sebagai SLOGAN bagi masing-masing untuk kemenangan dan menduduki kursi. Sangat terlihat bahwa mereka itu mengerti, namun mereka tidak dibarengi dengan niat baik mereka yaitu Hanya untuk kepentingan Raykat. Sehingga Kepentingan Rakyat Hanya sebagai Alat mereka untuk berjualan’.

**Page 187a:** ‘Jika dikatakan mewakili, saya rasa tidak. Hampir tidak pernah terjadi partai membangun komunikasi khusus dengan kelompok miskin kota’.

**Page 187b:** ‘Tidak tahu, karena selama ini tidak pernah ada pertemuan antara anggota komunitas dengan anggota Partai Politik’.

**Page 187c:** ‘Partai politik di Indonesia belum sampai pada fase tersebut. Mungkin secara umum Pemerintah membuka kesempatan seperti itu tetapi bukan mewakili partai politik’.

**Page 187d:** ‘Jarang terjadi hal seperti itu, karena mereka tidak akan memperhatikan kalau kita tidak menarik perhatian mereka’

**Page 187e:** ‘Tidak ada kesempatan untuk dialog dengan partai politik. Kami tidak tahu apakah partai politik menghargai anggota komunitas kami’.

**Page 187f:** ‘Tidak, dan saya tidak tahu apakah mereka menghargai hak-hak politik kami’.

**Page 188a:** ‘Pernah kami coba mengundang mereka dalam pertemuan tapi pemahaman mereka sangat jauh dari pemahaman yang sebenarnya’.

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‘Tidak. Selama beberapa periode dari proses pemilihan legislatif, banyak masyarakat yang mengeluhkan tentang hubungan-hubungan yang dibangun dalam proses interaksi sosial antara masyarakat komunitas dampingan dengan para politisi.’

‘Partai politik semestinya mendengar apa yang terjadi di dalam masyarakat. Karena partai mewakili masyarakat, maka seharusnya mereka menyuarakan apa kepentingan masyarakat. Masalahnya, para politisi justru sering berbeda sikap dengan suara-suara publik. Saat publik sudah marah dengan praktik korupsi, anggota DPR justru membela teman-teman mereka yang kena kasus korupsi dengan mendorong pelemahan KPK.’

‘Parpol hanya hadir disaat menjelang Pemilu maupun Pemilukada’.

‘Tidak ada dialog. kalo mau mendapat suara, baru datang ke komunitas’

‘Mereka baru muncul menjelang pemilu,sehingga pada umumnya tidak dikenal secara utuh oleh komunitas’.

‘Seharusnya demikian, partai yang memperjuangkan perbaikan nasib masyarakat akan mendapat dukungan suara dari komunitasnya, dan sebaliknya. Namun dalam kenyataannya hal itu tidak terjadi. Beberapa faktor penyebabnya adalah partai-partai tidak lagi hadir dalam masyarakat, partai hanya pengumpul suara untuk masuk dalam parlemen. Sehingga faktor dominan yang mempengaruhi hasil Pemilu adalah premordialisme, sekterian, dan politik uang’.

‘Dewan perwakilan rakyat cenderung sebagai dewan perwakilan partai pada saat menjalankan tugas, tetapi saat proses pemilu mereka sebenarnya didukung oleh suara rakyat’

‘Sistem politik saat ini telah memberikan pelajaran yang berharga bagi masyarakat dalam memberikan pilihan-pilihan, namun demikian seringkali politik sangat sarat dengan kepentingan yang tidak sesuai dengan janji-janji pada saat kampanye’.

‘Menurut saya pengalaman mendampingi komunitas masyarakat khususnya perempuan akar rumput, partai politik tidak penting untuk mengangkat isu di komunitas, tetapi bagaimana partai politik bekerja mengkampanyekan calon yang diusungnya, dengan cara mendekatkan diri dimasyarakat dengan banyak janji-janji
saja, ketika calon yang di usung lolos, apakah itu sebagai DPRD, Gubernur, masyarakat ditinggalkan begitu saja tanpa ada lagi perhatian seperti apa yang pernah dijanjikan saat mengkampanyekanya’.

*Page 189e:* ‘Hanya sedikit dari anggota partai politik yang memberikan kesempatan kepada komunitas untuk berdialog untuk meminta aspirasi pembangunan. mayoritas berdialog ketika sudah kampanye menjelang pemilu saja. Hanya sebatas kepentingan yang bermanfaat untuk dirinya sendiri dan partainya. Kemudian mereka akan kembali melakukan bujukan dan rayuan setelah lima tahun kemudian’.

*Page 189f:* ‘Kesempatannya sangat kecil, komunitas warga hanya di undang untuk mendengar janji-janji politik pegurus partai politik yang hendak mencalonkan diri menjadi anggota legislatif dan eksekutif’.

*Page 190a:* ‘Ya, tidak secara langsung, kadang--kadang melalui seminar-seminar atau dalam diskusi-diskusi mengenai Undang-undang tatacara pemilu’.

*Page 190b:* ‘Iya... kami sering berdialog... tetap menghargai namun kurang bisa dipercaya...’

*Page 190c:* ‘Kesempatan itu ada apabila aspirasi masyarakat tersebut berpihak atau sama dengan keinginan partai politik tersebut maka akan diberikan kesempatan untuk menyampaikannya’.

*Page 190d:* ‘Partai politik sebetulnya terbuka untuk dialog. Hanya saja banyak masyarakat kecewa karena dialog ya tidak ada hasilnya. Dalam konteks pemberantasan korupsi, partai politik bahkan sering mengundang saya untuk diskusi, tetapi hasilnya justru makin banyak anggota DPR yang dipenjara karena korupsi’.

*Page 190e:* ‘Pengalaman saya, ketika hasil pemilihan kepala daerah dimenangkan oleh figur yang didukung oleh organisasi atau mayoritas organisasi memilih figur tertentu atau ada kader organisasi kami terpilih dalam pemilihan pemerintahan maka saya dilibatkan untuk membantu kerja-kerja pemerintahan’.

*Page 191a:* ‘Ada partai yang diwakilkan oleh Calon Legislatif (Caleg) terpilih meminta Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) sebagai bentuk dukungan dalam proses verifikasi. Hubungan yang berusaha dibentuk sangat tidak etis karena mereka hanya meminta atau bahkan secara tidak langsung memaksakan memberikan dukungan
(formalitas). Bahkan, kami tidak diberitahukan mengenai gagasan yang ditawarkan oleh partai tersebut’.

Chapter Nine

Page 201a: ‘Para senior seharusnya berdiri memberi dukungan di belakang, bukan mengambil alih pimpinan’.

Chapter Ten

Page 238a: ‘menurut saya, sangat penting juga melihat pengaruh money politik dalam keterpilihan anggota partai politik. karena hasil money politik ini lah yang menjadikan anggota partai politik yang tidak memiliki kapasitas namun memiliki uang yang terpilih sebagai wakil rakyat di DPR/DPRD’.


Page 239a: ‘harus ada parameter untuk mengukur kinerja partai politik dan menghubungkannya apakah kinerja partai politik tersebut sejalan dengan perolehan suara melalui Pemilu’.