



## **Deepening understandings of Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital through a study of academic voice within academic governance**

Citation of the final article:

Rowlands, Julie 2018, Deepening understandings of Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital through a study of academic voice within academic governance, *Studies in Higher Education*, vol. 43, no. 11, pp. 1823-1836.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in *Studies in Higher Education* on 13 Feb 2017, available at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03075079.2017.1284192>

© 2017, Society for Research into Higher Education

Downloaded from DRO:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30090636>

**Deepening understandings of Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital through a study of academic voice within academic governance**

Julie Rowlands

School of Education and Centre for Research for Education Impact, Deakin University,  
Australia

Email: [julie.rowlands@deakin.edu.au](mailto:julie.rowlands@deakin.edu.au)

Correspondence:

Dr Julie Rowlands

School of Education

Deakin University

Locked Bag 20000

Geelong, VIC 3220

Australia

**Acknowledgements:** The author acknowledges The Warrnambool Collective group of researchers for their ongoing encouragement and support. Thanks are due to the 3 Australian and 2 US universities that generously participated in this research and to all those who were interviewed. Thanks are also due to the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University for the academic study program funding that enabled the US fieldwork to take place, and to Dr Shaun Rawolle for comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.

# **Deepening understandings of Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital through a study of academic voice within academic governance**

## **Abstract**

This article presents comparative empirical data from England, the US and Australia on academic boards (also known as faculty senates or academic senates) to highlight ways in which changes within contemporary academic governance effect a diminution of academic voice within decision making about and that affects teaching and research. Drawing on Bourdieu's notions of academic and intellectual capital it highlights the limited capacity of analyses of university power relations that are predicated upon managerial and collegial governance as being at opposite ends of a spectrum to account for the multiple academics who have taken up line management or executive-level roles, and the many practising academics who undertake quite substantial administrative roles alongside their teaching and research. The article concludes by arguing that a more nuanced reading of Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital, combined with his concept of the divided habitus, offers significant potential for a deeper understanding of the complex ways in which the asymmetries of power within universities are developed and maintained. In turn, this opens the way to transformational academic governance practices that could reassert academic voice within decision making about academic matters.

**Key words:** universities, governance, academic voice, Bourdieu

## **Introduction**

This article considers the subfield of academic governance within the broader field of higher education. Although practices vary significantly, academic governance generally involves overseeing teaching and research and ensuring the protection of their quality and standards (Austin & Jones 2016). It is fundamental to universities because academic governance produces the conditions that enable teaching and research to take place (Marginson & Considine 2000).

Notwithstanding differences within and between universities and nation states, there have been profound changes within academic governance within Western democratic nations in the past 30 years or so, resulting in the domination of managerial and corporate modes of governance over more traditional collegial forms (Middlehurst 2013). Indeed, within much of the literature, collegial and managerial governance are portrayed as being at opposite ends of a spectrum (Tight 2014). In Bourdieu's terms, this tension between managerial and collegial governance is represented as academic and intellectual capital—two opposing forms of cultural capital or power particular to the higher education field (Bourdieu 1988). In contrast to the impression given by its name, academic capital is accrued as a result of status earned by way of a senior management position held within the organisation hierarchy and intellectual capital is accrued on the basis of an intellectual or scholarly reputation generally related to research achievement and expertise (Bourdieu 1988). Although both forms of capital sit in tension within contemporary universities (Kloot 2009), it is their relative holdings of intellectual capital that position them on the international ranking scales within the global higher education field (Marginson 2008). However, domination of the higher education field and the academic governance subfields by academic capital or management has raised concerns about the potential for academic voices to be subjugated (see Shattock 2014b).

This article addresses the impact of recent changes in academic governance on the capacity of practising academics to speak and be heard during decision-making about and that affects teaching and research. Its underlying position is that the study of academic governance is relational and that changes and tensions within academic governance are at the forefront of broader shifts in universities' roles and functions. The article proceeds along three lines. First, it provides an account of academic and intellectual capital, centring on the ways that Bourdieu (1988) and others have traced power relations within university decision making about academic matters. Second, the article reports comparative empirical data from England, the US and Australia on academic boards, the principal academic governance body within many universities, to show how, in different ways, shifting power relations manifest as a diminution of academic voice. However, the data also reflect the need for a more nuanced consideration of power within academic governance, within which many academics have taken up line management or executive-level roles, and many practising academics undertake quite substantial administrative roles alongside their teaching and research (Macfarlane 2015). Third, the article argues that revisiting of Bourdieu's notions of academic and intellectual capital (Bourdieu 1988), combined with his concept of the divided habitus

(Bourdieu 1999; Reay 2015), offers significant potential for development of deeper and more nuanced understandings of the ways these complex and contested asymmetries of power are developed and maintained.

### **A brief account of the relationship between Bourdieu's academic and intellectual capital and academic governance**

Bourdieu's notions of academic and intellectual capital exist in relation to his theories of habitus, field and capital. Fields are bounded social spaces (Bourdieu 1985) within which agents are ordered and 'defined by their relative positions' in response to the quantity and worth of capital or valued resources they hold (Bourdieu 1985, 724). There are various forms of capital (social, economic, cultural), which accumulate within fields (Bourdieu 1986) in response to practices within those fields (Rawolle & Lingard 2013). In turn, habitus is an enduring but not unchanging system of dispositions or schemes that operate below the level of consciousness which lead to thoughts and practices within specific fields (Bourdieu 1977). Academic and intellectual capital are forms of cultural capital or power that originate within the university field and that accrue in response to the managerial, scholarly and scientific (including the social sciences) practices that take place there (Bourdieu 1988).

In his writings, Bourdieu employs the notion of academic capital in two different ways. On the one hand, he uses the phrase to describe the various inherited and acquired resources that students bring to bear upon their education and to what effect. Here, Bourdieu is using academic capital in a manner which equates to educational capital (see for example Bourdieu 1984, 18; 1986, 285; 1996, 17-9). On the other hand, when writing specifically about the internal workings of universities, Bourdieu uses academic capital to describe the power wielded by senior management within universities, which he contrasts with intellectual capital generated and possessed by practising academics (Bourdieu 1988). Elsewhere, intellectual capital is also described as scientific capital (Bourdieu 1975). The fact that within *Homo Academicus* Bourdieu uses the phrase academic capital in both ways in different places, the former in relation to the success of schooling in children (1988, 163), and the latter in reference to power relations between the various categories of university senior managers, suggests that these differential uses are purposeful and deliberate.

However, use of the phrase academic capital within this article is also problematic for different reasons—because the word 'academic' is part of expressions such as academic

voice, academic work or academic matters, where it has a quite different meaning. Thus, throughout this article, the phrase ‘academic capital’ when used in the Bourdieuan sense references managerial power derived from holding a senior management post within a university. In all other contexts within this article the word ‘academic’ refers to an aspect or aspects of the identity, practices and/or resources pertaining to teaching, scholarship and/or research. To reduce potential confusion, the phrase academic capital will at times be followed by the word ‘management’, or similar, to remind the reader of its meaning in that context.

Bourdieu’s primary goal in writing *Homo Academicus* was to expose the role of the university in contributing to the construction and maintenance of social inequality. Importantly for the purposes of this article, it also highlights the creation, distribution and asymmetries of power within universities themselves, which mirror the external inequalities (Naidoo 2004, 457). Although the empirical data reported in *Homo Academicus* pertain specifically to French universities in the late 1960s, the theoretical constructs have wider applicability (Wacquant 1990) and ongoing currency, evidenced by their subsequent use in other, more recent, contexts (see Kloot 2009; Rowlands 2013).

On Bourdieu’s account, academic and intellectual capital are in play as fundamental opposites (1988, 53). The poles they occupy within the university field also reflect power relations within broader social space where there are ‘two main fractions of the dominant class, with businessmen, executives, and state officials on the side of economic and political power vs. artists and intellectuals on the side of cultural and symbolic power’ (Wacquant 1990, 680). Thus, the university field exists in a state of ongoing struggle (Naidoo 2004), including over whether academic or intellectual capital is most prized, how each form of capital is defined and which agents or body get to determine this. The outcomes of these struggles determine the relative benefits that each party is able to draw from the field (Bourdieu 1988, 11).

Intellectual capital is primarily accrued on the basis of prestige ‘measured through the recognition accorded by the scientific field’, generally outside the individual university. In contrast, academic capital is principally acquired and measured within the university (Bourdieu 1988, 79) through ‘holding a position enabling domination of other positions and their holders’ (Bourdieu 1988, 84). That is, ‘control over the material, organizational, and social instruments of reproduction of the faculty [academics]’ (Wacquant 1990, 680). Bourdieu describes appointed positions such as dean, or director of the university-wide functions of education or research (in contemporary terms this would equate to positions such as deputy vice-chancellor academic or research) as being indicators of the holders of

academic capital (1988, 40). Intellectual capital is indicated by such roles as directorship of a research unit, membership of learned academies, teaching within a research training university, publication of research through esteemed scholarly publishers and presentations at international research conferences (Bourdieu 1988, 40).

Within the university field, intellectual capital is aligned with teaching and research practice and therefore with traditional collegial governance, which assumes that those who teach and research are best able to determine the academic goals of a university and how those goals can be met (Salter & Tapper 2002). The academic governance committee structure, culminating in the academic board or equivalent, is central to collegial governance (Ramsden 1998). However, despite the romantic ideal with which it is often associated (Middlehurst 1995) collegial governance has been criticised for being slow, cumbersome (and therefore expensive) and incompatible with the strategic and financial imperatives universities now face (Marginson & Considine 2000). In nations such as the UK and Australia, where collegial governance centred around the professor, it has also been critiqued for being elitist, undemocratic and exclusionary, particularly of junior, female academics (Ramsden 1998). This reflects that agents are both relationally and differentially positioned within a field (Wacquant 1990) and therefore not all academics acquire and deploy intellectual power equally (Bourdieu 1988).

As a form of governance, academic capital aligns with managerial power accrued through holding a senior executive-level position. Managerialism is a complex and contested ideology and within the context of university governance it manifests as practices that are frequently described as new public management (Deem & Brehony 2005) with a focus on executive-driven decision-making, performance measurement and output controls (Amaral 2013). In contrast to collegial governance, which is considered to be inward looking, managerialism references the external public and private sectors, with a tendency to consider academics as having a vested interest and consequently incapable of contributing effectively to university governance (Shattock 2014b). It is argued that managerialism signalled a shift from the role of university administrators as service providers to administration as a mechanism for control (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007). Managerialism has been extensively critiqued for its focus on commodification and therefore on financial and strategic matters at the expense of academic and student affairs (Robertson & Dale 2013), and for management practices that focus on top-down decision-making at the expense of trust, creativity and an entrepreneurial culture (McNay 1999). This is reflective of the domination of academic over intellectual capital within the university field (Rowlands 2013).

## **Data gathering on university academic boards from the US, England and Australia**

While some internationally comparative research investigates university governance, especially within Western Europe (see for example Shattock 2014a), cross-national research on academic governance specifically, including that which draws on Bourdieuan theory, is relatively uncommon. The data within this article are drawn from a broader and ongoing international comparative research project which seeks to make a small contribution towards filling this gap. To date, the research has concentrated on academic governance within Anglophone nations with a particular focus on England, the US and Australia. Academic governance within these nation states shares some common ancestry in the Anglo-American governance model while at the same time currently takes place within very different local political, economic and social environments. This makes England, the US and Australia of particular interest as exemplars.

This article presents interview data from broader case studies of institutional level academic governance in three publicly funded universities in Australia: one older elite research intensive, one new dual sector and one mid-level comprehensive teaching and research university; and two publicly funded doctoral granting universities in the US: one elite research intensive and one teaching focused. In common with many publicly funded universities in the US, the two US universities studied as cases were part of large, separate, state-wide university systems with each having academic board equivalent bodies at campus level and an overarching or statewide academic senate for the university system as a whole. Within the US research intensive university, interviews and other data collection took place at the level of the university campus academic board equivalent body, while within the teaching focused university, interviews and other data collection took place at both campus and statewide levels. Universities in both the US and Australia were purposively selected to ensure maximum variation between them within each nation state; however, the sample size of five cases remains a significant limitation. A total of 15 interviews were conducted in the US in 2016 with current and former academic board (or equivalent body) members and 31 in Australia in 2010 with current and former academic board members and senior administrators. The interviews were semi-structured and related to the role and function of the academic board or equivalent body, and the role of each respondent in relation to it. The same interview questions were used in both the US and Australia, subject to minor

modifications to accommodate differences in terminology or university structure. Steps in data analysis included transcribing interviews; coding; identifying relationships, patterns and themes in the data; identifying generalisations from within the data; and comparing those internal generalisations to formal knowledge to develop or refine theory (Miles & Huberman 1994). Data analysis included within and across case comparison and triangulation of data types (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2011).

The article also draws on publicly available data collected from a sample of purposively selected academic boards or equivalent bodies from publicly funded doctoral granting universities from England (n=27), the US (n=29) and Australia (n=37), collected in July 2015. An earlier set of the Australian data was also collected from the same universities in 2010, enabling comparison over time. While the Australian samples include every comprehensive publicly funded university, the size of the sectors within the US and England meant that this was not possible or practicable there. As a result, the US sample was drawn from 22 states and represents a mix of teaching focused, research focused and elite research universities. The English sample was drawn from a variety of institution types, sizes and levels of status, and includes 13 research intensive Russell Group universities.

The publicly available data collected in respect of each university include the name, size, composition and key powers or responsibilities of the academic board or equivalent, together with information about the place of each academic board within the governance structure of its respective university, the basis upon which each board was established and the number and name of academic board standing committees at each university. Data were drawn from institutional websites and cross-checked against relevant policy and legislative instruments. Limitations include that data from all three countries were drawn from official documentation and while they describe certain characteristics of academic boards or equivalent bodies there can be very significant differences between publicly stated academic board roles and responsibilities and what academic boards actually do. The case studies help to offset this limitation to some extent.

Care must be exercised when comparing academic boards across nations because of significant structural, historical and functional differences within university governance. The governance structures of almost all publicly funded US universities are classified as unicameral with the governing body being ultimately responsible for academic and financial matters. Academic boards or their equivalent within US universities do not generally have decision-making authority in their own right but instead make recommendations to the university president or vice-chancellor equivalent who is, in turn, responsible to the

governing body within a tradition of shared governance (Austin & Jones 2016). In contrast, many (but not all) universities within England, Canada and Australia have bi-cameral governance structures where the university governing body and the academic board equivalent are each established by the university's founding legislation and each have decision-making authority for a specifically defined set of matters (Shattock 2006). However, academic boards within bicameral governance structures are not always stronger than those within unicameral governance structures (Taylor 2013) since power within university governance can be exercised indirectly in ways that are quite different to official decision-making arrangements (Shattock 2014c). Similarly, although academic boards within many universities are now substantially less powerful than they once were (Rowlands 2017), this is not universal. For example, academic board equivalent bodies within many US universities did not ever have wide-ranging decision-making authority (Amaral, Fulton & Larsen 2003) and this is also the case for academic boards within those universities founded in England and Australia in 1990 or later (Rowlands 2013). In contrast, academic boards within many Canadian universities appear to have experienced fewer changes in role and function than elsewhere, although this does not necessarily mean they are considered more effective (Pennock et al. 2015).

Academic boards within different nation states may also be described using relatively similar language but may mean quite different things. Thus, the word faculty is used in the US to describe those who teach and/or research in universities, whereas in England and Australia, the descriptor academics or academic staff is more commonly used. In the US, the principal academic governance body is most commonly named the faculty senate or academic senate, whereas in England and Australia, the names academic board or academic senate are commonly used, amongst others. Also in the US, the chief executive of a university is most commonly known as a president whereas in England and Australia, vice-chancellor is the most common title. Within this article, the titles most commonly used in England and Australia are used generically (that is, academics, academic board, vice-chancellor) unless in reference to data specifically collected in the US, in which case US titles are used.

Regardless of the terminology employed, universities within and across nations are distinguished at least as much by their differences as they are by their similarities and it is misleading to suggest that all, or even most, of the issues and challenges are experienced in the same ways. Thus, a number of common themes emerged from the cross-national data but these themes tend to manifest differently in each university and in each nation state. These complexities add much needed richness and nuance to the data and subsequent analysis. The

remainder of this article focuses on academic voice within decision-making about academic matters, one of the strongest themes to appear within the comparative data.

### **Academic voice within decision making about and that affects academic matters**

In the context of this article academic voice refers to the capacity of academics to contribute to decision-making about teaching and research, including courses or programs, curriculum and assessment. This is a significant area of responsibility for academic boards or equivalent bodies. Within academic governance in England and Australia, a perceived lack of academic voice relates partly to the significant proportion of academic board members who are not practising teachers or researchers. The publicly available data on academic board composition and roles indicates that on average 50% of the members of English academic boards and 46% of the members of Australian academic boards are *ex officio*, with voting rights, who are there by virtue of a management position they hold, such as deans and other senior managers. In some individual cases within both nation states, including within some elite research intensive universities, the percentage of *ex officio* members who are representing senior management far exceeds 50%. This is reflected in the following comment from the academic registrar at the elite Australian research university studied as a case, noting the composition of the academic board there:

... it's got as many managers on the board as it has academics. I think we should focus a lot more on the academic side. *Academic registrar, elite Australian research university*

The significant proportion of English and Australian academic board members who are senior managers (Rowlands 2017) reduces the proportion of voting members who are grass roots practising academics. It also affects the power dynamic during the meeting, impacting on the willingness of those who teach and/or research to engage in robust debate or to ask questions. The following is typical of comments made by interview respondents within all three Australian case study universities:

So it is about that perceived power base I suppose, when you have a pro vice-chancellor or a deputy vice-chancellor sitting there promoting something and is then participating in the debate; very often when you have teachers or academics

or general staff, it takes a lot of courage and experience, I think, to engage in debate and argument with people at that level. *Deputy academic board chair, Australian new dual sector university*

However, a perceived diminution of academic voice within England and Australia is more complex than how many managers sit on academic board and its committees. It also arises from the conversion of what were once senior academic roles to executive level positions and from decisions that are increasingly taken in places outside traditional academic governance forums and which practising academics therefore can't access (Marginson & Considine 2000), or where decisions are effectively already made before they get to the academic board (Shattock 2014b). These shifts are reflected in the following interview excerpt:

I think it is definitely the case now that there are a lot more decisions made outside of the academic board that don't involve the board and obviously it only sees the things that have already been filtered through the vice-chancellor's committee. So whilst the academic board has its policies and procedures and ways of doing things, there is an awful lot that happens outside of the board that a lot of the members wouldn't know anything about. And they might not be able to influence those things. *Former elected academic board member, mid-level Australian teaching and research university*

Within the two US case study universities, concerns around academic voice manifested very differently. The publicly available data on academic board role and composition indicates that 95% of members of US academic board equivalent bodies within the sample of 29 universities are elected faculty or academics, with only 5% holding senior management roles, generally without voting rights. Additionally, the terms of reference of US academic boards are generally very broad, covering resourcing, staffing and other matters, in addition to more traditional academic ones. This suggest that US academic board equivalent bodies can potentially speak on a much wider range of matters than their UK and Australian counterparts. However, this does not necessarily mean that their voices are always heard. Within the two US case study universities a lack of academic voice was especially evident at the statewide academic board level, where university-wide matters of strategy, finance and policy are determined. For example, within the teaching focused university, statewide academic senate members expressed frustration that recommendations or resolutions were too

readily dismissed with the effect that the administration and the senate were often seen to operate in parallel universes:

We have authority over less and less, even over curriculum which is like the bottom line. What can we do? Most people believe that all we can do is advise an action on the part of the administration. It seems to me we should be able to do more but that seems to be what we've accepted is all we can do. We can advise an action. And that advice can either be taken under consideration, or not. *Elected statewide academic senate member, US teaching focused university*

At the elite research intensive university, where collegial governance at campus level was perceived as very strong, the chair of the academic senate reported that the academic implications of financial and strategic decisions made at statewide level were regularly not taken into account, providing the following example:

... some decisions about academic matters such as—basically the president agreed with the [state governor] about certain “reforms” without consulting anybody.  
*Academic senate chair, US elite research university*

The campus academic senate at the elite US research intensive university had significant delegated or conferred powers and could determine a very wide range of matters in its own right. [However, consistent with the dominant unicameral governance structure within US universities](#), this is rare (Shattock 2006), even amongst other publicly funded elite research universities. Thus, many US vice-chancellors [or equivalent](#) are empowered to reject academic senate recommendations outright. However, the campus president at the case study teaching focused university appeared very reluctant to do this. Instead, members reported that he had enacted a much more imaginative set of tactics to limit academic input into decision-making, such as bypassing the academic senate entirely or ‘sitting’ on certain academic board recommendations:

... the president would stall it. So what would happen is it would get up into his office after it went through and passed and then it would sit there and he would say he was adjudicating, [that] he was looking at it. *Former academic senate chair, US teaching focused university*

Additionally, although US senior university executives are rarely voting members of the academic senate, they do commonly sit on or are invited to attend some standing committees. At the case study teaching focused university this included the campus senate executive committee that determines the senate agenda. There, senior executives can exert considerable influence over how the senate operates and what it considers, especially in relation to academic policy:

They [university executives] have a lot of influence in the policy proposals, in particular. One example [deleted to preserve anonymity] was considered by [senate] executive committee on two occasions, and because of the push back from the administration we knew it was a non-starter. They're not going ... even if this comes all the way through Senate and has full senate support, it's not going to get signed. And so they absolutely do have influence and in that case it was really a foot down: 'This is my foot and it's down and it's the end of the discussion. This is not supported by us. Period'. *Academic senate chair, US teaching intensive university*

The examples reported in this section cannot be assumed to represent all other US and Australian universities, let alone universities more generally. However, they do highlight potential issues in relation to academic voice within academic governance that can be explored theoretically, with potentially broader application.

### **In between spaces and the divided habitus**

Bourdieu's theories of academic and intellectual capital can be useful when considering the power relations within contemporary institutional level academic governance, especially at the academic board or equivalent (Rowlands 2013). However, although it may seem as if concerns about a diminution of academic voice within academic governance can be explained simply, as a manifestation of the domination of academic capital over intellectual capital, it is contended here that the ways in which power relations within academic governance are established and maintained are more complex than they might initially appear.

First, although academic capital (or managerial power) currently dominates the university field, it is intellectual capital that generates and transmits new knowledge—the

core purposes of teaching and research universities. This raises significant questions about how intellectual capital can be subordinate when it is central to universities' existence and success? One possible reason is that not only do university senior executives and senior managers hold the greatest amounts of the dominant academic capital and most if not all of the economic capital (Rowlands 2013), they also appropriate and control some of the intellectual capital produced within the university. In turn, this appropriated intellectual capital is used for purposes other than knowledge for its own sake, such as through academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie 1997), when the products of intellectual labour are sold to procure income. Bourdieu writes that appropriation of capital takes place when the 'owner of the means of production' appropriates the 'services of the holders of the capital' through access to the 'embodied cultural capital' or the habitus (Bourdieu 1986, 247), which generates practice (Bourdieu 1990). That is, university senior executives and senior managers are able to control some aspects of the process by which intellectual capital is produced through their employment of academics, whose academic habitus lead to research and scholarly practices that generate teaching and research outputs. Bourdieu explains that the key means by which 'the holders of the dominant type of capital' are able to maintain this control is to 'set the holders of cultural capital in competition with one another' (Bourdieu 1986, 247). Thus, managerial power over some of the intellectual capital that is produced within universities is facilitated through orchestrating rivalry between and among academics and, in turn, universities. Although competition within academia is not new, institutional regimes of governance which facilitate contestation between and among academics via mechanisms for measuring, monitoring and reporting have become much more common in recent years (Power 1997). Such processes mirror and replicate what takes place at institutional, national and international levels by way of assessment and rankings (Shore & Wright 2015). In turn, academics play the competitive game (Bourdieu 1990), however reluctantly, partly because doing so provides quantified output for academic workload models, promotion applications and research grant applications, amongst other matters (Leišytė 2016).

Second, although Bourdieu describes academic and intellectual power as being naturally located at the two extremes of the university field, or as polar opposites, he also argues that '... between the two extremes where the two kinds of power would be entirely dissociated, there exist all the intermediary profiles' (1988, 105). That is, both forms of capital are in play within universities at the same time, in varying combinations. Moreover, in

spite of oppositional discourse around academics and managers or administrators within both literature and practice, Bourdieu notes that:

[d]oubling up is not entirely unknown, and we find, in the centre of the space, a number of professors who manage to unite and to reconcile the powers of the head, virtually absolute master of all academic destinies, and the authority of the scholar. (Bourdieu 1988, 104)

Here, Bourdieu implies that it is probably rare to be brilliant at both managerial (what in this context Bourdieu describes as academic) and scholarly or research practices, or at least, to be able to do both brilliantly at the same time. However, Bourdieu's 'intermediary profiles' (1988, 105) suggest that it is very possible to do both at the same time whilst remaining somewhat disposed towards one or the other. Indeed Bourdieu suggests that through 'the dispositions of the *habitus* and ... opportunities' (Bourdieu 1988, 99; see also Bourdieu 1999, 512) agents are predisposed (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) towards either managerial or scholarly/research practice, but not necessarily exclusively so.

In everyday university life many practising teachers and researchers routinely undertake quite substantive administrative and management roles alongside their traditional academic responsibilities (Houston, Meyer & Paewai 2006), even if they are not all fond of doing so. These administrative roles can include (but are not limited to) co-ordinating courses or programs, administering research project budgets, employing and supervising casual or sessional teachers or researchers and overseeing the completion of performance and workload management templates within a department or team. The combination of teaching and/or research work plus administrative or service tasks that makes up much ongoing or tenured academic work, diminishing though that form of employment may be, suggests the existence of blurred and in between spaces. That is, of positions in between the extremes of either all academic (managerial) or all intellectual capital.

One way of thinking about agents within the contemporary academic governance subfield who are required, or obliged, to simultaneously enact academic (or managerial) and intellectual power is through Bourdieu's notion of the divided *habitus*, '... a *habitus* divided against itself, in constant negotiation with itself and with its ambivalence, and therefore doomed to a kind of duplication ...' (Bourdieu 1999, 511). This implies significant internal struggle and ambiguity, such as an academic might experience when required to comply with the publication output targets of an academic workload model so as to secure a research allocation for the following year whilst at the same time being fundamentally opposed to such

mechanisms (Burrows 2012). Reay draws on the divided habitus in her recent work which considers habitus in the context of the psychosocial. She notes that while Bourdieu describes those who are comfortable in familiar fields as being like a ‘fish in water’, those who are not comfortable or are in unfamiliar fields may potentially be ‘positioned in an untenable space on the boundaries of two irreconcilable ways of being’ (Reay 2015, 13). Thus, ‘habitus can, in certain instances, be built on contradictions, upon tensions, even upon instability’ (Bourdieu 1990, 116; as cited in Reay 2015, 11). That is, the dispositions of the habitus can potentially point in two, or even multiple, conflicting directions.

The data presented within this article suggest that academic governance can be a fraught and contested social space or subfield. Continuing to play notions of managerial and collegial governance off against each other as if there can be nothing in between is unhelpful, not least because doing so pays insufficient attention to the well-documented weaknesses of both governance modes. It also risks paying too little heed the extensive difficulties academics face balancing the performative and performance measurement aspects of the academic governance subfield field with their desire to facilitate the best possible learning outcomes for their students, and the best possible research outcomes for their university, department and their own careers. There were numerous examples of such difficulties within the US and Australian data but one particularly powerful illustration was provided by a member of the statewide academic senate in the US teaching focused university who was describing the anxiety she feels when student progression and graduation rates are discussed within the academic senate. On the one hand there is recognition that if certain performance indicators are not met the university may lose funding but on the other there is deep concern over what is in the best interests of students:

So when they say something like ‘well we’ve got raise the graduation rate’ we say ‘well because of ... why?’, I mean we don’t like the fact that a certain amount of students are not graduating but this kind of sort of flogging of a rate without clear remedies for how to go about helping people who are terribly poor and can’t take full loads of courses—a lot of students are working 30 to 40 hours a week. It is just absurd for them to think that they can finish in 4 years. So there’s a disjuncture ... because it’s not good for the students to malingering at university for 6 years. [But] they’re not malingering, they’re not playing volleyball or painting their toenails. I mean they’re getting in their beat up old cars and running to the

next job or going home and taking care of their kids because they can't afford a babysitter. *Statewide academic senate member, US teaching focused university*

Although habitus 'function[s] below the level of consciousness' (Bourdieu 1984, 466), an agent's habitus is understood to be reflected in their practice (Bourdieu 1977). As a result, habitus can be at least partially read from practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). This suggests that an agent cannot meaningfully be asked to describe their habitus during an interview, but that descriptions and observations of their practices may provide an indication as to some of the dispositions that comprise it. During this senator's interview she reported numerous instances of resistant practice, speaking back to the requirements for measuring and monitoring, whilst at the same time complying with some aspects of those very same requirements, however reluctantly. As the interview excerpt indicates, this is a very uncomfortable place to be. Bourdieu suggests that instances of such discomfort have the potential to make conscious aspects of the habitus that would otherwise not be accessible (Bourdieu 2000, 163; see also Reay 2015). At the same time, Reay is careful to point out that emotional responses, such as that reflected above, are not aspects or evidence of individual or collective habitus (2015, 12). Rather, the impact of the emotional response has the potential to contribute to a reshaping of the habitus, leading to predilections to think, feel and act in certain ways, and not in others (Reay 2015, 12). The implications of this for a reshaping of the academic habitus arising from the impact of changed practices that result from the constant need to juggle academic and intellectual capital, and to enact both simultaneously, are quite significant.

The disjuncture between academic and intellectual capital within academic governance is not limited to academic board business, or its equivalent. It is also relevant to demands placed on office bearers such as academic board chairs or presidents, as the following quote indicates:

So there are things I know I'm told—I mean the price tag of being told the information is to keep it quiet. And ... obviously I've tried to push and promote as much transparency by the administration as possible ... but even in that sense there's certainly aspects of the planning process where putting all your cards on the table would be disadvantageous because you don't want people panicking prematurely. You don't want certain issues to be made public if we might be able to resolve them and they don't need to be made public and so forth. So that

creates a tension because on the other hand your colleagues all want to know what the heck is going on. They want to be fully informed. *Academic senate chair, US elite research university*

Unlike Reay's examples of the cleft habitus, where agents are straddling the competing demands of two different fields (2015), these academic board (or equivalent) members are juggling two competing forms of capital, within the one field. The senate president in the above example has access to privileged information from university management which he feels can help him perform his role more effectively; however the price of receiving this information is that some of it cannot be shared. Naidoo describes that within the field of higher education, agents 'implement strategies in order to improve or defend their positions in relation to other occupants' (2004, 459). Strategies are a 'specific orientation to practice' (Naidoo 2004, 458) that are 'determined by the implicit anticipation of their consequences' (Bourdieu 1973, 64). This senate president is strategising—does he distribute the information to his senate executive colleagues or not? If he does, there might potentially be a more informed decision about an important academic matter, but the consequence may be that such information is not forthcoming in the future and this may also impact on significant academic matters. The difficulties reconciling these conflicting demands are palpable and it is clear that doing so requires considerable 'self-regulation' (Reay 2015, 15).

However, the juggling of intellectual and academic or managerial power is not restricted to the US. The Australian case study data, and especially the interview transcripts, suggest enormous tension between the procedural demands of academic board business associated with academic capital, and the significant issues relating to teaching and research that draw on considerable intellectual capital so as to respond. On the whole, the academic boards within the three Australian case studies were considerably more procedural than their US counterparts, not in terms of meeting procedure but as regards academic board business and responsibilities. The following interview excerpt from a recent former member of the academic board at the mid-level teaching and research university reflects this:

It [the academic board] is supposed to be a forum for discussion of academic matters and, you know, perhaps controversial issues. I don't know, time is the problem. How can it engage in robust debates about controversial issues when it has all these other mundane functions that it has to perform? It should be a sounding board for things. You know, maybe things that come up at Vice-

Chancellor's Committee could be referred to [the academic board] for [it]'s views and then the views reported back to VCC. So maybe on some things we shouldn't go ahead until [the academic board] has [considered them]. *Former elected member academic board, Australian teaching and research university*

A common theme throughout the interview quotes cited within this section is respondents' concerns about the potential effect of academic capital upon academic voice, a theme also evident in the earlier interview data. The concern relates partly to the impact of senior managers and management practices upon the capacity of academic boards to speak and be heard about significant academic matters within the university. It also relates to unease about the capacity of practising academics to contribute meaningfully to decisions about such matters within academic board meetings or their equivalent, which, especially in Australia, can be dominated by management. However, a further issue is that the requirement for academic board members who are practising academics to wield significant academic capital in order to deal with the procedural and performance measurement aspects of academic board roles (again, especially in Australia) and the strategising required to respond to managerial domination within the university field generally necessarily limits their capacity (time, energy, mental space) to exercise intellectual capital at the very time when that is most needed for decisions around teaching and research. While in *Homo Academicus* Bourdieu may have speculated on a small number of university professors who managed to deal simultaneously in both academic and intellectual capital, the data presented in this article suggest that such juggling is now commonplace, or even required, within contemporary academic governance and within ordinary academic work.

## **Conclusion**

Academic governance occupies a state of unease between the traditional roles of universities in producing and disseminating knowledge and more recent trends towards corporatisation, competition and the market. The data presented in this article show that academic governance at the level of the academic board or equivalent is not only undertaken by academics but is also practiced and influenced by university senior managers and executives. The resultant diminution of academic voice is evident in a number of ways. First, especially within nations such as Australia and the UK, the power and influence of academic governance bodies such as academic boards or their equivalent, has reduced substantially within the past 30 years

(Rowlands 2013). Second, there has been a decrease in the number and size of academic governance bodies, such as faculty boards and academic boards arising largely from the corporatisation of university governance, especially within Australia (Marginson & Considine 2000), and the widespread consolidation of academic structures such as colleges and schools to form mega faculties or their equivalent (Shattock 2014b). As evidenced by the data from Australia and England reported earlier, there has also been a substantial reduction within some universities in the proportion of members of those bodies who are practising academics. Third, contemporary universities have been *executivised* through the conversion of what were once senior academic roles to managerial positions such as pro and deputy vice-chancellors (Bolden et al. 2015). Fourth, the imposition of administrative processes designed to standardise and control outputs impacts on curriculum, pedagogy and research practice—limiting and defining what can be taught and researched (Brady & Bates 2016). Fifth, domination of some traditional academic governance forums and processes by executives reduces the capacity for practising academics and academic leaders to speak and be heard at times when key decisions about (and impacting on) academic matters are being made, and also places academic strategy within the domain of management, separating it from academic work (Rowlands 2017).

The meaningful input of practising academics to decisions about and that affect teaching and research practice is essential. Empirical data suggest that strong central control mitigates against academic engagement and an entrepreneurial culture within universities, key factors for success (Bolden et al. 2015). Reduced academic voice relates not only to diminished capacity for academics to contribute meaningfully to decisions about and that affect teaching and research but also to the way academic governance and academic work within contemporary universities appear to have changed to require much greater use of academic capital by practicing academics, reducing their time, energy and mental space to produce intellectual capital, the very resource upon which teaching and research depend. In turn, the potential for changed academic practice to effect a reshaping of the academic habitus (Rowlands & Gale 2017) in a way that reflects increased requirements for academic capital within the field is of great concern.

This article has suggested that Bourdieu's concepts of academic and intellectual capital, within the broader context of his theories of habitus, field and capital, can contribute to understandings of power relations within contemporary universities. The use of Bourdieuan theory across national borders within international comparative research can potentially deepen this understanding by highlighting ways in which power is constructed and

maintained within very different empirical settings. The common themes that have emerged from this research despite these significant differences add weight to the view that such work should continue. Messages about the loss of academic voice within academic governance become all the more powerful when they are seen to cross national boundaries and enter the global higher education field.

A common impact of diminution of academic voice within academic governance is the potential for loss of academic control over areas such as curriculum, assessment and research. Academic governance is not something 'out there'. Rather, it is central to being an academic and to doing academic work. Participating reflexively in restrictive academic governance practices specifically with a view to transforming them is one way that change is possible. Such transformational practice (Maton 2003) is our collective, academic, responsibility.

## References

- Amaral, A 2013, 'The difficult life of prophets and seers', *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 26, pp. 463–78.
- Amaral, A, Fulton, O & Larsen, IM 2003, 'A managerial revolution', in A Amaral, VL Meek & IM Larsen (eds), *The Higher Education Managerial Revolution*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, vol. 3, pp. 275–96.
- Austin, I & Jones, GA 2016, *Governance of Higher Education: Global perspectives, theories and practices*, Routledge, New York.
- Bolden, R, Jones, S, Davis, H & Gentle, P 2015, *Developing and Sustaining Shared Leadership in Education*, Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, London, retrieved 6 April 2016, <<http://www.lfhe.ac.uk/en/research-resources/published-research/research-by-theme/collaboration-and-partnership/developing-and-sustaining-shared-leadership-in-higher-education.cfm>>.
- Bourdieu, P 1973, 'The three forms of theoretical knowledge', *Social Science Information*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 53-80.
- Bourdieu, P 1975, 'The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason', *Social Science Information*, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 19–47.
- Bourdieu, P 1977, *Outline of a theory of practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P 1984, *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*, Routledge & Keegan Paul, London.
- Bourdieu, P 1985, 'The social space and the genesis of groups', *Theory and Society*, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 723–44.
- Bourdieu, P 1986, 'The forms of capital', in JG Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Greenwood, New York, pp. 241–58.
- Bourdieu, P 1988, *Homo Academicus*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P 1990, *The Logic of Practice*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P 1996, *The State Nobility: Elite schools in the field of power*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P 1999, 'The contradictions of inheritance', in P Bourdieu & A Accardo (eds), *The Weight of the World: Social suffering in contemporary society*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca, pp. 507–13.
- Bourdieu, P 2000, *Pascalian Meditations*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P & Passeron, J-C 1977, *Reproduction: In education, society and culture*, Sage, London.
- Brady, N & Bates, A 2016, 'The standards paradox: how quality assurance regimes can subvert teaching and learning in higher education', *European Education Research Journal*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 155–74.
- Burrows, R 2012, 'Living with the h-index? Metric assemblages in the contemporary academy', *The Sociological Review*, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 355–71.
- Cohen, L, Manion, L & Morrison, K 2011, *Research Methods in Education*, 7th edn, Routledge, London.
- Deem, R & Brehony, K 2005, 'Management as ideology: the case of 'new managerialism' in higher education', *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 217–35.
- Deem, R, Hillyard, S & Reed, M 2007, *Knowledge, Higher Education and the New Managerialism: The changing management of UK universities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Houston, D, Meyer, LH & Paewai, S 2006, 'Academic staff workloads and job satisfaction: expectations and values in academe', *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 17-30.
- Kloot, B 2009, 'Exploring the value of Bourdieu's framework in the context of institutional change', *Studies in Higher Education*, vol. 34, no. 4 pp. 469–81.
- Leišytė, L 2016, 'New public management and research productivity – a precarious state of affairs of academic work in the Netherlands', *Studies in Higher Education*, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 828-46.

- Macfarlane, B 2015, 'Dualisms in higher education: a critique of their influence and effect', *Higher Education Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 101–18.
- Marginson, S 2008, 'Global field and global imagining: Bourdieu and worldwide higher education', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 303–15.
- Marginson, S & Considine, M 2000, *The Enterprise University: Power, governance and reinvention in Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.
- Maton, K 2003, 'Reflexivity, relationism & research', *Space & Culture*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 52–65.
- McNay, I 1999, 'Changing cultures in UK higher education: the state as corporate market bureaucracy and the emergent academic enterprises', in D Braun & F-X Merrien (eds), *Towards a New Model of Governance for Universities: A comparative view*, Jessica Kingsley, London, pp. 34–58.
- Middlehurst, R 1995, 'Changing leadership in universities', in T Schuller (ed.), *The Changing University?*, Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press, Buckingham, pp. 75–92.
- Middlehurst, R 2013, 'Changing internal governance: are leadership roles and management structures in United Kingdom universities fit for the future?', *Higher Education Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 3, pp. 275–94.
- Miles, MB & Huberman, M 1994, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An expanded sourcebook*, 2nd edn, Sage, Thousand Oaks.
- Naidoo, R 2004, 'Fields and institutional strategy: Bourdieu on the relationship between higher education, inequality and society', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 457–71.
- Pennock, L, Jones, GA, Leclerc, JM & Li, SX 2015, 'Assessing the role and structure of academic senates in Canadian universities, 2000–2012', *Higher Education*, vol. 70, no. 3, pp. 503–18.
- Power, M 1997, *The Audit Society: Rituals of verification*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Ramsden, P 1998, *Learning to Lead in Higher Education*, Routledge, London.
- Rawolle, S & Lingard, B 2013, 'Bourdieu and Educational Research: thinking tools, relational thinking, beyond epistemological innocence', in M Murphy (ed.), *Social theory and education research: understanding Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and Derrida*, Routledge, New York, pp. 117–37.
- Reay, D 2015, 'Habitus and the psychosocial: Bourdieu with feelings', *Cambridge Journal of Education*, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 9–23.
- Robertson, SL & Dale, R 2013, 'The social justice implications of privatisation in education governance frameworks: a relational account', *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 426–45.
- Rowlands, J 2013, 'Academic boards: less intellectual and more academic capital in higher education governance?', *Studies in Higher Education*, vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 1274–89.
- Rowlands, J 2017, *Academic Governance within Contemporary Universities: Perspectives from Anglophone nations*, Springer Nature, Singapore.
- Rowlands, J & Gale, T 2017, 'Shaping and being shaped: extending the relationship between habitus and practice', in J Lynch, J Rowlands, T Gale & A Skourdombis (eds), *Practice theory: diffractive readings in professional practice and education*, Routledge, Oxford.
- Salter, B & Tapper, T 2002, 'The external pressures on the internal governance of universities', *Higher Education Quarterly*, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 245–56.
- Shattock, M 2006, *Managing Good Governance in Higher Education*, Open University Press, Maidenhead.
- Shattock, M (ed.) 2014a, *International Trends in University Governance: Autonomy, self-government and the distribution of authority*, International Studies in Higher Education, Routledge, Oxford.
- Shattock, M 2014b, 'University governance in the UK: bending the traditional model', in M Shattock (ed.), *International Trends in University Governance: autonomy, self-governance and the distribution of authority*, Routledge, Oxford, pp. 127–44.

- Shattock, M 2014c, 'University governance in the UK: *Bending the traditional model*', in M Shattock (ed.), *International Trends in University Governance: Autonomy, self-government and the distribution of authority*, Routledge, London, pp. 127–44.
- Shore, C & Wright, S 2015, 'Governing by numbers: audit culture, rankings and the new world order', *Social Anthropology*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 22–8.
- Slaughter, S & Leslie, LL 1997, *Academic Capitalism: Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Taylor, M 2013, 'Shared governance in the modern university', *Higher Education Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 80–94.
- Tight, M 2014, 'Collegiality and managerialism: a false dichotomy? Evidence from the higher education literature', *Tertiary Education and Management*, pp. 1–13.
- Wacquant, L 1990, 'Sociology as Socioanalysis: Tales of "Homo Academicus" [By Pierre Bourdieu]', *Sociological Forum*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 677–89.