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Citation:

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From Radical Transparency to Radical Disclosure: Reconfiguring (In)Voluntary Transparency Through the Management of Visibilities

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This article challenges how the concepts of voluntary and involuntary transparency are understood in the digital age by focusing on the management of involuntary and voluntary disclosure. We tend to understand radical transparency through new forms of involuntary networked data dissemination, spread without the consent or knowledge of whoever held the data. This view conflates the politics of exclusion with crucial questions of compulsion. At the same time, radical transparency’s promise to end secrecy has not materialized. Instead, the social-material relations underpinning digital disclosures suggest they function to reconfigure visibilities of control and recognition rather than reveal extant objects. Thus, the article introduces a typology of disclosure to better understand the involuntary and autonomous and inclusive and exclusionary dimensions of managing visibility in the digital era. It then explores two sets of empirical “radical disclosure” practices, made with purpose but without consent, to articulate how digital disclosures reconfigure visibility and set limits and opportunities in society. The article concludes with a suggestion toward ramifications for governance and autonomy.

Keywords: radical disclosure, radical transparency, visibility management, digital leaking, social shaming

WikiLeaks, Anonymous, Snowden, SecureDrop, and GlobaLeaks have all used digital technologies to make political secrets radically visible. “These machines kill secrets,” reports Andy Greenberg (2012). For Greenberg, this is the inevitable outcome of a mix of cypherpunk culture, ubiquitous digital information, and advancements in cryptographic anonymity. Yet we await the end of secrecy much as we await the end of history. Digital forms of radical transparency have not yet ushered in total disclosure. As Roberts (2012) points out, “there is no such thing, even in the age of the internet, as the instantaneous and complete revelation of the truth” (p. 130). Thinking otherwise assumes that acts of transparency reveal truths rather than reconfigure what is visible (Flyverbom, this issue) and leads to categorical errors in understanding the political ramifications of disclosure in the digital age.
Specific to the focus of this article is how the current understandings of voluntary and involuntary transparency err by conflating the politics of inclusion/exclusion with crucial questions concerning whether democratic subjects are compelled to disclose. These understandings are symptomatic of incumbent politics, which allow the actors that set limits and opportunities for others in society, as Birchall (2014) argues, prescribe limits to disclosure’s role in society. Considering truly radical alternatives requires a new vocabulary.

I argue that thinking through voluntary and involuntary forms of disclosure makes more accurate accounts of visibility management possible. Whereas (in)voluntary transparency speaks to whether objects/structures are uncovered from within (or without), (in)voluntary disclosure speaks to how subjects reconfigure themselves and their world through autonomously enunciating their world or by being compelled to do so. Such delineations allow a more systematic way to think about the management of disclosure as it relates to Brighenti’s (2010) conception of “visibilities of control and recognition” (pp. 40, 148). Brighenti argues that visibilities of control reference a deprivation of power aligned to theories of governmentality. I suggest this corresponds to when actors are compelled to disclose. Brighenti’s visibilities of recognition, on the other hand, imply an emancipatory effect that one’s self-consciousness bestows on another by recognizing its equal dignity. I suggest these require voluntary disclosure. At the same time, Brighenti concludes that forms of control are implied and required by emancipation through egalitarian recognition, and that these two poles should not be regarded as a simple dichotomy. For instance, disclosure that is voluntary but that reconfigures the visibility of the secrets of others suggests a complex emancipatory moment that I term here radical disclosure.

The article is structured to expose the politics of transparency, introduce a typology of disclosure that links to Brighenti’s conception of visibilities, and then explore empirical consequences of radical disclosure through research on digital leaking and social shaming. The empirical examples also allow discussion on specific sociomaterial relations that are tied to digital materializations of radical disclosure. I conclude by speculating on the impact that these disclosure practices have on governing by introducing for further discussion the complex connections between Brighenti’s theory of visibilities and what Griggs, Norval, and Wagenaar (2014) call “decentered governing.”

Uncovering Politics Through Transparency

Transparency studies in the digital age have introduced the adjectives radical and involuntary to the metaphor of transparency. Radical transparency has come to define a diverse set of claims around accelerating or unexpected disclosure via digital technologies. Common to discussion on radical transparency is the implication that it is enacted through involuntary transparency. Involuntary transparency is generally understood to utilize information that is given off by target organizations without their knowledge or consent. Those definitions obfuscate the political tensions at work within the management of disclosure and limit more critical understandings of the political qualities of radical transparency. I explore those tensions here to reveal the current limits of scholarship concerned with disclosure in the digital age.
The digital roots of radical transparency grow from Kevin Kelly’s (1994) argument that, “in the network era, openness wins, [and] central control is lost” (p. 116). For Kelly, digital technology in day-to-day life affords an inevitable and ultimate transparency. By the early 2000s, networked digital methods of collecting, processing, and disclosing information elicited the turn of phrase “radical transparency” (Hammond, 2001, p. 103) to describe new forms of openness to drive economic and social growth. More recently, the idea of ultimate or radical transparency was used internally at Facebook to describe how the company’s vision (and product) is reconfiguring the world toward more open and honest communities (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Radical transparency in these configurations unapologetically uncovers what is true, holding to account those who would deceive. Openness wins.

However, assessing the continuing sociomaterial relations connected to radical transparency projects suggests that secrets are alive, well, and mediated. At one level, as Birchall (2014, this issue) argues, obfuscation is sometimes needed for openness to win. Anonymity enabled by cryptography in networks such as Tor enable secrecy to imbue radical transparency into new forums. However, radical transparency is not absolute. It is a mediated relation of disclosure. This helps explain how WikiLeaks failed to incite the groundswell of outrage and change it was designed to (Roberts, 2012), while the digitally mediated reactionary state was able to “manage its own visibilities in new ways” (Cammaerts, 2013, p. 429). For instance, while hundreds of thousands of state documents were captured by Chelsea Manning and then distributed through WikiLeaks, the digital age had created hundreds of millions more that remain secret. What any ideal of radical transparency must come to terms with is that new sociomaterial relations of digital life apply across configurations of disclosure. A later section of this article applies this logic in a tentative typology of disclosure.

To frame that discussion, consider that this article argues that any concept of radical transparency must critique the current sociomaterial relations that manage that visibility. For instance, there is a fundamental difference of expectation between what McStay (2014) identifies as liberal transparency, which opens the “machinations of power for public inspection,” and a radical form that opens both “public processes and private lives of citizens” (p. 44). Who is disclosing the information of whom, and how, become pertinent questions. Elsewhere, I have understood radical transparency in terms of disruptive shifts in both the media used to disseminate information and the political position of the actors that do so (Heemsbergen, 2013). In a similar normative argument, Clare Birchall (2014) suggests radical transparency should be “able to subvert or at least interrupt dominant attitudes toward disclosure’s limited and prescribed role” (p. 85). She suggests such critiques need to see through set relationships between data, narrative, information, interpretation, and understanding in acts of disclosure. Radical transparency that is defined solely by extreme levels or new techniques of uncovering information rather than reconfiguring relationships is not able to fulfill these requirements.

This is made explicit through the discursive connections between radical transparency and involuntary transparency. Currently, involuntary and voluntary transparency are defined by those institutional actors and structures that are able to set limits and opportunities for others. As such, voluntary transparency is described as “deliberate acts of openness,” while involuntary transparency materializes when “technological breakthroughs allow outside actors to corral data into knowledge without the comprehension or consent of the subject of transparency” (Lord, 2006, pp. 17, 126). As Shkabatur
(2013) has it, involuntary transparency functions as an “external and independent check on agencies’ behavior and is outside of their control” (p. 113). Even The New York Times notes involuntary transparency as a neologism worthy of record, describing it as a “new paradigm of enforced openness” applicable to everything from the “WikiLeaks disclosures and the ability to make instant online price comparisons” (Schott, 2010, n.p.). On the one hand, involuntary transparency’s ability to describe a spectrum of disclosure activity from WikiLeaks to augmented shopping practices suggests specific technical affordances involved in leveraging digital data that are “given off” rather than “given.” On the other hand, the breadth of purpose demonstrates that the term involuntary transparency cannot accurately account for the specific sociomaterial relations that mediate and manage visibility. This is mainly due to the dominant position of those who are defining (in)voluntary transparency and setting its political limits.

Specifically, conceptualizing (in)voluntary transparency as above conflates the politics of inclusion/exclusion with the politics of compulsion and, in so doing, obfuscates three political concerns regarding autonomy and control in the management of visibility. First, the definitions center discussion on the moral authority of the object/organization being made transparent rather than on the actor deciding to make it transparent. This privileges incumbent politics at the expense of recognizing emerging political freedoms for the subjects performing the disclosure. Second, the crucial democratic concern of whether the (democratic) subjects performing the disclosure are compelled to do so is not addressed. Involuntary transparency does not ask whether the disclosure was an act of autonomy or a reflex compelled by current structures of power. Finally, (in)voluntary transparencies both rely on the ontological assumption of revealing truth. Voluntary transparency is seen to spread cooperation or benign intent (Lord, 2006). Involuntary transparency deals with what Archon Fung (2013) has called the “defensive face” of the informational problem that protects citizens against the actions of powerful organizations. The underlying assumption of both of these models is that they reveal truth that was already there: benign actors open their benign data, while actors with secrets are hiding something disagreeable. In the modern axiom, if you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to fear—regardless of whether you want to disclose. These concerns present an unsatisfactory way to understand the power of managing visibility through digitally mediated disclosure that affects both objects and subjects of disclosure.

A critical study of disclosure that recognizes that visibility is managed must account for both the positional relations of subject and object as well as the presence of relationships of compulsion. As such, the next section introduces a typology for future discussions on disclosure in the digital age that differentiates (in)voluntary disclosure between an axis of compulsion and autonomy as well as the more traditional inclusion/exclusion dimension. This simple two-by-two matrix creates new categories of disclosure that consider how subjects and structures reconfigure themselves and their world through the freedom to autonomously enunciate their world—or by being compelled to do so.

Reconfiguring Politics Through (In)Voluntary Disclosure

A typology of disclosure is introduced here to provoke discussion toward more accurate ways to consider how both compulsion and position impact the management of disclosure. I suggest understanding involuntary disclosure as compelled, a reflex of current political structures. Voluntary
disclosure describes an autonomous decision to enunciate aspects of self. Radical disclosure is also voluntary, but targets the secrets of others. In this typology, involuntary self-disclosure is linked to poor self-awareness that can manifest, for instance, as political gaffes. Although gaffes can provide information for voter decision processes (Bennett, 1981), this category remains outside the current scope because it has less direct purchase on questions of governing others through digital technologies. The three categories detailed below help delineate the political relations available through managing disclosure in the digital age and speak to emerging functions and challenges for publics and practitioners in democratic governing.

The argument here is not that involuntary transparency is the inverse of involuntary disclosure. The former speaks to how objects/structures are uncovered from without, and the latter speaks to how subjects are compelled to reconfigure their own visibility. Categories of disclosure relate to how Brighenti (2010) delineates visibilities of recognition from visibilities of control. Specifically, voluntary and radical disclosure reconfigures subjects’ relations to the world through the freedom to autonomously enunciate it—and have that recognized by others. Although the typology shown in Figure 1 proposes an ostensibly systematic logic across two axes, it regards the resultant categories as non-exhaustive. They are not ideal types, but value-laden instances of disclosure that are mediated by specific sociomaterial relations. Each category is detailed below.

**Figure 1. Typology of disclosure.**
Involuntary Disclosure

What I term involuntary disclosure considers political subjects reacting to current organizational structures and politics of “transparency.” Introducing simple empirical accounts bears out the argument. Companies wishing to be publicly traded in the United States must make certain disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission under threat of fine—for the benefit of the public investor. Likewise, in courts of law where innocence is presumed, the judiciary compels disclosure from the prosecutor representing the state to reduce asymmetries of evidence—on behalf of the defendant. Thus, although these examples are deliberate and habitualized acts of openness (cf. Lord, 2006), they point to involuntarily giving up valuable information, even though sharing that information hinders one’s own prospects of success. In these cases, disclosure is compelled by those organizations that create opportunities and limits in society and is thus involuntary for the subjects of disclosure. Involuntary disclosure that is enforced by the self can be understood in the digital age through wishing to unsend an e-mail or delete a scandalous post racing across social media at the speed of the network.

In terms of the question of governing, the perspective of involuntary disclosure offers an explanation to the puzzle of why the state remains key in transparency literature that, by all other accounts, suggests transparency is normatively designed to decentralize power. Fung (2013) clarifies that, even in the Internet age of collaborative transparency, citizens must rely “upon regulatory and other coercive powers of government to secure [otherwise secret] information from organizations” (p. 189). Thus, in our language, involuntary disclosure happens at the behest of incumbent sociotechnical structures to habitualize how subjects are governed. Or to use Brighenti’s (2010) turn of phrase, involuntary disclosure administers the “deprivation of power” (p. 48) through purposeful visibilities of control.

Voluntary Disclosure

Voluntary disclosure is an act of visibility management where there is a lack of compulsion for actors to share their secrets, yet they still freely choose to do so. Voluntary disclosure can map to political practices through actions such as “official leaks.” These acts manage visibility by diverting public attention, defaming opponents, managing impressions, constructing political realities, signaling policy shifts, or generally misleading the public (Erickson, 1989; Fenster, 2014). Official leaks reconfigure visibility by contesting the rules of dominant information security practices and existing institutional channels of governing. Yet they further habitualize how subjects are governed, showing how the management of visibilities lies at the core of informal and formal social control (Brighenti, 2010). Official leaks stymie the sociomaterial relations of “unofficial” leaks by mimicking their exclusivity and anonymity for political effect. Further, anonymous digital drop boxes now provide official leaks an additional communicative obfuscation with which to manage visibility.

Another example that goes some way to explain the significance of managing visibility through voluntary disclosure in the digital age is the “quantification of self.” The quantified self does not merely suggest apolitical data acquisition on aspects of a person’s daily life. The social-material relations between code, sensor suite miniaturizations, and the ubiquity of smart devices afford a post-human ideology
(Jethani, 2015) of self-reconfiguration as opposed to self-discovery. The quantified self uses visibilities of recognition to recognize imminent identities through narratives that disrupt a vision of self as stable or dormant. Such practices were untenable in the analog world. The interoperability (Gasser & Palfrey, 2007) of digital data means that the entrance of a single additional element can easily shift the nature of disclosure into a different category. For instance, insurance markets (see John Hancock Financial, 2015) promote products that shift voluntary health disclosures from visibilities of recognition to control by compelling users to quantify their selves or face 18% higher costs.

**Radical Disclosure**

Radical disclosure is the voluntary disclosure of the secrets of others. Unlike voluntary transparency, where the political object and subject of disclosure are assumed to be coterminous (i.e., government information is public information!), radical disclosure involves autonomous actors choosing to reconfigure the visibility of incumbent organizations, regardless of the latter’s consent. It is neither compelled nor positioned within the control of the incumbent institutions or structures that set limits and opportunities for others in society. At one level, this category of disclosure describes shifting the reference point from the object that sets limits and opportunities to the political subject of those limits and opportunities. Doing so is a normative move that foregrounds autonomy through “direct” and agonistic democratic philosophies over liberal and deliberative ones. For agonists, the disruptions of radical disclosures reconfigure and make visible crucial new political needs and identities (Norval, 2007). In line with Brighenti’s (2010) view of visibilities of recognition, radical disclosures enunciate new iterations of democratic identities, subjects, and processes.

These practices present circumstances where disclosures disrupt the habitual governing of political subjects by reconfiguring not only what is visible but how it is made visible and by whom. In doing so, radical disclosure also disrupts the political consensus of transparency equating to good governance. The practice of radical disclosure thus fulfills Birchall’s (2014) ideal of radical transparency to question the relationships between data, information, interpretation, disclosure, and understanding.

**The Sociotechnical Relations of Radical Disclosure**

The second half of this article introduces two sets of sociotechnical relations of radical disclosure for empirical study. Digital leaking is introduced because it has a strong history and thus offers a useful case to test the theories of (in)voluntary disclosure. Digital social shaming is explored to present a more inchoate democratic expression to push the limits of the proposed typology of disclosure. The empirical focus of this section allows, as Brighenti (2010) has it, “reference to the socio-technical and material-technological configurations” (p. 148) that afford specific material patterns of disclosure. The affordances presented in this article draw from Treem and Leonardi (2012), asking what combinations of material features in certain technologies allow communicative actions that were previously difficult or impossible.

Radical disclosure in the digital age seems to rely on two such sociotechnical relations. These are described through the acceleration of dissemination through network time (Hassan, 2003) and the prodigious reach available through the interoperability (Gasser & Palfrey, 2007) of digital data. The
concept of network time speaks to radically accelerated process and connectivity that are mediated through material, economic, and social constraints to rapidly produce latent, asynchronous, and unevenly distributed information. Interoperability references the ability for data to be transferred and rendered useful across systems, from simple applications to complex organizations. Together, these affordances create ways of disclosing that are impossible in analog communications. I am not suggesting these two affordances represent an exhaustive expression of how digital technologies enable patterns of communication. In general, such technologies are seen to afford cheap, effective, and loose coordination that materialize capacities outside of the logics of market and hierarchy (Benkler, 2013). However, for the empirical examples explored below, network time and interoperability accurately describe how the previous limits of disclosure are transgressed.

**Digitalization of Leaks**

To set a reasonable scope on what is meant by *leaking* here, I include individual voluntary decisions to disclose the secrets of institutions that control limits and opportunities in society. Successful leaks do not require digital technologies, but the affordances present greatly increase the ease with which subjects can practice radical disclosure. Comparing the rote practices of Daniel Ellsberg to Chelsea Manning reveals how these differences affect the management of disclosure.

Ellsberg’s (2003) methods of radical disclosure required him and close accomplices to, among other arduous processes, personally “rip apart binders, cut off or tape-over the head and foot of each page to hide the incriminating ‘Top Secret’ stamps” and then frequent commercial copy centers to reproduce physical pages two at a time—at a 2015 inflation-adjusted price of US$20,000 (see pp. 300–333). Each part of this process was sequential, time intensive, and held continuous risk. Greenberg (2012) approximates that facilitating a “Manning-size leak” at this pace would take 18 years.

Digital technologies facilitated radically different processes for Manning. The sociomaterial relations available to Manning allowed immediate yet asymmetric temporal acceleration of data acquisition and dissemination. In parallel to Manning pretending to listen to a burned Lady Gaga CD on his network-enabled computer, hundreds of thousands of State Department cables were being written onto that same rewritable CD. Later, when WikiLeaks distributed these through BitTorrent protocols, the files reached across thousands of IP addresses in orders of magnitude more than Ellsberg could imagine copying and mailing out. This distribution was neither instantaneous nor unfettered; it was mediated. Contrary to public perception of the entire corpus of “Cablegate” being made public instantly and everywhere, most of Manning’s leaks were tightly controlled for months by the five major media partners of WikiLeaks. The leaks trickled into the public domain at an average rate of about 50 cables per day, even as they coexisted in a highly distributed and encrypted form across BitTorrent. Roberts (2012) has argued that the size of that leak, compared to the growing number of cables and similar documents in circulation, make Manning’s leak less remarkable. That argument is statistically accurate, but it neglects the radical shifts in sociotechnical relations that enabled newspapers, the public, and politicians to debate the limited role prescribed to Manning’s disclosure as well as its content.
Considering the controversy of both the content of Manning’s leaks and how their disclosure was managed, it is important to remember that the political potential of radical disclosure does not have to reflect content. Developing the spaces and platforms that radical disclosure depends on and works through can also answer a democratic need to contest current institutional limits put to disclosure. For instance, the encrypted and anonymous document submission platform, SecureDrop, was developed by Aaron Swartz and Kevin Poulsen and, as of mid-2015, is used by more than 17 major news organizations. A similar open-source project called GlobaLeaks boasts 27 implementations across smaller, issue-based media sites and is freely available for download on Github, a popular code repository. Platforms such as GlobaLeaks show how radical disclosure projects can meet Birchall’s (2014) critique of transparency to involve citizens in making decisions about how disclosure would be most effective and the extent to which it could precipitate change in specific contexts.

The complex sociotechnical relations that radical disclosure creates through digital leaks can be measured through both negative and affirmative government responses. Much has been written about political rhetoric and (extra)judicial pressures the U.S. government has put to WikiLeaks (see Benkler, 2011) and the U.S. administration’s new focus on stopping leaks in the digital age. By Rottman’s (2014) account, the Obama administration has secured 526 months of jail time for the seven leakers it is prosecuting (including two pending prosecutions), compared to 34 months given to the three cases of leaks prosecuted by all other administrations in the history of the United States. At the same time, recent judicial commentary on leaking even the most sensitive state secrets hints at the democratic complexity of managing visibility through radical disclosure. In a concurring opinion to the 2015 Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding National Security Agency surveillance activities, Judge Robert Sack restated his views that the illegal activity brought to light by Snowden’s leaks suggests that “some unauthorized disclosures may be harmful indeed. But others likely contribute to the general welfare” (ACLU et al. v. Clapper et al., 2015, p. 7). These divergent reactions suggest that digital leaking can produce unique, and sometimes inchoate, political pressures. These pressures are formed through practices that, in the language of Brighenti, offer visibilities of recognition—emergent autonomous voices and needs that cannot be ignored nor completely succumbed to. Understanding digital leaks solely through the frame of involuntary transparency ignores the complex political implications that they have for the practice of democracy. How the visibility of leaks is managed remains a crucial democratic concern and thus requires a typology that can discern the sociomaterial realities of disclosure.

The Digitization of Social Shaming

Public shaming through social media services that adopt mobile picture and video capabilities points to another potential for radical disclosure and is examined here through the Twitter hashtag #droughtshaming and capturing police violence. However, the political complexity of digital shaming on social networks first needs to be reviewed. Disclosure through social media can evoke what Hess and Waller (2014) describe as new rituals of public shaming created through the symbolic and disciplinary dimensions of public display. Some cases of public shaming can be understood as involuntary disclosure that is afforded by the relational structures of social media themselves. Ever-remixing norms of what shameful behaviors are, what practices of shaming are acceptable, and the resultant disruption to the contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010) of privacy and security are all in play. For instance, misogynist
practices of “slut shaming” proliferate in network time and through the interoperable reach of various social media services to provide highly aggressive forms of gendered politics and harassment online (Tanenbaum, 2015). The practice of “doxxing,” defined as maliciously publishing private or identifying information on the Internet, offers up personal identity to the same interoperable network flows. Doxxing and slut shaming evoke visibilities of control that show complex relations between (in)voluntary disclosure and radical disclosure. Disclosure in these circumstances is shown to reconfigure sociopolitical hierarchies in complex ways rather than reveal truth.

Nevertheless, public shaming practices can also contest current structures of information by providing new visibilities of recognition. For instance, online shaming can foreground the boundaries of colloquially understood free speech and censorship and the tension between anonymous speech and individual privacy (DeNardis & Hackl, 2015). Thus, digital shaming may also afford practices that demonstrate living outside of, and sometimes in opposition to, institutional procedures and channels. As Solove (2007) foresaw, Internet shaming helps people fight back while also (re)setting norms of civility and etiquette in ways that can be hard to control. Shaming may foment new identities as it discourages others. In Brighenti’s language, it offers visibilities of recognition to emerging viewpoints as it deprives power from those it exposes in visibilities of control.

One example of using shaming that recognizes new voices and enables control of others is exhibited through the Twitter hashtag #droughtshaming as used in California in 2015. Many #droughtshaming tweets embedded eyewitness pictures of excessive water use juxtaposed against the brown countryside of a multiyear, statewide drought. There is also an iOS application, DroughtShame, which automatically adds locative information to drought shaming pictures and uploads them to the cloud, where local water authorities have access to the report (Estes, 2015). These instances of public shaming may seem inchoate as a public good and offer excessive breaches of privacy: What do they accomplish in the policy arena? And by what right are personal properties made public? However, #droughtshaming does mediate a real, if still forming, democratic need.

Water usage records in California are institutionalized in such a way that usage by individual business and homes cannot be determined by the public or its governors. The history of water usage disclosure can be traced through California Water Code Section 13752, which in 1951 restricted access to individual well data to ensure fair competition for well drillers (Knudson, 2014). Further legislative changes in 1997 purportedly shield the wealthy from public scrutiny, while a judicial decision during the current drought shields corporations in much the same way (Mieszkowski & Williams, 2015). Thus, a public good is being depleted through a (mis)management of visibilities that are eroding the involuntary disclosure regime.

Water governance in California is also restricted in the space of voluntary disclosure. Although apps for smart phones with names like Dropcountr attempt to track personal water consumption, they are legally unable to interoperate between individual water customers and the customers’ data held by the utilities (Walker, 2015). Here the technical affordance of interoperability is stymied by institutional elements that make up part of the sociotechnical relations that mediate disclosure. In the context of eroding involuntary transparency over water usage, hashtags such as #droughtshaming embody practices
that challenge such institutional restrictions. Although reconfiguring the visibility of civic water authorities may seem a tertiary democratic concern, digital public shaming is also being used toward more pressing political issues.

Social media shaming disclosures reconfigure the visibility of institutional violence persecuted against minority populations in the United States. Videos of police violence filmed through dash cameras, body cameras, or with passersby’s mobile devices that are then prodigiously shared online present one such form of radical disclosure. Within the sociopolitical context of the United States, these disclosures foreground the statistically excessive amount of unarmed African American men killed by police. An exploratory snowball sample in 2015 from the search term of “black lives police death” linked recorded deaths since 2014 of nine unarmed individuals and one who was armed with a handgun. Each video linked to at least one of the others, while the original search returned results across numerous websites spanning from WorldStar and YouTube to the online presences of local network TV affiliates. Often these videos reconfigured the visibility of each death not just on scales and diversity of reporting but on the substantive reason for death, in some cases evoking criminal charges.

Although these videos are involuntarily or voluntarily disclosed by official sources or individuals, they become radical disclosures when they are remediated through decentralized digital networks of social sharing sites and services, regardless of the consent of the source. Here again, the affordances of interoperability and network time play a large part in enabling these radical disclosures to evoke and sustain their political impact. As radical disclosure, these videos deprive incumbent institutions of the power of what they previously held secret while making a democratic overarching need visible in new ways from (and to) new publics.

Conclusion: Radical Disclosure and Decentered Governing

The typology presented in this article is meant to provoke future discussion about the political realities of disclosure and visibility in the digital age. One direction to take that discussion is through connections to practices of decentered governing based on democratic theories of agonism. Specifically, the political and ontological connections between Brighenti’s claims for visibilities of recognition and control and what Griggs et al. (2014) define as practices of freedom and governance (see Figure 1) call for future research. For example, this would require consideration of how disclosure can create visibilities of control through practices that, using the language of “practices of governance” (Griggs et al., 2014, p. 9), set language, structure the field of others’ actions, and, in so doing, further habitualize the ways that political subjects are governed. Likewise, how do visibilities of recognition align with “practices of freedom” that seek to modify, contest, or reject the above governance by modifying rules, contesting institutional procedures and channels, and enabling strategies and struggles for alternative formations?

Through this logic, radical disclosure can be understood to contest and reconfigure existing political hierarchies by disrupting the incumbent management of visibilities. Radical disclosure decenters the management of visibility from existing institutions to inchoate formations that reconfigure the landscape of governing through new political enunciations. In this view, political acts such as digital
leaking and digital shaming manage disclosure while charting potential evolutionary courses for
democratic theory and practice in the digital era.

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