that challenged prevailing political, economic, and racial orthodoxies during that turbulent decade — until his death in 2016 Hayden remained an important figure in American public and political life. In Hell No, his final published work, Hayden again plays the dual role as historian-participant. Situating himself at — if not as — the epicentre of the turbulent 1960s, Hayden’s essay reflects the enduring demand of many veterans of the 1960s that the decade’s radical legacies not only be acknowledged, but also understood. As he puts it, his purpose here is to “rescue the Vietnam peace movement from oblivion” (p.137). At the same time, however, Hayden’s essay should not be dismissed as an exercise in self-aggrandizing nostalgia. Conceding, for instance, that one of the movement’s greatest failings — a “tragedy” as he puts it — was its inability to become greater than its often disparate elements, he laments the “internal divisions” over means and ends that robbed the movement of both coherence and power (pp.30-31). He acknowledges, too, that while the heady days of anti-Vietnam War activism are long gone, there are new forms of protest and dissent, which are challenging contemporary injustices and inequalities. In essence, Hayden’s message is that understanding his nation’s “haunted memory” of the Vietnam era is a prerequisite for confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century (p.130).

Inevitably, in an essay of this length, there are omissions. While Hayden links the anti-war movement of the 1960s to earlier expressions of American protest, such as the abolitionists and other radical groups, those connections are asserted rather than explained. Similarly, in stressing the international dimensions of the anti-Vietnam War movement, Hayden pays scant attention to the impressive and growing body of scholarship exploring the transnational networks of activism that developed during the 1960s. I think, too, that the role of the civil rights movement as a catalyst for ‘sixties radicalism is understated here. Finally, his conflation of cultural and political protest perpetuates some of the most persistent myths about the 1960s. But such criticisms are probably unfair. The omissions I have noted are understandable and probably inevitable in a work of this type, which self-consciously melds a respect for scholarship with political objectives that remain urgent in the United States, and elsewhere. While Hell No was completed prior to the 2016 Presidential election, it is surely a book for its times — a reminder of the past and a call to arms in the present. One cannot help but wonder, of course, how Hayden would have responded to the seemingly-constant crises convulsing the United States in the wake of that 2016 election. Then again, as Hell No suggests, we do know the answer to that: Hayden would have saddled up for yet another duel against the forces of imperialism, racism and oppression.

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John Selden and the Western Political Tradition. By Ofir Haivry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.xv + 504. £85.00 (cloth).

John Selden (1584-1654) — lawyer, scholar, parliamentarian — had a towering reputation in his time but has been largely ignored by later scholarship. John Selden and the Western Political Tradition seeks to redress this lacuna. The result is a momentous piece of scholarship: erudite, detailed and well-written, it is a worthy tribute to the man once acclaimed as “the learnedest man on earth”.

The work consists of six detailed chapters which overlap in their treatment. Chapter 1 is essentially a self-contained monograph on the life, work and ideas of John Selden, arguing that Selden’s main preoccupation was the defence of the English traditions of government against its intellectual and other threats; by employing his massive learning in this, he avoided the narrow insularity typical of the English
Chapter 2 contextualises Selden’s career by an examination of the crisis of knowledge and obligation in the seventeenth century, prompted by the rejection of earlier scholastic and Aristotelian approaches to science and metaphysics by Descartes and others, who sought to put in their stead a purportedly more rational and scientific approach.

Chapter 3 examines Selden’s ideas alongside those of the other leading thinkers of his day, namely Grotius, Filmer and Hobbes, who argued that “old-style constitutionalism was dead”, and sought to locate the source of political obligation in the will of the sovereign. Haivry argues that underlying the differences in the moral and political systems of these thinkers are differing approaches to epistemology. Rejecting abstract and rationalist approaches, Selden viewed tradition as a crucial vehicle for the transmission of knowledge and for providing the source of political obligation.

Chapter 4 contains the most complete discussion of Selden’s ideas. Selden proposed a theory of natural law based on the seven Noahide precepts which formed the underlying basis of all legal systems, which adapted and changed over centuries based on the circumstances and habits of each nation. The dominant picture is thus of continuity through change, with natural law being indistinguishably combined: the core of Selden’s theory was “continuity and local adaptation, not antiquity and universals” (p.315).

Chapter 5 contains a discussion of Selden’s Hebraist scholarship, the glory of this learning which provided the theoretical underpinnings for his constitutional thought. Selden effectively identified natural law with national customary law, the latter being the normal way in which the principles of natural law were adapted to particular circumstances, with the Jewish legal tradition providing the ideal archetype. Chapter 6 examines Selden’s theory of religion and state, arguing that Selden had an important impact on the settlement of the Church of England based on a strongly “Lutheran” view that there is only one sword — “the power of government in every state to enforce laws, be they profane or sacred”, and that the church is not a separate body with spiritual jurisdiction (p.403). In this the book is arguably too uncritical in its acceptance of Selden’s self-presentation as the defender of the English Constitution against its detractors such as Congregationalists and Presbyterians. The principles which Selden defended were, after all, of relatively recent origin, having themselves been enshrined little more than a century earlier after the significant disruptions to the English system of government in the sixteenth century.

As a presentation of Selden’s ideas, the book does a masterful job. It is, perhaps, a little less convincing in the assessment of Selden’s impact and legacy. How Selden could have been largely eclipsed for centuries and yet also have had a “major role” “in the development of the political thought and practice of English-speaking countries” (p.5) is not clearly explained. This argument also rests heavily on assigning a key role to Selden in providing intellectual firepower for the restoration of 1660. This, however, seems to overestimate the finality of the restoration settlement — which, of course, was no settlement at all, leading to further conflict which was only resolved in the “Glorious Revolution”. This is typically applauded as a good thing, decisively establishing the supremacy of Parliament, the defining feature of the English Constitution, and thereby introducing the basis for constitutional government, yet it seems a decided break from the principles of the Restoration, and indeed from Selden’s own ideas. Of course, it would be rather unfair to criticise a book of over 500 pages for sins of omission; these comments are therefore better seen as suggestions for further research rather than criticisms.

The picture that emerges of Selden is of an innovative, immensely learned and idiosyncratic thinker. The book displays a complete mastery of the subject matter and
Ideologues and propagandists often distort the ideas of eminent scholars to suit their own ends. Take, for example, the criticism of John Maynard Keynes, the famous Cambridge economist. Critics of his economics assert that he was a socialist, and that his policies would drive countries down the “road to serfdom”. Keynes himself insisted that he wanted to save capitalism, not destroy it; a careful reading of his work would endorse that assessment. Similarly, there is confusion about the intentions of Adam Smith, with many regarding him as an uncompromising advocate of laissez-faire. Jesse Norman disputes this view, arguing that Smith’s aim was to explain the nature of commercial society, how it functioned, and where it differed from other social systems, such as feudalism.

Norman is a practising politician, in fact a minister in the government led by Theresa May. He is also a philosopher, trained at Oxford, with a doctorate from University College, London, and the author of an acclaimed work on Edmund Burke. His book on Adam Smith is divided into three parts. Firstly, Smith’s life is covered, from his birth in Kirkcaldy in 1723 to his death in Edinburgh sixty-seven years later. There follows an assessment of Smith’s published and unpublished work, with his two major works, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations* — especially the latter — given extended treatment. In the third section, Norman discusses the significance of Smith’s contributions to thought and policy.

Adam Smith is considered by many to be the father of economics. Norman produces the results of recent surveys of economists to support this judgment. He points out that virtually all the great economists, including Keynes and Marx, expressed their debt to Smith. There are also major contributors to philosophy, politics and sociology — among them Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, Max Weber and John Rawls — who have acknowledged Smith’s influence on their work. British Prime Ministers, including Margaret Thatcher and Gordon Brown, have admitted that they were disciples of Adam Smith. His face appears on the British £20 note, his statue stands on the Royal Mile in Edinburgh, opposite St. Giles’ Cathedral, a think tank in London is named after him, and so is a chair in political economy at Glasgow University. The reverence with which Smith is regarded may be thought extraordinary, especially for such an unassuming man.

An undergraduate at Glasgow University from the age of fourteen, Smith studied moral philosophy under “the never-to-be-forgotten” Francis Hutcheson. Upon the completion of his degree, he was awarded a Snell Exhibition to Balliol College, Oxford. In contrast to the intellectual excitement he experienced at Glasgow, Oxford for Smith was a bitter disappointment. After six years at Oxford, working diligently in the Bodleian Library, he was appointed professor at Glasgow, first in Logic and Metaphysics, and later in Moral Philosophy. There he wrote *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, and established a close friendship with David Hume. In contrast to the idle professors at Oxford, the academic community at Glasgow was active and distinguished, dedicated to teaching, scholarship and the advancement of knowledge.

In 1763 Smith resigned his post at Glasgow to become tutor to the young Duke of Buccleuch. The salary was too good for him to refuse, and the position provided for a