La caze on envy and resentment

Van Hooft, Stan 2002, La caze on envy and resentment, Philosophical explorations: an international journal for the philosophy of mind and action, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 141-147, doi: 10.1080/10002002058538727.

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Title La caze on envy and resentment
Author(s) Van Hooft, Stan
Journal name Philosophical explorations: an international journal for the philosophy of mind and action
Volume number 5
Issue number 2
Start page 141
End page 147
Publisher Van Gorcum
Place of publication Assen, Netherlands
Publication date 2002-05
ISSN 1386-9795
Summary Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances.
Language eng
DOI 10.1080/10002002058538727
Field of Research 220319 Social Philosophy
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
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Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Social and International Studies
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