Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bilateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNI's 'strategic command centre' in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNI's continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former occupied province and now independent state.
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