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Protection versus promotion: an empirical investigation

Mitra, Devashish, Thomakos, Dimitrios D. and Ulubasoglu, Mehmet A. 2004, Protection versus promotion: an empirical investigation, Economics & Politics, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 147-162.

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Title Protection versus promotion: an empirical investigation
Author(s) Mitra, Devashish
Thomakos, Dimitrios D.
Ulubasoglu, Mehmet A.
Journal name Economics & Politics
Volume number 16
Issue number 2
Start page 147
End page 162
Publisher Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Place of publication Oxford, England
Publication date 2004-07
ISSN 0954-1985
Summary Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.
Notes Published Online: 17 Jun 2004
Language eng
Field of Research 140210 International Economics and International Finance
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2004, Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30008706

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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