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Evolutionary approach to revising modernization theory : an introduction to the credible polity

Goorha, Prateek 2009, Evolutionary approach to revising modernization theory : an introduction to the credible polity, World futures, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 176-203, doi: 10.1080/02604020701839551.

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Title Evolutionary approach to revising modernization theory : an introduction to the credible polity
Author(s) Goorha, Prateek
Journal name World futures
Volume number 65
Issue number 3
Start page 176
End page 203
Total pages 28
Publisher Gordon and Breach
Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Publication date 2009-04
ISSN 0260-4027
1556-1844
Keyword(s) Democratization
evolutionary games
modernization
nonconvergence
political credibility
Summary The future global distribution of the political regimes of countries, just like that of their economic incomes, displays a surprising tendency for polarization into only two clubs of convergence at the extrema. This, in itself, is a persuasive reason to analyze afresh the logical validity of an endogenous theory for political and economic development inherent in modernization theory. I suggest how adopting a simple evolutionary game theoretic view on the subject allows an explanation for these parallel clubs of convergence in political regimes and economic income within the framework of existing research in democratization theory. I also suggest how instrumental action can be methodically introduced into such a setup using learning strategies adopted by political actors. These strategies, based on the first principles of political competition, are motivated by introducing the theoretical concept of a Credible Polity.
Language eng
DOI 10.1080/02604020701839551
Field of Research 149901 Comparative Economic Systems
Socio Economic Objective 940304 International Political Economy (excl. International Trade)
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
HERDC collection year 2009
Copyright notice ©2009, Taylor & Francis Group
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30016689

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Deakin Graduate School of Business
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Created: Thu, 16 Jul 2009, 14:59:14 EST by Lee-Ann Stones

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