Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Trakakis, Nick 2005, Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?, International journal for philosophy of religion, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 35-66, doi: 10.1007/s11153-004-5895-6.

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Title Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?
Author(s) Trakakis, Nick
Journal name International journal for philosophy of religion
Volume number 57
Issue number 1
Start page 35
End page 66
Publisher Springer Netherlands
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2005-02
ISSN 0020-7047
Summary Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s11153-004-5895-6
Field of Research 220315 Philosophy of Religion
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2005, Springer
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