Nietzsche's perspectivism and problems of self-refutation

Trakakis, Nick 2006, Nietzsche's perspectivism and problems of self-refutation, International philosophical quarterly, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 91-110.

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Title Nietzsche's perspectivism and problems of self-refutation
Author(s) Trakakis, Nick
Journal name International philosophical quarterly
Volume number 46
Issue number 1
Start page 91
End page 110
Publisher Philosophy Documentation Center
Place of publication Bowling Green, Oh.
Publication date 2006
ISSN 0019-0365
Summary Nietzsche's perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine's apparent self-refuting character.  If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself?  Nietzsche's perspectivism must be construed either as a facts or as one further interpretation - but in the former case the doctine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one's perspective are rendered both impotent and superflouos.  The unpalatable consequencs of Nietzsche's perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche's treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction.  Finally, Nietzsche's perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense.  There is every reason, i conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche's perspectivism.
Language eng
Field of Research 220311 Philosophical Psychology (incl Moral Psychology and Philosophy of Action)
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
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