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Rowe's new evidential argument from evil : problems and prospects

Trakakis, Nick 2006, Rowe's new evidential argument from evil : problems and prospects, Sophia : international journal for philosophy of religion, metaphysical theology and ethics, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 57-77.

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Title Rowe's new evidential argument from evil : problems and prospects
Author(s) Trakakis, Nick
Journal name Sophia : international journal for philosophy of religion, metaphysical theology and ethics
Volume number 45
Issue number 1
Start page 57
End page 77
Publisher Springer
Place of publication Delft, Netherlands
Publication date 2006-05
ISSN 0038-1527
1873-930X
Summary This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe's new argument, I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe's argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William Wainwright as well as Rowe's attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable dijficulties in Rowe's challenge to theism.
Language eng
Field of Research 160699 Political Science not elsewhere classified
Socio Economic Objective 970116 Expanding Knowledge through Studies of Human Society
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2006, Ashgate Publishing
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30022114

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of International and Political Studies
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