You are not logged in.

Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?

Trakakis, Nick 2006, Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?, Ars disputandi : The online journal for philosophy of religion, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 1-1.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?
Author(s) Trakakis, Nick
Journal name Ars disputandi : The online journal for philosophy of religion
Volume number 6
Issue number 6
Start page 1
End page 1
Publisher Igitur, Utrecht Publishing & Archiving Services
Place of publication Utrecht, The Netherlands
Publication date 2006-10-12
ISSN 1566-5399
1572-8684
Summary Hard determinism, in theological dress, holds that there is no human free will since God is the sufficient active cause of everything that happens in creation. It is surprising that, in the ever-growing literature on the problem of evil, very little attention has been paid to theodicies that adopt a hard determinist outlook. It is commonly assumed that without free will the theodical project is a non-starter. I challenge this long-held assumption by, firstly, developing a cumulative-style theodicy from within a hard determinist framework, and secondly, comparing the merits of such a theodicy with two libertarian rivals, specifically, Molinism and open theism. The hard determinist model of divine providence is, I argue, in no worse shape than the principal models developed by libertarians.
Language eng
Field of Research 220315 Philosophy of Religion
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2006, Ars Disputandi
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30022115

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of International and Political Studies
Connect to link resolver
 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 452 Abstract Views, 0 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Mon, 18 Jan 2010, 11:04:49 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.