Noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution

Anbarci, Nejat 1993, Noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution, Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 245-258.

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Title Noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat
Journal name Quarterly journal of economics
Volume number 108
Issue number 1
Start page 245
End page 258
Publisher MIT Press
Place of publication Cambridge, Ma.
Publication date 1993-02
ISSN 0033-5533
Summary Given a finite set of alternatives, players alternate making offers. Player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto. If 2 accepts, it is enforced, and the game ends. Otherwise, 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives, and so on. If all alternatives are vetoed, a disagreement alternative is enforced. First, we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Then, we show that this outcome converges to the Area Monotonic Solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set, and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity.
Language eng
Field of Research 140103 Mathematical Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©1993, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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