Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy

Anbarci, Nejat 1993, Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy, Journal of economic behavior & organization, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 319-330.

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Title Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy
Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat
Journal name Journal of economic behavior & organization
Volume number 20
Issue number 3
Start page 319
End page 330
Publisher Elsevier BV
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 1993-04
ISSN 0167-2681
Summary In both the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and employee buyouts, the common and crucial phenomenon is that some workers have two sources of income, namely wages and shares of profit. We analyze that phenomenon in an economy where workers are nonunionized and wages are determined by voting. If the employers sell a certain amount of shares of the capital stock to some non-risk-loving workers, these workers vote for the lowest possible wage along with the employers. As a result, all workers become equally worse off because of the competition among workers to buy those shares.
Language eng
Field of Research 150311 Organisational Behaviour
Socio Economic Objective 970115 Expanding Knowledge in Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©1993, Elsevier Science B.V.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30024347

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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