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The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Counot supergames

Luca,Colombo and Labrecciosa, Paola 2006, The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Counot supergames, Economics letters, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 116-121.

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Title The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Counot supergames
Author(s) Luca,Colombo
Labrecciosa, Paola
Journal name Economics letters
Volume number 90
Issue number 1
Start page 116
End page 121
Total pages 6
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, Netherlands
Publication date 2006-01
ISSN 0165-1765
Summary We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether previous termoptimalnext term punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to previous termoptimalnext term penal codes.
Language eng
Field of Research 140103 Mathematical Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2005, Elsevier
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30024397

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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