Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures

Anbarci, Nejat 1997, Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures, Atlantic economic journal, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 403-411.

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Title Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures
Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat
Journal name Atlantic economic journal
Volume number 25
Issue number 4
Start page 403
End page 411
Total pages 9
Publisher Springer
Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Publication date 1997-12
ISSN 0197-4254
1573-9678
Summary In bargaining, players may adopt different prominence structures when making demands: (i) each player might use (1/N)th of his maximum monetary payoff as the prominence level or (ii) players might use a common prominence level. This paper considers a scheme in which players alternate making demands. It turns out that if the prominence levels described by (i) are used and if players have utilities linear in money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as players' prominence levels get smaller. If the common prominence level of (ii) is used and if players have identical constant marginal utilities of money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the equal sacrifice solution as that prominence level gets smaller.
Language eng
Field of Research 130203 Economics, Business and Management Curriculum and Pedagogy
Socio Economic Objective 970113 Expanding Knowledge in Education
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©1997, Springer
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30024632

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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