This paper extends Salop’s model of localized competition by introducing the consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for clean products and allows an individual firm to choose between a clean or a dirty technology. We assume that a clean technology is relatively costly to adopt. The consumer is willing to pay more for a product produced with clean technology and the model can also be interpreted as a world economy model where each firm represents a country. There exists a critical value of m (proportion of firms adopting the clean technology), m*, such that if m < m* then no country adopts the clean technology, all countries adopt the clean technology only if m > m* while some countries will adopt the clean technology and some will not adopt the clean technology if m = m*. Our results also identify an example of coordination failure. Since symmetric technology adoption delivers the same level of profits as non-adoption, global coordination will be necessary to achieve the clean technology adoption outcome. Finally, we demonstrate that the private and public (social planner) incentives to adopt clean technology differ.
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