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The padding scheme for RSA signatures

Batten, Lynn and Wolf, Christopher 2010, The padding scheme for RSA signatures, in ATIS 2010 : Proceedings of the 1st Applications and Techniques in Information Security Workshop, School of Information Systems, Deakin University, Melbourne, Vic., pp. 1-7.

Document type: Conference Paper
Collection: School of Information Technology
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Title The padding scheme for RSA signatures
Author(s) Batten, Lynn
Wolf, Christopher
Conference name Applications and Techniques in Information Security. Workshop (1st : 2010 : Melbourne, Vicroria)
Conference location Melbourne, Victoria
Conference dates 10 Nov. 2010
Title of proceedings ATIS 2010 : Proceedings of the 1st Applications and Techniques in Information Security Workshop
Editor(s) Warren, Matthew
Publication date 2010
Conference series Applications and Techniques in Information Security Workshop
Start page 1
End page 7
Total pages 7
Publisher School of Information Systems, Deakin University
Place of publication Melbourne, Vic.
Keyword(s) RSA
cryptography
signing
diophantine equation
Summary The RSA scheme is used to sign messages; however, in order to avoid forgeries, a message can be padded with a fixed string of data P. De Jonge and Chaum showed in 1985 that forgeries can be constructed if the size of P (measured in bytes) is less than the size of N/3, where N is the RSA modulus. Girault and Misarsky then showed in 1997 that forgeries can be constructed if the size of P is less than the size of N/2. In 2001, Brier, Clavier, Coron and Naccache showed that forgeries can still be constructed when the size of P is less than two thirds the size of N. In this paper, we demonstrate that this padding scheme is always insecure; however, the complexity of actually finding a forgery is O(N). We then focus specifically on the next unsettled case, where P is less than 3/4 the size of N and show that finding a forgery is equivalent to solving a set of diophantine equations. While we are not able to solve these equations, this work may lead to a break-through by means of algebraic number theory techniques.
ISBN 9781741561463
Language eng
Field of Research 080402 Data Encryption
Socio Economic Objective 890101 Fixed Line Data Networks and Services
HERDC Research category E1 Full written paper - refereed
HERDC collection year 2010
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30033839
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