Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

Anbarci, Nejat and Sun, Ching-jen 2011, Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution, Social choice and welfare, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 425-429.

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Title Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution
Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat
Sun, Ching-jen
Journal name Social choice and welfare
Volume number 37
Issue number 3
Start page 425
End page 429
Total pages 5
Publisher Springer-Verlag
Place of publication Dordrecht , The Netherlands
Publication date 2011
ISSN 0176-1714
Summary We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.
Language eng
Field of Research 140101 History of Economic Thought
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2010, Springer-Verlag
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30036871

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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