Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution

Anbarci, Nejat and Sun, Ching-jen 2011, Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution, Social choice and welfare, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 453-470.

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Title Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution
Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat
Sun, Ching-jen
Journal name Social choice and welfare
Volume number 37
Issue number 3
Start page 453
End page 470
Total pages 18
Publisher Springer-Verlag
Place of publication Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Publication date 2011
ISSN 0176-1714
Summary Suppes-Sen dominance or SS-proofness (SSP) is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (Review of Economic Studies, 66, 733–741, 1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash’s (Econometrica, 18, 155–162, 1950) scale invariance (SI) axiom and SSP. In this article, we introduce equity dominance (E-dominance). Using the intersection of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a weaker version of SSP (WSSP). In addition, we consider α − SSP, where α measures the degree of minimum acceptable inequity aversion; α − SSP is weaker than weak Pareto optimality (WPO) when α = 1. We then show that it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution using WSSP and SI only or using α -SSP, SI, and individual rationality (IR) only for any a Î [0,1)[01). Using the union of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a stronger version of SSP (SSSP). It turns out that there is no bargaining solution that satisfies SSSP and SI, but the Egalitarian solution turns out to be the unique solution satisfying SSSP.
Language eng
Field of Research 140101 History of Economic Thought
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2010, Springer-Verlag
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30036872

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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