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The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case

Silvers, Randy 2012, The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case, Games and economic behavior, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 352-365, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002.

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Title The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case
Author(s) Silvers, Randy
Journal name Games and economic behavior
Volume number 74
Issue number 1
Start page 352
End page 365
Total pages 14
Publisher Academic Press
Place of publication Maryland Heights, Mo.
Publication date 2012-01
ISSN 0899-8256
1090-2473
Keyword(s) Moral hazard
Information
Technology
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2011, Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30043097

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 3 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 4 times in Scopus
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Created: Mon, 12 Mar 2012, 14:26:21 EST by Katrina Fleming

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