Is narrative identity four-dimensionalist?

Stokes, Patrick 2012, Is narrative identity four-dimensionalist?, European journal of philosophy, vol. 20, no. Supplement 1, pp. E86-E106, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00485.x.

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Title Is narrative identity four-dimensionalist?
Author(s) Stokes, PatrickORCID iD for Stokes, Patrick
Journal name European journal of philosophy
Volume number 20
Issue number Supplement 1
Start page E86
End page E106
Total pages 21
Publisher Wiley - Blackwell Publishing
Place of publication Chichester, England
Publication date 2012-06
ISSN 0966-8373
Keyword(s) personal identity
four-dimensional ontology
Summary The claim that selves are narratively constituted has attained considerable currency in both analytic and continental philosophy. However, a set of increasingly standard objections to narrative identity are also emerging. In this paper, I focus on metaphysically realist versions of narrative identity theory, showing how they both build on and differ from their neo-Lockean counterparts. But I also argue that narrative realism is implicitly committed to a four-dimensionalist, temporal-parts ontology of persons. That exposes narrative realism to the charge that the narratively constituted self, on the one hand, and the self that is the object of much of our everyday self-reference and self-experience, on the other, can’t be the same thing. This conclusion may well force narrativists to abandon metaphysical realism about narrative selves — which, in turn, may leave the invocation of ‘narrativity’ as identity-constituting somewhat under-motivated.
Language eng
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00485.x
Field of Research 220309 Metaphysics
220311 Philosophical Psychology (incl Moral Psychology and Philosophy of Action)
Socio Economic Objective 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
HERDC collection year 2012
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Created: Wed, 20 Mar 2013, 14:23:54 EST by Patrick Stokes

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