Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program

Anbarci, Nejat and Sun, Ching-jen 2013, Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program, Economics letters, vol. 120, no. 2, pp. 211-214.

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Title Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program
Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat
Sun, Ching-jen
Journal name Economics letters
Volume number 120
Issue number 2
Start page 211
End page 214
Total pages 4
Publisher Elsevier BV
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2013-08
ISSN 0165-1765
Keyword(s) axiomatic characterization
economics of search
Nash program
noncooperative foundations
Midpoint Domination axiom
Summary This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein etal. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash's crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.
Language eng
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
HERDC collection year 2013
Copyright notice ©2013, Elsevier
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30056348

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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