Direct perception, inter-subjectivity and social cognition: why phenomenology is a necessary but not sufficient condition Reynolds, Jack 2015, Direct perception, inter-subjectivity and social cognition: why phenomenology is a necessary but not sufficient conditionNew yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, Routledge, London, Eng., pp.333-354. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Direct perception, inter-subjectivity and social cognition: why phenomenology is a necessary but not sufficient condition Author(s) Reynolds, Jack orcid.org/0000-0002-4725-0395 Title of book New yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy Publication date 2015 Series Religion, war and the crisis of modernity a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of Jan Patočka; v.14 Chapter number 18 Total chapters 19 Start page 333 End page 354 Total pages 20 Publisher Routledge Place of Publication London, Eng. Keyword(s) phenomenology intersubjectivity perception Sartre social cognition Gallagher direct perception Summary In this paper I argue that many of the core phenomenological insights, including the emphasis on direct perception, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an adequate account of inter-subjectivity today. I take it that an adequate account of inter-subjectivity must involve substantial interaction with empirical studies, notwithstanding the putative methodological differences between phenomenological description and scientific explanation. As such, I will need to explicate what kind of phenomenology survives, and indeed, thrives, in a milieu that necessitates engagement with the relevant sciences, albeit not necessarily deference to them. There will be two central aims to this paper: 1. to defend the centrality and vitality of phenomenological treatments of inter-subjectivity via a consideration of some remarks in Sartre - which I do think possess a non-trivial unity amongst the various interlocutors - and the manner in which they in fact serve to provide the basis for a better explanation of an array of empirical data than existing inferentialist or mindreading accounts of social cognition (notably Theory Theory, Simulation Theory, and hybrid versions); 2. to offer the methodological resources for renewing phenomenology in a manner that acknowledges ostensibly non-phenomenological moments in theory production - which involve explanation, inference to the best explanation, etc. - but does not abandon phenomenology for all that, allowing it to be simply absorbed into empirical explanation or other forms of philosophical analysis without remainder. ISBN 9781138923966 ISSN 1533-7472 Language eng Field of Research 220310 Phenomenology Socio Economic Objective 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies HERDC Research category B1 Book chapter ERA Research output type B Book chapter Copyright notice ©2015, Routledge Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30070749 Document type: Book Chapter Collection: School of Humanities and Social Sciences Related Links Link Description Connect to Elements publication management system Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Mon, 16 Mar 2015, 15:04:15 EST Tue, 17 Mar 2015, 04:07:17 EST Fri, 27 Mar 2015, 12:03:29 EST Wed, 04 Nov 2015, 12:04:21 EST Fri, 22 Apr 2016, 09:32:28 EST Fri, 22 Apr 2016, 09:37:11 EST Fri, 22 Apr 2016, 09:37:47 EST Thu, 14 Jul 2016, 10:00:08 EST Fri, 29 Jul 2016, 10:03:51 EST Wed, 12 Oct 2016, 13:42:13 EST Wed, 01 Mar 2017, 07:05:22 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 107 Abstract Views, 0 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Mon, 16 Mar 2015, 15:04:15 EST

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