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Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects

Shrestha, Asheem and Martek, Igor 2015, Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects, in Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on the Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, Springer, Berlin, Germany, pp. 759-770, doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-46994-1_62.

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Title Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects
Author(s) Shrestha, AsheemORCID iD for Shrestha, Asheem orcid.org/0000-0001-6080-4068
Martek, Igor
Conference name Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate. International Symposium (19th : 2014 : Chongqing, China)
Conference location Chongqing, China
Conference dates 7-9 Nov. 2014
Title of proceedings Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on the Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate
Editor(s) Shen, Liyin
Ye, Kunhui
Mao, Chao
Publication date 2015
Start page 759
End page 770
Total pages 12
Publisher Springer
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Keyword(s) China
Principal agent theory (PAT)
Public private partnerships (PPPs)
Summary The demand for infrastructure remains high in China. In order to meet this demand under conditions of limited government funding availability, local governments have increasingly sought private participation through ‘public, private partnerships’ (PPPs). While PPPs are recognised as a reliable mode for delivering infrastructure projects, agency problems are also known to interfere with their success. The nature of these agency problems, along with the types of partnership arrangements under which they occur, is the subject of this research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with PPP consultants working on infrastructure projects in China. Results suggest that opportunistic behaviour is to be found both within the private sector and within the government sector. While the private sector is shown to take advantage of ‘information asymmetries,’ the government sector is shown to allocate project risks and responsibilities disproportionately in their favour. Results also indicate that PPP arrangements between local government and ‘state owned enterprises’ (SOEs) were less prone to agency abuse, while agency problems in PPP arrangements between local government and private firms were relatively greater.
ISBN 9783662469941
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46994-1_62
Field of Research 120201 Building Construction Management and Project Planning
Socio Economic Objective 970112 Expanding Knowledge in Built Environment and Design
HERDC Research category E1 Full written paper - refereed
ERA Research output type E Conference publication
Copyright notice ©2015, Springer
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30073034

Document type: Conference Paper
Collection: School of Architecture and Built Environment
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