Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects Shrestha, Asheem and Martek, Igor 2015, Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects, in Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on the Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, Springer, Berlin, Germany, pp. 759-770, doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-46994-1_62. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects Author(s) Shrestha, Asheem orcid.org/0000-0001-6080-4068 Martek, Igor orcid.org/0000-0001-6573-1291 Conference name Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate. International Symposium (19th : 2014 : Chongqing, China) Conference location Chongqing, China Conference dates 7-9 Nov. 2014 Title of proceedings Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on the Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate Editor(s) Shen, Liyin Ye, Kunhui Mao, Chao Publication date 2015 Start page 759 End page 770 Total pages 12 Publisher Springer Place of publication Berlin, Germany Keyword(s) China Principal agent theory (PAT) Public private partnerships (PPPs) Summary The demand for infrastructure remains high in China. In order to meet this demand under conditions of limited government funding availability, local governments have increasingly sought private participation through ‘public, private partnerships’ (PPPs). While PPPs are recognised as a reliable mode for delivering infrastructure projects, agency problems are also known to interfere with their success. The nature of these agency problems, along with the types of partnership arrangements under which they occur, is the subject of this research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with PPP consultants working on infrastructure projects in China. Results suggest that opportunistic behaviour is to be found both within the private sector and within the government sector. While the private sector is shown to take advantage of ‘information asymmetries,’ the government sector is shown to allocate project risks and responsibilities disproportionately in their favour. Results also indicate that PPP arrangements between local government and ‘state owned enterprises’ (SOEs) were less prone to agency abuse, while agency problems in PPP arrangements between local government and private firms were relatively greater. ISBN 9783662469941 Language eng DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46994-1_62 Field of Research 120201 Building Construction Management and Project Planning Socio Economic Objective 970112 Expanding Knowledge in Built Environment and Design HERDC Research category E1 Full written paper - refereed ERA Research output type E Conference publication Copyright notice ©2015, Springer Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30073034 Document type: Conference Paper Collections: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Built Environment School of Architecture and Built Environment Related Links Link Description Connect to published version Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Thu, 07 May 2015, 09:14:33 EST Fri, 08 May 2015, 05:02:09 EST Fri, 08 May 2015, 08:17:19 EST Mon, 26 Oct 2015, 16:27:35 EST Mon, 11 Jan 2016, 12:26:50 EST Fri, 15 Jan 2016, 12:43:31 EST Sat, 16 Jan 2016, 05:06:19 EST Wed, 13 Jul 2016, 09:14:57 EST Wed, 12 Oct 2016, 13:45:23 EST Wed, 01 Mar 2017, 07:07:16 EST Tue, 21 Mar 2017, 10:20:15 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 572 Abstract Views, 3 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Fri, 15 Jan 2016, 12:43:30 EST

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