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Detecting Fraud: The Role of the Anonymous Reporting Channel

Johansson, Elka and Carey, Peter 2015, Detecting Fraud: The Role of the Anonymous Reporting Channel, Journal of Business Ethics, doi: 10.1007/s10551-015-2673-6.

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Title Detecting Fraud: The Role of the Anonymous Reporting Channel
Author(s) Johansson, Elka
Carey, Peter
Journal name Journal of Business Ethics
Publisher Kluwer Academic Publishers
Publication date 2015-05
ISSN 0167-4544
Keyword(s) Anonymous reporting channel
Asset misappropriation
Summary The purpose of this paper is to examine whether anonymous reporting channels (ARCs) are effective in detecting fraud against companies. Fraud, which comprises predominantly asset misappropriation, represents a key operational risk and a major cost to organisations (ACFE,, 2012; KPMG,, 2012). The fraud triangle (incentives, opportunities and attitudes) provides a framework for developing our understanding of how ARCs can increase detection of fraud. Using publicly listed company survey data collected by KPMG in Australia—where ARCs are not mandated—we find a positive association between ARCs and reported fraud. These results indicate that ARCs are effective in detecting fraud. Additional analysis reveals that small firms derive the greatest benefit from adopting ARCs. We also find that independent boards do not directly influence the detection of fraud, but companies with independent boards detect more fraud because they implement ARCs.
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2673-6
Field of Research 150199 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability not elsewhere classified
Socio Economic Objective 970115 Expanding Knowledge in Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2015, Springer Verlag
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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Created: Thu, 28 May 2015, 14:43:04 EST

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